Vol. 3 No. 14
I suggest that we should take amendments 2, 3, and 4 on the paper before amendment 1. If Deputy Johnson agrees to that procedure, Deputy Gavan Duffy will move amendment 2.
Amendment 2:—"In Sub-Section (1), after the words `income tax' line 8, to insert the words `under the assessment from which the time for appeal shall have expired."
There is a misprint in this amendment. It ought to be under "an" assessment instead of under "the" assessment. On the last occasion when we discussed this matter the Minister for Finance scored a point handsomely. He pointed out that the collector was not the person who assessed one, that it was the person who collected one's money, and I make him a present of his success in scoring that point.
I really cannot hear what the Deputy is saying.
I did not catch the observation.
The President thinks the Deputy resembles the President in being rather inaudible.
I do not much mind what the gentleman who assesses us is called. I think a rose by any other name would smell as sweet, and it does not affect the point of the observations I made on the last occasion and which has prompted me to put in this amendment. The difficulty arises, firstly, from the use of the word "levied"—when a person makes default in paying the sum levied on him in respect of income tax." I do not know what that means. I do not know if anybody in the Dáil knows what it means, but if the Minister will look up the Income Tax Act, he will find that nowhere is an assessment spoken of as a levy, and I take it that what is meant is that a person makes a default in paying a sum assessed, whereas the word "levy" is appropriate to a distress but not to an assessment. The result is this that the Minister will not know, and nobody will know, at what time the collector is entitled to operate. I want to make sure that he cannot operate by way of distress until the victim's time for appeal is exhausted. Under the present Income Tax Act the collector does not get put into operation at all until the time for appeal is exhausted. That is the present law, and the Minister will find it in Section 153 and Section 197 of the Income Tax Act of 1918. The collector must wait to get his warrant until the time for appeal is up. Now, I shall be told that that is the intention here, but if Deputies will refer to the first Section they will see it expressly provided in Sub-Section 2 that the existing Income Tax law is only to have effect subject to the provisions of this Act. Instead of this Act being read subject to the existing law, the existing law is to be read subject to this Act. Therefore, when a collector, or an Income Tax Commissioner, comes to interpret Section 7 he will say to himself "I am not bound by the existing practice as to when the collector is appointed, or when he starts operating." Under this Act distress can take place independently of any previous law whenever there is a default. In other words, owing to the way this Act is drafted the collector may be in a position to put in a distress before the time for an appeal is exhausted. That is what I want to avoid. The use of the word "levied," as I said before, raises a difficulty, because nobody will know what that means. Nobody will know when a person has made default in paying the sum levied upon him, because that is wholly the wrong word to use in respect of assessment, and, therefore, the collector or Commissioner will be in a position to say, the moment the assessment is made and disputed, under this Section, that the law can be put in force at once against the unfortunate Income-Tax payer. Now, I do not suppose for a moment that was originally intended, but I would ask the Minister to discuss that matter with his legal advisers, and undertake to have it put right. I repeat that if a different word from levied was used the difficulty might not arise, but the Clause as it stands certainly does open a vista of considerable trouble, in view of the fact that owing to Section 1 of this Act the collector and the collector's operation will not be limited by the existing law, which prevents the collector from starting operations until after the time for appeal has lapsed. I desire to state again, in the hope that it will enable the Minister to accept the amendment, that it provides that the time for appeal must elapse first, just as in the case of Sections 153 and 187 of the Income Tax Act, 1918, dealing with the giving of instruction warrants to collectors.
I am advised that the proposed amendment is unnecessary. This Section only applies where any person in this Section called a defaulter makes default in paying in a sum which may be levied upon him in respect of Income Tax. There can be no question of anyone making default with regard to the payment of an assessment within the time prescribed for the hearing of appeals, since the duty on such assessment would not become legally payable at all; of course, there would be no question of levying duty in such a case.
Can the Minister say what is the meaning of the words "default in paying in any sum which may be levied"? What is the meaning of the sums levied in respect of Income Tax in that connection?
Read Section 6.
I think it is perfectly plain on the face of it.
I do not think it is clear at all.
I move: "In Sub-section 1, after the word `assessment,' line 9, to insert the words `(being an assessment under Schedule A).' This amendment is not technical and, perhaps, it will have a better fate. I am in this unfortunate position that when an amendment of a technical character comes on the law adviser is not there, and, therefore, nothing can be done.
We have done a lot with the last amendment.
Perhaps the Minister for Finance will recollect that on the last occasion when we discussed this Bill he stated that we were all quite wrong in supposing that it was intended to utilise the words "defaulter not named in the assessment" in order to distrain upon employers, and that that expression merely had reference to Schedule A and nothing more. I am asking him to say so in the Bill, and I suppose again I will be told it is unnecessary. I want to read to the Dáil a Section of the existing law, Section 208 of the Income Tax Act of 1918, which makes very necessary that correction. It says: "The provisions in this Act which are applied to the tax under any particular Schedule, shall, if also applicable to the tax under any other Schedule and not repugnant to the provisions for ascertaining, charging and levying the tax under such a Schedule be applied in ascertaining, charging and levying tax under that Schedule as if the application of those provisions had been expressly and particularly directed." So that whatever the Minister's intention may be, it is perfectly clear that he will be entitled, if this goes through as it is, to utilise this Section, and the words I have mentioned in this Section, against employers whose employees have not paid taxes, although as he says all he wants is to put in those words to meet cases under Schedule A.
The Deputy has given me something in this Section. I do not want that, and I am not going to take it.
Does the Minister adhere to his statement that only Schedule A is intended?
That is not what I said, sir. If you look up what I said you will find it is not that.
I have read in print what the Minister stated, and it confirms my recollection. He was scoring a point against this and he said, "Put in Schedule A, if you like, to make it clear what you do mean."
I am clear as to what we do mean in this. The Deputy wants to give me something that I do not want, and that I am not asking for. I could, perhaps, meet the Deputy by suggesting that after the word "notwithstanding" in line 8 there could be inserted the words "in the case of a Schedule (A) assessment."
I will accept the Minister's amendment instead of my own.
Surely the word "and" should go in before "notwithstanding"; it is purely a matter of English.
I am advised that the Section as it is, is right. If it is so desired, I will withdraw my amendment and bring the matter up on the next Stage.
It would be simpler if Deputy Duffy would withdraw his amendment and the Minister for Finance brought this matter up on the Report Stage.
There was a general agreement on the Minister's amendment. It is only a question of grammar now.
If it is any advantage I will withdraw my remarks.
Amendment: "To insert in line 8 after the word `notwithstanding,' the words `in the case of a Schedule (A) assessment.' "
Agreed to.
The next amendment by Deputy Johnson is consequential on a matter which was already decided.
I move now to delete the whole Section.
Perhaps it would lead to simplification if instead of having an amendment to delete the whole Section there was a mere opposition to the Section as a whole?
I asked to have amendments Nos. 2, 3 and 4 put first, in order that the first amendment could then be put, and should a vote be called for it would be taken on a motion that the Section should stand.
I take it that we have before us a Bill that has passed the Second Reading. The Bill is thrown to us and we are asked to deal with it line by line and clause by clause. We are considering it clause by clause, and this is a definite motion that Clause 7 be deleted. I think that is the form we ought to adopt in these matters. If the clause is not deleted then it stands.
I do not want to press this matter, but at an earlier part of the proceedings I voted under a misapprehension. It would be desirable if we could get some ruling on this matter as to whether we are going to allow motions of this kind or not.
If Deputy Figgis voted Tá for Níl, or Níl for Tá, it was not because the matter was not sufficiently explained from the Chair beforehand, I hope. In this matter there was a certain difficulty which I am endeavouring to solve, but for the moment, at any rate, if the Section were moved, and if Deputies asked for a division it would have the same effect as moving to delete the Section. In other cases where a Deputy proposes a motion to delete, and then desires to amend the Section there is a little difference. In this particular instance, if we take the motion that the Section stands, and discuss that, it would be the simplest thing. We will be able to give a definite ruling on the whole matter in a very short time.
I move that the Section stand part of the Bill.
