Last night I was moved to enter a protest against the casual and non-informative manner in which this huge Estimate was introduced. We got the figures which we could read for ourselves; we got no information with regard to the position of this country, the defence plans of the country or the danger confronting the country. One very significant statement was made by the Minister and it was left at that. The Minister made a statement to the effect that, some 12 months ago or earlier, orders had been placed for warlike material to the extent of nearly £3,500,000, that since that time good to the value of about £700,000 had been received and that between this and April, 1941, he hoped to get £400,000 worth more of the goods ordered. In other words, he said that before 1941 we would not even get one-third of the warlike stores that the Taoiseach and the present Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures told us two years ago were urgently required, if the neutrality and independence of this country were to remain and if the people were to be left unmolested to carry out their ordinary avocations. I think that is a statement which needs some further explanation. If we have landed ourselves in such a mess that £3,500,000 worth of warlike stores were urgently required if our independence were not to go west two years ago and if we cannot get even one-third of those supplies by 1941, then some explanation is required.
What was the Minister for Defence doing from 1932 to 1938? Was there no sign of war? Every boob in every country could see the signs of war from 1935 onwards, and yet we waited until war broke out before we tried to fill up our stores, before we tried to equip our country, before we ordered even the minimum, according to the Minister, necessary to safeguard the independence of this country. And then we could not get it. Why? Because hatred of England submerged love of Ireland; because during all those years we were deliberately placing our orders in Sweden, in Belgium, in France and in America, so that actually goods were coming through the Kiel Canal in September, 1938. The policy of the Department was that not one pennyworth of goods was to be purchased from the only country near us and in a position to supply us. That policy was not reversed until, through the absence of the Minister, the Department was taken over by the Taoiseach; and then the European pot was boiling over and every country wanted all the arms they had, and more if they could get them, so we were left without.
If the Minister for War in Great Britain, France or Germany stood up last night to tell the Deputies in his Parliament that he had thought so little of the safety of his people that a year or so before he had placed an order for an immense amount of warlike stores urgently required as the very minimum necessary for the defence of his country and the homes of his people, but that he could not get even one quarter of his demands, and presumably would not get the whole of his demands until the war was completely over in Europe, how long would he be kept in office? How long would he enjoy the confidence of his Government or his Parliament? How long would he be tolerated by the people outside who had to pay the price and take the risk? But we are so unaccustomed to normal Parliamentary decencies that any gross negligence can take place in a Ministerial position, any major blunder can be made, any disaster can occur and, as long as there is a narrow prejudiced Party majority, the Minister will be either promoted or he will come back here smugly to ask for more and more money. I may say that my remarks have no direct reference to the present unfortunate occupant of the post. He is left with a legacy. He is left with the empty cupboard. He is left to stand the racket.
I may say to the Minister that times are changing inside and outside this House, and the time has gone by when gaily we can vote away millions without grasping or understanding the requirements. I want to make it very clear that the amount of information that any of us over here has with regard to Army policy, Army plan or national dangers is the amount we glean from the censored Press and the amount of information we have with regard to the necessity for this huge sum of money is the amount of information that was given to us by the Minister last night. In most normal democratic parliaments there is a committee for foreign affairs, a committee for defence, some machinery in private for all parties which helps them to deal with difficulties and to understand the dangers. Here we have such a committee to deal with the victuals that are eaten by the Deputies in the restaurant, but it is not worth while having such a committee to deal with national safety or national security. As I said last night, we are asked to vote this money in blinkers. We are asked to vote this money to an administration that has blatantly failed and broken down on the job. We are asked to vote this money to an administration that could not see any signs of war in 1935, 1936 or 1937. We are asked to vote it to an administration that would not even now have placed an order but for the accidental intervention of the Taoiseach, and that order was placed at a time when any grown up boy would know that no little country could hope to get arms even for solid gold. If we are to believe the statement made by the Minister for Defence in February, 1939, that £3,000,000 worth or so of warlike stores was the minimum required then for our safety, we are left now without a fraction of the minimum. We are left defended by nothing but the bleating cry of neutrality.
I believe that sooner or later we have got to grow up and face facts, even if they are politically awkward. We can at least read the papers and see what is happening other countries. It was the natural desire of every country and of the people in every country to keep out of war, to remain neutral, to be saved the horrors of war. Little countries on the far side of Europe, the Scandinavian countries, all desiring to be left in peace, to have their neutrality respected, were advised, and strongly advised, to get together and to stand firmly together or fall individually asunder. Many of them, not minding what happened their neighbour, as long as they might be saved themselves, and relying on the strength of a catch-cry or the appeal of a phrase, rather than the organisation of the people and a number of men, each one adopting a policy of isolationist neutrality, Lithuania, Finland, Poland, Denmark, Norway, went under, one by one. Standing together, with guarantees one to help the other, they might have all survived.
