Progress was reported last evening during debate on Amendment No. 10 (Mr. Darrell Figgis) to delete paragraph viii. of Clause I.
DÁIL IN COMMITTEE. - MINISTERS AND SECRETARIES BILL—THIRD STAGE (RESUMED).
We are all acquainted with the phrase, "There's a bee in his bonnet." It strikes me in the case of Deputy Figgis he has a fish in his bonnet, and judging by the number of times that this matter has been brought up here by him it is not a very fresh fish at the moment. Now, the question of economy in this case resolves itself into how many men can we spare? How much money can we spare? Provided you abolish the Ministry and hand it over to another Department, that Department will have to be staffed as efficiently and fully as if there was no Minister. It means that all you can spare is the Minister's salary, minus what you pay to the head of the other Department, and how much economy in pounds Deputy Figgis proposes to save to the tax-payer is what I would like to know. It would also be very important information for the Dáil. There is no field of labour in any of the Ministries so undeveloped or that needs attention so much as this question of inland and sea fisheries. The whole matter has to be built up. Scarcely anything has been done in the past. This whole Ministry and industry have to be developed, and there is nothing in the Saorstát that requires more attention and more initiative, and I will also say that more requires funds at its disposal. The only fault I have to find with the Ministry is that the Government do not propose to place enough money at its disposal to develop the inland and sea fisheries as they should be developed. Money can be found for every other thing; money can be found for salaries and for every other matter; but when it is a question of national development of this description we are told that money cannot be found. That is, I think, a very mistaken attitude on behalf of the Minister for Finance and the Government, because this is one of the cases crying out for development, and I hope in connection with it that the Executive Council will seriously consider the advisability of putting enough funds at the disposal of the Minister for Fisheries to develop this industry as it should be developed. Money, as I said, can be found for everything else. Everybody drawing his salary gets his cheque and there is no question of money being found for all these things. I, and the party with which I am associated, are prepared to begin with ourselves if nothing else can be done to try and finance this Ministry, and we are prepared and will propose a cut of 10 per cent. in the salaries of members of the Oireachtas. I hope that will be approved by Deputy O'Connell who is rather interested in these 10 per cent. cuts.
I would like to say one or two things. I would like to note the conversion that has already been effected in Deputy Gorey. He who, in the first instance, was the bell-wether of the flock has now changed, and he believes that the post that he has advocated the elimination of earlier should be maintained.
On a point of personal explanation, I think the Deputy is making a great mistake. I consistently advocated the continuance of this particular Minister, and I refer him to the records.
If I am wrong I am very sorry, but my recollection was as I stated. The Minister for Agriculture yesterday laboured a point that was not quite so candid as it might have been. He stated that this Bill was establishing—he used the very word "establishing"—a Department of Fisheries, not a Ministry. The Bill, of course, does nothing whatever of the kind. He went further and said that it established a Department of Fisheries with a view to future development in six or seven years' time. The Bill does nothing of the kind. The Department of Fisheries that exists to-day—although this Bill is not enacted—is substantially the same Department as was taken over from the earlier British regime, when it was worked in connection with the Department of Agriculture. I would like to say that when I urged that the Department as a separate Ministry—not as a separate Department — should be merged with some other Ministry and should be merged under the actual provisions of this Bill, I did so because it had been made evident to this Dáil at an earlier stage that the money would not be available for pressing forward reconstructive schemes, including the reconstruction of the national fisheries in the manner which that reconstruction will very clearly require. The Ministry argued against it. They will retain the Ministry. Very well, be it so. Then I hope that the alternative which they have accepted is an alternative which they will prosecute as it ought to be prosecuted. If that be the effect that will be achieved no one will be more delighted than I will be to see the Department of Fisheries remain not only a separate Department, but carrying its own Minister in this Dáil, if money will be put into that Ministry sufficient to make it a really live Ministry. I do believe that such money will be a very profitable expenditure for this State and people. I did only argue for the elimination of this separate Ministry and for the merging of this Department with other Departments on the supposition that money would not be available.