The objection I have to the Section is the same objection that I had to a similar proposal in the Enforcement of Law Bill. The provisions in regard to that Bill, as already stated in the Second Reading of this Bill, were contested here by a variety of Deputies representing all sections, but they were defended because they were temporary, and were to meet an emergency which would not last beyond the end of September of this year. It is now intended to make them part of the ordinary Income Tax law, so that in future when any defaulter from the payment of Income Tax is, in the opinion of the collector not likely to pay by other means he will issue a certificate to the Under-Sheriff to collect such goods, chattels or cattle, as the Under-Sheriff may decide, and take those goods, cattle or chattels to any part of this country, or any other country to sell in any way he wishes. He may also use the '"bum-bum' bailiffs, the super-bailiffs, this little army of persons who were established under the last Act, to collect such property, cattle, chattels, as the bailiff may decide he would require. He may do all the evil things that were empowered to be done under the last Act. On the occasion of the discussions on the last Bill when these provisions were first inserted, most of the assumption was that the provisions would be required for the collection of cattle, the transferring of cattle to a distant market, and the selling of those cattle in a distant market, without the knowledge of the debtor, and to avoid the chance that the debtor would collect a body of people to frustrate the sale. The cattle might be taken by any means or any route, to any place across the water to be sold. But the provisions of this Bill will apply not so much to the owners of cattle. Probably they will be more applicable to the owners of furniture or pictures. I think Deputy Magennis had something to say about it. And the connoisseur of pictures will have his pictures taken to Christie's sale rooms in London, and knocked down to the bidder who will be able to act in collusion with the seller, and really without the knowledge of the debtor. All these things that were objected to so strenuously, and only defended on the ground that they were to meet an emergency, have been inserted in this Bill dealing with the collection of income tax. They are not only going to apply to the debtor. It is not the person who is refusing to pay income tax only that is to be brought under the provisions of this Section, but the employer also; despite the insertion of this amendment or the promised insertion of this amendment, the employer will be a defaulter if he refuses or neglects to pay over to the Accountant-General such sum as is levied upon him. He will be in the same position as the debtor to the collector, and the collector, who is a law unto himself, has simply to put this Section in motion and arrange for all the proceedings that we have objected to regarding the collection of debts under the Enforcement of Law Act. The President, in an earlier speech on this matter, said that they were not going to allow the law to be laughed at, and have a distraint upon goods, and confine themselves to selling in the neighbourhood of the debtor's residence or premises, and by virtue of a boycott of the sale make the distraint of no value. I think that that is a conjuring up of an almost impossible situation, because the income tax debtors are not the kind of people to excite a great deal of sympathetic action of the kind that the President refers to. I cannot imagine a rich merchant in the City of Dublin who has not been able to collect income tax from his employees having his goods distrained upon and then being unable to sell them anywhere in Ireland. But, even were it so, the prospect of having those goods sent over to England or Scotland or France or Russia or anywhere at the discretion of the Under-Sheriff, provided he can make a case to satisfy some authority that is not mentioned, is a very bad proposition, and I hope the Dáil will reject it. It perhaps will be pointed out that the powers under Sub-section 11 will only exist until the 30th September, because the Act that has already been passed, the Enforcement of Law Act, expires on that day. I do not know whether it is intended that these exceptional powers shall expire at the date mentioned. But I would not like to risk much on the chance that the Ministry will not bring in a new Bill extending the time beyond the 30th September. It is about the easiest thing they can do, to bring in a formal Bill that the enactment will extend beyond the 30th September, and then the law for the time being, referred to in Sub-section 2 of this Section, will apply to the collection of arrears of income tax. I do not think anything can be said in defence of this Section, and I do not think any amendment is going to make it acceptable. I hope those who are interested in the income tax payers and in the employers who are not able to collect the arrears will vote against the motion and for the deletion of this Section. The emergency that was spoken of during the discussion on the Enforcement of Law Bill will not last as long as the income tax has to be collected. But this Bill is intended to continue. The powers under this Section are not intended to cease at the end of September. They are intended to be a continuous permanent provision, and are just as bad in this as they were when they were proposed by the Minister for Home Affairs when he was arguing for the Enforcement of Law Act. I will ask the Dáil to refuse to pass this motion that Section 7 remain part of the Bill.
An Leas-Cheann Comhairle at this stage took the Chair.
Having advocated these provisions in the Enforcement of Law Bill, and having become more or less acclimatised to the kind of criticism that was levelled at them, I rise now to defend and to advocate their insertion in the Finance Bill as special provisions necessary, if the income tax of the country is to be collected properly, collected adequately, and if the necessity for the payment of such tax is to be made abundantly clear to all citizens. If the Income Tax Act is wrong it should be amended or repealed. If it is not wrong it should be observed. And just because it is a burden, just because it is imposing a burden on the citizens, it is important to see that the burden is borne by all, and not merely by some. It is important to see that no citizens are allowed to shirk their particular share of the burden, throwing automatically and mathematically an additional burden on their neighbour. Deputy Johnson opposed these clauses in the Enforcement of Law Act. He finds it a natural thing and an easy thing to oppose them now. If Deputy Johnson had the responsibility which for the moment we have, he would be gratified by the result of the Enforcement of Law Act, extremely gratified. I could show him statistics for the various counties going to show that that particular Act was quite a good auxiliary to the Ten Commandments. The people all over the country suddenly became aware that they owed money for goods received, and began to remember that there was an obligation on them to pay for those goods that they had undertaken to pay for. In the same way, I trust that when this Act is passed, after some months it will be possible to show Deputy Johnson or some other person who is now a critic that the effect was good, and that the end justified the means.
That is the argument.
That, in short, is the angle into which it is brought, because, I take it, no Deputy suggests that there is anything intrinsically or morally wrong in this provision. It is a matter of facing up to certain facts in the national character and mentality and making provision to deal with them. Let us face them here, because we have to take a grave decision. We know that there are people in the country who will defy and set at naught a democratic and native Government who never defied or set at naught a Government imposed on this country, and which had no responsibility to it. We know that people have taken the field against the first native Government here, who never took the field against the foreign Government, and, just as surely as we ought to face and realise that fact, will we have to face and realise the fact that people who paid taxes normally and automatically to the British administration in the past will try to evade them when imposed by a responsible native administration. That is not a pleasant feature to dwell upon, but it is true, and every single Deputy knows it is true. It is, if you like, something of the slave mind. At heart they had much more respect for a foreign administration than they have for their own, whose sole right and status are that they stand here elected by the people. Income tax must be paid; every tax imposed here by this Parliament must be paid; and Deputies must not stand up, as Deputy Johnson has, and put the view that a debt to the State is no more than a debt due to the grocer or the tailor. It is something more, and the very fact that these special provisions are embodied in the Finance Bill is evidence of the recognition, by us at any rate, that it is something more, that it is a stronger claim, a more important claim, and a claim that must be enforced by more stringent measures than are at the disposal of the grocer or the tailor or any other private individual. This Section 7 is the evidence of our belief that liabilities to the State are more important than liabilities as between one citizen and another within the State. Day after day we have most far-reaching claims made on the State. It must drain the Barrow, it must provide roads as smooth as glass, it must build millions of houses, it must vigorously take up afforestation. These are all things that any sane citizen would like to see taken up and pushed to a conclusion, and as near perfection as is humanly possible. If we are to do a half or a fourth or one-tenth of them we must push the corresponding claim of the State as against the citizens at least as strongly as the claim of the citizen against the State is pushed day after day by Deputies. The administration of the country must be paid for by the citizens of the country. If taxation is not paid, if it does not come in, and if revenue cannot be collected, there is no use talking about big loans for one reconstructive purpose or another. The credit of the country will be good in proportion to the extent to which it can collect its revenue, and will be bad to the extent to which it fails. We are not asking any extraordinary or revolutionary steps from the Dáil. In the previous Section it was suggested that because power was sought to attach a man's wages, or portion of them, it was a startling step, and yet a garnishee is a routine thing. It was merely an extension of that principle that was sought here. Similarly there is no hardship involved in this. If people clear their minds of their sympathy with defaulters that clings to them because the Government in the past was not responsible to the people, if they clear their minds of these heritages of the days when we were unfree, and when the Government was not responsible, they will see that there is nothing startling asked for in this. You are asked to take the most effective steps to close all possible loopholes by which defaulters may slip out of their liabilities. Is it proper to leave one single loophole which you could possibly close? I submit that it is not. The sooner we face up to our responsibilities, face the realities of the situation and get rid of this lingering maudlin sympathy with defaulters, the more readily will the whole country follow suit and develop a sense of civic responsibility. As long as people in the Dáil are talking as if a man was a bit of a hero who cheated the State and picked his neighbour's pocket there will be talk to a much greater extent——
Will the Minister give us any reference to such a suggestion?
The general tenor of criticism of this Bill, of this section, and the previous section, has proceeded much along these lines—that you ought to leave some little room for a man to slip out and not to push things too hard. I suggest it is our duty to slam and bolt the door on prospective defaulters, and it is not our duty to leave a single inducement to a man to cheat the State. When you get down to analyse this section, where is the injustice? If a man is assessed for so much, he has his opportunity for appeal. In the long run there must be finality somewhere, and people must pay their taxes. We are simply out to show that instead of profiting by trying to evade their taxes, the probability is that they will make a handsome loss by that course. If any Deputy can point to a genuine hardship or injustice under Section 7 or the previous Section, we are perfectly open to consider it, but there is no hardship, and any advocacy that has been put forward against either of these sections has been put forward very much from the point of view that there should be sympathy with the class of people with which these Sections deal. There should be none. If the State is to shoulder all the responsibilities that are placed upon it, if it has to answer all the claims, there must be quite a strong and clear recognition of the claim of the State on the citizen, as there must be no sympathy, least of all representative sympathy, with the defaulter.
I want to repudiate at once the suggestion of the Minister, that the opposition to this clause in the Bill, and to a similar clause in an earlier Bill, had any reference at all to sympathy with the defaulter. It is because we see in it the introduction of a system of autocratic Government——
Prussianism.
