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COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS debate -
Thursday, 7 Jun 2012

Internal and External Reviews of the Central Government Debt Statistical Discrepancy

Mr. John Moran(Secretary General, Department of Finance) called and examined.

Today we will deal with the 2010 annual report of the Comptroller and Auditor General, Vote 6 - Office of the Minister for Finance, chapters 1-4, Finance Accounts 2010, and the internal and external reviews of the central Government debt statistical discrepancy. Before we begin, I remind members and witnesses to turn off their mobile phones as interference from mobile phones affects the sound quality of transmission of the meeting.

I advise witnesses that they are protected by absolute privilege in respect of the evidence they are to give to the committee. However, if they are directed by the committee to cease giving evidence on a particular matter and continue to do so, they are entitled thereafter only to qualified privilege in respect of their evidence. They are directed that only evidence connected with the subject matter of these proceedings is to be given and are asked to respect the parliamentary practice to the effect that, where possible, they should not criticise nor make charges against a Member of either House, a person outside the House or an official by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable. Members are reminded of the provisions within Standing Order 158 that the committee shall also refrain from inquiring into the merits of a policy or policies of the Government or a Minister or the merits or objectives of such policies.

I welcome Mr. John Moran, Secretary General at the Department of Finance. Before I ask him to introduce his officials, I wish to congratulate him on his appointment and wish him well. He is taking office at a unique time in terms of the economic environment and we wish him well in his work. I call on him now to introduce his officials.

Mr. John Moran

I will start with Ms Ciara Morgan, from the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, who is here in case any issues arise due to the split in the Department of Finance over the period in question. Mr. Garrett O'Neill is a new member of staff in the finance directorate of the Department. Mr. Michael Torpey heads up our shareholder management unit and is responsible for banking affairs. Dr. Loretta O'Sullivan is here from the economic division of the Department. Also with me are Mr. Paul Ryan and Ms Cep Carthy from our finance and corporate directorate.

I now invite Mr. Seamus McCarthy, Comptroller and Auditor General, to introduce Vote 6 - Office of the Minister for Finance, chapters 1-4.

Mr. Seamus McCarthy

The finance accounts are prepared under section 4 of the Comptroller and Auditor General (Amendment) Act 1993. They present an account of the payments into and out of the Central Fund of the Exchequer, together with a set of statements that analyse the receipts and issues of the fund and details of the national debt. A clear audit opinion was given on the accounts for 2010. The chapters of the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General, which are the subject of today's meeting, were compiled to highlight key aggregates and trends in Central Fund transactions and broader State liabilities. I will refer briefly to some of these, given the lapse of time since the reports were completed.

The deficit on the Central Fund was €18.2 billion in 2010. This was the net result of receipts into the Central Fund, totalling €35.6 billion and overall State expenditure of €53.8 billion. I understand the Accounting Officer has provided the committee with updates on these figures. The deficit on the fund is bridged by borrowing undertaken by the National Treasury Management Agency. By the end of 2010, the accumulated gross national debt amounted to €109.6 billion. During that year, the State also issued a series of promissory notes to fund certain banking losses. At end-2010, the total value of the notes issued was €30.85 billion. The net effect of the promissory notes was to create additional State debt.

The general Government debt is a broader measure of State debt than that captured by the national debt concept. Some of the chapters presented data about the general Government debt extracted from the Department of Finance's returns to EUROSTAT. As previously discussed by the committee, there was an error in the returns, which overstated the general Government debt figure by some €3.6 billion. Accordingly, the correct general Government debt figure at end-2010 was €144.5 billion. This includes the State's gross national debt, the value of the promissory notes and the debt of certain other State bodies, but excluding lending between State bodies, which was the origin of the error. Borrowing by commercial State bodies is not included in this measure.

Chapter 1 reports that in addition to the general Government debt, the State had commitments of over €4 billion in respect of public private partnership contracts. It also had long-term commitments in respect of occupational pensions for public sector employees. The latest available estimate of that liability was €116 billion at the end of 2009. Assets held by the State at the end of 2010 included €16.2 billion in Exchequer funds and €22.7 billion in the National Pensions Reserve Fund. The latter included the State's investment in Allied Irish Bank Plc and Bank of Ireland, which were valued at the end of 2010 at €7.6 billion. The State also had substantial contingent liabilities, arising out of its guarantee of the liabilities of certain Irish credit institutions and in respect of guarantees and letters of comfort issued to the Central Bank of Ireland for exceptional liquidity assistance to banks. The position up to mid-2011 is outlined in some detail in Chapter 4. The Accounting Officer will be in a position to update the committee on developments in that regard.

Chapter 3 was compiled because of the significant developments around the end of 2010 with regard to the funding of the State arising from the EU-IMF programme of financial support, which had not impacted on the finance accounts for 2010. This programme provides access for Ireland to a total of €67.5 billion in external borrowing facilities associated with a programme of fiscal and structural reforms. Progress on the reforms is examined and reported quarterly.

Finally, I should mention that a clear audit opinion was issued with regard to the 2010 Appropriation Account for the Department of Finance. Members will be aware that substantial changes have been made to the Department's remit since then.

I now call on Mr. John Moran, Secretary General at the Department of Finance, to make his opening statement. Is it in order to publish the opening statement?

Mr. John Moran

Yes, there is no problem with that. I would point out that an amended version was sent to the committee this morning.

I thank the Chair and the committee members for their kind words on my appointment. I am pleased to meet with the committee for the first time as Secretary General of the Department and I look forward to working with it in a positive way. I have a number of colleagues with me this morning and we will operate as a team in responding to questions, particularly if they go into specific details. I already sent the committee a brief in advance to bring it up to date on developments and I will now touch on some of the key points.

When my predecessor and I met with the committee last July, the Government had already entered into the EU-IMF programme of support, which was agreed in late 2010. Much of my Department's time since then has been focused on restoring fiscal stability, meeting its commitments generally under the programme of support, safeguarding the banking system and reorganising the structure of the Department. Before commenting on stabilisation of the banking sector, which is on the agenda today, I would first like to comment briefly on some of the other topics.

With reference to EU-IMF programme of support,the key condition for returning the economy to sustainable employment growth is restoring order to the public finances. Substantial efforts in this respect have been made and are continuing, with significant steps also being taken on the structural reform front. Last year saw a welcome rebound in economic activity, with GDP recording its first full year of growth since 2007, at 0.7%. A second consecutive year of positive growth is forecast again this year, following which it is hoped there will be a strengthening over the medium term of growth towards 3% per annum on average for the period 2014-15. The economy's return to growth last year was down to a strong contribution from the traded sector, which is expected to continue this year. Obviously, export growth will be affected by difficulties being experienced by the euro area. The substantial competitiveness improvements we have seen in recent years will provide some countervailing support to the difficulties elsewhere. It is also important to point out that a weakening of activity in our main trading partners is already factored into the Department's budget forecasts for economic growth. Similarly, weak domestic demand is allowed for in the budget forecasts. It will take time for the imbalances which were built up during the boom by firms, households and the Government to unwind. That said, domestic demand is set to fall at a more modest pace this year than in 2011 and the drag from domestic demand is expected to be less this year compared to previous years. It is also worth noting that an important contribution to economic recovery is reflected in foreign direct investment activity, with the IDA reporting a record number, 148, investments in the past year. Recent positive announcements in this regard in respect of 2012 are encouraging.

Moving towards a balanced budgetary position is a necessary but not sufficient precondition for restoring the economy to sustainable growth and job creation. An underlying general Government deficit of approximately 9.4 % of GDPwas recorded in 2011, as reported in the April Maastricht returns. This is well within the 10.6 % of GDP targetpreviously set for Ireland by the ECOFIN Council. Rome was not built in a day. It is worth noting that the return of the underlying deficit to single figures is a positive development and reflects the very strong progress that has been made. However, a lot remains to be done.

Notwithstanding the uncertainty around growth rates, the public finances are moving in the right direction and we remain on track to achieve our deficit target for this year of 8.6% of GDP. That said, we must bear in mind that a deficit limit of 8.6% of GDP equates to a gap of over €13.5 billionbetween revenues and expenditure. Our budgetary policy at present is framed against the backdrop of this still large deficit, which we must continue to close over the coming years by either growing revenues or reducing cost, or a combination of both.The analysis is simple:we cannot continue to run the business, which is the Irish economy, with the same cost structures by drawing down forever on our credit card to keep the doors open.

Reorganisation of the Department is another matter I would like to touch on briefly. Much discussion has taken place at this committee regarding the capacity of the Department in terms of skills and any gaps that may exist. I would like to comment on this, in respect of which I suspect we will get into further detail later. We are happy to do so.

Last month, I presented the Department's revised statement of strategy for the period 2012-2014. The revised statement of strategy sets out how we propose to optimise our resources by identifying the most significant initiatives we need to achieve and realigning our resources in line with our revised and more forward looking and in many ways ambitious strategic plan. Everyone throughout the organisation will be working to common goals and to finding the solutions which forward the attainment of our objectives as set out in the statement. Given the limited financial resourcesavailable to us, this may involve giving greater priority to certain tasks and lesser priority to others, but with a particular focus on initiatives which contribute to economic growth and recovery. Specifically, it will involve among others the following initiatives: the development of greater capabilities in our economic planning unit the creation of an enhanced project management unitto deliver not alone on our commitments under the EU-IMF programme, but all the goals we have set ourselves;the enhancement of our risk capabilitiesand a greater embedding of a risk management and control culture throughout all areas of activities in the Department; and the enhancement of our international divisionto play a greater and more leading role in the development of policies for European economic recovery.

To emphasise the break with the past, I took the libertyof explaining our new strategy in public so that everyone might better understand our plans and have the opportunity to question me on it. The Department and our country are confronted by some of the greatest challenges in the history of this State. It is not enough to just say goodbye to the troika at the end of the programme. We must do so having already rebuilt the finances of the State and designed an economic powerhouse on foundations solid and robust enough to avoid the mistakes of the past, including those mistakes we cannot yet foresee today. I will now refer briefly to some of the other issues on the agenda today.

On Vote 6 - Office of the Minister for Finance, the appropriation accounts for the Department of Finance in 2010 show a net outturn of €61.875 million compared to a budget estimate for that year of €70.158 million. This left a surplus of over €8 million to be surrendered to the Exchequer and represented a net reduction in spend of 5% year-on-year. A number of key variances contributed to this saving. These are set out in the brief and as such I will not go into them in detail now. As I have indicated in other fora, this level of savings is not in my view sustainable into the future given the increasing pressures facing the Department and the more ambitious objectives we have set ourselves. I make no secret of the fact that I considered it unwise to have forced the Department to cut into its running costs and staff by 9% when faced by great challenges. Before spending more money and increasing our head count, it was critical for me to set out during the first weeks of my appointment our new objectives and a running model to ensure that money would be spent wisely.

In relation to the Chapters listed for review today, Financial Outturn 2010 and State Funding Developmentsset out a summary of the major Exchequer liabilities and assets. The committee will be aware that this position has moved on significantly in the intervening 15 months. While, as appropriate, I provided an update on this in the advance brief, I will now touch on some of the highlights in this regard. The provisional outturn for 2011 shows a deficit of €24.9 billion. Key to this increased deficit is the treatment of banking related expenditure. The underlying tax revenue of €34 billion compares favourably with 2010 and adjusting for banking related expenditure the underlying deficit actually declined by €2.75 billion to €15.25 billion, which is evidence of the progress that is being made in returning sustainability to the public finances.

End quarter one 2012 Exchequer returns continued this trend and were also generally positive, showing double digit year-on-year tax revenue growth. On the expenditure side, budget 2012 brought forward a budgetary adjustment package designed to reduce further the deficit in our finances. The May Exchequer returns released earlier this week indicated that tax revenues in the first five months of the year are 2.8% ahead of target at €386 million. Encouragingly, three of the ‘big four' taxes, namely, VAT, income tax and corporation tax, are ahead of profile. While overall gross Departmental expenditure is just over €100 million higher than anticipated at end-May, with the main pressures arising in the health and social protection Votes, Exchequer developments to end-May are encouraging and provide confidence that our programme targets for 2012 will be achieved.

Over the period 2013-2015, it is estimated that a further €8.5 billion or so in budgetary consolidation measures will be required to reduce the general Government deficit to below 3% of GDP by 2015, which the Government is firmly committed to doing. I will deal briefly with the banking stabilisation measures, which have also occupied much of our time during the past year. This work is continuing. Returning the banking sector to health is an area that has been a particular priority for the Government and the Department during the past year. We must have a financial system that supports a return to sustainable growth in the economy.

The brief sets out details of the key steps that have been taken in the stabilisation process during the course of 2011 to 2012, reflecting papers published by the Department during the course of the year as we made progress on this road. As members will note from the briefing papers and as demonstrated by the Department, we had set out a five step process that we wanted to go through, starting with the reshaping and recapitalisation of the banks and working towards building banks up for the future, having gone through various funding work and so on.

The steps taken to date since we announced our plans in March 2011 have included the reshaping and recapitalisation of the banks with the State's investment reduced to only €16.5 billion while still delivering the €24 billion target required by the prudential capital asset review, PCAR, process. Ireland now has two universal Government supported pillar banks - Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Bank - which participate alongside Permanent TSB, Nationwide and other foreign banks that continue to operate in the Irish economy. The State's ownership in Bank of Ireland, which at the time of our last appearance before this committee was anticipated to be much greater, was successfully reduced to only 15% thanks to private investment which occurred in July of last year. We have also embarked on a very ambitious deleveraging programme to resize the banks and are very much in advance of our targets with €36.4 billion in the PCAR banks deleveraged against a target of €32 billion. In addition to that, thanks to what has been referred to as the largest loan sale transaction in global real estate history in IBRC, we also continued to deleverage nearly €85 billion from IBRC's balance sheet. Perhaps more importantly, we have seen that the deposit outflows, which were occurring in significant numbers prior to the PCAR recapitalisation, have now been reversed and the growth in deposit numbers in the second half of last year and the beginning of this year has been significant and we now have above €150 billion of deposits in the banking system in the covered banks, which is more than €10 billion greater than the low seen in June 2011. Our banks have importantly tapped into the wholesale secured "repo" markets in recent months and successfully started to also attract non-guaranteed deposits from corporate customers. All of this improved funding profile and the banks' deleveraging have contributed to reduce the Central Bank funding of the Government-supported banks from a high of €157 billion down to only €109 billion at the end of 2011 and the trend remains positive since then. The pillar banks have been set ambitious targets for sanctioning of lending into the economy and the 2011 target of €3 billion for each bank was achieved while the target for 2012 has been increased to €3.5 billion and the banks are being closely monitored to ensure they meet these targets; certainly the target to be achieved this year remains challenging.

Looking to the future, we are focused on establishing sustainable banks that can survive and prosper without the need for ongoing State support; developing and implementing solutions to the mortgage arrears problems in the country; and supporting economic growth by making access to credit available to viable businesses or individuals.

