Skip to main content
Normal View

COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS debate -
Tuesday, 25 Oct 2016

Special Report No. 94 of the Comptroller and Auditor General: National Asset Management Agency Sale of Project Eagle (Resumed)

Mr. John Collison (head of residential delivery, NAMA), Mr. Michael Moriarty (head of asset recovery, NAMA), Mr. Alan Stewart (senior divisional solicitor, NAMA) and Mr. Donal Rooney (former chief financial officer, NAMA) called and examined.

Today the committee will continue its examination of the Comptroller and Auditor General's special report No. 94 on the National Asset Management Agency, or NAMA as it is better known, and its sale of Project Eagle, the code name given to the sale of its Northern Ireland loan portfolio. To date we have met with the Comptroller and Auditor General to discuss his report, representatives of NAMA, the Minister for Finance, Deputy Noonan, and Mr Brian Rowntree, a former member of NAMA’s Northern Ireland advisory committee, NIAC. We have also met three members of the current board.

I welcome Mr. Michael Moriarty, current head of asset recovery in NAMA; Mr. John Collison, deputy head of asset recovery in NAMA at the time of the sale of Project Eagle, Mr. Alan Stewart, senior divisional solicitor in NAMA and Mr. Donal Rooney, former chief financial officer in NAMA. I remind members, witnesses and those in the Public Gallery that all mobile phones must be switched off.

I advise the witnesses that by virtue of section 17(2)(l) of the Defamation Act 2009, they are protected by absolute privilege in respect of their evidence to this committee. If, however, they are directed by it to cease giving evidence on a particular matter and continue to so do, they are entitled thereafter only to qualified privilege in respect of their evidence. They are directed that only evidence connected with the subject matter of these proceedings is to be given and they are asked to respect the parliamentary practice to the effect that, where possible, they should not criticise or make charges against any person or entity either by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable.

Members are reminded of the provisions within Standing Order 186 that the committee shall refrain from inquiring into the merits of a policy or policies of the Government or a Minister of the Government or the merits of the objectives of such policy or policies. Finally, Members are reminded of the long-standing ruling of the Chair to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the House or an official, either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable.

I invite Mr. Collison to make his opening statement.

Mr. John Collison

I am head of residential delivery at NAMA. In that capacity I am responsible for the management of NAMA's residential development funding programme which is aimed at delivering on a commercial basis, through NAMA debtors and receivers, 20,000 new homes in Ireland in the period out to 2020. Prior to this role, I held a number of senior positions in NAMA's asset recovery division, including the position of deputy head of asset recovery at the time of the Project Eagle loan sale. As deputy head of asset recovery in 2014, I worked with the head of asset recovery and the wider NAMA cross-functional team which executed the transaction following the board's decision to initiate the sale of Project Eagle.

Mr. Michael Moriarty is head of asset recovery at NAMA. At the time of the Project Eagle sale, Mr. Moriarty, like me, held the position of deputy head of asset recovery. Mr. Moriarty and I and the teams we supervised were responsible for the case management of the Northern Ireland debtors, but Mr. Moriarty was not directly involved in the Project Eagle loan sales process.

Mr. Donal Rooney until recently held the position of chief financial officer, CFO, at NAMA. Mr. Rooney resigned earlier this year to take up a role with another employer. The involvement of the CFO division in Project Eagle was twofold. The finance team in the CFO division provided routine baseline financial data on the portfolio which was included in various papers for the board. The operations, systems, treasury and tax teams, which also sit within the CFO division, were involved in the cross-functional transaction team.

I am also joined by Mr. Alan Stewart who is and was at the time a senior divisional solicitor and a senior member of the legal team engaged in the Project Eagle transaction. The legal team was involved in drafting and negotiating all transactions documents, the design and population of the legal section of the data room and dealing with legal due diligence queries.

Together with our external advisers, Lazard and Hogan Lovells, we were tasked with the detailed transaction execution work which followed the decision of the board to offer Project Eagle for sale in January 2014.

In 2011, NAMA procured European and US panels of loan sale advisers to be fully prepared to take advantage of deleveraging opportunities as they arose. We anticipated that there would be opportunities for assembling and marketing single connection and multiple connection loan portfolios during NAMA's lifespan.

NAMA also formed an internal loan sales team with experience in corporate finance, accountancy, banking, property and law. By the time of the Project Eagle sale, NAMA had completed a number of loan sales with total par debt of €4 billion, and we were preparing for the sale of Project Tower. We had also engaged with numerous international loan buyers as part of our strategy of developing a market for distressed property and loans in Ireland. The purpose of this strategy was to attract investment into the Irish market at a time in 2012 and 2013 when there appeared to be little or no appetite for investment in Irish assets compared with what subsequently transpired during 2014 and 2015.

In 2013 and early 2014, the Irish loan sales market was at a very early stage of development. The Irish Bank Resolution Corporation, IBRC, was placed into special liquidation in February 2013 and its loan books were the first large Irish portfolios to be brought to market. From 2013, the market evolved significantly and quickly in a relatively short period.

NAMA has always sought to implement best practice in its loan sales in order to maximise value. It continually makes changes to its processes to improve efficiency and to retain investor interest. From 2014 onwards, there was a move by sellers to offer more vendor due diligence in an effort to reduce bidders' due diligence costs which for a large portfolio could be €2 million to €3 million. This was a very significant outlay for unsuccessful bidders.

Since 2014, bidders have demanded access to a greater volume of information in loan sale data rooms. However it is important to note that single phase data rooms are still in use and the concept of a two-tier data room like that used for Project Eagle remains commonplace.

It is also important to note there was, and is, no single correct way for NAMA or any other loan seller to market a loan portfolio. Marketing approach depends on the size, value and granularity of the portfolio and the size of the potential investor pool.

Some sales are single phase and some are in two phases. A two-phase marketing approach is generally used where there is a long list of potential buyers who have the financial capacity and credibility to be approached and that list needs to be substantially reduced before going into phase two. In a two-phase process, the phase one data room has only very limited information and full due diligence is only provided to the short list of bidders, typically three final bidders who reach phase two. By reference to the loan sale practice at the time, the data room for Project Eagle was appropriate for the portfolio. As there was not a long list of potential buyers, a two-phase process was not appropriate. Lazard identified nine potential buyers of which five decided to review the data in detail. Accordingly, a single phase data room was set up so that the investors who sought access could get immediate access to full due diligence materials. In the circumstances there was no need for a phase one data room.

Since the top 55 properties represented a significant proportion of the underlying value of the portfolio, we adopted a two-tier approach to vendor due diligence.

The legal section of the data room contained a vendor due diligence report and copies of loan, security and title documentation for each of the top 55 assets and also included all of their anchor leases. The commercial section of the data room contained redacted November 2009 red book valuations and up-to-date tenancy schedules for the top 55 assets. This provided the bidders with all the cash flow information necessary to make their assessment of value. Extensive data tapes or schedules of information were also provided along with registers of receiverships, litigation and bankruptcies. For the smaller assets, the legal section of the data room contained a vendor due diligence report on each connection which set out details of the loans, security and guarantees. The commercial section of the data room contained November 2009 red book valuations for the smaller assets.

It has been suggested that some potential investors were discouraged from participating in the Project Eagle process because PIMCO had a head start. That does not reflect our experience, generally or by reference to Project Eagle. Loan sales are frequently initiated as a result of an unsolicited third party approach known as a reverse inquiry. In fact, over 50% of our significant loan sales were initiated following credible reverse inquiries. In assessing such approaches, our key consideration is whether the proposed transaction optimises the financial return to NAMA. If it does, and if NAMA believes that the party making the reverse inquiry has the financial capacity to deliver on it, we will prepare a formal assessment and seek a decision to initiate a formal loan sales process.

To date, of those significant loan sales triggered by credible reverse inquiries, only about a third have been won by the party that made the original reverse inquiry. This is strong evidence that PIMCO had no advantage over the other potential bidders. Following its expression of interest in September 2013, PIMCO was given access only to the redacted 2009 red book valuations for the top 55 assets and some information regarding portfolio cash flows. More limited information was provided about the smaller assets and no legal documentation of any type was provided to PIMCO.

The letter of offer from PIMCO, submitted on 4 December 2013, was based on its evaluation of the material provided on the top 55 assets. Following the board’s decision to market the portfolio, a single-phase data room was opened in February 2014 and six potential bidders signed non-disclosure agreements permitting them access. As is normal in loan sales, documents were uploaded to the data room throughout the process. The six potential bidders admitted to the data room were PIMCO, Oaktree, Cerberus, Lone Star, Goldman Sachs and Fortress. The only distinction between PIMCO and the other five bidders in the data room was that PIMCO had already seen November 2009 redacted red book valuation reports for the top 55 properties in late 2013. We do not consider that to have been a material advantage.

The committee has already heard from the chairman and CEO that, following the board’s decision to market the portfolio, Lazard was appointed in January 2014 as the loan sale broker to identify all other credible bidders for the portfolio and to advise on and manage the sales process through to completion. Lazard’s role involved designing the bid process, initiating engagement with potential credible bidders, managing the due diligence query process in conjunction with legal advisers, engaging with bidders throughout the process, leading the commercial negotiations and managing the sale execution.

The identification of other credible bidders and the sequence for engaging with those bidders was based on Lazard’s assessment of the loan sales market and we relied on its advice in that respect. Lazard identified a bidder list and then engaged with potential credible bidders to ascertain their level of interest in the portfolio. Based on detailed bidder engagement, Lazard confirmed to NAMA that all potentially credible bidders were given the opportunity to participate in the sales process.

Lazard worked with NAMA and our external legal advisers to design and populate the commercial and legal sections of the data room and decide on the detailed process. Lazard engaged intensively with bidders throughout the due diligence query process. Final bids were received on 1 April 2014 and Lazard evaluated the bids received from Fortress and Cerberus and recommended the latter’s bid to the board. Lazard confirmed to the board that there was sufficient competitive tension in the process until the receipt of the bids, and that the process was appropriate for a transaction of its nature.

Based on Lazard’s advice, we recommended to the NAMA board that it accept the bid from Cerberus to achieve a combined £1.322 billion for Project Eagle. Lazard’s role in this sale was similar to the role played by loan sale brokers in other NAMA sales. A copy of the Lazard contract has been provided to the committee and it gives it a sense of the range of responsibilities involved. In summary, Lazard was engaged to advise on the overall strategy, timing and tactics of the sale; identify prospective purchasers; advise on the data room and process letter; engage in direct discussions with purchasers - Lazard provided ongoing updates to NAMA on its engagement with prospective purchasers through weekly conference calls, update e-mails and formal reports; manage the ongoing sales process; assess submitted bids; make a final recommendation to NAMA; and manage the close-out of the process from the selection of the preferred bidder.

It has also been commented upon that Lazard did not have total control of the data room as loan sale advisers tend to do in most loan sales. That is a technical point and is not material to how the process was managed. Data room set-up varies from transaction to transaction. Data rooms are typically provided by an external specialist company, such as Intralinks, with substantial IT security and tracking features. NAMA and its legal advisers uploaded all the documentation to an Intralinks secure site. Only the bidders who had executed the non-disclosure agreement, and their advisers, could access the secure data room. Lazard had the same access rights as NAMA and maintained full oversight of all data room activity throughout the sales process.

Hogan Lovells was appointed as lead legal adviser for the transaction. Hogan Lovells provided legal advice, project management and transaction management to NAMA in respect of the Project Eagle sale, and provided advice on all strategic legal issues that arose during the process. Specifically, Hogan Lovells’s role included the following: legal advice on all aspects of the transaction; design, collation and population of the legal data room; preparation of vendor due diligence reports; drafting and negotiation of all transaction documentation; co-ordination of all legal due diligence queries and responses; project management of the legal process across all jurisdictions; and post-completion delivery of documentation and transfers of security.

NAMA’s engagement with Northern Ireland debtors had been difficult. Progress on sales had been poor, as only £112 million of Northern Ireland asset sales and loan redemptions had been achieved between 2010 and 2013. While the enforcement rate, 39%, was the same as for the overall portfolio, it was clear that, if Project Eagle did not go ahead, there were a number of probable additional enforcements in the pipeline. This is supported by an analysis of the credit grading profile of our loan book. NAMA assigned a risk rating to each debtor connection on a credit grading matrix based on certain criteria. The key criteria were mainly based on, first, the projected financial outcome or level of recovery of our debt; and, second, the overall level of co-operation, largely measured by debtor performance in meeting milestones.

Comparing the levels of co-operation by debtors within the Project Eagle portfolio with the rest of the NAMA portfolio, just 15% of Project Eagle debtors were graded as co-operating, compared with 28% on the rest of the NAMA portfolio. Also, based on the limited number of sales achieved, falling asset values and increasing impairments, the percentage of Project Eagle debtors which attracted a credit grading of either 3B or 3C was 76%. These are the lowest debtor credit gradings in NAMA’s risk matrix. These gradings relate to debtors whose case managers projected the worst financial outcome and, by definition, those that were projecting a loss greater than 20% below original expected recovery targets. In addition, debtors with these gradings also displayed evidence of significant milestone slippage including missed sales, assets not being pledged to NAMA, difficulty in supplying documentation, etc. This 76% credit grading for Northern Ireland debtors compares with just 36% for the rest of the NAMA portfolio and clearly demonstrates the scale of the challenge we were facing with these debtors.

I wish to comment briefly on the issue of the fair value of the Project Eagle portfolio as of the end of 2013. The gross cash flows arising from the Project Eagle loans aggregated to £1,675 million. The Comptroller and Auditor General's report has discounted these cash flows at a discount rate of 5.5% and has produced a net present value, NPV, of £1,489 million.

However, it should be pointed out that this is not in line with the fair value methodology that was used in preparing information required as part of NAMA's financial statements for the end of 2012 and the end of 2013, both of which were certified by the Comptroller and Auditor General. The fair value methodology for the 2012 accounts agreed with the Comptroller and Auditor General was based on a discount rate of 10% and, had this fair value discount rate been applied to the Project Eagle portfolio, the net present value, NPV, would have been £1.365 billion. This was the prevailing fair value discount rate that applied at the time that the sale of the Project Eagle portfolio was being considered by NAMA in quarter four of 2013.

The fair value methodology adopted in the 2013 accounts involved the application of a discount rate of 5.5% for cash flows arising in the period 2014 to 2016 and a rate of 10% for cash flows arising during the period from 2017 to 2020, the blended portfolio rate. However, the blended portfolio fair value rate would not, in our view, have been appropriate for the Project Eagle loans given the particular characteristics of that portfolio. The Project Eagle portfolio carried higher risk and would therefore have warranted a discount rate higher than the blended portfolio rate and indeed, higher than the 10% fair value rate used in 2012 in order to derive its fair value.

When PIMCO expressed an interest in this portfolio, the board instructed the executive to assess the opportunity. Following detailed assessment, the board took the view that the assets securing the Project Eagle loan portfolio did not have sufficient upside potential to justify a hold strategy and if NAMA could, in effect, lock down the value of the portfolio upfront by selling it in 2014, that would be the optimum commercial outcome. The NAMA executives supported that view and remain convinced that the decision to sell and the method of execution were appropriate and that the price achieved was the best available.

I thank Mr. Collison. The first speaker indicating today is Deputy Bobby Aylward, to be followed by Deputy Noel Rock. The first speaker will have 20 minutes, the second will have 15 minutes and all other speakers will have ten minutes. I will indicate when there is one minute left in the time slots and members will have an opportunity to contribute a second time. Before I open the meeting up to members, I ask Mr. Collison to clarify two points for the benefit of the public. Essentially, I seek an explanation for terminology used during the presentation. First, Mr. Collison made reference to the 2009 red book valuation. I ask Mr. Collison to explain to the public what that means.

Mr. John Collison

The red book valuation is an industry standard. The Royal Institute of Chartered Accountants has set what it believes are best practice standards for valuing real estate. The most recent guidance was issued in January of this year. Basically, it is the standard rules that are applied in terms of valuing property.

Why the reference to 2009?

Mr. John Collison

That was the acquisition date, when NAMA acquired the debt from the participating institutions.

Is the red book valuation in 2009 the value at which NAMA took over the loans?

Mr. John Collison

No.

Explain the difference.

Mr. John Collison

As part of our impairment exercise and throughout our general management of these assets, we would have regularly insisted on updated valuations being obtained. That could be because assets were being brought to the market for sale. We might get independent verification of a sales agent's opinion. In total, 54% of the assets within the Project Eagle portfolio were subject to independent verification of value when we were bringing that portfolio to the market.

When were those valuations done?

Mr. John Collison

The majority of them - 84% - were done in 2013.

That is news.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

Sorry, Chairman-----

There are two points that I want clarified in the public interest. On the 2009 red book valuation, I will ask Mr. Collison to go through it again because it is important. It is not the value when NAMA took over the loans.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

If I might clarify, Chairman-----

Could the witnesses explain-----

Mr. Michael Moriarty

I think I heard the question differently-----

The witnesses are doing very well so far in terms of layman's English but there are two points-----

Mr. Michael Moriarty

Yes, on taking over the loans in 2009, all of the properties were valued then but they were adjusted for a long-term economic value-----

Correct.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

The loans were valued in terms of the underlying security. Every asset was valued and obviously that was a huge exercise. Then this long-term economic value adjustment was made. If we had taken over the loans at just the underlying value, the figure would have been approximately €26 billion. In fact-----

Twenty what?

Mr. Michael Moriarty

€26 billion or €26,000 million would have been what we would have paid-----

Instead of-----

Mr. Michael Moriarty

Instead of €32 billion-----

So the long-term economic value was-----

Mr. Michael Moriarty

The EU adjudicated that in fact there was state aid to the extent of €6 billion in what we paid. We sometimes make the point that when people are judging how NAMA is performing and make that judgment against the €32 billion figure, in fact that €32 billion is inflated by €6 billion in terms of the long-term economic value adjustment. We are talking here about the 2009 valuation plus this long-term economic valuation. This was to be seen to give some value to the banks and not take them at what was hoped to be the lowest point. Indeed, it did not turn out to be the lowest point.

So Mr. Moriarty is lowering the bar.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

If one were to take out the state aid, then yes.

We will ask NAMA to send us a note on that because the EU agreeing the long-term economic value is probably history but what Mr. Moriarty is saying is very important. If NAMA is to be judged on €26 billion rather than €32 billion, that is significant. Will NAMA send us a note on that?

Mr. Michael Moriarty

We will.

I do not want to delay the meeting so I will move on to my other little question. While I understand it, I ask the witnesses to explain what they mean by the data room. That is not a real room, behind lock and key but an online data-----

Mr. Michael Moriarty

It is a virtual-----

I ask the witnesses to explain it because when one talks about a data room, 90% of people think of a room somewhere. They think of people going in, the doors being locked, mobile phones being turned off and people looking at books. Explain to the public how the data room works.

Mr. John Collison

It is a virtual data room. It is a secure system set up through an independent body. We retain the services of Interlinks, a global firm that provides these services. It is very secure. All of the information is uploaded to the data room by whoever controls the room. In this case, NAMA would have controlled it. Hogan Lovells would have had authorisation to upload all of the legal documentation and Lazard would also have had the same access rights as NAMA. We then would have granted particular access to the investors or prospective bidders and they would be able to access all of the information. They could see exactly what we were uploading to the data room. We were doing that incrementally and in reality we probably ended up providing more documentation than some of the bidders were expecting over the period. They would get notification by e-mail each time when new documents were uploaded to the data room. Maybe Mr. Stewart could give a flavour -----

Just to explain, then, it is really a secure site that Cerberus or PIMCO in the US could look at from America.

Mr. John Collison

Yes -----

It is not an actual room. The phrase "data room" confuses people.

Mr. John Collison

Yes. Many of the bidders would have been based in New York, London and so on and once they had access rights, they could go in and see what information was available.

Was NAMA able to monitor who was going in and out?

Mr. John Collison

Yes, we were able to monitor all of the activity.

Okay, it was just that simple point that I wanted to put out in the public domain. People often do not understand what is meant by data room. I now call Deputy Aylward.

I welcome the witnesses to this meeting today. This committee is having an ongoing debate every week about NAMA and the sale of the Project Eagle portfolio. I will begin with an observation. I have been very frustrated at the lack of clarity and detail in terms of minutes of meetings and paper trail deficiencies. The quality of record keeping and documentation in general leaves a lot to be desired.

My first question is for Mr. Collison and it concerns PIMCO. The head of asset recovery met PIMCO to discuss the latter's approach. PIMCO played a pivotal role in this from the very beginning, even though it pulled out eventually. Was there more than one meeting with PIMCO?

Mr. John Collison

Yes, I would have met PIMCO initially. PIMCO submitted its initial expression of interest on 9 September. A meeting was set up with PIMCO, attended by a member of its senior management team and an adviser from Brown Rudnick. I attended that meeting along with the head of asset recovery at the time. That was the initial engagement where PIMCO expressed its interest in the portfolio. Then there was a follow on meeting which took place towards the end of October. Again, PIMCO was re-confirming that it was very interested in proceeding. It wanted to progress the sale on the basis of exclusivity. PIMCO was proposing that it would be an off-market transaction which we told them, right from the start, we would have difficulties with and that our policy was to openly market. There certainly were two meetings that I attended with PIMCO at that time. There would have been further engagement with the company by e-mail thereafter. PIMCO then submitted a non-binding bid but with more substance behind it on 4 December. That was submitted in writing and that was the basis for the proposal that went to the board of NAMA.

So there were two meetings. Where did those meetings take place and what was discussed?

Mr. John Collison

They took place in the Treasury Building, in NAMA's offices.

The discussion that took place was, I suppose, to the effect that they were keen to express their desire to acquire the portfolio. They had been following the Northern Ireland market. They certainly advised at the time that they could transact quickly, that they would be able to ingest a portfolio of that magnitude and that they had substantial financial capacity to complete the transaction and were very keen to see if we would be willing to progress that opportunity.

What level of detail did PIMCO have in respect of the portfolio to enable it to make an offer?

Mr. John Collison

They advised us that the information they obtained they had gleaned from public information, from maybe our financial statements and so on. They also claimed to have reverse engineered, I suppose, some of that data in relation to the Northern Ireland based debtors. We probably, I think, were slightly sceptical of that. I mean there is only so-----

Did Mr. Collison wonder how it got the information?

Mr. John Collison

No. They claimed that a lot of this information was public and that the information that they had and they used was in the public domain. There was only so much information they could glean at that point so their offer was certainly very high level and subject to a lot more due diligence. They really were just teasing out the opportunity at that stage. They certainly were not able to put firm numbers behind it. It was only when agreement was reached to provide them with some limited information - I suppose to allow them firm up on that offer - that they were able to access what we provided at the time, which were redacted Red Book valuations on the top assets. The portfolio was very concentrated so a huge amount of value was in the top end of the portfolio, in a limited number of assets. They were provided with redacted valuation reports, which provided the actual detail on the real estate. It provided details of the asset itself, a description, a location, the market, the rental level, whether it was in line with the market rental levels and they were able to assess and evaluate the value of those assets from that, and that is what resulted in their bid then coming forward on 4 December.

PIMCO sought a closed deal. That is the way it approached NAMA first but NAMA, in its wisdom, wanted an open-market deal. How did PIMCO respond? Did NAMA explain matters to PIMCO even though the latter had sought a closed deal with only itself involved and no-one else?

Mr. John Collison

Deputy, we were upfront with them from the very start. We told them that an off-market transaction was hugely problematic and very unlikely to take place. We were certainly managing their expectations that we would transact on an open market basis. They, I suppose, were certainly hopeful during that process, during that period, that we might change our views. I do not think at any stage one could say that we led them to believe that there might be an off-market offer.

Was PIMCO happy to proceed with the sale on the open market?

Mr. John Collison

They were. They were happy to continue their due diligence. It was only after the board meeting later in January that they were advised that Lazard were now being appointed and that we were going to the market. Lazard were instructed to go out to the market to look for other potential credible bidders. I can remember that there was a telephone call with PIMCO at the time to advise them of that and they certainly were quite disappointed.

Did NAMA ask PIMCO if it had a relationship with Brown Rudnick at that stage? Who made the initial approach and when?

Mr. John Collison

Brown Rudnick just appeared as their adviser and attended both of those meetings with them.

Did Brown Rudnick make the first approach to NAMA?

Mr. John Collison

My understanding is that Brown Rudnick would have written to the Northern Ireland Executive and, in turn, there was contact between both Governments when they expressed interest firstly but it was PIMCO that wrote directly to NAMA.

This paper also states that PIMCO liked the value proposition and that they believed the secondary markets offer good opportunities for further investors at great value. What did PIMCO mean by the term "value proposition"? How would it know the value of the portfolio? Did the executive disclose the value when it met PIMCO?