If the separate Ministry be maintained, then I say that it is the responsibility for the Minister for Fisheries, according to the provisions of the Constitution, whether the Executive Council likes it or whether the Executive Council does not like it, to come down here with proposals to this Dáil and ask this Dáil to approve of those proposals, and then let it be put up to the Minister for Finance to accept those proposals by which this Ministry will be made a live Ministry in future, as it has not been a live Ministry while it existed already. That is an alternative. There are two alternatives. I had only taken the first, because I thought that was the alternative that the Ministry most favoured. They are opposed to it. I willingly accept their decision in the matter. I only indicate that their decision does place upon them certain responsibilities, which I hope they will accept. There is at the present moment very considerable hardship throughout the entire fishery population. In every constituency with a sea-board, people want not only material with which to conduct their industry, but even if that material were provided—as it is, not within their means to provide it themselves, as they are dependent upon State funds, State loans and State allowances to do it, and as these loans, allowances and funds have been available in the past—they would still be in the same position that they are now. The fundamental requirement of this industry is the opening up of proper markets. The opening up of proper markets takes money. If this Ministry is going to be retained, if this proposed amendment of mine be defeated, I shall not be at all sorry; I shall be glad. But I do say that in that case the Minister—not the Ministry, because we are dealing with an individual Minister here who has no responsibility whatever to the Executive Council, but is directly responsible to this Dáil—will have the responsibility placed upon him to bring before this Dáil some definite reconstructive scheme, and to ask this Dáil to let him put it through in order that the responsibility may then be placed upon the Minister for Finance to make good the schemes which this Dáil has approved, so that the Ministry as a separate Ministry may be a live Ministry.
I think Deputy Figgis has given proof of his interest in fisheries, because I find on inquiry that the report of the Commission which he presided over was most important and informative. It has been necessary for me during the last month to look deeply into this fishing question, as a large portion of the constituency which I represent is interested in the matter.
There is no doubt whatever of the grave distress that exists amongst the fishing community, and there is no doubt that the present system of conducting the fishing industry must be radically altered. It seems to me that the arguments of Deputy Figgis have defeated the purpose of his amendment. The amendment objects to the appointment of a Minister, but the ground he set forth was that he would not object to a Minister, if funds were placed at his disposal. I think if the Dáil came to the conclusion that the fishing industry should be taken up as a national one, and its possibilities thoroughly developed—and there is no doubt that it can be done—no Government, no matter how parsimonious, would refuse to provide the necessary funds. I have had some relations with the Minister for Fisheries in connection with my constituency, and I must say, speaking from actual knowledge, that I found him willing to give his assistance, which was most valuable. If this Department is developed in the direction that Deputy Figgis indicated, by providing the funds, the necessity for a Minister will be so apparent that the Dáil cannot but agree. I have, therefore, much as I value Deputy Figgis's remarks on the fishery question, to side against his amendment.
Deputy Figgis has conceded the necessity for such a Ministry. His complaint is that under existing conditions the Ministry is not as efficient as it ought to be. I think nearly all of us will agree with him in that respect, but we have to walk before we run. The Minister for Agriculture made it clear that the present purpose of the Ministry is to complete the machinery that will enable it to take effective action in the near future for developing fishing as it ought to be developed so as to make it a big national industry. Deputy Figgis in his remarks last evening admitted that in the course of a couple of years, even if the Ministry were merged into one of the other Departments, the necessity would arise of having a separate Ministry. Why not concede that that position exists at present, and that it is of such vast importance to the people that, from the very outset, it ought to function as a separate and independent Department, concentrating all its energies and knowledge and tabulating everything with a view to development? That is possible, and only possible when it is worked as an absolutely independent Department. The internal fisheries and the external fisheries of Ireland have a big future before them. I submit that we should more readily realise the vast possibilities of this Department by working it as it has been worked, as an independent unit, concentrating all its energies on that work alone. Everybody knows that a good deal of attention will have to be paid immediately to the internal fisheries of Ireland, as owing to the way in which the poacher has been dominant for the last few years there are hardly any fish left in the rivers or lakes. To my mind, the Deputy was himself the most eloquent advocate in opposition to the amendment. He has admitted the necessity, in the near future, of having a separate Department functioning for this particular purpose. That future will be rendered nearer by having the Department in being, not controlled as a sectional Department of another Ministry, but devoting all its energies and powers to the development of what I believe will, in the near future, be one of the chief sources, not alone of employment, but of income to the State.
