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Committee on Budgetary Oversight debate -
Wednesday, 9 Mar 2022

Pre-Stability Programme Update Scrutiny: Economic and Social Research Institute

Apologies have been received from Deputy Pearse Doherty. To limit the risk of spreading Covid-19, the service encourages all Members, visitors and witnesses to continue to wear face masks when moving around the campus or when in close proximity to others and to be respectful of other people's physical space, and they are also asked to adhere to any other public health advice.

Before we begin, I will explain some limitations to parliamentary privilege and the practice of the Houses as regards references witnesses may make to other persons in their evidence. The evidence of witnesses physically present or who give evidence from within the parliamentary precincts is protected pursuant to both the Constitution and statute by absolute privilege. However, today's witnesses are giving their evidence remotely from a place outside the parliamentary precincts and, as such, may not benefit from the same level of immunity from legal proceedings as witnesses who are physically present. Witnesses are again reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice that they should not criticise nor make charges against any person or entity, by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable, or otherwise engage in speech that may be regarded as damaging to the good name of the person or entity. Therefore, if their statements are potentially defamatory with regard to an identifiable person or entity, they will be directed to discontinue their remarks. It is imperative that they comply with any such direction.

Members are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against any person outside the Houses or an official either by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable. I remind members of the constitutional requirement that they must be physically present within the confines of Leinster House to participate in public meetings. I will not permit members to participate where they are not adhering to the constitutional requirement. Therefore, any member who attempts to participate from outside the precincts will be asked to leave the meeting.

Today's meeting is an engagement with representatives from the Economic and Social Research Institute, ESRI, and I thank them for their presence. The stability programme update, SPU, report is due to be published in mid-April by the Department of Finance and it will set out Ireland's medium-term economic outlook and fiscal plans. Its publication indicates the beginning of the budgetary preparation for budget 2023. The committee will undertake ex ante scrutiny of the SPU to understand the current fiscal context, to engage with stakeholders on these issues and to allow for greater parliamentary engagement and transparency on the budgetary process. Today, the committee will meet with the ESRI to discuss medium-term fiscal and economic outlooks, Exchequer and general government developments and outlooks, general government debt risks facing the economy and the long-term sustainability of the public finances. On behalf of the committee, I welcome Dr. Kieran McQuinn, research officer, and Dr. Conor O'Toole, assistant researcher, and I thank them for their attendance.

I invited Dr. McQuinn to make his opening statement.

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

I thank the Chair for the invitation to the ESRI to appear before the committee. I am joined by my colleague, Dr. Conor O’Toole. We are grateful for the opportunity to appear before the committee to provide our views on the present economic and fiscal situation and to discuss some key issues and risks that the medium-term fiscal strategy should consider. Obviously, events are changing day by day as far as economic issues are concerned in regard to the awful circumstances in the Ukraine, so some of our forecasts have not yet incorporated the exact implications of that. We will address that in our next quarterly economic commentary, which is out at the end of the month. We will endeavour to discuss some of the issues today in terms of how we see them impacting the medium-term outlook.

The economy has emerged from the pandemic in a robust manner. Work conducted in the ESRI suggests that the economy grew by approximately 4.5% to 5% per annum between 2013 and 2019. This meant that the economy went into the pandemic in a strong position, which provided economic space to deal with the economic shock and emerge in a resilient fashion. However, a number of challenges are set to confront the domestic economy and these have been exacerbated by the fallout from the recent invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation. We will discuss the potential fallout from the invasion in the risks section later.

I will turn to the fiscal and economic outlook. The improved situation with regards to the Covid-19 pandemic enabled the Government to lift almost all of the public health restrictions as of 28 February 2022. This has allowed for a re-normalisation of economic activity similar to that which operated before the onset of the global pandemic. The unwinding of public health restrictions through 2021 did result in strong recoveries in both consumption and underlying investment, while the export sector of the economy performed robustly throughout the pandemic. In 2021, we estimate that GDP grew by 13.6%, with modified domestic demand, MDD, increasing by 6.2%. For the present year, this trend is set to continue with MDD expected to grow by 7.1%. It will continue to grow strongly. This reflects strong contributions from both domestic and external sources of growth.

The labour market experienced a sustained improvement throughout 2021. Unemployment, which peaked in February 2021 at 27%, fell to 7% most recently in February of this year. This strong recovery is set to continue and by the end of the current year, we expect the unemployment rate to fall to 5%. The rapid decline in the unemployment rate, coupled with the strong domestic economic rebound, gives rise to the possibility of labour supply bottlenecks and associated risks for overheating in the economy. The strength of the economic performance is reflected in the improvement in the public finances. This year, 2022, is likely to see the first positive general government balance, GGB, since 2019; this reflects both increased Exchequer receipts and lower expenditure given the fall-off in unemployment during the pandemic.

With regard to the public finances, 2021 witnessed significant growth under almost all tax headings, with particularly large takings of income tax, VAT, and corporation tax. These three tax headings saw annual growth of 17.4%, 24.3% and 10.3%, respectively. The overall tax intake was €68.4 billion in 2021. Expenditure for the year was 2.6% higher in 2021 compared to 2020, however, it was €1.4 billion, or 1.5%, lower than had been allocated for 2021. The lower-than-allocated spending as well as the substantial tax intake produced a general government deficit of -3.1% of GNI*, or -€7.3billion, for 2021. This is significantly smaller than was expected at the onset of the year. Debt levels have increased substantially over the past two years due to the large State intervention in response to the pandemic. However, the strong performance of the economy has resulted in Ireland's debt-to-GDP and debt-to-GNI* ratios being somewhat lower in 2022 than they were in 2019, just before the pandemic. It should be noted that the suspension of the Stability and Growth Pact has also contributed to the ability of governments to intervene during the public health crisis. At the moment, reforms of the European Union fiscal rules are being debated, with some proposals suggesting that expenditure on climate-related matters should be excluded from the new rules that are proposed. The return of the public finances to a sustainable path so soon after the significant costs of the pandemic gives rise to important policy questions concerning fiscal policy going forward. Given the Government's stated plans for expenditure levels over the coming years, improvements in the public finances are likely to see a persistent fall in the debt-to-output ratio, whether output is classified as GDP or GNI*. Indeed, if the current trajectory of the public finances were to continue, the debt-to-GDP ratio could, quite soon, fall to rates not seen since the mid-2000s. However, should Government policy be aimed at achieving as low a debt-to-output ratio as possible or should a certain target be set, as suggested in a well-known contribution by economists, Jason Furman and Larry Summers in 2020?

