I desire to make one more appeal to the Minister to improve the Bill by striking out this section. The amendment to the Title which has just been carried certainly does not cover this section, because it refers only to certain anomalies that have arisen in the Dáil Courts, which are the only Courts referred to in the Title to the Bill. This Bill deals with the time limit for starting or instituting proceedings in any Court, and it seems to me that this section opens the gates for a flood of fraud and perjury, and that it is likely to open up cases which can lead to all kinds of hardship. People who have acted in the capacity of executors, and who administer estates in good faith and paid away property to people who were entitled to it, relied upon the fact that the statutory period of six years had elapsed from 1912, and got the property distributed. These people, I say, who have been in undisturbed possession of the property since 1912, are now liable to be put out at the suit of some next-of-kin or of anybody who comes forward and says that he would like to have brought his action in 1918, but that he had not got the money. If this section is passed everything that was done between 1912 and 1918 can be ripped up in the case of people who, in good faith, distributed the assets they were bound to distribute to the people who were entitled in law to receive them. That is what will happen in cases where there was a sale of land. People who acquired a title to lands by having occupied them for twelve years in undisturbed possession will now be liable to have cases faked up against them by some returned next-of-kin from America or some other place. A person who brings such a case may have no hope of succeeding, but when he sees legislation like this passed he will bring his action in the hope that the person he proceeds against will settle with him, and if not he can saddle the other person with enormous expense. Apart from these cases there are the very serious cases of tort and assault. An action for assault was statute-barred after four years, and an action for slander was statute-barred after two years. Cases of that kind can be raked up again against some person or other, who will be told, "You'll have the law unless you pay me compensation for blackmail, and I will take proceedings against you in Court." It seems to me to be a mischievous thing in an Act of Parliament to introduce in a Bill for the winding-up of the decrees of the Dáil Courts a provision whereby the Statute of Limitations in all cases is extended and under which actions that were barred after six years can now be brought on. In some cases a person, relying on the Statute of Limitations, who brought his action and got his decree may now find that the case can be brought on all over again. We have had a certain amount of retrospective legislation in this Dáil, but we have never had anything to approach within a thousand miles of this. It was only on Saturday last that I got a decree for a poor member of the minority in the Northern State. He sold a farm, relying on his statutory title, but the parties to whom he sold it thought they would be able to squeeze him a little more, having already squeezed him out of his farm. But his title was held to be good, and even in Belfast they have not passed any legislation like this. If they had this poor man would have been done out of his farm and out of his money as well. I think the Minister should pause before putting into an Act of Parliament dealing with the winding-up of decrees of the Dáil Courts a section such as this, which will create chaos in the administration of estates that have been administered since 1918, the parties concerned relying on the law as it stood at that time. As I say, this section is only for the benefit of people who were not prepared at the time to say on which side of the fence they would come down. It is only the people who would not commit themselves to one side or another that get the protection of this particular section, and not only that, but for six or seven years, as the case may be, when they had the ordinary law to go to, they refrained from going into court, before 1918. These are the people who, for eleven years, that is to say six years before 1918, refrained from going to court, who are now given an extension of five years from 1918 to three months from the date of the passing of this Act. I would earnestly appeal to the Minister to say that this is not the kind of section that ought to be passed at all. It is certainly not the kind of section that ought to be put into an Act without giving some kind of protection to people who, relying on the ordinary law as they found it at the time, administered estates or bought and sold property. For five years before 1918 these people, relying on the law as it stood at the time, administered estates and did the other things that I referred to.
DAIL IN COMMITTEE. - DAIL IN COMMITTEE.
Mr. O'HIGGINS
I have only to say what I said on the Second Reading against the hypothetical cases which the Deputy conjures up, that there is in my Department abundant evidence, from actual concrete cases, of the hardship that would ensure if the Statute of Limitations were not extended in such a way as to omit these few years of turbulence and revolution, when there was a concurrent jurisdiction and a concurrent lack of jurisdiction. That is the case which I mention against the cases which he says are conceivable. I know there are actual cases of people in many areas in the country who were unable, during these years, for reasons that it is unnecessary to dilate upon, to collect debts or assets of various kinds. It has been represented to us very persistently and very consistently in recent months that a Bill should be brought in to provide that matters of that kind ought not to be Statute-barred, having regard to the fact that for two or three years it was not reasonably possible for inhabitants in many areas through the country to get redress of the law or the support of the law for the obtaining of their rights. I do not suppose that the Deputy would contend that in Cork, Kerry, or Tipperary, or in many other areas through the country, during these few years of strife, that the machinery of the law was absolutely and normally at the disposal of traders, let us say, for the collection of their debts. That is just the other side of the shield, and putting one against the other, and having regard to the short period fixed here of three months in which cases of that kind must be brought to the surface, we have felt that the weight of the argument, and the weight of the equity, lies rather in favour of prolonging the period than to take the view where you could or could not get redress of the law, where you had or had not the machinery of the courts at your disposal between 1918 and 1921, the Statute of Limitations and other barring statutes of that kind must be held to have run.
I am very glad that the Minister intends to stick to his section for the sake of the people he mentions. I do realise that there is a liability of danger such as Deputy FitzGibbon has suggested, but I think it ought to be possible to get rid of that danger by a small amendment to this section. If we provide that the extension of time limited by statute shall apply, subject to the leave of the Commissioners, every person who wants to take advantage of this section must go before the Commissioners and get their sanction to his so doing. That, I think, would meet all the cases that the Minister has in mind, and at the same time I think it would satisfy the people whose interests Deputy FitzGibbon is afraid to see jeopardised. Some scheme of that kind might be made to enable the Commissioners to decide on the facts whether it is right or not that people should get rid of this statute-barring. The Commissioners would be able to decide whether the case was a proper case to go forward, or whether it was an improper one. In the latter case they would refuse to remove the bar.
I think that should be done by a proper Statute of Limitations Bill, which could be brought in here when we would have time to consider the arguments for and against it. The Minister speaks of turbulence of Cork, Kerry, and Galway during the period of two years. But what, I ask, was there to prevent anyone from prosecuting a suit here in the City of Dublin? I suggest that in the City of Dublin there are as many suits for the recovery of debts dealt with in a given period as there would be over the rest of the Saorstát. Here in the City of Dublin we had both courts functioning, and yet, despite that, under this section power is to be given to have hundreds of these cases ripped up, as if the turbulence of this city prevented people from going to the courts with their cases. The districts in which the courts were not functioning were fairly limited, and could be very clearly defined in an Act; but it is the reopening of cases at random, without any regard for decency or justice, that revolts me against this section. I do not think we could possibly amend the section by tinkering with it now in such a way as to cover cases on each side—the side of justice and the side of hardship. I suggest that this section should be withdrawn altogether, and that the Minister should carefully consider granting an extension of the statutory limitations, which provided protection for people who had sold their property or administered estates bona fide. Take the case of a bona fide administered estate. A person sold certain landed estate bona fide, and for a valuable consideration, relying on the statutory title he had got. Surely a person in that position is entitled to some protection, but under this section he would have none. I think a Bill should be brought in covering cases of that kind and giving protection to people entitled to expect justice and not injustice from this Dáil.
As it is now 8.30, the Committee will report progress.