We are asked here to rely on empty armouries, empty arsenals, the cry of neutrality and, possibly, 20,000 troops and, as far as we are told, we have asked nobody to come to our assistance if our neutrality is violated. It is no departure from neutrality to have that neutrality guaranteed by every and any possible power. We have associations, long, sentimental, firm, historical, with the great Republic in the west. Have we even asked that Republic to guarantee our neutrality? The Taoiseach says naively, "Oh, if this country is attacked, other countries will be interested." It is the curse of this country that we will face an army but we are afraid to face words. What did the Taoiseach mean, when you parse it? That if this country is attacked Great Britain will be interested and will come to our assistance, not for love of us but for her own safety. That is sticking out. That is common sense. That is obvious. That is stated from the head of the Government. If that is so, is there anything wrong in having a prearranged plan for co-ordination, for speedy assistance, for efficient and harmonious joint co-operation in the event of this country being attacked? Politically it would be awkward but, remember, the Minister is not just responsible for the pay, equipment, food and drilling of so many soldiers, he has a responsibility for the safety of the lives and the sanctity of the homes of the people in this country. He is not going to claim for one moment that his Army of 16,000 or 17,000, even of the best men on earth, is going alone to safeguard this country if invaded. There is nobody sufficiently ignorant and insular to think that an army of that magnitude or of three times that magnitude could successfully repel or drive out of an island country the number of troops that any modern army of a major power would utilise for the invasion of a distant country. I have enough respect and confidence in the personnel of the Irish Army to know that they would fight with valour, they would sell their lives dearly, they would be true to the traditions of the country and, at best, they would delay any modern force for a week-end. It is not a heroic defeat that I would look forward to, if I were in the Minister's place. What I would look forward to would be a successful defence, even though the successful defence might not be as spectacular as a heroic defeat or a glorious failure. There is too much of that kind of thing in the history of this country—a history of glorious failures and heroic defeats— but, as a self-governing entity, I think that we should aim at successful campaigns, and, if I were in the Minister's position, I should like to get some assurance of effective assistance, in the event of an attack being made upon this country. I should like to get an assurance of assistance in the event of attack, even from a Hottentot country, or any other country, and I would not consider that I was doing my duty to this country unless I was using any weapon and every weapon to save the liberty of this country and the lives of the people of this country.
We are asked to vote money, and big money—money that is hard to get—to support a policy of isolation as a defence of those shores in the event of invasion. It is a fool who pretends to be a prophet in a time of universal war, and none of us can say what may take place in the present position of the world. That, however, is a danger that each Minister for Defence must keep in mind, and that danger cannot be met, I suggest, by a small, paid professional Army alone, and even if invasion should take place, that danger cannot be repelled by the inside strength of this country alone. In view of that, I should like to know if any arrangements have been made or if any queries or applications have been made to any country in the world to come to our assistance in case we should be attacked. Have any queries been addressed to any country in the world in that regard? Practically every country that is left amongst the neutral countries has some country, at least, at call to come to its assistance, if attacked, or some country to account for. Have we any such country that has promised to come to our assistance, if we are attacked? We are told by the Taoiseach that Great Britain will be interested in case we are attacked. Well, interest in such a case is no good, or very little good, if there is no understanding or no plan of co-operation beforehand. If 'planes advance on this country to attack it, passing over England, England might be interested, but only so far as her own safety is concerned. Have any arrangements been made to give us notice of such an attack? If, for instance, troops should land on the west coast of Ireland, England might be interested, or might simulate interest, to the extent of asking us to let her know of the landing of troops that was taking place; but when we ask for the defence plans of this country somebody bleats about neutrality. Neutrality, of course, is a good thing, but in the present circumstances of the world it seems to be only a pious hope, and what is wanted really now is a plan to meet attack in case our neutrality should be violated. We never got any plan, or any beginning of a plan, or any policy, and an Army can only design a plan behind a policy, and if there is a Ministry so muddle-headed as not to have a definite plan, or to have so many divergent plans, or a Ministry so cowardly as not to be able to face up to the plans they have, then, obviously, the Army is left without a policy and, accordingly, the country is left without a military plan of defence. That is the position. It is well known that that is the position in the country, and neither in public nor in private has the Minister for Defence, or his side-drummer, been able to convince anybody that there is any real tackling of the possible dangers that lie ahead.