I would like to add a word on the two reports our Department issued today on the €3.6 billion error in Government debt computations. I think the committee will understand when I say that it is wholly regrettable that an error like this would occur and continue to be reflected in the calculations produced by the Department for such a long period. I was aware of this issue and the need to address it prior to my taking up my new responsibilities and, as a result, many of the steps I took immediately on taking up this office involved restructuring the Department and were designed to deal with the problems such as those identified in the report. It is not, however, sufficient to deal with this isolated part of the Department and fix it in a siloed way. The changes I outlined above around our statement of strategy, including the creation of a new finance and risk office, are designed to do what can be done to prevent a recurrence of a similar situation throughout the Department as a whole. That had to be the priority and I have had much discussion with our internal audit team and the chair of our audit committee since taking up this office to build a more robust control framework across the Department for the future.

It is, however, important to point out that human error while it can be minimised cannot be eliminated altogether. Which of us can genuinely say that we have never made a mistake along the way? While it is important to reinforce in our colleagues the key importance of doing what we can with utmost care, it is even more important to build the checks and balances that will identify any mistakes which will inevitably occur despite these efforts. Responsibilities must be clearly identified on a one by one personal basis and within Departments and no one person should be asked to conduct a key task on his or her own. Resources must be allocated to the task of double-checking results if we are to avoid a similar situation. More important, we must work together to foster a culture across the system where people are not afraid to admit to having made a mistake. Mistakes, when hidden, get worse not better. We need to assure people that recriminations or witch hunts will not be the reward for admitting honest mistakes.

I understand that the committee has also been anxious to get the reports and believed that they may be available earlier than today. The importance of due process in the preparation of the reports and a broadening of their scope have contributed to certain regrettable delays. I endeavoured, however, to have them for the committee in order that the first public debate on these documents should take place, as I thought appropriate, before the committee and not elsewhere. Personally, I believe that the work product completed has been worth this extra effort and I would like to thank both the internal teams and teams from Deloitte for their very significant efforts to help us understand the steps we need now to take. The first step will be a centralisation, as recommended, of the compilation of the data in the CSO which has the better resources to do this task.

On a more general note, I believe that we have made very considerable progress even from early last year when I first embarked on travelling to New York and Europe to engage with foreign stakeholders and explain Ireland's plan for recovery. I took the liberty of including a diagram in the briefing papers from which members will see in one shot the success of the measures to date but the yet very significant headwinds which remain, especially out of Europe, before we are fully back to the market-based funding at acceptable rates. If one follows the trajectory of the lines, one will see the positive impact of the PCAR announcements, which saw the first reduction in Irish Government spreads and, more important, the announcements around the Bank of Ireland restructuring in July, which decoupled the Irish sovereign rates from the Portuguese rates at that time, moving, as one follows through the period since July of last year, to bring Ireland in many ways closer to the yield rates of Spain and Italy. Somewhat worryingly, however, towards the end of the diagram, members will note that, like the other countries in Europe, as pressure builds on the sovereign, the impact of that on Ireland is also significant in worsening the spreads despite the very considerable efforts we have made. Over the coming months we need to continue to buckle down to the tasks we have set ourselves and I hope that further substantial progress will be made on the agenda, as we have set out in our statement of strategy. I look forward to working with the committee and I thank the members for their attention.

I thank Mr. Moran for that. Can we publish his statement?

Mr. John Moran

Yes.

I welcome Mr. Moran and his colleagues from his Department and other Departments. I want to refer to a number of themes in his presentation. He referred to our saying goodbye to the troika and that would be the best birthday present I could ever get. Reports in the media this morning indicate that it appears discussions are under way with Spain in terms of a bank rescue package as distinct from a sovereign rescue package and that there will be a split for Spain. In his role as Secretary General of the Department of Finance, Mr. Moran has a key role in bank restructuring. Some €63 billion has been put into the banks by the State, €20 billion has been put into them from the National Pensions Reserve Fund and €43 billion has been put into them from Government borrowings. At present, that sum of €63 billion is equivalent to 43% of Ireland's GDP. It is seven times the education budget and four and three times those of health and social welfare budgets, respectively.

More particularly, I wish to raise the issue of the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation, IBRC, promissory note. It is roughly equivalent to 20% of Ireland's GDP, and decoupling it from the sovereign would make a significant difference to Ireland's general Government debt. Were the existing balance of between €25 billion and €28 billion decoupled from the sovereign, our debt-to-GDP ratio could move to approximately 90%. What is the current status of the discussions on the promissory note? What is the Secretary General's view on the implications of the discussions that are taking place with regard to Spain as we speak in respect of Ireland's ability to decouple its bank debt from its sovereign debt? It would go a long way towards ensuring we could return to the bond markets. After the Secretary General has dealt with those points, I will return with further questions.

Mr. John Moran

The first point to mention is this probably is a difficult question to answer fully, given there are so many policy issues one would talk about and we are not supposed to talk about policy issues in this forum. It probably is best to refer to previous statements I have made in which I have expressed strongly the view that for dealing with bank resolution problems in Europe, the optimum way to deal with bank resolution in national situations is to do so on a pan-European basis and this would help to reverse a regrettable trend which one can begin to see happening in Europe. The European banking system should operate on a cross-border basis, consistent with a single market environment and objective, and should not become national banks operating only within national borders. The Spanish situation obviously is being dealt with by the Spanish authorities and it would be inappropriate for me to engage in speculation about what might be the results of that.

It is more important to express the point that our teams, and that of Mr. Michael Torpey in particular, remain in close contact with all of our European partners about the discussions on the promissory note, which as the Deputy may recall, have a number of different objectives. One is to improve the viability of our banks, that is, those banks we are keeping in the system, by potentially removing from them certain of the low-yielding assets. A second objective is to come through a process of trying to alleviate the burden in the short term of the debt that has been taken on by the State in respect, in effect, of the bailout of the banks and which therefore is in many ways reflected by the promissory note structure, which was put in place before the bailout and some of the other issues were in place. What is important for us is to continue to stay very close, as indeed we are, to the discussions taking place across Europe. Moreover, while of course it is not possible at present for the existing ESM structures to invest directly in banks in a way some people are recommending should take place, we must make sure that any new policies and measures can be retrofitted in many ways to the effort we undertook to bail out the banks here in Ireland to alleviate ultimately the pressure on the sovereign.

What is the delay in the troika issuing the proposal it is preparing in respect of the IBRC promissory note? An ordinary person in Ireland will read reports in the media today of talks about the EFSF fund, that is, the current fund, being used as bank recapitalisation for Spain, as well as talks in respect of the ESM itself. The question I wish to ask concerns the delay in this regard. Were Ireland to get a restructuring deal on the promissory note, whereby it no longer formed part of the sovereign debt, what impact does the Secretary General believe that would have on Ireland's general well-being with regard to its debt levels and capacity to re-enter the market? When does Mr. Moran envisage Ireland's full re-entry to the bond market? In the context of a robust economy and being able to say goodbye to the troika, that will arise when Ireland is able to re-enter the bond markets. Consequently, it strikes me that the IBRC promissory note is critical. It is money the taxpayer probably will never see again and the Secretary General might touch on the impact he believes a decoupling of the Anglo Irish Bank debt from the sovereign would have. Second, when does he envisage Ireland's re-entry to the bond markets? Third, I refer to the €66 billion that has gone into the banks thus far. What is its value to the taxpayer at present?

Mr. John Moran

The Deputy has asked me a couple of questions and hopefully I will not forget any. The plan of action with respect to a return to the markets already has been well identified and I think the Deputy will understand that-----

Does Mr. Moran agree with the comments of Mr. Draghi, the head of the European Central Bank yesterday when he stated that Ireland was well on its way to re-entering the bond markets and that it would happen much sooner than was expected 12 months ago?

Mr. John Moran

As the Government also has stated, the NTMA's plan is to put a toe in the water - I believe that is the expression being used - later this year. I am sure the agency will appear before this committee at another time and can talk about this in more detail. This will be a necessary first step to occur before full market re-entry next year. Obviously much effort has taken place to try to deal with one major obstacle to Ireland's return to the market, namely, the funding cliff that will occur at the beginning of 2014. Any measures that can help to alleviate the market concern about that issue are welcome and will contribute importantly to a successful re-entry by the Government. It also is important to continue to see progress on the various measures that are taking place, as well as the continued meeting of our objectives as set out across the budgetary process. Remaining firm in this regard obviously is a huge priority, as indeed is meeting all the troika targets.

The Anglo Irish Bank situation really is representative of one possible solution on which we have been working, which is, it is fair to say, horrendously complicated. This is because it involves not just the actual movement of banks across the system as we did last year but potentially taking parts of banks out of the banking system, which of course the system would not have been able to have absorbed last year before the banks had time to conduct their operational reviews and break up their systems and teams. It also is important to state that while the European system is trying to find solutions to what otherwise is a highly difficult ask in the context of the available measures in Europe at present, time is not necessarily being lost on our side because the teams are working closely with the banks about the identification of the assets that would be moved and are moving forward on the issue of analysing how the banks themselves would become more viable. It is equally important to deal with the sovereign debt issue to which the Deputy referred and to return the banks back to viability as soon as possible by removing from them the low-yielding assets that exist, the tracker mortgages being the best example.

Is moving the tracker mortgages off the banks' books still in the equation in respect of the IBRC promissory note issue?

Mr. John Moran

The best way to answer that question is to state there are a number of steps which must be taken to achieve the objective. I refer to the first and most important objective with respect to the banks. The Deputy referred to trying to achieve the maximum return for the taxpayer in terms of the investment in banks. That would best be achieved by having the banks we have identified as "going forward" banks, return to viability and profitability as soon as possible. The Permanent TSB plan, which has been made public and has received much attention in recent months, sets out clearly what is required to achieve that objective, namely, that low-yielding assets which continue to remain in the banks, if they can be funded elsewhere - I say "if" because as yet there is no funding solution for the wind-down of banks other than through the sovereign, which is itself not necessarily the best objective - by moving those assets out of the banking system, we will see the clean banks recover much more quickly. In effect they will be able to lend to the economy and be attractive to foreign investment.

Is Mr. Moran talking about moving those into IBRC?

Mr. John Moran

Yes, or into another vehicle where we can actually fund them, without having them funded by the State. One of the problems with this process is that as Europe continues to grapple with the issues that Ireland has faced for some years, and sees them occurring in other areas, there is a possibility or likelihood - I am not yet sure which it will be - that new tools may become available. Had they been available to Ireland last year or the year before, we would have used them sooner. It is a well advised fact that for some time, including around the PCAR process, statements were made by myself and others that were long to medium-term solutions available for the wind-down of assets, that would be an optimum solution for the banking system. It would allow us to remove those assets from the system. In the absence of that, the strategy adopted last year was to try to identify in the non-core deleveraging part of the banks, those assets which were not required by the system. They could therefore be deleveraged from the system in a shorter period at prices that were acceptable to maximise recovery.

Where are the discussions at the moment with the troika and Europe on the issues of tracker mortgages and dealing with the IBRC promissory note? Where do they currently stand and why has there been a delay? The ordinary person looking on, hears that talks are taking place with the troika and about forthcoming plans, but why is there a delay?

Mr. John Moran

It is fair to say that discussions are ongoing because a lot of technical issues need to be addressed so that were we to find a solution we would be able to implement it. That is what I referred to in terms of the complicated process of assessing the capital impact of moving assets around the system. That is the first point to make.

Second, aspects of the solution that are required are not available at the moment in the European system. Ongoing discussions that are occurring in parallel to other banking issues across Europe may move the agenda forward at a political level.

If Spain gets a separate as distinct from a sovereign bank rescue package, how quickly does Mr. Moran expect Ireland to get the same deal in respect of our banking sovereign debt of €63 billion? The key to that is the promissory note.

Mr. John Moran

"How quickly?" is an impossible question to answer. With respect, it is going to be a question of what exact instruments might be used, if there are any instruments to be used. It is not clear.

Let me rephrase the question. If Spain gets a deal, as we currently read in the media, which effectively means it will get a separate banking deal, so the banks can be funded from EFSF or ESM funds, how confident would Mr. Moran be that, at some point, Ireland will get a similar deal in respect of the €63 billion of debt? Much of that debt will never come back to the taxpayer.

Mr. John Moran

I do not think it is appropriate for me to try to express views of confidence. I am confident, however, that we will be doing whatever we can to achieve that result. In fact, the Government has been engaging in discussions with the European partners to try to help that process along.

As we speak, discussions with Spain clearly appear to be moving in that direction. Would it be a huge benefit to Mr. Moran, in his role as Secretary General of the Department of Finance and with responsibility for restoring the public finances, to have such a tool in place? Would it make our re-entry to the bond markets significantly easier?

Mr. John Moran

It is certainly the case, and everyone understands, that anything that can be done to ease the burden either in the short term for refinancing risk or the overall cost of the Irish debt, is helpful to reinforce the sustainability of the debt and, ergo, reassure the markets that they can lend to Ireland again at rates we find acceptable. I referred to that table earlier and one can see the impact of measures like that on our sovereign spread. We saw what happened to the sovereign spread when the interest rate reduction took place in the middle of last year. The markets continue to react to positive news around the ultimate issue of debt sustainability. The right result in the bank debt would obviously contribute to that and make my job a little easier, but not much.

The Department of Finance manages the overall restructuring and stabilisation of banking. Some €63 billion has gone into the banks: approximately €21 billion into AIB; €5 billion into Bank of Ireland; €35 billion into Anglo Irish Bank, the bulk of which is a promissory note; and about €2.7 billion into Irish Life. From Mr. Moran's calculations, what are those investments worth today to the Irish taxpayer?

Mr. John Moran

The methodology of valuing assets such as that would really be speculation. If we sat there with investors on the other side who are willing to invest in Irish assets, one could try to put that in context. As we saw in the Irish Life situation, trying to assess the value of assets situated in Ireland, in a euro crisis, is an almost impossible task. The question is "Do we have a buyer who would be willing to buy the assets from the State?" It is fair to say that in 2012, with the crisis in Europe, we do not have that buyer, so any efforts at valuation would be speculation.

Is it not fair to say that the taxpayer will never again see the €35 billion that has gone into IBRC?

Mr. John Moran

The accounts we have seen, and the subsequent updates on those, show that amounts have already been written off the investments. With reference to what the Deputy has just mentioned, the IBRC investment was already assumed to contribute to the deficit on the basis of very insignificant recovery.

I note that, to date, the National Pensions Reserve Fund has written off nearly €12 billion of the €20.7 billion. Some €16 billion has gone into AIB and €5 billion into Bank of Ireland. The fund is valuing that €20.7 billion at €9.4 billion. From the fund's latest report there is clearly a significant fall in the value for the taxpayer of the investment that has been made.

Mr. John Moran

That is correct. In many ways that is not a surprise because some of the capital that was going into the banks is intended to absorb expected losses that were identified by the PCAR process. The deleveraging process is a good example of that, whereby our job is to try to maximise the return of that capital by not allowing all of the capital put aside for losses to be used up, if we can achieve that.

I have two final questions. Mr. Moran has spoken about the impact on staff of a 9% reduction in funding for his Department. Banking has effectively now come within the Department of Finance in terms of managing the portfolio. Mr. Moran comes from a private sector background. Mr. Moran is a poacher turned gamekeeper. Have others with similar skill sets come into the Department? I ask him to outline the changes that have occurred in the profile of the staff with which he is now dealing. He put a strong emphasis on skill sets in the Department. Who is overseeing the banks on a daily basis? Have many people come from the private sector?