After the speech of Deputy Figgis I do not think it is necessary to say much in opposition to the amendment. There has always been a fishery service of a sort. We had until recently a fisheries section or Department attached to the Congested Districts Board and a fishery section attached to the Department of Agriculture. It is undoubtedly desirable and necessary, now that the Congested Districts Board has gone, and that the Department of Agriculture has been divided, that the particular branches of administration dealing with fisheries should be joined together. I believe that the hopes some people have of the ease with which the fisheries of Ireland can be developed are too rosy. Undoubtedly the whole question is one of immense importance. In a country like this, to simply put fisheries in the background, as an unnamed section of some Department dealing with either agriculture or industries, is not, I think, giving to such a question the attention that it ought to get. I believe that there can be very little serious opposition to having some department of administration charged solely with the developing and safeguarding of the Irish fishing industry. If that is so there is very little to be said with regard to the amendment, because the Bill, as it stands, does not necessitate the appointment or the continuance of a Minister for Fisheries. It simply provides for the establishment of a Department of Fisheries. If it were thought desirable it would be quite possible, under the Bill, to give that Department of Fisheries to some Minister who also had another Department, and to appoint, if it were thought desirable, a Parliamentary Secretary to take charge of the Department of Fisheries. It seems to me to be beyond doubt that little attention has been given to the matter of fisheries in the past. The Fisheries sections in the Department and in the Congested Districts Board were the Cinderellas. Very little attention has really been given to the possibilities and the needs of the fishing industry and, to my mind, now more than at any other time is it desirable to have a Minister solely charged with the consideration of what can be done, and with the formulation of proposals for the development of fisheries. The fact that there will be great financial stringency this year and next year is not an argument against that. We have got over the great difficulties that caused our present financial situation. I have no doubt at all that after a year or two we will have a steadily improving financial situation. If at that time money is available, and you have a Minister who has been giving attention to the whole question of the needs of the industry, putting forward its claims and making a good case, you will have the likelihood that what could and ought to be done for the development of the fisheries will be done. If, on the other hand, you keep the matter of fisheries in the background, then even when we get to the state when a good deal of money might be available, nothing would be likely to be done and no considerable result achieved for a long time.
I do not think that the Minister could do all that Deputy Figgis suggested he ought to do. If we are to have a Minister for Fisheries, at least he could see that there is no neglect, and that is a very important matter. He can see that this matter is kept in the forefront, and he will be expected to do so. It will be expected that something will be done, and it will be expected that some consideration will be given to fisheries. It will be expected that the money available will be well spent if we have this Department and a Minister in charge of it. If, on the other hand, you put it into the background, as in the past, you will probably spend the same money as before. It will probably be spent almost anyhow, because the Minister for Agriculture will not have the time or the energy to give very close guidance to policy in the matter of fisheries. If you were to give the matter to the Minister for Industry and Commerce, he would not have the time nor the energy to give very much consideration to it. If there was actually a line of policy in operation; if a big expenditure was going on; if there were schemes carried through and in operation for a considerable time, it is easier to assume that work would be much better done under some other Minister, such as the Minister for Agriculture, than it would be at present when we are at the beginning and the work has to be done, when we really have to consider the whole matter from the foundations, because I do think that heretofore there has been no thinking-out of the matter and no formulation of a sound plan that would bear criticism. In the old days Dáil Eireann plunged into some fishery developments as the result of adopting popular notions at the time, and the results were disastrous indeed. It simply resulted in the complete loss of a considerable sum of money, and it convinced me that this needed far more attention than it had received. Probably the Deputy who proposed the amendment had in mind that the Bill as it stands necessitates for all time the having of a Minister for Fisheries, or that it necessitates having a Ministry of Fisheries at any time. It does not, and the question of whether we should have a Minister for Fisheries or not is one that can be considered and decided on at some other time. The real thing that the Bill proposes is to have a separate Department of Fisheries, and I think that there can be no doubt that we should have such a Department, standing on its own feet and open to criticism, dealing with fisheries, and not simply some obscure branch of a bigger department. I do not think much argument is required against the amendment.