Mr. John Collison

Well, they would have certainly been able to put some form of value on probably the top two thirds of the actual portfolio based on the real estate information we provided. They had their own view, Deputy, on the Northern Ireland market but we did not necessarily share that view. They felt that, based on the portfolio, the Northern Ireland market, possibly, was one that offered opportunity, and that there might be good growth prospects there. I cannot say exactly that we would have shared that view. We found it a very difficult market, a very small concentrated market. I also certainly got the impression from PIMCO at the time that they were going to provide some capital expenditure, so they were going to invest in these assets. That would have been a riskier proposition for us, to be providing capital to assets outside of our jurisdiction. That would not necessarily have been the approach we might have taken. PIMCO would probably have taken a different investment approach and strategy to this portfolio.

The other thing that I can recall appealed to them is that there was a reasonable concentration of retail property in this particular portfolio. PIMCO would have transacted in the past, prior to Eagle, on a number of deals at the time. They had a concentration of retail assets. They had retail specialists, I think, within their business so they felt comfortable with that asset class. I think that also appealed to them.

If NAMA's policy was to have an open-market loan sale, why did asset recovery propose to give PIMCO a head start by granting it access to information in order to carry out due diligence? This is an important aspect.

Mr. John Collison

It is but we did not feel it conferred any material advantage. I suppose the other benefit of that was it definitely gave rise to a sort of proof of concept here. We felt that the initial offer was too high-level. While it certainly merited investigation and further review, there needed to be more substance to it. We felt that providing them with further information, albeit on a limited basis that they could then put more substance on their offer and in turn inform our view as to whether, yes, this is an opportunity we should progress, and a proposal we should consider and bring to our board would this present an opportunity in one fell swoop to potentially sell off this portfolio at a price that was acceptable to us.

Why did asset recovery recommend a loan sale for NAMA at that point?

Mr. John Collison

I suppose at the time we did not feel like a loan sale was inevitable. We certainly felt that there was an opportunity for it but-----

Would it not have made common sense at that stage?

Mr. John Collison

Again, based on the information that they were provided with, we had the information there. They were not provided with any kind of values. All of the information that was provided was on the real estate. There was no debtor information provided. The values themselves were redacted. We were not providing them with anything but information on the actual assets themselves. We felt that if that then materialised in, potentially, an offer that was of more substance, we possibly had something we could work with and that we could bring it to our board. If the board was willing, we could then progress and open up a process. At that point, a loan sale adviser would certainly have been brought on board.

What were the other options available? What about selling large assets separately, as happened with Project Arrow? NAMA had set a precedent with Project Arrow. Why not put forward such consideration at this stage? Did the board ask questions about the matter?

Mr. John Collison

Yes. We looked at the portfolio in a fair bit of detail at the time. As I said, it certainly struck us that the portfolio was very, very concentrated. I think the top five debtor connections represented between 60% and 70% of the overall value. We could potentially have launched a sale of those but we really would have found it extremely difficult to divest ourselves of the tail - or more granular end - of the portfolio. We were certainly of the view that the portfolio needed more impairment and that is consistently referenced right throughout our papers from October into January. We felt that this portfolio, or a large part of it, was certainly falling in value. It did not present as many opportunities as we would have liked. Working these assets out was going to be extremely difficult as well. I mentioned in my opening statement that if we did not sell Project Eagle, further enforcement would have been inevitable. That would be certainly my opinion on where we were with some of these debtors. They were very, very difficult to manage. We have very limited progress vis-à-vis our debtors in the Republic.

With regard to asset sales, there was huge experience of missed milestones. We found it difficult to get visibility on some of the rental income. We found it difficult to get control of some of the rental income. Any time assets were put on the market, there were reasons to delay the process. It was very difficult to manage a lot of these debtor connections.

Does Mr. Collison mean NAMA was pressurised or that it deemed it better to sell off the assets as quickly as possible?

Mr. John Collison

No, I will not say that we were pressurised. Certainly, we have a situation where, you know, we regularly receive reverse inquiries across our desks. It is quite commonplace. Some of them we reject outright. They just would not be credible or at a level that would pique our interest.

There would be others that we would give credence to and we found that when PIMCO expressed an interest in this portfolio, this presented an opportunity that we had to explore.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

I might add to that. On an ongoing basis day by day, week by week, month by month we look at all the assets in all the cases to see the best thing to do. All the options would have been reviewed on an ongoing basis as each case came up we would be looking at the assets within it and asking ourselves how do we best realise these assets. We then look at them on a geographic basis from time to time and we look at them on a sectoral basis, retail, office and so on. There is a constant review from the bottom up and the top down as to what is best and that would have been ongoing. As the big cases in that portfolio would have come up for review, as they would on a regular basis, we would have been looking at the options. That is a constant part of the work we do and that would have been a constant part of what we were doing at that stage. As my colleague has explained, it was difficult to see how we would realise certainly the rump of that portfolio. There might have been a few attractive assets at the top end that would go in a relative short order but there was a tail on it that would be very difficult.

Mr. John Collison

The timing was important. Our CEO appeared before the committee on 29 September and I think he might have referred to the timing. We were about to exit the troika and at that time our bond redemption targets were looming - we had probably redeemed €7.5 billion at that point - and we still had a long way to go. This was an opportunity to generate momentum in that area in terms of generating cash.

The October paper noted that NAMA would only sell loans by way of open competition. Yet the December paper sought the board's guidance on whether to do a closed transaction with PIMCO. Why did NAMA change its stance on asset recovery?

Mr. John Collison

I would not describe it as a change in stance.

There were two months between the position in October, which was open competition and having sought the guidance of the board in December-----

Mr. John Collison

Yes, PIMCO had reverted and again expressed not just interest in the portfolio but its wish and preference for an off market transaction. This was a major call for NAMA and it would have been the largest transaction that we would have dealt with at the time. It was a multi-connection loan sale, the first one we would have dealt with. It would have been unusual but because of the scale of the request, the asset recovery division were seeking guidance from the board as opposed to putting a firm recommendation on whether it should go with a closed or open sales process. Our policy certainly dictated that we would sell everything by way of way open marking and our sense was that would be the way the board would want us to progress. We had to make the case and put forward what PIMCO had requested also.

PIMCO's indicative bid for the top 55 properties, which were the cash ones was €950 million, which was higher than the €890 million that NAMA expected to sell the loans for. Will Mr. Collison explain this figure as it suggests that NAMA's projected disposal values were too low?

Mr. John Collison

It is not that the values were necessarily too low. PIMCO had raw real estate information at that stage. It did not have-----

It was €59 million of a difference.

Mr. John Collison

We looked at the comparison of the data room for PIMCO recently with the official data room when the sales process was launched. PIMCO had less than 10% of the documentation that was uploaded into the overall data room.

Did Mr. Collison not think at that stage that it would have been a good idea to get a valuation of the properties?

Mr. John Collison

At that point our sense was that PIMCO had so much due diligence to complete that it was a non-binding letter of intent that it produced. There would have been potentially movement on that proportion of the portfolio as well as at the tail of the portfolio. It is very difficult to be definitive about that.

Section 2 of the paper sets out the challenges of an open market process and the advantages of a closed transaction. A number of risks of a closed sale are also set out in paragraph 142. The paper states that in summary while it would be possible to openly market the loans, the scale of the project would mean careful planning, budget management and execution. This suggests that assets recovery had a bias against an open competition. Why did you adopt this approach in the paper?

Mr. John Collison

Sorry Deputy, is it page 142?

Yes, it is the second last paragraph on page 142. It states that in summary, while it would be possible to openly market the loans, the scale of the project would mean careful planning, budget management and execution.

Mr. John Collison

That is an accurate statement. It would be possible to openly market it. It was a particularly large transaction and would need a lot of intensive management to bring it forward and get it to the final execution stage. I do not think there is anything I would disagree with in that statement.

NAMA did not seek current property valuations for all its property and consequently had no estimates of what an investor might pay for the portfolio. The only guide to what a bidder might pay was the PIMCO bid. On what basis did the paper recommend a minimum of €1.3 billion?

Mr. John Collison

The basis of the recommendation is the analysis we did on the portfolio at the time. There were two things, and this is important, that we were adamant about at the point when we were assessing this. One was that the portfolio needed further impairment, and we were in no doubt about that, and second was the discount rate that would apply as 5.5% was not the appropriate discount rate for a portfolio that carried this particular level of risk. Our sense was that even 10% discount might have been a bit on the conservative side. That said, there are things that we would factor in. In the paper that went to our board in June, the 5.5% effective interest rate is quoted as a potential discount rate but there are exceptions to when we would use that rate and there has to be qualitative and quantitative factors that come into play. We certainly felt that Project Eagle was one such case.

I will come to Mr. Rooney.

Mr. Donal Rooney

I want to answer on that particular question. The Deputy asked what led to the price. I think there are two core elements that led to the price. One was the carrying value at 31 December 2013, which is in the paper at €1.475 billion. That is a factual figure. Second, again the Deputy is looking at an appropriate discount rate on top of that figure, which as set out in the paper is a minimum discount rate of 10%. When one cuts through everything else these are the two core elements that led to the minimum price.

Was the analysis intended to show what the loans were worth? Was this the value of the loan worked out at the figure less the 5.5% and-or 10% discount rate? On page 42 of the report, it sets out how the board approved a 5.5% discount for evaluating potential transactions and commercial decisions. The analysis shows on page 44 that the board uses this 5.5% rate to estimate the net present value of the loans. The analysis intends to show what the loans are worth. Was it a projected loan work out value at 5.5%?

The Deputy has one minute remaining, that is his last question. We will come back to Deputy Aylward again. We are doing 20 minutes, 15 minutes.

I understand. I was waiting for the bell.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

Perhaps the Deputy has not had a chance to see some of the additional information that went down last night.

Nobody has seen it.

No member has seen that.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

I will read briefly from it.

Could we have a copy of it?

We have had a problem since we started about the 5.5% discount and the 10% discount. That has to be explained properly to us. We need to understand the reason the discount rates were applied.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

I will defer to Mr. Rooney on that point. The Deputy asked a number of times why NAMA did not get valuations. The Deputy is correct that NAMA did not commission a wholesale valuation of the entire portfolio. It is import to state that in the course of our review for impairment for our bad debt provision twice a year, we go through them in great detail and in the additional information that was sent down in response to the written requests, there is a paragraph that states that the valuation of the underlying property collateral was a major input into the impairment reviews by value. NAMA had commissioned a third party valuation advice in relation to 54% by value of the Project Eagle property portfolio since its acquisition, a total of 84% of this valuation advice was received in 2013. There was quite a lot of up-to-date valuations just from our normal work in doing our assessment of the portfolios. I absolutely agree there was not a wholesale valuation done and the reasons for that were explained when the chairman and chief executive were before the committee. We did not want to start a flurry of activity on that. A great deal of up-to-date information was available.

Is Mr. Moriarty saying there was 10% impairment on the Northern Ireland portfolios, but up to then the rate of impairment was 5.5%?

Mr. Michael Moriarty

Let me explain. The impairment is different, it is where we assess whether the loans are collectable at the level that they are at written down in our books.

Twice a year we go through them in great detail and look at the big cases case by case, property by property. We just do the sums and ask whether we are going to get back enough to repay the loans at the amount that we are carrying them at. If we are not, we have to provide for that. That has that impairment in it. That is our impairment exercise and that feeds into the discount rate.

Mr. Rooney can make a quick comment and then I will call Deputy Rock.

Mr. Donal Rooney

On the 5.5% discount rate and its analysis in that paper, there was an analysis done in the paper showing an illustrative net present value using a 5.5% discount rate. That was based on NAMA's standard discount rate of 5.5% at that time. It should not be read that that automatically led to NAMA's estimate of a workout value. Indeed, that was not the case. A more appropriate discount rate, if we were to get to a work-out value, would have been a discount rate of at least 10%.

I would just point out as well, Chairman-----

I said I would call Deputy Noel Rock and there about 15 speakers.

Mr. Moriarty has quoted evidence that we have not seen yet.

Yes. I will come to that documentation. We wrote two detailed letters to NAMA. One letter was written on 5 October to which we got a full reply. It is in the documentation provided to members. We wrote a subsequent letter a week later and a reply arrived last night on a key fob. There is a lot of documentation involved and it was only available to be sent to us today. I accept that it only arrived yesterday and we have not had an opportunity to go through it yet.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

I was just attempting to reply to a part of the Deputy's question which I thought had not been addressed. I was just pointing it out to the Deputy.

Mr. Moriarty's point is taken.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

Yes, okay.

We are where we are in the documentation. It means we have a lot of homework to study tonight when we get this documentation.

It means that the witnesses may have to return at some stage also.

It does. To be very clear, this morning we gave the clerk to the committee the authority, if any gaps in the evidence arise during the course of the day, to write on our behalf to seek the information rather than waiting for a subsequent meeting to get permission to write the letter. That is going to fast-track the matter. Any member, during the course of tomorrow, the next day or any other day, can say to the clerk that there was a gap in the evidence, ask him to write for it and he will do so.

I call Deputy Noel Rock.

One point the Comptroller and Auditor General has made seems to me to be of substance. I refer to the critical board minutes of December 2013 or January 2014 which state a bottom line of £1.3 billion. There seems to be no great analysis of how NAMA reached that figure. The Comptroller and Auditor General also made the point that the NAMA executives were not really red-line recommending this at that time. Do the witnesses believe that the documents backing the valuation were adequate? Are there any which we have not seen at this time? I address my two questions to Mr. Collison.

Mr. John Collison

I am not aware of anything that members may not have seen. Certainly our analysis at the time was based on the evidence that is in the actual December board paper. Again, at the risk of repeating ourselves and what my colleague here has said, our view on the £1.3 billion was pretty strong at the time and was based on the fact this portfolio required further impairment. That was actually borne out by reference to the impairment coverage which we would have had on, say, our entire participating institution managed portfolio. The coverage at the end of 2013 was approximately 23% and that increased to 35% by June 2014. A lot of the Project Eagle portfolio was in that participating institution managed portfolio as well. That certainly bore out the fact that we felt this portfolio needed further impairment but also the actual discount rate. I know this is a professional disagreement and I know the Comptroller and Auditor General's stand on this, but we were very sure at the time that a minimum of 10% was required for this particular portfolio.

That effectively sums it up. A professional disagreement is how Mr. Collison sees it. NAMA is right in terms of its conflict with the Comptroller and Auditor General. That is the nub of this, is it not? A lot of this is summed up by the statistics that Mr. Collison put forward in his opening statement such as "15% of Project Eagle debtors were graded as co-operating" as opposed to the regular 28%. These are circumstances that surely support NAMA's position.

Mr. John Collison

Absolutely. Again, I suppose it is hypothetical. I am convinced that if we did not sell Project Eagle at the time, there would have been a lot more enforcement across that book. We were having difficulty with a number of those debtors. It was heading that way. I cannot, obviously for confidentiality reasons, go into specific cases but I have no doubt we would have had a lot more enforcement and that certainly would have impaired the value of the portfolio even further. There was a general lack of co-operation across a lot of these.

One of the things that stood out to me in looking at this is the row, if one likes, on whether a bundle of loans with a face value of £4.6 billion could have been so bad that they were sold for £1.32 billion or, if one likes, 29p on the pound. The figure the Comptroller and Auditor General says NAMA should have got is about 32.5p on the pound. It would have also been the case that NAMA bought this bundle of loans for somewhere north of £1.9 billion. Is that correct? One would have been looking at a loss, even in the first instance, of somewhere between 25% and 30%. Surely, that would have supported the idea of moving quickly on this as the trajectory was working at the time.

Mr. John Collison

We felt that the value was in decline. There is no doubt about that. The fact of the matter is that the portfolio, like very few very attractive assets within that portfolio, comprised investment property and was throwing off a rental income of close to £100 million, but these were secondary and in some cases tertiary assets. Much of the portfolio was mixed. Over 40% of it was located in Northern Ireland. Probably a little over 40% was in Britain but these were not located in the south east in London. These were located in regional locations. Our view on that was these were challenging markets. Our overall sense was the value was under pressure.

Mr. Donal Rooney

To add more substance to one particular point that Mr. Collison made that our view was the portfolio was in decline, one needs to look at where NAMA's impairment was at in 2013 compared with where it eventually went. It is very important. If one looks at NAMA's overall impairment in 2013, it was in or around 18%. That increased to in or around 24% in 2015, so it increased. In 2013, what I call the premium impairment, that the Project Eagle portfolio had, was in or around 6%. The Project Eagle portfolio impairment was 24% in 2013 against NAMA's impairment of 18%. I think it is very fair to say that that gap would have remained. When one looks at NAMA's impairment in 2015 of 24%, that premium would have increased. NAMA's impairment on Project Eagle would have been somewhere possibly in the region of 30% with hedging.

Am I right in saying, therefore, that this supports the case for somewhat different treatment?

I have a technical question. The opening statement mentioned the percentage of Project Eagle debtors attracting a credit grading of either 3B or 3C being 76%. There is a reference on the next page to a credit grading for Northern Ireland debtors. I presume that was for all debtors in Project Eagle. Am I correct?

Mr. John Collison

That figure of 76% was the percentage of debtors within the entire Project Eagle portfolio. These were all Northern Ireland-based debtors that attracted a credit rating of 3B and 3C. When compared with the rest of NAMA's portfolio, the equivalent percentage of debtors in the 3B and 3C categories was 36%.

That is much lower. The following question is for Mr. Rooney. Would NAMA have been conscious of currency risk during the sales process? For example, when the sale closed on 30 June 2014, the rate of exchange was about £1 to €1.25.

Mr. Donal Rooney

Yes.

Was it the case that NAMA needed euro to repay its borrowing at that point?

Mr. Donal Rooney

NAMA managed its currency risk at a macro level. NAMA looked at its overall book and its overall sterling exposure and then put in place hedging at a macro level to manage that exposure to the extent that if we sold our sterling book, our hedges would have fallen away as well. It is fair to say that our foreign exchange risk was managed separately so it was not a key driver behind the decision to sell.

That is fair enough. One can see the pressing reasons NAMA would have sold with speed. It is perhaps interesting to note on the record that had it been sold in September 2016 or indeed in June 2016, it would have reduced the level of loss quite substantially. The difference between the Comptroller and Auditor General's figure and NAMA's figure would have fallen to around €100 million. Credit should be given where it is due, in that respect.

I would like to know why NAMA adopted its approach. Even though the explanations are clear enough in the Comptroller and Auditor General's report, why exactly did NAMA take on such a tight timetable? What was the rationale for doing so?

Mr. John Collison

I suppose that was driven by the board's decision, and this is documented in the board's minutes.

It wanted a focused, time-bound and confidential process. That translated into a discreet, bespoke process but one that was tightly managed and transacted within a short timeframe. We were all acutely aware of the confidentiality and the political sensitivities around this at the time. That was what influenced how the process evolved. We then engaged and retained Lazard to advise us in that regard. It was very satisfied to work with, and stand over, the process. That meant there was a restricted number of bidders but these were credible bidders invited into the process who could transact at the scale or level we are talking about and as quickly as we were seeking. That was the rationale for, and the background, to it.

Given the expedited process and the fact that PIMCO had already had two months to examine top assets, did Mr. Collison think that this may have given PIMCO something of an advantage?

Mr. John Collison

There has been some reference to that in recent months but we certainly did not believe that. We felt the head start was neutralised, as such, when many of these bidders were invited into the process. We opened up a data room initially for a four-week period and that was extended by a further two weeks. All the bidders were given full details as to how the process would evolve at the very outset. When they were briefed they were told how short the timeframe was going to be. They were told the information they were going to be provided with. They were told that they had to transact in cash and that we had to establish whether they were in a position to write a cheque of that scale. We gave them an opportunity at that point to continue and decide to avail of that opportunity or to opt out, but they were all well aware of the position.

I certainly can recall when PIMCO was advised that the process was opening up to other bidders. It was quite disappointed and certainly at one point expressed the view that many of these other firms had such substantial in-house and external resources that they would swallow up a lot of this information in a short period and that would neutralise any head start, if there was such an advantage conferred on PIMCO. We did not believe there was, but PIMCO was certainly of that view regarding these investors. I was at a number of the initial meetings with the parties that were invited into the process, and on at least probably three occasions the investors said they were living with short timeframes and with limited representations and warranties being provided as part of a loan sale process. They were living with limited information much more. This was the market at the time. Certainly one or two expressed the view that the information that would be provided was greater than the level of information they might have seen on a couple of loan sales that were on the market at the time. This was not us coming up with a brand new process. This was the way the market was evolving at the time.

To go back a little on that, PIMCO was unhappy about this potential opening up of the process.

Mr. John Collison

Yes.

How did it express that to Mr. Collison?

Mr. John Collison

In a telephone conversation with its representatives, they said they were disappointed straight out because they knew this was going to open it up to other bidders and that it was going to present more competition. They wanted it off-market. They wanted it executed in a private discreet manner, one on one with NAMA. This was now going to mean there was competition and it reduced their chances of successfully acquiring the portfolio.

Did Mr. Collison feel under pressure from them to put it off-market?

Mr. John Collison

I would not say under pressure but they certainly asked on more than one occasion and that was made clear in the documentation - the letters - they sent through to us. As I said earlier, we left them under no illusions that our policy was open market and we were managing their expectations in that regard. I certainly felt that we did not give them any sense that we were ever going to agree to an exclusive, closed or off-market process. We were very upfront with them about that.

Nobody in the organisation gave them that impression.

Mr. John Collison

Not that I am aware of.

In terms of the discount rate, Mr. Collison addressed this in his opening statement to a certain extent around the blended rate and how he had to use an enhanced rate based on the various metrics and so on. He has explained why the different approach was taken. Was the board informed of why the different approach was taken?

Mr. John Collison

The Deputy used the word "informed" and certainly there would have been reference to that. I would bring him back to the June 2013 papers that went to the board specifically about the discount rates. That paper clearly states that there would be instances where the effective interest rate, the 5.5%, would not be an appropriate discount rate to use and that there were other risks that might be associated with different parts of the portfolio, for example, that we would not ordinarily see and that we would have to factor in these quantitative and qualitative factors into our decision-making. The other area, to which I would point the Deputy, is our fair value adjustments in our 2012 and 2013 calculations and our 2012 and 2013 financial statements. That use of 10% was already in practice. We would have had discussions with our loan sales adviser on a number of transactions before Project Eagle and after it, and some of those discount rates increased quite substantially beyond 10% up to nearer 15% and up to 18% in some cases. The use of 10% was not used for the first time, for example, for Project Eagle.

In light of where we are now, the amount of scrutiny that has gone into this process and the question marks it has drawn up among the public about NAMA, would Mr. Collison have done anything differently in this process?

Mr. John Collison

I do not believe we would have done anything differently in relation to the actual sales process, how that was run and how it was managed because we were given a set of instructions. We operationalised the board's decision. The board made the decision to sell this portfolio at a minimum reserve price of £1.3 billion in a time-bound, focused and confidential manner, and we executed that. I think the process that was run was appropriate and I think Lazard, which I gather may be appearing before the committee, will confirm that. I believe it was appropriate.

If we put it into context, there were only a limited number of investors that operated at this altitude. We were asking them, in dollar terms, to write a cheque in excess of $2-$2.2 billion. There are only a handful of firms worldwide that can do that. We instructed Lazard to find these firms. We were satisfied it did that and that it would run that process in a short time-bound manner with the information we felt was appropriate for it to evaluate and make its bid.

I think, and this goes back to a point that our chairman made on 29 September, that our record-keeping - this is probably why the committee has so many queries - probably should have been a bit more comprehensive, and I would accept that. We try to learn, evolve and improve our processes, but that is one area where we probably would need to sharpen up. The board minutes are recorded in a certain way. They record the decision. I do not think there was any criticism of the way the board minutes were recorded prior to now, but I would accept that record-keeping could have been better.

Yes. Based on all that we have said in that case and referencing what I said in my opening remarks, does Mr. Collison think it is fair to say that this whole situation is effectively a matter of differing opinion between NAMA and the Comptroller and Auditor General about the valuing of assets and about the interpretation of the process of valuing the assets?

Mr. John Collison

Yes. I would agree. We have had a long-running relationship with the Comptroller and Auditor General. We get on with his office. We have a very professional engagement. This is, as our chairman summarised it, a professional disagreement. The Comptroller and Auditor General has his view and we have our view and I am not so sure we will reach a consensus on that. My experience has been that we have always engaged professionally and worked positively together. We have set out our position on this. We exceeded the reserve price we were set. If we were undervaluing this portfolio, there would have been a lot more bidders there at the end clamouring to buy it because they would have recognised or seen this portfolio potentially being underpriced. I do not think it was and only one exceeded that in the end.