And the gathering together, in the hands of the Executive, powers which British legislation had taken from the legislature because of the evils attendant on the accumulation of power in the hands of the Executive. The system of the protection of the citizen against the Executive has been a very long and continued growth. It has been the movement towards freedom of the British people, the freedom of the people against the Executive, because the Executive inevitably tends to gather unto itself powers that are going to deprive the citizen of liberty. You had your debt collecting machinery. You had your process of distraint, and the powers given to the Sheriff and the Under Sheriffs. Those powers were limited so that the debtor would have some supervision over the action of the Sheriff, and the Sheriff would have some responsibility to the citizen. You have removed that in this. You have given him powers that take him away from the control of the citizen. You leave him entirely in the hands of the Executive, and no check——
Pardon me. Is the Executive not in the hands of the citizens? Is not the responsibility of the Executive to the citizen?
The Minister is indeed very innocent. Responsibility to the Executive ultimately and undoubtedly is in the hands of the citizens. So nominally was the responsibility of the Kaiser; nominally the Kaiser was responsible to his people; the Czar adopted, Charles I. and all the tyrants have adopted, the same argument that the Minister here has adopted to-day. It is not a question of morality. It is a question of political expediency. "The political end justifies the political means." It is not a question of morality. When the Minister here defends this proposition on the grounds that effective collection of tax justifies the barbaric means, justifies means that are not defensible from any point of view of democratic government, and are not defensible from the point of view of civic liberty then he is going the way that Governments tend to go, the way to tyranny by bureaucracy, which will deprive the citizens of individual liberty.
Civic liberty to evade taxes.
The Minister says that the powers he is now asking for are necessary so that the citizen must be compelled to pay. Have you so little trust in the responsiveness of this community to what is right and lawful, that you think they will always refuse to back up the Executive in the collection of just debt, and is your trust so little that you must take means to withdraw the property you have seized under the special provisions with an armed guard, and take it away to England or Scotland, or to other places, to sell it outside the supervision of the citizens of this country?
That clause is permissive.
Certainly it is permissive. The whole Act is permissive to the Government, to the Executive, and if they want money they will act upon it. It was permissive for the Czar to hang his revolutionists. Permissive! That is put forward as an excuse. Of course it is permissive. We want to deprive you of that power.
What I meant by permissive is, that the provisions in that Act would be availed of only where the circumstances seemed to warrant them. While extraordinary powers are placed in the hands of the Under Sheriffs, it does not mean that the Under Sheriffs shall automatically put those powers into operation. But where they deem at necessary they shall be entitled to do so.
Exactly. It gives the collector of income tax debt the power to say to the Under-Sheriff, "Collect this debt in due course, and those are your powers." The only check upon the abuse of those powers is with the Minister himself. The Home Minister will intervene and tell this executant of the law how far he is to go in carrying out his duties. Even in this the Home Minister wants to exercise the authority and control over the man who is empowered to carry out the execution of a decree. Again, it is an interference that the Ministry is taking in the administration of justice, and one can see in a dozen different ways that the Ministry we have now is interfering with the administration of justice, and believes it is doing that by right. The matter will come up in another way, but we have statements that the Ministry is, in fact, suggesting to Justices what they shall do. Here you have another example of that kind of mentality which assumes that the Ministry has authority to interfere with the courses of the law. I had hoped that the experience of the last two or three days in England might have suggested that it is not desirable to out-step the normal processes of law in these matters, and that the political Ministry is not an authority over and above the law. The provisions in this Bill are intended to give to the Ministry, at least to embody in law certain powers that will simply add to the authority of the Executive for the time being and take them outside the influence of public opinion. The Minister defends the provisions of the Bill by saying that they are only intended for putting into operation when the Minister for Finance wishes, when the Commissioners for Income Tax wish, but if there is anything at all in the processes of law, as we have argued before, once the matter has left the Court, once the matter is put into the hands of the Executive Officer, the Ministers ought not to interfere. If you, through your collector of income tax, hand over to the Under-Sheriff the power to collect by this means, to distrain, to remove to another place, and to sell at such a price as he thinks will cover the debt and the expenses, and if he makes the expenses very much higher than they need be, you have no right to interfere with his course of action; your only right is to prosecute him for having exceeded his powers. It is too big a power to give to an Under-sheriff. An Under-sheriff and the people that he gathers around him are not the kind of people that you ought to give these powers to. Bear in mind this does not merely refer to debts that have accumulated during these last two or three years. This is a permanent Bill, and it is intended to apply to arrears of income tax at any time in the future. You are trying to embody in this Bill these powers, and I say it is a scandal that the Government should, at this time, try to do any such thing.
When I was very young—and even that is at last beginning to recede a bit from memory —I remember hearing a tale that caused these particular hairs to stand on end like quills upon the fretful porcupine. It was the story of a man that went up into a mountain and received two tables of stone having inscribed thereon the Ten Commandments. I heard that when he came down from the mountain he destroyed them. Apparently the whole tale was not told me at the time, or at least it was not told to the law-giver at the time, because, had he only known that the Minister for Home Affairs was waiting at the bottom with an auxiliary to the Ten Commandments he might not have destroyed them. That auxiliary to the Ten Commandments, of which he stood in advocacy some months ago when it was before this Dáil, was specifically told us to be merely emergency legislation. We were told that the justification of it was that it was only to be for six months. Now, by what one cannot describe as much other than sleight-of-hand, the provisions are put into the Finance Bill and made of their nature permanent for inclusion in subsequent Finance Bills from year to year. Whatever the justification for the original Bill, now an Act, for the enforcement of powers as a temporary measure, I opposed it then, and I do not think that the case was made out. I do urge that the case is not made out anyhow for putting it as a permanent provision in a Finance Bill to last for twelve months, and once these things have been adopted in a Finance Bill they have a habit of being perpetuated in Bill after Bill and becoming a permanent part of the instrumentality of the State.
The Minister for Home Affairs stated that objection to this Section meant, and was based upon, sympathy with defaulters. That was a shameful thing to have said, because nothing has been said in this Dáil that at all approximates to that. No sympathy has been expressed. On the other hand, no case has been made out that the ordinary process of law for the collection of Income Tax has failed, and I dare venture to say that, apart from these provisions, the methods of collection were completely adequate for the collection of Income Tax, and that the real case for inserting this Section now in the Finance Bill is, not that the others were not adequate, but that they do not provide a sufficient short-cut for the Executive, which is quite another matter altogether. If one had put as part of the advocacy for this Section that all the provisions that are to-day available, apart from this Section, had been employed, but owing to the special conditions in the country—which happen to be the argument for the Enforcement of Powers Act—these ordinary means failed to collect the Income Tax the citizens owe, I am sure that every Deputy in this Dáil would agree that, whatever the debts of the citizens, either to one another, or to the State, these debts should be and must be collected. But no such case has been made. This is simply put forward here for providing a simple method for the Executive getting straight down to business and short-circuiting all the ordinary legal processes that are at the moment available; not only short-circuiting these processes but short-circuiting—and this is a more important matter still—the justifiable set-offs which the citizen might demand, because with these powers in the background, with these provisions remaining where they are, there is no reason why there should be any delay in considering the niceties of justice in matters of assessment. With these powers in the background all those niceties might easily be dispensed with, because at once the Under-Sheriff and his new bailiffs may be unloosed, as the Executive, having these powers in these provisions in their possession, might then be able to say: "We say this is owing, be it so." Consequently the provisions are put into executive effect at once. That is where the real danger of the Section comes in. I state, in the first case, that it is not desirable, that it is a very improper proceeding for any Executive to come to this Dáil and to ask for certain measures on the express plea that these measures will not be enforced for more than six months and, having got them in that form, then to put them into another Bill where they become a perennial matter. In the second case, I state that it has not been shown to this Dáil that the ordinary methods have failed, and until that proof has been given, we are right to believe that the ordinary methods have not failed.
Whereas we do know that with all Governments it is a natural disposition and propensity that they would like to have at their disposal some auxiliary to the Ten Commandments by which they can at once put executive power in force and obviate the necessity of meeting reasonable objections. The Minister for Finance may tell us that all the ordinary appeals still remain. That, no doubt, is perfectly true, but what is the effect and what is the value of these ordinary appeals when they can be hastened forward, when it is known that these drastic provisions remain for the instant collection of whatever the Executive may allege to be owing? It is wrong to say that there is any sympathy in the Dáil—and it is a remark that should not have been made—with those who attempt to evade obligations imposed by the Dáil. But this Dáil has a dual function. Having appointed its Executive to undertake that collection, it has also a direct responsibility to the citizen to see that the citizen's rights in the matter are also protected and that drastic powers of this kind are not made over to any Government whatever. The Government have already powers that are quite sufficient for the carrying out of the collection of such income tax as may be owing, powers in which, though they now exist, in a large number of cases have not yet been enforced, simple and reasonable powers, not powers like these, which are drastic and unreasonable.