Mr. John Moran

I am not sure of the term "poacher turned gamekeeper." I had the same problem when I was at the regulator, which wondered how I ended up on its side of the table rather than sitting beside the banks. One of the changes we introduced last March in the run up to recapitalisation was the reintegration into the Department of the team which formerly worked for Mr. Torpey in the NTMA. This achieved a marriage of the staff in the Department, who had been working hard and who might be referred to as internal and external staff, in order to deal with the banking crisis somewhat independently of the NTMA unit. The recommendation, which was approved by the Government, was to bring those two teams together. From memory, among the staff currently working in the banking team, the greatest concentration from outside the Civil Service - approximately 23 or 24 individuals - come from backgrounds which are not fully trained civil servants. In particular, those people would have experience in the banking system and they understand how banks work. Mr. Torpey and I have considerable experience in banking but that runs throughout the team even to its most junior members. They work closely with a number of the people who worked in the Department of Finance before I joined in March 2011 as part of a unified team dealing with banking issues. They will interact with management. As the committee will be aware, we have issued new relationship frameworks which set out in a more formal way the methodology governing our interactions with the banks and, in effect, set the limits on the interference, if that is the right word, we can extend to specific issues. They make it clear that we should not be involved in individual decisions made by the banks on commercial matters but should concentrate on the broader strategic plans of the banks and their maintenance of those plans.

On the deleveraging side we obviously have a different relationship because that is in many ways a core bank and non-core bank issue. The monitoring of capital is carried out by a team of people who interact with the banks and a deleveraging committee with regard to how we do it. In regard to how we run that through the process as part of a theme that runs across the Department about challenge and peer review, each month after, for example, the presentation by the bank management team to Mr. Torpey and his team, we have an internal meeting which includes people from the shareholder management unit and from outside of that unit to assess whether we are comfortable with the progress that the banks are making and, if not, set out actions for the next month.

I understand the process. Has the Department taken on people since Mr. Moran's appointment as General Secretary to beef up its banking functions? Who has it taken on or what type of people were taken on?

Mr. John Moran

Some 13 people transferred from the NTMA unit. We started with a team of individuals who, without exception, were previously employed in banking or financial services.

Will the Department be taking on any new people?

Mr. John Moran

We have supplemented that team along the way. As the Deputy will be aware, in order to replace my own position we expressed a preference for a public selection process and advertising for the post both inside the Department and externally. In the area of mortgage arrears, which is in many ways being handled by the people on the policy side of the Department, we have brought individuals with economic skill sets into the Department, as well as a senior banker.

Does the Secretary General believe that the banks will need further recapitalisation? The Financial Regulator, Mr. Elderfield, has stated that he believes a further €4 billion or more will be needed.

Mr. John Moran

The further recapitalisation of the banks depends on the period of time on which the forecast is based. A number of changes are planned on the regulatory front in regard to the way banks operate, such as Basel III. The implications of these changes will inevitably give rise to new capital requirements when we start dealing with deferred tax assets and other issues unless the banks return to profitability in the intervening period and can build the capital themselves. The Irish banks will no different to banks across the world in dealing with those changes, which require them to be more capitalised then they are today in order to operate the same businesses. The first point of call for our banks and the other banks across Europe and the US will be to seek to source that capital from outside their current share holding base.

I ask Mr. Moran to outline the cost of the Deloitte report and explain why the reports took so long to issue. The previous Secretary General was before this committee on 8 November 2011 but the reports only issued six months later.

Mr. John Moran

I met representatives from Deloitte shortly after taking up my role. It had prepared a draft of the report for consultation with those who were involved in the Department. The internal report was more difficult because it focused on individuals and their roles in the Department. The commitment I expressed to the staff was that we would make sure the reports were available to the committee by the time we met it. This is why I wanted to publish them today so that the first public discussion would take place in this committee. I am sure a number of people want to explore the details and it was preferable to have allowed them to do so but, more importantly, I released them in advance so that the committee would have time to prepare. The cost of the Deloitte report was €61,500.

I welcome Mr. Moran and wish him a successful tenure in his job. I wish to pursue the line of questioning begun by Deputy O'Donnell in regard to bank recapitalisation. What are Mr. Moran's plans for bank recapitalisation?

Mr. John Moran

I am not sure I understand the question.

Are there plans for further recapitalisation of the banks?

Mr. John Moran

At present the banks are operating within their capital requirements, as set out by the Central Bank.

I know that but has Mr. Moran any plans for future recapitalisation of the banks? Does he anticipate that it will happen?

Mr. John Moran

As I pointed out earlier, we have a five step plan for the banking system. The most important step is the last one, which involves returning the banks to viability so that they can generate profits and their own capital requirements, as they should. We need to get to that point as soon as possible. If we can achieve that objective or make our banks attractive to private investors, that will help to release of capital from the banks rather than adding further capital. We would like that to occur within a timeframe that runs in parallel with the other changes taking place across the European and global regulatory framework, which effectively represent a cost for being a shareholder in a bank.

There are plenty of forecasts from very reputable people, including the Central Bank, which anticipate a need to recapitalise the banks. I believe Deutsche Bank published a report, of which Mr. Moran will be aware, indicating that the banks would need an extra €4 billion. Does he agree with that?

Mr. John Moran

I do not know whether it is the same €4 billion that Matthew was referring to. The point I think I have expressed-----

It is still €4 billion. It does not matter which €4 billion it is.

Mr. John Moran

If it is €4 billion based, as I said, on regulatory changes which are scheduled to come down the track for all banks, not just the Irish banks, then I think I would agree with the statements the Central Bank have issued about that, but that is in the future and something to be dealt with and planned for the future. The more immediate issue is whether or not the existing capitalisation of the banking sector is adequate for the activities of those banks. As the Deputy will be aware, the Central Bank has the primary responsibility for doing that. It has made it clear in subsequent statements around the other reference he had that it believes - and we have to take that as the best indicator of the result - that the banks are adequately capitalised at the moment and for the future. They have done their stress tests and will not do another one until next year.

Why was the stress test put off until next year?

Mr. John Moran

The Deputy will be aware that all stress tests across Europe were put off-----

Mr. John Moran

----- across the year. Our position was that the Irish banks were in a different place from their European peers a year ago. They needed to have a more robust stress test done and done so on different parallels and in advance of the European - EBA - stress test. When one sees deposits returning to the Irish banks as we have - they are now above €150 billion which is €10 billion up on last year's low just before the capitalisation of the banks - it is absolutely important to returning the banks to viability and recovering as much of the taxpayers' money as we can that our banks are, frankly, not seen to be discriminated against relative to their European peers. Bringing the Irish banking stress tests in line with the other European banks seemed to us to be an absolutely important first step in doing that.

It means that they are deferred. Mr. Moran will be aware that Mr. Matthew Elderfield said recently that the banks were "overwhelmed" by the scale of the problem of mortgage arrears. Would Mr. Moran agree?

Mr. John Moran

Matthew has the advantage of being much closer to the details because as the Deputy will be aware the timing of the mortgage arrears project has required the Central Bank to receive plans for the banks. As yet we have not seen the details of those because in fact they were only concluded at the end of May. So the Central Bank is doing a review of all those as to how they work. It is something the banks themselves would admit. Some of the steps the Deputy will see have been worked through by Michael and his team, for example in Permanent TSB. He will see that the bank's management would agree that it needs to significantly upskill its teams in order to be able to deal with the operational issues of mortgage arrears such as collecting and dealing customer-by-customer with the actual problem it has. If the Deputy would refer to that as overwhelmed - if that is the word mentioned-----

He referred to it.

Mr. John Moran

He has a team of people who are able to actually look at the banks in much closer detail than anyone in our teams can.

Is that not a bit of a red flag?

Mr. John Moran

It is an indication that something needs to happen and in fact as I mentioned things are happening on this front. The management team, for example, at Permanent TSB, which is probably the most recent one I have met, has confirmed to me that it is well under way in hiring new people to deal with this issue.

If the mortgage arrears problem is as bad as he has signalled, is Mr. Moran satisfied that the banks are making adequate provision for it in their accounts?

Mr. John Moran

The first thing to question is what the Deputy means by "as bad as he has signalled". What Matthew Elderfield was referring to - if I understand the Deputy's question and the statement he referred to - is whether or not the banks have appropriate teams of people to deal with the scale of the issue confronting them in terms of the number of mortgage arrears and how they deal with that. A part of actually dealing with those mortgage arrears issues appropriately is in fact enhancing the collection mechanisms of the banks rather than simply just adding into deferral mechanisms in respect of mortgage payments. Once one tries to achieve that, then one gets to what is the key of in fact our own policy implementation which is that one gets to an appropriate distinguishing between the mortgages of people who are unable to pay their mortgages and the mortgages of people who have decided for their own reasons not to pay. Only when that is done properly will we really know what is actually the scale of the problems in the banks and how much they come inside the PCAR stress test.

I remind the Deputy that the stress test numbers that the BlackRock PCAR process assumed a fall in property prices which is greater than that we have seen to date. Therefore that would give some comfort to the fact that if we can properly distinguish between people so that relief is targeted in effect in the right places - inevitably capital will get used by the bank system if relief needs to be given to people who are unable to pay their mortgages - but if it is confined to that then I think we are in a position that was in many ways the assumptions around the PCAR process that we will have banks that are adequately capitalised.

So Mr. Moran does not believe they are under-provisioning. Does he believe they are providing enough for the mortgage problem at the moment?

Mr. John Moran

I am not going to necessarily fall into the trap of dealing with provisioning and adequate capitalisation.

It is not a trap. It is a very serious question.

Mr. John Moran

As the Deputy knows, provisioning is a backward-looking issue and capital is forward looking. So there is a very important distinction. The Deputy has asked me whether I think they are adequately provisioning for them. The accounting roles will not allow the banks to actually provision for all the expected losses that would be in the system, as they would see it. What is much more important as a question is whether we thing the banks - as indeed the regulator has confirmed - are adequately capitalised to absorb the losses that might be in the system as a result of that.

Would Mr. Moran like to answer that question then?

Mr. John Moran

I think I have.

He thinks they are adequately capitalised at the moment.

Mr. John Moran

The regulator has confirmed it and I think I can believe the regulator.

The banks are always pleased that there is a European rule that forbids them from doing this. However, there is also an overall obligation on the accountants and auditors to provide a true and fair view. Does Mr. Moran believe they are doing that?

Mr. John Moran

I believe everybody is aware that there has been a debate over the course of the last year and a half particularly about whether or not the accounting rules, which are what the accountants have to apply, are actually appropriate to the situation. Indeed the Central Bank of Ireland has in many ways led the way in terms of pushing the banks to provision as much as they can in the confines of the existing rules, but we do not have the same number on provisioning and capital because the rules are different and in particular the rules are different in the Irish banks and that is why the Irish banks are capitalised to 17% and 19% when other banks in Europe are much less than that. This is because there have been buffers put in as part of the PCAR process to absorb losses even beyond the normal stress test period and in effect covering them for losses that might occur outside of normal provisioning.

Does Mr. Moran believe we are getting a true and fair view in the balance sheets of the states of the banks and that they are provisioning enough for the moment?

Mr. John Moran

I would like to think so.

Mr. Moran would like to think so - so would I.

Mr. John Moran

I would like to believe that the accountants who are closest to it and the regulators will actually be able to give me advice that I can rely on.

Is that Mr. Moran's view? Does he believe it is adequate at the moment?

Mr. John Moran

Yes.

How does the Department select its auditors?

Mr. John Moran

Is the Deputy referring to selecting the auditors of the banks?

Mr. John Moran

The Department does not select the auditors of the banks. The bank's boards select the auditors.

However, the Department of Finance, as the main shareholder in all the banks, bar Bank of Ireland, would be able to change that if it wanted to.

Mr. John Moran

It may be an appropriate time to refer to the relationship frameworks of the banks so that there is a clear understanding of what in fact the role of the Department is in respect of the banks as set out in the relationship frameworks. The role of the Department is to represent the interests of the State and to ensure maximisation of the value of the State's investment but acting through the boards of the banks. Therefore, the decisions of the boards have to be recognised as independent. They should exercise their judgment in respect of matters such as that.

The Department is the major shareholder in most of the banks we are discussing and has the power to move the boards one way or another if it wishes. The selection of auditors is extraordinarily important. Mr. Moran knows as well as I do that the banks stick to the auditors like clams. They do not change them - apart from in the case of Anglo Irish Bank - until there is a disaster. The fees charged by auditors for auditing the banks' accounts are exorbitant. I would have thought it is a matter of great concern to the Department that, for instance, the top three accountancy firms were paid €164 million over a ten year period. KPMG was paid €14 million over a three year period and I can quote other ones, for example, PWC, which is only a 15% per cent shareholder, was still paid over €100 million over several years. These auditors never change unless there is some absolutely compelling reason as there was in the Rusnak case for AIB, and in the case of Ernst & Young with Anglo Irish Bank when there was a large problem regarding its activities there. For Mr. Moran to say this is not a matter for the Department of Finance is detaching the Department from a very large problem. I would have thought it is imperative that he got involved in this and said to the banks' boards that they will have to look at their auditors and see how they select them. Is Mr. Moran not doing that?

Mr. John Moran

I have no problem in taking the Deputy's suggestion as to how we should do it, but it is absolutely important to reiterate that our role in respect of how we deal with the banks - there has been considerable progress in this respect even in the past 12 months - is to select a board. We have certain restricted, in effect, veto rights, which is the best way to put it, over certain senior managers, which depend by reference to the shareholding we have and our ability to exercise or negotiate relationship frameworks with those banks, and by changing the boards of the banks, I would have hoped that were it appropriate to change the auditors of the individual bank in question, if there is one in particular, that the board, by virtue of being changed, would want to look at the same issue itself.

Mr. Moran might hope that, but banks' boards do not have a great record of doing that, they have the opposite record. They keep them there, stick with them and pay them huge sums of money, and the Department is the shareholder. It is to the Department that this goes. The reappointment of the auditors goes to an AGM every year. Is Mr. Moran telling me that he does not know whether it is looked at every year?

Mr. John Moran

We are about to come up to AGMs this year. I am not close enough to the detail to know whether, on the AGM papers for the current round of banks, there are any changes to the auditors or requests in that respect.

They will be reappointed presumably one way or the other; either they will be or will not be reappointed at the AGMs.

Mr. John Moran

Without knowing what we are doing with each individual bank, I do not think I can even answer that question.

Does Mr. Moran intend to do anything about it?

Mr. John Moran

I am happy to see-----

Does Mr. Moran intend to do anything about reviewing the auditors?

Mr. John Moran

I have said I will.

AIB has had the same one for ten years; at least it changed it only after the Rusnak situation. Bank of Ireland has had the same one since kingdom come and I do not know how long Irish Life and Permanent has had KPMG. Why do these banks, which are run by the State, have to have members of the big four constantly auditing their accounts?

Mr. John Moran

We are starting to stray into many issues that have been addressed in Green Papers from the European Union and everything else, where views have been expressed about how one might try to break down the situation where there are very few accounting firms that have the scale and size to be able to take on the audits of institutions of the size and complexity of the banks, but this is not a problem restricted only to banking. This is a problem that cuts across many other public companies of significant size as well.

Does this accountancy work go out to tender?

Mr. John Moran

I would have to check that. Given our somewhat limited role in this respect, I do not know whether it does. I remind the Deputy that the public procurement rules do not typically apply to the banks, but as a typical matter, they tend to follow a basis to try to find the best results in terms of costs.

