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Dáil Éireann debate -
Monday, 22 Aug 1921

Vol. S No. 4

DISCUSSION ON PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

The Dáil assembled for Private Session in the Oak Room, Mansion House, Dublin. The Ceann Comhairle took the Chair at 11.45 a.m.

in opening said the first business of the day was to discuss the peace negotiations. He did not know to what extent it was necessary for him to go over the ground but he expected all the members had read the proposals of the British government to them and their replies. He need hardly say that long before that there had been informal negotiations. Messengers were sent over to sound them to see what their attitude was likely to be, but they gave those secret agents no encouragement with the result that the British government had formally to make the proposals now before them. They saw what the offer was. It was not Dominion status but a sort of Home Rule for a divided Ireland with more general powers than were offered in the best Home Rule proposals heretofore— but to this extent it was for a divided Ireland. The only attitude the Ministry could take was that this offer was not acceptable. The Ministry could not take the responsibility of recommending it to the Dáil or the Irish people and they told the British government so.

He did not propose to go further into explanation. The letters themselves would give the whole attitude. The Ministry took full responsibility for the replies and were ready to stand the fire of any of the members who had questions to put. They proposed to send a further reply to the last letter received practically in the same terms as the previous one—that the terms were not acceptable and that they did not form a basis for negotiation, and the only basis on which it could be hoped to secure peace would be a basis in which the guiding principle was that of "government by consent of the governed".

asked was it on his own initiative General Smuts came into the negotiations.

replied that Irish friends in South Africa influenced him to interest himself in the matter. Mr. L. George was also anxious for him to interfere. As far as immediate contact was concerned it would be best understood by the correspondence which took place. He asked friends of theirs in London if he could be of any help. He sent his private secretary, Mr. Lane, over here with a letter of introduction to me dated 29th June and this letter would explain his attitude. It was as follows:—

Savoy Hotel,

London, W.C.

29th June, 1921.

My dear Mr. de Valera,

I am sending my Private Secretary, E.F.C. Lane, to you with this letter, as I am desirous to get into touch with you direct, and apart from all intermediaries. I have taken great trouble in what has happened during the last fortnight to secure that a real attempt should now be made to come to a settlement of the Irish problem.

I have sent you some messages through intermediaries to the effect that I am prepared to meet you either in London or Dublin, and either alone or with some of your friends, in order to facilitate matters. I do not know whether these messages have reached you in the spirit in which I have sent them. Hence this attempt to come into direct contact with you. My sole and single desire is to be helpful in the solution of this age-long trouble.

I do not represent the British Government, and do not speak for them, although they know how greatly I desire that a settlement should be come to. All the influence I can command has been and will be used to that end.

And what I wish to say to you specially is this, I have been through the same trouble in my own country. The best years of my life were spent in the same struggle through which you have been passing. I feel certain my experience can be of some use to you, and this letter is simply to tell you, as from man to man, that I am ready to meet you and talk things over with you at any place or any time, if you think such a course will be of any assistance to you.

You can send me a message either in writing or by word of mouth through Mr. Lane.

Ever yours sincerely,

J.C. SMUTS

He (An tUachtarán) replied to that letter as follows:—

30th June, 1921.

My dear General Smuts:—

I have your letter of June 29th which was delivered by Mr. Lane, and hasten to assure you that I greatly appreciate the reason that prompted you to write to me, and to say that I shall be very glad indeed to meet you.

We meet on a common platform in that we both are anxious in the cause of humanity to settle finally and forever an issue that has embittered relations between the peoples of the two islands and caused infinite distress to the Irish people.

I shall be glad to see you in Dublin at any time suitable to yourself, and to introduce you to my colleagues.

Believe me,

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) ÉAMON DE VALERA

That indicated the first formal approach, which was made by General Smuts himself. It was a similar case as the contact with the North of Ireland. Birkenhead suggested that they asked that the communication be kept quiet, but that was not true. If the British wanted to save their faces that way as long as he (An tUachtarán) lost nothing by it he would let them do so.

asked what was General Smuts' attitude.

