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Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 12 Oct 1922

Vol. 1 No. 22

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON EXECUTIVE ARTICLES OF CONSTITUTION OF SAORSTAT EIREANN BILL. - TERMS OF REFERENCE.

(b) "To arrange the details of the provisions for appointing Ministers who shall not be members of the Executive Council, and need not be members of the Dáil, but shall be nominated by the Dáil, and shall be individually responsible to the Dáil alone for the Departments respectively under their charge; further, to make such consequential changes as may be necessary in Articles 50B to 59, inclusive, of the draft Constitution; the Committee to consist of Deputies FitzGibbon, Thrift, Johnson, Davin, Gavan Duffy, O'Connell, Gorey, McGoldrick, Sears, and McCarthy; the quorum to be 5, and the Committee to have power to examine witnesses, and to report to the Dáil not later than Wednesday, the 11th October."
The Committee met that afternoon, and on several subsequent occasions, and on Tuesday last we completed our report which is in the following terms:
"We have recast Articles 50B to 59 inclusive, of the Draft Constitution, in accordance with our instructions. We considered that the terms of our reference precluded us from considering Article 58. We append a draft of the new clauses recommended by us for the consideration of the Dáil. The alterations, recommended by us, will, if adopted by the Dáil, necessitate verbal alterations in clauses which were not included in the reference to us, and which have already been passed by the Dáil."
We have set out and recommended the insertion of a new clause, perhaps, strictly not in the terms of our reference, and we have set out in the appendix nine new clauses which we recommend for the consideration of the Dáil in lieu of the nine clauses referred to us by the resolution. The reason we had to do this was that as soon as we tackled our work we found it was practically impossible to comply with the terms of our instruction by making merely verbal alterations in the clauses referred to us, and we found it necessary to recast nine clauses completely, and we have set out, as I have said, the new clauses we recommend. Now, in presenting this report I beg to move that it be adopted by the Dáil, and that these clauses which have been unanimously recommended by your Committee should be taken into consideration by the Dáil subsequently in Committee if this resolution is passed, in lieu of the clauses dealing with the Executive Council that were referred to us, I do not know whether that motion will commend itself to the Dáil or to the Government; but I feel it my duty to the Committee which did this work to move that these clauses be taken into consideration in substitution for the ones referred to us. In adopting this resolution, if you do adopt it, the only question of principle to which this Dáil will commit itself is the question of principle which, it seems to me, it has already accepted in the terms of the resolution under which the Committee was appointed, because that resolution reads: "That this House approves as a general principle that certain Ministers"—and it defines them—"are not to be members of the Executive Council," and so on, "and need not be members of the Dáil." It will be within the recollection of the Dáil that the Executive Council in the Draft Constitution comprised all the Ministers of the State. They were all to be members of the Executive Council, and it went on to provide that certain of these Ministers need not be elected members of the Dáil—indeed, that certain of them must not be elected, but must be selected from outside. Now, when these clauses came before the Dáil, they were criticised from every quarter and from every point of detail, and the Committee, in dealing with these clauses, when they came to try and recast them in accordance with what we gathered was the opinion of the Dáil found it necessary to introduce safeguards and modifications to meet what we believed to be objections raised in the Dáil upon points of detail. I would implore the Dáil, when they come to debate the resolution I have proposed, not to devote their attention too much to matters of detail, which can be raised in Committee, if you go into Committee on these new clauses, but to confine the discussion upon this resolution to the one question of principle, which it appears to me, with all respect, the Dáil has been committed to already—that there may be some Ministers of the State selected from outside the Dáil itself. We have met the two main objections urged in this Dáil— the objection that the policy of the country will be dictated by people not elected by constituents—by providing in our draft that no member of the Executive Council can be taken from Ministers who have not been elected to this Chamber. We have endeavoured to meet another objection by providing that, whatever number of Ministers may be chosen from people outside the Chamber, they shall not be a majority—that is, the entire Executive Council and the majority of Ministers, whether Executive Council or not, must be men elected to this Dáil by their own constituents and who are Members of this Dáil. Another great objection urged was that the original clause drawn prescribed that anybody who became a Minister should at once face his constituents. A number of Deputies thought that it was a ridiculous thing that a man who had been first honoured by election by his constituency, and who had then been honoured again by being made a Minister should have to vacate his seat and make a new election necessary. We have eliminated that provision from the draft which we submit to you, but as I say these are all matters of detail. The question of the number of Ministers or the mode by which they are to be selected whether by the Dáil or by a body selected by the Dáil are all questions of detail that can be considered in Committee. I ask you to adopt this report and refer these questions to yourselves, in Committee—they are all these questions of detail—as soon as you have passed the resolution which we have unanimously adopted. I am not going to weary the Dáil by repeating the arguments on the matter of principle. You have had two days of that already and if all the arguments which have been brought forward have failed to convince these Deputies who stand for the principle that no man shall be a Minister who is not elected—if they are not convinced by the arguments already heard, I am not so conceited as to think that I could make them change their minds. Perhaps some member of our Committee, which was unanimous in preparing that report, will favour me by seconding this motion.

Mr. DARRELL FIGGIS

Before the matter goes further, would I be in order in asking the Deputy who proposed, or the Deputy who will second this motion, to give a little time to the explanation of what are called the verbal changes referred to at the foot of page one?

Mr. FITZGIBBON

I think these will come out better in Committee. The reason for the verbal alteration is this, the word "budget" is objected to by many people on the ground that it was taken from another Parliament, and we are substituting the word "Estimate" instead. It is necessary as we used the expression "Estimate" in our draft Clause and we think that the word "Estimate" should be substituted for the word "budget" where it occurs in Article 35 the first time, and also where it occurs the second time, and in cases where the word "Estimate" does not fit we used the words "financial resolution." In Article 50A that has already been passed by the Dáil, the words "seven or less than five" should be substituted for the word "twelve." At that time all Ministers were to be members of the Executive Council, but the Committee recommended that there should be certain Ministers that should not be upon the Executive Council, because no member chosen from outside the Dáil ought not to be on the Executive Council, and therefore we are substituting the words "not more than seven""and not less than five" for the Executive Council, which would otherwise be called the Cabinet, which is the body of Ministers who rule State business, external affairs, and questions which touch every branch of the policy of the Irish Free State as a whole and therefore we arrived at the conclusion—and this is a matter for the Dáil at another time—that there ought not to be less than five, because if there was less than five there might be the danger of a one-man government, because a Cabinet of four might be dominated by one man, and objection was raised to that in debate. On the other hand, we thought that more than seven might tend to split into two sections, and then you would run the danger of having two sections, one of four dominated by one man, and the three other members of the Executive Council in substance would find themselves outside the debates. Therefore we recommend that the Executive Council be not more than seven or less than five. That would leave whatever would be a minority of the Ministers of the Council to be selected from outside this Chamber or from this Chamber. Thus, if you had twelve Ministers in all, not less than seven would come from this Chamber and not more than five from outside.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

As a matter of order, for the information of Deputies, if this motion proposed by Deputy Fitzgibbon is passed, I take it the Dáil is not committed to the consequential changes, to the additional Article suggested, or even to the exact wording of the new Articles. It is committed to the principle which has been mentioned by Deputy Fitzgibbon, and which is embodied in the resolution passed before, and in the terms of reference given to the Committee. If the resolution is passed, therefore, the Articles in the Appendix will come up for discussion, and may be amended in Committee; but if, on the adoption of this Report, we have a debate on the principle that there may be Ministers who need not be Members of the Dáil, then if the motion is subsequently passed we cannot accept amendments to the Articles which would aim at a reversal of that principle, and which would give us further discussion on a matter already discussed twice.

Mr. SEAN MILROY

Do I take it you suggest that even if this motion is passed to-day, that at the next reading of the Constitution Bill we will not be in a position to move amendments?

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

At the next reading, certainly; but if this motion is passed now, we shall consider the Articles in the Appendix in Committee of the Dáil, but we shall not be able to discuss in every Article the principle again.

Mr. THOMAS JOHNSON

What is the actual form of the motion—that the Report be received?

CLERK of the DAIL

"That the Report of the Committee appointed by resolution of the Dáil, dated 6th October, 1922, be received and adopted, and that the draft Articles Nos. 50b to 59 be taken into consideration.