I call Deputy Madigan next. The sequence of speakers is Deputy Madigan followed by Deputies Cullinane, Burke, Catherine Murphy, Connolly and McDonald as they indicated they wanted to speak in that sequence. They will each have ten-minute time slots.

I thank Mr. Collison for his - I was going to say evidence but we are not a court - assertions today and for his opening statement which we all received this morning.

I will preface my comments by pointing out that anything I say is based on my own reading of what has been presented to the committee. To me, bearing in mind the Comptroller and Auditor General's report, there seems to be a scrambling to retrospectively correct or present certain information in a certain way. That is my reading of it. There were a lot of references to due diligence and best practice in the opening statement but this is the first time we have heard talk from NAMA of those issues. There is a concerted effort on the part of NAMA to provide clarification around the valuations, the sales process, the governance and all of the issues that we have discussed to date.

I am sure Mr. Collison has looked at the assertions made by Mr. Daly at this committee. I ask him to clarify a number of remarks made by the chairman of NAMA. When I asked Mr. Daly if he accepted that there was any wrongdoing on the part of NAMA, he said that if he had the opportunity to do it again, there would be some "tweaking". What does Mr. Collison think he meant when he said that?

Mr. John Collison

First, I can only give the Deputy my view but I certainly do not think there was any wrongdoing on the part of NAMA -----

Mr. Daly said that also but he did say, as a concession, that he felt that there should be some tweaking and that he would have applied some tweaking. I am just wondering what Mr. Collison thinks he meant by that.

Mr. John Collison

I think what he meant by that - Mr. Daly is on record on this - was that NAMA tries to continuously improve its processes as it is working through its portfolio and there is always room for improvement. I think this probably goes back to the answer I gave to Deputy Noel Rock. I think our record keeping probably could have been better -----

Is Mr. Collison specifically referring to the board decision?

Mr. John Collison

No, not necessarily the board decision. In fairness, I have been at a number of board meetings and when we are presenting any particular credit request to the board, as one would expect, we are challenged on the content of the paper in terms of the actual recommendation. That would have been the case for Project Eagle as well. The board minutes will not record, verbatim, the conversation that took place because some of these meetings -----

I have a difficulty with that. I welcome the fact that Mr. Collison thinks that there was room for improvement and that would have been brought forward. However, what Mr. Daly said to this committee is that the board minutes should record decisions, not discussions. He also said that the board decision was unanimous. I would be of the view that it would be a rudimentary exercise to take a contemporaneous note of the discussions when a decision of such magnitude is made. Mr. Daly felt that the decisions rather than discussions should be recorded but that was not done either. Does Mr. Collison accept that?

Mr. John Collison

No, I believe the decisions were recorded. Were the verbatim conversations recorded? No, they were not but that has never been our process in NAMA. I do not think our minutes would ever set out the exact conversation or discussion that took place. However, there are references in a number of places to "after considerable discussion" or "considerable debate" and there would have been a huge amount of debate and discussion at a lot of the board meetings because significant decisions were being made.

What does Mr. Collison think of Mr. Daly's response that now he would be happy to provide details of the verbal discussions that took place at the time to the committee. He is now saying that he will provide that. My very simple view is that if he is willing to provide it now, why could it not have been provided at the time?

Mr. John Collison

With all due respect, that is probably a question our chairman will have to answer and it is best directed at him. I do not think that the style of our -----

Does Mr. Collison share that view?

Mr. John Collison

I do not think the style of our board minutes is such that we could get into such detail. At our regular board meetings there are probably 20 to 25 items on the agenda. Some of them relate to regular bi-monthly updates while others relate to specific credit requests and decisions that are made. These can be decisions that are quite significant and -----

I appreciate that and I think it is helpful that Mr. Daly made the remark to the effect that in future, details of those discussions should be provided. Details of those discussions, which are the basis for the decision making and explain how people formed their views, should be provided. Mr. Daly offered that to this committee when he appeared before us. Does Mr. Collison share that view and is it something that he thinks NAMA will consider doing into the future? It is important from the taxpayers' perspective that we have an idea of how decisions were reached, in terms of transparency and accountability.

Mr. John Collison

In the past I certainly never had an issue in this regard. I can see why the Deputy is posing the question now but I certainly never had an issue with regard to the quality or the comprehensiveness of the minutes or minute-taking for our board meetings. I feel that the minutes generally reflect the actual decision that was made at the time and that is the real purpose of them.

Mr. Donal Rooney

May I make one comment on corporate governance standards? It would be normal, in corporate governance terms, that board minutes would record the actual decisions, as was done, as well as some flesh around those decisions. I have had exposure to the minutes of board meetings of a lot of organisations throughout my career and my view is that the NAMA board minutes would stand up very well in terms of the minute taking and how decisions were recorded. I just wanted to give the Deputy a wider perspective on that.

That is very helpful and I thank Mr. Rooney for that.

Mr. Daly also said that running a commercial entity is about making commercial decisions. Does Mr. Collison agree that this was done on this occasion with regard to Project Eagle?

Mr. John Collison

Yes, very much so.

I have a difficulty - perhaps Mr. Collison will clarify - with NAMA's assessment of itself. We have all heard the phrase, "self praise is no praise". In terms of the credit grading, for example, Mr. Collison spoke about 76% being applied to Project Eagle, as the lower debtor credit rating and 36% for the rest of the NAMA portfolio. Is NAMA itself reaching those conclusions? Who is actually saying that?

Mr. John Collison

Yes, the Deputy is -----

That has a knock-on effect in the context of the €190 million that was possibly lost, in terms of the valuation of the properties.

Mr. John Collison

All financial institutions generally have a risk rating matrix and credit grading -----

It is NAMA itself that -----

Mr. John Collison

It is NAMA itself, yes. It is our case managers who carry out a credit grading assessment of a particular case, based on a set of established key criteria. That is then assessed by our delegated authority, that is, whoever has discretion to approve a particular credit request. The delegated authority is always a minimum of two people. They are -----

Are they within NAMA itself?

Mr. John Collison

Yes, within NAMA and they are an independent sign off -----

So, apart from the Comptroller and Auditor General coming in and conducting an independent report on that, there is nobody to say that the process is correct or incorrect, other than NAMA itself.

Mr. John Collison

We have a credit grading policy that is the subject of internal audit and I am sure that the Comptroller and Auditor General has reviewed that document and is familiar with how our credit grading matrix works.

Would it be abnormal to get a second opinion on that?

Mr. John Collison

In terms of the risk rating? I do not think the Deputy would find that any financial institution would do so. It is generally put forward by the front-facing or business part of the institution. It is then assessed by the risk section or the delegated authority section and -----

Mr. Collison can at least see where I am coming from, that the valuation comes from within the same institution, so -----

Mr. John Collison

Sure -----

The eye cannot behold itself. It is good to have somebody else look at it.

Mr. John Collison

Yes, but it is available for review by any of our auditors. It is used as a decision making tool because it allows us to track the migration of grades to determine if the portfolio is deteriorating or improving and we can see -----

It will be very interesting when we speak to the Comptroller and Auditor General, after all of this discussion, to hear his views on this.

The same applies to the blended portfolio fair value rate, which Mr. Collison said was, in his view, appropriate given the characteristics of the portfolio. That is why that rate was used. I have a difficulty with self-evaluation, not just for NAMA but for other institutions too because the taxpayer likes to know that when one is talking about due diligence and best practice that it is actually done as opposed to being simply talked about. That is where I am coming from. I am not criticising Mr. Collison per se, or anybody else but am just looking at the issue from that perspective.

The Deputy has one minute remaining.

Mr. Donal Rooney

Can I make one quick comment? Mr. Collison spoke about the credit grading.

It is important to add that the inputs into that credit grading are very factual. There are two main inputs: first, around the overall projected loss or profit on the particular debtor connection, and second, the level of debtor co-operation. It is not a subjective process. It is a very factual one.

Mr. Rooney says there is no correct marketing approach. There are plenty of wrong ways too. There should perhaps be more transparency about that approach in future.

I welcome the witnesses. Three of their board members got red cards from the Chairman for their opening statement last week. The CEO and the chairperson could equally have got red cards for their opening statements. Mr. Collison's statement was more measured. I do not know if that represents a change in NAMA's strategy but it is certainly welcome.

There are two issues I want to deal with, the discount rate and conflicts of interest and discussions between NAMA and PIMCO. There was reference to a professional disagreement between NAMA and the Comptroller and Auditor General about the difference between the 10% and the 5.5% discount rate. What is the witnesses' view of the Comptroller and Auditor General's concern about the discount rate that was applied, his analysis and his conclusion?

Mr. Donal Rooney

In essence the Comptroller and Auditor General had relied on a 5.5% discount rate and NAMA says that in order to arrive at a proper work-out value against which the sale price would be benchmarked a minimum discount rate of 10% would be used. The 5.5% discount rate is NAMA's standard discount rate. It is not put forward as a discount rate to be used across all transactions. It would not make commercial sense to have one discount rate used across all transactions because all transactions are different. What does the discount rate do-----

With respect, that is not what the Comptroller and Auditor General is saying. I am trying to establish the facts which are in the Comptroller and Auditor General's report and what he said before this committee, on the public record. It is my understanding that there is no contention by the Comptroller and Auditor General about a market rate being applied on a loan sale. Would Mr. Rooney agree with that?

Mr. Donal Rooney

I agree that if one were to come up with a valuation of a loan portfolio one needs to apply a market discount rate.

I am trying to establish whether Mr. Rooney understands what the Comptroller and Auditor General's concern was in his report in respect of the 5.5% discount rate. Can he explain his understanding of that to me? It seems to be flawed.

Mr. Donal Rooney

My understanding of what the Comptroller and Auditor General has in his report is that he has come up with an estimate of what NAMA could possibly have realised from the portfolio if it had not sold it but by using the 5.5% discount rate.

He is basing it on an asset sale which is to work out the assets over a time period, which was the original strategy.

Mr. Donal Rooney

Correct, but using a 5.5% discount rate.

I will get to that. He has not referred to, and does not dispute, the market rate being applied if it was a loan sale or a fire sale. That is not his contention. His contention is that if NAMA holds and works out the assets in the manner in which it was originally intended then the 5.5% discount rate would apply. Is that fair enough?

Mr. Donal Rooney

To avoid confusion, if one is going to come up with an estimate of realisable value or work-out value, in other words, what NAMA might have realised had it held onto the portfolio and not sold it, one would go through the same methodology, consider the plain simple cashflows from the portfolio and apply an appropriate discount rate to those cashflows, which we do not believe is 5.5%.

I accept that. In the letter we got from NAMA this week, setting out the issues relating to the discount rate there is reference to the end of 2012 accounts-----

Is that the opening statement?

No, it is the correspondence from a Martin Whelan, head of public affairs in NAMA.

The reference number is 11 B.

Yes R-115 B, page 3, 1h. It refers to NAMA's end of 2012 accounts which were audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General and published in May 2013. The approach adopted by NAMA was to discount all future cashflows at a discount rate of 10%, which was deemed an appropriate discount rate at the time. It does not go on to refer to something that is in today's opening statement, the fair value methodology that was adopted in 2013. What was in those accounts in 2013?

Mr. Donal Rooney

We are talking about audited accounts that were signed off. It is a requirement under international financial reporting standards to provide a fair value disclosure in respect of a loan portfolio as part of the accounts, so as a disclosure, it is not necessarily the basis-----

Can we get page 9 of the opening statement on the screen please?

Mr. Donal Rooney

If I can answer the question I can go on to specifics. As part of the 2012 accounts NAMA provided a fair value estimate of its entire loan book. That was stated in the letter, €21.8 billion. The Project Eagle loan portfolio would have been included within that. That was calculated for the purpose of the 2012 accounts, using a discount rate of 10%.

What NAMA wanted us to believe, and this is the crux of the matter, when it is pressed about the 10% discount rate that was applied it talked about the 2012 accounts, the 2013 accounts and the fair value methodology and all of that. That is the excuse that is given. On page 9 of the opening statement, however, we read, "The fair value methodology adopted in the 2013 accounts involved the application of a discount rate of 5.5% for cashflows arising in the period 2014-2016 and a rate of 10% for cashflows arising during the period from 2017 to 2020". Project Eagle was in 2014 so would it not follow logically that a 5.5% discount rate should have been applied to the cashflows? Is that not the policy Mr. Rooney is talking about, the fair value methodology?

Mr. Donal Rooney

Let me clarify that, for the 2012 accounts, yes for the purpose of the fair value disclosure a 10% discount rate was used. For the 2013 accounts it was a blended approach, a 5.5% discount rate was used for the cashflows up to the end of 2017 and 10% thereafter. It was a change in methodology which can happen in the normal course of events year to year but that was a blended discount rate for the entire NAMA loan book. Project Eagle was only one component within that loan book. There are lots of other far superior assets, far superior loans as part of that loan book so therefore the blended approach of somewhere between 5.5% and 10% might have been appropriate.

This is what we are trying to establish because we need contemporaneous proof that when a decision was taken to apply the 10% discount rate that was based on evidence, not on a verbal analysis that might have been given by individuals at a board meeting or on some generic fair value methodology that was worked out in 2012 and 2013, but in the here and now in 2013 when the decision was made.

The opening statement continues that the blended portfolio rate, which would have been the 5.5% discount rate up to 2014 and 2016 in terms of cashflows, and 10% thereafter. It refers to "the particular characteristics of that portfolio - the Eagle portfolio carried higher risk and would therefore have warranted a discount rate higher than the blended portfolio rate". What evidence, what expert opinion not verbal but written, was presented to the board to justify that?

Mr. John Collison

The board was certainly advised that this portfolio, apart from the fact that it was concentrated, contained a huge amount of assets in secondary or tertiary locations, there was certainly some element of uncertainty about cashflows. It would have been informed and aware that the Northern Ireland market was quite stagnant-----

When Mr. Collison says "informed" and "advised", I am being quite specific. Was it documentary evidence, did it come from experts, was it internal, from people within NAMA, was it presented orally? How was the information given to the board presented?

Mr. John Collison

It was both, it would have been in papers presented to the board and in discussions and in the debates-----

Do we have those papers? This is the evidence we have sought over and over again.

Mr. Moriarty cited some documents earlier that we have not seen yet but we have not seen any so-called paper evidence. Mr. Collison is saying it was both. There was oral evidence and written documents to support this. Specific to Project Eagle, I am referring to the particular characteristics, the higher risks. I assume an analysis was conducted. Mr. Collison is saying this is all in documents that can be presented to us, which were given to the board at the time.

Mr. John Collison

There are always detailed papers around our debtors and our connections and they go to our various delegated authorities. They go to our chief executive officer, some go to our credit committee and some go to our board, and they would know exactly the experiences they had with many of these debtors.

I am not talking about papers being around; I am talking about papers that we want in our possession. I am not interested in what might be around or not around. If they exist, we need them. We have sought them. We have asked over and over again and we have not received them. NAMA needs to give us that documentary evidence. I am talking about documents that refer specifically to Project Eagle and some of the issues that Mr. Collison alluded to about the difficulty in working out the assets because of the difficulties with debtors and so on.

I can help the Deputy. The reply to the letter we wrote to NAMA on 12 October arrived yesterday evening. It is unfortunate that we did not have it for the meeting. The first paragraph of our letter addresses what the Deputy is seeking. It requests "a full copy of the minutes of the board meeting, including papers presented and discussed". I am expecting what he is looking for to be on our system this afternoon. If it is there, well and good; if is not, that is a different story.

It is a little unfortunate that we do not have them because we might have to call the witnesses again.

The Deputy's time is up.

We will see what is furnished. The witnesses may have to return if the documents we are looking for are not provided.

The Deputy has been in possession for 12 minutes and he is only supposed to have ten. He will have an opportunity to contribute later. I call Deputy Burke.

First, I would like to focus on the discount rate because it is the fundamental issue in determining whether there was a significant loss of funds to the taxpayer and the State and to address the frame of mind the Comptroller and Auditor General was in. An auditor can only judge on what evidence is put before him. There has been an admission by NAMA officials that their record keeping was not adequate in a number of areas in respect of recording an explicit justification for the departure of the 5.5% discount rate. Does Mr. Collison agree there was not a robust, strong justification for that departure?

Mr. John Collison

On page 146 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's report, we reference our own experience of a party buying a non-performing loan and the likely value that they are going to attribute to that portfolio or the discount that would apply to the underlying security. At least 10% is mentioned to reflect the associated risks. I can recall that was discussed at that board meeting because our experience was that discount rates on certain portfolios were even higher than that. It may not have been as clear but it certainly is referenced in our June 2013 papers.

That is the point I am getting at. Mr. Collison said he recalls that it was discussed but the evidence particular to Project Eagle does not stack up in respect of the clear detail of why a departure was taken. When one looks in detail at the board paper from December 2013 on page 42, NAMA used a 2.5% discount rate as well as a 5.5% for Northern Ireland. That is confusing for people who are trying to ascertain a departure from the 5.5% rate when the cashflow projections in one of the Mr. Collison's papers uses a 2.5% discount rate.

Mr. Donal Rooney

I can clarify that. There is a board paper from June 2013 in which the matter of discount rate was addressed and discussed by the board. The context for that board paper was NAMA had up to that point used a standard discount rate of 5.5% and the board wanted to reflect on and consider whether it was appropriate to continue using that as its standard discount rate. The board reached a conclusion in that paper that 5.5% was appropriate. A discount rate has two key considerations. It has a company's cost of funds plus a risk premium for any particular transaction and, therefore, the board felt it appropriate to continue with that rate but, critically, the board made a decision as part of that exact same paper that there needed to be flexibility for every transaction to allow a higher discount rate in the event that there are higher risks for a given transaction, which is exactly what occurred in the case of Project Eagle.

Critically, I am not clear on why a 2.5% discount rate for Northern Ireland debtors was mentioned in that paper.

Mr. John Collison

That was just for the purpose of showing the sensitivity between rates.

Mr. Donal Rooney

It was a scenario analysis.

People auditing this will only reflect the evidence put before them. They can see a worked out cashflow with a discount rate of 5.5% and the alternative before them is a 2.5% rate. Mr. Rooney will acknowledge why someone may be concerned about a 10% discount rate being used all of a sudden.

Mr. Donal Rooney

I have direct experience of this. Any inquiry or investigation has two particular strands. One is you look at the evidence and you can pick out the particular evidence the Deputy mentioned. The second is the clarifications provided around that evidence, which management did extensively, to the Comptroller and Auditor General. All the clarifications provided to him around that point were that the 5.5% or, indeed, the 2.5% discount rates in the paper were just used for illustrative purposes. The real rate was 10% plus.

The critical point in this regard is that was retrospective. If one is trying to examine what was happening, which is difficult at this stage, when the process was ongoing, it is difficult to ascertain the work that was carried out to justify the 10% rate at the time. I questioned Mr. McEnery previously in a robust exchange. He alluded to a HSE property with a 30-year lease being sold at a discount rate of approximately 7.5%. That is all well and good retrospectively but when someone is evaluating that process at that particular time, Mr. Rooney would have to agree that it is strange to see a lower discount rate than 5.5% being used in the evidence presented to the Comptroller and Auditor General in terms of events and board papers when NAMA was trying to argue that 10% was justifiable.

Mr. Donal Rooney

Critically, in that board paper, a discount rate of at least 10% was put forward and that, as I mentioned earlier, is one of the key components in the equation to get to the minimum price. Second, I am speaking from personal experience. When you are looking at a review, you are looking at evidence. The documentary evidence is only one part of the equation; it is the subsequent clarifications and follow-ups through meetings with individuals that you need to also consider as importantly as the written evidence. Any clarifications that NAMA staff and management provided to the Comptroller and Auditor General would have clarified the point that the 10% discount rate was the one the board focused on in making its decision.

I accept that point but I come back to the wider context, which is this was the biggest sale that NAMA undertook at the time in terms of a block sale of all its Northern Ireland portfolio. Central to that is how the portfolio and cashflows were valued and discounted. Should there have been greater emphasis and clearer detail at board level and operational level given the documents we have been through in the Comptroller and Auditor General's report showing why a 10% discount was used rather than retrospectively trawling through sales trying to justify what happened?

Mr. John Collison

I certainly think that it was never our intention to mislead our board in any shape or form and that was not the thrust of the discussion that took place at the board meeting itself.

Was Mr. Collison at that board meeting?

Mr. John Collison

Yes, I was.

It would be helpful because, according to the evidence, the paper at the meeting on the 12th was presented by the asset recovery unit. It is always good for us to have a feel for what went on. As Mr. Collison said documentary evidence does not cover it. There is no documentary evidence that he was there. Please tell us who else was there in order that we have a feel for what went on. I am sorry for cutting across him.

Mr. John Collison

It was a private session.

Page 136 in the report-----

Mr. John Collison

The minutes of that meeting are on pages 108 and 109. The head of asset recovery presented that paper to the board. The footnote of the minutes refers to the head of asset recovery and the deputy head of asset recovery having also attended for that item. I also attended. Mr. Ronnie Hanna was head of asset recovery at the time and he would have presented the paper. There was considerable discussion of this particular transaction at the time, as one would expect. A lot of the focus was on PIMCO and its request for off-market. There was also a fair bit of discussion around the value of the portfolio. We were at the time approaching year end and we would have been in the midst of our impairment exercise at that stage. I appreciate that some of this information is only just being provided but we were able to substantiate the valuations on a huge number of the assets.

We will review that this afternoon.

Returning to the issue, it is easy to see how someone examining the evidence would be confused by the reference to the lower discount rate being used.

Mr. John Collison

There was no intention to confuse anybody. The background is, perhaps, that 5.5% was a rate the board was used to seeing. It was our standard interest rate. The 2.5% rate was detailed to demonstrate the sensitivity issue. I can certainly confirm to the Deputy that-----

I understand that point but why then was there no increased rate to show sensitivity? A lower discount rate would obviously show an increase of funds to the taxpayer, which is very good, but one of the most important questions when it comes to risk assessment is what are the adverse consequences of a sale. It would have been reasonable to include a sensitivity rate above 5.5% because that is where the risk is for the State. The State can lose money on assets. Why was that figure not shown given the figure in regard to downward sensitivity is provided?

Mr. John Collison

The Deputy is correct that an increased interest rate could also have been provided. It is referenced in the paper and I can assure the Deputy that there was a fairly detailed discussion about it.

I accept it is referenced. I have read the note from the board. The departure from the discount rate is not detailed. The point I am trying to get across is that as I understand it, when it comes to evaluating a sale, the adverse consequences should always be clearly detailed. I do not understand why in relation to such an important sale the only rate detailed is the discounted interest rate, which obviously was a great windfall for the taxpayer. Why are the adverse effects not shown or detailed?

Mr. Donal Rooney

The Deputy is correct that the calculation is not run at 10%. I accept that. The 10% discount rate is referenced in the paper and we are saying that that was the rate the board used. The qualitative aspects around the risks of the transaction are set out in the paper but the calculation showing the 10% is not done. If the Deputy reads through the paper he will see that the risks are referenced.

Does Mr. Rooney accept that it should be done?

Mr. Donal Rooney

I was not involved in preparing the paper.

If Mr. Rooney personally was selling an asset, would he think it good practice to have a working for the departure on the discount rate?

Mr. Donal Rooney

With the benefit of hindsight, it would have cleared up a lot of questions had we run that particular number. All I can say is that the board based its decision on the 10%.

When the Minister for Finance, Deputy Noonan, appeared before the committee, he said that a work-out of the loan book was not a viable option because of pressure from the European Central Bank, ECB, in the context of Ireland trying to exit the bailout programme. From an operational point of view in terms of calculations and valuations, were any of the witnesses aware of that pressure such that it was not an option to work out these loans?

Mr. John Collison

I would not have been aware of it. We would have always looked at opportunities as and when they arose. I recall that there was a board away day in February 2014 at which reference was made to accelerating disposals, that is, increasing the momentum in terms of cash generation. I do not think there was any political pressure on us to sell Project Eagle. We were not told that the portfolio had to be disposed of. As far as I am aware, that discussion did not take place. We evaluated the proposal on its own merits. There were certainly political sensitivities, to which our chairman alluded, but section 10 was our overriding objective here. That is evidenced in some of the documentation in terms of our interaction with Lazard. Maximising the return was our number one objective.

Had we not achieved the bid levels we got, in other words, if the bids had come in a lot lower, the board would have had a very difficult decision to make. It may have been that the transaction may not have proceeded. Thankfully, we did exceed the reserve. That would have been a very difficult decision to take at that time.