explained that General Smuts was able to realise the sentiments of the Irish people better than the English government and felt at home in the Irish question but he approached it purely as a thinking machine. It was the head that played all the time without any heart. His attitude was simply that of a British imperial statesman who had taken a certain action himself in his own country and thought a similar line of action would be the best for the Irish people. How far he left himself be led away by imperial necessities is a question one could only guess. He approached the matter, while talking it over with them in Dublin, as a professor would approach a problem. Of course the principle data, the feelings and sentiments of the Irish people, he was neglecting. He approached it fairly when they took into account his position. He could not advocate a Republic simply because he had not done so in South Africa. His last covering letter was written from the point of view that he, the President, required some ammunition to use with his own colleagues. He wrote that letter expecting he would use it. When Lloyd George discovered at the end that he did not intend to use it, he thought he would use it himself, and the best thing possible that could have happened to that letter happened. He was throwing in his reserves at the beginning of the battle. The letter did no harm. Smuts' letter could be taken as sympathetic as any other letter they could get from any statesman inside the British Empire.

The big question was policy. They should remember they were now really deciding issues of war or peace. The best thing he said he could do was to answer any questions they had in their minds.

asked An tUachtarán for a full and clear definition of his policy with regard to Ulster.

explained it was difficult to have a policy for Ulster when they could not get in contact. Their present aim was to get in touch with them. They had not the power, and some of them had not the inclination, to use force with Ulster. He did not think that policy would be successful. They would be making the same mistake with that section as England had made with Ireland. He would not be responsible for such a policy. Ulster's present position was that she claimed the Six Counties as a constitutional right given to her constitutionally through the Realm and did not want to be under the domination of the rest of Ireland whose sentiments, ideals and religion were different. They said they would not give away their established rights and that they were prepared to die for them. The question was how they were to deal with Ulster—peace or war conditions. At the present the Ministry proposed to act as they had done before under war conditions. He could not definitely say further than that their object at present was to get in contact to see what exactly Ulster wanted. The moment contact was established they were up against a big difficulty. Ulster would say she was as devotedly attached to the Empire as they were to their independence and that she would fight for one as much as they would do for the other. In case of coercion she would get sympathy and help from her friends all over the world.

asked if they understood that under no circumstances were they prepared to give any sanction to dual nationality in this country.

replied as far as dual nationality was concerned, they never recognised it, but that fact would not prevent the British government from establishing it. For his part, if the Republic were recognised, he would be in favour of giving each county power to vote itself out of the Republic if it so wished. Otherwise they would be compelled to use force.

said he disagreed with that policy and he would move a motion later on.

stated that a statement was made the other day to the effect that the Ministry were willing to go to limits to meet the wishes of Ulster. He asked, in the event of war being renewed, should not the Ulster cabinet be regarded as traitors in league with the enemy.

stated that he did not agree with the statement made that Ulster wished to be left alone; England said so, but as far as they in Ulster were concerned they thought force should be used against Ulster. There were sufficient Volunteers in Belfast to hold it for Ireland. The Ulster people had very little force themselves if unaided by British armed forces. So far as Ulster was concerned they could not meet them by concession. He had dealt with them by force in Monaghan, Fermanagh and Tyrone, and those people were now silent. There was no Ulster question so far as Ulster was concerned. They realised they could not exist without the rest of Ireland.

pointed out that they had got away from the real business. He thought it would be helpful to the deliberations if the full terms of the reply which the Ministry proposed to send were submitted to them. The question for them to settle was did the reply suggested by the President meet the requirements of the situation. If it did all they had to do was to give it approval. The two things they would have to safeguard were Ireland's national honour and national interests, and judging by the way the Ministry had handled the negotiations up to the present they could rely on it that nothing that would jeopardise the national honour and interests of the country would be done. For that reason he would like to move, if necessary, that the Dáil approve wholeheartedly of the reply. The country had arrived at what might be called the greater climax of the last eight centuries. The issue was whether the British conquest was to be completed or whether the national struggle was to triumph and in such a grave situation as that the one great need was the essential unity of this assembly because if they did not hang together now they would hang separately the moment hostilities were resumed. If they got unity of opinion he thought they would have an unassailable position. The British government wanted peace and they wanted peace. The British government can have peace if they were prepared to pay high enough, but the Dáil would never agree to a peace the price of which would be national dishonour or a betrayal of the great heritage of centuries.

asked if the answer proposed to be sent to Lloyd George was to be discussed here to-day.