Mr. SEAN MILROY

I firmly hope that that calamity you apprehend, of this being passed, will not be consummated. I am rising now to urge, as strongly as I can, that we reject this report, and reject the principle which it defends, for the present at any rate. I have been looking forward with a certain amount of interest to the production of this report. I am not, I think, an unreasonable man; I am always open to conviction. This Committee was sent to perform some kind of surgical operation upon Article 50B, and in the report I see no reference whatever to Article 50B—not the slightest allusion. No one would suspect that there was such a thing as Article 50B, save for the fact that Article 50A is alluded to. I want to know did this Committee consider Article 50B at all? I understood that was what they went to consider.

Mr. GERALD FITZGIBBON

On a point of explanation, may I ask Deputy Milroy to read the first four words of the report of the Committee?

Mr. SEAN MILROY

Oh, I have discovered a clue—"We have recast Articles 50B to 59 inclusive." That is the only indication that this Committee took cognisance of Article 50B. We have no information as to how Article 50B was recast. I think we will have to ask this Committee to go back to do the work they were asked to do, when they were set up. I gathered from the statement of the mover of this report that he wishes the discussion here more or less to hover around the principle involved. I am not at all disinclined to follow that line of discussion. I recollect on the last day when we were discussing this, before this Committee that has not done its work was set up, that the President made a few observations on the matter which were put forward as arguments, and when I got up to try to throw some light on the rather misty logic of the President the Ceann Comhairle told me I had already exceeded the time limit. I am at least in order in referring to those arguments of the worthy President. So far as I could gather his arguments were that a snatch vote of this Dáil should not be sufficient to remove one of those stone age Ministers, one of those men who come from God knows where, and who remain for all eternity in the Government of the Dáil I want to know is that a democratic principle, that a vote of the Sovereign Assembly of the Irish Nation cannot remove one of these freaks of administrative genius? Another argument the President made was that he wished these gentlemen who would be placed in these positions to be independent of the opinion of the Dáil. Unless I misconstrue what he said, his words were something like this: "That Ministers who were simply carrying on internal administration should be in a position of absolute independence of the change of opinion in the Assembly." I do not want to misconstrue the words of the President, but both of these arguments were, to my mind, exceedingly strange, to come from the head of the first democratic Assembly we have had in Ireland for many generations. Another argument that was used was that some such curious system as this must be evolved in order to secure individual responsibility to each Minister. I say it is quite unnecessary, and it is quite easy to insert in the Constitution provisions which will have the effect of securing that a mere adverse Departmental vote shall not mean the resignation of the Government. The easiest thing in the world to say is that an adverse vote of this Dáil, on a merely Departmental question, shall only affect the Government to the extent of the head of that particular Department. I think, if the Government acted with its general shrewdness, that the one argument that ought to have conclusive weight with them would be that Deputy Gavan Duffy is in favour of this proposal, because, so far as I have seen, they have always acted on the assumption that whatever Deputy Gavan Duffy favours must be wrong. I would like them to give some consideration to that—the attitude of Deputy Gavan Duffy. Is it possible that in all other matters of constitutional law he is fundamentally wrong, and that on this, which is admitted to be freak legislation, he is right? I ask the Government to exercise their usual shrewdness in the discussion of this matter. Now, if ever there was a time when we should be on our guard against such a proposal as the present one, it is now. I do not know that I am fundamentally opposed to the principle, but I say it is an exceedingly dangerous experiment to try just now. The Dáil will recollect that in the early stages of this Session, when the proposal was made to merge two or three large Departments under one head, I opposed that, and I predicted that by giving so much administrative work to one Minister, that he would not be able to do it, and the effect would be that permanent officials would control that Department, and run that Minister instead of the Minister controlling the Department and the officials. I believe we will have, if this principle is accepted and endorsed, and carried into effect, just what I then predicted. Five or six years hence, when under the influence of a free Irish Government with Irish Ireland ideas permeating the whole functions of Governmental life, we have trained up a crop of what you might call expert officials, who had an Irish outlook and an Irish point of view; then I would say, there is not so much risk. At the present time the President, or whoever is at the head of this Sovereign Assembly, whenever this Article takes effect, has several vacancies to fill, and he has to look out for efficient men to nominate to these positions. Well, I used to hear years ago of Diogenes, I think, a gentleman who used to go home with a lantern looking for honest men, and I can imagine our President in the role of Diogenes looking around for efficient administrators in the immediate future. I can imagine him going round all the benches of this Dáil and failing to secure that individual, and then he goes out with his lantern, and where will he search for efficient administrators? I am very much affraid he will have to search amongst the ranks of those who filled the positions of permanent officials under the old Dublin Castle regime. Do not let us get away from the fact that permanent officialdom of the old Dublin Castle regime has not yet relinquished its hope of controlling the economic life of this country. I tell you I am not going by my vote to give them a helping hand to secure that menace over the life of this country. At least the men who go through and run the gauntlet of election have to abide by the popular will; they have their credentials established, and I certainly will do all that is in my power to try to prevent a situation arising, that will enable the men who have changed their tactics—not their outlook—with the change of events that has come, to come and sit in this Assembly, not merely as heads of Departments, but responsible Ministers, who will run these departments, not upon the lines of National thought that we want, but on the old routine lines, that kill initiative and stifle progress. That is what I am afraid of, and for that reason I say, at least suspend for some years yet, the adoption of this principle. As a matter of fact, I do not think it is necessary at all to embody it in the Constitution. I have heard very constitutional lawyers—I nearly said liars—in this Assembly say that it is taken as one of the things which every people and every government have a fundamental right to do; that is to call upon any citizen to fulfil any ministerial function. If that is a common fundamental right, why put it into writing, why have it written in your Constitution, unless the purpose is to carry it into effect immediately, and in my opinion, the carrying of it into effect immediately will bring you within measurable reach, if not actually right into that danger to which I have alluded. I say it is unnecessary to the Constitution; it is undemocratic; it is a menace to the development of our National and economic life, and real life lines, and it is something which no other country, so far as I know, has embarked upon. The President referred to two Ministers in America—Mr. Hoover and Mr. Hughes. I do not know what position Mr. Hughes filled, but we all know Mr. Hoover's position was simply one created by the abnormal circumstances of the war, and I do not know whether the President anticipates that we are going to declare war and engage the services of several Hoovers or not. But what is the necessity of bringing in non-elected Ministers. If there is any man of outstanding capacity, surely to goodness, under Proportional Representation, he will get a quota to return him to this Dáil, and if he cannot get a quota, what right has he to speak with the voice of authority in the Sovereign Assembly of the Irish nation? I am utterly opposed to the principle of this thing. The more I have seen of it, studied it, thought of it, the less I like it, and I was hoping to see the proposer of this report throw some ray of enlightenment, that would show that this report or the principle it advocates is going to help us in the slightest degree. My opinion on the matter was open to conviction and change, but not a single atom of argument worthy of consideration was adduced in favour of the principle of this Article, and for that purpose I wish to register my vote against it.

Mr. T.J. O'CONNELL

I must congratulate the Deputy who has just sat down in getting in at this stage the speech in which he was interrupted on the last occasion. I can see no other reason why he should at this stage of the proceedings make that speech, because, to my mind in any case, it has very little reference to the matter before us at the present time. I can hardly believe that Deputy Milroy has read the Report of the Committee, in view of the statements which he has made. We had, in the first case, reference to 50 (b), and then we had his picture of the President going around with the lamp looking for a suitable Minister. Now, the facts are, briefly, these: The Minister nominates his Executive Council, and he must pick the Executive Council from the members who are elected to this Dáil. He cannot go outside the Dáil. If the Deputy has read the Report of the Committee carefully, he will find that it is fully provided for that he cannot go outside the elected members for his Executive Council. Then, so far as the other members are concerned, they are selected by the Dáil —they are nominated by the Committee set up by the Dáil—and they, therefore, must have the confidence of the Dáil. I do not anticipate that those people of whom Deputy Milroy is afraid will get into the Council of the Ministry. I would agree with him that they should not get into the Ministry, but I do not think that a popularly elected Dáil will be anxious to give these people positions in the Ministry. That is what Deputy Milroy seems to predict. I think that we should not spend time now debating the principle of this, seeing that we have spent already two days debating it, and the principle has been carried by this Dáil.

Professor MAGENNIS

Not before.

Mr. T.J. O'CONNELL

I maintain, in any case, rightly or wrongly, that the principle has been voted on and carried, and that the Committee which was appointed on the last day, and now reports, is only showing how the principle which has been already agreed upon can be put into practice. I respectfully suggest to Deputies that the Report be received, and that it should be allowed to be carried, and that we should go into Committee, if necessary, to change these various Articles in any manner in which we think they ought to be changed.