Does it not seem strange to Mr. Moran that there is this constant insistence by the banks and now by the State-owned banks to employ the same auditors year after year when they have been so culpable in the banking crisis?

Mr. John Moran

I have no problem as part of the process of this year's AGMs, on foot of the matter now having been raised, with asking the banks to respond to us in terms of the process. If the Deputy is afraid they are continuing in this regard, I have no interest in keeping a particular auditor in the banks. We will ask the CEOs of the banks to consider it as part of the process this year to continue to tender. They may very well do this, I have no information at the moment as to what is the process. This question has come to me and I do not have the information that would allow me to answer it.

Mr. Moran is saying that he has no role in this but that he will have a role in it by asking a question now?

Mr. John Moran

I said that I am happy, because this issue seems to be of particular concern and because it has been raised, to ask the CEOs of the boards to find out at least the information about what is the process. I reiterate that the primary responsibility for the management of the banks needs to reside with the boards. If we take that away from the boards by exercising effectively that type and level of responsibility in the Department, we will do a disservice to the banks and to the overall objective we have, which is to get the banks to be able to function as banks and to be acceptable to outside investors to come in, operate and invest in them.

I am disappointed this is not something in which Mr. Moran has got actively involved. The way the auditors have behaved or missed things has been a huge running sore in the saga of the banks and I am disappointed the Department has not got directly involved and told them to behave in a certain way and to get their act together on this.

Mr. John Moran

I would make one point to make some things clear. If the Deputy checks the record, he will note that I have gone on record, and I did so while I was at the Regulator as well, about how we might achieve a better process for both the regulation of banks and the use of accountants in order that there is much better sharing of information. As a result of those efforts, a channel of information has been opened between the auditing profession and the Regulator in order that information that comes to the attention of one or other can be shared in a more open way than was the case previously. As a result of that, we hope we will get to a position where the work done by the auditors would have great value to the robustness of the accounts in assessing them and that by identifying these problems on a more shared basis, we would get to a better place.

I suggest that the big four should not exclusively get these particular accounts as they inevitably seem to have got them, that the fees should be looked at in an aggressive way and that this work should go out to tender on a regular basis and go out to tender to other firms that are adequately equipped to audit the banks.

I wish to move on to another matter on which I will be brief. Mr. Moran mentioned the directors, there are public interest directors on the boards of the banks. What is Mr. Moran's relationship with them?

Mr. John Moran

First, it is very good. We meet the public interest directors from a number of the banks in regard to periodic processes through the year in order to understand if they have any concerns.

They express them to you.

Mr. John Moran

I do not do it individually any more now-----

No, but to people in the Department.

Mr. John Moran

-----but it would be to the Department staff.

Mr. John Moran

When we believe or if they believe they have a concern, there is an open channel of communication in order that they can contact us if they want to.

They are accountable to the Department.

Mr. John Moran

It is probably fair to say they see themselves as having a slightly different relationship than perhaps others of the directors on the boards who would not be appointed in that way because they have an interest in looking after the public interest.

Do the others not have that?

Mr. John Moran

It is not necessarily the case. This is again another subtlety that is important about the operation of the boards and the appointment of the directors. If one takes the concept of being appointed as a director, in many ways the primary obligation one has at that point is to the shareholders and the company, not necessarily to the broader concept of public interest. The fact that the Government is the shareholder creates a level of concern over and above that which is in some other situations in the shareholders' best interests. The Deputy will understand that there is a tension that can occur at times between what is in the interest of the shareholder as maximisation of the value of the shareholder and what might be an action taken by the bank which could have a broader public interest concern. It might not necessarily be consistent in an economic way with the maximisation of the value of the shareholding in the banks. Therefore, the boards, in particular those such as AIB have directors who in many ways have slightly different nuances to their responsibilities.

Is that the case even though the banks are all publicly owned now?

Mr. John Moran

Yes, because if one were to think - as I think Deputy Ross would agree we should - of the banks as institutions in which we have invested on a commercial basis then our interest in some respects, were we looking at them like that and only like that, should be very much aligned. For example, if I take the case of Bank of Ireland with the interests of the individual shareholders that are also investing in the bank, I do not think that we would necessarily think that all of those individual shareholders, when they are choosing board members to sit on the board or voting in respect to those, are necessarily thinking about whether the actions of the board are in the public interest, but they are potentially in the interest of the shareholders.

Directors appointed by the Government to sit on the boards of the banks have potentially two roles. To make that clear, the statutory framework that was established for the banks before I started made it clear that some directors were appointed by the Minister as public interest directors. Therefore, that allows us to continue to have other directors who might in many ways see themselves as more analogous to the directors appointed by either a private equity firm that invests in a bank or any other institutional shareholders with a view to maximising the value of the bank to the shareholders.

How long are the public interest directors appointed for?

Mr. John Moran

They have been on the boards for various different terms.

Yes, but how long is the term?

Mr. John Moran

One of them has resigned from AIB recently and he will come off the board at the end of this month.

Mr. John Moran

Mr. Declan Collier.

Yes, but how long is the term when they are appointed?

Mr. Michael Torpey

There was no fixed term at the time of their appointment.

Is there no fixed term?

Mr. Michael Torpey

There was no fixed term at the time they were appointed by the Minister under the Act for an undefined term.

Why is there no fixed term? That is most unusual.

Mr. Michael Torpey

The appointment by the Minister was made under the Act and it is something he will have considered at the time. Frankly, I do not know.

Is it not totally unsatisfactory that people should be politically appointed for no fixed term?

Mr. John Moran

Almost all of the directors that we are talking about were appointed before I took on this role or even in my previous role. Therefore, when one is appointed, one has an appointment and that is the contract.

But their contract is-----

Mr. John Moran

That said, the Deputy may also be aware that we have asked the chairs of the boards, shortly after taking over this role last year, to come up with a plan. I agree with what the Deputy is suggesting. It is a key and important part of the functioning of the board that there are replacements of those members, not just the public interest members, but all members, on a rotational basis so that one gets a change in the board.

Has the Secretary General made proposals on that basis to the Minister?

Mr. John Moran

We have already gone out to all the chairs of the banks to ask them to come up with a management and a board renewal plan.

I am talking about a specific problem. It seems to be quite extraordinary that the two political appointees on the board of the State-owned banks are appointed for an indefinite period. Some of these guys are paid up to €100,000 a year.

Mr. John Moran

Off the top of my head I do not have the figure.

I think they get very close to that anyway. They are appointed for an indefinite period. There seems to be no rationale behind that at all. Does Mr. Moran have a view on that?

Mr. John Moran

I think that first, we are touching on policy.

The Deputy is touching on policy.

Mr. John Moran

What I have already said is that, as head of banking last year, we approached all the chairs of the banks to come up with a management and a renewal plan. By doing that it is obvious that we have a preference for renewal of the board members.

When was that done? When did Mr. Moran ask the banks to do that?

Mr. John Moran

It was done as part of the process of renewal of the banks.

They are taking their time.

Mr. John Moran

No. In fact, if one sees the way the boards have gone – I do not have all the information to hand so I will summarise it – there have been significant changes in the boards in the course of the last year. We need to have time to go through both boards before we could supply the information.

Okay. Could I ask one more question?

I must ask the Deputy to conclude as he is way beyond his time.

Could I ask one more question?

I want to ask about whistleblowers in the Department. What is the Department's policy on whistleblowers? As Mr. Moran is aware, there was a high profile case in the Department where there was a dissenting voice on the property frenzy and the banking collapse. It was well reported in the newspapers. Is there room for dissenting voices and does the Department have a policy on whistleblowers?

Mr. John Moran

That was a couple of questions. The first question is whether there is room for dissenting voices. Absolutely. I made that very clear in all of the statements I made such as in the public statement of strategy. Much of what we are trying to do in terms of the changes in the Department is to come up with new frameworks that allow a much more robust debate to take place on issues. An example of the type of changes I talk about is that it is now the case that after every MAC meeting – I accept that some people probably do not understand how the Department operates in that respect – but we have a management meeting every Monday, which typically lasts for about an hour and a half. It deals with policy issues and corporate issues. As a way of encouraging more fulsome debate on issues we now have a series of themed discussions that take place for another hour and a half on issues such as the management of the economy, the European strategy that we have, to which we invite the teams that participate in that at all levels, not just the most senior person, to present where they are going with those different priorities. We encourage a robust debate.

I know Deputy Ross does not seem to have much faith in the functioning of all bank boards but some bank boards have functioned well and I have sat on some of them and one of the ways they work well is to bring in the people to make propositions as to what they want to do and encourage a fulsome debate and challenges around those. That has been taking place on the economic side and the EU strategy side and it also takes place in respect of how we deal with the individual banks. I am certain that one of the issues we will deal with at the next meeting when we deal with the banks is the position of auditors and whether we should have a rotation of them and if our plan is correct.

As to the specific question of a whistleblower policy, there is legislation coming down the tracks, under the aegis of the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, but in advance of that since taking up office what we have done is produced for the MAC a whistleblower policy for the Department. It has been circulated to all staff and reiterates that I want to hear the views of all staff members if they have views different to mine or their own bosses. We have channels of communication to allow when people have concerns that they can raise them. A simple example of how carefully we are doing it is that the first version that was drafted suggested that those people should feel free to come directly to me if they did not want to talk to their bosses. Given the experience I have had in the past about how this should work, we broadened it to make it clear that just in case they are afraid of me and do not want to talk to me that they can approach me or the HR manager or other MAC members. We have made a significant step forward in respect of that even in the short time we have been there. Mr. Garrett O'Neill can go into the detail if necessary as he has also been involved in creating the best policy.

Okay. So there has been no victimisation of the assistant principal.

Mr. John Moran

It is quite to the contrary. In fact I have met with this person. I do not wish to talk about individuals.

No, I am not going to name anyone.

Mr. John Moran

She has a new role in the Department which gives her a much more central role.

She is not, as was quoted, ostracised or treated in a negative way.

Mr. John Moran

Absolutely not.

I wish Mr. Moran the very best in his new position. I have only one question.

Mr. John Moran

It must be a hard question.

It is an obvious one. I will try to explain where I am coming from. Like a lot of Members, I debated the fiscal treaty and one of the main points I tried to make is that a "Yes" vote was important because of the perception on investment into the country and that isolating ourselves from Europe right now would not be a good idea. If we were to vote "No" it would send out the wrong signal to people with money looking to invest in this country. Mr. Moran pointed to that in his opening statement with regard to the 148 IDA record number of investments in Ireland. I went away at Easter to a place where there were only a few English speaking channels, one of which was Bloomberg. I do not believe everything I hear on Bloomberg but even at Easter the commentators on the shows were distinguishing Ireland from Portugal, Greece and Spain. They were beginning to make that differentiation, which was a positive thing. The message with regard to how people perceive Ireland is critical because as Mr. Moran knows there is uncertainty in Ireland, even on the ground level. People are saving. They are not spending. They are paying off their debts. The retail sector is collapsing, and in that regard the perception is very important.

We spent the entire referendum campaign telling people that a "Yes" vote was not linked to a reduction in our banking debt. It was made clear from day 1 that it was separate. What I do not understand is that in the two days after the referendum result the impression was given very quickly that a deal on our banking debt might be forthcoming. We then had a response very quickly from the German Ministry of Finance, followed by Mr. Draghi's comments yesterday about there being no quid pro quo. Mr. Moran alluded to it being necessary for his Department and his officials to stay close to the discussions going on in Europe. I come back to the question of perception. It is not helpful when we go through this process of saying that the “Yes” vote was completely separate from our banking debt, where two days later people are given some hope in terms of the idea that there would be a reduction in our banking debt only to have the German Ministry of Finance and Mr. Draghi make their comments which beat that idea on its head very quickly. The perception is not good.

Communications within Government must be tighter. Deputy O'Donnell asked Mr. Moran a question about Spanish debt. I have heard Ministers talking about Spanish debt but it turned out there was no basis for their comments in some cases. That process needs to be tighter, and Mr. Moran's Department is central to that and to the type of discussions it has with Ministers and the message it gives them. I do not expect it to shut politicians up. That is not its role, but the message needs to be tighter with regard to our position on negotiations and the possibility of banking debt reduction because of the major uncertainty that exists, even on the ground. I am aware Mr. Moran is new to this job. It is becoming annoying for people to read one comment in the newspapers one day and then to have it clarified by someone domestically or someone in the German Ministry of Finance. It does not help matters. The communications to the public from Mr. Moran's Department, through the Ministers, needs to be tighter. Mr. Moran might respond to that.

Mr. John Moran

I am not sure. Part of what the Deputy said is that we should not have a role in the Department in terms of what politicians say or should not say.

Mr. Moran did say that it was key for his Department to stay close to the discussions going on around Europe. Was Mr. Moran aware that the German Ministry of Finance had such a negative opinion on what was being asked for or thrown out for discussion in the two days following the referendum?

Mr. John Moran

The discussions around the European crisis take place across a range of different areas. They take place in the ECOFIN meetings, in the preparatory discussions for the euro working group, and in a series of bilateral discussions that go on around those. To follow the Deputy's terminology, what is said by politicians in Ireland is not something our Department can control and we have even less of a role in discussing what German politicians or indeed any other politicians say across Europe.

What happened in respect of this arrangement, and I referred to this earlier, is that a number of elements are required to solve the situation of the banking debt. They are complicated and need a lot of discussion to take place. Ongoing discussions are continuing with all the relevant parties, both the individual treasuries, the staff of the IMF, the staff of the European Commission, and the staff of the European Central Bank. They continue to go on as we speak in terms of our "asks", if I can call it that, and what we think is important to bring to bear on the Irish bank debt, the type of tool kits that are needed. Each individual country, I suspect, is also engaged in the same type of issues and inevitably discussions were crossed.

I think Mr. Moran understands my point. Going back to his line about close discussions around Europe, it is not helpful when it is thrown out that a deal is coming down the line which is corrected quickly and forcefully by Mr. Draghi or somebody from the German finance ministry. It does not help in dealing with the current uncertainty. I presume Mr. Moran's officials would be talking to the German Ministry of Finance and would know its opinion with regard to our position and any possible reduction in our banking debt. That is my point. I have no problem with people being positive but I am beginning to have a problem with people who are making comments, perhaps unwittingly, that have no basis. It does not help, and I think Mr. Moran's Department has a role with regard to communicating a clear message that is not deviated from and does not add to the current uncertainty.

Mr. John Moran

We have put in a lot of effort in the past year around the banking sector, and I could speak to that in terms of what we have been doing there. Since we started on this process last March we started engaging in a much more proactive way with the outside world, not just at ministerial level but at official level. That is an important development to take place because we need to be able to hear what people are saying on the outside and be able to communicate, in effect, what we are trying to do. The issues are extremely complex and as the Deputy said, it is very easy for things to be misunderstood. That is one of the reasons, as we have gone through even the bank crisis situation, we have gone to great pains in our Department to put together at the end of every quarter a series of presentations, which I think have been shared with the committee as well in preparation for today, that explain the steps we are trying to do, why we are doing it and where we are hoping to go. Instead of waiting for people to ask us lots of questions about matters we have tried to proactively get out information about the bank debt, the promissory note and, frankly, the deposits because it has been a very helpful communication point to explain to the world that the deposits are coming back.