replied that he was anxious that the correspondence up to this date should be first discussed. He explained he wanted to be able to put in the first paragraph of the reply that the Dáil unanimously approved of the attitude adopted by the Ministry. In other words that they could not accept those terms. It was a question of tactics that only the Ministry were involved in these replies, except so far as ratification was concerned. It was therefore advisable that nothing was sanctioned by the Dáil until it saw the light. The Dáil could always turn out the Ministry if not satisfied with the result and it was safer the reply should come from the Ministry only. It was also intended to incorporate a phrase in the reply that the Ministry were empowered to negotiate peace with Great Britain on the basis of "government by consent of the governed". That was a phrase that would allow the Ulster question to come in and be debated. His attitude would be that the minority in Ulster had a right to have their sentiments considered to the utmost limit. He believed the minority in this country were devotedly attached to certain connections and it was their duty so far as they could to go the utmost limit without sacrificing the interests of the majority. He would like to have a statement as regarded the correspondence up to the moment and to find out from the Dáil if he could state in the opening paragraph of his reply to Lloyd George that the peace proposals had been before the Dáil and that the judgment was that the Dáil could not accept the terms offered.

pointed out that the powers given to the Six Counties under the Partition Act were much less than those offered now to the rest of Ireland. He wanted to know would the balance of those powers for the Six Counties be vested and remain under the control of an united Ireland.

said he was sure they would not. He probed their minds and he was of the opinion they would be faced with two Dominions—North and South Ireland. They would have two Irish representatives, a plus Ireland and a minus Ireland. Ireland's vote in a Dominion status would be a negative value.

stated what he was anxious about was if the negotiations went a step farther he would like to be satisfied the Ministry would stick to the two cardinal points "unity of Ireland" and "government by free consent" and he certainly would not like the Ministry to allow in any negotiations any plebiscite or referendum in which that free consent was not offered. The people should be offered a Republic or something else. They should not be offered Dominion status versus the Black & Tans. That would not be "free consent".

They should insist on a single authority of a single State in Ireland. If there was to be any separate government for Ulster it should be as a government holding equal powers as one, say for Munster or Leinster or Connaught but all holding authority under a single power for the whole of Ireland.

considered a direction was necessary from the President as to the line the discussion should take. He thought it was absolutely necessary at this stage to confine themselves to approving or otherwise of what had been done up to the present. He had no doubt the Dáil would give approval, but he was doubtful that the country would unanimously approve, or approve to the same extent as the Dáil, of the replies sent and the negotiations which had taken place. For that reason he would ask the President for a direction now. If they were to have the terms of the proposed reply to-morrow they could then discuss the further reply.

declared the Ministry was ready to stand by what had been done. He considered that matter should be taken up first. As far as what they were going to do was concerned, he was simply asking the Dáil whether he could, in writing to the British Premier, say the Dáil had unanimously approved of the attitude of the Ministry. Now was the time for criticism. The Ministry were ready to account for their stewardship and were anxious to know what the thoughts of the Dáil and the people were.

asked what Lloyd George meant by "free association with British Commonwealth group".

said the point about it was that they could not turn down what appeared to be on the face of it an invitation to join a group of free nations provided it was based on the principles enunciated by President Wilson.

proposed the Dáil would approve of the terms of the replies and the speeches of the President as head of the Ministry. He was not in touch with the country and did not know its feelings, but personally he gave his heartiest approval to the negotiations as they had been carried on up to the present. In the letter addressed to the Prime Minister on the 10th August in the 3rd paragraph it was set out—"Ireland's right to choose for herself the path she shall take to realise her own destiny must be accepted as indefeasible". Basing themselves on that proposition the Ministry were not likely to misrepresent the views of this assembly. Without going further into the replies he would, he said, propose formally that this Dáil should give its approval to the terms of the replies sent so far by the President on behalf of the Ministry and also to the negotiations in general so far as they had gone.

He then handed to the Speaker the following written motion:—

"Cuirim mar rún go bhfuil an Dáil sásta leis an bhfreagra do thug an Príomh-Aire ar Riaghaltas na Breataine Móire."

seconded the motion. They had every confidence in An Uachtarán and his colleagues and he would like it to be understood that as far as he knew the Deputies were determined there should be no division of that necessary unity which was essential to the salvation of the country. He reserved the right to criticise every point that came up and at the same time he would be more insistent than anyone else that come what might there should be no such thing as cliques or parties or divisions amongst them until such time as they had won peace. He would like to emphasise that fact. He thought that the Ministry had done their work admirably; they had a very difficult problem to deal with; like the rest of the Dáil they had no great experience and they were up against men who had deceived the world. It was therefore natural the Ministry should expect the support of the Dáil but he did not agree with the suggestion that the Cabinet should be allowed to adopt a policy in advance and then if the Dáil would not accept that policy the Cabinet could resign. He did not want any threats of resignation when the Dáil criticised the Ministry's policy.