Mr. DARRELL FIGGIS

I agree with the previous speaker that this Report is not exactly open to the same charges as the original draft proposals that we put before this Chamber; but I think they have avoided a considerable amount of the matters that to me, at least, were not desirable in that original draft. I think they have not avoided them all, from my point of view, but that was hardly to be expected, as we are all looking at this thing from different angles. I would have wished the mover of this Report to have spent a little time in explaining why they have introduced into this Report an entirely new principle altogether, even more offensive and less desirable than the principle underlying the original clause, the principle being that there will be henceforward, if this be carried and becomes the form of Ministry for the Free State, two parts to the Ministry—an Inner Ministry and an Outer Ministry—because the Executive Council, in effect, will be the Inner Ministry, and the Ministers who do not form part of the Executive Council—from wherever they be appointed—either from within the Dáil or without the Dáil—will be directly responsible, and it is so stated in this Report to the Dáil and will form two entirely different bodies. You will have one group that is not to exceed seven and is not to be less than five. In addition, however, there may be a certain number of other Ministers, each of whom will, if I might say so, swing in his own orbit, although, according to the intention of the Report—and I wish to bring it to the attention of the mover of the Report, it will not be so in actual effect. I asked the mover of the Report, when he was bringing in this Report, to deal with what he alleged to be verbal alterations in Article 35. I did so for the specific reason that what are called "verbal alterations" have been made. A change has been made from the word "Budget" to "Estimates" in one case and also there is the change of the word "Budget" to "Financial Resolutions" in another case. According to his explanation it appeared that my interpretation of these changes was not exactly the one that was in his own mind. I venture to suggest to him that, if he looks into it, my interpretation will be exactly what will be produced in the future. I gather that some offence had been taken to the word "Budget" because it had been used across the water. The word "Budget" is, I believe, rather French in origin. There is a word in French that is called "Le Budget," and I know that the standard work on the Budget is a work in French. To fight shy of the use of the word "Budget" because it is used in England is not reasonable. What is the difference between "Budget" and "Estimates?" Let me illustrate it in this way: here is one of these external Ministers who do not form part of the Executive Council. He is, let us say, the Postmaster-General. In that case he would be directly responsible to the Dáil for the administration of his Department, but in order to administer that Department effectively he will require certain moneys and will come to the Dáil in order to get a vote for these moneys. These moneys either can be granted by the Dáil or cannot be granted by the Dáil. I am not quite clear whether the Dáil can or cannot grant these moneys, irrespective of the recommendation of the Executive Council. Either the Dáil is restricted from granting these moneys, or it is not. In the first case, what happens with the Postmaster-General directly responsible? According to the theory embodied in this Report to the Dáil, for the purpose of the administration of his Department, he comes to the Dáil and asks for certain moneys to make that administration practical and efficient, and he finds between himself and the Dáil another body interpolates. It is that other body—the Executive Council —which informs the Dáil that it cannot recommend these moneys; so that, you see, really in effect the Postmaster-General is one of those Ministers directly responsible to the Dáil, but, although directly responsible to the Dáil, he becomes very little more than an agent of the Executive Council, but without having the right to be present at the meetings of the Executive Council to make his own recommendations to them as to how that money should be allotted, as is the case in every other country. The Minister has not only the right to come to the Dáil, but he has the right to go to the spending or allotting body, which is the Ministry, and put his proposals before that body, and ask that there should be some general recommendation to the Legislature that certain sums of money be given in order that certain Departments be efficiently administered. You will have an Executive Council that will exist on the will of the Dáil, and you will have certain independent Ministers either from within the Dáil or without the Dáil, each swinging, as it were, in his own orbit, but not one of whom will be able to establish an effective and direct contact with the Dáil to which he is supposed to be directly responsible, for this fundamental reason, that this Executive Council has charge of finance. He cannot conduct his Department apart from finance, and so really he will become in the nature of an Administrative Officer dependent not directly on the will of the Dáil, but dependent far more directly on the will of the Executive Council. He is not to be, so far as I can understand from this Report, a member of the Executive Council, and, therefore, cannot be present at the meetings of the Executive Council, and I suggest that instead of getting greater efficiency, that this will get less efficiency; instead of establishing more direct contact between each of the Ministers and the Dáil, less contact actually will be established, so that you will have the Executive Council and members of the Executive Council in a freer position and more responsible and effective position than any one of those outside Ministers. Whether they are appointed from the Dáil, or whether they are not appointed by the Dáil is not part of the case I am making against the Report at the present moment. I think it unnecessary to say that they may or may not be members of Parliament. I should imagine that it should be quite sufficient to have the Ministers who may not be members of the Executive Council to be chosen by the Chamber, but to leave it entirely open, as all other Constitutions do, with one or two exceptions, to the Chamber, whether it appoints them from within or from without. The very fact that you introduce this form of——

Mr. FITZGIBBON

Is that not purely a Committee point, the introduction of the words "may" or "may not?"

Mr. DARRELL FIGGIS

I think not. I think to introduce them here in this way does suggest that there would be a desirability that members should be appointed who are not members of the Dáil. But, in any case, I agree at once that that is a great deal better than the form of words in the original draft, and that, as Deputy Fitzgibbon has pointed out, it could be amended, perhaps, in Committee. But what could not be amended in Committee, or what it would be more difficult to amend in Committee, and what would require far more drastic revision than the report if it were to be so amended is this dual responsibility. Now, I stated here before that I thought it very desirable that the responsibility of the Ministry to the Dáil should not be quite so tight in its collectiveness as it is. It would be a point, I believe, that is desirable, and I believe that it could be effected, and that it could be effected without introducing what I must regard as a new principle and not a wise principle, of making your Ministry of two parts—one part with entire possession of recommendations for expenditure from the National purse, and the other part depending on that purse for responsibility for administration, and yet which could not get that administration put efficiently into effect until they can get into contact with that person, and so you get a dual responsibility between two parts of one administration, and for that reason I will vote against this report.

Professor MAGENNIS

I must congratulate the members of the Committee on having formulated an exceptionally clear and intelligible scheme, but at the same time I cannot help feeling that any one of them with the ability for which each of them is noted, could have produced something better. It is the common experience that the collective wisdom of a number of men will work out at less than that of the average member of the Council. It seems to me—I submit it with all respect to our distinguished colleagues— that this report sins by excess and by defect. In the first place it claims to have worked "within the terms of reference that we have drafted in accordance with our instructions." I find on page 2 an insertion in the Constitution of an Article which has nothing whatever to do with the matter referred to—"that Ministers shall have the right to attend and speak in the Senate." I have not the slightest objection to that; in fact, I should cordially vote for it if it came up by itself as a separate resolution. Then, again, we are told that they have remodelled Article 50 B. Article 50 B. appears nowhere in this. The elements of it have been disintegrated into separate elements, and some of these, but not all, will be found in the new combination elsewhere on another page. Then we read of what seems to my poor understanding a contradiction, but which no doubt will be explained away, that all the Ministers are to be appointed by the Representative of the Crown on the nomination of the President, and yet the President of the Council shall be appointed on the nomination of the Chamber. So that the President is to be nominated by the Chamber and by the President. I daresay the procedure would work out as a contradiction. Then, again, we have not only the doctrine upon which Deputy Darrell Figgis expatiated at some length, the doctrine of having an Inner Cabinet, which is the real Executive Council, and an Outer Ministry. I do not presume to criticise that now, as it would be out of order for me, although it was not out of order for Deputy Darrell Figgis to debate what has already been settled by the vote of the House.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

Deputy Magennis was not present when we began this particular debate, and it was decided that the Dáil would not be committed to the exact wording of the Articles which are in the Appendix to the Report, but that they could reject the Report by rejecting the principle and these two Articles would fall.