I will now turn to risks in the medium term. Despite the significant upturn, a number of factors pose challenges to the economy and living standards in the near future. In the short-term, rising inflation and the cost of living are particularly pressing. The most recent data indicates that the annual inflation rate was 5% for both the CPI and the HICP in January 2022. This inflation is largely a result of international factors, with energy and transport costs being the main driver of the rising cost of living. This is due to supply chain disruptions during the pandemic and a faster-than-expected economic revival globally. The rising energy costs are putting pressure on households and on lower-income households in particular. It is believed, however, that these inflationary effects are temporary, with many expecting the supply chain issues and other pressures to ease through 2022. We have forecast an average inflation rate of 4% in 2022, with a peak in spring followed by decreases as base effects subside and supply chain issues are resolved. However, we will revisit that forecast soon. The forecasts were published before the recent crisis in Ukraine and the price of oil and gas has already risen since the actions taken by the Russian Federation. Sanctions have been placed on the Russian economy and although no sanctions have yet been placed on the energy sector of the country by the European Union, this has been discussed as a possibility. It seems likely that energy prices are set to increase further. Indeed, recent research by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, NIESR, in the UK suggests the global inflation rate could rise by 3% this year alone. This could have significant implications for the recalibration of monetary policy by the European Central Bank, ECB. To date, the general assumption has been that the recent increase in inflation was temporary and, hence, policy rates have been left unchanged in the short term. This policy may change if higher inflation rates are expected to persist, although the ECB will also factor in the impact of the crisis on the growth performance of the euro area. Over the medium term, western authorities may decide to reduce European consumption of Russian gas and oil. This would almost inevitably lead to higher energy bills over the short to medium future. There has been significant research, even in recent days, on this matter. More generally, the radical shift in the geopolitical landscape will inevitably result in a sharp rise in international business uncertainty. This uncertainty is likely to drive growth lower in the general precautionary savings channels. The Irish economy, owing to its small and open nature, is particularly sensitive to significant changes in global economic activity. Preliminary estimates from the ECB indicate that the conflict could reduce economic output in the euro area by up to 0.4% this year. Previous modelling work done using the COre Structural MOdel, COSMO, the large-scale macro-econometric model of the economy, indicates a 1:1 relationship between global and domestic economic activity. The aforementioned study by NIESR in the UK indicates that the potential impact on global growth of the Russian invasion could be in the region of 1%. Most of the key drivers of the recent surge in inflation, such as the increase in energy costs, have been external to the domestic economy. However, one key element of recent increases in the cost of living, which reflects domestic challenges, is the cost of housing. Recent estimates from the Central Statistics Office, CSO, indicate that house prices are now growing by 14% per annum, while rents are growing by 8%, according to indicators from the ESRI and the Residential Tenancies Board, RTB. These increases are on top of sustained increases in both categories over the past six to seven years. The pandemic, which had a negative impact on the supply side of the housing market, has exacerbated the pre-existing imbalance between supply and demand in the economy. While a number of affordability-related issues are associated with these increases, one area where it may have a direct impact on domestic economic performance is through a loss of competitiveness. The lack of adequate housing supply has been identified by a number of domestic and external agencies as being one of the biggest challenges to our competitiveness as an economy. The recent Housing for All initiative by the Government is welcome in terms of its multi-annual targets and expenditure commitments, and the State must continue to focus on the delivery of social and affordable housing to tackle this issue.

Another significant challenge facing the economy over the medium term is that of climate change and the green transition. Through the recent Climate Action and Low Carbon Development (Amendment) Act 2021, the State has committed to an emissions reduction path of 51% by 2030 and net-zero emissions by 2050. The importance of such a commitment is widely recognised, but it is also acknowledged that meeting such targets, along with tackling the housing issue, will require significant investment by the State going forward.

The economy has recovered strongly from the pandemic and both it and the public finances are on a firm footing at present but international factors could have a large effect on the domestic economy. Inflation has prompted a policy response from the Government in the form of energy credit payments and it is not inconceivable that other policy responses will be required if these international circumstances worsen further, with particular attention being paid to the conflict ensuing in Ukraine.

I thank Dr. McQuinn. I now open the floor to members, beginning with Deputy Patricia Ryan.

I thank Dr. McQuinn for his presentation, which is much appreciated. On page 2 of his opening statement, there is reference to labour supply bottlenecks. Which areas does he expect will be the hardest to address in this regard and what actions does he recommend?

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

There probably are a number of sectors that may suffer from bottlenecks as we move forward. One area we are particularly cognisant of, and pay particular attention to, is the construction sector. The Housing for All plan sets out quite significant targets for meeting housing supply over the coming years, with which most of us would agree and wish to see occurring. However, there is no doubt it will pose a significant challenge in achieving those targets and the ratcheting up of supply. We are looking to increase housing supply at a time when the unemployment rate is heading towards 5% this year. That will pose a significant challenge in getting the workers necessary to achieve that output level. This is one sector of the economy that is likely to experience difficulties in achieving that.

On what can be done, some of the issues are more long term, such as improving training programmes and getting people back into the supply side of the construction sector. Net immigration and migration may also play a very important role. We have in the past seen a large influx of workers into the country who were targeted more at the construction end of the scale in terms of where they could contribute. That probably is the most pressing area in which we would envisage bottlenecks arising but there are others within the economy. My colleague, Dr. O'Toole, may want to comment on this.

Dr. Conor O'Toole

Coming into 2020, our expectation was for quite a rapid recovery in the domestic economy, particularly as the public health requirements were stood down over time. The outturn of the abatement of the public health restrictions would lead us to assume that this rapid recovery will happen in the domestic economy. Our expectation was that the expenditure we expected to happen this year would go into the types of activities households were unable to do during the pandemic. For example, the expectation was that it would be targeted towards entertainment, recreation, hospitality and accommodation. We expected that these really hard-hit sectors, which required public interaction, would see a recovery.

Notwithstanding the geopolitical tensions, if the recovery does materialise in those sectors, there may also be capacity constraints in getting the labour in there, particularly in the short run. These are sectors where people may have been laid off for long periods during the public health restrictions and who may have taken up other employment. A number of frictions may have caused the traditional labour pool for those sectors to have moved away a little. The construction sector certainly is a key issue but there may be other domestic non-traded sectors in which, if the demand comes back following the easing of restrictions, there could be bottlenecks.

I thank the witnesses. I only have a couple more questions as I have to go to the Chamber. What is their opinion on excluding climate-related matters under the fiscal rules?

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

This is a very interesting development that we have seen being discussed over the past number of months as part of a general discussion around a revisiting of the fiscal rules. Potentially, excluding climate change expenditure is a good idea and there are a number of reasons to argue for it. Obviously, this is an issue that is confronting nearly all countries in the European Union and there is a possibility to get agreement across many of them. Investment is required. One advantage of having climate measures excluded from the rules is that, arguably, it will enable the Government to commit to them on a multi-annual basis. With the crisis emerging in Ukraine, we have seen domestically that there is always a danger that the climate change agenda could be derailed by the issues that are pressing today. However, we all agree that, in the longer term or even the medium term, climate change is the hugely important issue. Having measures in that area excluded from the fiscal rules would give them a certain degree of security of funding by domestic governments and ensure this funding is not thrown off course by urgent issues that might arise on a day-to-day basis.

There also is the possibility for other areas of expenditure to be excluded from the fiscal rules. Housing is an area that could be considered. The housing issues and difficulties we have in Ireland are not specific to the Irish market. We see constant reference right across Europe to difficulties that are being experienced in this area in other jurisdictions. I would argue that we could even look to exclude expenditure on housing. We know there is an overlap between climate change and housing in terms of the retrofitting issue. There clearly are areas that could be developed in that regard.

My final question is kind of off the cuff. What impact do the witnesses see the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the sanctions imposed on Russia as a result, having on the Irish and European economies? This probably is not something the ESRI has done much work on at this time but I would like to get a feel for the witnesses' views on it.

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

We are actively considering this issue. Our next quarterly commentary will come out at the end of this month, in which the matter will very much be addressed. When there is major geopolitical tension or an actual conflict like we currently have, there clearly is huge uncertainty around that. We do not know how long the conflict will last, how widespread it will be, the danger of proliferation to other countries, etc. That leads to a massive degree of uncertainty and, generally speaking, business does not like uncertainty when it comes to making investment decisions. Investment will be impacted in a global sense. Likewise, generally speaking, households do not like to make significant financial decisions when there is a considerable degree of uncertainty. Consumption levels will be impacted, as will trade levels generally.

There will be direct trade impacts through the sanctions against Russia and because it is a huge exporter of grain. We have seen the pressure on the grain and cereal market generally over the past week or so. There also are indirect effects. We do not have a huge volume of trade with Russia directly but we have a lot of trade with other countries that trade with it. There are potential spillover and knock-on effects in that sense. As a small, open economy, we are going to see a contraction in international economic activity, both in the euro area and outside it. There is no doubt this will have a direct bearing on the domestic economy. It has been shown time after time in studies that when there is a major international shock, it very much transmits down into the domestic economy.