explained he merely stated that all Cabinets had to take responsibility for their policy.

said it would be better to take the members into their confidence in advance and then the necessity for resignations would never arise.

stated that the prisoners in Ballykinlar Camp were of a unanimous mind that the Ministry had managed the negotiations in a splendid manner.

stated as far as he was concerned the conduct of the negotiations and the replies sent to Lloyd George met with the approval of the whole country. With regard to the Smuts letter, from his experience round the country he considered the people required some education on the question of Dominion rule and what Dominion status meant and how it would affect a country neighbouring on England in comparison to one thousands of miles away. The analogy which Smuts made use of was altogether illogical. In dealing with South Africa Lloyd George was dealing with a black country, where the blacks outnumber the whites by five to one. It was a new country not a nation at all, where the Dutch and the British had equal rights and Smuts was acting merely with expediency as he wanted the Dutch to rule the country. He would advise the "Bulletin" to see that these issues were more clearly stated and that the provincial papers were supplied with some propaganda to that effect.

As far as anticipating further negotiations he wished to say with regard to the President's statement about giving self-determination to the Ulster counties he would not exchange Irish unity for an Irish Republic for portion of Ireland.

proposed a vote should be taken at once on the proposition before the Dáil.

thought it was premature to discuss what concessions they could make. It would be wiser to consider the proposal before the Dáil as to whether what had been done had the approval of the House. The Ministry had shown very great statesmanship in difficult circumstances and it was very difficult for them to discuss questions of tactics with a war Ministry when they knew very well there were private facts the Ministry could not disclose at this stage. He thought it was due to the Ministry to thank them for having brought down the discussion to the Dáil at all. No other government did so in such circumstances.

He would like to suggest to the Ministry that this might be an opportune time to make another approach to the North-East before sending the reply to the British government. The Ministry might have already considered the matter but it seemed to him the President was most anxious to put the blame on N.E. Ulster. That would be an admirable policy if it succeeded, but at present they were emphasising the fact that there was a difference between N.E. Ulster and the rest of Ireland. He thought it was very necessary that the emphasis should be laid, not on the difference between them but on Ulster's obstinacy. He further suggested that a declaration or statement should issue at the psychological moment laying the emphasis on this obstinacy when they would focus universal attention on Belfast with the dual result first of emphasising still more that the real difficulty was with these people and secondly of putting them in the wrong opinion outside. It would be easier for the Ministry afterwards to take a better stand against the British government than they could if they left the position in the state of uncertainty it was at present. He quite admitted they were bound to get an answer from Sir J. Craig pinning them down beforehand, but it was a matter for the Ministry to decide whether the advantage outweighed the disadvantage.

said as a matter of fact, before the last reply was sent to Lloyd George, they had an invitation to Craig ready but at the last moment they decided that it was better not to send it. They were going on the ground that the fight was between Ireland and Britain. If they could advance to a stage in the case in which the phrase "government by the consent of the governed" was accepted, that phrase would be applicable to Ulster and they could follow it up by an invitation to Ulster saying they were ready to meet her on the basis of that principle. That would be a basis which certainly would commend itself to the world at large. The word that summed it up was self-recognition. The Dáil recognised itself as the legitimate authority for the whole of Ireland while N.E. Ulster on the other hand recognised themselves as having a definite status. If either side asked that self-recognition should be given away as a condition to negotiation they could get no further. It was only on the basis of giving away nothing when they came together that they should have negotiations. He assured the member for Dublin that the question of inviting Ulster had been in their minds and if they got a suitable time they would make use of it.

wished to support the remarks made by Mr. G. Duffy. As far as his constituency was concerned all the people were very well pleased with the manner in which the Ministry acted. The only thing said to him was they hoped that the door would not be slammed and he was glad to see that the door was not to be slammed and that these negotiations were to proceed further.

remarked there did not seem to be much desire on the part of the members to speak. Everybody should realise that they were dealing with an issue of peace or war and that up to this they had only been sparring for position. They had not come into contact yet but they were going to get a definite ultimatum very soon. They knew the British wanted to go to America. Now their Ministry was going to be put into the most difficult position a Ministry was ever in. They were going, and they would have to, if they wanted a Republic, challenge the might of the British Empire. It was done before but up to the present the position was this: the British adopted the attitude of trying to coerce a certain crowd of the people to obey the law. Their military operations did not partake of a definite war but rather the nature of military operations in support of the civil police. That was why they (the Irish) had great difficulty in getting the world to realise that they were at war with Britain.

