Just a moment,
—and by secret postal ballot.
There was a doubt with regard to the secret postal ballot. The Minister thought that himself and introduced amendments in the Dáil. We do not get a copy of Dáil amendments so that it is extremely difficult for us to find out exactly what changes are being made in a Bill after it is introduced in the Dáil and as it comes to us in the amended print. I think it is rather a pity that Government amendments to Bills in the Dáil are not circulated to members of the Seanad. If that were done it would enable us to see readily what changes had been made. I have read this Bill but in view of what I have just said I intend to re-read it afresh over the week-end.
I gathered from the Minister's speech last night that the amendments made to the Bill were largely of a transitory character, and designed to deal with this question of postal voting. He said that he believed that he had made that position satisfactory. I think he probably has and I am not disputing it, but when you come to the system by which each elector is to have five transferable votes it might be held, I think, that that does not fit in with the plan of the single transferable vote. I want to make myself quite clear. I am not attempting to say that that is right.
The other view is that you could have five panels, that there could be virtually five separate elections, each having a single transferable vote and that that meets the provisions of the Constitution. I hope that is right, because I think the system of virtually five separate elections, if the electorate were satisfactory, would be good. The old system was muddling to voters, no matter who the electorate were. I should like to see that view held, but I am doubtful and other people to whom I mentioned the matter have grave doubts about it. I want to put it to the House that it is a very dangerous thing to bring in a new Bill for the election of a Seanad if there is the slightest doubt or the slightest possibility that it could be held to be unconstitutional. I do not think that anyone would be at all likely to spend money in going to the courts to have it proved that this particular point is unconstitutional, simply for that purpose, but if there were a big moneyed interested which questioned the validity of an Act passed after this Bill because law, it is quite conceivable that it might be prepared to spend money for the purpose of showing, in effect, that the new Seanad was not a Seanad at all, that it was not elected in accordance with the strict terms of the Constitution. I suggest to the Minister that he cannot be certain on this occasion, as on other occasions, as to exactly what the Supreme Court might decide.
I must assume, as, I am sure, is a fact, that the Minister's legal advice is that this is not unconstitutional, because the Minister would not have brought the Bill in otherwise, and I am not setting myself up against his legal advisers; but I am saying that after the experience we have had in some cases in which the matter was raised in Parliament and in which legal advice was against it, and in other cases in which it was not raised and the Supreme Court decided it was unconstitutional, it is not very wise, and in fact is definitely unwise, if there is a doubt, to put a Bill through in a hurry. It would be very much better even to put up with one more election under the old system, much though I hate it personally, than take the risk of the legislation passed by the two Houses in the next six months turning out to be void. Under the Constitution, every Bill has to be passed by both Houses, and if the new Seanad was held not to have been properly elected it could be very serious.
I do not want to raise a scare because it is quite possible that my interpretation is wrong, but the view that it could be held to be one election in which each elector had five transferable votes is not solely my view. It is the view which other people with experience have expressed and I think it only right that I should give expression to it here. I do not propose to argue with the Minister that I am right in this. The only point I want to put is that there is a doubt, and if I were to argue it would be only as to whether there is that doubt and not as to who is right, because I do not feel in any sense competent to argue that point.
I have already expressed my objection to the system under which the electorate is to be, as to four-fifths, members of local bodies. I think that, within the Constitution, the committee could have avoided that. It would have been much better—I am not putting forward what I regard as the ideal scheme, but something which could have been done within their terms of reference and within the Constitution and which, I think, would have been preferable—to have divided the panel members roughly into two— say, 21 and 22—and to have said that half of these are going not only to be nominated by the Dáil, but directly elected by the Dáil and Seanad together. That would be frankly and openly the political half. It could not be unconstitutional, because it is the way in which by-elections have been conducted up to the present, so there is no doubt that it would come within the Constitution. The other half could have been elected, if so desired, by the local authorities. It would not have been idea—I am not convinced that the local authorities are the best electorate—but it would have got over this peculiar situation in which there is this enormous preponderance of four-fifths of the electorate represented by local authorities.