The other area of impact, of course, is on prices. Energy prices, as we all know, have been escalating very sharply, having already risen quite significantly over the past six months. It is a long time since we have seen the kinds of increases in energy prices we are now witnessing. This will pose a significant challenge both to households and firms. There is no doubt about that and there is a substantial increase in inflation associated with it. Unfortunately, as we have seen, lower-income households, from a distributional perspective, tend to be hit disproportionately by that type of serious increase in inflation.

There are knock-on effects on the public finances. We have seen a number of initiatives taken by the Government, even in the past couple of weeks, all of which carry a cost. We are somewhat fortunate in that the public finances, as we said in our opening statement, are on a relatively stable path so soon after the pandemic. That gives the Government some scope to deal with these issues. As to the scale of it, we just do not know. It all depends on the scale and length of the hostilities. We are seeing a massive humanitarian issue, with millions of people leaving Ukraine. The Government has welcomed in a lot of people, which is right and proper to do. Inevitably, there will be expenditure issues around this that will have to be dealt with. There are a number of different channels through which the conflict will impact the domestic economy.

At this stage it is hard to be definitive about the exact effects. Certainly, there will be some considerable effects in the short and medium term.

I thank the witness. I appreciate the witness's time.

I thank Professor McQuinn for his presentation. I will start where he left off with Deputy Ryan. If a comparison was done between Covid-19 over the past two years and what is now happening in Ukraine, which is the bigger worry for us? Looking at agriculture and food security, Professor McQuinn said we do not trade much with Russia. However, Russia produces much of the world's fertiliser which is important for us. Ukraine produces much of the grain we need for feed as well as seeds to sow our own grain. We have a perfect storm there. Now we are talking about adapting our farming and our agricultural practices to do more tillage to produce more of the basic ingredients we need in order that we have the foodstuffs for ourselves and for the animals in winter so that we can continue to produce beef and dairy produce. If Professor McQuinn was the Minister for Finance, what would he think about this? Is there an issue around climate and farming that has to be revisited or recalibrated in light of what we are facing now?

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

I will probably avail of my experience working in Teagasc some years ago to address some of those questions, in particular regarding the tillage sector. On a straight comparison between the two issues, it is hard at this stage to quantify that. We had two years of the pandemic, although within those two years we had periods of opening up and closing down.

As for the economic effects overall, the economy still managed to grow quite strongly through the pandemic. That is one of the remarkable features of it. It is a testimony to how strong the Irish economy was performing before the pandemic that it came through the pandemic in quite a strong position. Certain sectors were obviously very badly affected but in general the economy came through quite strongly. As I said, in terms of the fiscal side, the Government and the State spent a great deal of money on the support measures, the pandemic unemployment payment, the wage subsidy schemes, additional expenditure on health and so on, but the key fiscal metrics of debt to GDP, the Government balance, have come back to a more sustainable path in a very quick fashion after the pandemic because of how strongly the economy has been performing. The pandemic had a huge impact but in general terms the economy managed to keep going through it and, as we said, has come out in a very strong position in the immediate aftermath.

In regard to the Ukrainian situation, it depends on how long the conflict goes on, and how widespread it becomes. That is the key issue. At this stage, it is very hard to tell. However, there have already been significant economic impacts, as we have seen. The Deputy mentioned grain prices and the impact on agricultural input prices in terms of fertilisers. There is no doubt that has had a huge impact and will have a big impact right across the globe. The energy market repercussions from this could be huge. We have seen the US and the UK authorities minimising or reducing completely their reliance on Russian oil. We have seen growing pressure for the European authorities to do likewise. The desire to reduce energy dependence on Russia is perfectly understandable but it comes with an enormous cost transformation. It would entail a significant amount of transformation right across the economy.

These are very hard to quantify at this point in time but certainly the downside risks associated with this are substantial and are possibly greater than anything we saw during the pandemic. Equally we do not know whether the whole situation could possibly be resolved quite quickly. If there was a change of government or whatever in Russia, then the military action could be reversed. It is difficult to assess how significant the measures will be over the medium term but certainly in the short term, we have seen significant economic implications of the crisis.

In regard to the implications for agriculture directly, as I said, I spent some time modelling the grain sector years ago. I know from my knowledge there that it is not the easiest thing. Sometimes people looking on from outside think you can switch production from beef and dry stock to tillage or from dairy to tillage. It is not that easy. It requires significant adjustment and so on. I do not think anybody should underestimate the challenges in terms of doing that and underestimate the impact of increasing costs on agricultural production. These costs are obviously going to come through myriad channels as a result of this. There are serious challenges for agriculture as well as the rest of the domestic economy.

Professor McQuinn spoke about the fiscal rules. I may be wrong but I cannot see how the fiscal rules can be brought back into play or even contemplated until we see how this pans out. We are two weeks into this war and the repercussions are being felt right across the globe.

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

I agree with the Deputy. In general, it is fair to say that European institutions, whether the Commission or the European Central Bank, have probably learned a great deal from the financial crisis when they did not perhaps react in the way they should have. There has been noticeable change in the way they reacted to the pandemic in terms of suspending the fiscal rules and providing supports which they previously had not been as quick to do. European institutions have learned much and reacted to the pandemic in a good manner in terms of trying to ensure economies got through the crisis and were not thrown off too much and that policy decisions made by the European institutions did not themselves bring about contractions in economic activity. That will colour and influence decisions going forward in regard to this issue. People will realise that you cannot just reimpose the fiscal rules given the huge uncertainly prevailing. It would be very difficult ask to try to get governments to take on board the full implications of the fiscal rules in the present context.

The next big issue or crisis is housing. What has been a housing crisis will be compounded by the fact that we will probably have 80,000 or 100,000 - those figures have been bandied about - more people who will need housing as a matter of urgency over the next 12 months. How do we deal with that and the existing shortfall? In my book it could be a case of taking out some of the processes that exist at the moment and getting on with building, as opposed to having processes which mean it takes between five to seven years for a project to get off the ground, and bringing in emergency measures to allow us to get to the stage where we are building and putting in infrastructure, such as water and sewerage, in places where it is needed. That will take money and resources. Are we in a position to front-load our national development plan starting now, and not just projects that might be delivered over time but putting up buildings to house people so that they can live in a humane way? What are Professor McQuinn's thoughts on that?

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

We have spent time in the past talking about the imbalance between supply and demand in the Irish economy as far as housing is concerned. Our estimates in the ESRI suggest we need about 35,000 units per annum to meet the structural demand for housing that exists.

Yet, we have been building, on average, between 15,000 and 20,000 units per annum during the past six or seven years. We are not even meeting the yearly requirement. That leads not only to missing out on meeting the annual requirement but also to an accumulation in the shortfall over time. As everybody knows, there is a major task in meeting the challenge that already exists in the housing market. Clearly, if there is an additional increase in the structural demand to house between 50,000 and 100,000 people due to the Ukrainian issue, that will compound the existing difficulties. Significant increases in revenues have been pledged on foot of the Government’s multi-annual commitments under the Housing for All strategy. One could argue that perhaps more money could be pledged but the fundamental problem will be the capacity to get the workers and materials required to meet that housing demand. That is where the challenge will be. It is worth remembering that the energy and other related costs we mentioned earlier are all directly affecting the housing market as they are affecting many other markets. We have seen very sharp increases in housing costs. Those directly impact the ability of the industry to provide the supply needed. It would be worth considering any measures that can fast-track the supply given the challenges that will probably exist as we go forward. We are facing a very significant challenge in that regard. I do not know if Dr. O'Toole would like to contribute.