It seems to me that when we hear all this talk about Prussianism, and the Czar, King John and King Charles that there is very little sense of reality of the situation, very little sense of perspective or proportion in the matter. What might be a very necessary safeguard in one set of circumstances and at one particular time may be merely a clog on the administration of the law at another time. For my part, I believe that the greatest part of the Enforcement of Law provisions are provisions which might very well be embodied in the permanent law. There are some of them that would require modification if they were to be made permanent, but, on the whole, they tend rather to remove safeguards which were inserted in the law at other times and in other circumstances, safeguards which to a very great extent had become obsolete. It is well to bear in mind that what might be a struggle for liberty at one time might not in other circumstances be anything of the sort. The arguments seemed to be based on some sort of idea that the Executive here, which may be turned out at any moment by a vote of the Dáil, is to be regarded as in exactly the same position as the administration of the Czar or the Kaiser. That is nothing less than ridiculous. It is quite safe, from the public point of view, to entrust a democratically appointed and a democratically controlled Executive with large powers which might be exceedingly dangerous in the hands of an Executive that could not be easily removed. It is quite right once an order of the Court is given that the Under-sheriff should execute without any interference from the Executive Authority. Nobody, I think, will challenge that, but if when the Under-sheriff is given special and wider powers than he had heretofore—powers perhaps wider than you would give in normal circumstances—there are ways of dealing with the Under-sheriff if he abuses these powers. If the Under-sheriff proceeded to seize and send goods away to a distance and purposely incurred costs that were unnecessary and could not be justified, no Executive could stand that would not take steps to deal with that Under-sheriff.
We need not have it argued that an Under-sheriff is a Czar who cannot be displaced without a revolution. One would almost think, from arguments put forward, that there was no possible way of dealing with the Under-sheriffs if they abused the power given them. Any official who abuses his powers, whatever the powers are, can be dealt with, and, just as Deputy Fitzgibbon said you cannot prevent corruption by legislation, neither can you prevent the abuse of powers by any safeguards. You can make them more difficult by safeguards, but the real thing is that you have power to deal with any person, from the highest officer of the State to the lowest officer, if he requires to be dealt with. There is no doubt at all that we are not in a condition where the citizen has to struggle against an overstrong Executive. We are not in a condition where the citizen is crushed by the weight of Executive authority. We are not in circumstances where the law is too strong, and where the individual not only has to obey it, but must be crushed by it. We know very well that the law is not enforced, that the powers in the circumstances that have existed, and now in the hands of the enforcing authorities, have not been sufficient to get uniform and general obedience to the law. Now, in view of the morale in this country and the circumstances at the present time, it is necessary that the Executive Authority charged with the enforcement of the law should have very wide and strong powers. If you have an Executive over-strong and the people not free, and suffering under Executive action, then the changes that are to be made should be in the direction of curbing the power of the Executive and protecting the people. We are not in circumstances where the power of the Executive requires to be curbed and the people protected from the Executive. It is because we are in circumstances different from those of the time of King Charles or of the Czar that all the arguments advanced against this Section are entirely or mostly irrelevant. It is a case of false analogy, and it will be possible, if it is found that the necessary powers which are now asked for are at any time used rigorously, to modify them. Nobody can say that any particular system or device for the enforcement of the law which is provided will always be satisfactory. Sometimes it will operate too strongly against the individual citizen; sometimes it may not operate strongly enough, and as circumstances change the legislation can be changed. But in asking for this we feel that stronger powers than we have had hitherto are necessary. Everybody knows quite well, in the case of a large number of people, you must have, in view of all the difficulties that we know so well in the way of the enforcement of the law, all necessary powers, you might say summary powers, so that there may not be time to conspire to circumvent the people who are charged with the enforcement of the law.
They are not summary powers, they are "wintry" powers.
I think Deputy Johnson overlooked the fact that the Minister for Home Affairs has an incurably feudal mind; he might have stepped out of the pages of Ivanhoe. You cannot argue with a man of his convictions. I am sorry he has left the House, because I should like to give him the benefit of that compliment in his presence. I am sure the Minister himself is wholly unconscious of the fact that it is impossible to argue with him, and, as a result, this has been degenerating into a Second Reading debate. When a man tells you, as we were solemnly told, that a debt due to the State is something more, something higher, and something more sacred than a debt due to an individual, equally justly, there is no use arguing with a man like that. What Ministers do not seem to understand, when they object to criticism of this particular clause, and when they suggest that criticism may not be based upon sympathy with a defaulting debtor, is that this is supposed to be a democratic State, and that there is a fundamental objection to anyone, with the most elementary democratic notion, of importing the military to collect civil debts. It is not the duty of the Army. They do not like it, and ought not to be called upon to do it. On the last occasion several of us asked the Minister to tell us why these extraordinary powers were necessary. It was pointed out to him that the State has already very rigorous sanctions indeed at its command. He did not tell us why these powers were necessary, and we have not been told to-day. We have not been told whether the existing machinery is deficient. Perhaps, I am now getting into the Second Reading debate, but I really rose to call attention to two points of detail which seem to me to make the section worse than it would otherwise have been. First of all, when one wanders through this very long section and its sub-sections, one fails to discover any provision whatsoever giving the ordinary protection to certain classes of goods. It does seem a little singular that, when the Minister for Finance decided to pay this highest form of flattery to the Minister for Home Affairs, and put in section by section all the lovely things that the Minister for Home Affairs evolved two months ago, that he should have overlooked, in some curious way, that little section that did give a certain amount of protection to the unfortunate victim. I am sure it was an oversight, and that I have only to point it out to the Minister so that he may correct it. The fact remains that, if he does not correct it, the State, as has always been the case, will be put in the position of ignoring completely the usual sorts of special immunities that have existed in the case of distress or execution, on the theory that the State is the Crown. There is another matter which I should very much like to have cleared up. A number of assessments have been made and sent in and are now due for payment. These assessments, in at least some cases, and I am inclined to think it is general, were made under the British Government by British officials against people who did not send in any income tax returns, acting on the instructions or— if the Minister does not like that—with the approbation of Sinn Féin at the time. For failing to send in returns they had assessments put upon them far higher, of course, than the assessments that would have been made had they made returns. Everyone knows that the income tax officials' practice is to put the higher assessment on a man in order to induce him to send in a return of his income. That is the usual common practice, but it is most unfair in the present case, most unfair in our present circumstances, that we should treat as good and valid to-day assessments made during the War with England by British officials against people who did not make income tax returns because they did as they were told. Does the Minister think that is fair? The assessors, certainly, had no sympathy with the people whom they were assessing, and on principle they were bound to put an assessment higher than the right figure in order to induce the income taxpayer to send in a return the next time. We all know that they do that. The present position is that you have hundreds, it may be thousands, of these assessments standing out, made under these circumstances, assessments over which no one could stand for a moment, except technically; assessments which are manifestly unfair and are bound to be unfair against people who did as they were told. They did not send in any income tax returns, and these are the people against whom this section is to be put in force. I hope the Minister will be able to tell us that he has not any intention of carrying out these powers, if he gets them, against people in that position. He will surely say, as the Dáil will say, that people in that position are entitled to have an opportunity of sending in income tax returns now. My information is, and it certainly is true in some cases—I believe it is true generally—that since the present Government came into office persons liable to pay income tax, and against whom such assessments had been made, have not been called upon to make returns in respect of these preceding years, but the assessments made against them in default by the British officials have been treated as good. I can actually produce cases where that has been done, and I think it is grossly unfair that it should be done. I should like to hear what the Minister has to say on the subject, and to know that he is prepared to meet cases of that kind.
I will take the last case mentioned first, and that is as regards assessments. I observe very closely what the Deputy said. I did not hear him say—he may have said it, but I did not hear him—that the other assessments that have been made by us were assessments in excess of the amount of income of the persons concerned. It was simply that the assessments were in excess of previous assessments agreed upon between themselves and the British Government.
Not at all. The assessments you proposed to collect were excessive assessments made in default.
Excessive assessments of what kind? Is it in excess of the income in the individual case? I think the Deputy well knows that most people had an extraordinary reticence about disclosing the whole of their resources to the British income tax collector, and that reticence may still be with them, and if their case is that they are only entitled to be assessed now on the amount that they would have agreed upon at the time of the British Government, we have no sympathy with these cases. If they are cases where the persons were assessed in excess of their income, and that there had been allowances by reason of the bad advice and unbusiness-like advice and the unauthorised advice of men like the Deputy, who told them not to send in their income tax return, I think there is a case there for consideration. Certainly I should say with regard to allowances and with regard to assessments, "I am not clear upon the number of cases, nor of the justice of the cases, and there has been a lopsided view." The Deputy charged the Minister for Home Affairs with having a feudal mind, and with being in essence a sort of feudal baron. But the Deputy may have the other sort of man in view, the man who thinks that the Government is against everybody in the State. That is not the case in this instance. The Government have the best of good wishes for everybody assessable, and only hope that the incomes of all these people will improve, and that they will realise that they must pay what they can. There is a member in this Dáil who did not return his income tax forms or make any response to the repeated applications of the collector. That was in the years 1919, 1920 and 1921, and I exhorted that member to do so. He is a member of this Dáil now—he is not here at the present moment—but he will bear me out in what I say. I said to him, whatever the circumstances of the case, not to return your income tax form is bad, and you are bound to lose. If within a few years we come in you will be salted. If, on the other hand, we lose and the British have authority they will salt you. In any case you are bound to lose.