Professor MAGENNIS

Thanks very much. This scheme of an Inner and an Outer Cabinet works deleteriously upon the principle which appears to have been the main concern of those who drafted the Constitution. It was recommended to us as a superb expedient for securing the services of the best abilities of the country, that the Dáil should be at liberty to go outside of its own membership and select for Ministerial positions as heads of Departments outstanding men of distinguished ability. Now, in all such practices there are two sides. Will your man of distinguished ability be willing to come in as an inferior Minister, the head of a Department, seated, as I called it on the last occasion this was before us, in comparatively outer darkness, not privileged to know any secrets of the real administration of the country, but simply a glorified Civil Servant, allowed to expound or explain or defend the action of his administration in the House. Not only that, but he is to have a very qualified tenure of office. I have seen it stated somewhere recently that he is to hold office by judicial tenure. Now, judicial tenure, to give a free translation of the Latin phrase, is "So long as he conducts himself properly," and judicial tenure means that the Judge, so long as he conducts himself properly in the discharge of his judicial functions, can be removed only on the joint petition of the two Houses. What is to be done with this distinguished man who has been called to the service of the Ministry and to be the head of a Department? "The term of office of any Minister not a member of the Executive Council shall be the term of office of the Chamber"— that is, four years at most—"existing at the time of his appointment," so that if he were appointed towards the end of the period of the Dáil, his office would be for just the residuum. "And no such Minister shall be removed from office"— here is the semblance of judicial tenure—"And no such member shall be removed from office during his term otherwise than by the Chamber/Dáil itself, and by them for stated reasons, and after the proposal to remove him has been submitted to a Committee chosen by a method to be determined by the Chamber/Dáil." In other words, we would have something like the trial of Warren Hastings on a small scale each time that a Minister has to be removed. There must be a formal indictment and the articles of the accusations set out and a Committee of the Dáil will sit in judgment upon these and find a verdict. I presume all this will be in public—a nice alluring bait to a man of eminence outside the Dáil to persuade him to come in and give his services to the Dáil as the head of a Department. There is no provision made in this—this is one of the defects —for filling vacancies when they occur. Unfortunately vacancies will occur, for even Ministers are not immortal. There should be some provision of this sort: "that if, from any cause, the position of a Minister becomes vacant, his successor shall be nominated and appointed in public manner prescribed for nomination and appointment to such Ministry." There is no provision of that sort whatever. Deputy Gorey reminds me neither was there in the original draft; but then, the wisdom and experience of these capable members of the Committee were requisitioned to improve away the defects—to take away deficiencies of the original draft. I am impugning them for having left this cardinal defect. Then again, there is, in the Inner Cabinet, a Minister for Finance, and the words expressly used in the report are "that he is to be in charge of the Department of Finance." Consequently he is in charge of a department in precisely the same sense as each of the Outer Ministers are in charge of a department, and there is a provision made for arraigning the ordinary head of a Department and for bringing him to book; but there is no provision made here except this extraordinary provision that in order to indict a Minister for Finance it would be necessary to bring down the whole Ministry—all his colleagues—along with him. That, I think, may on occasion prove a very useful and very serviceable scheme, but it does not belong to a report of a budget to work out the details of something along the lines of individual responsibility of Ministers. We are trying to work out here two different principles—collective responsibility and individual responsibility. As I understand it, or perhaps I should say as I misunderstand it, there are two sets of Ministers. For one of them the doctrine of collective responsibility is laid down; for the remainder, taken individually, the doctrine of individual responsibility is laid down. Is that a misunderstanding?

Mr. D.J. GOREY

No.

Professor MAGENNIS

Very good. Why is this differentiation made? In order to enable the Dáil to bring down an administration? Is that fair, or is it just to the colleagues of the Minister for Finance? He brings forward the Estimates. According to the view of the majority of the Dáil there is excessive expenditure in some Department. There is something in his extremity of which they disapprove; they wish to give an adverse vote on that particular point, but to support the Ministry on its general policy. According to this scheme it becomes necessary to fell the Ministry en bloc in order to disapprove of a particular item in the Estimates. Although I have learned to have a more than usual admiration for Deputy Gorey, I venture to suggest that in his calmer moments he, as a member of this Committee would not stand for this. I will reserve what I have to say in regard to the other items for the Committee stage, but I need hardly add that I am giving notice I am going to vote against the adoption of this Report.

Mr. W.A. DAVIN

The Dáil, instead of placing the issue of adopting or not adopting the Report is more or less inclined to go into Committee on the redrafted clauses of the Constitution. On the general principle it does not matter who may dispute the fact—if the Deputies will refer to the original resolution submitted by Professor Thrift, they will have to agree that the principle has already been voted upon. I would like to contradict what seems to me to be a wrong impression conveyed by Deputy Darrell Figgis. He seems to understand, or to lead other people to understand, that the extern or outside Minister will not have the right under any circumstances to attend the meeting of the Executive Council. The Executive Council on matters of general policy may determine the policy of the Department with which that outside or extern Minister is connected; but I am quite sure any Executive Council controlling the Government of this country will not go into the details of the administration of an extern Minister's Department without giving that Minister a chance of coming before the Executive Council when such matters are being discussed by that body.

Mr. T. JOHNSON

The question raised by Deputy Darrell Figgis with regard to the Budget was the one point of importance, I think, and I want to say that the whole of the scheme harmonises with the suggestion that a Minister who is going to propose legislation involving finance must have that ratified and supported by the Treasury or it will not go through the Dáil. He may, under the scheme, if he has temerity enough, bring forward a proposal which may involve finance, but if the Treasury official or the Minister for Finance informs, the Assembly of the financial consequences of the proposal, and says they cannot support it, it immediately becomes a vote of confidence or no confidence in the Ministry. If the Minister's proposal is lost, he need not resign. That is the whole of the fact in this matter. He is entitled to go beyond the Ministry to explain a scheme which may involve finance and which the Dáil itself may agree should be involved and should be placed upon the country. The Executive takes upon itself the responsibility of saying that this scheme of finance is not one that they can support. They make it a vote of confidence. It immediately becomes a question then of the wisdom of the Dáil as against the wisdom of the Executive—that is to say, the Finance Minister. That is a very right and proper position. The circumstances, if you had not this scheme, would be different. A Minister of a Department would propose the same plan, involving the same expenditure, incurring all the expenses of the preparation of such a plan and such a scheme. He would go before the whole of the Ministry, of which in this supposition he is a member, and it would be turned down, and he would have nothing more to say. But he could not then come to the Dáil and say, "This is a scheme I wish to propose, and it is valuable to the country." He would not have the right to go beyond his Ministry. I do not think the new scheme is a defect from any democratic point of view. It is very desirable that if that Minister, who has been chosen by the Dáil for his special wisdom and knowledge, has a proposal affecting his Department that he believes is of value, if he cannot persuade the Treasury or the Executive to approve of it, then he can come openly, without any wire-pulling or without any backstairs influence, to the Dáil, and advocate his scheme, the Ministry frankly saying that this is a scheme we cannot support. They make it a matter of confidence, and it then comes to be a question whether the Minister is so strongly in favour of his proposal as to risk its being turned down by the Dáil, or to risk it being carried by the Dáil in the teeth of the Treasury. That is a matter on which he is going to be responsible, and he must take that responsibility. There you have an individual responsibility.

Mr. DARRELL FIGGIS

Why was it decided not to confer the same right and liberty upon individual members of the Executive Council in charge of constructive working departments?

Mr. T. JOHNSON

Because as a matter of practice the Executive Council must act unitedly. The Executive Council may consist of five members, none of whom except the Minister for Finance need have a portfolio. That is to say, so far as this is concerned, only one Minister must necessarily have portfolio. The Executive Council may deal with matters of general policy, and not matters of a departmental administration, and there is a very distinct difference. It was agreed that there should be that sense of collective responsibility in matters of general National policy, but that there are departments which are somewhat apart from general questions of National policy, that ought to be under a distinct Ministry and that ought not to depend, to any extent, upon the accidents of the political vagaries and thoughts of the time. I contend that this is a reasonable proposition, and that it meets the criticism that was levelled against the original proposals very effectively. I think that some of the arguments that were used by Deputy Magennis did not deal with the scheme, as presented in the revised form. I am afraid that I was not able to pick up his points about the election or nomination of the President, but it seems to me clear that it was the intention that the President was to be nominated by the Dáil. He, in turn, would nominate members of the Executive Council. I believe that is laid down very clearly in those clauses, and I do not understand where the difficulty of appreciating that arises. The other members of the Ministry, that is to say the other members who are not members of the Executive Council, will be appointed by the Dáil, direct on the nomination of a Committee representative of the various departments of the Dáil. The Dáil has direct control of every Minister who is outside this Executive. The Dáil has direct control of the Executive as collective body. That is the scheme, so far as I can explain it. It is a simple scheme, and I believe it meets with the objections of the critics in so far as they were not fundamental. There are those who believe that no man, or no woman, should hold office unless he, or she, had gone through an election campaign, and had succeeded in being elected to the Dáil. I believe the circumstances of the time justify a departure from that principle, which is supposed to be the essence of democracy. I do not think it is the essence of democracy. A departure, in so far as it is a departure, mounts to this, that instead of having a direct election for the Ministry, you have the collegiate system. The Dáil directly elects the man who may not be a member of that Chamber. That is the only departure, and it is a departure perfectly justified, and I believe it will prove itself of value, and I support the motion to approve of the report.