Dr. Conor O'Toole

As Dr. McQuinn mentioned, the shock we saw with Covid-19, which was very much based on having to restrict public interaction, which in turn had an impact on economic activity, is very different from the shock we are facing now, which is pretty much a sudden stop and a direct sudden stop in terms of the energy price escalation. It is rapidly rising in ways we have not seen for many years. The risks in terms of direct price effects cannot be understated with respect to how much they could affect building costs and materials. All of these commodities are internationally traded and will increase in line with the stresses we are seeing in the international markets. That can feed through directly into our ability to meet even our current commitments and current envisaged investments in the housing sector. We cannot understate the risks associated with how the propagation of the severe price stress we are seeing will feed back into the Irish economy. It is certainly a major risk which is very difficult to deal with in the short term. Housing issues take a long time to deal with. As we have seen with the supply challenges, it has taken many years to ramp up supply. This crisis layers an additional complexity to the ability to manage the delivery in the housing market.

I thank the witnesses for those responses. I wish to ask about budgetary scenarios having regard to all that is happening as we face into the next budget. I know that is like being asked to look into a crystal ball. I refer to the pressures on existing contracts with suppliers and business people that have been entered into. For instance, a person who has a bus company contacted me today. Two years ago, that person entered into a five-year deal with Bus Éireann to provide bus services at a rate that was based on the price they were paying for diesel at the time. Now there is the issue of what they will have to pay for it now. With the constant pressure on businesses that have entered into those types of contracts, are those businesses sustainable? Will they disappear, as it were, from the market or is that a major risk? Should we be budgeting to support those businesses with fixed-price contracts for three to five years, whether they be capital or service projects whose costs have greatly increased?

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

Our original outlook for inflation was pretty much along the lines of what most other people felt, which was that inflationary pressures would peak somewhere in the first quarter of this year and then gradually subside and abate towards the end of year. The danger related to what we call the second round effects, whereby we would have an initial spike in inflation and that would prompt people to look for higher wages or revisit contracts, along the lines of what the Deputy mentioned, and the initial spike in inflation would then prolong in the system for a period of time. We would have been arguing against that and saying that is not something we want to see. Unfortunately, it is highly unlikely the inflationary issue is going to go away in the short term. Everything we see in terms of the energy markets, cereal prices, grains and commodity markets is pointing to much higher prices certainly for the foreseeable future. The inflationary period we are now in is being prolonged because of what is happening in Ukraine. As to how long and severe it will be, it is a question of how long the crisis lasts and the conflict continues. Certainly, we are on the cusp of seeing very significant price hikes and, unfortunately, I do not see any great hope of those price increases abating any time soon.

It is sounds very depressing but it is the reality to which we must adjust our thinking in light of what has happened during the past two weeks. I thank the witnesses for their insights.

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

The Deputy is welcome.

I thank the Deputy. I call Deputy O’Donnell.

The one issue dominating the agenda is the Ukraine crisis. It has come sharp and sudden. I appreciate it has just happened but have the witnesses had an opportunity to do a body of work on the impact of the Ukraine crisis on the Irish economy? What intervention measures should the Government be taking? We had a reduction in excise duty today. What do the witnesses envisage in terms of the cost of living for people? For instance, Ukraine is one of the biggest producers of wheat. I understand we import 30% of our wheat requirements from Ukraine and Russia. What intervention measures are required? Are the witnesses doing a body of work on the impact of the crisis? Where do they envisage there will be a shortage of supply? How can we counteract that? Will they address those questions specifically on the Ukraine crisis?

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

We are preparing our next quarterly commentary, which will be out at the end of March. We are obviously considering the impact of this crisis in the short to medium term. The duration of the period we typically consider in the commentary is the rest of 2022 and into 2023. We will be considering the impact of the Ukrainian crisis on the Irish economy for that period. In terms of other work, I have no doubt we will be spending much time on this issue into the future. I could compare this crisis to the pandemic. In fairness to my colleagues in the institute, they have displayed a remarkable degree of versatility. We were able to shift our work focus very quickly when the pandemic hit to consider the impacts of the pandemic on a myriad of areas in terms of macroeconomics, behaviour, health and the like. I have no doubt a significant amount of work will be done on the impact of this crisis in the coming period. Certain Departments with which we interact quite a lot will come to us with requests for analysis and more deep-seated and longer–term analysis and medium-term appraisals. I have no doubt that will be the case but we are certainly considering its impact in the short and medium term.

I want to focus on the issues. The impact of this crisis is already manifesting itself in the price of oil and the potential shortage of supplies. We are speaking to grain merchants and so forth. I am looking at the impact of the crisis as a layman but the witnesses are the experts in this area.

Where do they see the Ukrainian crisis manifesting in the Irish economy? What form will it take and how grave will it be? Will the impact of the Ukrainian crisis far outplay the impact of the Covid crisis? I want to drill down into the details.

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

There are a number of different areas. As we suggested in our opening statement, a situation like this initially brings a large degree of uncertainty, and uncertainty is bad for business decisions on investments and consumption decisions by households. It has an adverse impact on global trade in a myriad of fashions. All the major drivers of growth that we can envisage are impacted across western economies. We are a small open economy. Typically, there is a 1:1 relationship between Irish economic activity and global economic activity. If global economic activity falls by 1 percentage point, Irish economic activity tends to fall by 1 percentage point.

That is the overall uncertainty effect, but then there are cost-of-living issues. Energy costs have increased sharply. Much will depend on the scale and duration of the conflict; that will determine the point. In the short term, though, there will be significant increases in energy costs, commodity prices, grain prices and the prices for related agricultural products and inputs. We are looking at a substantial increase in the cost of living across the board. What its duration will be depends on the scale of the conflict.

This poses a challenge for the public finances, given that the measures the Government has introduced to deal with the inflationary issues come with a price tag. It may well be the case that more such interventions will be required in the months and, possibly, years ahead. Those will also have significant price tags. From the overall impact on economic activity to the impact on the cost of living and the public finances, there is a substantial effect.

Regarding the comparison between this situation and the pandemic, it is too early to say. We will have to wait to see how long it lasts. As I told Deputy Canney in response to pretty much the same question, the pandemic had an impact on the Irish economy, but the resilience of our economy enabled it to come through in quite a strong fashion. While there are sectors that are still suffering from its effects, the economy performed in a resilient fashion overall and the public finances were able to be returned to a sustainable path quickly. That puts us in a good position coming into this crisis, but the scale and duration of the crisis will depend on the scale and duration of the hostilities.

The Ukrainian crisis will not end overnight. Are there intervention measures that the ESRI as an advisory body would recommend the Government should be taking now?

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

Whatever intervention measures are introduced – more will probably be required to meet the cost-of-living challenges – one of the key challenges will be to ensure they are as targeted as possible. In our opening statement, we referred to how overheating pressures had been building in the Irish economy before the pandemic and were building again after exiting the pandemic in a robust fashion. In the absence of all these crises, the danger is that we would have overheating in the economy. Therefore, any measure that we introduce, such as measures to support family incomes, should be as targeted as possible. Those are the kinds of measure that one can envisage at this stage. Given that it is difficult for the Government to introduce interventions that can deal with some of the global-related issues, this is about supporting family incomes and ensuring that the least privileged in society are insulated from the cost-of-living hikes that we will face.

It is early at this stage to prescribe supports for businesses in terms of the duration of the effects and so on, but something like what we saw during the pandemic may be required. Does Dr. O'Toole wish to discuss supports for businesses?

Dr. Conor O'Toole

I will add something in terms of how the impact of the Ukrainian crisis feeds through to the Irish economy. As Dr. McQuinn said, one of the main channels is the uncertainty channel. It is likely to deter business investment, in that businesses will postpone investment decisions from now until they see the situation becoming a little clearer, and households may engage in higher precautionary savings. However, these are channels that might take a little longer to work through the system.

Two direct effects that we know will happen are that it will feed into higher food prices and higher energy prices. We will see these direct effects in the economy quickly. Targeted measures should directly help with the cost of living for households that spend a disproportionate amount of their budgets on the items in question, namely, lower income households. The International Monetary Fund, IMF, has warned in its statement on the Ukrainian crisis that lower income households globally are going to feel the effects of this crisis first because they are the ones that spend more of their budgets on food and energy.