Mr. Moran is coming back to my original point, and I will conclude on this. I refer again to my Bloomberg experience. The perception of people who might want to invest in this country is desperately important right now. It is critical that we do not have mixed messages or the kind of reaction from figures in Europe that we have had in the past three or four days clarifying something that had no basis in the first place. That is from where I am coming. It is important that we keep a handle on that kind of communication within the Government.

I thank Mr. Moran and his officials for attending. Following on from what Deputy Deasy said, one of the benefits of this committee and what we are doing today is to try to bring clarity to much of what is happening in the Department, the country and the wider economy but I seek clarification on a particular point which Deputy O'Donnell raised earlier. In regard to what was happening with the ESM in talks around Spain's banking debt, Mr. Moran said it was our policy to retrofit any new policy measures to ensure they would ease the banking debt put on our sovereign debt. Is that correct?

Mr. John Moran

To say it is our policy is probably incorrect. The process of dealing with the European crisis, which has been going on for quiet some time, has tended to involve the introduction - not necessarily in one big-bang approach but on a step-by-step basis - of amendments to existing or new policy tools. The reality faced by Ireland is that its banking crisis was one of the first in Europe. The aspects thereof that were dealt with by people before me and the problems that were faced led to the introduction of policy measures in Ireland and the utilisation of toolkits that were available in Europe at the time. These were probably not as fit for purpose as the ones we have today. There is certainly great speculation in the press about other banking crises that have some parallels with ours and which could lead to some of the issues that followed our implementation of measures to address ours. They could lead to similar problems. There is speculation that new aspects or new tools might be brought to bear to alleviate the pressure that might arise if dealing with a banking crisis domestically, which pressure might not occur if one were to deal with the problem on a more pan-European basis. If those tools become available, it will be essential that we try to position ourselves to take advantage of them with a view to retrofitting the tools we already have. This would be to determine whether doing so can give us a better result than we would otherwise have.

Is Ireland the only country in Europe that has changed banking debt to sovereign debt?

Mr. John Moran

No, the Portuguese did so earlier this week.

To what extent?

Mr. John Moran

The requirement of their banks was another €6.5 billion at the beginning of the year. There is much ongoing discussion as to what will happen in other countries such as Cyprus, which faces similar problems. The latter's problem is very significant by GDP standards even though the absolute amount is very small.

At the moment, it is just Ireland and Portugal.

Mr. John Moran

Each of the other countries, because it is not in a programme, is able to continue to borrow money on its own. In Belgium, France and Germany, the authorities have been able to take the debt on at the sovereign level without necessarily using a programme. It is fair to say the banks have been capitalised by states in other countries, but not in the same way as us, that is, through a programme.

To clarify that point, the reason this matter has arisen in respect of our banking debt is that of the moves Spain will have to make if it is to avoid taking banking debt on as sovereign debt as part of its bailout programme. Is that from where this is coming?

Mr. John Moran

No. For quite some time, we have supported the view - I may have said this early last year at a meeting of the Irish Banking Federation - that the appropriate way to deal with domestic banking crises that are significant in size relative to the size of the country is to operate on a mutualised basis. That should apply in terms of guarantees of the debt of the banks, the deposits of the banks and, in an ideal world, the capitalisation of the banks, if required. The resolution of banks that run into trouble should occur in Europe largely in a similar way to that which obtains in the United States and England. No one expected the city of Sunderland to have been required to bail out Northern Rock. The problem was handled at the centre of the currency union. The same happens in the United States. States in which the banks are headquartered, be a Delaware or North Carolina, are not individually responsible for bearing the burden of capitalising banks that happen to be located therein. Europe has been asked by many, including Ireland, to continue to move forward in that direction as it represents a better way to handle the process. It is the case that the crisis of the Spanish banking system has become more acute relatively quickly. Therefore, the same types of issues that would have been part of a debate by Ireland in respect of bank debt for quite some time are now issues for debate by my Spanish colleague and other counterparts associated with the European agenda.

Let me address another issue associated with our bailout programme? How much funding is left in the programme?

Mr. John Moran

I believe approximately €67 billion has been drawn down. I can confirm that number.

The funding that is left is due to run out at the end of 2013.

Mr. John Moran

I referred the re-financing wall at the beginning of 2014. This is really the key point for us. There is a remaining re-financing obstacle beginning in 2014 and we do not have available funding or cash reserves to surmount it.

We are talking about dipping our toes back into the market prior to then to determine whether we can raise money in the markets ourselves. We are going to try it this year.

Mr. John Moran

This has been managed by the NTMA. Therefore, the right person to answer the question is Mr. John Corrigan. The Minister has stated that, as an optimum result, it would be desirable if market conditions were to allow that approach. Even in the past three or four weeks, we have been in a different place from that which we might have expected four weeks ago. Were market conditions to permit the approach in question, it would be the right one. As the Deputy may be aware, the IMF process associated with the programme is always seeking a period of approximately 12 months to ensure the State has finances to continue or allow draw-downs. As with any re-entry to the markets, it is important to start achieving market access in a limited way. There are two choices; one can have a big bang or the alternative approach. Most people would say one should proceed as I describe.

In a limited way?

Mr. John Moran

One should start in a limited way-----

One should start 12 months before 2014, for example. At what price are we willing to enter the markets?

Mr. John Moran

Again, these are issues for the NTMA.

Mr. Moran must have a view on it. He must have discussed it with the NTMA.

Mr. John Moran

We have another change in the way we are running the debates on these issues in the Department. We have introduced a new funding-the-State committee which will involve the people who will be able to have debates on how to approach using available assets better to gain access to funding, to fund infrastructural developments and to get back into the markets.

Surely the funding of the State is central to Mr. Moran's role as Secretary General of the Department of Finance. I refer to the management of the budget and the adjustment that needs to take place over the next three to four years.

Mr. John Moran

This is one of the reasons I have done what I have done. As I stated to Deputy Ross, a measure I wanted to introduce in the Department was one that would allow for many more fora in which issues like these could be debated by senior departmental officials and other relevant stakeholders. The Deputy is correct; funding of the State is a key part of the role of the Department and needs to be considered in a much more holistic way. The committee will allow us to do so.

Mr. Moran must now have an idea as to the kind of rate he believes to be affordable for the State given that we will be returning to the markets within the next six months and given what we need to achieve.

Mr. John Moran

We have a sense, but decisions on that relate to policy decisions on the rate for which the Government will opt. Our job will be to assess the impact of that on the sustainability of debt, for example. It is clear that, on examining the spreads for today, which show a figure close to 7%, we would not be doing that.

What is the rate from the ESM?

Mr. John Moran

It would effectively be the same. I can obtain the exact rate for the Deputy. It is important to note that the programmes in Europe are now designed, after the changes of last year, not necessarily to offer penal rates for countries but rates that would give countries the time and the breathing space they need to restore their economic positions to the point where they could re-enter the markets.

Therefore, the rate probably would be between 3% and 2.5%.

Mr. John Moran

I do not have the figure. I would assume so.

It is highly unlikely that we will be able to obtain funding at that price when we enter the markets in January next year.

Mr. John Moran

The choice one must make, which is ultimately one for the NTMA in advising the Government, concerns the trade-off between independence regarding one's funding, which would allow one to trade in the market directly, and continuing with a programme or the ESM funding. If the structure remains, there could be cheaper funding that market access would allow. One may still want to opt for more expensive funding because it would give one back economic sovereignty.

Will these new structures then come up at that price, that is, what we are willing to pay to exit the bailout or to exit such conditionalities?

Mr. John Moran

If one considers the position of those countries that are under speculation as to whether they should be in a bailout, all of them have issued debt in recent months and for some time that is far in excess, as a cost, of the cost of the bailouts. However, they prefer to so do as a part of operating independent treasuries rather than taking the economic gain of taking the cheaper funding.

As for our funding in the bailout-----

Mr. John Moran

I remind the Deputy that, ultimately, this is a policy choice as to which preference the Government chooses. We can advise on what is the impact on different debt sustainability and on what are the other measures that may be needed if one chooses a funding that is more expensive than the programme.

While the actual funding in the bailout runs out at the end of next year, we still will be in the programme until 2015. Is that correct? I refer to the conditions we must meet.

Mr. John Moran

Yes.

So by 2013, we will not have returned sovereignty to the people, because we still will be in the bailout until 2015, but we will have access to new funding.

Mr. John Moran

The bailout is funding available to us.

Albeit with conditions that last to 2015

Mr. John Moran

But the conditions are conditions we would say should be done in any event, regardless of whether there was a bailout.

Why not borrow at a cheaper rate under the ESM under the cover of those conditions?

Mr. John Moran

Again, there are options available.

Okay. But is that being considered?

Mr. John Moran

At the time, one will consider all options as to what is right. I cannot speculate today as to what advice I would give to the Government about the policy choices in 2013, when we do not know what will be the market rates.

However, the fact is those policy choices will face us much sooner than 2013, because we will be dipping our toes back into the markets 12 months in advance of that. Consequently, this is something that is being considered at present.

Mr. John Moran

Yes. The NTMA is the arm of the State that considers in the first instance the real detail on the choices the Deputy is considering-----

Mr. John Moran

----- in terms of whether it is profitable to go into the markets today in limited amounts to raise funding. The banks have the same issues. For example, the banks are addressing whether they will, as they are doing, pay higher rates on corporate deposits to be able to issue deposits that are not guaranteed by the State. We certainly would encourage them to do this because it helps to reduce the level of support given by the State to the banks. These are treasury decisions that must be taken as-----

Is it possible that we could be in two bailout programmes concurrently? I refer to a scenario in which we were obliged to access the ESM because we could not afford or did not like the price at which the markets were pricing Irish debt.

Mr. John Moran

Essentially yes, because one would be looking at a tapping in to the available sources of funding. I could not tell the Deputy now what are the rules as to whether one must first exhaust one's first bailout in respect of all the available funding before one can tap into the ESM. Perhaps one of my colleagues knows the answer to that. Essentially however, bearing in mind we still will be running a deficit into next year and consequently must find funding to keep the lights on, the process of funding the State will be a matter of looking at all available funding sources into which we can tap and using them to the best interests. They will have certain trade-offs.

Okay. For example, does Ireland have a large debt repayment to make in 2014?

Mr. John Moran

To my recollection, it is early 2014.

What is the amount?

Mr. John Moran

It used to be approximately €14 billion but some of it was dealt with by the bond swap that was carried out earlier this year. They have been working that down.

I refer to specific information Mr. Moran does not have to hand this morning, such as that pertaining to the last question. He might make it available to the committee, if someone has taken a note of the information sought-----

Mr. John Moran

Yes, we can do that, no problem.

----- and give us the detail on it in order that we can follow up.

Mr. John Moran

Absolutely.

It is time for the Deputy to conclude.

As for the fiscal adjustment Ireland must make between now and 2015, I believe it is approximately €8.5 billion over three years, in terms of the gap between revenue coming in and what we are spending. However, that is separate from the debt repayment that must be made in 2014. Is the Department considering the possible use of the ESM as a vehicle to manage it off our books, as in to roll over that debt in order that it would not fall to the taxpayer and the State's budget adjustments between now and 2015?

Mr. John Moran

We are looking at all options. One reason we have been looking at how the restructuring of the bank debt can be done is exactly the same type of issue. The refunding obligations in respect of the bank debt with which we must deal - take the promissory note - require us to borrow money to make those payments over the course of the next couple of years. If we find ways to adjust the schedule of repayments on that debt, that means we do not necessarily have to be back in the markets in 2014 to the extent we would be obliged to be in the markets today. To the extent that the arrangement, if any, around bank debt restructuring presents a cost of funding that is more appealing than going back into the markets or even than the ESM, we certainly will want to take advantage of that, if it is available to us. This is a moving picture that changes on an almost weekly or biweekly basis. We have built a certain assumption into our projections as to what will be the cost of funds to the State. I refer to the extent to which we can achieve market access at lower than that cost, thereby ending up with a better debt stability point. A policy decision must be taken and I cannot necessarily tell the Deputy what that will be. It would be a policy decision by the Government as to what should be done with the trajectory that now was slightly different, as to whether it was preferable to repay debt at that stage or to continue with fiscal consolidation. What is clear is that a 3% target is set out for 2015 and we will be working to that target. All these various elements will help us to get there or hinder us, depending on the choices that are made.

To conclude, in the context of Ireland's passing of the stability treaty referendum and the ESM now being open to us, this has been brought more sharply into focus. We now know it is a possibility and I am sure it is being considered as a likelihood.

Mr. John Moran

Absolutely, but the key part of ESM availability to us is the insurance policy it provides to us. It is not necessarily that one wishes to use it; it is the fact it is available to one if one needs it. Therefore, with the optimal result of returning and leaving the programme funding and the bailout framework as soon as possible, the existence of that safety net is what may be the trigger or the comfort factor that allows market participants to come in, in the knowledge that, in respect of the 2014 funding cliff for example, were we not to raise enough money between now and that moment in time, the ESM would be available to cover that requirement at that time. If we raise money between now and then, we may never need the ESM treatment or may decide not to use it at that time. However, it would be tough to be faced with the guillotine of the aforementioned funding cliff without the safety net. This is the reason it is so important to be able to choose all these options.

I wish Mr. Moran well in his new role. However, at the outset I must note that in his opening remarks, he referred to a welcome rebound in economic activity last year. I note his subsequent comments on dissenting voices and open debate within his Department. I certainly hope this assessment of the level of economic activity is contested vigorously within the Department's ranks, given that in the past year, there have been four downward revisions in respect of economic growth. I was gobsmacked to see this couched in such language and I wished to make this point to the Secretary General.

My colleagues have covered much of the technical element on the relationship between the circumstances in which Spain now finds herself and what one is told are Ireland's attempts at Government level to secure a deal on our debt. What, if any, is the level of communication between Dublin and Madrid, between our system and the Spanish system on these matters?

Mr. John Moran

I think the Deputy is aware that there are ongoing publications all the time. The way in which the European system is set up, there is a framework of committees with representatives of all the various countries. Papers get processed through that system effectively up to the working group level, and then ultimately up to the Ecofin group, as regards my own Department's specific role in that.

One then gets into situations, either at the fringes of those meetings or potentially at bilateral calls between different countries, where discussions can take place.

I understand the multilateral element of it but I am referring to bilateral communications. Unlike Deputy Deasy, I do not lay the blame for the message that was sent out after the referendum in respect of the potential for a deal on debt, at Mr. Moran's feet. It was the Taoiseach who articulated that position, so it is a matter for him to stand over it, but there is a general sense that there is now a direct relationship between the capacity of this State to achieve something unspecified on the debt, and the fate of Spain and the argument it is making. I want to know about that bilateral communication. In other words, is Spain an ally for us now, in much the same way as we rode on Greece's coat-tails in respect of a reduction in the interest rate? Are we look to Spain and cultivating a strategy or relationship to yield that for us?

Mr. John Moran

The Deputy will be well aware that discussions take place across different countries on a bilateral basis on a number of different fronts. I certainly cannot quantify for the Deputy how many contacts were made with officials of Departments.

Is Mr. Moran talking to his opposite number in Madrid?