I do not think that it requires much penetration to see that a Department of Fisheries is necessary. It is a Department likely to be of increasing importance, and now is the time to establish it. So far am I from curtailing the responsibilities of the Department that I would like to suggest to the Minister that he might enlarge its functions, and as we have gone out of our way to put under the surveillance of this Department, the matter of rural industries, I think we should also put under it the administration of the smaller harbours. The well-being of the fisheries is so intimately connected with the provision and upkeep of these harbours that I think that some day it will be absolutely necessary for the Minister, or whoever is in charge of this Department, to have control over the harbours. As far as I know—the question has always been a very vexed one—our small harbours are sometimes under the control of several bodies, and there seems to be no central body to determine what repairs shall be done or how much money shall be expended on them, and to determine the claims of rival harbours that are perhaps only twenty miles apart. I would suggest to the Ministry that they should enlarge the scope of this Department so as to include the smaller harbours.
I would like to ask permission to withdraw the amendment. I do so because it has achieved much of the purpose I sought in putting it down.
Is the Deputy going to make another speech on the amendment?
I just want to state what the purpose is, and I will do so in three sentences.
The Deputy has made three speeches on the amendment, and I think that is really all he can be allowed to make. If we are to go beyond that number we are lost.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments 11 (Mr. Davin) and 12 (Mr. P. Hogan, Clare) not moved.
Amendments 13 and 14 are precisely the same. They aim at the deletion of the words at the end of paragraph IX.—"and shall be assisted by Council for Defence as hereinafter provided." I would like to point out that there are motions down to delete Section 8 which provides for the Council, and a discussion on amendment 13 or 14 gives us a double discussion on the same thing. The effective discussion would take place on Section 8, I think.
I was aware of the point you mentioned. In putting amendment 13 down, my only intention was to draw attention to the fact that passing these words will not prejudice any objection one may want to raise when the actual Section comes under discussion.
No, it will not.
Amendments 13 (Mr Darrell Figgis) and 14 (Mr. Davin) not moved.
Amendment No. 15 is involved in amendment No. 1, which has been discussed and decided.
Amendment not moved.
Question: "That Section 1 stand part of the Bill," put and agreed to.
SECTION 2.
(1.) Each of the Ministers, heads of the respective Departments of State mentioned in Section 1 of this Act, shall be a corporation sole under his style or name aforesaid (which may be lawfully expressed with equal validity and effect whether in the Irish Language or in its English equivalent as set out in the preceding section), and shall have perpetual succession and an official seal (which shall be officially and judicially noticed), and may sue and (subject to the fiat of the Attorney-General having been in each case first granted) be sued under his style or name aforesaid, and may acquire and hold land for the purposes of the functions: powers or duties of the Department of State of which he is head or of any branch thereof.
(2.) The Executive Council shall on the recommendation of the Minister appoint the principal officer of each of the said Departments and each of the said Ministers may appoint such other officers and servants to serve in the Department of which he is the head, as such Minister may, with the sanction of the Minister for Finance, determine.
(3.) The terms and conditions of appointment of all officers and servants appointed by any Minister shall be prescribed by the Minister for Finance and there shall be paid out of moneys provided by the Oireachtas, or if there be any fund properly applicable by law to such payment, then out of such fund to such officers and servants such salaries or remunerations as the Minister for Finance may from time to time determine.
(4.) The expenses of each of the Departments of State established under this Act, to such amount as may be sanctioned by the Minister for Finance, shall be paid out of moneys provided by the Oireachtas.
Mr. P. HOGAN (Clare):
I move:—
"In sub-section (1), lines 29 and 30, to delete the words `subject to the fiat of the Attorney-General having been in each case first granted.' "
In putting forward this amendment I had in mind that for some time past we have been considering the Courts of Justice Bill, and every party in the Dáil has given its time in endeavouring to make justice as easy of access as possible for every citizen. Whilst of course that is just and right we cannot refrain from thinking that Ministers are citizens of the State, even if privileged citizens. I am sure they would not renounce their citizenship for the sake of being Ministers. I cannot conceive why a Minister should be hedged around with privileges that are not the privileges of other citizens. In other words, I cannot conceive why the Attorney-General should have a veto on actions or litigation that may be brought against a Minister of State, why he should constitute himself so to speak a fairy godfather for the Ministry, to protect them from litigation. Of course it may be argued that frivolous actions may be brought against Ministers, but no citizen is free from such actions, and our courts of justice are just as competent to deal with frivolous actions brought against a Minister as against any other citizen. In reading the Section what occurs to one's mind possibly is the old tag, "The king is dead; long live the king," and that we have not yet got away from the divine right of kings. But in our day I think we have no place for such relies of antiquity even where these rights are vested in reigning monarchs or where they are sought to be vested perhaps in the descendants of a king who cultivated a particular animosity towards the natives of Denmark. I do not think that there is any place in our Constitution or in the courts of justice for such a thing.