When discussing the types of instrument that we could use and calibrate to try to direct the impacts the most, it would be those measures that are most targeted at lower income households that spend more of their budgets on energy and food costs. That is the type of directionality that should be applied in calibrating the instruments.

If the Ukrainian crisis had not happened, would the Irish economy have begun to overheat?

Dr. Conor O'Toole

That is a good question. In recent days, we were speaking internally about our commentary and were trying to dichotomise what was happening. There are two countervailing forces. In the absence of the Ukrainian crisis, the Irish economy was recovering quickly. The epidemiological situation was improving rapidly, the domestic economy was kicking back in and the unemployment rate was falling rapidly. We were starting to see signs of overheating – falling unemployment, higher wages and higher price pressures. The international dimension was also a contributor to the inflationary pressures. It was likely that, if these pressures continued and households kept consuming in a rapid fashion, there could be a build-up of vulnerabilities through the overheating channel.

This crisis has created a shock – a roadblock to growth – that we did not anticipate. These uncertainty channels are likely to kick in and slow some of that growth quickly. Households will put off some of their consumption decisions.

Could there be a contradictory inflation situation, with a reduction in the economy due to world prices dictating energy costs and the Ukrainian crisis dictating food prices, which are two of the key components of any person's daily life? Typically, inflation would be associated with an overheating economy, but could there be that contradictory situation because of the Ukrainian crisis?

Dr. Conor O'Toole

There is one way to think about this. One way in which inflation in the domestic economy can materialise is if there is too much expenditure at that time. That puts pressure on resources. The current crisis is a different type of shock. Prices are rising in the international markets and these are passing to us domestically. That will lower households' expenditure because their budgets will not go as far and they will not be able to make as many consumption decisions. Real incomes will be squeezed. Since inflation is increasing at a faster rate than wage growth, households will have a shock to their real incomes. That will lead to lower expenditure and then-----

Instead of giving subsidies, should Government policy be directed in some way – obviously, it has to be targeted – to try to find a mechanism to reduce costs and thereby counteract the imported inflation from energy and food costs? Should such a policy be pursued to try to keep control of inflation in Ireland?

Dr. Conor O'Toole

Dr. McQuinn should feel free to contribute on this point as well. Costs are set by markets and it is difficult to change market structures in a way that would drive cost efficiency quickly. If we change competition or the degree to which-----

For instance, the reduction in excise duty is bringing the price down. It has to have some impact on keeping inflation down whereas if we were to give it in the form of a subsidy at the existing price, that would clearly drive inflation in a much faster way. Is there a case for that?

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

A number of speakers made a key point about the previous Government's intervention in dealing with inflationary pressures, which is the same point I made earlier. To answer the Deputy's question on whether we achieve overheating, since the domestic economy is growing very strongly, when the unemployment rate starts to go below 5% is typically when we see inflationary pressures building in the domestic economy. We are still a little way off that. The unemployment rate is approximately 7% but given that inflationary pressures are building anyway in the domestic economy, it means whatever supports we give should be as targeted as possible so they are getting to the people who need them the most and, if possible, are not spreading out towards the more general economy where they may contribute to inflationary pressures. In essence, whatever intervention is introduced should be as targeted as possible and reach in particular the people whose incomes and livelihoods are most threatened and challenged by the inflationary period.

Stagflation, which is in effect high inflation and low input, is something that could occur at an international level, certainly, and possibly even in the euro area. We are seeing a pick-up in inflation and euro area output levels typically have not been very robust anyway so there is a greater risk of that occurring, although not so much in the domestic economy because our output levels are quite strong. I do not see stagflation being an issue, therefore, certainly in the short term in the Irish context, but at an international level it is something that could manifest itself.

I very much thank our witnesses for attending. We appreciate their time very much. I will touch on two specific issues because we are trying to figure out all that is happening at present and trying to look around corners when we see what is happening with inflation and the implications of the war. Every one of us is acutely aware of the sanctions the world is putting on Russia but since the representatives have expertise, have they got any insight they could give us on this? What is their view of the implications of the possible sanctions that Russia will put on us? I am talking about the disconnection of energy, fuel supplies and the general trade we have. We have talked about our inward trade; I am talking about the way we might rely on Russia. We have a very strong number of Russian connections in Ireland in the business world.

I have heard people say all types of things. At present, I feel very bad to be even talking in this way about the economy, economics, money and trade at a time when innocent women, children and men are being murdered and run out of their homes and places of living, but I am only doing my job. I have to ask questions when we have experts such as the ESRI representatives before us. Do not think I am being cold-hearted in asking questions about finances and ignoring the most important thing of all, which is the tragedy that is befalling these lovely people. It was so nice today to be able to meet and support the Ukrainian ambassador after she was kindly invited to the Dáil. There was a massive outpouring of support for her and her people. I will preface everything I am asking by saying that the most important thing of all are those beautiful children, the lovely people who have lost their lives so far, the displacement and the horror. No one can forget that but, as a public representative, I also have to be hard about it and ask the representatives about food security of supply to Ireland and fuel security of supply. We already hear of rationing of fuel. I know of agricultural contractors and, indeed, farmers, being told they will get half of what they are looking for.

I am asking about those two specific issues, the other being Ukraine, which obviously has to make decisions with regard to trade and everything because it has to try to protect itself. Again, what are the implications of that for our country?

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

On the implications of the measures Russia could take in countering us or responding to the sanctions that have been imposed on it, energy is the obvious issue. Russia has already been making noises about reducing the energy supply. It is even cutting off completely the gas that is supplied, particularly to Europe. We know that Europe in general has a high dependency on Russian gas. Germany, in particular, has a very high dependency since approximately 40% of its gas comes from Russia. That is a very high dependency and there is a significant threat from the Russians to cut off energy. However, it is worth bearing in mind that gas and oil are probably the only two commodities that Russia is now trading with the rest of the world and are certainly the two main ones. They are worth a huge sum or value of cash to the Russian economy every day. Europe, in general, is paying somewhere in the region of almost €1 billion a day to the Russians in payments for gas and oil. In fact, our energy consumption of gas and oil has increased over the past week or so. We have been paying more for gas and oil to Russia than previously. That is one of the elements.

Whether the Russians would carry through on a threat to limit supplies of gas and oil to Europe is a vexed question. However, there is growing discussion about the possibility of Europe pulling the plug on supplies of gas and oil. Again, to date, it has been very reluctant to do so but we have seen the actions of the US authorities in banning imports of Russian oil, while the UK has said it will cease all imports of Russian oil by the end of the year. At a European level, one suspects that the clamour for this action will possibly grow in the weeks and months ahead, especially if the humanitarian situation in Ukraine deteriorates because it is ultimately the one last and most severe economic sanction the West can undertake.

Whichever way it comes, whether Europe decides to stop or change its imports of gas or the Russians decide to pull the plug, it is fair to say there will probably be a significant transformation in European energy use, certainly over the next year or two, in terms of what ensues from this crisis. That will bring major challenges - there is no other way to say it - and possibly quite substantial increases in energy costs in the short term as we try to adapt. As I said, quite a lot of work has already been done by various European agencies in looking at the challenges that would bring in respect of how quickly we could bring in liquid gas as a potential substitute, or even again looking at the possibility of nuclear power etc. These questions are all being teased out and discussed at this time.

Our trade with Russia is quite limited although, and Dr. O'Toole is in a good position to comment as he has been looking at this, in certain key sectors of the economy the quantity of goods we import from Russia is quite high. Dr. O'Toole will possibly be able to talk about that. On sector specifics, we have heard a lot of talk about aircraft leasing and Irish companies trying to get hold of aircraft they leased in the Russian market. Other headline companies have quite significant plants and possibly exposures in the Russian economy. Some of those have already been mentioned in the public domain; I do not think I am mentioning anything that others have not. The likes of Kerry Group and CRH have a substantial presence in the Russian market. It is probably too early to tease out exactly what the implications are in respect of those issues. While our direct exposure is quite limited, there is no doubt that the fact Russia supplies so much energy and agricultural produce to western markets means this will certainly have a general impact on producer prices, cereal prices and grain and food prices here.