It is a reserve that is poorly justified in a way in terms of the options. We should have had details on a discount and a calculation for the increased option. However, the reality is that we do not have that and so we must move on from it.

Mr. John Collison

I do not think it was poorly justified. I think maybe we could have explained it a bit better but the rationale is the correct one.

Reference is made on page 11 to the three valuation methodologies reviewed by the Comptroller and Auditor General. In regard to the first valuation in respect of which a carrying value of €1.4 billion was used, there was a downward adjustment of €85 million in that regard. The Comptroller and Auditor General has stated that on examination of this valuation, there was no clear backup to support this downward valuation and that an €8 million adjustment was more in line. Again, there is a lack of backup information in regard to decisions taken at that time such that we are again trying retrospectively to get answers to these questions and obtain evidence which may indicate the reason behind decisions. Perhaps one of the witnesses would comment on that point.

Mr. Donal Rooney

There are three points I need to make on the €85 million. This information is a little technical. The reason for the €85 million adjustment is because NAMA, for the purposes of the December board paper, was trying to arrive at an appropriate carrying value against which to apply the 10% discount rate for the purpose of calculating the minimum price. The €1.475 billion carrying value that was arrived at in the paper prior to the €85 million was essentially a financial reporting or accounting-driven figure. Had NAMA relied solely on that figure for the purpose of applying the 10% discount rate, it would not have been a true commercial starting point because NAMA's impairment process had certain rules around it that were suitable for accounting purposes but not necessarily suitable for loan valuation purposes. The €85 million was essentially an effort to bridge that gap. NAMA's impairment process-----

Essentially, you were trying to make the carrying value work towards the 10% discount.

Mr. Donal Rooney

No.

That is how it appears.

Mr. Donal Rooney

No, NAMA's impairment process at the time involved a detailed asset-by-asset, bottom-up review of cashflows for 2014, 2015 and 2016. It was a very specific review across all the portfolios. Deliberately, at the time, cashflows were not reviewed in detail for the period beyond 2016. This was done very deliberately, the reason being, if members cast their minds back to 2013, that because we were in a distressed property market, we could not look more than three years out. Nobody could do that. We did not have a crystal ball and so we took a three-year time horizon, applied a very detailed and rigorous review to those particular cashflows, which afterwards were, in essence, left as they were. In other words, they were not adjusted. The €85 million adjustment was used for loan valuation purposes, which is a different concept completely from impairment financial reporting purposes, in the context of trying to get into the 2017-2018 numbers in a different way over and above impairment.

That would be explicitly driven by the rent or income-generating capacity of the assets.

Mr. Donal Rooney

The €85 million was an effort to get over the principle that the carrying value was only there for impairment and financial reporting purposes. We needed a different starting point in terms of carrying value for loan valuation purposes. The €85 million was the best option at the time.

In arriving at that figure, was there no look past 2016?

Mr. Donal Rooney

The €85 million relates to an estimate of the period 2017 onwards.

I would like to clear up a number of issues in regard to access to the data room. First, everybody had to sign a non-disclosure agreement for phase 1 or phase 2. In this case, was there a difference between what was redacted in the red book in relation to phase 1 and phase 2?

Mr. John Collison

There is a huge difference between what was in the data room in phase 1 and phase 2, but in terms of the redacted information, the same information in respect of the top 55 assets of phase 1 and phase 2 was redacted.

It was redacted for both phases. The board made a decision - I believe on 13 February 2014 - as an exception to policy to provide all of the November 2009 red book valuations for the rest of the portfolio. Those were uploaded to the main phase 2 data room at that stage. In terms of the volume of documents, the level of information that PIMCO would have received at the start was less than 10% - it might even have been nearer to 5% - of what was ultimately uploaded to the data room.

Would the advisers to PIMCO have had access to the same data? If they were acting for PIMCO, that would have been the case.

Mr. John Collison

That is correct. They would have sought consent to access the data room and NAMA, on Lazard's recommendation, would have agreed to or not agreed to the use of those advisers. Once they had their arrangements with their bidder, they would have had access to the data room as well.

When PIMCO exited the process and Cerberus and Fortress became the final two, each had an adviser that had formerly advised PIMCO. They would have had that information from the data room.

Mr. John Collison

Mr. Stewart might wish to comment, but we were aware that Cushman and Wakefield had switched from PIMCO and been retained by-----

Mr. John Collison

-----Fortress and NewRiver Retail, which had also previously been with PIMCO, had been retained by Cerberus. We had been advised of that and Lazard would have been aware of it at the time. It is commonplace for advisers, particularly property or specialist advisers, who are retained by a bidder who happens to drop out of a process to then have their services retained by a bidder who is still in the process.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I wish to make a point about the legal advisers. It is important to mention that when PIMCO withdrew from the process, Lazard was immediately instructed to tell PIMCO to destroy all documentation to which it had access. That extended to its legal advisers, Brown Rudnick, also.

Did that happen?

Mr. Alan Stewart

That happened on PIMCO's withdrawal. That was 14 March. Immediately after that, Lazard was asked to request that they destroy the documentation to which they had had access up to that point.

Did the agent from Lazard have the ability to take the information to someone else?

Mr. Alan Stewart

Yes. Lazard was specifically asked to tell PIMCO to do this.

No, sorry. Would the people PIMCO had engaged have had the ability to use that information and take it on despite the request to PIMCO?

Mr. Alan Stewart

It comes down to their-----

When they downloaded the information from the data room, were they able to keep copies?

Mr. Alan Stewart

Potentially, but to do that would have been a breach of the NDA, which required PIMCO and its advisers, on request from NAMA, to destroy documentation. That is what we-----

We have constantly been told about competitive tension but what if there is an advantage for one group over another? Would it have been an advantage to have an adviser that had been in the data room previously as opposed to others just entering the process?

Mr. John Collison

Cerberus retained the services of NewRiver Retail, which is a retail specialist. Cerberus would have felt that retaining NewRiver Retail after PIMCO had withdrawn would have added value because it would have had views on the marketplace and been familiar with the real estate. I imagine that NewRiver Retail would have been in possession of some information for which Cerberus would have been happy to pay.

As Mr. Stewart stated, the information that was downloaded from the data room could not, under the NDA, be shared afterwards with a third party. There were restrictions on advisers but they would have been retail specialists and had considerable in-depth knowledge of the market and where these assets were located. Cerberus is probably the only one that can answer the question.

If one is in a data room and one has information, one is not going to forget it if it is critical. That could give an advantage when advising a subsequent bidder.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

That information is already available to the other competitors. It is available to everyone. There is no advantage. They can read it for themselves anyway.

Right, but there was a very-----

Mr. Michael Moriarty

The better informed bidders are, the better the chance that we will get a good price. We do not have a problem with bidders being well informed and getting good advice. That is what the competition is about. We are not in the process of restricting them. If it was in the data room and the other bidder was a qualified bidder who had access, that bidder had access to the information anyway.

Yes, but in a shorter period. Mr. Collison stated that it could be a costly process. According to his opening statement, there seems to have been a change since 2014. Was that done in respect of what had happened?

Mr. John Collison

No. The market changed and we were responding to it. Buyers were insisting on more information. If one is selling something, one needs to be able to react or risk not being able to maximise the price. One of the bidders that withdrew at a later stage had completed a substantial amount of due diligence and had sought from NAMA an underwriting of its costs as one of the conditions of staying in the process, which we flatly rejected. The market was evolving even then.

In his opening statement, Mr. Collison drew attention to the liquidation in February 2013 of IBRC. He stated, " ... its loan books were the first large Irish portfolios to be brought to market. From 2013, the market evolved significantly and quickly within a relatively short period." Is that because there was a perception of better value from a purchaser's perspective, given an increased availability of assets or loans to purchase?

Mr. John Collison

Exactly. There were many more products in the marketplace. Equally, market conditions were starting to improve. Some buyers had set up platforms in Ireland. They were certainly targeting Ireland as an area in which they could transact and do business. Many of them were American firms, so there was no language barrier. They liked the legislation. Combine this with the level of activity in the marketplace. The market knew that IBRC's special liquidators were going to be bringing a great deal of debt to the market. Obviously, we were deleveraging as well. There were many more opportunities for purchasers.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

I might supplement that and revert to Deputy Burke's question. When IBRC's special liquidators were appointed, NAMA was directed by the Minister to take over the IBRC's debt to the Central Bank. We issued almost €13 billion in Government-guaranteed loan notes. We were there as the reserve buyer. We spent most of 2013 - when all of this was happening - making preparations to take on that residual IBRC loan book. The conventional wisdom at the time was that, even though the special liquidators were going to sell the loans, they would probably find it difficult. That was part of the evolving market that we mentioned. It was also another context, in that we were keen to progress. We were facing the prospect of - and spending a lot of money preparing to do so - taking on another large amount of loans if the liquidators did not sell them. It was only in April 2014 that the Minister was able to tell us that we did not need to take on the loans because the liquidators had successfully sold them and repaid NAMA's debt. It was a major transaction, as reflected in the board's minutes.

All of that was happening in a constrained or reduced timeframe.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

We were still only going to do deals that were right. This relates to Deputy Burke's question on whether there was pressure. There was no pressure to do a specific deal. We had large cash targets set for us every year, as every business does, and we tried to translate them down. The board had set a target that, by the end of 2014, NAMA would have redeemed 50% of the original bonds, which was quite a step up. That translated down into those of us at the coalface getting a cash target that we tried to realise in the course of the year.

The IBRC liquidation and the potential for NAMA having to take on such a large tranche of additional loans was in the background and working its way through. We were only relieved of that additional task by the fact that the liquidator was successful in selling the loans in Project Eagle-type transactions, that is, large chunks.

That is the next point I wanted to come to. Mr. Moriarty is talking about a more optimistic phase than in 2013. There was more interest, from 2013 on, after the liquidation of IBRC. Mr. Moriarty has just explained that. In hindsight, did the bundling, and the limiting of the potential buyers to persons Mr. Moriarty has described as of a certain altitude, limit the potential of getting better value for the assets?

Mr. Michael Moriarty

I might pick that up in a general sense as well. That methodology is a very well-recognised way of selling loans. Typically, as we have described, and it has been reported, we do a two-phase sale where we put out a limited amount of information and anyone who signs up to a non-disclosure agreement and looks like they are a credible bidder can have a look at that. We have a first round of bids, then we have a short list of typically three who go into the second round. They receive access then to a huge amount of more detailed things and then we get final bids from the three.

It is quite common, even though we have not used it in many instances, for the one-phase approach to be used. In an entirely different situation, I have seen advice from one of the biggest loan sale brokers on both sides of the Atlantic which says that it has done it in this way in more than half the transactions of this type that it has done, and it suits particular types of transactions. One of the actual instances the broker cites which it has executed is, by co-incidence, a Northern Ireland portfolio of in excess of 900 properties. It targeted three people and says it can get the competitive tension. There is a quasi-first round in that people want to be in it and they want to qualify for those short lists. This broker tells us it has done more than half its business in this way.

Is it best practice?

Mr. John Collison

I can add to that point that some of the bidders who were involved in the Project Eagle process, some of whom even maybe withdrew very early or did not even enter the data room, confirmed to us that the timeframe and the size of the transaction appealed to them. They did not have a problem with the compressed timeframe. The bespoke process, in terms of a limited number of bidders, certainly appealed to them as well. They did not see a difficulty in transacting within the timeframe or on-boarding a lot of these loans, which they would have had to do, and get a servicer in afterwards. There is a lot of debt related to these 900 properties. That did not faze them at all. In actual fact, it appealed to some of them.

On the Northern Ireland debtors, NAMA talks about the level of non-co-operation. Did that non-co-operation relate exclusively to assets that were in Northern Ireland or did it extend to where the assets were in different locations? Why would that have been the case?

Mr. John Collison

It related to all of the assets. It was our interaction. Obviously, we - our case management teams - interact directly with the debtors and those debtors had portfolios of assets. Some were located perhaps, in the context of Project Eagle, in Northern Ireland. Others had assets in different jurisdictions. I certainly had experience of some of the case management teams that Mr. Moriarty and I would have managed and which would have been presenting papers to us. We could see there were missed milestones. There certainly was a history of recalcitrant debtors where there was dragging of heels when it came to sales and the assets were not put on the marketplace. On cash generation, they just did not compare when it came to the cash generation that was happening with the debtors that we managed down here. There were very difficult tough negotiations with many of these debtors.

Is it agreed that we will break now for half an hour? Agreed.

Sitting suspended at 12.55 p.m. and resumed at 1.30 p.m.

I remind everybody to turn off all mobile phones completely.

Are there any women in this organisation or were women involved in any part of this decision-making process?

Mr. John Collison

There are certainly plenty of women on the project team.

In the Project Eagle process?

Mr. John Collison

Yes. They were working on the Project Eagle team that executed the deal.

They do not seem evident

Mr. John Collison

Aideen O'Reilly is our head of legal.

The head of legal is female?

Mr. John Collison

Yes.

We now have another ten pages before us. Very soon, the pages from NAMA will exceed the actual report. The witnesses have not addressed one of the issues. They have simply zoned in again on the figures of 5.5% and 10% and said once again that the Comptroller and Auditor General had inappropriately used a figure. I am exasperated at this point because he will be coming back in due course to answer but from what we have read, he did not pick the figure of 5.5% out of the sky. He picked it from the NAMA board and minutes and has made comments and drawn conclusions that NAMA did not justify its decisions, did not show evidence for its decisions, did not back them up and did not look at alternatives. I will not waste my five or ten minutes going through all of that again but I have put it repeatedly to the different NAMA witnesses. I would have thought that at this point, if they were coming in with ten pages, they might go through chapters 3 and 4 and deal with what the Comptroller and Auditor General raised - the Project Eagle loan sale process, the other chapter concerning the basis for the decision for the decision to sell the Northern Ireland debtor loans and the conflict of interest. They are three major areas. I would have expected the witnesses to go through all of that. They have had five draft reports. They have had ample opportunity and we are now at the end of the October and I do not see any of the concerns raised.

I will use my time to concentrate on the conflict of interest. Which member of the witnesses' delegation would have been present when the phone call with PIMCO took place?

Mr. Alan Stewart

I was present for the PIMCO phone call.

Who was with Mr. Stewart?

Mr. Alan Stewart

From the NAMA side?

From any side. Who was in Mr. Stewart's presence when he participated?

Mr. Alan Stewart

My direct presence in the room?

Mr. Alan Stewart

Ronnie Hanna, who was head of asset recovery, was there for the call on 10 March and likewise for the first call on 11 March, which was a morning call.

I will take the first call because there were about five calls.

Mr. Alan Stewart

There are five calls-----

Mr. Alan Stewart

-----one on 13 March, which falls outside the-----

We will go through each one of those calls. The first one is on 10 March.

Mr. Alan Stewart

That is right.

Is it correct to say that this phone call follows on from a request from PIMCO on 7 October? PIMCO needed to talk to NAMA or the legal team about something. Is that correct?

Mr. Alan Stewart

Yes. What happened was that the head of legal in PIMCO left a voicemail for my manager on 7 October seeking a call. A call was then scheduled for 4 p.m. on Monday, 10 March. My manager was unable to attend as she had an appointment that day so she asked me to sit in with Mr. Hanna for that call.

So just two people were there?

Mr. Alan Stewart

That is correct.

What was said to them?

Mr. Alan Stewart

First, PIMCO thanked us for arranging the call. It outlined the fee arrangement, with which the Deputy is familiar, that there was to be a three-way split between Brown Rudnick, Tughans and Frank Cushnahan of the success fee it said was payable.

This was the first time Mr. Stewart heard about this?

Mr. Alan Stewart

Absolutely.

Did it come as a shock to him?

Mr. Alan Stewart

Absolutely. PIMCO asked whether we were aware of this. We immediately said "No", which was the reaction of Mr. Hanna and I. We were not aware of this. From there, the call went into a question about how PIMCO became aware of it. We were talking to the legal team in PIMCO - nobody from the commercial side. The legal team told us in broad terms that it had become aware of it when it first started looking at the letter of engagement with Brown Rudnick. That is when the three-way split came to light. The call concluded. I will refer periodically to my notes. They are based on handwritten notes of the call. I think the committee has a copy of them from what was provided last night-----

I do not have them now. If Mr. Stewart is going to refer to them, I would like it-----

Can we get them up on the screen? Is there a reference to them if we have them on our system?

Mr. Michael Moriarty

The heading on the one Mr. Stewart just talked about is record 1, in what was sent down - if that is of any assistance in locating it?

Mr. Alan Stewart

I should add that Appendix E is a useful guide as well.

Could we work from Appendix E because that is what has been disclosed to us? That is what we have.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I will do that. I do not take issue with what is in Appendix E. It is largely consistent with what is in my notes. There is a bit more in my notes but that probably-----

That is great. So Mr. Stewart is confirming what is in Appendix E?

Mr. Alan Stewart

Yes.

That is interesting because Mr. Daly is not quite happy with Appendix E but we will come back to him on that. Mr. Stewart is confirming Appendix E as is? He has read it.

Mr. Alan Stewart

Looking at my notes and comparing them with what is in Appendix E, I am broadly happy with what is in Appendix E.

Is there anything in it with which he disagrees?

Mr. Alan Stewart

There is one point I can address now if the Deputy wishes?

Mr. Stewart can address it now.

Mr. Alan Stewart

The one point I would take issue with is the use of a footnote for the context I gave to a particular point that was raised.

There were two footnotes in fact.

Yes, Nos. 1 and 2.

Mr. Alan Stewart

It is more the fact that they were put as footnotes. I was on the calls and I recall what the context was. I felt it would have been appropriate to elevate it to the body text, as opposed to a footnote. That is my impression.

However, the witness is not taking issue with the accuracy.

Mr. Alan Stewart

No.

That is great. I have read them and have them marked. I am sure all the other members have read them.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I will work from those then, rather than confuse things with what the committee received last night. Obviously at that point in the call we explained to PIMCO. The question was asked: "If this is an issue for PIMCO, what does that mean for PIMCO in this process?" I have that in my notes. It might not be clear from Appendix E but the Deputy will see it from my notes.

I will not talk about Mr. Stewart's notes. We do not have them. I am talking about Appendix E, if the witness will keep it clear for me.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I understand, but the committee will have my notes. I just wish to make that point again. We take the Deputy's point.

Mr. Stewart is before me now. This is difficult, Chairman. I have ten minutes, but four have gone and I have not moved. What I have before me is what I have read in detail. Take me through Appendix E.

Mr. Alan Stewart

Of course, but it is important that I deal with it. Obviously, I will be happy to appear again before the committee on another day if the Deputy has questions that she does not reach.

I do not wish to be argumentative but we are under time pressure. Mr. Stewart has confirmed that he has no problem with these notes, except for the footnote, so let us work through Appendix E.

Mr. Alan Stewart

Okay. What was then said, and this is mentioned in Appendix E, is that if NAMA considered the fee arrangement to be an issue, PIMCO would have concerns over continuing to deal with the three counter parties involved-----

Excuse me, Mr. Stewart had the telephone call and he was shocked. What happened next?

Mr. Alan Stewart

We asked how it came to light and explained-----

Yes, we heard all that. What did Mr. Stewart do with that information?

Mr. Alan Stewart

With that information after the call?

Mr. Alan Stewart

We took the information back to the board and there was a telephone call with the board the next morning. There was a meeting and I believe there is a board minute of-----

Who did Mr. Stewart contact on the board with that information?

Mr. Alan Stewart

I believe there was a call put through to the chairman and a board meeting was convened for the following morning.

Mr. Stewart told the chairperson and presumably he called a meeting.

Mr. Alan Stewart

That is correct.

We have the minutes of that meeting.

Mr. Alan Stewart

Yes.

As a result of that meeting Mr. Stewart was to go back and talk to PIMCO.

Mr. Alan Stewart

Yes, to relay the board's position to PIMCO, which is what we did. Then there was the 11 a.m. call on 11 March which was directly after the board meeting. Again in that call, which was quite a short call, we simply relayed the board's position that this was a very serious issue for NAMA. That was put to PIMCO and it was asked to reflect on this. Should I continue with the interaction?

Mr. Alan Stewart

That evening there was a call with PIMCO again. I think we may have missed a call from it and we were returning it that evening at 5 p.m. In that call PIMCO expressed its disappointment that disclosures of interest, which it thought would have been made, had not been made. Its people went on to say that it was willing to withdraw completely from the process. That is how it was put, that it was willing to withdraw. Then there was a query about whether it had considered other options. This was reference back, and I am quite clear about this, to what had been said in the 10 March call where PIMCO had referenced the possibility that it would need to consider with the business - that if this was an issue for NAMA it would explore other options. That is what Mr. Hanna referred to when he said, "Have you considered other options?".

Wait, we have gone through 10 March and that was not said.

Mr. Alan Stewart

Actually, it is in Appendix E, in the last paragraph of the first page. It states:

PIMCO confirmed that its legal due diligence would not proceed until NAMA's position was clarified [That is the legal due diligence in the legal data room] and that, if NAMA considered the fee arrangement to be an issue, PIMCO would have concerns over continuing to deal with the three counterparties and would need to consider if the transaction could be progressed without their involvement.

What is missing from that is that they would need to consider with the business. That is a reference to the fact that the legal team does not have the ability to make those types of decisions on its own.

It states: "... the transaction could be progressed without their involvement".

Mr. Alan Stewart

Yes, without their involvement. That possible option was what I believe Mr. Hanna was referring to on 11 March at the afternoon call. When they asked what other options he was referring to, the text is "if the deal could be 'shaped differently for the arrangement fee to come out'." I believe that is a reference to removing the three counter parties, because it says the same thing in a different way in my view.

Mr. Hanna asked this.

Mr. Alan Stewart

Yes, that is right. The core concern of the board was the fact that Frank Cushnahan was a potential beneficiary from this fee. That was relayed. Indeed, that is consistent with what is in the board minutes. At that point, they raised the point that a third of the fee was in fact payable to a named individual in Tughans and, again, that they were willing to withdraw from the process.

At every stage PIMCO was upfront. It initiated it from 7 March and confirmed it through the telephone calls. Its representatives said they were disappointed there had been no disclosure to NAMA and then said they had no option but to withdraw.

Mr. Alan Stewart

Yes, and they said at a number of points that they wished to be transparent and upfront about that.

I thank Mr. Stewart for confirming what is there. Was Hogan Lovells NAMA'S legal advisers?

Mr. Alan Stewart

Yes, they were our advisers on the loan sale.

How much were they paid?

Mr. Alan Stewart

I believe it was just over £1 million.

Were they ever asked about how to handle a conflict of interest?

Mr. Alan Stewart

The scope of their work was to deal with the loan sale process, the data room and dealing with queries and whatnot.

It never arose that they would have been asked for their opinion on PIMCO withdrawing and subsequently.

Mr. Alan Stewart

No, there is an in-house legal function in NAMA so we would be able to deal with such issues.

Is that Mr. Stewart?

Mr. Alan Stewart

My manager, who is the head of legal, and a number of others. Obviously, there are more on the team.

It was the legal team's role, rather than the role of Hogan Lovells.

Mr. Alan Stewart

Yes, and there is a compliance unit in the NTMA as well. Reference was made to that in the report also.

Did the legal team see a problem with the payment to Mr. Cushnahan?

Mr. Alan Stewart

Of course.

Will Mr. Stewart tell us more?

Mr. Alan Stewart

When I sat in on the call on 10 March, I did not know who Frank Cushnahan was, to be honest. I knew the name, I knew that he was from Northern Ireland and that he was on the Northern Ireland advisory committee. That was it. I was not aware of any conflicts of interest, involvement with debtors or what-----

When did it come to Mr. Stewart's attention?

Mr. Alan Stewart

It came to my attention afterwards.

What was Mr. Stewart's role then?

Mr. Alan Stewart

At that point in time, the board had given us its view, PIMCO had expressed its willingness to withdraw and the next day said it was withdrawing.

Was Mr. Stewart asked for an opinion on this?

Mr. Alan Stewart

Yes.

What was your opinion?

Mr. Alan Stewart

That under no circumstances, from a reputational point of view, could this type of arrangement be allowed to proceed. That was my view at the time.

Was that given in written or verbal format?

Mr. Alan Stewart

I was present at the board meeting at 10 a.m. on the 11th and I would have expressed the view at that stage. I think that was the uniform view, by the way.

Was Mr. Stewart asked for a view on Cerberus and taking on the same legal advisers and one set of property advisers?