We had a message from America saying that Americans were Republicans because their fearless leaders refused to negotiate with England. Those analogies in the past did not apply. He felt inclined to reply their fearless leaders were 3,000 miles away and that one of their fearless leaders himself had stated if Ireland was 500 miles away Ireland would have no fight because there would be no question of fighting. Ireland, a nation of 4½ millions, was challenging a neighbour of 50 millions with all the resources of a great Empire. They were going to challenge her now under conditions which had the sympathy of the world. Some thought the letter of Lloyd George a surrender; it was nothing of the kind but a deadly thrust at this nation. He had to change his method of warfare. Up to this his method was not successful and he wanted to get the support of the world for the methods he wanted to pursue by putting Ireland in the wrong.

It was ridiculous of course to say that because Ireland was near Britain she should give Britain safeguards. But America demanded such strategic safeguards from the small island of Cuba and those people in America who talk in our favour were the people who would not allow an independent Cuba beside them. England would go on the claim that she had a right to protect her own shores and by Ireland resisting that she would tell the world they were resisting something reasonable. She would also go on the claim that one third of the Irish people had a desire for connection with the British Crown. She would go before the world and say those Sinn Féiners do not stand for the principle of liberty, and they would smash the sentiments of the minority, if she was gone. Lloyd George would work them on the question of nations. He would show Britain was a compact piece. Look at America, where are the natives? Wiped off the face of the earth. In the process of time nations had been built up in Europe. That process was a natural one they would say. Those people had been put into N.E. Ulster and those Sinn Féiners want to stamp upon these people and deprive them of their rights. These arguments he was putting before them were rather fallacious, but the fallacy was not recognised by those to whom they would be addressed. Hence he would like them to realise if they were determined that they would only make peace on the basis of the recognition of the Republic, they were going to face war and therefore he wanted to know if the Ministry came to the Dáil with a proposal that meant war would the Dáil be ready to take war.

In deciding that they should ask themselves what resources they had, were they ready to die as a nation for that principle. The next time they were going to be put to the test. There was a time when men got out of prison because they were ready to die, but that was past. If they were going to declare now for war they must be ready to die as a nation in the fight as individuals had been ready who were put to the final test in prison. They would have to consider would they be better after the fight than when it began. He, as head of the Ministry, would say that sizing things up as best they could they would do that which they thought best for the country and they would come here before the Dáil with the definite propositions. It would be difficult to shift the British from the position they had taken up now. The first shift would be if they could settle the Ulster question. One Deputy had said he would prefer the unity of Ireland to an Irish Republic.

explained that his view was that they could never bring N.E. Ulster into an Irish Republic whilst the British Empire was what it was and his attitude was that at all costs they should dig themselves in somewhere in Ireland, even in the islands of Aran, as an Irish Republic.

continued and said people could differ on each of these views. The building up of Irish unity was a slow process. They were trying to stop disintegration. Now was the time that that disintegration was beginning. As he had said there were considerations of that sort which would have to be taken into account by the Ministry. What they wanted was to get the feeling of the people and to get all the assistance possible so as to try and secure for the nation what is best for the nation at the moment.

The new war if it comes would be on a different basis to the one past. It would be taken as a definite attempt at reconquest. There was not a government in the world that would not do something to prevent the falling away of portion of its territory. The governments of the world would realise that and would be very slow to step in. He did not believe he was too pessimistic when he said that England would be given as free a hand to deal with Ireland at the present time as she was given to deal with the Boers in the South African War. Unfortunately they were very far away from living in a world where moral forces counted. But the practical question is at the moment brute force and they should realise that the moment England thought she was in danger of losing Ireland, a thing she considered particularly precious to her, she would face the world's odium to crush Ireland to the earth.