Mr. John Moran

Not specifically because the relationship we have with European governments is handled by Mr. Jim O'Brien and the international team in our Department. One of the changes we brought in when we introduced the new statement of strategy, was to think much more holistically about how we deal with the EU and the interaction we have with Europe. Therefore the mandate that team has is to engage in much more enhanced bilateral discussions with all European governments, not just with the Spanish.

That is very laudable.

Mr. John Moran

They have certainly been doing that in the last week.

That is marvellous but can I suggest that in the current political climate and looking to a potential opportunity for us, that a key discussion at every level should be between this system and the Spanish system, and arguably between this system and the Cypriot one? I do not lay this at Mr. Moran's feet, but I have no sense from the Government of any thought-out strategy or alliances with other member states, bar running back and forth to Angela Merkel. With due respect to all concerned, that has clearly failed. There is no sense at governmental level that there is that level of activity. Perhaps they are being discreet in their utterances. I would like to hear from Mr. Moran, as the man who is now in charge, that his Department and the permanent government is ahead of the curve in this respect. I would anticipate that there is an intensive bilateral discussion between yourselves and the Spanish system. That would be in our interests now.

Mr. John Moran

I think the answer is "Yes", although that was a long question and I am not sure exactly what it was. If the question was "Are we, as a Department, engaging in bilateral discussions with our colleagues across Europe?-----

No, I am not asking that. I am talking about the Spanish state and Madrid.

Mr. John Moran

I think it is fair to say that there are elements of each of the European countries that have advantages for us. The Deputy referred to the creation of alliances and a thought process around how Europe should move forward. It is equally important that we address those concerns and ideas, as we have been doing with many other treasuries, including those in Spain, Portugal, Cyprus and others. Just because the problem has developed in Spain now, and all of our focus is on Spain this week, it would not be reflective of a strategy or longer-term strategy that we are implementing.

The problem has not just developed in Spain now. This has been a long burner and there are distinctions. The clear parallels between the scenario here and the one in Spain have long since been identified. I am not asking this question in a spirit of "Did you raise the ‘phone last Tuesday?" The general public would like to hear that the system here is on its game and is speaking to the relevant people, sharing the relevant information, and joining forces to give the argument for debt relief here more force. We have heard all about the complexity of the discussions around the promissory note for a long time. I have no doubt but that the matters are complex, that is a given. There is one simple element in this, however, which is that we need to achieve a result. Because we are a small peripheral country, we need to have the leverage, relationship and intensive bilateral contact with the likes of Spain which, as I instanced to Mr. Moran, would be to our advantage.

Although one cannot stop them, the politicians are not indicating that is the case, although they then look hopefully to Spain for some kind of comfort. I am asking Mr. Moran, as head of the Department, about the level of that bilateral contact, although he is not answering me.

Mr. John Moran

Let me try.

I would expect a more specific focus on the likes of Spain, for instance, than some of the other EU partners because there are such obvious parallels and because there is such an urgency for all of us in respect of getting something concerning the debt burden. Does Mr. Moran understand what I am saying to him?

Mr. John Moran

I understand. Let me try to give the Deputy some comfort by explaining the changes that have taken place even in the last year, but specifically in the last few months. I think she will be able to draw the appropriate conclusions from that, without necessarily specifically talking about one situation. The level of engagement that has taken place historically between Irish officials and their counterparts in Europe, tended to be quite restricted around the involvement of committees in Brussels. In the last year, we have seen a transformation of that approach into not only relying on discussions around committees, but also engaging with our colleagues across other European countries. I myself have been in Berlin, Paris and London, and am due to go to other European capitals shortly.

Has Mr. Moran been in Madrid?

Mr. John Moran

I may even go to Madrid.

Mr. John Moran

I have not been there.

Could I suggest strongly to Mr. Moran that he should do so?

Mr. John Moran

I have other colleagues, however, that have been involved in it. One of the other key parts of the change in respect of the way my own Department interacts with the European system and the system outside Europe, is that the Department now has an international economic affairs division to which we have seconded two people from the Department of Foreign Affairs - one of whom was in the embassy in Paris and the other was in the embassy in Berlin, and before that in China. They now work in the Department so they form the nexus we need between ambassadors, who are on site and are engaging frequently with officials in Madrid and capitals in other European countries, so that the message that needs to be communicated on behalf of Ireland to represent our position, and the information we need to get - in some cases, in advance of it being distributed in Europe - has got a direct channel to our Department. We can therefore use that channel to dissimulate across various other places the information we need to be able to assess exactly what the Deputy is getting at - which is, at what stage is it appropriate for me to go to Madrid, if that is the right place to be, or to go elsewhere if that is the optimum? All of that is a necessary part of the process of operating in a system that is as complex in terms of decision-making as the European system. We are dealing both with the 17 eurozone countries and the 27 EU member states, as well as with technical issues and, potentially, decision-making where it is sometimes difficult to tease out all the nuances.

I understand that and I am familiar with all those channels. I am not questioning whether those channels are in place.

Mr. John Moran

We did not before but we now do.

That is not my point. My point is there is a political immediacy around this issue. We accept this across the board. In the first instance, there is a crisis in Spain, as it presents at a fairly critical juncture. If one adds to that the deliberations around the European Stability Mechanism, ESM, the target date for it and that Spain will be a considerable contributor to it and a key player in it, some 11% to the ESM, it is a no-brainer that there is a coincidence of interests between this State and Spain at this specific point in time.

I have very little faith that figures in government are nimble-footed in pursuing these matters. What I am hearing from Mr. Moran about protocols and processes suggests to me that sluggish approach is replicated in the Department. I know the Department has its channels and how complex the entire system is but there is a simple proposition here. Spain is looking for something and is saying, "Play ball with us or the euro has a problem." They understand the absolute gravity of the situation if its sovereign becomes encumbered in the way we have experienced. What I cannot understand is why there is not a much more active pursuance by the Government or the Department. It is sluggish, slow and represents all the things for which, sometimes even unfairly, the public sector and the Civil Service are criticised.

Mr. John Moran

The Deputy is misunderstanding what I am saying.

I do not think I am.

Mr. John Moran

There has been very active consideration by all counterparts of all the issues around Spain and their implications. There are issues that countries will decide to keep to themselves. They may decide it is in their best interest not to necessarily share certain matters. We spoke about communications and the lack of wisdom in having potentially negotiations about sensitive issues taking place in open forum. The Deputy will understand there is a limit on what I can say about the details. I can assure her that discussions are taking place with the Spanish and with others so we understand, as best we can based on the information that will be released to us by the Spanish Government or the people they are talking to, what might be the implications for our situation domestically or, more importantly, what are the implications for the broader European picture. I can assure the Deputy it is not sluggish and slow.

I do not feel the least bit reassured by that. That is not what I hear. I have made my point, however. I hope Mr. Moran heard that in the spirit of active and lively discussion. There is now a real expectation among taxpayers and citizens that a deal will be done on the debt issue. The average citizen looks to the window this Spanish positioning affords us. There will be no glory or honour for either people in government or departmental officials, such as Mr. Moran, if in the public mind that window is squandered. I make that point in a spirit of assistance to Mr. Moran.

On the general government debt statistical discrepancy, I see the internal report was signed off on 23 March and the external report on 8 May. It is obvious the internal review was carried out first and was then used as the basis for the external review by Deloitte and Touche. Why was this sequence chosen to investigate this matter?

Mr. John Moran

I am not sure if the Deputy is aware of comments I made in my opening statement.

I have seen them. I have read them.

Mr. John Moran

The choice of the way the reviews were done was not my choice. I cannot speculate on the way it was done. The two reviews cover somewhat different ground. The first review was the more difficult to conduct with speed because focusing on individuals and the roles they had in the process in a granular way leads itself to much more controls being imposed by the Attorney General's office. As I understand, these controls affected the speed at which it could be conducted, the way we needed to have an interaction between that team and the sharing of information.

The second report, referred to as the review by Deloitte and Touche, was shared with me not too long before the date mentioned by the Deputy. We worked with the premise that the first debate on the matter should take place at this forum. In essence, I know there have been delays for some weeks but we were working to have the review delivered to this forum. It is not like we have been sitting on these reports and not doing anything about them.

I am not suggesting that for a second.

I am asking quite a different question. It strikes me as odd that the Department would first do an internal review and then that internal review would be handed to an external reviewer to guide them on their review on the same set of events, structures and so on. I do not understand how that makes any sense.

Mr. John Moran

I have the disadvantage of not deciding on this review or being at the committee when it was discussed beforehand. I would have thought this arrangement was agreed and put in place. Without the transcript, I cannot tell the Deputy what was the debate on the matter. This is the process that was put in place. What we have is two reports that identify weaknesses in the structures of the Department and the way it works. As I mentioned earlier, I do not want to have that corrected just necessarily in that one part of the Department. It is a symptom of changes of processes-----

Just before we go there, I do not have a recollection of the committee being told there were going to be two separate processes.

No, we were told there would be two processes.

I understood all along it was going outside. If I am not mistaken, when Mr. Cardiff appeared before the committee, he said he would be investigating matters.

The Minister said there would be an internal review.

I still think it causes a dilemma.

In the internal review, the statistician in question is identified time and time again with their decisions and communications thoroughly scrutinised, as it should be, given the turn of events.

What strikes me forcibly from the report is that it is mute, so far as I can establish, in respect of responsibility further up the chain. There is no commentary, good, bad or indifferent, in respect of the role of the former Secretary General, Mr. Moran's predecessor, the person in charge of the Department. That is astonishing considering it is a piece of work to identify the flaws, what went wrong, etc. I put that to Mr. Moran and ask for his reaction.

Mr. John Moran

When one commissions a report, it is important that one lets the drafters of the report draft the report they want to draft and there should not be interference by us. That would be something one would want to have in the same way as one would not want me taking pieces out of the report that they would like to put in.

What has happened - this is where it is more important to focus - is that there are weaknesses identified in the system and we have tried to address those issues. I think I mentioned earlier that, for me, the biggest message out of the various reports has been the lack of clarity around individual accountability. When I say "individual", I do not necessarily mean by a person. I mean individual units or functions of the Department or, indeed, other parts of the system outside of the Department, have to have greater clarity around what their actual job is rather than having the duplication of functions of preparation of documents that was a feature of that, and in many ways, is a feature of the system because of the fact that historically the resources have not been put in place to have the checks and balances one needs to have.

Earlier, I referred to the fact that mistakes will be made. We cannot avoid human error in the system. What we have to do is minimise the impact of that by having a checks-and-balance system that catches those mistakes when they occur and surfaces those issues so that they can be dealt with. We have changed the overall structure of that section of the Department by combining the preparation of, effectively, the Government accounts under a new finance and risk department, which is headed up by Mr. Garrett O'Neill, who is new to the Department and who will be assessing those controls and all the procedures that apply around the preparation, not just of the other accounts we have here which deal with the normal matters of the Department but also the preparation of the Government accounts, the Government debt numbers and everything else, so that we have a much more robust system.

The other thing that was also lacking at the time is that there was not even an appropriate extension - to my mind, and I think the reviews would concur - of the role of internal audit and the audit committee to cover functions like this, and that has been extended. In fact, since I have been in place I think I have had four meetings with the chair of the audit committee, meeting with the internal committee. I have sat with the audit committee where I have tried to get an extension of the way that they look at the matter so that we are looking as much around the processes of the Department, and how these work, so that they can help inform us about what needs to take place. I have also referred, in the statement of strategy, to the idea of bringing a completely different risk framework into the system so that there is a better identification of risks and a better allocation of resources to where the risks occur.

I appreciate all of that. In Mr. Moran's remarks this morning, he referred to the core blocks or pillars that were identified in the reviews. The only absence there that I noted was on the issue of communications. A good communications structure was not one of Mr. Moran's bullet points but no doubt he is attending to that also.

I bring Mr. Moran back to my central point. Anybody reading those review documents would see that there were clearly systems failures. Clearly, there is always a capacity for human error, and that is all right. However, what screams from the document is a big question mark around the quality and level of leadership within the Department and senior managerial responsibility, and I refer, in particular, to the Secretary General of the Department. It strikes me that a review that analyses in great detail the statistician or statisticians in question and that has nothing to say in respect of the person in charge, the person with whom the buck stops, is an incomplete document.

Mr. Moran states that one cannot tell people the report to write, and that is fair enough. I can only take from that that those internal reviewers, and, indeed, Deloitte, did not think there was a question to be asked in respect of that leadership at the most senior level. That is very odd. Any objective person working through that material would clearly analyse the systems failures and the process dilemmas that needed to be resolved, for example, the actions of the statisticians in question, but they would ask where was the guy who was in charge of all of this and how could something like this pass on his or her watch. Why, therefore, in neither document is there no reference whatsoever, no critique or recommendation in respect of that?

Can I add a comment to that before Mr. Moran answers?

Certainly, I am finished.

Then to pick up on where Deputy McDonald left off, I have to say that I am deeply disappointed with the two reports. Neither report deals with the issue that was raised here with the previous Secretary General. The manner in which the report seems to have been compiled was that the internal report was completed; it was that internal report, and its findings, that Deloitte dealt with, and hence the other, second, external report.

Mr. Moran is correct in stating that human error will never go away; it is always there. There is no one in this room or any other room who has not made mistakes. I have made them in my business life, and I am sure in my political life, but I never paid anyone €61,000 to tell me what mistake I made. I always stood up and recognised the fact that I made a mistake.

On what is missing from the report, the report is similar to any other report as issued by Departments over the past number of years. It is always a systems failure. It has always come across the desks here of the Committee of Public Accounts as being a failure of some system or other, for example, some IT system or some middle-ranking to low-ranking junior staff in a Department. It is never a senior person standing up and taking responsibility. If senior civil servants are taking their paychecks with their names on them, alongside those comes a responsibility.

The responsibility in this case of those line managers was to stand up and state that they left that statistician on his or her own and did not put around him or her the appropriate necessary supports for him or her to complete the job. It was failure of management in the Department that caused that to happen, yet there is no mention of management in either of the reports. That is what I find so shocking and unacceptable about the report.

It does the civil servants, and the Civil Service generally, no good that such reports are going out there. The taxpayer will be appalled that, yet again, on top of the €3.6 billion error, the Department spent €61,500 to tell us that the statistician, the weaknesses in the Department, etc., remained there without being corrected. I would direct Mr. Moran to the hearing of the committee with the Central Statistics Office. It, quite clearly, and simply, explained to us what had happened. It did not cost the CSO €61,500.

It would have been much better for everyone concerned had Mr. Cardiff come back from his job in Europe and taken the time to tell us that it was his human error, maybe, in terms of his management, that caused the overlook of the fact that appropriate numbers of staff, or support staff, were not in place. I mention this because Mr. Moran suggested that he is open to robust exchange in his Department. I am delighted with what he said regarding the whistleblower who should be promoted rather than intimidated or pushed to one side. I am delighted that is not the case. I would love to see the Department's guidelines on whistleblowers because it would be a useful example for other Departments to follow. That is as much as I will say about the report. It was a whitewash of the critical issues that needed to be examined and it is shocking the Department felt it should spend €61,000 to produce it. Having listened carefully to Mr. Moran, my only hope is that the new type of culture which he described is introduced by him to his Department and that other Departments follow suit. I wish him well in his work in that regard. We can learn lessons from what has happened and how these reports were produced.

In regard to the €61,500 spent on the report, was a procurement process entered into and were others interested in doing the work? Did someone just pick Deloitte and pay it €61,500?