As I stated, the impact from the energy component alone will be substantial in terms of the pressures it will bring on household incomes. Dr. O'Toole may wish to come in on the fact that certain sectors do quite a lot of importing from the Russian market.

Dr. Conor O'Toole

Obviously, Ireland is not a major direct exporter of any particular products to Russia. We do not have a major direct trade in merchandise exports to Russia but we have an import dependency in the context of two items mentioned earlier, namely, fertilisers and the energy sector. Russia is not necessarily the largest trading partner but it is a large one. Naturally, if there were to be any rationing or halt in the trade flows by Russia on these items, that would cause disruption to the Irish ability to use those imports in the production process and that could be disruptive to our economic activity.

I thank Professor McQuinn and Dr. O'Toole. I appreciate the benefit of their knowledge.

I am mindful we scheduled the meeting with the ESRI before the Russian crisis and Ukraine war truly began. Inevitably, the conversation has moved that way and I apologise for that. It is something that is out of our control. Deputy Healy-Rae had it right when he said it is very difficult to talk about anything else at the moment because what we are seeing on screens and on our desks is so appalling. I also have questions on other matters but I wish to start there. Given that Deputies Canney, Healy-Rae and O'Donnell have contributed, it is no surprise there has been a great deal of discussion of the particular vulnerability of the agriculture sector and the impacts of energy, but I am also noticing a discussion in respect of whether Russia might default and in terms of the financial markets. What is Ireland's exposure to that or the knock-on effects, for example, in other markets where Russia might be particularly influential?

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

It is a good point. Even in recent days there has been a significant amount of commentary on it and speculation that a default is imminent. From what one can gather, obviously there is the issue of the International Financial Services Centre, IFSC, exposure. However, I do not think it poses a systemic financial stability risk to the Irish financial sector in general terms if some of those bodies were to default. In terms of a broader default by the Russian state itself, these things can be difficult to assess. We do not fully know what the knock-on implications may be. Outside the IFSC issue, I do not think we have any particular exposure in terms of Russian finance generally as far as our financial sector is concerned, but clearly there would be an impact in terms of, for instance, risk premiums generally and the setting of interest rates. That would have a knock-on effect on interbank interest rates and possibly on interest rates at the household and firm level. If there is a major international episode such as a default, especially by a sizeable economy such as the Russian one, it would have knock-on effects. The one channel that would affect straight away would be through the risk premiums channel and that would lead to an increase in interest rates charged throughout the financial system, whether interbank rates or possibly rates that are set in terms of households and firms. That is the one channel where I would see that occurring. I do not know whether Dr. O'Toole agrees or has anything to add.

Dr. Conor O'Toole

I agree with the broad assessment that Irish households and firms and the banking sector are not particularly exposed to Russia and, therefore, the direct financial stability risks in Ireland are not especially high. There are countries in Europe whose banking sectors have exposures, such as Austria, Italy and France. Those countries are more exposed to defaults not only by the Russian state but by banks in Russia with which they have exposures. There is always the possibility of contagion from financial stability mechanisms propagating through the system. The banking sector in particular is a lot stronger now than it was at the start of the financial crisis. The European banks are very well capitalised. The funding structures for European banks are much more stable than they were back in the global financial sector period. The vulnerabilities that materialised in the financial crisis are not necessarily the same now. The risks are lower but, with such a significant shock as the war in Ukraine that has such large consequences for the international financial sector, it is difficult to know at this stage where all the effects are going to wash through.

I understand this may be forecasting beyond what we can do, but if we were to see that kind of impact, what would our guests estimate the type of impact on interest rates would be? I know interest rates are currently at an historic low. What percentage rate would they expect to see resulting from that kind of impact?

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

Is the Chairman referring to a Russian state default?

A state default rather than any other type.

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

It is very difficult to quantify. Obviously, a lot will depend on the response of the European Central Bank and the monetary authorities there. Indeed, the whole issue of future interest rates will be very interesting because, typically in the case of a very sharp pick-up in inflation such as we are witnessing now and are likely to witness going forward, the standard response of the ECB and other agencies would be to increase interest rates as a way of controlling inflation. To date, the ECB has been reluctant to do so in the context of the inflation increases we have seen prior to the Ukrainian issue. That has mainly been because, as I stated in response to an earlier question, many of the European institutions are cognisant of some of the mistakes that were possibly made during the financial crisis when, for instance, there was a tightening by the ECB of monetary policy in 2008 and 2012. In hindsight, people regard that as a profound mistake. The danger is that if one starts to tighten monetary policy at the wrong time, it will choke the recovery of economies from the pandemic. Of course, now economies will also be hit by this significant shock from the Ukrainian situation and that will counterbalance to a certain extent what the ECB decides to do in response to inflation. It is a very difficult position for the ECB to be in. It will witness substantial increases in inflation but it will also be mindful of the effect the crisis is having on everyday economic activity and it is going to try to sustain that economic activity through this crisis in the way it did during the pandemic.

In terms of the way the ECB has been dealing with it to date and in the context of the kind of asset purchasing schemes it has in place, the way in which it signalled it was going to deal with the inflationary issue was to wind down those asset purchase schemes initially and maybe accelerate the winding down of those schemes before it would start to increase the policy rate itself. Of course, it is possible it will not wind down those asset purchase schemes if, for instance, it sees that countries are getting into difficulty in terms of sustaining the fiscal costs that may come about as a result of the crisis. It is a sticky wicket for the ECB in terms of how it deals with and reacts to the present situation. Clearly, its response will be crucial in terms of the scale of the impact of a Russian economy default and its impact on interest rates within the euro area.

I thank Professor McQuinn. That kind of sets me up for my next set of questions, which relate to interest rates. I have another question before we move off the topic of Russia. I am not an economist so it might be a slightly stupid question, but if there is a state default, will firms such as those in the IFSC necessarily default? Will they have to cease trading or do they not necessarily have to do so?

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

My understanding is they would not have to do so just because the state itself defaults unless they have funding from the state and consequently have to default themselves.

I am not aware of any rule that just because the financial institution is domiciled originally in a state that itself has defaulted, the financial institution is obliged to do so. It would just be a case of whether it had funding tied in with the state and consequently could not redeem it.

I thank Dr. McQuinn for clearing that up for me. I want to ask about interest rates. Dr. McQuinn's opening statement referred to the significant cost of the pandemic and the Government's stated plans for expenditure levels. Dr. McQuinn mentioned a paper by Furman and Summers, which I went away and read. Obviously, it is an American paper. I am not an economist, but from what I can gather it seems to be suggesting that structural changes have happened in economies which are unlikely to revert to the way they were. The way we have been using interest rates in recent decades is not the way we will use them in the future. Is that a correct reading of that point?

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

One of its key points is to question why interest rates are so low at present. What are the determinants of that? How is that likely to evolve or change in the future? Larry Summers has done considerable work on why we have had such low interest rates over a longer period of time. One of the reasons highlighted in western economies is the demographic shift that is being observed in societies. It is also tied into the relatively low rates of economic growth in western economies in Europe and the United States in recent years. Consequently, there has not been the pressure on interest rates there was previously.

A number of factors are contributing to the low interest rate environment. Obviously, policies of central banks have been instrumental, particularly in the euro area in the past ten years, in keeping interest rates low. The determinants of why the natural long-run interest rate is so low are likely to remain the case in the long run. Obviously, the major shock of the whole Ukrainian issue, especially the energy price shock, could disrupt that in the short to medium term. The longer term outlook would certainly point in that direction.

Based on that, Furman and Summers suggest the debt-GDP ratio standard we have had can be a bit misleading. I am not sure if the ESRI or the Furman and Summers paper itself gave the example of borrowing for a mortgage and accruing equity in a home. The suggestion is we need a new conversation about investing to accrue assets and value.