In the Southern States of America there were many who still held on to the cause of the South and they well remembered Sherman's march. But there was no use facing war again unless they in Ireland were prepared for a Sherman's march. They should not come to a decision without realising what the position was.

said the remarks just made by the President would prove very clearly that the opinion of the country would not approve unanimously of the action taken is not quite correct. If the President's statement was put before the country he felt perfectly certain they would not have a majority in the country. He was in thorough agreement with the proposition made and they could not take any other stand except that of the Ministry—rejection of the terms. But they should surely admit that every person in the country was vitally concerned in the issue of peace or war and if it was the considered opinion of the Ministry that the British would not give them better terms he did think they should have to put the issue to the country, at all events before they acted, so as to make known the situation as the President had outlined—namely a Sherman's march through the country, because while they as individuals did not qualm about that, there were persons, in fact the majority of the country, who would not be willing to face it. Therefore he put the view before the Ministry if it was known that the British were not going to give any better terms that the Ministry should consider that they should put those terms to the country before the war was renewed. They as a Dáil were ready to face the war on what they had pledged themselves to, but it was right they should consult the people. They spoke for a majority but they spoke only for a majority on certain conditions— Black & Tanism versus the old Partition Act.

said he was in favour of the position adopted by the Ministry. He knew they as individuals would have to sink their ideals for the benefit of the country. His principles were well known and were unchanged but he would have very much confidence in supporting any action approved of by the Ministry as he believed it would be for the public good.

said he would like to say to the member for Cork City (Liam de Róiste) that they would be saved from putting the matter to the public as Lloyd George would do it.

rose to protest against the proposition of the member for Cork City (Liam de Róiste).

pointed out he suggested the Ministry should consider the matter. He did not approve or disapprove of it.

objected to the suggestion. If anything was put before the people it should be free self determination. He thought everybody was prepared to go for war. The only point was a nation might have to give way without surrendering its nationality; it might have to admit itself beaten whilst yet retaining its right as a separate nation. They might have to do the same but the country would not agree to any terms to give away its nationhood even if it meant a Sherman's march.

said the issue before the country at the last election was not Black & Tanism; the issue was an Irish Republic and they were put in to uphold the Irish Republic. It was a very serious matter and she did not think it ought go to the country. The President has said that Lloyd George will put the terms to the country at the time and in the way it suits him. Cabinets did not put a vote to the country about a war. If they did there would have been no European War. It seemed to her that the great difficulty was in the wording of the reply to Lloyd George. If it could be done in such a way that they could continue negotiations without giving up allegiance to the Republic, she would say it would be a great credit to the Ministry. All over the world it was a marvel that the President and the Ministry had managed as they did to get the better of the "master-mind" of Europe.

The essential difficulty was raised on the first clause of Lloyd George's last letter— that of allegiance to the King of England. Other matters were only minor ones.

complained the debate was taking an unsatisfactory course. He asked the Speaker to put the motion before the House that it approved of what had already been done by the Ministry, and he would then ask the President to lay before them the draft terms of the reply he proposed to send to Lloyd George.

SPEAKER

pointed out he had avoided trying to limit the discussion on account of the altogether grave and exceptional character of their proceedings here to-day, because there was only before them the general matter of negotiations and no particular or detailed order for the day.

Ceist curtha agus aontuithe.

told the House that he proposed to read for them to-morrow the draft reply they intended sending to the British Premier. He then proposed the Dáil would adjourn till 4 p.m.—when they could continue the discussion of the reports.

seconded. Agreed.

Dáil re-assembled at 4.15 p.m.

moved formally the adoption of his report.

supported the motion and said the Department did very good work in difficult times.

moved that the report be varied in so far as it dealt with the £100,000 loan to enable Wexford Corporation to get £2,000 for a building scheme. Over 70 per cent. of the population of Wexford were dependent on the one industry which was shut down at the moment and the Corporation were trying to get a housing scheme through which would give employment to a large number. Something would have to be done. The Minister for Local Government had sent down an inspector to go into the matter and he could tell the House when he spoke that the situation was very critical. The reason he was asking for this £2,000 was to show the rate-payers they had the Dáil behind them.