Professor WILLIAM MAGENNIS

As a matter of courtesy to Deputy Johnson, may I explain to him what this very trivial point of mine amounted to? It dealt with Article 50A.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

The Committee went outside its terms of reference in suggesting anything whatever about Article 50A. I intend to rule that particular matter out of order, and I think, therefore, it would be more desirable if we had no discussion whatever on it.

Professor WM. MAGENNIS

My point is with regard to Article 51. The second clause states:—"The President of the Council shall be appointed on the nomination of the Chamber/Dáil."

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

I think when a Deputy has spoken to a particular point, that that is sufficient.

Professor WM. MAGENNIS

I quite agree. I was desirous of speaking merely on a point of personal explanation.

Mr. G. GAVAN DUFFY

May I point out with reference to your ruling that a very distinct difference is drawn in the wording of the report by the Committee, between the Articles drawn or revised by the Committee, and submitted as such to the Dáil, and other Articles in which certain consequential changes are merely recommended as a necessary corollary? They are only put forward in that form as a necessary recommendation on the assumption that the main part of the report be accepted.

Mr. T. JOHNSON

The end of Article 50A was the word "Crown?"

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

Yes.

Mr. T. JOHNSON

It is not competent for the report to contain words following that, and, in this Appendix, to add after the word "Crown,""on the nomination of the President of the Executive Council."

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

The point is that Article 50(a) has been passed.

Mr. THOMAS JOHNSON

Yes, up to the word "Crown."

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

No amendment to Article 50(a) can be accepted now.

Mr. THOMAS JOHNSON

50(a) is not an Article. There would be no Article 50 (a) in the new draft. It was only put in there as a matter of convenience.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

Yes.

Mr. GOREY

Article 50(a) meant, originally, Article 50, and Article 51 meant the latter part of 50.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

We have already passed the Article which is called Article 50(a). That is passed as part of the Bill, and it must stand part of it for the present particular reading. It can be amended later on.

MINISTER for HOME AFFAIRS (Mr. Kevin O'Higgins)

A Chinn Chomhairle, I merely rise to say that this Committee's Report and the Articles appended to the Report of the Committee are accepted by those who have primary responsibility for this Bill. On the principle of the new proposals, there is very little to add to the case that we have attempted to make for those proposals. We pointed out that it would be desirable to cut away as far as possible from the party system and the obvious evils of the party system; that it was particularly desirable, in view of the system of franchise now in existence in this country, in view of Proportional Representation and the kind of Assembly that Proportional Representation will give here— an Assembly composed, not as the British House of Commons is composed, of two or three large parties, but rather of a number of small groups, and that in an Assembly so composed you will not have the thing that is most needed in Ireland, the thing that will be most needed in Ireland for many a long year-you will not have a strong or stable Government. You will have frequent changes in Government, and no continuity of policy in your Departments. You will have a state of affairs pretty much like what you had in Italy or in France. And that state of affairs is not at all suited to the needs of an infant State endeavouring to go forward on a course of reconstruction. And so the suggestion is that collective responsibility be limited to a number which may be five, or six, or seven—at most seven, and at least five—and that those five or seven men would take collective responsibility for broad matters of policy, and that they would stand or fall together upon these matters of policy; but that outside that you would have Ministers individually responsible for the conduct of their own Departments. It is strange that the controversy seemed to have ranged and raged most round the point that is not the most important point in the proposals, for the most important point in the proposals is undoubtedly this question of individual responsibility, rather than the question of whether a particular Minister may or may not be a member of the Dáil. We should try to have clearly in our minds what is our objective. If our objective is to secure for the Irish people the most efficient conduct of the Departments of State, then it does not seem extravagant to leave to this representative Committee of the Dáil the power of going outside the membership of the Dáil itself if it seems that the efficiency of a particular Department will be best served by doing so, and if it seems that the people who, after all, do count and will always count, and should count—the whole administration, I take it, is for their benefit—if the interests of the people will be best served by going outside the membership of the Dáil. Personally, I am inclined to think that that will not occur very frequently. I am inclined to think that it will be the exception rather than the rule. It is certainly not an extravagant thing, and not an unwise thing, to say that this Committee of the Dáil may, if it likes, go outside the rigid membership of the Dáil and select the man who may be particularly suited for the headship of a particular Department. There is nothing undemocratic in that, as Deputy Johnson has pointed out. It simply means that this Committee will through its own representative cloak over the man it selects for the position: that, instead of the primary election of the people you have a man selected by a body that is representative of the people. Now, the alternative to these two things—the alternative to this question of individual responsibility—is that you will have this Dáil tied up to vote for the measures, or practically all measures, that are brought forward by any particular Ministry, for fear that Ministry which represents a particular policy in external affairs may go down, and in its going down that a particular policy may go down with it. Even in the short lifetime of this Assembly, we have seen the spectacle of people—particularly on that Compensation debate —voting for the Government while not very sure that in their own minds they felt that the thing the Government stood over was right or wise. If that is so in this Assembly, how much more would it be, or will it be, after the Constitution comes into operation and when you are more likely to have the bitter cut and thrust of Party Politics? Then it will mean that everyone who approves of the external policy that the Government is standing over would feel bound to vote practically for any measure brought forward from the Government benches; and, on that account, you would not have the deliberation and the freedom necessary, and you would have men backing measures because they were brought forward by the Government which stood for a particular external policy. We want to have the Parliament of Saorstát Eireann a deliberative Assembly in the fullest sense of the word, an Assembly endeavouring to do all things for the beet advantage of the Irish people, and so we want calm consideration for each measure — we want each measure analysed only on its merits, and we want the maximum of individual liberty for the Deputies in the Dáil. You will not have that by adhering to collective responsibility. You will have it by giving the largest possible measure of individual responsibility, and by limiting collective responsibility to a group of five, six or seven. I have spoken of the kind of Assembly we are likely to have in Ireland under the system of Proportional Representation voting. You will have an Assembly consisting of a number of groups. You will not have two or three large parties, and that kind of Assembly will not make for stable Government if we have collective responsibility.

I have here a book "Canadian Constitutional Studies," written by Sir Robert Borden, and Sir Robert Borden writing on that kind of Parliament where you have a number of small groups says:—"Another tendency which does not make for efficiency or stability in government is group representation in Parliament. Before Confederation there was experience of that tendency in Canada; administrations succeeded one another with startling rapidity, and stable government became practically impossible. President Lowell of Harvard University has pointed out the effect of the group system in France. During the twenty-three years, from 1873 to 1896 there were thirty-four different administrations, so that the average duration of a French Cabinet in that period was less than eight months and a half. Lord Bryce mentions nine French parliamentary groups which existed in 1914, and eight at the beginning of 1920. He alludes to the kaleidoscopic changes of government in France. Of the party as contrasted with the group system he says: `Parties are inevitable. No free large country has been without them. No one has shown how representative government could be worked without them... When there are small groups each becomes a focus of intrigue, in which personal ambitions have scope. The groups make bargains with one another and by their combinations perhaps secretly and suddenly formed successive ministries may be overturned, with injury to the progress of legislation and to the continuity of national policy. Since there must be parties, the fewer and stronger they are the better.' In the first Parliament elected in Poland after the recent war more than a dozen political groups were represented, and no less than thirteen parties compose the present Parliament. `They are perpetually involved in petty feuds and there is no stable majority. As a result there are frequent and, to outsiders, inexplicable changes in the personnel of the Cabinet. Constructive reforms are indefinitely delayed by the futile vicissitudes of the mere game of politics.' The dangers of the group system are intensified when groups are differentiated by occupation, race, or creed, rather than by political opinion."

We will have groups here—small groups of seven or eight. We will not have parties on definite lines of political cleavage; we will rather have a representation here and the reflection here of interest—particular interests in the community; and as there are many varieties, of interests in the community, we are likely to have representatives here of all these interests. I do not consider that there has been particularly wise or sensible criticism of these proposals. There has been vehement criticism, heated criticism, a lot of sound and fury signifying nothing, from behind us, and these statements were analysed by Deputy O'Connell, and they were found not to stand that analysis. We, at any rate, while leaving these matters absolutely open to the Dáil, approve of the Report of the Committee, and we accept it, and we recommend it to the Dáil.