That was not the view of your Cabinet.
I never heard a single member of that Cabinet give any other advice than that. I recollect the then Minister for Finance, the late Commander-in-Chief, on every occasion that the matter came up saying we would only agree to advising people not to pay income tax on the condition that they paid it to ourselves. Now, there is an entirely different view taken on the part of the Deputy with regard to income tax.
I am wondering why the President and his friends burned the Custom House and destroyed all the income tax papers?
If there is going to be a division on this Clause I intend to vote for the Clause. All I intend to say——
I had not finished. I only gave way to an interruption.
I beg pardon. I only hope the Minister will not say anything that will make me change my mind.
The point that has been urged by two of the principal objectors to this Clause, Deputy Figgis and Deputy Gavan Duffy, is that we have made no case for it. Assuming that you require to have a case made for it, it is obviously one in which you have got to admit that there are arrears of income tax not paid, and that there is difficulty at the present moment in collecting the ordinary income tax accounts. If the Deputies show any doubt upon that I will give them plenty of evidence on it. I should say there is something like £3,000,000 of income tax due at present. I spoke already of the City of Dublin case, in which something like 2,000 persons, drawing fine salaries, have not paid. The sum due is something like half a million. I have had many representations from the Revenue Commissioners to the effect that certain collectors throughout the country were not earning the salary they were getting from us, and that we would have to change them, and so on. What more proof is there that you require in order to convince you of the necessity for this particular Section?
I told the Minister the point is, you have already very drastic powers, and why take these extra powers?
I have no sooner answered one Deputy than up jumps another and raises some other point.
That was the original point.
I originally made the objection.
Now, if I sit down again, sir, some other member will stand up, and I think it is due to Deputy Fitzgibbon that they should not interrupt him a second time.
It is due to the Deputy that the Minister for Finance should not misrepresent what is being said by him. I originally raised the objection, and what I said was that it had not been shown that any attempt had been made to collect these outstanding debts by the large powers that were now available.
If any Deputies have grievances, they can raise a question of personal explanation afterwards.
Of course they can and they can speak four or five times, or six times, if necessary. "There are large powers available"—what are the large powers? The collector can distrain. Just imagine an unarmed collector walking in to a man of the fierce demeanour of Deputy Figgis and saying: "I am going to take up your library." What would the Deputy say to him?
"For the love of Mike——"
"Use discretion."
Now, the collector is not a sufficiently strong institution in this country to warrant him taking any liberties when there are such unusual quantities of arms and such a large number of Irregulars knocking about. You have constitutional Irregulars as well as military Irregulars. We have not the power that we require, and we are asking for it. We are asking for some power. We are not asking for more than there is in Scotland. I believe the same power exists in Scotland, where the defaulter can be referred to the under-sheriff and the under-sheriff has power to sell up. We are asking for more in this sense, that we do not want to sell in a neighbourhood where an agitation can be started against what Deputy Figgis calls the Executive. On every conceivable occasion the Deputy gets an opportunity he avails of it to pour odium and contempt on the Executive. Now, he will have that opportunity within the next two or three months. He will have twenty-six platforms and twenty-six constituencies all over the country, and he can go around and roar at the people and inform them of the iniquities he knows that the Executive is guilty of, and he can tell them that no matter how well the war has been won, no matter how much revenue has been collected, Ministerial Stock is going down. That is one of the great advantages of the democratic institutions that we have provided in the Constitution. I hope the Deputy will not look at me so fiercely, because I am a very timid kind of man. The Executive is owed between two and three millions. It is not the Executive that is owed all this, it is the State, and when Deputy Figgis succeeds me as President, or as Minister for Finance, I want to make sure that he will have that much money in his pocket, that he will be able to satisfy the payments that come in from all parts and from his own constituents, payments in circumstances that we have to satisfy, when he is going up for election.
It will not matter then.
I want to start him off for the credit of the country, so that the new Executive, when they come along, will be in a position to pay debts that they are going to contract; that they will be in a position to go before the world and to say, "Taxation here means revenue, and taxation does not mean a joke"—a short cut for the Executive. I should say that if we were living in feudal times the Deputy's head would probably be upon one of the pillars outside. That would be rather a short cut for the Deputy for his disrespect. Sleights-of-hand were also spoken of. Now, what should be the principal objective of every member of this Dáil is respect for Government. Here is a Deputy who is in one of the most respectable constituencies in the country——
The most respectable.
Pouring odium and contempt upon the very institution that is supporting him in the country, and that is making it safe for him to walk the streets and for people to raise their hats to him—emergency legislation he called it. We wanted it for six months for the ordinary citizens, during which we can collect their debts, but six months for us is not the same thing as six months for the ordinary citizens, because some of this money is not yet due. They will not have their assessments, the legal niceties that have been referred to by the Deputy will not have been settled, and we will require that— not we who are sitting here—when the Deputy and much more respectable and much more heavily weighted members are sitting in these Benches and requiring these powers. It will not be put up then that it is because of the Deputy's infirmities that he will be looking for these powers, but he will be able to say, "Thank God, I am not as other men; I have not had to look for powers that other men had to look for." Now, Sir, the legal niceties referred to by Deputy Figgis arose on the question of assessment and appeal. The collector cannot operate until all those questions have been settled, until all questions of appeal have been dealt with, and there is no doubt whatever that the man owes the money, the only doubt being as to whether the Government is able to collect it. I think that, under the circumstances I have made my case for the retention of this Section, and that it is a good case, and that the Dáil appreciate it, and I leave it to them.
I was going to support this clause if it went to a division for reasons that have been restated by the President, and which were stated by him when he moved the Second Reading of this Bill—that is that there is at present £3,000,000 of income tax uncollected, and that it has been running into arrears for three years, the people having got out of the way of paying taxes. That seems to me fair justification for these two clauses, but it does not seem to me any justification for making these clauses permanent, as they practically are by this Bill, and I had intended, if I had not been distracted from it, to put down an amendment strictly limiting the duration of clauses of this kind, and it is my intention, if the rules of the Dáil permit, to put down such an amendment for the next stage of this Bill. It is no answer to the criticisms that have been brought against these clauses to say that this is an excellent way of collecting taxes. I agree entirely with the Ministry that it is their duty to use drastic measures to get in the arrears that are now outstanding and to overcome the disinclination to pay taxes which has increased greatly during recent times. But surely it would be a shocking criticism upon the Government by themselves if they were to tell us, as they have told us to-day, that they will want these drastic powers in perpetuum. What sort of Government do they intend to carry on, or do they think that other people will carry on in this country, and how is it to be carried on if you are continually to resort to measures such as this for extracting your taxation from your citizens? The Minister for Home Affairs told us that even to a foreign Government these taxes were paid with great regularity without going into arrears at all until the other day. Surely, when the home Government gets settled down they will be paid with equal facility; not with willingness, as no one loves to pay taxes. One pays with a grumble, but one does pay one's own Government. The reason we object to these drastic clauses, both in the temporary Enforcement of Powers Act and this one is because they go far beyond what justice needs. There is no justification in normal times to empower a Sheriff to carry distress out of the country and to sell it necessarily at great additional expense to the debtor. There is no justification in normal times for such a provision as there is here; that unless gross negligence can be proved no action can be brought against the Sub-Sheriff for carrying out this. Surely for ordinary negligence he ought to be liable in normal times. It is because these provisions go far beyond what has ever been required in any civilised country in normal times that we do not think they ought to remain on the Statute Book for ever, when this country is restored, as we hope it soon will be, to normal conditions. It is because the conditions are not normal, and because I am satisfied that what the President said on other occasions and to-day, that abnormal means are necessary to enable arrears of taxes to be collected, that I support the Bill on this occasion. But it is because I do not think that powers such as these are justified in normal times that I shall certainly do whatever I can to prevent these powers being made in perpetuum. It is quite true, as the Minister for Local Government has said, that you cannot safeguard the abuse of powers by legislation, and it is for that very reason you ought to be very careful how you confer abnormal powers, because if you cannot safeguard against the use of these powers by legislation, you ought to take very good care that you do not confer powers which are liable to be used beyond the point which is absolutely necessary to effect the object in view.
As a matter of historical accuracy, I think I should say, in answer to one of the statements made by the President in reference to the payment or non-payment of income tax two or three years ago, that a certain organisation which sprung up in Ireland, largely under the inspiration of the National struggle, had a demand served on it some considerable time before the Treaty was signed, for income tax. The Executive of that organisation consulted the then Minister for Finance, the late General Collins, and after that consultation they got a letter from the Minister for Finance telling them not to pay their income tax. If the Minister so desires, I am in a position to give him the name of the organisation.