SPEAKER

said he did not think a motion of this kind would be raised at this stage.

said the motion might come up more suitably on the vote for the departmental estimates. His inspector reported there was little opportunity of further employment in the foundries in Wexford. The Corporation had a scheme for the erection of concrete houses at £450 each. It was not mandatory on them to get rid of this £100,000 and they had taken great caution to distribute it slowly and with great hesitancy. £10,000 had already been advanced to bodies in serious difficulties and which required absolutely this assistance to enable them to continue administration. The late Dáil granted that £100,000 with a general stipulation that it be repaid by December next. He would like to say a few words with regard to the general position of local government. Naturally it was inadvisable to place a complete picture of the situation before the public. They had got to get the public mind attuned to confidence. During the year serious financial difficulties were experienced. First through withdrawal of grants to the extent of 1¾ million. As a set off against that loss local councils did not repay sums of money due to the British government or perform other acts that cost money for the British government and the actual net loss would be something less than one million. On top of that came the opposition to the rate collectors which was practically universal throughout the country. Only in a few councils were the ratepayers willing to lodge money to other treasurers than to the treasurers recognised by the enemy department. In most places rate collection ceased altogether and it was through the Minister of Defence the position became steady and subsequently stabilised. At one period it came very near the point of closing down but they never actually reached that point. Towards the close of the financial year every solicitor received a warning from the Department to the effect that any solicitor obtaining garnishee orders of decrees would be proceeded against with all the forces of the Republic, that these moneys were regarded as vital for the country and any interference with them would be regarded as criminal. The result exceeded their anticipation. A meeting of the solicitors was held and all the decrees had been withdrawn in Ireland with the exception of three in Tipperary. The difficulties at present concerning them were mainly agitations against payment of rates. Owing to the great increase in rates and the slump in prices of agricultural produce and general business there was a great reluctance to pay rates which was a very ill-judged and ill-advised policy. There was no extravagance, a great tuning up had been done, and generally there was greater efficiency than since the Local Government Act was passed.

Rate collectors were instructed to lodge moneys to the local councils and in only one case had they discovered that a rate collector made away with money. A bond was usually entered into between the rate collectors, the local committee and the British Local Government Board, but owing to the operations of the criminal injuries code that proceeding had to be varied and there was little use in having any bond.

One other matter he would like to mention and that was the great difficulty local councils had in holding council meetings. Black & Tans had attended these meetings and members were arrested and imprisoned for opposing motions introduced by some pro-English member.

The Department had got applications from Ballinasloe and Clonmel Asylums for the assistance of able administrators and they had sent down two good men and hoped that some improvement would be effected. The Department had a staff of 20 inspectors who had been going all over the country attending meetings of the co. councils and district councils and endeavouring to stir up and improve the administration of the country. They had been of immense use and through their work were instrumental in improving the rate collection. They had also a staff of about 5 auditors. Both the inspectors and auditors had to work under great difficulties and several of them had been arrested. They had held three sworn inquiries—in Claremorris, Cork and Limerick.

In connection with amalgamation of unions, he said the matter met with great local opposition in most places. It came from every class of the community even from religious communities. He considered the abolition of the boards of guardians was absolutely essential. The Department had set up a new institution under the Dáil which would free people for ever from the taint of pauperism.

He would like to mention that the Limerick scholarship scheme which had been adopted by the Ard Fheis was really initiated by two members of the L.G.B. staff.

He desired to say in conclusion that the Department came very well out of the period of intensified terrorism and he would like to pay the highest tribute to his colleague, K. O'Higgins, and to the staff.

stated that the English Minister of Transport was offering large sums of money to public bodies to enable them to employ ex-service men on public works. There was a stipulation made that the money must be used by the employment of ex-service men and as the councils concerned had also to supply adequate road metalling, gangers etc., several of them asked him for guidance. He now asked the Minister for a direction in the matter.

replied that in December last that question came up and the facts stated by the Deputy for Cobh were quite correct. The money was available from motor taxes. A case occurred in Wexford and he wrote to the County Council there as follows:—

(Insert copy of letter and further correspondence)¹.

1. Neither the letter nor the further correspondence is on the record.

Another case occurred in Thurles where a grant of £1,000 was made. There was no objection he knew of to acceptance of this money should there be no such conditions made as to audit of accounts or control of employment. They could not accept any money which would involve loss of principle.

One other matter he forgot to mention and that was in the case of vacancies occurring for the secretaryship of co. councils the Department had set up an examination and held examinations and the co. councils had accepted the men who had passed.

asked who appointed the auditors and whether due consideration was given to their records.

replied that there was no competition for these positions. Some objection was raised because some of the inspectors did not know Irish. They were for two months endeavouring to get a staff of 14 and it was four months before they had them. With regard to auditors they had the greatest possible difficulty in getting the five they had.

asked had they any fixed policy with reference to public men taking up paid positions under their councils.

replied that the position of Town Clerk of Waterford was not subject to the approval of Dáil Éireann. The Department pointed out the undesirability of such things but did not take any responsibility for the appointment. The only other case he knew of was in Baltinglass where the chairman of the local rural council resigned and became a candidate for the clerkship. The Department did not sanction that and pointed out he should have ceased to be a member for 6 months. They made a temporary appointment. At the end of the six months the Department wrote again saying they would refuse to sanction the ex chairman's appointment. An ex-policeman was then appointed.