Mr. GOREY

I do not rise to speak upon this Report, because I happen to be one of the members of the Committee, but I speak on it because I believe the Report carries out the idea adopted here, I think on Friday last, and I rise principally to protest against some of the dishonest tactics that are employed with regard to this matter. I have no objection to a man standing up here at this Dáil and saying what he means, but I do object to him going around the Lobby and saying what is not true; and if it is true, it ought to be said here in this Dáil. It is said that the Ministry, or whoever may be the Ministry in the future, want to bring in here people of a certain society. It was said to me, and therefore I repeat it here—it was said that they wanted to bring in Freemasons. Now, that is not fair to the Ministry or to us, that statements of that kind should be made, as they were made in the Lobby. That is not honest criticism If it were true criticism, it ought to be stated here publicly, and not in this wire-pulling manner. While I am here the Dáil will hear plain speaking from me, and I will have none of this kind of thing to which I referred while I am here. Professor Magennis made a lot of comments upon the clauses, especially those giving the same opportunities to members of the Executive Council as we give the external, outside, Ministers. Now, we do not think it right for any Executive Council to have the opportunity conferred upon any of its members to do any act without the consent of this Council, and that is the reason we want them to act collectively and have joint responsibility. Because, if it were otherwise, no Executive Council responsible for the running of the country could work at all. We believe if you are going to have a centralized authority on fundamental questions the Executive should act as a whole and that any proposal to be put by members of the Executive Council should have the sanction of the Executive Council. We are giving a different opportunity to the external members. They can come here and have the merits of their proposals discussed and decided upon by the Chamber. It is true that we added a few clauses to the report, and perhaps that we went a bit outside the Terms of Reference, but these are sent down by our Committee more in the form of matter to be considered than anything else. One was the clause relating to Deputies having to seek re-election. We thought, under proportional representation, that that clause should be put up for your consideration. I think that Deputy Johnson has disposed of. Deputy. Professor Magennis's objection to the President nominating his Executive and in the first instance having the President nominated by this Chamber. If the President is not to be nominated by this Chamber, then, by whom is he to be nominated? Once the President is nominated by this Chamber, I think it is right that the President should nominate his Executive Council.

Professor MAGENNIS

Certainly.

Mr. GOREY

We are giving him that right now. Now we are told that there is a great deal of danger to the country if we adopt these proposals. Now the people who say that do not mean danger to the country at all. They mean danger to themselves. They do not think, perhaps, there are enough of jobs to go around, and therefore the great danger to their mind is the great likelihood that some of them might not fall into their share. Now these amended clauses make nothing at all mandatory. This Dáil is at perfect liberty to bring in outsiders, and they are at liberty to keep them out if they so desire; it is the free choice of this Dáil whether these people come in or not, and this Dáil will select the Committee which is to nominate the people whom they wish to bring in, and these names will be put to the Dáil, and if they do not like them they can turn them down, but the Dáil will be absolutely free. If the Dáil does anything wrong it will be the Dáil's own decision, and if the majority of this Dáil goes wrong it is perfectly entitled to do so. The Dáil is entitled to have its decision whether it is right or wrong, because the majority must rule whether right or wrong. Even in my own case I sometimes go wrong. The case of the Minister for Finance was cited. Now we thought after the President and the Vice-President, the Minister for Finance was considered to be the most important man in the Executive Council. We thought it right that before he submitted his measures he should have the question considered by the Executive Council, and have its consent, if possible. We thought that was only following the usual method by which government is carried on, and I do not think we ought to depart from it. We want it made possible to work smoothly. If the Government cannot do that, they can be got rid of pretty quickly. I do not think there is anything wrong with those proposals. The Dáil will have the doing of the matter, in their own hands, and if there is anything done which is wrong it will be the wrong act of this Dáil, and not the fault of these proposals.

Mr. GEORGE NICHOLLS

I would like to express my entire concurrence with the views expressed by Deputy Gorey, that members are going around the landing canvassing. They certainly have approached myself to try if they could get me to change my views in the matter. This, to my mind, is a most undemocratic proposal, and I expressed my opinion on it in the beginning, when I voted against every amendment, and against the original proposition. Ireland at the present time is in its infancy, as a free Nation, and I think the only argument that would be inclined to carry any weight in favour of this motion is that it was an experiment, and an experiment well worth trying. I think Ireland is too young to start experiments. I think we had much better follow precedent, until we have grown, from infancy to manhood, and then let us tackle experiments when we will be in a position to deal with them. In my opinion, the proper thing for us now is to pick out the best from all the Constitutions of the nations of the world. We have an assorted Constitution before us. I have read other Constitutions, and seen other points. Pick out the best from them, and for Heaven's sake let not Ireland in its infancy start a drastic experiment like this. I would not have spoken at all, only for the remarks of Deputy Gorey about canvassing in the Lobby. I just rise to enter my emphatic protest against an experiment in our infant stage.

Mr. JOSEPH McBRIDE

Listening to the Minister for Home Affairs, it appeared to me that he was arguing for the putting up of a dictatorship—a dictatorship that would not be limited to any specific time, but would be eternal. There is no such thing as individual responsibility in the Ministry. Individual responsibility as it is set down here is nothing more than a pious hope or a pious expression. The Ministry, I presume, will follow exactly the same rule as is followed in any Assembly, no matter whether it is Governmental or not, of consulting upon any measure that will be brought in, and the opinion of the majority will carry. Now, the Minister for Finance is just as responsible for the carrying on of his Department as the Minister for Agriculture, who may be a non-elected member. The Minister for Finance looks to his Secretary or to his Chief Clerk to carry on his Department properly, and he advises him. I presume there will be Chief Clerks or Secretaries in all the Departments of those outside Ministers, or Ministers not elected to the Dáil. There will be Chief Clerks or Secretaries who will run their own Departments, and they will be responsible to them. What is the use of setting up supernumerary Secretaries or supernumerary Chief Clerks—supernumeraries who will not only be Chief Clerks and Secretaries, but who will become dictators? Deputies have talked of experiments and innovations. There is no experiment in this. It is as old as the ages. There is nothing new in history. Those so-called experiments or innovations, though they might work out very well in the beginning, ultimately become a drag on the Nation's onward march. This old-time Nation, now resuming its onward march, must not be shackled by anything hung on to it such as this—a proposal to elect gentlemen to be Ministers who have not been elected by any constituency in Ireland.

PADRAIG MAG UALGHAIRG

Cuidighim-se leis an rún atá os cóir na Dála. Bhí a lán cainnte annseo i gcoinne an rúin, ach sílim nach raibh mórán céile ann.

This resolves itself into one simple question, to my mind, whether a member elected to the Dáil or a member elected by the Dáil is going to be the best possible form of selection. That seems to be what permeates the whole of the controversy that arises here. I submit that this Dáil, if it has been regularly elected, as it will be, by the people should be the concentrated electoral intelligence of the whole community, and it should comply with all the conditions that are attachable to the general electorate in the community, and it should discharge these duties even with a good deal more efficiency and ability than the ordinary electoral bodies would do. I think that would be surely a principle that could hardly, be in question. It is alleged that sinister influences would prevail, and that a great many agencies might be employed, and that a lot of energy might be spent in trying to drive this Dáil astray and to make it do something that was against the interest of the people we are here to represent. Any gentleman who stands up here and at once finds a verdict that this Dáil is likely to do is not honestly following any logical line of reason. These extern Ministers can be removed by the Chamber for stated reasons upon a report of a Committee representative of the Dáil, and they can go out with the Parliament in any case when the life of the Parliament expires, or when there is a General Election. They are bound to go out automatically, or they can be put out by the methods in the clause devised by this Constitution for the purpose. It is alleged here that the extern Minister is going to be some sort of qualified Departmental official who is not to be elected in a democratic way, and that he can perform some sort of hypnotic influence over the whole body that will make them ride roughshod over everything the people may desire. But the Dáil can reject any proposal he makes without affect ing the Government. They can deal with him as they think he deserves to be dealt with. If any proposal of an intern Minister is rejected you at once proceed to a General Election, with all the expense and delay it entails. Deputy Magennis thinks this is useful. He probably wants a new election with every change of the moon. I think it is not at all in the interests of the country that you should have following one another these General Elections. The country cannot afford them. We have not demanded that these men should be selected. We have only allowed an option. That is all we have given. If you do not give an option to National efficiency, what are you going to give an option to? Are you going to close the door to National efficiency? Are you going to adopt the British party system here, where you have two parties who continually keep fighting with each other, and where you have no Minister at all who will be independent of these parties? Ministers will either be on the Government side, or waiting to get in with the turn of the tide, with the new Government. I think you had better leave this option to the Dáil, and show faith in the new Dáil. They will give as honest a decision as will be given by any constituents, and I have no doubt whatever or reservation in accepting this motion. I urge you to accept it, and I am going to support it.