Sheltering behind phrases about neutrality is merely a burking of the issue. What this money is wanted for is not in regard to our neutrality being respected, but only in view of our neutrality being violated, and if it should be so violated, we have been told by the Taoiseach already that it will only be violated by a great country that is at war with Great Britain. Assuming, as we must assume, that there is some danger of that happening—because, if there is no such danger, there is no justification for the huge demands that are made here—do we propose to face and beat a major Power with 17,000 troops with the Volunteers thrown in? The Minister knows that, if he has 17,000, or 30,000 troops, the most of that 30,000 that could be hurled in any one direction would be 10,000. He knows that, with the internal dangers which, we all know, threaten our internal lines of communication, our buildings, barracks, internal lines of supply, and so on—all of which have got to be defended and safeguarded from attack —even with 30,000 troops at his disposal, he would not have 4,000 troops to be thrown around the coast for its defence. You have one of the longest coast-lines in Europe in this country, and you have empty ports and idle forts beside these ports. As far as we know, no understanding, or no scheme of co-operation with any other country has been come to. Apparently, we are going to do what the Polish army of 2,000,000 men failed to do, and we are going to do it with an efficient and highly-trained Army of 8,000, and with a Volunteer force, 75 per cent. of whom, we are told, are reliable but not highly trained. It must be remembered, however, that the 25 per cent. remaining is a source of weakness.
Now, in this Vote we have made provision on a larger scale for the Volunteer side of the Army, and I want to know clearly from the Minister for Defence if he is satisfied that he is pursuing sound lines in this regard. Defence is becoming a serious matter in every country, and there is no use in us burking the difficulties that we are up against. The enemy that is nearest to you is the enemy that is most dangerous. Like most other countries, we have an enemy within our own shores—an enemy that is highly organised, working secretly, and in a position to strike in any place at any moment. That is the danger that is nearest to us, and that is the first enemy that an Irish Army has got to meet. An Army, living and existing under such conditions, must ensure that the soldier admitted to that Army is passed, not through one, but through a dozen sieves; must ensure that the soldier's loyalty is unquestionable, and that his affiliations are entirely with and for the State—that he has no affiliations with any bodies inimical to the State or that he has now served such affiliations, if he had any; in other words, that he has no entanglements with any anti-State bodies. One of the first essentials of our Army is that we should be able to swear to the reliability and loyalty of any man we take in, and then, having taken him in, we keep him there so that we know his most secret thoughts. Was it wise in those circumstances, in a country with our history, to throw the barrack gates wide open, to invite any agent of that enemy organisation to come into barracks, to supply him with a rifle and with equipment, to drill him, to train him, and to send him out as an information carrier to join his old pals or to keep him in as an enemy within the walls? When we see cases in courts of men offering big money to private soldiers to tell them simply at what hour the officer comes around to inspect the sentry, what the appearance of that officer is, and what is the plan of the barracks, can we not see the danger in throwing the secrets of our barracks open to any fly-blow that comes in for 17 days per annum and carries out all the information?
A still more venturesome and risky policy was embarked on some five or six years ago and I think the weakness and the flaws were visible even within 12 months. One of these was that the fellows you trained one year never came again; or a few of them came, that although you kept the numbers uniform, it was a different set of men each year and that you were passing through the Army and familiarising with Army routine 30,000, 40,000 or 50,000 men of whom you had no control. Remember that, in the early days of this movement, these men came in echoing the cries of the Ministers: "Up the Republic", "Cut the connection", and "Up the Republic and down with the Free State". Mind you, no matter what Ministers were, some of these men might have been honest, an odd one of them might have been sincere, and when the hierarchy turned in their tracks, they could not count on all those men turning in their tracks, and the affiliations and sentimental attachments of these men who were enrolled in our colours were exemplified by the cry on their lips at the time. I want to know if any reports were ever received from responsible officers with regard to the advisability or inadvisability of continuing that scheme; I want to know if any reports were ever asked for, and if all the military reports which the Minister got were to carry on. I want to know if he got no reports warning him of the wastage, warning him of the fact that there were leakages, warning him of the dangers and suggesting alterations, and if he did get such reports, what action was taken about them?