In a case in Rathdown a man in Ballykinlar was appointed and as he was not available some local representative was taken on at £4 a week to keep the job open. The Department objected to this and said they would order a new election as they could not sanction payment of a greater salary than was attached to the position. His wife then took up the job.

When the Department took over the supervision of the local government councils they took over all regulations under the Local Government Act subject only to such exceptions as might be ordered by the Department with the sanction of the Ministry. The Department administered the rules and laws as it found them. One chairman of a co. council made a most bitter attack on it because it would not concede to his council the right to say to any servant "your services are no longer required" and with regard to pension "you are a fairly wealthy man and you do not need it". That would be a monstrous thing to allow—to say that the local committee could inquire into the private affairs of any official who was retiring. It was a very bad thing for a man in the position of a chairman to make an uncalled-for public attack on the Department when they were engaged in a deadly duel with the enemy.

said the Clare Co. Council were absolutely dissatisfied with the running of the Local Government Department. The success which had attended the Department was due to the efforts of the local co. councils. He asked were the inspectors employed qualified in local administration.

said he did not understand what was meant by were the inspectors competent. He should get specific cases of complaint. Clare Co. Council had the largest amount of rates outstanding of any council in Ireland. The inspectors had visited every local committee in the country, they had visited numbers of rate collectors and given valuable information that enabled the Department to get the services of the Defence Department and put the Army after the hostile rate-collector with splendid results.

asked if the Minister was aware there was trouble in connection with the appointment of a surveyor in the South Riding of Tipperary.

said small matters like that would be better not discussed here. He explained an examination was held at which Mr. Meade was successful and Mr. Duggan failed. Mr. Meade was subsequently arrested and Duggan was taken on temporarily. The Department had informed the council they should appoint at least a man who had passed the exam.

complained that corruption was creeping into public bodies. He asked did the Department insist that all public appointments were duly advertised.

said no cases had been brought to his notice of appointments being made without notice by advertisement. In future no appointments would be sanctioned unless there was an exam or the candidate had already been in the public service.

said all the boards of guardians were objecting to the amalgamation schemes and making false statements that the schemes had not been sanctioned by Dáil Éireann.

We would like to know if any rates had yet been collected.

replied yes, but not with any degree of efficiency except in Dublin. There were just a few places where there was great opposition to payment of them. In Galway it was alleged the I.R.A. were advising the non-payment of rates. He did not believe that but he thought other people were operating in the name of the I.R.A.

said the question of audit was most essential. Many of the public boards were clamouring to have their accounts audited and it was not fair to leave them in control of public funds for a year and a half without audit.

said they were endeavouring to get qualified auditors for the Department.

suggested with regard to amalgamation if the Minister could make some ruling on the matter and, by leaving it to the local committees, schemes would be more satisfactory. He believed, in order to do away with pauperism as it existed, all boards of guardians should be advised in all cases to have young children under their control boarded out with respectable families in the country. Any children reared in institutions could never get away from the bad atmosphere of such places.

said he regarded the attack made on the Minister by the member for East Clare (P. Brennan) as very unwarranted. The Department were carrying on the business under great difficulties and with great efficiency. The best proof of that was that control of all local administration had passed into their hands. With reference to the matter in dispute between the Clare Co. Council and the Department he thought that discretion as regards pensions should be left to local councils. What they complained of under the old regime was the power held by the enemy Department. The councils should not be bound hand and foot like they were under the old British law.

With regard to amalgamation he pointed out there were certain districts in one county and it would be better for them to come into a neighbouring county. He had the case of Borris Union in Offaly in mind. It would be much easier for the people to come into Roscrea.

, said there was no objection to the Tipperary Co. Councils making the necessary arrangements with the Offaly Co. Council. There would have to be a national scheme on a national basis, but all this was useful preliminary work. They could not lose 1¾ millions in grants and carry on as if they had lost nothing. They had got to close down a great many of those institutions all over the country.

Report was then put and adopted unanimously.

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