Mr. John Moran

I do not have all the details but perhaps the Chair will allow me to respond in writing with specific reference to the details. I recall a discussion about the difficulty encountered in finding people who were willing to do the work.

Do not tell me that.

Mr. John Moran

I will revert to the committee with the specific information.

I hope there was a procurement process and that other people were interested in the work. If there was no procurement process I want to know who selected Deloitte and how its name cropped up. It seems to me to be part of the nonsense and poor management that obtained in that Department for years. The report itself - I do not want to prolong this because it annoys me so much - referred to similar errors which occurred in 2004, 2005 and 2006. It just happened that 2010 was the big one involving €3.6 billion. To pretend that it was one year and an individual statistician is simply wrong. It is difficult to even read the report because it is written in a language that is almost not English. All we asked for was a report that would be sufficiently independent to tell us what happened in the Department regarding this error. Based on what the CSO had to say to us we could have made a recommendation that it be given the task of recording these figures.

Neither report sets out exactly what happened in a one page summary.

That is the point I am making. Our exchange with the CSO could have been summarised on one page, as could the action required. It showed appalling management within the Department and I am disappointed, having had an exchange of views with Mr. Cardiff, that I did not arrange for the report to be presented in his presence.

I do not know why we were expecting anything different because when the terms of reference for the reports were issued in brief, we noted that they were only looking into the systems. We pointed out that was not enough. It is stated in black and white on page 4 of the internal review that it does not "identify individual officials as the purpose of the review is to gather information on the nature of the events and systems surrounding the debt discrepancy." The terms of reference for the external review state: "processes, systems, staffing, and control issues; (Individual staff performance is excluded from the scope of this review)".

We did a good job when we discussed the issue initially as a committee and if we had more time, perhaps two days of special session, we would have gotten to grips with it. Instead we opted for two reports, the terms of reference for which were criticised as not being able to give us the reports we wanted. Six months later our fears have been confirmed. To be fair to Mr. Moran, he was not there at the time. The matter should have been addressed differently by the committee. Perhaps we should not have dealt with it alongside everything else we are discussing with Mr. Moran.

We agreed at the time how the reports should proceed. We discussed the matter with Mr. Cardiff and he understood the message from the committee. If senior civil servants are being paid, a responsibility accompanies that payment.

The terms of reference were set out in a way that ensured we would never get the report we wanted.

We did not set the terms of reference.

I know that but when the terms of reference were set out we criticised them, or at least I did, because they would not give us the kind of report we sought or the report we received through our examination of Mr. Cardiff and the CSO.

Given that criticism it appears that the dogs will bark and the caravan will move on. That will not be the case with this issue and other issues of relevance to this committee. We are determined to focus on the expenditure of each Department in a way that raises issues publicly and ensures the culture and approach to doing business change. I hope the introduction of new people like Mr. Moran will help to bring about that change.

I welcome Mr. Moran and wish him the best of luck in his important new role. He noted that subsequent to the publication of the report, in which there is no great confidence, he met the chairperson of the Department's audit committee or auditors from Deloitte on four occasions.

Mr. John Moran

There were a number of meetings but most of them were independent of the report.

I am curious to learn who Mr. Moran was referring to.

Mr. John Moran

The Department of Finance, like other Departments, has an audit committee. The chair of that committee was one of the first people I asked to meet so that I could get his views, completely independently of these reports, on the robustness of the Department's controls and processes. It quickly became apparent to me that the terms of reference and focus of the audit committee, and in many ways in respect of the internal audit, were not as broad as I would have expected. Some of the meetings which took place - in many ways the report changes are an example of these - focused on ways of identifying how we might best use the limited number of hours available to us in the system for internal audits of the Department over the next six to nine months.

Who is the chair of the audit committee? I am sure it is a public position.

Mr. John Moran

It is a gentleman from the Institute of Public Administration.

I am sure I can identify the individual's name through a freedom of information request or from the Department's website.

Mr. John Moran

His name is Aidan Horan.

I have just heard something shocking. Since taking up his position as Secretary General, Mr. Moran met the chair of the audit committee for the Department of Finance, who is obviously an esteemed member of the Institute of Public Administration, and he says he was not satisfied with the brief, scope and nature of the internal functions in his Department. That is a severe criticism of the chair and, possibly, other members of the audit committee. If this were the chair of the audit committee of a local authority, I might say he was not very experienced. However, we are dealing with the Department of Finance, before it was split in two, which was setting out the template for every other Department on the need for internal audit. It was sending out the memos and recommendations, with the IPA training staff giving the training. I believe the IPA has probably run organised training courses for internal audit committees throughout the public service.

While I am not criticising Mr. Moran, it is shocking that a new Secretary General of the Department of Finance could believe that the chair of the internal audit committee of the Department of Finance, who is really the boss of the boss of the internal audit committees for the entire public service, was not carrying out his or her function in a broad enough manner with which Mr. Moran was not satisfied. I consider that a very serious position. I suspect Mr. Moran sincerely holds his views. However, if that is his view of the internal audit committee in the Department of Finance, it would be a good day's work for Mr. Moran and his counterpart in the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform to interview the chairs of the internal audit committees of all other Departments and perhaps he would have the same view about all of them. It puts a big question mark over the confidence I, as a member of the Committee of Public Accounts, can have in internal audit committees if that is Mr. Moran's initial assessment.

Mr. John Moran

Let me clarify something. I think-----

Does Mr. Moran follow my train of thought?

Mr. John Moran

I follow exactly, but I think the Deputy may have misunderstood something I was saying. First, the person is not here and it is important to state that. The discussion I had at the beginning, in effect not having seen the audit committee in operation before that, was to ask how it runs and what could be done to improve it. It is not a correct representation - I apologise if I gave that impression - that any improvements were all uniquely improvements that I was suggesting to him. Indeed he had improvements and embellishments he thought we could do to the operation of the system. If one puts this in a context, for example, around the internal audit, one will understand perhaps the mindset that I am trying to bring to this which is that in the past for me an internal audit function and an audit committee function are best viewed as significant help to the management of any organisation to identify weaknesses in their systems. Therefore, they need to be properly resourced to do that and given as much assistance as they can get.

This issue first came up in the context of the identification of members of the Department of Finance who could be representatives in effect of the management on the audit committee. Of course that raises certain issues when one comes at it from outside, because it is the case that most audit committees in private organisations would not have members of executives sitting on the committees. So there is already a model that is different. Part of the discussions - dare I say, it was not so philosophical - was a discussion about the role of a committee in the private sector so I could get to better understand this. Out of that came suggestions that we are putting in place, like, for example, that one of the audit committees, of the period of audit committees throughout the year, should take place without any of the executives there so that in effect non-executives, who are represented on the audit committee, could openly discuss what they think about the process. That is an embellishment of the process; it is not necessarily a criticism of a system that was working in the past, but there are always improvements to the system.

The other aspect was to make another change, which was that of the two people from the staff of the Department, who would participate on the audit committee, we chose one person who had previously been in internal audit and therefore should have a knowledge of the process and also chose to pick, not just at principal officer level, which was the original structure, somebody who was actually at the management committee level so that it created an immediate connection between the audit committee activities and indeed the management discussions that we have on a weekly basis. So some of what I am saying is that we have that system. It is fair to say that we would probably both be in agreement, coming at it, I suppose I could say, fresh.

I will take up the Deputy's suggestion to talk to Robert about whether these changes should take places in other Departments. They may already be in other Departments, I do not know. I was simply taking on board what I had in front of me. The scope of the internal audit and in some respects the scope that had been assigned to the audit committee to my mind could profitably be expanded so that they could both as institutions play a much better role in what we do, but then one faces the opposite problem. That is why looking back on history is somewhat difficult because one never knows who actually gave rise to any result.

One then faces the issue that when I look at the number of hours allocated to the internal audit of the Department of Finance, for example the maximum allocation we could get on foot of contingency matters is to my mind way too small. Were we to have an issue - I hope not - and find another problem like the €3.6 billion, there is almost no available resource to actually do an internal audit of that matter from now to the end of the year. We talk about €61,000, but we do not have anything available. So we have tried for the remainder of this year - again to help me and to help Garret in terms of actually identifying what we can do to improve the situation - to ask the internal audit team reporting to the audit committee to actually look at areas. This could be done by taking selections of it so I can get a sampling of the quality across the Department or by providing us with a generic assessment without going too deep into the system but until such time as they can give us a sort of a general view of the robustness of the controls.

This is what I would say about the external reports. In many ways I have inherited the two reports in terms of trying to decide what can be done in the future. I understand they - in many respects like the discussions with the internal audit and the audit people - identify that the job at hand is of a significant scale in terms of introducing into the system many of the changes that need to take place. One of the points already made - it is in the statement of strategy document and the discussion around that - is, as I said in my opening statement, that when one tries to challenge a Department to deal with a crisis and to deal with a lot more work the difficulty one faces is that one puts an unfair burden on the shoulders of the people working in that Department at a time when they are not resourced. So again we could find ourselves in a situation of saying that the internal audit people should have identified more in the Department of Finance, but if they are not resourced to spend enough time looking at these issues then it is not a fair criticism of that team of people to be saying that they should have done more. They are doing all they can.

I am not criticising the team.

Mr. John Moran

I am not saying that the Deputy is but I am pointing out that I think-----

Mr. Moran has just made another point that concerns me. He has said that owing to the level of resources, if an issue arose between now and the end of the year, the internal audit resources may not be available within the Department to conduct an inquiry. If that is the case in the Department of Finance it makes me wonder whether it is the case in every Department. Do we have all the paperwork in place showing we have an internal audit committee, but it is not really resourced? Mr. Moran has suggested they were not working, were not resourced or were not broad enough. We will come back to the issue another day. If this is the case in the Department of Finance I suspect it could well be the case across other Departments. There are effectively no adequately resourced internal audit functions across Departments between now and the end of the year, if the Department of Finance is typical of all other Departments. There is no reason for it to be the exception.

Mr. John Moran

I cannot comment on any other Department.

I will move on to what I had intended to ask about.

A resource which we continue to ignore, formerly part of the Department of Finance and now with the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform is the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General. In the context of the €3.6 billion error, the Comptroller and Auditor General does not audit the general Government debt and does not audit the Housing Finance Agency despite constant recommendations from this committee. There should be a role for the Comptroller and Attorney General in these two matters. If the recommendation is that the CSO should look after this in future there should be a role for the Comptroller and Attorney General. It is part of the country's audit process and therefore it is better to compile all of the information in one office so we can have complete oversight. It begs the question as to whether the next banana skin for the country in this regard is the €5 billion that goes to local government which cannot be audited by the Comptroller and Attorney General. This is another question that should concern Mr. Moran and the Department because it is a huge amount of money and we cannot follow it. From the discussion at this meeting about the €3.6 billion error, the issue of how general Government debt is audited arises, as do the issues of how the Housing Finance Agency and the €5 billion spend in local government are audited. These are questions with which the Department should be concerned. They are not policy issues in my opinion. They involve serious expenditure of taxpayer money and they should fall under the remit of the Comptroller and Auditor General and therefore this committee.

We have slightly diverted from the questions I intended to ask. When addressing questions from Deputy Shane Ross, Mr. Moran mentioned Mr. Matthew Elderfield which suggested that perhaps because of regulatory changes that may follow agreements which will be made there may be a need for additional capital of €4 billion for the banks. Will Mr. Moran, as Secretary General of the Department of Finance, indicate to us the possible breakdown of to which institutions this €4 billion would go? I do not state it will happen but he indicated it might be likely to happen depending on changes to regulatory procedures.

Mr. John Moran

I am not trying to avoid the question but it really is one of those which I do not think I could answer because of what we are doing with regard to the viability of the banks in terms of moving assets around. Earlier I mentioned the issue of low yielding mortgages in some banks. If these were not in the banks at the time or for some period before it, their profitability profile and their ability to create capital to match the new regulations would be completely different.

To finish on this exact point, perhaps the committee will write to Mr. Elderfield requesting his assessment of how he arrived at the possible figure of €4 billion. He knows from where he got the figure. If we must invest further money in the banks how will it be recorded with regard to the Government deficit? In what year will it be entered? In recent years we have seen that where a large amount of money has been invested in the banks it has been part of the deficit. If we had to invest more money in two years would it be considered part of our deficit?

Mr. John Moran

Not necessarily. The point is that the regulatory changes are designed to require banks to operate with a balance sheet with more equity funding than debt than is the case at present. There is no reason Deputy Fleming should believe the conversion of debt - which is itself a valuable investment in the banks' balance sheet - to an equity component, by the introduction of new equity so there is less need for debt, should in any way need to be written off in any deficit amount. It would be different as a concept in terms of regulatory change. It is designed to require banks, in order to protect the depositors, to operate with a greater level of capital or equity on their balance sheets than is the case at present.

What Mr. Moran is stating is that it is a reclassification in the balance sheet and not new funding.

Mr. John Moran

It will require somebody, whether an outside investor-----

These are the State banks which we own. Who else would want to put money into them?

Mr. John Moran

If at that time there was no other investor willing to invest in the bank in effect we would make a greater investment-----

How would this be reflected in the deficit? What are the accounting procedures?

Mr. John Moran

It should not need to be reflected in the deficit except to the extent that if we were required to borrow money to put it in it would be in the accounts.

We will continue to borrow for the foreseeable future.

Mr. John Moran

Yes, but it would not be treated like the €5.7 billion which was reflected in the deficit last year and rose to €13.1 billion because it reflected the view we would not necessarily get it back. Therefore it could no longer be viewed as an investment. The difference between the two situations is that equity invested in the banks is not to deal with losses in the bank; it is to strengthen the balance sheet of the bank by converting-----

If we classify it as a recoverable investment it does not affect our deficit but if it is classified as a necessary capital injection to cover losses it is a deficit.

Mr. John Moran

An example to explain this is the purchase by the State by the end of the month, if all court cases go well, of Irish Life will not necessarily be an investment we should write off because it is a valuable asset.

Mr. Moran made a comment during one of the discussions when he was asked whether he was happy with the trueness and accuracy of the banks' accounts that banking accounting rules do not adequately allow them to make full provision. Will Mr. Moran explain this comment?

Mr. John Moran

Provisioning in banks tends to look at experience on a loan book historically. There is a tendency to allow for provisioning based on what has happened in the past and not based on what could happen in the future. I will explain the point I was trying to bring out. Provisioning does not allow for the certainty that a particular asset quantity will remain on the banks' accounts. We have capitalised the Irish banks at levels far above the required amounts from an accounting perspective. They have capitalisation level percentages in the high teens. However, they are measured against a future accounting threshold of 10.5%. I expect to see a convergence over time, as losses are experienced during the stress period of the banks, between the accounting number and the capital number as the expected future losses are reflected in new provisions which would reduce the value of the assets.

Mr. Moran expects that over a period of time the accounting rules will have to recognise the actual losses-----

Mr. John Moran

Losses occur during the cycle.

Mr. Moran's instinct is there are hidden losses in the banks' accounts and published financial statements and perhaps from a prudence, provision and conservative point of view they are not taken into account fully.