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

They make a number of interesting points. One of the points they make, which is very much related to that, is the kind of target we should be setting. This ties into the discussion about the fiscal rules and fiscal policy and whether we should be targeting a specific debt-GDP ratio. For instance, should we aim for a debt-GDP ratio of 30%, 35% or 40%? Once we hit that rate, we could then adjust our budgetary position in response to that. For instance, in May if we are able to hit a specific debt-GDP ratio, we could still possibly engage in some degree of borrowing. I wrote a paper last summer that looked at that particular issue in some detail, assessing what we could do in an Irish context. Could we specifically target a certain debt-GDP ratio and then, given the likely growth rate in the economy and the likely outlook for sovereign debt costs, could we possibly borrow and still meet that target? The evidence suggests we could.

These are very interesting and important fiscal policy decisions we need to think about. If we did not have the awful Ukraine situation, we would be saying quite conclusively that the fiscal metrics are improving quite strongly in the Irish economy. Even given the significant cost outlay associated with the pandemic, the debt-GDP ratio and debt-GNI* ratio will be lower at the end of this year than they were in 2019. There has been a downward trajectory as far as those debt-GDP ratios have been concerned ever since the financial crisis.

One of the issues we were flagging was whether we will just continually run down the debt-GDP ratio over the coming years. Will we just try to get it as low as we can, similar to where it was prior to the financial crisis, or do we set a target of, for example, 35% or 40% and then, once we are clearly hitting that target, we will be able to generate surplus funds we can use for investment purposes in areas such as housing and climate change.

That is an important debate. There is considerable debate even internationally as to where, for instance, the fiscal rules could go as a potential option. It is an important point as far as the future conduct of fiscal policy is concerned.

I thank Dr. McQuinn for that. It outlines it really well for me. I understand the level of disruption the Ukraine situation brings to the debate. Leaving aside the level of disruption and uncertainty war brings, if we see a corresponding change in interest rates, does Dr. McQuinn believe that would negate that thesis or will it simply be a temporary effect and over time interest rates will continue to be low?

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

That is a very interesting question. It will ultimately depend on the scale. Unfortunately, I need to answer the question in the same way. It goes back to the scale and persistence of the difficulties. If we are into a persistent period of much higher energy prices, that will ultimately feed into higher inflation and will ultimately feed through to higher interest rates as far as central banks are concerned. They will need to start increasing policy rates at some stage to get a handle or put a lid on the inflationary issue. If the crisis is relatively short-lived somehow - obviously we all hope it is - and we see some return to fairly normal energy prices, maybe by the latter half of this year, then it is quite feasible we will see a return to the kind of longer term path where interest rates are concerned. However, in the short term we need to be prepared for the possibility of policy rate increases given the sheer inflationary impact that is likely to occur from energy prices.

The argument Furman and Summers put forward is to simply adjust budgetary stance. The same framework can still be used. It just requires factoring in higher interest rate charges and possibly a lower GDP growth rate because of the effect of the crisis, and that will ultimately change the target to be set. The framework they are suggesting to be applied is just as valid into the future irrespective of the Ukrainian situation. It would obviously require considerably different values for future interest rate costs and possibly for the future growth path of the economy. That will ultimately impact the target GDP ratio to be set, or the surplus or deficit targets in fiscal policy from year to year.

That is very helpful. I thank Dr. McQuinn. Page 4 of the submission reads, "Preliminary estimates from the ... (ECB) indicate that the conflict could reduce economic output in the Euro area by up to 0.4 per cent this year." I am interested in the next sentence which reads, "Previous modelling work done using ... the largescale macro-econometric model of the Irish economy ... indicate[s] a 1 for 1 relationship. I had not been aware of that. We have all learned from the past two weeks - some of us knew it already - that we are not as reliant on Russian oil and gas as other EU countries. Notwithstanding that inflation here is impacted by the war as much as it is elsewhere, we have less vulnerability to the particular energy outputs of Russia.

Will that one-to-one relationship of growth or non-growth between Europe and Ireland be exactly the same over the 12 months given that unlike Germany, we do not get 40% of our gas from Russia?

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

No, we do not but, unfortunately, the way energy prices are set at a European level means that if there is a huge energy price shock at a European level, it ultimately impacts the Irish consumer even though we do not have any or very little direct gas exposure to Russia. In terms of the effect on the Irish economy and this general one-to-one relationship, what that reflects is how open an economy we are and how dependent we are in terms of economic growth. The traded sector of our economy is hugely important, particularly the multinational element of that. We saw that during the pandemic. The multinational element of our traded sector actually performed very strongly, which is why overall economic growth actually increased in 2020 when economic growth in every other country was declining. We are hugely dependent on the traded sector of the economy. Overall, what you would expect and what the preliminary ECB analysis is suggesting is that the crisis will have a contractionary impact on the euro area economy. Obviously, the US and UK economies will more than likely be impacted. These are the major economies as far as we are concerned with regard to the kind of trade we do, so even though we do not have the same direct exposure to Russia as those economies, the fact they are being hit and adversely impacted by the crisis will ultimately affect us.

It is worth saying that the ECB figure is very preliminary in analysis in terms of what the ECB has actually stated. The other work that was arguably a bit more developed in the sense that it came out after that suggested more in the region of a one percentage point decline in economic activity due to the Russian crisis, so I would focus more on that figure being the overall global and euro area effect at this stage rather than the preliminary ECB analysis. More analysis will come from the ECB in that regard. This is why it would have an effect on the Irish economy because we are so reliant on our traded sector and that is so reliant on the UK, US and euro area economies.

My follow-up question comes from a more domestic perspective. We saw a significant failure to spend in terms of our capital allocations over the past couple of years. Covid was the cause of some of that but we have talked a lot about capacity within various sectors. I presume some of the effects of the Ukraine-Russia crisis will impact that capacity issue as well and supply. Does Dr. McQuinn believe we have the capacity to spend our capital allocations in 2022 and 2023?

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

It will be a challenge, especially in light of the Ukrainian situation. Another important related point is that the capital amount we are allocating will not go as far as it would have simply because cost pressures will eat into that. The tangible output we would have got in terms of the number of housing units or other tangible outputs you would get from spending that capital allocation will now probably be less than what we originally intended or forecast simply because of these cost pressures, which will eat into the allocation amount.

We spoke about the construction sector earlier. Some capacity constraints will emerge there. They are already there but in terms of scaling up production, for example, housing output, there will challenges in meeting those kind of targets. In terms of some of the other infrastructural projects, it is probably the case that the cost pressures we will see emanating from the crisis will eat into that capital allocation to a greater degree than we would have previously thought, so the amount of goods and services, particularly tangible goods, we get from the capital allocation will be less than we envisaged at the time we allocated that expenditure. I do not know if Dr. O'Toole wants to add anything.

Dr. Conor O'Toole

I agree. It is very hard to quantify exactly how large the cost pressures are going to be in particular sectors because this is a very fluid and fast-evolving situation, but it is undoubtedly the case that we will get less for the expenditure than we expected. These challenges will only increase. If the international price is a signal to how the commodity markets are working, it will create serious pressures, especially in the housing market. Any large capital infrastructure that requires these international commodities will be a major challenge this year.

Is there a concern around the sustainability of tax revenues if sectors are impacted in that way?

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

There has been ongoing concern about buoyancy, particularly from the corporation tax source. Every year, when we formulate our forecasts for corporation tax revenues, we deliberately take quite a very conservative path, and at the end of the year, we are surprised by how large the increase has been relative to what we had expected. That is certainly one area where there is an ongoing issue in terms of the sustainability of that revenue stream. Along with others, we have suggested we need to estimate as far as we can, because it is a difficult thing to do, how much of that increase has been what we call windfall in nature - how much of it is sustainable and how much of it is not. We should try to base our current expenditure plans on the basis of the elements of corporation tax we believe are sustainable. We should not seek to spend all of it on current expenditure but leave some of it for capital expenditure or divert it elsewhere. The extent to which the crisis has an impact on corporations generally and multinationals is hard to say but it is more a concern generally about the sustainability of that taxation revenue stream.