Mr. Alan Stewart

When that issue came to light I was not aware of it. Our second daughter was born on 30 March, so I was off work from 1 April. I did not know of Cerberus retaining Brown Rudnick and Tughans. Indeed, I only found out about that in the middle of last year.

Who in the office found out? Somebody stepped into Mr. Stewart's shoes when he stepped out.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I believe, and I am looking at these e-mails second-hand, that the interaction was first between the head of asset recovery and Cerberus.

Mr. Alan Stewart

Yes, that is correct. I think he would have consulted with the CEO and I think-----

Mr. Stewart had nothing to do with this.

Mr. Alan Stewart

No.

Who on the legal side had? Was the legal team asked about Cerberus taking on the same solicitors?

Mr. Alan Stewart

I know there were discussions with my manager, who is the head of legal. That ultimately resulted in the approach taken, which was to get this-----

When was Mr. Stewart's office made aware of that?

Mr. Alan Stewart

My first awareness of it-----

I do not mean Mr. Stewart personally but whoever was taking the decisions.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I believe it was 3 April.

Is the witness sure of that?

Mr. Alan Stewart

The e-mail from Cerberus saying it was retaining Brown Rudnick was on 3 April.

This is important. Here we have Cerberus taking on the same solicitors and the same property advisers. I wish to ask questions about how the conflict of interest was followed up, not to be argumentative but because the Comptroller and Auditor General raises it.

Mr. Alan Stewart

Of course.

He makes specific conclusions that further steps should have been taken. If Mr. Stewart is not in a position to help us on this, we will get the appropriate witness. Is he not in a position to help us here?

Mr. Alan Stewart

Not with regard to the interaction on 3 April, I am afraid.

What person in the office was approached for advice regarding whether it was appropriate that Cerberus had the same solicitors?

Mr. Alan Stewart

I imagine it was the head of legal.

Mr. Steward cannot help us.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I cannot on that specific one. I can with regard to PIMCO.

I am asking about Cerberus.

We have dealt with PIMCO.

I have two final questions. Is Mr. Stewart aware that when a bidder comes forward to bid, the financial adviser, such as Lazard in this case, would set out what responsibilities are on the bidder?

Mr. Alan Stewart

Yes.

What responsibility would have been on Cerberus with regard to disclosure?

Mr. Alan Stewart

It would have been expected to make its bid in a way that was compliant with the process letter. That is essentially-----

I am talking about its advisers. What obligation would have been on it to disclose who its advisers were?

Mr. Alan Stewart

In order to access the data room, they had to inform us who their advisers were and there was an obligation on them to put in place a similar NDA, non-disclosure agreement, which they had us, with their advisers.

Did Cerberus inform NAMA that it had taken on the same set of solicitors and the same property advisers? Did that come back as part of its obligation prior to the bid?

Mr. Alan Stewart

Yes, prior to the bid. The legal advisers Cerberus had retained prior to the bid who were very active in the data room on their behalf were Linklaters and A&L Goodbody, two other firms. That is partially why I was shocked when I heard last year that Cerberus was retaining Brown Rudnick because I could not understand why it would have a need to retain another legal firm when it had two full service firms which were so active.

Did Cerberus tell NAMA that it had retained Brown Rudnick?

Mr. Alan Stewart

I believe the first time it told us was on 3 April. That was the e-mail I had seen.

This gentleman was not there that day.

Mr. John Collison

My understanding was NAMA had only become aware of it on 3 April.

That is the point I am asking about. There is an obligation on the bidder to say who his or her advisers are and write it out before making the bid.

Mr. Alan Stewart

Perhaps I can clarify the matter for the Deputy. The obligation arises in order to facilitate access to the data room. They have to tell us who their advisers are in order for those parties to be facilitated in accessing the data room. As far as I am aware, Brown Rudnick never accessed the data room in its capacity as an adviser to Cerberus. That is an important point.

That is important if Mr. Stewart says there was no obligation except only in relation to the data room.

I have one last question for Mr. Collison on the bid process. He did not address any of the issues raised.

Mr. John Collison

In what way?

I cannot read all of them, but they are all mentioned in the report. I do not have the time to do so, but I will come back to them in ten minutes. They are all set out in the conclusions, one after another. For example, it is stated the process was not competitive and that the bidders were restricted. Mr. Collison keeps talking about nine or ten bidders, but there were three.

Mr. John Collison

I never mentioned that there were nine or ten bidders.

Other speakers have. The process was not competitive but restrictive. Mr. Collison said, "If we had underbid, there would have been a lot more bidders."

Mr. John Collison

Potentially.

Yes, I took a note of what Mr. Collison said. There were a lot more bidders, but NAMA stopped them. Eight out of ten bidders came forward, but only two were allowed in.

Mr. John Collison

On the advice of Lazard.

Eight were refused. When Mr. Collison makes a statement that if they had underbid, there would, potentially, have been a lot more bidders, it must be remembered that there were a lot more bidders. In the process NAMA had set up it was stated they were not being taken in. Different reasons were given and set out in the report. One was that a commitment had been given to the existing bidders that there would be a restricted process. A second was that Lazard stated seven out of eight had excellent reputations but that they could not be taken in.

Mr. Alan Stewart

There were not eight bidders. There were eight parties which had expressed a possible interest. That is an important point to make.

Yes, we understand that.

The most important point is that NAMA said "No" to them.

We will come back to the matter.

I welcome all of the witnesses. Unlike Deputy Catherine Connolly, I do, in fact, have the contemporaneous notes of the conversations in front of me. At a previous hearing of the committee, Mr. Alan Stewart's boss, Ms Aideen O'Reilly-----

Mr. Alan Stewart

She is my manager.

-----informed the committee that contact had been made with NAMA by PIMCO in reporting concerns under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. As somebody who was party to some, although not all, of the telephone calls in question, did PIMCO seek the acquiescence of NAMA to the fee arrangement in question?

Mr. Alan Stewart

I do not think that is the way I would have interpreted it from the interaction I had with PIMCO. The way I would interpret it is that it did mention on a couple of occasions that there might have been other options to consider. On one later occasion - it might have been 12 March - it did raise the possibility of the process with Lazard being extended.

I will come to that matter in due course. With no disrespect to Mr. Stewart, that is not what I asked. Would he be surprised if I were to say to him-----

Mr. Alan Stewart

I am sorry to interrupt the Deputy, but I did answer the question I was asked. That was the way I had interpreted it. I did not interpret it as acquiescence.

One would be surprised then that the minutes of the board meetings on 13 March, which were signed off on by the NAMA board, state PIMCO had sought NAMA's acquiescence, namely, to the fee arrangement.

Mr. Alan Stewart

As I was not present at that board meeting, I do not know what course the discussion took.

I am trying to establish that, as somebody who was party to some of the telephone calls, this certainly was not part of Mr. Stewart's impression.

Mr. Alan Stewart

No. Just to add a point, I was also aware that it did seek to understand if we were aware of the fee.

Board minutes of the meeting on 11 March, two days previously, recorded the following sentiment:

PIMCO, ostensibly in the spirit of transparency, wish to advise NAMA about the success fee arrangement and sought NAMA's agreement that it was appropriate.

The word "ostensibly" is used in minutes of the board meeting, which it seems is questioning the motivation of PIMCO which, it should be borne in mind, as Mr. Stewart's boss told us, had approached NAMA because of concerns about the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. However, the board minutes state:

PIMCO, ostensibly in the spirit of transparency, wish to advise NAMA about the success fee arrangement and sought NAMA's agreement that it was appropriate.

I am taking it that this does not tally either with Mr. Stewart's understanding of the telephone calls.

Mr. Alan Stewart

No. The use of the word "ostensibly", when the first call from PIMCO had only been received the day before, was perhaps an expression of the fact that we had only started an engagement with PIMCO and that we were still trying to develop and understand where it was coming from. Perhaps that is why the word "ostensibly" was used. However, I am speculating.

Mr. Stewart had been writing a record in his contemporaneous notes and I do not see any such doubt cast on the motives of PIMCO.

Mr. Alan Stewart

No. Over the course of all the telephone calls with PIMCO, when it stated it was acting in the interests of transparency, I took it at face value.

Of course, but Mr. Stewart's boss told us that it was about the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act that it had contacted NAMA.

Mr. Alan Stewart

To be clear, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was not specifically mentioned in the telephone calls.

In previous testimony Ms O'Reilly cited it.

Mr. Alan Stewart

That might have been its motivation. I am only telling the Deputy what I recollect from the telephone calls.

On the far end of the line PIMCO had Mr. Tom Rice, European legal counsel, and Mr. Hugh Mildred, legal counsel. There was a third party to the conversation on 10 March, Dechert, Neil Gerrard, partner. Why was Dechert party to the conversation?

Mr. Alan Stewart

I believe Dechert was party to the telephone call as it was an external legal adviser to PIMCO.

It was Mr. Stewart and Mr. Ronnie Hanna on 10 March.

Mr. Alan Stewart

Yes.

At no stage in the records - this is reflected in Appendix E of the Comptroller and Auditor General's report - does NAMA state to PIMCO the position is untenable and that one must exit from the proces.

Mr. Alan Stewart

We did not say it in so many words. Wearing my legal hat, my assessment was that it had no realistic option other than to withdraw from the process. There may have been other options, but no realistic option. To answer the Deputy's question, I do not recall us specifically saying it to PIMCO.

I wanted to receive clarification because there has been some controversy about whether PIMCO walked or was exited. Mr. Stewart will be aware that the position of his board, chairman and chief executive officer - it seems it was not based on anything - was that PIMCO had been forcibly exited, but that is not borne out by the records.

Mr. Alan Stewart

Perhaps that is a reflection of what I said that PIMCO had no realistic option other than to withdraw. The Deputy can ask it that question.

In respect of the telephone call on 11 March, with Mr. Stewart and Mr. Ronnie Hanna from the NAMA side, from the notes I note that Mr. Hanna asked the question of "when PIMCO had become aware of the issue," the issue being the success fees or the fixer's fees. Mr. Tom Rice, European legal counsel for PIMCO, responded by saying, "the [Project Eagle] process had been with NAMA for several months and he referenced April or May 2013". To what was he referring?

Mr. Alan Stewart

The way he answered that question was rather vague. Reference was made to April-May 2013, but he was incorrect in saying it had been with NAMA since. It had not.

I am not sure if he was maybe referring to the fact that Brown Rudnick had been interacting with PIMCO from around, I understand, May 2013. I think there was reference to that in some of the notes I have seen elsewhere. That may have been what he was referring to.

What notes elsewhere?

Mr. Alan Stewart

I do not know - in preparation for the Comptroller and Auditor General so it would have been the materials that were given to the Comptroller and Auditor General's office.

Will Mr. Stewart say that again? There were references to-----

Mr. Alan Stewart

April-May 2013. I think I have seen somewhere that maybe one of the first interactions between Brown Rudnick and PIMCO might have been around May 2013 but I am not certain of that.

That is certainly news to me. The board minutes from the meeting of 13 March state: "The Board noted that PIMCO had advised that the negotiations had commenced in April 2013". In our previous session, which was attended by some members of the NAMA board, Mr. Oliver Ellingham agreed with me when I put the following to him: "PIMCO, on leaving the process of its own volition, as I interpret it, informed NAMA that this deal was struck in April 2013. That is my reading of the NAMA board minutes." In response to that statement from me, Mr. Ellingham agreed that that was how the minutes read but said this was a typo. It is clear from the notes of the telephone call that this was not a typo. Mr. Stewart was party to the conversation in which Mr. Rice stated that the Project Eagle process had been with NAMA for several months. He references April or May 2013, which is then reflected in the board minutes. I want to get to the bottom of that. What does it mean?

Mr. Alan Stewart

I was not involved back at that point during any part of 2013, so I am afraid I cannot shed any more light on that for the Deputy. I took his reference to be an error because when I established it subsequently, it was the case that it was not with NAMA from that point in time so I do not-----

Hold on a moment. Mr. Stewart is party to this conversation and Mr. Hanna is there because he is head of asset recovery. Mr. Stewart was there in his capacity. What is Mr. Stewart's position again?

Mr. Alan Stewart

Senior divisional solicitor.

Mr. Stewart was there for his legal input. Is he saying that a reference was made to April or May and to this day he has no understanding of what it refers to or why April or May were referenced?

Mr. Alan Stewart

No, I am not clear in my notes as to why that was referred to. What was more important was what follows in the rest of the paragraph.

Hold on. When Mr. Stewart was doing up his notes, and in fairness to him he kept notes-----

Mr. Alan Stewart

Yes.

Well done. When Mr. Stewart was doing up his notes, did he inquire of Mr. Hanna what might have been meant by that reference to April -May 2013?

Mr. Alan Stewart

I may have done. If I did, he was not able to shed any further light on it either.

Mr. Stewart simply cannot recall. We have a record of a phone call which was not any phone call between a set of people. Bear in mind the board is talking to the legal counsel from the PIMCO end. This is reflected in Mr. Stewart's contemporaneous notes and the board minutes and he is not disputing that those dates were mentioned. We have no explanation as to what was meant and why those dates were cited. Is that what Mr. Stewart is saying?

Mr. Alan Stewart

Yes, because it pre-dated NAMA's involvement with PIMCO, as I understand it.

Did it? According to Mr. Rice, European legal counsel for PIMCO, the process had been with NAMA for several months and he referenced April or May 2013. The board minutes state: "PIMCO had advised that the negotiations had commenced in April 2013". This pre-dates correspondence from the Northern Minister and all of that sequence of events.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I am afraid I am not able to offer any more assistance with that, but perhaps PIMCO would be able to assist with that. I do not know.

Yes, perhaps PIMCO might assist. When members of the NAMA board were before the committee they were insistent that PIMCO was seeking to stay inside this transaction. They were emphatic on repeated occasions at our meeting that PIMCO wished at all costs to sidestep whatever regulatory irregularities it may have come across and remain within the process. Is that Mr. Stewart's recollection?

Mr. Alan Stewart

I did not have that impression of it. My impression was more that it was prepared to tentatively explore whether there might be other options that it could have invoked to stay involved. It asked at one point whether the process with Lazard could be expanded. However, as I understand it from looking at the minutes of the board meeting on 13 March, that is something that was discussed at that meeting. That was a private session and I was not present at it so I was not in a position to----

I appreciate that. Let us go back to Mr. Stewart's notes on the 11 March telephone call. Mr. Rice for PIMCO states that PIMCO did not want to continue in a process with any degree of impropriety for PIMCO or NAMA and that PIMCO was willing to withdraw completely. That is a straightforward statement of intent in that PIMCO understood the seriousness of the issue and its legal obligations and it was for walking. At this point, Mr. Hanna, on behalf of NAMA, asked whether PIMCO had considered other options. According to Mr. Stewart's note, Mr. Rice then asked what options and Mr. Hanna asked if the deal could be shaped differently for the arrangement fee to come out. Would it be fair to say, on the basis of these notes, that far from it being a case of PIMCO wishing to manoeuvre to stay inside the process, it was in fact Mr. Hanna who was suggesting a differently shaped deal or different arrangement for PIMCO to stay on board?

Mr. Alan Stewart

No, I do not think that would be fair. I will explain why that is the case.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I think the Deputy is looking at that note in isolation. On 10 March, which was the first call with PIMCO - I will refer to my notes because I think the Deputy has them in front of her as well for that call. Does she have them?

Mr. Alan Stewart

The penultimate paragraph states:

RH [Ronnie Hanna] asked, if what had been outlined was an issue for NAMA, whether Pimco would proceed with its work on the proposed transaction. TR [Tom Rice] said they would certainly not proceed with their legal due diligence [which is the work in the legal data room] until the position had been clarified. TR said that if it was an issue for NAMA, Pimco would have concerns with continuing to deal with the 3 counterparties and would have to consider whether the 'business' could proceed without the counterparties involved.

For clarity, I think the reference to a "business" is a reference to the commercial side of the house. The legal team is obviously a support.

What does Mr. Stewart surmise from that?

Mr. Alan Stewart

What I surmise is that when it was put to PIMCO if this was going to be an issue for it and whether it could continue in the process, there was a thinking out loud. That is the way I viewed it at the time. It was, "Well, there might be a possibility but we would have to talk to the business about whether we could proceed without the three counterparties involved." I took this to be a reference, not unreasonably I think, to Brown Rudnick, Tughans and Frank Cushnahan. My interpretation of it is that when that was raised on 11 March by Ronnie Hanna - the point the Deputy mentioned a few moments ago - he was referring back to the that loose end that had been left out there from the 10 March call and that that is why he brought up the point. That is my view of it from being on the calls and from the notes I have of the calls.

How lengthy is the note on the call of 10 March?

Mr. Alan Stewart

It is not lengthy. It is actually an e-mail, which is why the Deputy might not see it. It was an e-mail that was attached because I put my handwritten notes into an e-mail. The Deputy will have that.

I will study the notes. I have to say that is not how the records-----

The Deputy must conclude.

I will conclude but I would first like to make the following point. We have Mr. Stewart in the room and we obviously need to study Mr. Stewart's notes. I do not know whether other members have these notes or whether it is appropriate to take a break to allow people to study them.

Deputy McDonald should carry on. What we can do and what we have agreed is that when we get an opportunity to study the correspondence, members can contact the clerk to seek further information without having to wait until the next meeting. This is being done in an effort to keep the questions moving.

If we are to investigate or examine all of this correctly, we must have time to absorb the detail before putting the questions.

I agree.

Written correspondence after the event is fine but I am very concerned that I have no explanation for this April-May business. It seems the board or members thereof believe this was a typo, whereas we have established it is not a typo. I want to know what was going on in April or May. Is this a reference to when the deal was cut with Frank Cushnahan, who was still on the Northern committee at that stage? Mr. Stewart has it in his notes but cannot explain what it was a reference to. The whole situation is most unsatisfactory.

We will come back to that.

Furthermore, we have inferences in the board minutes of ostensible commitments to transparency on the part of PIMCO.

To me, that is very loaded language in a minute of a board meeting. According to my reading, it demonstrates hostility on the part of NAMA towards PIMCO having bothered coming forward. There is a very firmly stated position by the board, the people who are in charge, the CEO and the chairman, that PIMCO was actually prepared to do whatever it would take to stay in. That does not tally with anything I have seen. With no disrespect to Mr. Stewart, a narrative about thinking out loud simply does not cut it. He is a legal professional and I am sure he will appreciate the point I am making.

Mr. Alan Stewart

All I can do is recount my recollection and reference the notes I took during those calls.

No. Mr. Stewart has to be able to account for his notes. He refers in his notes to Mr. Tom Rice, European legal counsel for PIMCO, citing that the process had been with NAMA, referencing April and May 2013. His notes do not record any challenge to or refutation of those dates. The April date is echoed in the board minutes. As of yet, bar some makey-uppy thing about it being a typo, we have no explanation as to what that was all about.

Mr. Alan Stewart

Let me take the Deputy back to that paragraph. The paragraph does state some other things, namely, that this development went back to the origination of the deal with PIMCO and the proposal for an acquisition fee. The proposed split was mentioned some time ago and inquiries were made on it. One should remember the call was just with the legal people from PIMCO.

Yes, I am aware of that.

Mr. Alan Stewart

Reference was made to a draft letter of engagement. Once the amount was queried, it became evident that the payment was to be split three ways and clarification was sought from the firm afterwards. If one considers the call of 10 March, when it was asked how the matter came to light, it was clear the legal team had only looked at the letter of engagement much more recently. Obviously, I would think no legal team would have let a matter like that sit with it for very long before picking up the phone and asking for NAMA's view. My impression is that the legal team, which was the team on the call with us and the people of whom we were asking the questions, was privy to the information about the fee split only relatively soon before the call-----

I am not for a minute challenging that. I am taking that as read until somebody demonstrates otherwise. I am simply saying that notes from NAMA now record these dates, and an account cannot be given of them. I refer not only to Mr. Stewart in this regard.

Mr. Alan Stewart

The Deputy asked why we did not probe it. Given that is what the legal team went on to say, probing it would not have shed any more light on it because it made it clear its involvement was only in reviewing the letter of engagement, which was much more recent. I am not sure that, even if I had asked questions, those concerned would have been able to say anything about April and May 2013.

But we are not going to know because Mr. Stewart did not ask and nothing is recorded here.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I want it on the record that I did not see fit to ask that question because I did not believe the people on the call would be capable of answering it. That was an entirely reasonable conclusion to draw.

They are senior counsel.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I can say it was a reasonable conclusion to draw.

Before I call on Deputy Cullinane, I shall put a few questions. Some seek information for the witnesses to send on. They just make observations on what has been sent on. I ask the delegation to take note of my remarks. Reference was made to the bond repayment schedule and the need for inward cash flow. Could I have a document showing what the required bond repayment schedule was for the years in question and what was actually achieved? I just want to put that straightforward information on the record.

The witnesses talk a lot about the difficult debtors in Northern Ireland. Is it possible that NAMA was not as diligent and strong in marshalling its debtors in Northern Ireland as it might have been with debtors down here? Could that be part of the reason NAMA was not getting as much co-operation in the North, given that the witnesses are saying that, in the Northern Ireland jurisdiction, the debtors were missing targets, not putting properties up for sale, not making available rental income, and slower in agreeing business plans or whatever? When I hear that, I believe there are two sides to it: the Northern Ireland debtors and NAMA. Is it reasonable to suggest 100% of the fault was on the debtors' side? Do the witnesses understand the question?

Mr. John Collison

Sure.

We are all hearing about the political context. Was there a little bit of backing off from NAMA because it was Northern Ireland? Could the witnesses explain why this was the case? We cannot just let go the contention that the debtors were 100% at fault.

Mr. John Collison

I shall make a few points on that. First, we quoted the rate of enforcement on the Project Eagle portfolio at 39%, which is quite similar to the rate for the rest of the NAMA portfolio. If NAMA had not concluded the sale of Project Eagle, that percentage would have increased pretty substantially. I can think of at least three substantial enough connections that were being considered for enforcement in the run-up to Project Eagle. They were certainly heading in that direction.

There were 17 debtor connections out of the 55 in the Project Eagle portfolio that had absolutely no sales whatsoever recorded in the period 2010 to 2013. They had not generated one sale. That stood out completely against the rest of the NAMA portfolio. If one were to ask why the enforcement rate had not increased above and beyond the rate associated with the rest of the portfolio, I would contend some of these connections were later acquisitions. We took them in at a later point, maybe a few months later than some of the other connections that NAMA was dealing with. By the time we actually evaluated their strategies, we would have assessed all their business plans and put in place a strategy we felt might work. We were probably a few months behind some of the other connections we were dealing with down here. It was partly a timing issue, probably. If Project Eagle had happened a year later, I believe the enforcement rate would have been a lot higher but I can assure the committee that we have a monthly review of all connections in NAMA, on which we report to our CEO. Mr. McDonagh would be able to confirm this. From looking back over our records of some of those engagements at the time, I believe there was a history across the Project Eagle portfolio of failed milestones, difficult negotiations and debtors just not co-operating. I am not saying for a minute that we did not have difficulties with the debtors down here because we did. As a particular portfolio, however, this was an extremely difficult one to manage. It took up a huge amount of time in terms of our resources.

Could I put a certain interpretation to Mr. Collison? He said some of the debtors in Northern Ireland were not co-operating in the way he would have liked. Is that agreed? The debtors in the North said they will not co-operate with this crowd from Dublin, stick to their guns, not facilitate NAMA and eventually get rid of it. They achieved their objective. They did not co-operate with NAMA and got it off the pitch.

Mr. John Collison

I am not so sure they got us off the pitch.

But NAMA is off the pitch. They did achieve it.

Mr. John Collison

Sure. We achieved the actual sale, which is what we set out to do. In their difficult negotiations, our case mangers would certainly have been challenged on a regular enough basis as to whether the NAMA Act actually applied up in the North. We felt there was a higher litigation risk with this portfolio than with a lot of others.

Can Mr. Collison think of any other major debtors who were awkward with NAMA for selling off their loans so it would be shut of them? Was it normal practice to sell where there were awkward debtors?

Mr. John Collison

No, it certainly was not.

So this was unusual. There was a bunch of awkward debtors-----

Mr. John Collison

The Chairman will probably have heard ad nauseam that section 10 overrides everything. Whatever we believe will deliver the maximum return for the taxpayer is what drives us. If it means not actually proceeding with a loan sale but actually having the difficult negotiations with the debtors, that is what we will choose to do. If we believe enforcement might generate a better return, that is what we will be prepared to do.

Mr. Collison said NAMA has had a lot of impairments in the North over all the years, as evident in its financial statements, etc. Perversely, did the non-co-operation of debtors in the North ultimately drive down the value of the portfolio?

