The committee has asked me here to discuss errors which have arisen in the calculation of the amount of the general Government debt, errors which, once calculated incorrectly, turn up in a number of different publications. Like the Chairman, I regard this as a most serious matter and I am having a report compiled internally on how this matter arose, as well as taking other steps. I will give the committee as good an account today of this matter as I can, but it will understand that we are looking into it in more detail. The fact that these errors arose also gives rise to questions about the systems used for these calculations, in some ways, more importantly. I will be arranging for a detailed external review of the processes concerned from a systems point of view.
Before getting into the detail of the error that arose, let me explain briefly that there are, at least, for this purpose, two separate measures of Ireland's State debt which ought to concern us. The first measure is the Exchequer or national debt. This amount represents the money owed by the Government, net of cash holdings, and does not include the separate debt of most State bodies, local authorities, etc.
Separately, there is the slightly newer, but still at this stage well-established, concept of the general Government debt, and it is this measure on which the error occurred. The general Government debt includes substantially the national debt, but is gross of cash holdings, and it also includes the debt of other State bodies within the general Government sector. The "general Government", for that purpose, does not include every State-owned body. It includes most public service bodies but does not generally include commercially-operated State companies.
I would like to explain, if I can, what went wrong in this case by way of an example. In the past if the Government borrowed €1 billion, that would add to the national debt, and if the HFA separately borrowed €1 billion, that would add to its debt. Both of those transactions would be handled by the NTMA, but the first €1 billion, the Government's borrowings, would be done by the NTMA on behalf of the Minister for Finance under his delegated authority, and that would impact on the national debt. The NTMA would arrange the second €1 billion but, in that case, as agent of the HFA, and that would increase the HFA's debt. In that case, the general Government debt - the debt of the Government sector combined - would go up by €2 billion because the central government would have borrowed €1 billion and the HFA would have borrowed €1 billion. The total would go up by €2 billion. In 2010 though, as market conditions changed, rather than borrowing as agent of the HFA, in other words, instead of the NTMA going into the market and stating that it wanted to raise there €1 billion, in this example, on behalf of the NFA, the NTMA would have gone into the market and stated that it wanted to raise €1 billion for the Exchequer which it would pass on to the HFA. In this example, the NTMA borrowed €1 billion for the Government's account and a further €1 billion on the Government's account which was passed on to the HFA as a type of loan. The HFA had €1 billion in borrowings and the Exchequer had €2 billion but because the HFA's borrowing was from another part of the Government sector, it should not have added to the overall general Government borrowings in presentation terms. Borrowings and loans from one part of the general Government sector to another ought to be consolidated out rather than presented as adding together. The additional borrowings for the Government sector reflect the overall Government position vis-à-vis the private sector. This is what went wrong because when the HFA began to be funded indirectly via the Exchequer instead of directly from the market, its borrowings continued to be reflected as if they had been from the market. They were added to the total instead of being treated as an intragovernmental transaction. This did not affect the HFA’s overall balance sheet position because it was still borrowing, in our example, €1 billion from somebody.
Specifically, the general Government debt figures reported to EUROSTAT, most recently at the end of September in respect of the period to the end of 2010, overstated the debt figure as a result of the double counting. The reported figure for the end of 2010 was €148 billion, which overstated the amount by €3.6 billion. An element of double counting has been ongoing since the CSO reported to EUROSTAT in mid-2010 in respect of quarter one of 2010.
This double count ought not to have happened. The potential for the change in the way the HFA was funded to have an implication for the preparation of the general Government debt figures appears to have been signalled at a technical level to the Department by the NTMA last year. It seems that the significance of the matter was not appreciated at that time nor was it appreciated when the quarterly figures and accompanying documentation were received from the NTMA. In the context of the work currently under way for the publication of the medium term fiscal statement later this week the matter arose again in discussions between the NTMA and the Department and at that stage an examination of the matter conducted by the Department, the NTMA and the CSO established that the double count had occurred. The CSO has already informed EUROSTAT about the double count and the information has also been communicated to the EU and the IMF.
As a result, our debt to GDP ratio for the end of 2010 is now 92.6% of GDP rather than the 94.9% previously published. This means our projected peak level of general Government debt will be lower than previously forecast. The details of this will be made clear in the medium term fiscal statement that will be published tomorrow. However, this revision did not change the net debt position for 2010, which is the general Government debt less liquid assets and cash, nor does it not have any effect on the general Government deficit for 2010 or for this year. In overall terms, Ireland is no better or worse off.
The questions we must now address are how these errors occurred, whether the mistake could happen again in the same way or in another guise and how we can ensure that such errors do not happen in the future. The systems concerned will be closely examined and made right as a matter of urgency.