Mr. John Moran

I would not describe them as hidden because these are the rules to which all international banks and companies operate in terms of the process. What has happened is that the regulator-----

There is such a thing as a reserved accounting. It sounds like reserved losses which is the opposite to having-----

Mr. John Moran

When one looks at the PCAR numbers put in place in March last year one sees a considerable amount of capital put against expected losses which might occur due to the deleveraging of the portfolio of the assets, but the value of these assets, which are held on banks' books under accounting rules, is appropriately held at a different number than the value of the loan minus the capital. When one examines the capital rules, particularly under a stress scenario, one must make certain assumptions about what the future value of assets may be. The accountants would not allow one to make the same assumptions-----

Under international financial standards.

Mr. John Moran

Yes.

I am asking about something that is quite different. Given the fact that the Department of Finance is a shareholder in some of these banks, would it be possible for Mr. Moran, as the Accounting Officer, to produce a separate management report? We understand the obligation to produce the published financial statements in accordance with international financial standards. Is someone producing a management report to Mr. Moran that shows him the differences in the figures about which he is concerned?

Mr. John Moran

In the past year, provisioning in the banks has increased significantly. In a sense, the banks, working with the regulator, are taking the most expensive view of what they believe the provisioning should be.

Reverting to the deleveraging example in terms of what we examine, we monitor each sale in every portfolio before the sale occurs so that we can gauge the price range relative not just to the provisioned, written down loan book of the asset, but also to the value of the asset minus the capital. The best set of accounts - it would be more robust than any management account I might be able to produce - analysis the capital that has been invested in the banks and the nature of that capital. Some of that investment is designed to provide for potential expected losses.

I will broaden that point. What is the difference with NAMA? We will discuss the matter with its representatives separately. NAMA is the largest institution with recoverable loans, in that it is working out those loans like a bank. People will be aware that I raised the question of how NAMA records interest in its accounts. Given the fact that it is operating to financial standards for accounting and reporting systems that are similar to the banks, is Mr. Moran concerned that this issue also arises in respect of NAMA? If not, why not?

Mr. John Moran

I understand that NAMA will appear before the committee shortly.

Yes, but I want the Secretary General's perspective.

Mr. John Moran

An important distinction must be made. Where historical losses are provided for on a bank's balance sheet, one is dealing with the price of the asset when it was originally put on the book. In NAMA's situation, the organisation acquired the assets as a result of a transfer that was not based on historical values but instead reflected a new book.

Mr. John Moran

Yes. Therefore, the situations are not comparable.

It might not be as severe, but there is a similar element. I will address two other points mentioned by Mr. Moran. Did he state that we took on the banking debt as sovereign debt as part of the EU-IMF funding programme?

Mr. John Moran

I am not sure.

I do not know to whom the Secretary General was speaking, but I believe he made that comment. I noted it.

Mr. John Moran

I am not sure of the exact comment. By virtue of borrowing at State level to capitalise the banks, the bailout of the banks is reflected in the sovereign debt. That may have been what I meant.

That is probably what I wanted Mr. Moran to say. He gave the impression that it occurred when we received the programme's funding. I understood him to mean the EU-IMF programme and was about to tell him that we took on the debt much earlier when we effectively nationalised the banks. Are we agreed?

Mr. John Moran

Originally, the responsibility for the banks' debt was effectively associated with the guarantee.

Mr. John Moran

Had the banks stayed solvent throughout the process, the guarantee would not necessarily have had an impact on the State. The contingent liability of the guarantee was originally €400 billion, but it has decreased to €100 billion. While this contingent liability weighs on the shoulders of the sovereign as a contingent liability, it is not the same as when we needed to borrow money to capitalise the banks.

Or nationalise them.

Mr. John Moran

Or invest capital.

That was when we took on the debt.

Mr. John Moran

That was when it became-----

Sovereign debt.

Mr. John Moran

-----a specific burden on the shoulders of the State.

If a new arrangement is reached at EU level in respect of Spain and its banking debts, we do not know what type of mechanism it will be. Mr. Moran wants to see what that mechanism will be and to ask that it be made available to us. Have I understood him correctly?

Mr. John Moran

There are two issues. Developments in other European countries may help to move forward the debate on what should or should not be done, but I will not wait until such time as there is a resolution of the issue in Spain or elsewhere to push our own discussion forward.

If something comes about, it may be useful. To some extent we are spectators, but we might benefit from something that is done for Spain.

Mr. John Moran

I would not necessarily describe us as spectators.

Substantially spectators.

Mr. John Moran

As with our discussions on the interest rate, the same debates were being held between other countries and the European system. If one puts enough people in different rooms working on the same problem, they may find themselves reaching the same answer.

My final question has not been asked yet. I have a difficulty with an issue that relates to the State and some of its debts, in that we have too many agencies dealing with the issue. NAMA is working out the bad bank loans. The Irish Bank Resolution Corporation, IBRC, is doing precisely the same work in respect of its bad loans. Mr. Moran will call it a policy matter, but let us discuss the practicalities. Under the land aggregation scheme, the Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government's Housing Agency has taken over loans worth €500 million from local authorities and their landbanks. Some people call it the NAMA for local authorities, in that it is managing their bad loans.

Three substantial State organisations are dealing with achieving value from property loans. Some of them are not directly under the Department of Finance, but Mr. Moran is what I would deem the most senior Accounting Officer, given his position in the Department of Finance. Is there any merit in these organisations being managed as a unit? There would be efficiencies of scale and a consistency in approach. Local authorities often discuss benefiting from NAMA, yet they have transferred some of their lands to the Housing Agency. The IBRC has some other lands. If they were kept under one roof, there could be many benefits to the taxpayer. I am not asking about policy but practicalities.

Mr. John Moran

From a practical perspective, the more we can examine matters holistically across the system, the better. This was not specifically mentioned in the statement of strategy - it is at a level below that. From the briefing papers provided to the committee, members will see that, since I took on these new responsibilities, we have moved the Department's management of NAMA into the shareholder management unit.

Mr. John Moran

It is where we manage the shares in the banks and insurance companies. We made the move to consolidate the management of the parts of the system for which my Department is responsible.

IBRC and NAMA are managed by whom?

Mr. John Moran

They are managed by Mr. Torpey to ensure a whole picture view of that situation. What also might be of assistance in terms of the process mentioned by Deputy Fleming is that all of these banks and organisations have a bearing, positively and negatively, on the state of play of the property market. We have a separate agenda and committee in the Department focused on what measures should or should not be taken in terms of stabilising and improving the property market. That is a key measure in terms of recovery of the economy and the estimation of the capital and mortgage arrears needs of the banks. We have had a number of sessions on this with outside stakeholders to identify what measures should be taken in this regard. We plan - somewhat akin to what was done in the context of the Keane report - to consider all the measures that could be used and what changes might be needed to get the property market working again. We are now reaching the point with Dublin property, perhaps decoupling with the rest, where we need to be involved in that and to have the banks actively engaged in providing credit.

I appreciate this has been a long session but perhaps Mr. Moran would respond to the following question. The Department of Finance has a nominee on the Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government review group, which was established to undertake a critical review of the proposal to merge the Local Government Audit Service and the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General. What is the name of that nominee and how many times has the review group met? Does the person concerned carry instructions from the Department in terms of its attitude towards that merger?

Mr. John Moran

I am sorry but I do not have those details with me and will have to communicate them to the Chairman.

The review in part relates to legal issues, governance structures, staffing, IR issues, shared services, efficiencies and financial savings. Accountability, in terms of what is being set out and considered, does not come into it. It is this committee's contention, and I say this to Mr. Moran in the context of the Department of Finance being the lead Department in all of this, that this is what we are about. I would suggest that the amalgamation of the Local Government Audit Service and the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General is required if we are serious about taking a full view of the spend of local government. The committee might agree to write to the Minister, Deputy Hogan, informing him of our keen interest in this issue and our desire to be represented on the review group or to meet formally with it to discuss the matter.

It would be important that the representative of the Department of Finance on the review group would carry instructions in regard to its view on the analysis of the spend of local government and the role of the Comptroller and Auditor General.

Mr. John Moran

I hear what the Chairman is saying. All I know about this issue is that it is being led by the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform as part of its reform process. If my Department has a representative on the group I will ensure he or she takes on board the Chairman's views.

I will allow two brief questions from Deputy O'Donnell.

Had the guarantee given in 2010 not been as broad as it was, would we be in a bailout situation today?

Mr. John Moran

That is a policy issue. We inherited a guarantee. Where we would be now is a completely different matter. Positions are being taken by European partners all the time. Would they have put us in the same place, I do not know.

On the €3.6 billion issue and internal control matters, according to the report, the mechanics of the calculation were done on an Excel spreadsheet, there appeared to be no templates in place and only one person, who had been seconded from the CSO to the Department of Finance, was involved and as such there was no double checking, which is astounding. Has a template been put in place into which all the relevant figures are inserted, following which there is a checking process before the information is sent to EUROSTAT?

Mr. John Moran

Yes.

It is pointless having good internal controls if the actual process does not work. Has that been remedied?

Mr. John Moran

Yes. I will ask Mr. O'Neill to comment further later. In terms of the processes that have gone wrong in the past, the computation of the calculations around this is largely a statistical matter-----

Mr. John Moran

-----but the error is in many ways a consolidation issue. For example, a person coming into the Department having trained as an accountant would be more likely to pick up on that because he or she would be thinking in terms of consolidation. In terms of new staff, we have doubled the number of those involved in this exercise so that there is a check and balance situation. People often view this as a waste of resources because if one does not catch anything it appears one's entire time has been spent trying to pick up on something that is not there. The point I was trying to make is that when one does have those resources available one is putting an impossible task on the shoulders of one person.

One of the reports recommends the implementation of a new IS and IT system. Discretionary spend for the Department of Finance, in terms of IT projects, was €25,000 when I asked about implementation. The Deloitte spend was mentioned. It may be better to spend money on these things beforehand rather than on external reports. The resources have not been made available. What that looks like in other Departments, I do not know. All I can say is that we have gone through the specific recommendations. We now have in place a committee which deals with this matter. We will potentially have to use spreadsheets for another year until this function passes over to the CSO. It is important that during the transition period we have in place a team of people producing the numbers and a further team checking the numbers but not necessarily doing the same thing.

Perhaps Mr. O'Neill would like to come in at this point.

Mr. Garrett O’Neill

One of the tasks is to ensure that all of the recommendations made - there is a great deal of consistency between the two reports - are addressed.

One report was done off the other.

Mr. Garrett O’Neill

Some of the recommendations have already been addressed. On the reporting template, the template in respect of the HFA matter has been amended so as to more clearly outline the particular type of consolidation required.

Mr. Moran referred in his opening remarks to the fact that he had reported the Department's statement of strategy last month. In that regard he spoke of enhancement of the Department's risk capabilities and a greater embedding of risk management control culture, which is germane to the proposed banking inquiry in terms of the reason bad decisions were made and the structures and controls within the Department that failed or did not exist. Obviously, if a banking inquiry is established this is an area into which it will delve. Mr. Moran makes the assumption that by strengthening and adding to the process there is now sufficient structure in place within the Department to prevent bad decisions being made. Perhaps he would elaborate on that in the context of it being germane to what we are talking about in terms of a banking inquiry and the reasons bad decisions were made, politically or within the Department.

Mr. John Moran

When one comes into an organisation, irrespective of what type of organisation it is, one inevitably, in terms of experience, brings practices one has seen work or not work in the past. When I considered this issue - I spent much time with Mr. O'Neill working out how we would do it - I wanted to try to extend across the entire Department many of the changes that we had started to introduce in the banking section in the past year. It is a completely different system of reporting and it spreads across the entire Department, rather than being a siloed process. A way of reporting through the system is indicated that identifies the task by priority. The biggest fear one has in a role like mine is getting caught in the detail and missing the big picture. That can easily happen if one sees the amount of paper and e-mails pouring in on top of everybody in the Department. This must be taken into account if one considers where we are going in the next six months.

Thanks to the decisions by the Government to give additional resources to the Department, we are moving from a position where we have 75, 100 or 120 people doing the type of policy thinking we are talking about in the decision making process, and we are adding almost as many people again during the period of the EU Presidency. It gives an entirely different level of power to analyse and take in views from outside, thinking about processes and debating them. I must create fora in which that can occur but we tend not to see that in a crisis management environment if robust structures are not in place. People are trying to do their best, working late at night and struggling with the latest problems. This is instead of putting in place a process of forward thinking.

We have begun with a revised statement of strategy, as we are not dealing with the strategy from last year. We identified the big priorities for the Department, and in a cascade from that, every one of the objectives we have is being assigned as a primary matter to different people or divisions. Each division comes to the management advisory committee with the top five priorities to be dealt with, as well as actions for this week and next, for example. The management committee now gets a report on what would, in effect, be the top 50 priorities of the Department, including what has happened and will happen next week. At the bottom of the same sheet are the risks deemed by a section to be the biggest that must be dealt with. There is also an indication of the risks to the delivery of what must be done the following week. In that way the management committee can try to assess where we are going in terms of risk.

That is a sort of first step and we must collect those risks. I am hoping that very shortly I will be able to have a new risk manager appointed from outside the Department to work with Mr. O'Neill in order to collate those risks and put them in order of priority. If it is the risk, as mentioned, of €5 billion in funding, that should pop to the top as a big item that must be assessed for robust controls. I am not saying this is a foolproof system but it is much better than managing the latest crisis as it comes along. It is only in this way that we can identify the priorities and biggest risks, as well as mapping the available resources.

I may be stating the obvious but is it the case that risk management controls were not sufficient or were deficient within the Department when Mr. Moran took over? He is clearly not surprised that bad decisions were made based on the kind of controls that existed in the Department.

Mr. John Moran

I have been given authority under a Government decision to bring in 40 or 50 more people to focus on that. We have just discussed an example regarding the accounting. If there is no second person, we cannot risk-control what the first person is doing. A second person can either deal with another issue or we can decide that the responsible role in which to put that person is in a risk function. This is a change of direction relative to the previous structure. By separating a finance and risk function rather than having that process embedded, there will be responsibility at a higher level focusing on risks. That is rather than worrying about what must be done in a crisis.

Mr. Seamus McCarthy

I have a comment on the suggestion regarding assignment of the audit of the general government debt to the office. The finance accounts are quite limited in scope and just consider transactions on the Central Fund. The chapters being discussed today have been produced to try to give a more rounded picture of the liabilities and assets of the State. It is not a decision for me or my office but perhaps it is time to consider the idea of producing a whole-of-government account; that would be broader, and capture those other liabilities. It may be worth considering in the future.

Mr. John Moran

I was reminded earlier that an observation may have been made by my predecessor regarding inviting this committee in on a periodic basis to discuss aspects of what the Department is doing. If that is of interest, it can be done, particularly around the time we issue reports, as we have in the banking area, about the work.

The members expressed an interest in that and Mr. Cardiff extended an invitation. At the convenience of the Department we would like to get a full briefing on such matters.

Mr. John Moran

That is okay.

I thank the witness. Does the committee agree to Vote 6 - Office of the Minister for Finance and dispose of chapter 1, Exchequer financial outturn for 2010; chapter 2, national debt; chapter 3, State funding developments; and chapter 4, banking stabilisation? Agreed. I thank the witnesses for attending and I wish Mr. Moran well in his new post.

The witnesses withdrew.

The committee adjourned at 2.30 p.m. until 10 a.m. on Thursday, 14 June 2012.
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