In supporting Deputy Johnson's amendment I would like to say that my reason for doing so is because to my mind Section 7 is really unnecessary, as you will have no defaulters in the country who refuse to pay their income tax. I am sure that the farming class will not—at least it was said here some time ago that their pockets were only bursting with the readiness to pay the Government. I do not know whether that can be really said of the majority of the people, especially when we take into account that in 1920 all the County Councils, the Mental Hospitals, District Councils, Poor Law bodies, etc., were all under the jurisdiction of the General Council of County Councils. At a meeting of that body in 1920 it was unanimously decided that no income tax returns would be furnished to the British Government, and when the representatives of the Councils came back, their statement was that the officials of these bodies were to pay no income tax, and to furnish no returns in respect of income tax. Now, I think it is very hard on those clerks and officials who acted at that time on the decision of the General Council of County Councils. I think I can distinctly state that President Cosgrave did act at that meeting as Chairman. He was then Minister for Local Government. He should remember, if the people of Ireland decided to act in regard to his wishes, that it is not necessary now to come forward and ask that we should get permission of the Government, now under his jurisdiction, the same as the Committee were at that day, and that those people cannot afford to pay their income tax, as they did not save the amount of money. Are we going to place an instrument in the hands of the Government that they can call upon a sheriff or the debt collectors and get the military to seize the furniture or any other items in people's houses if they cannot find the money to pay up the arrears of income tax? I would like to explain that I am very much interested in a good number of officials in my own constituency. These officials do not intend to deprive this Government of their income tax. They are quite willing to pay, but there is a certain little concession they would like to receive at the hands of the Government, remembering that they acted according to the directions of the Government in 1920, and that is that the officials of these bodies not having paid any income tax for three years, that that amount of money should be paid by the County Councils and deducted from the employees in three instalments over three years to come. I think an action of that kind would be appreciated, and would certainly go a great deal more in favour of the Government than trying to terrorise people, for terrorism makes irregularism, and you will never in any shape or form be able to terrorise the Irish people. Surely every Deputy fully realises the necessity of arousing sympathy where you can. You can get around an Irishman and get him to do anything; you cannot drive him, you may lead him. I ask the Government to do the same thing with regard to the defaulters who have not paid their income tax, to give them a chance and you will earn a better name for yourselves than by terrorising them. I support the amendment, and will certainly vote against Section 7.
I just want to touch on another aspect of this amendment. Perhaps the Minister for Home Affairs will take note of it. There is no provision for rendering an account to the debtor of the proceeds of a sale of his goods. It may be implicit in the ordinary law relating to distraint, but there is a complaint abroad that goods have been seized under the provisions of the previous Act, which embodied these powers, and sold, and no account has been rendered to the debtors of the proceeds of the sales. They do not know whether the proceeds amount to as much as the debt, or are in excess of the debt, or only by a curious combination of circumstances just fit the debt. No balance has been handed over as between the amount of the debt and the result of the sale, and no further demand has been made for a balance, so that we have got to presume, too, that by that curious combination of circumstances and foresight on the part of the distrainers they have just been able to seize the right amount of property and to get the right amount of purchase money to meet the debt plus expenses. The debtors complain they have not received any account of the sales.
I would be anxious to know whether the Deputy is talking gossip or speaking with personal knowledge of specific cases. There is a difference, and a difference that would be of material interest to me. If the Deputy will supply me with any definite information with regard to cases in which he puts forward a definite suggestion of fraud I will undertake to have the case investigated.
I have not suggested fraud. I suggested that the debtor knows not what was the result of the sale of his goods.
You spoke of peculiar coincidences. If it happened the goods seized precisely covered the amount of the debt, neither more nor less, there was underlying that a suggestion of fraud, but as I say, is that gossip or has he any personal knowledge that is worth the consideration of a Government Department? If he has I suggest it is his duty to forward it to the Government Department, so that it may be seriously considered, but to get up and give out what may be, for all I know to the contrary, tea-table or dinner-table gossip with a view to prejudicing the particular matter under discussion is unseemly and unbecoming a responsible Deputy like Deputy Johnson.
I would ask the Minister to say if he will tell us categorically that the accounts had been rendered for all the sales that have taken place under the previous Act, and what provision is there under this Section to ensure that the debtor will have an account rendered to him of the sale?
The Deputy knows the provisions of the Act as well as I do. Should it happen in any case throughout the country that the Under-Sheriff fails to comply with the provisions of the previous Act, then there is an obvious remedy in the hands of the people who have been wronged.
I will supply you with the case.
I will be very grateful, but in addition to that, may I point out, that if the law is broken through the country, if particular persons' legal rights are infringed, it is the concern of someone besides the Minister for Home Affairs to go and set those legal rights in motion. The citizen is supposed to know the law; certainly the citizen's solicitors are supposed to know the law, and if a particular legal provision has not been complied with, and if, in consequence of that, the citizen has been wronged, he has his remedy. I will look into this case; it has an interest for me. It is an evidence of the probity or the want of probity of the officials who are carrying out these seizures.
Will the Minister assure the Dáil that within the provisions of this Section it is compulsory on the Under-Sheriff to supply the debtor with an account of the sale and of the proceeds?
The Sheriff, under this Section, would not be relieved from any responsibility that he would have in the case of seizures carried out as distinct from this Section. It would be on all fours. There is the necessity for rendering an account in the case of a seizure. The existing law provides for it, and the Sheriff would be bound by that when performing the duties imposed on him by this Section, just as he is bound at present.
The Minister for Home Affairs has reminded us that every citizen is supposed to know the law. I wonder does that include the Minister for Local Government?
No.
I am glad to have the assurance that that is not so, because it defends the Minister for the speech which he delivered a few moments ago. The Minister for Local Government is under the impression that no matter what grievance a defaulter whose goods have been distrained upon may have, there is no reason for him to do other than rejoice because the Executive would make it all right for him in the long run. I hope the Minister will challenge me if that is a false or even an imperfect representation of what he said.
I have great pleasure in challenging the Deputy. It is a false and imperfect representation of what I said.
I listened to the Minister, as I always do, with the closest attention. I need not say why. I for my part, with no doubt imperfect hearing, heard him assuring the Deputies opposite that the Under-sheriff would do nothing wrong, or if he did there were remedies. What is the remedy? What is the remedy when he has got absolute immunity by this Section for everything except what he does through provable malice or gross negligence, except the interference, the bureaucratic interference, of the Ministry? The Minister for Local Government drew a very excellent distinction between the Czardom of the Executive and the Czardom of the local collector of income tax exercising the powers with which he is clothed by this Section. It is quite true that under a democratic Constitution such as we have secured it would be impossible for the Executive, who can be turned out of office by the outraged sense of the people's representatives, to exercise despotic powers. I quite agree. But if an Act of Parliament is passed clothing the minor official with despotic powers, how is the exercise of those powers to be corrected except by bureaucratic interference, so that the liberties of the subject are in the last resort to be defended by what is a still worse and grosser infringement of the liberties of the subject—that the Ministry should interfere in the lower machinery and mechanism of the administration? That is my objection, and has been my objection from the beginning to this Section. I have nothing but the most cordial sympathy with what the Minister for Finance said, when he proposed, as he called it, to make a case on the demand of Deputy Gavan Duffy for asking for these powers. I should be thoroughly inconsistent if that were not so, because I have more than once declared, and I am strongly of opinion that it would be far better for good citizenship if we replaced indirect taxation by direct taxation; and being an advocate of Income Tax, as a great source of revenue for the State, I am particularly jealous with regard to anything in the administration of the exercise of the financial powers in connection with Income Tax. Anything that is done or it is proposed to do that will bring Income Tax into odium or contempt unnecessarily, is, to my mind, an offence against good government. That is my principal reason for opposing the demand for those extraordinary powers.
To be quite frank, I go further and agree with the Minister for Finance that this is not a normal situation, and consequently desperate diseases require desperate remedies. If a remedy of this type is required we should arm the Minister for Finance with necessary power. But we may go too far, and I take the liberty of suggesting that this is going too far. There are others not so constitutionally minded in the Executive as the Minister for Finance. The Minister for Local Government began his speech by declaring that he thought the major portion of what is here was borrowed from the other Act. I can never quite remember the name of that other Act, and I had to refer to it to-day as the Under-Sheriffs' Omnipotence Act, because that is a very fair description of it, although it is not the title.
The Minister for Local Government would like to make this permanent. There may be others not quite so candid but equally strong in the belief. If the Ministry are returned to power at the next election, we may have Bills in which these things are continued; in fact, the machinery may be improved upon. I do not want to make Income Tax unpopular, and I do not want the Government to be unpopular. I want this administration to go down in history as an illustrious, an admirable, administration. Why will it insist on having credited to it, as amongst its sins, that it has unnecessarily enabled what are colloquially called "understrappers" to exercise despotic powers? Now, this is called rhetoric. It has been again and again exclaimed against as a tempest in a teapot and as exercising our souls unnecessarily over imaginary grievances. I would ask the Minister for Local Government, who takes that attitude towards the opponents of a particular Section, to read it. With your permission I will read a few of the choicer passages.
Read the whole of it.
Take Sub-section 10, for instance. The moment a collector has issued a certificate to the under-sheriff, observe what the under-sheriff can do, and do with impunity. There are places I remember in the Alps where there is a notice forbidding anyone to laugh or sneeze or shout under penalty of a heavy fine, for the simple reason that the vibration of the atmosphere so set up will precipitate an avalanche, and once the avalanche proceeds to slide down the mountain-side, whole villages and huge forests will be swept away. Look at what is proposed: "Every person who after the passing of this Act shall in good faith purchase at a sale held by or under the authority of the under-sheriff any goods, etc., taken in execution by such under-sheriff under any such certificate as aforesaid, shall acquire a good title, valid against all persons, to the goods, animals and chattels so purchased, notwithstanding any invalidity or irregularity in or about the seizure or sale of such goods, animals or chattels."