Mr. John Collison

I do not believe it did. There were certainly a couple of connections in respect of which we were close to enforcement at the time leading up to the sale of Project Eagle. We probably went into a holding pattern regarding the further progression of our enforcement strategy because we took the view that if there was litigation and suing as a result of enforcement regarding a certain connection, it would probably impair the value of that connection within the portfolio. I do not believe we would have deviated from our normal case strategies in any shape or form but, perhaps in the two or three months in the lead-up to the sale of Project Eagle, there were certainly a couple of cases in respect of which we probably held off on enforcement because we felt it would possibly have impaired the value.

Yes, but the witnesses can see the point that the debtors' non-co-operation frustrated NAMA in its efforts. It is recorded several times that this ultimately took up a disproportionate amount of NAMA's time and effort. I am sure the debtors did not have a problem with somebody approaching NAMA to get them off the pitch. Did they succeed?

Mr. Michael Moriarty

I can only reiterate-----

Does Mr. Moriarty see the other side of the equation? The suggestion is that they decided not to co-operate in the hope of eventually frustrating NAMA and forcing it to walk away and sell off these properties. Perhaps they felt that the more they refused to co-operate, the lower the price would be and they would be able to deal with someone else.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

We did not sell off the properties with any forbearance. They still owed all the money they originally owed - they now owed it to someone else - so now they were going to be-----

Minus personal guarantees.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

No, absolutely not.

Can Mr. Moriarty explain why not? That is what has been said.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

I do not know what happened after they went but we did not-----

I mean the new purchasers. It is said in the documents that have been circulated in the Northern Ireland Executive that they may not pursue-----

Mr. John Collison

There was a memorandum of understanding or letter of intent - I do not know what term was used to describe it - that suggested there was going to be some post-sale arrangement with the debtors if, for example, PIMCO was successful with the acquisition. We had no knowledge of that until we heard about it when it was referenced at one point. We were certainly not going to be party to that. There was no debt compromise and no forgiveness of guarantees. We sold the security in its entirety with all the charges over the property and all the guarantees.

It was up to the purchaser.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I want to reiterate what Mr. Collison has said by making it clear that guarantees would have passed as part of the loan sale. The full recourse available to NAMA was now available to the buyer.

I accept that it was a matter for the purchaser. The witnesses have spoken about NAMA's enforcement procedures. How many enforcement procedures were concluded in the courts in the North? What were the outcomes of those procedures? It is fine to threaten enforcement but how many procedures were actually concluded-----

Mr. Michael Moriarty

I would have to-----

-----and in respect of what value? Would the witnesses have that information? Would there have been some?

Mr. Michael Moriarty

We can check. I do not think anything would have been through to conclusion - would have washed out - given the length of time we are talking about. I remind the Chair that we took on some of these in 2010 and 2011. We were getting to grips with them in 2012. Now we are talking about 2013. Even if we went into receivership in late 2012 or 2013, it would not have washed through.

We have heard a great deal from the witnesses about following the debtors. We have been told that some of the five big debtors known to Mr. Cushnahan were being pursued and enforcement procedures were being taken. We have heard about the 39% enforcement rate. When I asked how many were completed, the witnesses failed to mention that none of them was ever completed through the enforcement procedures. I accept what Mr. Moriarty has said about the timescale, but it would have been helpful to say "By the way, we never completed any enforcement procedures."

Mr. Michael Moriarty

I should clarify the matter in case we get the terminology wrong. We appointed receivers and enforced. I thought the Chairman was asking whether the receivers had finished their work, sold all the assets and given us the final position regarding what the result of the receivership was. I thought that was what the Chairman was asking when he referred to completions.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

We had appointed receivers in a number of cases. Those details are set out either in the opening statement or in the documentation we have provided to the committee. Yes, we had appointed receivers.

Mr. Moriarty might send us a note to crystallise that point.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

I think the Chairman will find it is already there. I will come back to it in a minute.

I want to make one more quick point because other members are keen to speak. Mr. Moriarty might give us a breakdown of the loan sales over the period to which we are referring so that we can get an understanding of this matter. It has been mentioned that income of €112 million was generated from loan sales in Northern Ireland. Perhaps the information I am seeking can be broken down across the various jurisdictions - the UK, Ireland and Northern Ireland - or in whatever way it is shown in NAMA's documents. Is the percentage of the income received in Northern Ireland significantly lower than that received in other jurisdictions?

Mr. Michael Moriarty

Is the Chair referring to income from the sale of property assets on which we had security?

I am asking about income. I will not break it down. It could include rental income. I will not make a distinction. I am asking for information on NAMA's income. I thought I would ask a question to place this in an historical context. If the answer to my question is in today's documentation, that is fine. If not, perhaps it can be sent on to us. Will the witnesses give us a breakdown of the €4.7 billion NAMA took over from the participating institutions, namely, Anglo Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland and AIB? That information must be readily available to NAMA. Can the witnesses send it on to us? I do not need it from them this second. I would not expect them to have it. If we knew where these moneys arose from, it would place the loan book in an historical context. I accept that most of the discounts happened before the loans came to NAMA. We understand that. Is it normal practice for the reserve price to be published when a process like this is being initiated? Would it be considered good practice to tell the public, including any bidders, "Here is what we are looking for" by publishing the reserve price?

Mr. Michael Moriarty

Yes, it would be considered good practice in certain situations, including this one, as a means of advising people not to waste their time and their good money unless they are prepared to step up to the minimum price. It is a way for us to tell people that if they reach a point where they are concluding that their price does not get up to that, they can stop and save themselves the money because we will not be selling at that price.

Okay. That is a regular enough issue.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

It is regular enough. It can be formal or informal.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

In a case like this, where anyone coming in would have to spend quite a bit of money-----

When Mr. Stewart responded to Deputy McDonald, he mentioned a reference to a fee paid to Mr. Cushnahan. When NAMA heard about that, did it report it to the compliance unit in the NTMA? Obviously, it sent shockwaves through Mr. Stewart and the board. How soon did it report it to the compliance unit? PIMCO's compliance unit seemed to be very good about it. How quickly did NAMA respond when it heard about it?

Mr. Alan Stewart

I would like to make a distinction at the outset. I think the legal and compliance team in PIMCO might be a single team.

Mr. Alan Stewart

That is the title they use. It is all in the one.

Mr. Alan Stewart

Under our system, there is a separate compliance function in the NTMA.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I would have reported it to my manager, who is the head of legal. PIMCO had made its decision to withdraw by the time we had given the board feedback. We are talking about a former member of the Northern Ireland advisory committee. The issue of a success fee could not arise unless PIMCO was staying in the process. The view we would have had was that if PIMCO was out of the process, no potential success fee could arise and, therefore, there could be no-----

No success fee arose.

Mr. Alan Stewart

-----possibility of a benefit to Mr. Cushnahan. I suppose that was the view that was formed.

How would Mr. Stewart know that? How can he speak for Cerberus? He is speaking for Cerberus when he says-----

Mr. Alan Stewart

No, I am not. We are talking about PIMCO here. Cerberus was later on.

Everybody involved with PIMCO moved on. How can Mr. Stewart sit here and give an assurance that no fee was subsequently paid? That is what he has just said.

Mr. Alan Stewart

No.

Mr. Stewart cannot do that.

Mr. Alan Stewart

All I can say is that a success fee is payable upon a successful outcome.

By PIMCO.

Mr. Alan Stewart

For PIMCO. I am afraid I cannot speak to the Cerberus position.

Mr. Stewart said that no success fee would be paid if the sale fell through.

Mr. Alan Stewart

No, no, no.

Not by PIMCO, but it could have been paid by someone else. Mr. Stewart does not know that this did not happen.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I do not know that, but I am talking about PIMCO. The engagement we had with PIMCO is what I was referring to.

Mr. Alan Stewart

The first time we became aware of Cushnahan-----

I will go back to the first question. There is a State body here. If PIMCO thought it was a compliance issue, did NAMA not feel the same? It went all the way to the board. Was this not a compliance issue for NAMA?

Mr. Alan Stewart

Possibly, but-----

I know he was a former member. The board took it so seriously that it called the process "fatally flawed". If it took it so seriously, was it reported formally to the compliance unit in the NTMA? Does Mr. Stewart know-----

Mr. Alan Stewart

I do not know the answer to that-----

Any of the witnesses may answer that question.

Mr. Alan Stewart

-----but we-----

Who can answer that?

Mr. John Collison

I cannot. I was not at the board meeting.

Okay. We will get somebody. We need an answer to that specific question. I have two more questions. Record 3 in Mr. Stewart's notes covers the phone call with Mr. Tom Rice about which Deputy McDonald asked. We will get the information up on the screen. It is good that Mr. Stewart has notes. I am interested in the note that states "TR said the [Project Eagle] process had been with NAMA for several months referenced April/May". When Mr. Stewart went to write that down, did he not ask himself whether he might have got it wrong? Did he not ask what it meant? Obviously, Mr. Rice was clear in what he meant. Could he have been talking about a member of the Northern Ireland advisory committee?

Mr. Alan Stewart

At the time, I did not know when the process had started. I did not know when NAMA had first been told of PIMCO's interest. I did not know that answer then. I was simply taking down notes on whatever I was hearing during the call.

Mr. Stewart was not aware that it started in June 2013.

Mr. Alan Stewart

No.

For all Mr. Stewart knew, NAMA was involved in April or May.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I did not know the context at all. All I knew was that it had started in the second half of 2013 - late 2013. I got involved from January 2014.

Right. When Mr. Stewart wrote that note, he believed this may have been going on since that time and that is why he did not bat an eyelid.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I simply did not know. Looking at it since, I am afraid I cannot reconcile it. I have tried to explain that to the committee.

Mr. Ronnie Hanna, who was in the room with Mr. Stewart, knew when the process started with NAMA.

Mr. Alan Stewart

He may have done. I could not speak for Mr. Hanna. He may have done.

Has Mr. Stewart discussed the matter with Mr. Hanna since then?

Mr. Alan Stewart

No.

I am going to conclude. We had agreed to invite Mr. Hanna, but that issue has not yet crystallised. We will have to pursue that issue and the issues around it.

I will come back to Mr. Stewart in a moment. Very quickly, I want to come back to the first issue I raised earlier about the discount rates. I seek clarification from Mr. Collison. We received documents on the discount rates but they are not what we were looking for. Mr. Collison spoke earlier about documents that were floating around that were very specific to Project Eagle and the particular characteristics he spoke about in his opening statement about the higher risk involved that warranted a discount rate higher than the blended portfolio and so on. They do not seem to be in the notice that we received, or that I received. If Mr. Collison could float whatever notes are floating around in our direction, it would be very useful because we do not have them yet.

I seek clarification on one thing. In Mr. Collison's opening statement, he said, "The fair value methodology adopted in the 2013 accounts involved the application of a discount rate of 5.5% for cash flows arising in the period 2014 to 2016 and a rate of 10% for cash flows arising during the period from 2017 to 2020". We discussed this earlier. He put a lot of stock in this in criticising the Comptroller and Auditor General. The head of NAMA was also quite critical of the lack of what he called "market experience" within the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General as well. Essentially, Mr. Collison is falling back on the 2012 and 2013 accounts and is saying that this was to do with fair value projections, calculations and methodology, which is actually market value. Mr. Collison said that the fair value methodology for 2013 was a 5.5% discount for cashflows between 2014 and 2016 and a 10% discount from 2017 to 2020. That was not applied in the case of Project Eagle. Is that not correct?

Mr. John Collison

A rate of 10% was applied.

Yes. The witness keeps referring back to 2012 and 2013 accounts to justify the 10% discount rate. However, in the 2013 accounts, it says that the fair value methodology was a 5.5% discount rate for cashflows arising from the period 2014 to 2016.

Mr. John Collison

The references made were to provide evidence that this was not a figure that just appeared. We had used that figure-----

That is what I am getting at. That was the position, but it was not applied in the case of Project Eagle.

Mr. John Collison

A rate of 10% was applied.

Exactly. Therefore, there was deviation even from what was in the 2013 accounts. There was a deviation.

Mr. Donal Rooney

If I may, the reason for the so-called deviation is that we are talking about two different loan books. In the 2013 accounts, there was a 5.5% discount up to 2016 and 10% after, which is in reference to the entire NAMA loan book. That has a whole host of different risks and characteristics to the Project Eagle loan book.

Exactly. That is the whole point, but the witnesses have never given the committee any documentation that justifies the 10% discount rate for Project Eagle. The witnesses are the ones who reference back to the 2013 accounts, not me. They answered the question for me. Mr. Rooney accepts the flaw in that argument in his response. We are looking for the rationale and the justification for applying a 10% discount rate and not a 5.5% rate based on evidence and expert opinion, and not internal verbal advice from NAMA. I asked earlier about documents. I was told documents are floating around. We have not got them but we need them. Mr. Rooney cannot fall back on 2013 because, by his own admission, it is not the correct way to look at it.

Mr. Donal Rooney

I am not sure I admitted that in the way the Deputy has portrayed it. The reason we put forward the information from the 2012 and 2013 accounts was to show that there was on record and within NAMA's audited accounts a fair value calculation using a 10% discount rate either across the board or as part of the calculation. When it came to the December 2013 board paper, it was not the first reference to a 10% discount. That is the point we are making.

With respect, the 10% rate was for cashflows from 2017 to 2020-----

Mr. Donal Rooney

Correct.

-----and not for 2014.

Mr. Donal Rooney

They are two different numbers. One was the entire NAMA loan book-----

Of course they are two different numbers-----

Mr. Donal Rooney

-----and one was the Project Eagle loan book.

-----but if Mr. Rooney lets me make the point, he is confusing the issue because the Project Eagle sale was in 2014. By his own admission, the 2013 accounts detail a 5.5% discount rate for cashflow discounts for 2014. NAMA applied a 10% discount rate, so he cannot use that justification.

Mr. Donal Rooney

I do not think that we are trying to make that argument. The only point we are trying to make here is that the December 2013 board paper was not the first reference to a 10% discount rate. It was on NAMA's records before that. That is the only point we are making and I do not think we are trying to overly rely on that point.

I want to be very clear on this before I move on to Mr. Stewart. The Comptroller and Auditor General never criticised the market rate or the fair value rate that Mr. Rooney is talking about in terms of a loan sale. That is not coming across when anybody from NAMA deals with it. We received some clarification today but the witnesses really need to reflect on that because NAMA representatives cannot appear before the committee and twist what the Comptroller and Auditor General was actually saying. It is not fair on his office, especially when there were aspersions cast about the lack of expertise within his office, which we do not accept. We are going to-----

Mr. John Collison

I do not believe we were trying to twist what the Comptroller and Auditor General was saying. We fully understood his position on this. All we are trying to do is-----

It was obvious from the opening statements made this morning. It was Mr. Collison, or Mr. Rooney, who said that the Comptroller and Auditor General has undervalued the loan portfolio.

Mr. Donal Rooney

No, I did not say that. I said-----

Mr. Rooney did. I took the note and we can go back over the record.

Mr. Donal Rooney

Just for avoidance of doubt, my point was that the Comptroller and Auditor General's reference to work-out value, that is, the value that NAMA might have achieved had it not sold Project Eagle, was with reference to a 5.5% or 10% discount.

Based on an asset sale and the previous strategy.

Mr. Donal Rooney

Based on a work-out value that NAMA-----

Yes, a work-out value. I am glad that at least that has been clarified. I come to Mr. Stewart. Can we get record 3 up on the screens?

Mr. Donal Rooney

Sorry, Chairman, I must leave for a minute.

First of all, it is quite extraordinary. What legal background does Mr. Stewart have?

Mr. Alan Stewart

I am a solicitor.

A solicitor. The justification that Mr. Stewart gave for NAMA not passing this on to NTMA compliance was that there was no real need because PIMCO had eventually withdrawn from the process. It is a very weak argument.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I did not try to justify it that way. I simply offered my thoughts at the time. There is quite a difference between the two. We concluded that maybe someone else may need to be called to elaborate further on that.

Mr. Stewart was asked a specific question by the Chairman. I think it was why he or anybody else in NAMA did not pass this information on to NTMA compliance. His response was that it was because NAMA was made aware of it, the board had to discuss it and, in any event, by the time it would have gotten around to it, PIMCO had withdrawn. That is a very weak legal response to a serious issue in which NAMA was made aware of success fees and a potential conflict of interest.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I am afraid I do not agree. The acid test of that is what NTMA compliance would have done with the information. That question has been put to it subsequently. The response, I understand, that it gave was that there was nothing further-----

Again, Mr. Stewart is using retrospective evidence to back up his lack of action at the time. He cannot do that.

Mr. Alan Stewart

No. If I may respond, the Deputy has made a fairly serious statement. I am saying that the NTMA compliance unit has indicated to us that had it been put to it at the time - not now with everything that has gone, but if it were consulted at the time - there were no steps that it would have taken that had not been taken. I do not know how the Deputy could conclude-----

My point is that Mr. Stewart did not know that at the time when he did not make the information available to NTMA compliance. He was unaware of that at the time. I have got his answer-----

Mr. Alan Stewart

The legal and compliance functions are not dissimilar. I was equally able to make that assessment for myself, which was the same conclusion that the NTMA compliance has since reached.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I mean if-----

Have we that in writing? Is that a document? I have never heard of or seen it. This is new to us. Is there a document to justify that or is-----

Mr. Alan Stewart

I can try to establish that. This was from discussions I have had and what was put to the committee some weeks back by the Chairman.

When was this put to them? Was is just recently?

Mr. Alan Stewart

I can find out.

Again, it is retrospective. I think we can all seek retrospective-----

Mr. Seamus McCarthy

It is actually reflected in the report.

What paragraph?

Mr. Seamus McCarthy

Paragraph 5.25.

Thank you.

Let us come back to record 3 of the information we received today. It is my last line of questioning. It states in record 3, "TR [Tom Rice] said the [Project Eagle] process had been with NAMA for several months referenced April/May 2013. This development went back to the origination of the deal with Pimco and the proposal for an acquisition fee". I am presuming that is the success fee. It continues, "The proposed split was mentioned some time ago and enquiries were made and it was looked at in more detail in the second half of 2013". Again, this is very confusing. It seems to suggest that NAMA would have known about this in 2013. It then goes on to say, "Once the amount was queried it became evident the payment was to be split 3 ways and clarification was sought from the firms afterwards".

Mr. Alan Stewart

There is nothing in that to suggest that NAMA would have been aware of this fee arrangement in 2013. This is PIMCO talking about its internal workings.

Mr. Alan Stewart

It is not talking about NAMA. This is something PIMCO relayed in response to a question that was posed by NAMA.

Is Mr. Stewart saying that PIMCO would have been aware of this in 2013 and only made NAMA aware of it in 2014? Is that his recollection of it?

Mr. Alan Stewart

I am saying that PIMCO was aware of the fact that a success fee was agreed with Brown Rudnick and that the split did not come to light until much later in the day. I assume that when the legal department looked at the letter of engagement, because that is what it had referenced in the first call that we had with it-----

I understand the split charge, but what Mr. Stewart is saying is that he is absolutely certain that nobody in NAMA would have known of the success fee until late 2014.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I cannot come here and say I am absolutely certain that no one in NAMA knew it. That is a very blanket statement for the Deputy to want me to make. I am saying that on the call neither Mr. Hanna nor I, nor anyone I have spoken to since, was aware of this in 2013. That is my impression. I cannot speak for every single person in NAMA. Deputy Cullinane is looking for me to make a very blanket statement, which I think is a little unfair.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

On the timetable in general, the Comptroller and Auditor General sets out the entire timetable very usefully on page 22. It starts in June 2013. I am sure the Comptroller and Auditor General will agree that we made available to him everything that was in our place. That is every record. We mind everything. That is where the process starts in NAMA's records. I have nothing personal to add in terms of it. Suffice it to say that, as far as I am aware, in the course of the examination, everything was made available and there was nothing that was worth documenting on any event before June 2013.

I thank Mr. Moriarty for that. When Mr. Soffe was here last week, in relation to the board meeting, where the board had to make a decision about PIMCO, he said:

We took the view that PIMCO had to go. It was offered the opportunity to leave the process ... If it refused, it would have to be forced out ... It could not stay in the process.

There is nothing in any of these recordings, or minutes, that would concur with that. Let me give Mr. Stewart some examples. I know he dealt with this with an Teachta Mary Lou McDonald, but I was not satisfied. On the same page, on record 3, it states, "[Tom Rice] TR said they did not want to continue in a process with any degree of impropriety for Pimco or NAMA and that Pimco was willing to withdraw completely." It continues, "[Ronnie Hanna] asked whether Pimco considered other options." Mr. Stewart then justified that by saying there was a previous call the day before and there would have been some discussion about this. Then the record states, "TR asked what options [that Ronnie Hanna was talking about] and [Ronnie Hanna] asked if it could be shaped differently for the arrangement fee to come out."

That does not sit with what Mr. Soffe said, which was that PIMCO had to go, that it was offered the opportunity to leave the process, and that, if it refused, it would have to go. Nowhere in any of these minutes that Mr. Stewart took does it suggest that PIMCO was forced out. It certainly does not confirm what was in the minutes, where they seem to want to acquiesce.

This was referred to by Mr. McEnery where he said: "Following the recent disclosure by PIMCO Legal and Compliance units of the existence of a success fee sharing arrangement ... NAMA's acquiescence [was sought by PIMCO] to this which NAMA had not acceded to." He went on to state, "PIMCO said it had these arrangements and asked if NAMA would acquiesce but NAMA said "no"."

From Mr. Stewart's legal perspective, because this is very serious for PIMCO, would it be fair to say that PIMCO acquiesced to staying in the process despite the existence of the success fee?

Mr. Alan Stewart

I think the question is whether it sought our acquiescence to stay in the process. Is that the question Deputy Cullinane is asking?

No, it is NAMA's acquiescence-----

Mr. Alan Stewart

That is what I am saying. Deputy Cullinane is asking if it sought NAMA's acquiescence.

Mr. Alan Stewart

As I said to Deputy McDonald, that was not my impression from the calls.

So the board minutes are wrong?

Mr. Alan Stewart

I am not saying that. If I say something to the Deputy and he recounts it slightly differently to Deputy McDonald and she recounts it slightly differently in print - I am not saying that the Deputies would - that does not make me or anyone else a liar. It may have just become twisted in the course of discussion between different people who were not on the call. I can only tell the Deputy what was on the calls.

Mr. Stewart has to be mindful of where we are at.

Mr. Alan Stewart

Sure.

We have a situation where, when Mr. Daly, Mr. McDonagh and three board members were here, they were all singing from the same hymn sheet, which was that NAMA took the very strong robust position that PIMCO had to go. That was their position, and that PIMCO was left under no illusions. As far as NAMA was concerned, it had to go. That is not reflected in any of the minutes I have here. Again, the board minutes state that PIMCO sought the acquiescence of NAMA to stay in the game, despite the existence of the success fees. If that is not Mr. Stewart's view, and he was the person who took the minutes of the meetings, he was one of those who was party to these telephone calls-----

Mr. Alan Stewart

I was not at the board meeting of 13 March.

I am talking about the conference calls.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I beg your pardon.

What I am saying is that the conference call minutes, and the assertion that Mr. Stewart has just made, seem to be at odds with what is in the minutes of the board meeting. That is where there is some confusion. One of the board members - I think it was Mr. Ellingham - intimated that Mr. Hanna had perhaps overstepped his remit. If it was the case that the board gave a direction to Mr. Hanna, did he follow it through? Was he acting on behalf of the board when he asked if this "could be shaped differently for the arrangement fee to come out"?

Mr. Alan Stewart

I think he did follow it through in the sense that, after 11 March, the message to take back to PIMCO was that the board viewed this as a very serious issue for NAMA and that message was delivered back on the morning of 11 March. In fact, it was immediately after that board meeting. So, that was taken back to PIMCO. The call later that day was PIMCO saying it was willing to withdraw. If we look at the record from 11 March, there is a note at the top of the page. I do not know if Deputy Cullinane has it. We can see that it was explained and "reiterated that it was a very serious issue for NAMA and that there was a need for Pimco to reflect on this and what this meant for Pimco in terms of the Eagle process". That was said on the call on the morning of 11 March immediately after the board meeting. The board's view was taken back, I believe, very clearly to PIMCO and its was the next move, as it were, and it stated-----

The members of the board reject completely the assertion that they would have been aware, and they were very surprised when they were made aware, that Mr. Hanna had talked about things being shaped differently for the arrangement fee to come out. That was news to them.