Other elements of the tax base have registered quite strong growth as well. They include income tax returns and VAT. A lot of them are registering strong returns at the moment because they are bouncing back from low levels during the pandemic, especially VAT sources and, to a certain extent, excise. In general, we still believe the economy is going to grow this year and next year despite the crisis. With that, we would still expect fairly strong taxation revenue to grow but, again, there is the ongoing issue about how sustainable is the kind of increase in corporation tax.

I apologise for not being here earlier. I agreed to attend another colleague whose household was struck down by Covid and did not realise this meeting was going to be on at the same time, so I missed the entire thing. If I repeat something somebody else has said, please let me know. We saw on Sunday that Putin's regime indicated its sovereign bond repayments could be conditional on the financial sanctions imposed on it by the west. In 1998, it defaulted on $40 billion in domestic debt after the Asian debt crisis and falling oil prices shook confidence in its short-term rouble debt. Will the witnesses outline the impact of such a default?

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

It is a very interesting question. A number of factors are associated with it. First, our financial system has no real direct exposure to the Russian financial system apart from some of the entities in the IFSC. We do not have exposure in terms of our mainstream banks and banks regulated here. The direct exposure of the Irish financial sector to such an event is relatively limited. However, obviously you cannot control things and it is very difficult to assess what happens to entities that are exposed to the Russian financial system to which we may be related or connected. As Dr. O'Toole pointed out earlier, a number of Austrian, French and Italian banks have significant exposure to the Russian financial sector.

In terms of the overall impact of a sovereign default, one would probably see pressure in respect of the risk premia, upward pressure on interest rates across the system and interbank rates and possibly resulting in upward pressure on rates at the household and firm level. However, a clear agent in that will be the response of the monetary authority and particularly the ECB. If the ECB decides to try to insulate households and firms in the euro area from those upward pressures, it can do that. Much will depend on its response. Without wishing in any way to underestimate the impact, it is fair to say there is a relatively limited exposure of the Irish financial economic system to such a shock, but inevitably there would be some implications.

The other point to make, and Dr. O'Toole made it earlier, is that the Irish financial sector is much more resilient now than it was 15 years ago. When the financial crisis hit in 2007 we were particularly exposed because of the exposures in our financial sector. We are in a much stronger, more stable position. Most financial institutions across Europe are as well, following the impacts of the financial crisis.

That is very interesting. These are very difficult times and it will be interesting to see how that develops in that side of things. There is much talk about inflation as well at present. This committee has just issued its inflation report, which recognises that the underlying causes of the inflation are external and can be attributed to things such as supply chains taking time to reopen and so forth. I am conscious that an increase in interest rates is unlikely to impact on those things, but would make the cost of borrowing more expensive. What are Dr. McQuinn's thoughts on that? I should note that the reason I am reading from my telephone is that we had an IT issue and I could not print anything as I have been in meetings since.

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

Our outlook on the inflation situation has changed with the events of the last two weeks. Like most commentators, our view on inflation was that it was temporary in nature. The inflationary pressures we witness, particularly the energy market issues we saw and other elements, were down to the energy market and supply chain issues. There were obviously base effects as well which were working through the system in the latter part of last year and into this year. We felt those pressures would abate as we moved through 2022 and that, by the end of this period, the inflation rate would be back at the target ECB rate of approximately 2% across most euro area countries. In that context, we felt that the ECB probably would have been unlikely, certainly in the short term, to increase policy rates. It may do other things such as scale back some of the debt programmes or the support programmes it has, the asset purchasing schemes and so forth, but it was unlikely to increase policy rates.

The events of the last two weeks have potentially changed that considerably. Inflationary pressures are now likely to emerge particularly to do with issues concerning energy but also to do with food, and we have seen the huge pressure in areas such as cereals, grains, wheat and other commodities that originate both in Ukraine and Russia. The upward pressures that are likely to come on price levels from the events of the last two weeks probably are going to be quite significant and, depending on how long the events last, could be quite persistent. In that context the ECB will probably have to look at rates being raised possibly sooner than it would have anticipated. Again, however, it will depend on the overall impact of the crisis on the performance of euro area economies. The ECB will be mindful of the fact that if it starts to increase policy rates, there may begin to be some concerns about sovereign debt sustainability in certain euro area countries, so it might be reluctant to do so. It is a very difficult position for the ECB. On the face of it, substantial increases in inflation, probably like what we are going to witness, would generally be met with higher interest rates and an increase in policy rates, but the implications of the crisis for the growth rates of individual euro area countries and consequently the sustainability of their debt will be an issue as well.

The ECB was very clear before this crisis, and it could not have been clearer, that it was not going to follow the US in that regard. I have been in many debates in which people told me that interest rates were going to rise and I kept returning to what Christine Lagarde has been saying. Obviously we are living in quite interesting times.

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

To be fair to the European institutions, there have been lessons learned from the way in which the financial crisis was dealt with. The ECB increased policy rates in 2008 and 2012, and there is a general acknowledgement that this was a mistake and that it cut off the potential recovery of some of the economies in the euro area during the financial crisis. There is a lot of institutional memory there, as it were, in terms of the impact that those rather hasty increases in policy rates had, so I believe that is still influencing decision-making in the ECB at this juncture. However, clearly, if inflation really takes off and is very persistent, it is going to have to act.

It is very interesting. It has been announced that the fiscal rules will not be returning in 2023, if they return in their current incarnation at all. We have seen the issues with energy security and the requirement for that bulk of funding from the Green New Deal coming from a national level. This is evidence that we need to hasten our transition away from fossil fuels. Will Dr. McQuinn comment on that and will he comment on the issue of the fiscal rules more generally?

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

We have said, perhaps not in this committee but in other Oireachtas committees, that in the reform of the fiscal rules it would be a good idea to exempt some climate change expenditure levels because it is important that we ring-fence expenditure on climate change across the euro area. We have seen in recent times here that there is significant pressure on some of the climate change policies because of what is happening in the Ukrainian crisis, so it important that we ring-fence the expenditure levels on those issues in order to effect climate change over the longer term. One way of doing that would be to exempt certain climate change expenditure levels in the fiscal rules. I also believe it could even be extended further to commonly accepted areas such as expenditure on housing which, as we said earlier, is not just an Irish issue but an issue across the euro area in terms of the need for more social and affordable housing and more involvement by governments in providing that. There are a couple of areas where there could be exceptions built into any reform of the fiscal rules.

Regarding the fiscal rules in general, we mentioned the research by Jason Furman and Larry Summers. Other more recent research by Olivier Blanchard has provided quite a lot of interesting insights into where the fiscal rules should go. There is a need for greater clarity, for them to be more transparent and for them to be more comprehensive as far as lay people are concerned. Often they have got very much attached to very technical definitions that are not only hard to estimate but hard to explain to the lay person. There are many areas where the rules could be reformed, but certainly I believe, in principle, excluding certain areas of government expenditure, particularly relating to climate change and also relating to certain elements of housing, would be a good idea.

I thank the witnesses. That is very interesting.

I do not see any more Deputies on the line. To be honest, at one stage I thought this meeting would not happen because of our IT difficulties, so I am glad we were able to have this conversation. I thank Dr. McQuinn and Dr. O'Toole for their assistance to the committee today. It was a very interesting conversation.

The committee's next meeting is scheduled for Wednesday, 23 March, at 5.30 p.m. when the committee will continue its pre-stability programme update scrutiny and meet officials from the Central Bank.

The select committee adjourned at 7.20 p.m. until 5.30 p.m. on Wednesday, 23 March 2022.
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