In Sub-section 12 it is stated, "no action shall lie against an under-sheriff for or on account of his having entered or broken into any lands, house, close, or other premises for the purpose of taking into execution under any such certificate...." Sub-section 13 states: "No action shall lie against, and no penalty shall be incurred by, any under-sheriff in the absence of fraud, malice or gross negligence." I am afraid the Minister for Local Government could not have read this Bill. It would be necessary for the aggrieved party to prove negligence. Now, there are between two-and-a-half and three million arrears of Income Tax outstanding, and the State is entitled to have those taxes paid, and undoubtedly through irregularities— spelled with a capital "I"—it would be possible to frustrate the ordinary operation of the law. It would be, in certain districts, a piece of fatuous nonsense to advertise a sale or to attempt to conduct it there, and necessarily the Minister for Finance must be invested with special powers. Surely there is no necessity to go to those grievous lengths. Why invest the under-sheriff with the character of a Czar? Without fear of being accused of using rhetorical language without consideration, I repeat that you invest him with the power of a Czar. He is to be the sole judge of the place, the time, and the manner of the sale. No negligence of his, except it is palpable, gross negligence, is he to be taken to account for; no action, no penalty. We are now told the ordinary law imposing an obligation upon the sheriff is not abrogated. What a delightful position to create? The law still remains by which the sheriff is accountable, but the under-sheriff is not accountable, and it is the under-sheriff who by this Bill is given all those powers. I could understand the sheriff being vested with additional powers and some slight modification of the ordinary law being put in, but here you actually confer on the subordinate official such powers as I have stated.
He is not a subordinate official.
That is perfectly true in one sense. Though he is the under-sheriff he is not the under dog.
The taxpayer is the under dog.
He is a subordinate official in the administration. The citizen after all has some rights. The Minister for Finance said that the collector has his rights as well as his duties. What irritates me in this matter is not merely, as I already complained, that it brings the income tax as an institution into hatred and contempt, but this also. This is the second occasion on which the present administration has spoiled its chances at the next election. The farmers have been irritated unnecessarily by a recent measure, and here again it is the farmers who will be chiefly hit. The Minister does not regard me as being seriously concerned about the safety of the administration in the next election. That is because he allows himself to be influenced by phrases; he allows the newspaper's invention of the title "independence" to hypnotise him, and he does not realise that his friends are trying to save him from the consequences of his own folly.
I should say that something like 60 per cent. of the tax is collected without any force, or even the necessity for employing what is called moral suasion. The next 10 per cent. is is a little expensive, the next 10 per cent. is expensive, and anything over that is costly. It is the last 10 per cent. that we are concerned with. We do not get the whole 100 per cent., but in connection with those between 85 and 95 per cent. we want, not so much the powers, as the fact that we have got them. Everybody knows that under the Constitution there is not a more democratic State in the world, and everybody knows what facilities are provided in regard to the so-called unfortunate income tax payer, or an alleged income tax payer, and that at least he has three members, and at most nine members representing his constituency who are in a position to assail the Minister for Finance or the Minister for Home Affairs, or the whole Ministry, for any undue pressure that may be brought to bear on him to get this particular impost that he is liable for, the same as eight-tenths of his brethren in the State. Although a good deal of criticism has been made against the Enforcement of Law Act, there has been no criticism that I know of that has been brought up here which can point to any grave lapse of sound administration in carrying that Act into practice. We all know that an Act of that sort must and ought to press unduly on some section or individual in the community, and yet, looking over the question here, and hearing the representations made to the Executive Council, I do not know of any case in which there has been proof of undue severity in the exercise of that particular Act. What are the facts we have in mind? One case came before our notice in which there were formerly two fields, and anyone who has knowledge of the country realises that land marks are most difficult things to efface. If you question that, go to Tara and see the mounds that have resisted centuries of changes. They are there still. In one particular case, where there were two fields with a ditch between them, modern civilisation has removed the ditch, so that where there were two fields there is now only one. The gentleman who occupied, let us say, what was field A now occupies both A and B. We sent down our officer to collect, in respect of a certain debt, and it is alleged that cattle were seized on field A, formerly his property, though it is impossible to point out which is A and which is B, because the land mark has been obliterated. That is the case that is covered by this particular section to which the Deputy has taken exception. We have here a conspiracy to defeat the ends of justice, and in that case, what position would the under Sheriff be in? He goes into a place where, formerly, there were two divisions but now there is only one, and the occupier says "You did not collect that particular bullock, or that particular cow, on my land and it is not my property you seize." When there is a case put to us that there is real injustice inflicted on any individual who assumes and responds to responsibilities as a citizen, then there is a case made for wiping out any such section or sub-section as we have put in. I understand that Deputy Lyons stated that I presided as Minister for Local Government over a meeting of officials, etc.
I did not say that you presided at a meeting of officials, but at a meeting of the General Council of County Councils in 1920.
Yes. Of course, continued repetition of the facts of the case may weary members to death. I hope they will not. The facts of the case are:—Local Authorities, as such, suffered serious loss by certain grants of monies, and other revenue being withheld by the British Government, and in consequence of that, and in virtue of my position as Minister for Local Government, I said, "Do not pay any of the charges that are made against Local Authorities by the British Government. When the British Government pays us what is due to us in respect of Local Authorities then we shall off-set our liabilities in this with respect to Income Tax, loans, etc." As regards officials there is no fear of the assessments being in excess of their salaries, because their salaries are down. If it is in respect of property it is surely their right and duty to discharge their debt in respect of Income Tax, bearing in mind the fact that they have lost nothing by the withholding of grants. They have been paid to them. Some time after the Treaty the Minister for Home Affairs was in London, and together with Michael Collins and Mr. Eamon Duggan secured back £1,300,000, which made good all the money withheld by the British Government in respect of those grants. Local Authorities have lost nothing. It is their duty to pay, and if I gave them advice to withhold Income Tax that was necessarily reasonable and sound advice at that particular time, but I never said to them they should withhold all that Income Tax and put it in their pockets. It was a set-off to greater sums withheld from them. They got them and their liability for smaller sums remains.
I agree that the amount of money owing to the Co. Councils has been got by them. The officials who were working for Co. Councils owed three years' Income Tax, and members of this Dáil are aware that those officials did not put that money aside until the Government would call on them to pay it. I only ask that certain facilities for payment be given to those officials who are willing to pay, and that it should not be collected from them in a manner that would put their dependents on the rates.
There is no fear of that. We have already agreed to accept any reasonable instalments and to grant any reasonable accommodation required by business people, professional people or anyone else, on representations in respect of such persons being made. In one very important section of the country that undertaking was given six months ago, and we had no difficulty. It is not a question of the State coming down with a strong hand upon those people, but it is a case of the State taking such precautions, and adopting such proceedings as will ensure that what is due to us will be paid.
I hope the Minister will not think me factious in pursuing this matter further. I am 99 per cent., in fact I am 99.87643 per cent. in favour of his proposals in view of the special circumstances of the moment. It may be my error, but as I interpret the proposal in Section 7, once the local collector has furnished this certificate to the Under-Sheriff it is in the discretion of the Under-Sheriff from that moment, and these guarantees which the Minister for Finance is good enough to proffer now can hardly be brought into play to restrain the Under-Sheriff. The case I tried to make was if the Minister did, say, enforce them, then to do a little right he does a great wrong. He is introducing into the wording of the administration a thing which the Constitution should not tolerate. Why not, therefore, introduce into this Bill some of those mitigating elements to which the Minister for Finance has just referred. That, I understand, is all we have been contending for. At least, it was that was mostly in my mind in speaking on the Second Reading. There are arrears. Owing to the arrangements about which the Minister has satisfied us the monies when collected are to go to the service of the State. A good citizen of the Free State ought to pay to the measure of his liability, but the Minister for Finance admits there would be men grievously hit if the total amount of their arrears were to be demanded, and collected from them now, and if they were to be paid in one sum. He has generously assured us that every facility will be afforded people in that unhappy position. Why not have that in the Bill instead of this terrific power being given to the Under-Sheriff first practically to ruin the man? The Under-Sheriff is to exercise his unquestioned, unrestricted will. Instead of permitting the Under-Sheriff to do all those extraordinary things, why not put in as a qualifying clause in regard to the defaulter, what a defaulter is for the purpose of this enactment?
I quite agree that there will be, at the most, ten per cent. at the final lap, so to speak, of this race against Income Tax collection for whom these measures will be required to be instituted. But for the protection of some of the other persons it seems to me it would be easy to introduce into the Bill such a definition of a defaulter as would make those powers exercisable only against those for whom there can be no possible sympathy on the part of a good citizen. Therefore, I wish to make my position clear. I have in consistency, on principle, to vote against this Section, as I spoke against it on the Second Reading. On the other hand, I feel that I ought to support the Minister for Finance in doing everything reasonable, that I ought to support him with my vote in procuring such powers as will secure the greatest amount of collectable tax for the State, and that in the most effective way. But in that dilemma I must give my first consideration to the citizens and to principle. I have no definition of a defaulter ready to offer, but it would not be a matter beyond the power or the abilities there are at the disposal of the Minister so to define defaulter for the purposes of this Section as to bring it about that when the under-sheriff does seize, and sell, and do all manner of things, that are absolutely of the Czarist type, that no properly-disposed citizen should raise even a murmur of disapproval.