Mr. Alan Stewart

Sure, and-----

They use very strong language when they say, as Mr. Soffe said, that PIMCO had to go and that it was offered the opportunity to leave the process. Then we hear from Mr. McEnery who says that it tried to acquiesce or sought the acquiescence of the board to stay in the process. Then Mr. Soffe goes on to say that if it refused it would be forced out and that it could not stay in the process. That does not really sit with Mr. Stewart's understanding of those conference calls at all, does it?

Mr. Alan Stewart

To some degree, there was a lapse of two days between the board meetings on 11 March and 13 March. In that period, PIMCO did, in point of fact, withdraw. The impression I would have is that it never had to be told to leave because it withdrew itself, so it did not devolve to that point.

It withdrew itself. That is very important, because that is not what NAMA was telling us. That is, at least, what Mr. Daly told us. We were led to believe that right through, because we had to seek clarification from the Comptroller and Auditor General several times as to whether PIMCO voluntarily withdrew. It is good that we now have someone from NAMA's legal division actually accepting that PIMCO voluntarily withdrew from the process and did not have to be forced out.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I think I clarified the position for Deputy McDonald earlier on. I gave my impression-----

Very emphatically now, but it is at odds with what we were told in earlier-----

Mr. Alan Stewart

As I-----

I am going to give the next Deputy an opportunity. I will call Deputy McDonald.

Mr. Alan Stewart

Just before that, as I explained, I think it had no option other than to withdraw.

I will call Deputy McDonald and then Deputy Connolly. That is the sequence in which people indicated.

Mr. Collison, in his opening statement, made reference to a reverse inquiry from PIMCO and said it was not a unique scenario. Mr. Stewart, in the e-mail he sent to Ronnie Hanna reflecting what transpired in the first phone call of 10 March, cites Mr. Tom Rice, European legal counsel for PIMCO. He states, at line 3, "[Mr. Rice] explained that the Project Eagle deal was brought to Pimco by Brown Rudnick".

I ask Mr. Stewart to help me with this. The impression has been given throughout, including in the Comptroller and Auditor General's report, when one examines the chronology of events, that Brown Rudnick on behalf of PIMCO and A.N. Other - the identify of whom we are not sure - made contact with various parties, including Sammy Wilson, then a Minister in the North, and so on.

I think we worked on that supposition because it would make sense that PIMCO, which was in the business of loan acquisition and so on, would make its assessment, engineer the balance sheet, or whatever process it would go through, and then via legal channels initiate the approach as a reverse inquiry. I would think that to be a standard way for this to happen. However, I find it very interesting that it did not happen that way and that, in fact, Project Eagle was brought to PIMCO by a firm of solicitors - albeit high-powered ones that were well-tooled up and so on.

Did that strike the witness as interesting in the course of the conversation on that day? Mr. Hanna was with him.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I took it as a reference to the Project Eagle deal being the proposition for an acquisition of loans of Northern Ireland debtors, which is what Project Eagle was.

Mr. Alan Stewart

It was a concept brought to PIMCO by Brown Rudnick and, yes, that did strike me-----

Is that not so interesting? Why would Brown Rudnick be cooking up a concept like that-----

Mr. Alan Stewart

I do not know.

-----and bringing it to PIMCO? Who might be able to help us in explaining that? I have always understood the reverse inquiry. In fairness, Mr. Collison, the point has been made before that it is not uncommon. I will not query that and I accept it. Is it not odd that it would be Brown Rudnick who would hook PIMCO in and say "How's this for an idea?". That is certainly not how I would have understood the sequence of events up until I read the note today.

Mr. Alan Stewart

No, it is the idea of an acquisition from NAMA of these loans. At no point have I ever had the impression that NAMA was aware of this interaction between Brown Rudnick and PIMCO at that time.

I am just saying the witness has assisted us because of the clarification that, according to Mr. Rice at any rate and speaking on behalf of PIMCO, this idea did not come from within PIMCO but, rather, that the latter was approached by Brown Rudnick in respect of it. That is very interesting. We have established that there was a relationship between Brown Rudnick and Tughans and that it was certainly a core dynamic in the Project Eagle scenario. Have the witnesses ever been able to establish at what stage that interchange between Brown Rudnick and Tughans commenced or how far back that relationship went?

Mr. John Collison

No. The first time we became aware of that-----

Okay. Has Mr. Collison any knowledge of how far back the relationship between Mr. Frank Cushnahan and Tughans - an established relationship - and Brown Rudnick dates?

Mr. John Collison

No.

Who, if anybody, within NAMA could help us with that?

Mr. John Collison

I am not sure. I certainly never attended a Northern Ireland advisory committee meeting and I am not even sure if I met Mr. Cushnahan. I may have met him once before but I have no background knowledge of his connection with Tughans, Brown Rudnick or any of that. Going back to the Deputy's earlier point about the origin of the deal, the Comptroller and Auditor General set out on page 22 of the document the key events and timelines.

Mr. John Collison

We do not know if it was PIMCO that retained Brown Rudnick or whether Brown Rudnick came with the deal to PIMCO.

As a matter of fact, we do. According to the note taken by Mr. Collison's colleague, Mr. Stewart, counsel for PIMCO have made it clear that Brown Rudnick came to them. So a firm of solicitors came to them. We subsequently discovered that said firm of solicitors had a specific relationship with Tughans but we do not know at what point it began. We know for sure that Mr. Cushnahan had a close relationship with Tughans as well. I was simply inquiring as to whether the witness could help us with the timelines in respect of all of that.

Mr. Collison was deputy head of asset recovery and Mr. Moriarty worked closely with Mr. Ronnie Hanna.

Mr. John Collison

That is correct.

Am I right in assuming, however, that it was Mr. Hanna, in the course of these exchanges with PIMCO - with Mr. Stewart party to some of the conversations - who was reporting back to the board?

Mr. John Collison

Yes. I was not at the exchange in March. There was a private board meeting, I think, on possibly 11 March and 13 March. I was not at those. Mr. Hanna, as head of the division, attended those board meetings. He was on the calls. I certainly was involved in one of the final calls, which was the point of the exit.

That is fine. We might come back to the matter. Turning to the extract from the signed minutes of 13 March, in this scenario Mr. Ronnie Hanna is reporting back on the conversations with PIMCO. At this stage there have been four exchanges between legal counsel, all of which Mr. Stewart was party to, along with Ms Aideen O'Reilly, who is his superior.

Mr. Alan Stewart

There were five, with one on 13 March as well but that was outside the scope of the appendix.

That is correct. We only have four recordings. Do we have the fifth?

Mr. Alan Stewart

No. Appendix E only goes to 12 March.

I thank the witness for the clarification. In response to a question from the board, it was noted that - notwithstanding the premeditated fee-sharing arrangement that had been put in place by PIMCO - the catalyst for disclosure of the arrangement to NAMA was allegedly the insistence of PIMCO's legal and compliance department. I assume from the minute that it was Mr. Hanna presenting the information and Mr. Hanna fielding questions from the board. The astonishing thing is that at the tail end of these phone calls, the approach having been made by NAMA, it was making it absolutely clear it was prepared to walk and it was deeply concerned. It was not seeking acquiescence, as we have established. At this point, Mr. Hanna reports to the board and it is faithfully recorded, allegedly at the insistence of PIMCO's legal and compliance department. I raise the issue of the tone of the minutes not to get into literary analysis but because it says something very worrying to me about the dynamic of what was ongoing in that board meeting.

Mr. John Collison

That is something the Deputy will have to ask our board about or our chairman and chief executive officer. We are not in a position to comment.

I certainly will. I notice that at the end of record No. 4, which is the phone call with PIMCO on 12 March, there is a discussion around managing the message. PIMCO indicates that it does not want it to look like it has been kicked from the process, and that is not unreasonable from Mr. Rice's perspective, as it was clearly not kicked out of the process. A call in the morning was arranged on communication of the message, with 1.30 p.m. on 13 March provisionally scheduled. Do we have a note on that call?

Mr. Alan Stewart

There is a note but it is not covered in appendix E, which is why I did not bring it. It can be provided.

Could we have a note on that? It is ironic, particularly as NAMA subsequently has gone to considerable lengths to suggest that PIMCO was kicked out of the process. I would appreciate that note.

Mr. John Collison

Reading through the transcripts, our chairman confirmed to or advised the committee that PIMCO withdrew. If it had not withdrawn, the board would certainly have had the view that PIMCO would have had to have been exited if it did not voluntarily withdraw.

I am sorry but we may have to agree to disagree on this point. Any objective analysis of what Mr. Daly and others have had to say does not tally with Mr. Collison's benign assessment.

In the context of record No. 4, Mr. Rice stated that they had not notified the decision to their advisers. PIMCO, at this stage, has called it and is withdrawing. It informs NAMA that it had not notified the decision to its advisers that brought the deal and was still working that through. It was sensible to have a joint view, it said, and asked how to approach the issue going forward. At that point, Ms O'Reilly, Mr. Stewart's boss, states that there were no reporting obligations for NAMA in respect of its advisers and no need to take positive action. She goes on to say the matter may evolve in the normal way and that no great question may be asked but that NAMA would not be proactive in communicating the position. Mr. Stewart was present at that conversation. Will he disentangle that for me?

Mr. Alan Stewart

Sure. What is being said by PIMCO is that it had not notified what I would take to be Brown Rudnick about this. It felt it was good sense that it and NAMA would have a common message to put out when dealing with advisers. Obviously, Brown Rudnick were PIMCO's advisers. For our part, we had advisers in the form of Lazard, which would be the name that would come to mind.

Mr. Alan Stewart

The point there about no reporting obligations for NAMA is that there was no legal obligation on NAMA to tell Lazard the full facts of what PIMCO had outlined to us in the detail that they had. That the matter may evolve in the normal way and no great question will be asked, I think that is a reference to, you know, as PIMCO withdrew, which by now of course they had indicated they were going to do, then Lazard obviously would get notification of that as part of the overall sales process, and that they may not ask any further questions of NAMA as to PIMCO's reasons for withdrawing.

That boils down very much to a decision being taken by NAMA's most senior legal person. Is Ms O'Reilly the most senior legal that NAMA has?

Mr. Alan Stewart

Yes.

The decision was taken to leave the loan advisers in the dark and not to tell them.

Mr. Alan Stewart

No. I think it is a decision that, as part of the joint message that is going out there, whatever PIMCO tells Brown Rudnick we do not-----

Please hold on. Sorry, Mr. Stewart, I want to point him to the-----

Mr. Alan Stewart

Yes.

-----following: "There were no reporting obligations for NAMA-----"

Mr. Alan Stewart

Yes.

"-----in regard to its advisors and no need to take positive action."

Mr. Alan Stewart

Sure.

That is the decision that was taken at that point.

Mr. Alan Stewart

Sure. But the point is whatever PIMCO is telling Brown Rudnick is presumably the message they would also be saying to Lazard as to why they are pulling out of the process. What is being said there is that there is no reason to deviate from the reasons given to Lazard by PIMCO, when they pull out of the process in that way.

Mr. Alan Stewart

That is the point.

A vote is taking place in the Dáil.

I do not know what it is about.

It is an ad hoc vote. I am told it might be about whether the Dáil should sit next week.

I have no problem staying.

Will the Government fall? Do members-----

Perhaps we should all go.

Maybe the seconders can go. The secretariat could advise Fine Gael's Whip that the two Deputies are paired with two of my party for a Committee of Public Accounts meeting. Perhaps the Deputies are not allowed to do so. I do not know.

I would not be sure.

The Deputies can do their own thing.

It is better safe than sorry.

We had a pairing arrangement in the past but maybe it does not exist in the new politics arrangement.

I do not think people would anticipate NAMA bringing down the Government but how and ever.

We will continue and the next speaker is Deputy Connolly.

Sorry, Deputy Connolly, I have other questions.

Yes, go ahead.

NAMA relies on Lazard. NAMA has cited its advisers repeatedly as guarantors as to the competitive tension within the process, having achieved best value in respect of the taxpayer and so on. This is very much the outfit that afforded NAMA the catch-all comfort blanket that all was well. Yet, it turns out, and we knew this already, that it was not informed of this carry on around fixer fees or success fees. Not alone that but that did not happen by accident. It was a very conscious decision by NAMA, at executive level and, it seems, board level.

I want to put it to Mr. Collison that given all of that, and the restrictive different role that NAMA afforded to Lazard as a loan adviser in this scenario, as against other loan advisers in other sales processes, given the fact that Lazard was not informed of a very key development within the entire sales process, and given the fact that the letter of comfort that NAMA received from it at the end of the process is partial, that in fact we cannot afford a huge amount of confidence in respect of Lazard in the way that NAMA seeks to do.

Mr. John Collison

Deputy, certainly it was no reflection on our confidence in Lazard and our relationship with them. We would have held them in high regard and they were retained to carry out a role which they ultimately performed.

I think part of the issue here is the board was quite concerned that this was a sensitive matter and needed to be managed appropriately, and carefully managed. I suppose it was looking also at the potential reputational damage on the part of PIMCO as well. The facts were at that stage that PIMCO were withdrawing. Whether they were exited or not, I know that is an issue for debate. They were withdrawing. We were left with two final bidders. As to why they were withdrawing, we felt I suppose, or maybe, it was not absolutely vital that Lazard knew that or not because, as I say, it was a sensitive issue.

Can I put the following to Mr. Collison? I mean this genuinely as just a perspective. Given how things developed thereafter, given the fact that at the end of all of this, after all the comings and going have been concluded, NAMA is left, yes, with the sale but, again, with history repeating itself, and let us put it politely, a very deep controversy around success fees and fixers' fees and where they were going, do subsequent events not demonstrate very clearly that a huge mistake was made? Whatever the legal obligation on NAMA, was a big mistake made in not informing Lazard as to what had happened and the reason for PIMCO's withdrawal?

Mr. John Collison

At that point, Deputy, we were well advanced in the sales process. There were three remaining bidders which then distilled down to two.

I shall call Deputy Connolly after this.

Mr. John Collison

We were, I suppose, very focused on ensuring that the sale completed, and completed successfully. We certainly discussed this with Lazard in terms of PIMCO's withdrawal. We were very, very concerned about whether there was still sufficient competitive tension within the process. In actual fact, in some of those discussions Lazard was of the view that because the original party, who made the reverse inquiry, was now no longer in the sales process, there was an argument that the two remaining bidders would be even more highly motivated to actually try and acquire this portfolio. So, there was certainly a lot of discussion around the competitive tension and whether that still remained. We were satisfied, on the back of Lazard's advices, that that still was there and ultimately got us to a point where we exceeded the reserve price.

Did Mr. Collison know why PIMCO withdrew? Were Mr. Collison and Mr. Moriarty aware of the fixers' fees?

Mr. John Collison: The success fee I became aware of literally after the board meeting on the 11th because I sat in on the call on the 12th as well when that discussion took place about PIMCO's exit. I was not aware before that and I was not at the board meeting on the 11th of March.

And Mr. Moriarty similarly.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

I was not directly involved in the transactions, as we said at the outset. I was not at the board meetings. So, I simply did not have an involvement in that and in-----

When did Mr. Moriarty become aware of them?

Mr. Michael Moriarty

I honestly cannot remember. It was probably at some stage later in the process. As I say, I was not directly involved in the transaction and was not at any of the private board sessions. The only board meeting I was at, in relation to this, was the June one where the final elements were being dealt with. So I was not in the mainstream of this. I cannot remember at what stage because-----

I call Deputy Connolly.

Chairman, I hope my presence here does not ensure that we are back in the Dáil next week because I am looking forward to spending a week in Galway. In any event, I had better ask a good question.

I wish to follow on from Deputy McDonald's questions on this matter. Obviously the witnesses can accuse us of having the benefit of hindsight. I cannot tell the witnesses how many times I have looked at the Comptroller and Auditor General's report to try to be fair to all parties.

Mr. Collison has said I did not outline questions that he had not answered. Is that right? To be fair to him, he said that I had not done so. I can pick at random from three major chapters. I shall pick page 95, which has conclusions. The Comptroller and Auditor General set out six conclusions. I have not seen Mr. Collison or any of his colleagues deal with those conclusions. I ask him to look at conclusion No. 1. I do not have the time to read out the six conclusions but I shall outline the gist of each one. Conclusion No. 1 reads:

Mr Cushnahan's declared involvement with NAMA debtors whose loans represented at least half the value of the Northern Ireland loan book meant that a potential conflict of interest arose that would not be managed sufficiently by the withholding of debtor-specific information.

The Comptroller and Auditor General concluded: "NAMA should have formally considered whether Mr Cushnahan's engagement in discussion of its Northern Ireland strategy" and so on. Can Mr. Collison see that? In each paragraph, the Comptroller and Audit General set out a conclusion. I expected the witnesses to come back, with all of this time, and say either we agree or disagree with his finding.

Mr. John Collison

Deputy, in relation to the conflict management piece, it was not an area that I was particularly involved in at all.

Mr. John Collison

This was a matter for our board, and conflicts of interest and-----

That is fair enough. Mr. Collison and his colleagues cannot comment on this matter, but-----

Mr. John Collison

Not on that particular matter.

Surely the legal team would have a role in dealing with conflicts of interest.

Mr. Alan Stewart

Again, speaking for myself, I was not aware of any conflict involving Mr. Cushnahan. As I explained earlier, I did not even know who he was. I did not even know that he had an involvement with debtors.

There is a lot more than just Mr. Cushnahan involved.

Mr. Alan Stewart

Yes, but the paragraph the Deputy has just read-----

I referred to one of the conclusions, but there is a whole chapter on conflicts of interest. It leads on to Cerberus.

Mr. Alan Stewart

Sure, but we are now jumping ahead. I am referring to the paragraph the Deputy read a few moments ago.

My difficulty is that I have only so many minutes. I am referring to the six conclusions and would have expected the witnesses to deal with each of them.

Mr. John Collison

I am not trying to sidestep the question, but this was such an important issue that the matters relating to success fee payments, Mr. Frank Cushnahan and so on were dealt with by the board. They were of the utmost importance.

Yes, I accept that. Let us look at the board. I will go to a different chapter, the one on the sales process, about which the Comptroller and Auditor General highlighted a number of controls in dealing with the same problems. Page 72 deals with something of which Mr. Collison has some experience as he made a comment on the bidders. The report states that on 13 February 2014 "there was a national press report that PIMCO had approached NAMA". In other words, the story broke, despite NAMA's efforts, and was now open. The report continues:

The NAMA board held a normal scheduled meeting on the day the press article was published. Project Eagle was a planned agenda item. Although strict confidentiality had been a key project objective ... neither the media report nor the breach of confidentiality are mentioned in the Board minutes. The only evidence that the Board reconsidered its objectives for the process is that the minutes record that the Board gave Lazard and the NAMA Executive [the witnesses present] the flexibility to increase the number of bidders involved in the process 'if genuine credible interest arose'.

Is Mr. Collison saying that was a matter for the board?

Mr. John Collison

That is recorded in the board minutes of the meeting of 13 February-----

Mr. John Collison

That was the instruction. The Deputy is absolutely right. It coincided with the story breaking in the media and the board giving licence to engage in asset recovery and, in turn, to Lazard to increase the number of bidders.

Absolutely. We will come to Mr. Collison's role. He cannot comment because he was not on the board.

Mr. John Collison

No, but I was at that board meeting.

Is that an accurate reflection of what happened at the board meeting?

Mr. John Collison

Yes.

There is no sense that the board was taking this issue seriously. There had been a huge breach of confidentiality.

Mr. John Collison

A breach of confidentiality.

Yes, it was mentioned in the newspapers that PIMCO had approached NAMA.

Mr. John Collison

That certainly was not-----

I do not think the witnesses have read the report. I do not think NAMA has read it. It zoomed in on the figures of 5.5% and 10% and placed a spin on them. "Spin" might be a strong a word, but that is what I believe. At every opportunity NAMA has come forward and zoomed in on what is a difference of opinion, as opposed to focusing on what the report actually states.

Mr. John Collison

I can only tell the Deputy about my experience at the time and my recollection of what happened. The sales process had been kept quite confined. On the instructions of the board, we kept it to a limited number of bidders. At that point, it gave flexibility and said that if there were others that fitted the profile, Lazard had the authority to invite them into the process.

I will continue by reading the last paragraph on page 72:

Following the media coverage, NAMA and/or Lazard received enquiries from a further ten firms. Two of these - Goldman Sachs and Fortress - were allowed to enter the process. Lazard informed NAMA that it had excluded the other eight firms, seven of whom it said were well known to Lazard and had excellent reputations.

They were just not allowed in.

Mr. John Collison

At the risk of repeating myself, Lazard was aware on 13 February that flexibility had been provided. It was told that if there were others that fitted the profile, they could be invited into the process. There was an opportunity to do this. Between 4 and 14 February, a number of bidders were approached, but others subsequently came forward. We asked Lazard for an assessment, based on what we were trying to achieve, of whether these investors would be the right fit and if they had the required financial capacity and so forth. For a number of reasons, two were accepted but others were not. We acted on instructions and the advice of our loan and sales adviser at the time. It should be borne in mind - again, I do not want to be argumentative about this - that we sat down initially with the original bidders that had been approached. We told them that this was a bespoke process and that a limited number of parties would be invited to participate. That was the message they were given and why they had been invited into the process. It was not the case that we could have taken a completely different approach at that stage.

When I read about it, I see a very limited approach. NAMA started with three bidders. As we have said so often, it was kept deliberately small for a small number of people. Other firms were excluded. Mr. Collison has said that if there had been an underbid, there would have been a lot more bidders. In reality, a lot more bidders were kept out because it did not suit the strategy, but that is entirely NAMA's business. However, what I read in the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General is that NAMA did not justify or explain it. That is the theme throughout.

Mr. John Collison

The firms that were either invited or approached to participate in Project Eagle accounted for 90% of the loan sales activity in the marketplace. Lazard confirmed to us on more than one occasion that both the right number of parties and the right parties were in the data room. We had to take its advice in that regard.

I do not accept that and do not accept Mr. Collison's interpretation. NAMA actually told Lazard what to do. It guided it. This is one of the points made in the report. If Mr. Collison reads it, he will see that the Comptroller and Auditor General is saying it differed from other types of sale, that Lazard had a very limited role compared with other sales advisers and that it was told what to do. Mr. Collison has answered Deputy Mary Lou McDonald, but I am not happy with the answer he gave her. I do not know why Lazard was not told the reason PIMCO had withdrawn. It could not give a reasoned opinion without being told that. It came back to NAMA and, suitably, told the agency that there was sufficient competition, but it did not know what it was talking about because it had not been given adequate information.

Mr. John Collison

We did not direct Lazard-----

Mr. John Collison

Lazard is a huge international advisory firm; it is a global firm.

According to the board, NAMA directed Lazard. According to the minutes, NAMA told Lazard what to do. It was set out what it should and should not do.

Mr. John Collison

What I am saying is that we certainly gave Lazard instructions. It was aware of its mandate and obviously was aware on 13 February that there was an opportunity to invite more bidders into the process. However, when it came to the recommendation on those bidders, in terms of who qualified and did not, we took Lazard's advice. We did not say, "No, we do not want that firm" or "We want that firm." We actually took Lazard's advice on the recommendations.

I am going back - I will be very careful - to Brown Rudnick. It is the committee's understanding the board did not know until 2 or 3 April that Brown Rudnick and Tughans were involved with Cerberus. Is that correct?

Mr. Alan Stewart

The date is 3 April.

I was trying to be fair to the witnesses. Someone probably knew before that date. It seems, based on the documentation submitted today by Deputy Mick Wallace, into which I have not had a chance to go in detail, that Cerberus is clearly stating NAMA knew about the legal people it had employed well before the bid was accepted.

Mr. John Collison

The legal people Cerberus had retained.

Yes, that Cerberus had employed Brown Rudnick and Tughans and that NAMA was aware of this prior to the making of the bid on 1 April.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I can answer that question.

It is a "Yes" or "No" answer.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I do not think it is.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I will need a moment to answer it.

Mr. Alan Stewart

Like I said, I was not involved to a great degree. We were aware that Linklaters and Goodbody were acting for Cerberus. It can be clearly shown that they were active in the data room.

Mr. Alan Stewart

What is being said is that prior to the bid being accepted, Cerberus had told NAMA about Brown Rudnick. As I understand it, it told NAMA about Brown Rudnick on 3 April. The bid was accepted-----

Mr. John Collison

On 1 April.

Mr. Alan Stewart

The bid was made on 1 April, but I am talking about its acceptance. It was accepted on-----

Mr. John Collison

On 3 April.

I am not arguing over one, two or three days. I am saying that prior to that time-----

Mr. Alan Stewart

It seems to have been a number of hours prior; that is my point.