Mr. J. ROONEY

There are so many reasons given for voting here, and one thing or another, that I would not like to give a silent vote on this matter. To my mind there is one very serious principle involved, and it did not occur to me when I voted for this motion on the last occasion, that we were taking the power from the people of Ireland, and giving it to a future President or future Dáil. I consider we should not infringe on the rights of the people, and for that reason I will vote against it.

Mr. GERALD FITZGIBBON

As my colleagues have defended so successfully our joint work against criticism, I only want to reply to one or two points very shortly. Deputy Milroy, who, apparently, had not read the first word of the Report, as he could not find Section 50B in it, complained that you would have the old Castle gang pitchforked into the Ministry, where he said they would remain for all eternity. I leave him to settle that question with Deputy Magennis, whose complaint was that the outside people would not be left long enough to get warm in their position. They might be put out in three or four months, or possibly three or four years. They can settle between themselves where the eternity comes in about that. Deputy Figgis and Deputy Magennis, particularly Deputy Figgis, complained that the Committee had invented an entirely new principle, and he opposed the resolutions because they were a new principle—a Ministry in two parts. He had read the report, but he had not read the resolution of the Dáil which appointed the Committee, as we were directed by that resolution to divide the Ministry into two classes, those who were members of the Executive Council, and those who were not, and we had no other way of going about our business except in dividing it into two parts. We were told the Dáil approved the principle of certain members who should not be members of the Executive Council, and therefore you have the Ministry in two parts, those in the Executive Council and those who are not. The Ministers who are not in the Executive Council were by the same resolution made individually responsible to the Dáil alone and not to the Executive Council for the due performance of their duties. So we did as we were told. We made provision for the election of the Ministry in two parts, one for the Executive Council and one for the Ministers who are not in the Executive Council—the Executive Council which is to be directly responsible to the Dáil, and Ministers who are to be individually responsible to the Dáil. That disposes of the real argument against the principle of this thing, except the one about our having included in the Executive Council the one single Ministry—the Ministry of Finance. The reason, I think, is obvious. If there was one Minister out of the whole collection besides the President who must be a Minister elected by the people and a Minister in this Dáil. it is the man who controls the finances of the Nation, who has to form the Budget, who brings in Estimates, and submits them to the Executive Council, and who is responsible for taxing the people. If there is one Minister over all who should not altogether be outside this Dáil it is the man who controls the purse, because he controls, directly or indirectly, every other Ministry under him. It is when a Minister in an independent office, like the Minister for Agriculture, or whatever office you please, is preparing legislation for the coining season finds he wants money to do it, he must go to the Minister for Finance, who is on the Executive Council, and he has to prepare the Estimate, submit the Budget, and he must deal by resolution under that clause we have already passed for the appropriation of every penny, and of course if he makes it a matter of policy for the whole Government whether the money is to be forthcoming or not, the Executive Council must either take up or reject the proposal of the individual Minister. If they take it up they stand or fall by it. On the other hand, they can say we do not approve of this. We will submit your proposals to the Dáil, and if the Dáil backs you up, then we will see if we can do it. For these reasons I respectfully submit these proposals to the Dáil and ask them to let us get into Committee on them, and then we will welcome all the criticisms we can get for the purpose of improving these matters, because we do not set ourselves up, as Deputy Milroy said, to be Constitutional experts at all. We are just common ordinary members of the Dáil, probably not much worse and certainly not any better than any other Committee, and we welcome any criticisms in Committee.

The question was put, and, on a division, was defeated by 31 to 30, the voting being:—

Tá.

Níl.

Pádraig Ó Gamhna.Liam T. Mac Cosgair.Donnchadh Ó Gúaire.Tomás de Nógla.Riobárd Ó Deaghaidh.Liam de Róiste.Pádraig Mag Ualghairg.Tomás Mac Eóin.Seoirse Ghabhain Uí Dhubhthaigh.Deasmhumhain Mac Gearailt.Domhnall Mac Cartaigh.Maolmhuire Mac Eochadha.Liam Ó Bríain.Éarnán Altún.Sir Séamus Craig.Gearóid Mac Giobúin.Liam Thrift.Pádraig Ó hÓgáin.Pádraic Ó Máille.Tomás Ó Conaill.Aodh Ó Culacháin.Risteárd Mac Liam.Liam Ó Daimhín.Caoimhghin Ó hUigín.Éamon Ó Dúgáin.Éarnán de Blaghd.Seán Buitléir.Nioclás Ó Faolain.Domhnall Ó Muirgheasa.Domhnall Ó Ceallacháin.

Uáitéar Mac Cúmhaill.Seán Ó Maolruaidh.Seán Ó Duinnin.Micheál Ó hAonghusa.Domhnall Ó Mocháin.Seán Ó hAodha.Séamus Breathnach.Peadar Mac a' Bháird.Darghal Figes.Seán Ó Ruanaidh.Ailfrid Ó Broin.Micheál de Staineas.Liam Mag Aonghusa.Seosamh Ó Faoileacháin.Seoirse Mac Niocaill.Séamus Ó Cruadhlaoich.Criostóir Ó Broin.Séamus Eabhróid.Pádraig Mac Artain.Tomás Mac Artúir.Séamus Ó Dóláin.Proinsias Mag Aonghusa.Peadar Ó hAodha.Séamus Ó Murchadha.Seosamh Mac Giolla Bhríghde.Tomás Ó Domhnaill.Uinseann de Faoite.Domhnall Ó Broin.Séamus de Burca.Risteárd Mac Fheórais.Micheál Ó Dubhghail.

30

31

Mr. D. McCARTHY

There is a Standing Order of this Dáil, I think, that when the Dáil comes to a decision it cannot be altered within six months. Is that so?

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

It is, except under certain conditions.

Mr. GEORGE NICHOLLS

The Dáil came to a decision to submit this matter to a Committee. It was submitted, and we have the Report of the Committee. Deputy McCarthy knows as well as we do that there is nothing in his point.

Professor THRIFT

The Dáil did more than submit it to a Committee. The Dáil approved of a principle, and asked the Committee, in accordance with the terms of that principle, to prepare certain resolutions and bring them back. The Committee acted on the resolution of the Dáil, and brought in this Report, judging that the decision of the Dáil had been given on these principles. Now, the vote that has been given to-day reverses the opinion of the Dáil on that principle. I ask for a decision as to whether the Standing Order holding that the decision cannot be reversed within six months applies in this case.

Professor MAGENNIS

I made the point before, and I make it again, that the wish of the Dáil on a general principle was declared. Now, the principle is— certain Ministers are described—and the principle with regard to them is that they need not be members of the Dáil. What is already decided, I submit, does commit us to the view, and we have put it into the Constitution, that Ministers may be appointed who are not members of the Executive Council. I gave the illustration before, and I cannot think of a better one at the moment—if we were to decree that members of the Dáil who wear white hate shall not receive the monthly allowance, that would have no application whatever if there were no Deputies of that description. The same thing holds good and is an exact parallel here. The principle that they need not be members of the Dáil is applicable merely to a certain class described. That is all the length we have got. We should have a vote on the separate proposal of individual responsibility and the eligibility of non-members of the Dáil to be elected Ministers, but that was refused. The only thing we are committed to is that a certain class of men with whom we have no concern are eligible to be appointed from outside the Dáil.

Mr. THOMAS JOHNSON

I submit that the words of this resolution contradict flatly the position taken up by the Deputy who has just sat down—that this Dáil approves of the general principle that certain Ministers shall not be members of the Executive Council; there it is assumed that certain Ministers would not be members of the Executive Council. Such Ministers would be nominated by the Dáil, and be responsible to the Dáil alone; but the very inclusion of that phrase indicates acceptance of that position by the Dáil. I think there can be no question in anybody's mind on that point. The very fact that there is an assumption that there would be certain Ministers who would not be members of the Executive points to that.