I have no objection at all to a proportion of the House being elected by local authorities. I personally would go further and say that I would not mind having a proportion—I do not think I would go as far as one-third direct representatives of local authorities, apart from nomination by bodies outside. The Constitution does not prevent direct election by vocational bodies, if you want it. Apparently the committee was opposed to that. It is one of the things which the Constitution definitely provides could be done. I would not like to see too large a proportion of the Seanad elected directly by outside bodies, because, if the proportion were too large, it might introduce too great a political elements into these outside bodies, but I do think it a pity that the committee and the Government went whole-hog for an electorate of 1,000, of whom approximately 800 will be members of local authorities and the balance members of the Oireachtas.
When I expressed the view that for my part I should agree to have one more election on the existing basis, I do not think I made it perfectly clear that that was only because of the doubt as to whether this provision is constitutional, but, if you were to have another election on the existing basis, you would at least introduce the new provisions for postal voting and secrecy, which I think nobody would question; but if the danger of its being regarded as unconstitutional is not regarded by the House as serious—I think it is a serious danger—rather than have the election on the old system, I should prefer to try one on the new system, and then have the whole Bill examined carefully and slowly, having regard to the new experience, and see if we cannot get the best possible system.
There are one or two other matters in the Bill about which I have very considerable doubts. Instead of having nominations by certain registered bodies in the further, we are to have proposals for nominations, and apparently—the Minister will correct me if I am wrong and I think will be sympathetic with my difficulty in understanding all the details—according to my understanding of it, after the transitory period, the number of bodies which can propose for nomination is not limited. That means that, on the commercial panel, say, instead of having 15 bodies, we might have 50. We will assume, not that there will be 50, but, what I think is probable, that there will be 30 or 35. I am taking one panel only because it is the one I know most about. Those 35 will include, probably, the present 15, who are the most representative, or believed to be the most representative bodies—there is always a slight argument about one or two—out of the large number of commercial bodies who might otherwise qualify. Under the new scheme you will get another 15 or 20, less representative, smaller less important bodies, added. You will give to each of these bodies the right to propose two for nomination. Their proposals for nomination will go before a new committee on which all the 30 or 40 are to have representatives. What does that means? It means that the smaller and less important bodies will be able to vote out the more important ones and their nominees may not be sent forward. I am speaking from the point of view of the commercial panel. I would respectfully suggest that that is a danger. What do you gain by it?
The present system, I think, is better. It was not perfect. It would require some adjustment, particularly with regard to the committee that was to decide appeals, as to who should be on the register. I am confining myself for the moment to one panel, but the principle is probably the same in all the others. I think it would have been much better to have stuck to your 15 and to have removed the provision by which they must nominate two. I am not sure whether that is removed in the Bill or not. Under the old Act they could not nominate one, which many bodies would have preferred to do. I think Senator Summerfield will agree with me that there were several bodies who would have preferred to have nominated one but were obliged to nominate two and found themselves in a difficulty.
I do not think that out of the 15 you would have too many candidates and, with the large electorate which is now proposed, I do not think that would be any very serious harm. I regard it from the point of view of getting the best representatives and of getting the independent-minded type of person, who may of course have his Party affiliations, which I do not object to for a moment.
I think it is a mistake to have this special, or preliminary election, simply because it will reduce the number of persons nominated because I do not believe it will improve their quality. It is much better to be quite frank about it and what I think will happen is that, assuming you have 30 bodies, you will have two nominations each from the 30 making 60; the less suitable will start a vigorous campaign amongst the members of the committee so that they may get nominated and the most independent-minded will regard that as infra dig and will not do it and may not be nominated. As I said, I am talking of the commercial panel.
I would very much like to know from some member of the committee what they thought they were going to gain by that particular system. In that matter, I think it would have been much better to have left well enough alone, subject to some minor amendments which experience had shown to be necessary.
There are quite a number of smaller matters which perhaps will arise on Committee but my greatest objection to the scheme is making the Second Chamber in this State largely dependent for election on local bodies when at the same time the tendency, for good or evil, has been more and more centralisation and to lessen the powers and authorities of local bodies and when, in addition, you are providing for single-member constituencies. I suggest that it will be extremely difficult, after the new scheme comes into operation in 1950, for any person who could be regarded as representing minority interests, to get elected.