Prior to 1 April - let us take that date as the cut-off point - was NAMA aware that Brown Rudnick and Tughans were acting for Cerberus?

Mr. John Collison

No.

Mr. John Collison

An e-mail was received in NAMA on 3 April from Cerberus which stated the law firm Brown Rudnick had been retained as a strategic adviser.

Yes, but I am asking a question and stuck for time. It is a "Yes" or "No" answer.

That NAMA had no knowledge.

Mr. John Collison

No.

Mr. John Collison

As far as I am aware, no.

From the documentation submitted, I understand there is an onus on the legal or property advisers to tell NAMA, and that NAMA asked, through Lazard, to be told who the advisers were. Did that happen?

Mr. Alan Stewart

Linklaters and Goodbody were put forward as Cerberus advisers. We were told that, and they were allowed access to the data room.

Is there an obligation on any bidder to specifically set out in writing who its legal and property advisers are?

Mr. Alan Stewart

Not for legal advisers. The non-disclosure agreement, NDA, makes a distinction. For legal advisers, it is not specifically required that they set them out. For property advisers and other advisers I think - I would have to examine the NDA to be absolutely sure of it - there is an obligation to say what they are.

This is my third time to ask the question today. The witnesses know more than we do. It is crucial. We have gone around in circles asking when NAMA became aware that Cerberus had the same set of legal advisers. The witnesses tell me it was not before 3 April. I asked whether there was an obligation on the bidder to tell NAMA who its advisers were. The witnesses have said there was an obligation on property and other advisers, but not on legal advisers.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I believe that is correct. I would have to check the wording of the NDA. It is a specific point that goes back to the wording of a clause in the NDA.

On this exact point.

Mr. Alan Stewart

I would have to check the exact point. I do not have the NDA in front of me.

NAMA has not been helpful to the Committee of Public Accounts or itself. We specifically addressed the issue with the NAMA chairman on 29 September at approximately 7 p.m. when he produced an e-mail. He got the indemnity from Cerberus about no success fee being paid to anybody. It was produced that evening after the board meeting. An extraordinary six weeks after the arrival of the chairman, who was asked the very simple question Deputy Catherine Connolly has asked, we have not got an answer. I understand that Tughans and Brown Rudnick, which went to work with Cerberus, were not there as legal advisers but as other special advisers. Mr. Stewart is indicating that he believes there would have been an obligation on Cerberus to notify NAMA before placing the bid of who their advisers were.

Mr. Alan Stewart

Exactly, and-----

How can it be that six weeks after the chairman appeared here, nobody in NAMA can answer the question?

Mr. Alan Stewart

The NDAs deal with access to informational materials. One must sign an NDA before getting access to informational materials. To gain access to informational materials, bidders are required to sign the NDA and notify NAMA who their advisers are - I think there is a distinction for legal advisers, but I want to double-check it - so we can know who will be accessing the data room where those informational materials are stored. This is the purpose of their telling us who their advisers are, so we know who, on their behalf, will access the data room, and so we can facilitate this access. This is the context.

Mr. John Collison

Neither Brown Rudnick nor Tughans had access to the data room on behalf of Cerberus.

We understand. The NDA would have required them not to disclose to Cerberus anything they picked up when working for PIMCO. We understand all that.

Mr. Alan Stewart

So, when we talk about an obligation to notify of advisers, it is in the context of the NDA, which deals with informational material.

This is the crunch question. Aside from access to the data room, was there not an obligation in the terms and conditions on people submitting bids to notify NAMA who their professional advisers were, so NAMA could be satisfied that they were not people working for NAMA? Would that not be a normal requirement?

Mr. John Collison

The notification of advisers relates to the informational materials in the data room. They could have retained other advisers in the background whom we might not have been aware of.

You did not require to be informed of those advisers.

Mr. John Collison

Not as part of the process, no.

I refer to two pages of the Comptroller and Auditor General's report, one of which is page 117, which refers to the board meeting of 11 March regarding PIMCO. It states: "In light of Frank Cushnahan's involvement in the PIMCO bid, the board discussed whether PIMCO's bid, at this stage, was fatally flawed [very strong words] given the potential perception that PIMCO might have benefitted from insider information as a result of Frank Cushnahan's involvement." The board, when it discussed Frank Cushnahan's involvement, considered it so serious as to state that it made the whole process potentially flawed. Am I reading it accurately?

Mr. Michael Moriarty

Not the whole process.

No, the PIMCO bid.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

Yes. In some of the previous conversations, it has been widened.

Mr. Moriarty is saying it was not the entire process but the PIMCO process.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

Yes, there could have been a perception that one competitor could have benefited. It was a matter of reputation. One party had offended this and was being removed from the competition, but the competition went on with the rest of them.

Correct. Is Mr. Moriarty satisfied that the involvement of Frank Cushnahan resulted in PIMCO's bid being fatally flawed? Is that the essence of it? The witnesses are nodding their heads. We want to hear a "yes" on the record.

Mr. John Collison

Yes.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

Absolutely, and although maybe there are still some differences, that is what all the board members have been saying, and they are well able to say it themselves.

I am not adjudicating. I am just setting out the board's position that Frank Cushnahan's involvement in the PIMCO bid resulted in the board's view that the PIMCO bid was fatally flawed. I think that is NAMA's position and they have no problem with it.

Mr. John Collison

Yes.

I refer to page 94 of the report, which we spoke about earlier. The last sentence of 5.24 states: "NAMA considers that the integrity of the process was preserved by PIMCO's withdrawal." Paragraph 5.25 states:

It is not clear how any other steps NAMA might take could have any relevance to the completion of the transaction, particularly given that Mr Cushnahan was no longer a member of the NIAC. NTMA Compliance has indicated that, given the information available at the time, there was no additional action that it could have advised to be taken that had not already been taken by NAMA.

Paragraph 5.24 also states: "NAMA has stated that although Mr Cushnahan was no longer a member of the NIAC at the time of PIMCO's disclosure and never had access to debtor information, the Board considered the potential payment to Mr Cushnahan was a significant issue because, if implemented, it created a significant reputational risk for NAMA". How do the witnesses know the fee was not implemented? They seem very definite. The advisers moved to Cerberus from PIMCO. I am not making any suggestion. How can NAMA be sure that when they moved to Cerberus, a success fee was not still in play? We are coming to the undertaking the chairman referred to here a month ago.

Mr. John Collison

Is the question whether PIMCO or Cerberus made a payment?

No, Cerberus. Although the board considered the PIMCO bid was fatally flawed, the compliance unit did not think anything needed to be done. Those two positions are mutually contradictory. The compliance unit thought there was no big deal, however, when it went to the board, the board said it was fatally flawed. It is a serious issue that renders something fatally flawed. If it does that, it crosses the barrier for being a compliance issue.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

Compliance in general is something that should be dealt with by the board.

I am just contrasting the two points.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

There are several conditional statements that if implemented, if it went through and if PIMCO won and it became known that somebody who was previously on an advisory committee of the seller, there could be a perception that they had some advantage and, therefore, that it would have been seen to have been an unfair competition.

I think that is all that that is saying.

That is fine, and the board wanted to ensure that no such arrangement would continue with Cerberus.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

With Cerberus, and in one of last night's dispatches-----

We have not seen it yet.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

They are there, and it is unequivocal that they have-----

Will Mr. Moriarty tell us what is in it because we do not have it on the screen?

Mr. Michael Moriarty

There is so much paper I have to rummage but it says that nobody in NAMA, that ever was in NAMA or ever was on a NAMA advisory committee is receiving any part of the fee Cerberus was paying to Brown Rudnick and which was being shared with Tughans. The Chairman can see for himself it is-----

So the success fee was continuing with Brown Rudnick and Tughans-----

Mr. Michael Moriarty

It came in two stages, as far as I remember, and Mr. Stewart was probably closer to this.

-----minus the third party.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

Yes. First, it was Brown Rudnick and after a phone call, when the counsel returned - he came back with an e-mail - they said that just for completion they wanted us to know that Brown Rudnick had told them that it was being shared with Tughans, but then we got a crisp undertaking, which was as much as anybody could expect, which fully satisfied the board.

Which NAMA essentially drafted for Cerberus.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

No, we did not. We told them-----

I think it did.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

They were told that we needed an unequivocal statement to cover the possibility of somebody else down the line getting it. The Chairman will see that sequence, which I will find in a minute.

When we mention the success fee, people have an issue with that. Somebody from NAMA said previously that success fees are not unusual in this line of business. Would they be unusual? Is Mr. Moriarty aware of success fees in any other of the bids in which NAMA has been involved?

Mr. Michael Moriarty

We would not know what the purchasers might be paying.

Unless the purchaser tells NAMA.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

To go back to Deputy McDonald's point, if a lawyer here in Ireland who acts for one of these funds tells them that there is a particular set of loans they might target and try to extract from a particular bank, NAMA or whoever and that he or she can help them do that, they might say that is a very interesting idea and if it comes to something, they will pay him or her. It is not unusual in the corporate finance world where somebody who sources an acquisition of a business in general gets a finder's fee, and some people are simply in the business of doing that.

Does Mr. Moriarty have knowledge of similar success fees being paid in respect of people's dealings with NAMA?

Mr. Michael Moriarty

No.

This is the first time. Even though we are being told it is common, Mr. Moriarty has no evidence of that.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

We are on the selling side. We just collect our proceeds, and the buyer pays his advisers or-----

Can the committee discount the statement from one of NAMA's directors that this is a common issue because Mr. Moriarty has no basis on which to back that up other than-----

Mr. Michael Moriarty

It is just market knowledge that such fees are paid in the corporate world.

But the biggest property sales company in the world has never encountered it.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

We are sellers. We are not paying them.

NAMA has never encountered it.

Mr. John Collison

Not directly, but loan sales advisers have confirmed this to us on many occasions because they have often acted not just on the sale side but also on the buy side of some of these transactions, and I think they will be able to confirm that for the Chairman.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

A number of professional firms will do a set of work sometimes on what they call a no foal, no fee basis or on a success basis in that if their bidder is unsuccessful, they get just about enough to recover themselves but if they are successful, they get a higher fee.

Can I just ask-----

I will conclude with this comment. The first letter from Brown Rudnick on 24 June that started this process began by stating that two of its clients were interested. That is on page 22 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's report. Has NAMA found out the identity of the second client?

Mr. John Collison

No. I am not aware if there was a second client or who it might be.

Was there a second client?

Mr. John Collison

We do not know.

If, in the interests of getting best value for the taxpayers' money, the first thing NAMA is told is that there are two people interested and it does not inquire as to who the other bidder might be in the entire process, that is remarkable.

Mr. John Collison

We had no direct relationship with Brown Rudnick. It came forward with PIMCO and the process evolved from there, but we had no direct relationship with it.

In terms of market intelligence, would somebody not have tried to find out the identity of the second bidder because it might have been beneficial for the State and for NAMA?

Mr. Michael Moriarty

To go back to the Lazard involvement, which was to source all the known bidders for a book like this, it said it did that. If there is somebody else out there who happens to be a client of Brown Rudnick who also would have been capable of it, it would be surprising if they were not in Lazard's sights.

I call Deputy McDonald, and we should try to be brief because it is getting very late.

I will be extremely brief. This question is on a different issue because there was a good deal of discussion on the discount rate, departure from the 5.5% rate and the different perspectives on that. However, another element that NAMA departed from was a position of working out the assets and a decision to bundle, but NAMA did not bundle the assets; it bundled debtors.

Mr. John Collison

Their loans, yes.

I am aware that even when NAMA is bundling assets it is, in the final analysis, dealing with loans. That is the issue here. On 10 October 2013, NAMA started its discussions with PIMCO. At this stage the board has been informed of the interest of PIMCO and so on. NAMA meets with it. The head and deputy head of asset recovery, who is Mr. Collison-----

Mr. John Collison

That is correct.

-----meet with PIMCO to explore its offer. I refer to Appendix C, and page 133 in particular, which records that in the paper NAMA presented to the board, PIMCO's approach is based on debtors who were based in the North, although they fully acknowledge that these debtors typically tended to also acquire assets in Britain and other jurisdictions, and PIMCO intends to acquire all such related debt. Whose idea was it to bundle the debtors resident in the North? From my reading of it, PIMCO came up with that approach.

Mr. John Collison

That was the approach that PIMCO made to NAMA. We looked at our portfolio at the time to establish exactly who were the Northern Ireland-based debtors and what the bundling, as the Deputy described it, of their debt would amount to in terms of potential value. The Deputy is right, and it is referred to in the board paper, that some of these debtors only had assets that were located in the North while others had branched out and had bought property in-----

For the purposes of clarity, where were the debtors located?

Mr. John Collison

The debtors were located in the North.

They were located in the North, and this was PIMCO's brain wave.

Mr. John Collison

It was its proposal to us, yes. Obviously, in terms of the way its borrowings would have been advanced to these debtors by the participating institutions, much of it possibly would have been as they, on a continuous basis, bought more property, so many of these borrowings were-----

Mr. Collison might help me with this aspect. Getting back to the reverse inquiry, Mr. Collison said there was information that was on the public record, that they could look at NAMA's balance sheet and arrive at their own conclusions. This may just be a lay person's blind spot. I could understand that more readily if it were a matter of them making assessments as to the individual assets, but Mr. Collison might explain to me how they could have reverse engineered that and why they were so specific that it was bundling those debtors in the North.

Mr. John Collison

Again, it was more like an expression of interest. On page 22 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's report there is a reference to a letter that they submitted to NAMA and I believe they valued the Northern Ireland proportion, in other words, the Northern Ireland assets, at about €1.1 billion. I think that was the figure they might have put on it at the time but it was a tentative offer. I suspect they probably could not have had full knowledge of what were the cross-collateralised positions on some of these debtor connections. In other words, the fact that a debtor might have had three or four assets in the North, they then might have bought some property in Britain-----

I understand that, but that is not what I am asking Mr. Collison. Does he understand the question I put to him?

Mr. John Collison

Sorry, could the Deputy repeat it?

We now know Brown Rudnick brings this idea to PIMCO and it is an idea that is very specifically premised on the Northern debtors. That is the shape of the proposition and I am merely trying to understand why Brown Rudnick and PIMCO would have taken that particular approach that was very much focused not so much on the assets but on the debtors and where they were.

Mr. John Collison

I cannot speak for PIMCO or Brown Rudnick. I suppose my take on it would be that they certainly saw a State asset management agency deleveraging. We had a long way to work through our portfolio.

I know all of that-----

Mr. John Collison

Sure, but-----

-----but that is not what I am asking.

Mr. John Collison

No, no, but-----

I am trying to get behind the rationale for all of this.

Mr. John Collison

They had a view on the market as well. Their view was that the Northern Ireland market might have actually been coming close to-----

That still does not explain why they would focus in on debtors in the North.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

Deputy McDonald would really have to ask them. They approached us with the idea.

Mr. Moriarty takes my point. Assets in the North could have been owned by Mr. Moriarty resident in Galway or Massachusetts.

Mr. John Collison

The way these firms work is they tend to adopt a loan-to-own process. While Deputy McDonald is right that there are debtors here that own the actual assets and they acquire the debt, generally speaking, these private equity firms' route is to go down to the underlined real estate.

Is there any chance that PIMCO or Brown Rudnick might have had, I do not know, a conduit or some additional debtor information from some source that might have informed their choice or shaped their take on this?

Mr. John Collison

Not that we are aware of.

Mr. Michael Moriarty

I think one of the board papers - I can check it - said that in their discussions with the committee they had not spoken to any of the debtors.

Mr. John Collison

They did.

Did Mr. Collison believe them? Does he believe them now?

Mr. John Collison

Certainly, we would have received reverse inquiries with regard to various debtors over the years.

But reverse inquiries of this type?

Mr. John Collison

Not for something of this magnitude.

Can they cite another example where a reverse inquiry was premised in this way-----

Mr. Michael Moriarty

In reality, the vast majority-----

-----in terms of bundling up debtors from a specific geographic location?

Mr. Michael Moriarty

No, we would not have had that.

Had that ever happened before?

Mr. Michael Moriarty

They normally-----

No, I want to know did that ever happen before.

Mr. John Collison

Not on this scale.

Right. Has it happened subsequently?

Mr. John Collison

No. We have tended to market-----

I am looking at some of the information. I must ask who came up with Eagle. Who code names these?

Mr. John Collison

I cannot recall.

I was looking at other ones. They are fairly class names: Saturn, Quattro, Aspen, Chrome, Holly. Maybe the latter was around Christmas time, was it? No, it was quarter one of 2014.

Mr. John Collison

Somebody on the project team might have come up with those.

It was somebody with a good imaginative capacity.

It is like the names for hurricanes. Every year, somebody comes up with the names.

Mr. John Collison

I cannot remember.

They cite all of these, and that is fine. Let us take Quattro. This particular transaction, with a par value of $200 million, was a collection of hotels located along the east coast of the United States. It is based on asset location. I understand investors moving, and a rationale for all of that, but it strikes me as singular of Brown Rudnick, not to make an approach to NAMA which is fair enough, but to do so on the basis of the location of debtors.

Mr. John Collison

That is not unusual in our experience.

Mr. Collison just told me that it had not happened before.

Mr. John Collison

It certainly has not happened in terms of the scale of the transaction. My point is, in relation to one of these large global investment firms taking a position on a particular market or particular geographic location-----

No, it was more than that. It was not about where are the assets. If they were-----

Mr. John Collison

But the-----

Hang on. If they were looking at the North and saying, "Well, this has bottomed out. They are in trouble there. They only way is up," I can understand viewing the assets in that location, but that is not what happened. They were quite specific that it was about the debtors.

Mr. John Collison

There are a couple of things to bear in mind here. First, they definitely took a position with regard to the geography here. They were looking at the Northern Ireland market. The other thing that I am sure - because bear in mind they would have transacted in Britain and they would have definitely acquired a lot of non-performing debt in the wider UK - they would have been well aware of is, it would have been known in the marketplace, that a lot of the Northern Ireland debtors and borrowers over the years would have also happened to acquire property in Britain where their presence-----

Let me cut to the chase here because maybe Mr. Collison is politely side-stepping what I am thinking. It strikes me in this singular focus on the debtors in the North that it would have been in the interests of persons with connections with those debtors in the North perhaps to have had them bundled up and acquired by an appropriate entity. It strikes me as odd when one considers that Mr. Frank Cushnahan - as we now know, it is not a matter of dispute - had a relationship with debtors up to the tune of 50% of the value of Project Eagle. He was debtor-focused. He had that relationship there. This strikes me as odd. It is even more odd since we have now established, with the help of Mr. Stewart and his note, that Brown Rudnick, the legal firm, approached PIMCO with this idea. It would be interesting to know if Brown Rudnick had the idea of focusing on the debtors in the North. Have we invited them in, Chairman?

No, we have not.

We may need their help.

Mr. John Collison

Could I just make one point on that? If I could point Deputy McDonald to page 133 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's report, there is a paragraph that begins, "In terms of rationale,". The last two sentences there read:

PIMCO believe the Portfolio would provide them with quantum quickly and overall they like the value proposition. PIMCO would very much see this as a "bolt-on" acquisition believing that the secondary markets offer good opportunities for incremental capex to drive value.

That does set out the rationale. They took a view on the Northern Ireland market. They also knew that in the portfolio there was a strong concentration on retail assets. They operated in the UK market. They had a fix and a good focus on retail. There was commercial logic behind their investment strategy here.

I am not disputing that but I am also thinking out loud. Somebody referred to that earlier, that it also would have been a neat vehicle for those debtors who wanted out from under NAMA. Would it not?

Mr. Michael Moriarty

We would not have had another geographic concentration that would be comparable. Our debtors, as the Deputy can imagine, were mainly in the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland, and some in the UK. We did not take anywhere there were US borrowers. The Deputy may remember that each of the banks sold off their US portfolios of US borrowers. IBRC did it. Bank of Ireland did it. There would not have been an equivalent grouping of debtors that I could easily think that someone would make an approach to us for. That is all I can offer. We can only listen to the Deputy's speculation as to what their motivation was.

I am merely highlighting that it strikes me so.

Deputy Cullinane, briefly, and we will try to wrap up.

I have two quick questions for Mr. Stewart. We now know that Mr. Cushnahan was part of a three-way split of a success fee, to follow on from the previous line of questioning, and that three-way split was between Brown Rudnick, Tughans and Mr. Cushnahan. That was to be paid by PIMCO. Why would Mr. Stewart think PIMCO were paying Mr. Cushnahan at all? Why would he have been in receipt of any success fee?

Mr. Alan Stewart

Deputy Cullinane is asking me to speculate. What PIMCO said to us, that they had learned that the split involved Mr. Cushnahan, suggests that it was not apparent to them from the outset that he was involved in it but that they established that from inquiries they had made.

The reason I am asking is-----

Mr. Alan Stewart

The short answer is: I do not know the answer to that question. I did not know who Frank Cushnahan was, as I say.

The point is that there was an exchange. Mr. Stewart was a conduit for the board and he was one of those who were party to the conference calls between NAMA and PIMCO. The board was concerned about the success fees and PIMCO had come to NAMA to make it aware of it. When NAMA was made aware of it, the Minister was then contacted by the chair of NAMA. Mr. Stewart is a legal person working with NAMA. From a legal perspective, why would he have contacted the Minister?

Mr. Alan Stewart

I imagine ultimately it is the Minister for Finance who has oversight of NAMA and this was regarded as such a serious development that he felt the need to bring it to his attention.

The Deputy would have to ask the chairman-----

Mr. Daly told the committee there was no role for the Minister because it was a commercial decision. Why would they have contacted him?

Mr. Alan Stewart

The Deputy has seen the minutes of the meeting on the 11th. The answer is probably in them - that it was regarded as a very serious issue for NAMA. There was a very serious reputational risk referred to. I imagine it is for these reasons that the chairman felt the need to contact the Minister about it.

Was Mr. Stewart ever informed of the emergence of success fees with Cerberus? Was he made aware that two of the three players involved in the PIMCO success fee were also party to success fees?

Mr. Alan Stewart

I was not aware of any of it, but then again, I was out of the office from that point in time.

Was NAMA legal ever made aware of it?

Mr. Alan Stewart

I think it was brought to the attention of the head of legal after there was some interaction on the point between Cerberus and NAMA. The e-mails are probably in the pack the committee will look at. The Deputy will see it in it.

Therefore, NAMA legal was made aware of it.

Mr. Alan Stewart

Yes, after the initial interaction. As it is off the top of my head, bear with me. When Cerberus brought it to the attention of NAMA that it was retaining Brown Rudnick-----

Was NAMA legal ever asked for its opinion on the so-called letter of comfort from Cerberus? Was it asked whether there were legal or compliance issues?

Mr. Alan Stewart

Certainly, the head of legal had some input into what was obtained ultimately from Cerberus. Whether she drafted it verbatim or told it what needed to be put in it, I cannot be certain, but there was an input into it.

Is this why the Comptroller and Auditor General says in his report that NAMA was more concerned with its legal responsibilities, not with forensically interrogating what was happening with the success fee?

Mr. Alan Stewart

From NAMA's point of view, the board had made it clear that the issue with the success fee was the fact that Frank Cushnahan stood to be a beneficiary. That was clear from the PIMCO interaction and the Deputy has seen that that was the case. Again, I am speculating because I was not involved at the time, but I am thinking if that remained the concern, as I imagine it did, a way of addressing it was to obtain confirmation in writing from the head of legal and compliance in Cerberus along the lines of that ultimately sought.

The letter of compliance was from Cerberus in which it confirmed it was not paying money to anybody associated with NAMA. My understanding of the Comptroller and Auditor General's criticism is that we do not know if Tughans and Brown Rudnick were making payments to others. Was that ever highlighted as a concern by NAMA legal?

Mr. Alan Stewart

The chain of e-mails shows that there was confirmation given by Cerberus - there is reference to the specific foreign legislation: the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 and the UK Bribery Act 2010 - that it had satisfied itself by confirming with Brown Rudnick and Tughans that there was no breach of that legislation. I would have to refer to the e-mail to be able to give the specifics of it.

Was this Cerberus or NAMA?

Mr. Alan Stewart

Cerberus was telling NAMA.

That should be in the information pack we received at lunch time. I thank Mr. Moriarty, Mr. Collison, Mr. Stewart and Mr. Rooney for participating in the meeting. We have found their evidence helpful to us. There will be further engagement with former board members of NAMA and the current chief executive officer and chairman in due course. We indicated during the meeting that there were certain documents that we required. We ask the witnesses to make sure they work their way to the committee within seven days.

The witnesses withdrew.
The committee adjourned at 3.55 p.m. until 9 a.m. on Thursday, 10 November 2016.
Top
Share