Everybody, the man in the street and the man living in any parish, knows that, of the nine or ten men who were enrolled one year, two turned up the following year, with an additional eight, and that, in the third year, three of those men turned up, with an additional seven. What was the justification for squandering money on material which was never available from year to year? What is the defence of squandering money on men who were only sufficiently blooded with the taste for soldiering to go into the British Army? What is the justification for carrying on with that scheme in view of what happened on Christmas Eve, in view of what is happening month after month down at the Curragh, and in view of what we see in the police courts month after month? Why, if we have enemies within this State, make it easy for them to come within the camp and within the barracks? That scheme was a faulty scheme from the beginning. It had its political uses at the beginning. It has its military dangers at the moment and the dangers must be as apparent to the Minister as they are to anybody else.
As I said, living in our circumstances, it is unsafe to take anyone into the Army, no matter how urgently men are required, without being able absolutely to swear by his reliability. What happened at the Magazine Fort could have happened at any barracks in Dublin. Remember that what happened at the Magazine Fort could much more easily have happened at Government Buildings, only that the material in Government Buildings was not considered as valuable as the material in the fort. It could have happened at any barracks in the country and do you think that the Minister can come along and ask for increased millions for a weapon that might be turned against ourselves? By reason of old association, by reason of close association and knowledge, I would be prepared to stake my life and everything I possess on the loyalty, the efficiency and the bravery of the youngest soldier in the regular Army. I would be prepared, not having the same amount of knowledge, to go as far as to say that 80 to 90 per cent. of the Volunteers are as reliable, but I would be prepared to stake my reputation for common-sense that, living in a country with our conditions, 10 per cent. of the new men rolling into barracks must be rolling in as the agents of the Irish Republican Army. If I could devise a plan to get rid of the 10 per cent., without interfering with the 90 per cent., we would all cheerfully adopt it, but if I had to choose between keeping the 10 per cent. in order to keep the 90 per cent., I would let the whole lot go, and I would feel stronger, safer, and more secure, and let them back by another entrance under other conditions.
We have selected this particular year to launch ourselves as a naval power. Was it the idea that as we could not get arms and equipment for the Army, and as the money was there, we might as well spend it in any case, that we might as well buy a navy, or was it the idea, rather belatedly, that the Government was convinced that the ports and forts were only of use for sheltering and harbouring of a navy, and seeing that that was the situation, they said: "Very well, buy a navy to put into them"? But there is just as big a mystery, and just as much reticence about our launching out as a naval power as there is about the arrival of our first Navy. The first six weeks were shrouded in mystery. Was it lost or was it captured? Was it disabled? What happened to the Navy from the date of delivery to the date of arrival in this country? How did it happen that the Navy got a civic reception in Waterford before it got an official reception in Dublin? Was the function of the Navy to report to the Mayor of Waterford or was its function to report to the Minister for Defence in Dublin? How did it happen that the crew of the Navy found themselves in the water on the night of its arrival? Was there any truth in the newspaper report that its arrival was greeted by the Irish Republican Army boarding the ship, or was it that the waters in Dun Laoghaire Harbour were too turbulent for the legs of the crew?
The thing that matters more than anything, however, is, what is the purpose of this particular Navy? What is the justification for spending tens of thousands of pounds at the present moment? What is the function of this Navy? What factor, defensive or offensive, did it fulfil since it arrived at Dun Laoghaire port? What important safety mission was it on for six weeks before it arrived there? It may be a very interesting thing to have a Navy as well as an Army, and I suppose we must have a Navy as well as an Army when we have a Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures, because he cannot coordinate an Army as Minister for Defence, but having got the ports we must get a Navy. Having got a Minister for the Co-ordination of the Defensive Measures we must provide different defensive measures. Is that the line of country?
We come to the cost of this Marine Coast-Watching Service amounting to about £319,000 for the coming year. There is £17,000 odd for pay, £58,000 for maintenance, £50,000 for stores, and £172,000 under the heading of capital. Are we going to purchase more naval vessels? What are their functions? What are they going to do? Is it the function of a craft, the size of the one lying at Dun Laoghaire, to repel invasion? Remember the Power that comes to invade us is strong enough to cross the seas in the teeth of the mightiest navy in the world. Is it for show? Is it because the money is there and it might as well be spent? These particular Marine and Coast-Watching Services are to cost nearly £500,000 for the year. I think any Deputy, no matter where he sits here, before he votes the money, is entitled to know what he is voting it for. What is the Coast-Watching Service? What are they watching through? Where are they watching from? What are they watching for? If they see anything coming, what are they going to do? It is nonsense to have a man here and there along the coast who, if a fleet is arriving, will telephone or signal. To whom?