The man who will not pay the taxes which he is able to pay, and which are justly due by him, is a bad citizen and, undoubtedly, he commits an offence against his fellow-citizens, and they should not seek to protect him from the consequences. These are elementary doctrines, elementary principles of good citizenship. On the other hand, I am quite sincere and serious in stating that I reprehend anything on the part of the Ministry which will have the effect on the outside public of exciting antagonism in their souls. There is a tendency undoubtedly amongst all of us, partly a tendency belonging to human nature in general, but partly a tendency created in us by past misgovernment, by which we resent the exaction of taxes on the part of the State. We have all got to be taught that we are in a new relation to the State, and that with that relation comes a new duty and the necessity for a new spirit. But everything that will retard the creation of that new spirit, that will promote friction instead of kindly subjection to the requirements of the Executive, is all so much to the bad. It seems to me, therefore, that the draftsman might come to our assistance and make this measure more acceptable. It is not through any factious opposition I desire to say that, and it is not because I do not realise the position in which the Minister finds himself, but because I wish to save the Executive from committing a mistake. I say that in all sincerity.
There is one point I would desire to put before the Minister for Finance. These special conditions—both the provisions set out in this Section and in the previous Section—are put in because of the exceptional circumstances. So we are informed, and we know that the circumstances are exceptional. But they constitute what may be described as the machinery of the Finance Bill, and that machinery will be the permanent machinery of the Finance Bill if the practice in other countries is observed in this country. The taxes enclosed in the machinery may be varied, but the machinery itself will be continued from year to year. Obviously that is not the intention. But, I think, a great deal of the hostility both to this Section and the Section that precedes it in the Bill might be removed if the Minister for Finance were to agree to consider the raising on report, either on an amendment by a Deputy or on his own instance, of limitations in time of the provisions in these two Sections, that time to be limited to such a period as would enable the collection of arrears of Income Tax to be made. Let it be, say, for two years, which would give plenty of time for the collection of all arrears or to have got the arrears into seemly shape. Let the time be stated, and in this first Finance Bill of this new State, let it be clearly understood that these exceptional, these drastic provisions are not intended to be ordinary provisions, that there is a time when they will terminate and these Sections will drop out of subsequent Finance Bills.
I wish to say on this first Finance Bill of this new State that everybody ought to be made pay, and not have one or two particular sections paying. The section that I represent has been made pay. They have visible property throughout the country. They have been harassed and worried and they have had to pay. We are not against these provisions because the people whom we represent are not concerned; they have already been dealt with. The people who do represent big incomes are speaking for them in this Dáil, and have spoken in this discussion. We have not spoken, because we do not represent people with big incomes or very taxable incomes.
Deputy Wilson spoke.
I am speaking about this Committee. When one section is made pay let all the other sections be made pay, and not have a set of swindlers living on the rest.
Will the Minister give the assurance, which would satisfy a good deal of anxiety, that so far as the debts for Income Tax due by the agricultural population are concerned, they have all been paid?
I think they have. I could not tell you off-hand. I am sure they are all very honest people.
They do not require soldiers to collect them.
I will be telling them that in a couple of months' time when I go down there.
Be sure and tell them that no matter what you think.
I would like to say that these are exceptional powers asked for by reason of our experience not alone of the difficulty of the collection of Income Tax, but of the difficulty of collecting other debts, rates and so on. Nobody knows better than members opposite how serious a dislocation to the people they represent was the non-collection of rates in certain parts of the country during the past couple of years. There are two or three counties, at any rate, in which there was great danger to the ordinary services, so essential to modern civilisation, by reason of the fact that rates were not paid.
By honest men.
There were more than honest men in it. Honest men sometimes withheld payment, because they saw other people not doing their share.
And will do it again.
It is right to say that in one part of the country the people for whom Deputy Gorey speaks, and the people he represents directly and indirectly, the farmers and the Farmers' Unions, gave us every possible assistance, but their strong case was "We will not pay, and will not advise members to pay any of this year's rates, until the arrears of last year have been collected from the people who will not pay." That was their case, and it was an honest case, and I had to admit the honesty of it. Everybody who knows anything about the collection of debts knows that to leave them outstanding for any length of time makes them more and more difficult to collect as time goes on. The non-payment of rates, the non-payment of ordinary debts, rendered very easy to persons affected the repudiation of Income Tax. I have spoken before about the necessity for maintaining the credit of the State. In a short time we will appeal to the public. It is quite possible that one of the reactions of stabilisation will be that there will be no money, as it will be required for the extension of business, and will be eaten up in the competition for shares in various Irish concerns. Deputies who have studied the Stock Exchange returns within the past month or six weeks will have observed that there is an extraordinary improvement in practically every security and every investment that is quoted on the Stock Exchange. There is competition, and the more competition for it the less money there will be, possibly, to lend to the State. We will probably have to go outside the State—though, I hope not— in order to get people to invest, and the very first question that will be put to us in connection with that is—"How is your revenue, and are the people responding to the laws of the State in paying their contributions?" We will want to be in a position to say that for the past three years there has been no respect for Executive authority, there has been no general support for the central administration, but there has been an improvement, and we have taken steps to strengthen the improvement, and to render it almost impossible for any individual in the State to escape his liability. We will have to point out that 15 months ago when the late leaders asked for Committees of Public Safety, and so on, they were denied them; that for the best part of two years we have had no police in the country, but that even with all that the revenues of the State were fairly paid in the circumstances, and that the ordinary administration is gradually approaching stabilisation; that there is general acceptance of the principle of ordered Government, and that apart from that we have secured, in any of the laws we have passed exceptional powers which will prevent people, who in every State seek to escape their responsibilities, from doing so. That will be the best argument to show that the credit of the State is being maintained, and that notwithstanding the fact that these are unpopular things to do, we at the very moment that our existence was threatened, and that the safety of the State was threatened took on this unpopular task and faced it, knowing full well that the sound judgment of the people would ultimately vindicate us with regard to it.
The powers that are asked here will be invoked with the utmost care and only in cases where the collector is able to satisfy the inspector that it is impossible for him to enforce payment, except by the operation of these provisions. There will be no general handing over of cases to the Sheriff at the discretion of the collector. Every case will be carefully scrutinised by responsible officials. We are giving away nothing, absolutely nothing in that case. It will not pay the State, and it will not pay the Executive, and it will not pay anybody to put any man out of business, to harass any citizen. It would be simply damaging the credit of the State and making life more unstable if we were to do that. Certainly that is not our intention. The present remedies are slow and expensive. It means bringing people before the High Courts if we want to avail of the services of the Under-Sheriff. The collector at present has this power, but it is limited to the extent of sale in the immediate vicinity of the seizure, and by reason of the fact that he cannot call on the resources of the State when dealing with an abnormal situation. When you ask us to say: will you give us this for a year or for two years? we say in all honesty— there is no reason why we should ask for these powers for two or three years; only the exceptional circumstances of the times warrant us in asking you to make this an Act of the Parliament. You can criticise future Executives for any unusual operation of the powers granted here. They may never be necessary.
I do not believe they will be necessary, but you will render them absolutely unnecessary if you can always point to the fact that you can use them at the necessary moment. Before any steps are taken under this clause, the Revenue Commissioners will arrange to notify defaulters as to their position, and at the same time inform them that, if they have any claim for a reduction of the taxes, they should get into communication with the Inspector of Taxes. Technical objections will not be pressed where the appeal period has lapsed, provided the taxpayers come forward and make reasonable efforts to have their liabilities adjusted. In any event, no case will be placed in the hands of the sheriff before a period of three months, from the passing of the Finance Bill, shall have elapsed. When I was taxed with the fact that we had a six months' Emergency Powers' Bill, I pointed out that that Bill will have run its course before we will be in a position to stake our claim under the provisions embodied in that particular Bill. Now, what I have got to say is this: that in the past, here in the City of Dublin, and in many places throughout the country, the finest exhibition of civic spirit that could possibly be given was given by the public. As Deputy O'Brien well knows, when we here in Dublin had lost all the grants, amounting to £212,000 for the City of Dublin, and appealed to the people, all sections of the community shouldered the burden and paid their rates promptly, and they are nothing the worse for doing that. In other parts of the country, where the rates had got to be increased and where such an appeal was not made, and where such a seemingly unpopular activity on the part of representatives was not shouldered by the local representatives, the result was not satisfactory. In this case, we are placing the whole of the case on the table for the people to see and to realise that it is not a battle of the Executive we are fighting, that it is the battle of the people and the credit and the stability of the State. If that stability be restored, the people will benefit by it, even though an occasional individual who seeks to evade his responsibility may possibly have to suffer.