Mr. D.J. GOREY

The issue, to my mind, is quite clear.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

Is it a point of order? On a point of order, then, Deputy Gorey.

Mr. D.J. GOREY

On a point of order, I say that this matter was decided on Friday. The only question here for discussion is this particular, report. Did that report do what it was intended to do, or did it not? As the Dáil has rejected the report, you are in the position in which you were on Friday, and that is all.

Mr. WM. O'BRIEN

The Dáil committed itself to a certain principle. Is the report not concerned with details rather than the principle itself?

Mr. KEVIN O'HIGGINS

Several speakers, in the course of the debate that has just concluded, drew attention to the fact that we were debating something that was decided last Friday on the debate on Deputy Thrift's motion, and that, in fact, the business of the Dáil to-day should have been to go into Committee and to consider in detail the appended resolution of Deputy Fitzgibbon's Committee. That was not done. Any suggestions that we were discussing something that had already been decided were ignored by you. The responsibility is on you now, Sir, to find the way out of the rather peculiar position in which the Dáil finds itself.

Professor WM. MAGENNIS

To save the Ministry.

Mr. W. COLE

On Friday a Committee was appointed to draw up suggestions as to the procedure in applying the principle which had been approved in practice. The suggestions made to apply the principle in practice have been rejected by the Dáil. I submit that, as the principle in practice has been found by the Dáil to be unworkable, that the whole thing is rejected.

I submit that the discussion on this report, according to the resolution that was adopted on Friday, is somewhat irregular. It says that the consideration of the report should come before the Dáil later whilst in Committee on the present Bill Either it comes before the Dáil or it comes before the Committee unless the Dáil embraced the two. If before the Committee it is quite possible that the vote that has just been taken is a decision which does not abolish this report for all time. There is no doubt about that, but such a very tight expression of opinion indicates that there are passages in this report which might be acceptable to the Dáil, or at least the speech made by one Deputy confirms me in the view that that Deputy, at any rate, was voting wrongly, and not according to what could have happened if each paragraph, or each Article, rather, were being discussed. Some deputies said that they were in favour of parts of the report, others said that they were in favour of other parts of it, and so on, and the Dáil, as a whole, discussed nine Articles in bulk. I wonder what the position would be if the vote had been thirty-one for and thirty against? Would the Dáil then have been in this position if the Dáil had adopted the nine Articles of the Constitution in the Dáil as a whole? Is it that the Dáil having done that, having passed the nine Articles, would send them after having already passed them twice, in the First Reading and in the Second Reading, before the Committee and run the gauntlet again? The procedure, to my mind, has been somewhat irregular, and I submit that the nine Articles ought to have come before a Committee of the Dáil, and have each Article dealt with on its merits. It is quite possible that the method of dealing with the Articles together would not commend itself to the whole Dáil, but the fact that it has commended itself to one less than the majority of the Dáil certainly gives rise to the opinion that each Article ought to have been considered on its merits, and amended if they were not satisfied.

Mr. SEAN MILROY

I do not understand what the meaning of this discussion is. Do the Ministry want to reverse the decision of the Dáil? Can they not take their beating like men? When you talk about the incompetence of the Dáil to make this decision it is talking sheer nonsense in my opinion. Suppose this Dáil had decided, say, on the Nationalisation of Railways, and appointed a Committee to consider ways and means, it would not follow that the Dáil would reject the principle of the Nationalisation of Railways.

That is what we are explaining.

Mr. SEAN MILROY

I am glad I have converted the Ministers to my way of thinking. I am not contending that we have affected the decision of last Friday, but I am contending that this decision to-day is valid and binding inasmuch as it rejects this report. I presume then we come back to consider the Articles in the original draft, or else appoint another Committee to do their work better than the last Committee.

Mr. ERNEST BLYTHE

I would suggest that in considering this matter of a way out of the difficulty that the Dáil is in at the moment we should leave the six months' rule aside. I do not believe the rule applies strictly, and I do not think it was intended on its adoption to apply in such a way as to hold up a discussion on a matter about which there was difficulty in Committee. If we were agreed that the six months' rule would not apply it might facilitate matters.

Mr. THOMAS JOHNSON

To meet the difficulty I would suggest that we would accept the decision of the Dáil, and revert to Committee stage on the particular clauses of the Bill concerned, and that Deputy FitzGibbon moves the deletion of the clauses and the substitution of this report, Article by Article.

Mr. G. GAVAN DUFFY

I think the suggestion is a very good one. We are now back where we started three days ago Now, it may be that there should be on the Notice Paper a number of amendments which are contained in Deputy FitzGibbon's report. If for any technical reason these cannot be discussed to-day, then it will be permissible, I think, to proceed further with the Bill. I submit as we are on the matter it would be quite simple to proceed this way. I suggest there can be no question that we are now back to the Committee Stage, and must take these clauses one by one, with or without amendment.

Professor WILLIAM MAGENNIS

I desire to support Deputy Johnson's proposal. It enables the Dáil to deal with this matter systematically. If, however, Deputy Fitzgibbon is allowed to move each of the recommendations set out here one by one, we shall find ourselves in reality debating the principle involved, and it might be possible, therefore, to vote for the permissive aspect of the proposal to select Ministers from outside the Dáil. It will admit of us voting separately on the question of individual responsibility and collective responsibility, and so on. In that way we shall be doing what we ought to have done in the beginning, and which I did my best to recommend to the Dáil at the time. The opportunity was not seized. It would have saved a great deal of valuable time, and the only thing now is to retrace our steps. I agree with the Minister for Local Government in that regard.

Mr. W. COLE

I would be glad to have some enlightenment as to the procedure regarding possible amendments that Deputies may wish to submit. If the debate in Committee is resumed tomorrow, according to the Standing Orders we could not submit amendments now.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

Amendments in Committee can be received by permission, without notice.

Mr. W. COLE

I would suggest that the Dáil gives permission for amendments in view of the situation which has arisen. We are up against a novel situation.

Mr. DARRELL FIGGIS

Amendments to what? There cannot be amendments to the clauses of a report that the Dáil has rejected.

Mr. W. COLE

Not at all. I refer to amendments to the original draft of the Constitution.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

I take it the matter is not so difficult as it appears.

Mr. D.J. GOREY

I wish to support Deputy Johnson's suggestion, and I do so because one Deputy has assured me that the reason he voted against the report was he did not like one line in one particular clause.

I said that when I was speaking; I knew that.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

As regards the various points of order raised: When in Committee it was proposed to appoint a special Committee to go into particular clauses, I think I pointed out that only the Dáil could appoint a special Committee. We came out of Committee and I think the President himself moved that a special Committee should then be appointed. It was appointed and it had to report to the Dáil; it could not report to the Dáil in Committee. When it reported the adoption of the report had to be moved——

Not necessarily, I should say.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

When it was moved to-day, the understanding was, that a vote for the report did not mean that the Articles put in the Appendix of the report became part of the Constitution. It meant that these Articles would be taken up in Committee instead of the Articles standing in the draft Bill. That was made quite clear. But it was also understood that if the report were adopted after discussion on the principle again, we could not accept amendments in Committee to these clauses which aimed at the principle. Now the report is lost and it seems to me that we go into Committee on the original clauses and not on these clauses of the report.

Do you rule them out as amendments?

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

When we are in Committee on the original clauses we have a Standing Order which enables amendments to be proposed without notice, if allowed; that is to say, with special permission. That seems to be the situation.

Mr. W. COLE

The report, as a report, is gone. In Committee we will consider clause by clause and anything in the report dealing with the particular clause under discussion could, I presume, be submitted as an amendment.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

Certainly. That would be my ruling.

Mr. THOMAS JOHNSON

I move that the permission of the Dáil would be given to Deputy Fitzgibbon to move that the recommendations which stand in his name as the Chairman of the Committee shall be taken as amendments.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

I hardly think that is necessary. The Standing Orders deal with that matter.

Mr. G. FITZGIBBON

I think you might add to that that they might be moved by any member of the Committee. I am quite sure the other Members do not intend to run away and leave me to hold the fort.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

My ruling was that the recommendations embodied in the Report, in so far as they are relevant to particular clauses, could be moved, without saying by whom. If the Dáil agrees, we can go into Committee on the clauses contained in the original draft.

The Dáil agreed, and then went into Committee.

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