Might I point out that this Section makes a tremendous advance in this regard upon the previous existing position. In England no action can be brought against a Minister first of all without a fiat, and, secondly, certain kinds of action are excluded altogether; that is to say, one can only proceed by petition of right, and can only proceed in actions raised on contract. No action in respect of wrong can be brought against a Minister with or without a fiat in England. This section has advanced to the far more democratic position of permitting actions to be brought against Ministers, as such, requiring only that there should be a check upon such actions in order that frivolous actions may not be brought, and that actions cannot be launched against a Minister in his Ministerial capacity as Minister of the State, which perhaps could not be brought against him in his personal capacity.
Amendment put and negatived.
The following amendment stands in my name:—
In Sub-section (2), line 39, after the word "determine," to insert the words "provided that any officers so appointed have satisfied the Civil Service Commissioners as to their qualifications and general fitness to perform the duties which will be assigned to them."
Am I to understand that the Minister for Finance is willing to accept this amendment?
I accept the principle.
In that case I am willing to withdraw the amendment and thank the Minister for the consideration he has given us.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question—"That Section 2 stand part of the Bill"—put and agreed to.
SECTION 3.
(1) The President of the Executive Council for the time being shall, so soon as may be after his appointment as such President, determine and declare how many and which of the said Departments of State established by this Act shall be assigned to and administered by the members of the Executive Council to be appointed on his nomination pursuant to the Constitution: Provided, however, that the Department of Finance shall always be one of the Departments of State so assigned and administered.
(2) It shall be lawful to assign two or more of the said Departments of State to a single person who in such case shall be appointed to be the Minister head of each of such Departments.
I beg to move the following amendment:
To delete Sub-section (1) and to substitute therefor as follows:—
"As soon as conveniently may be after the first meeting of a newly-elected Dáil Eireann, that House shall direct the Committee to be appointed in pursuance of Article 55 of the Constitution as to how many and which Departments of State shall be assigned to Ministers not members of the Executive Council and subject to the provisions of Article 52 of the Constitution, those Departments shall be so assigned, and the remaining Departments shall be assigned to Ministers who shall be members of the Executive Council."
The question raised by this amendment is, first, that the proviso is unnecessary inasmuch as it is a constitutional provision, and I wish to suggest it is undesirable to insert in general Acts provisoes of this kind which are inevitably under the Constitution.
There is also a question raised as to the relative positions of the Dáil and the President of the Executive Council in the selection of Ministries which shall be controlled by Ministers who are or are not members of the Executive Council. If the Section is passed in its present form it will have the effect as regards the Ministries, which the Dáil desires to select as the Ministries which shall be directly controlled by the Dáil through the Ministers responsible only to the Dáil, that the region of selection left in the hands of the Dáil will be minimised. The proposal in the Bill is to say to the President, "You may now select Departments and then appoint persons to these Departments, which may mean seven out of such number as may be defined, and the area of selection left to the Dáil will be reduced." The effect, further, is that the Dáil is practically in a position of subordination to the President, for the time being in regard to such matters as these. To illustrate—and I do not want to refer to it more than as an illustration—the Department of Education is clearly a Department in which it was generally admitted, a year ago, that apart from the personnel of the Ministry, the Department of Education should not be within the control of the Executive Council; that is to say, it would not be a political office in the same way as other Departments might be. A Minister for Education, for instance, should not be subject to the chances of a change of Ministry. The object of the Constitution regarding extern Ministers clearly was to make it possible to have selected persons, who would not be in the hurly-burly of political fight, who could be placed in charge of Departments such as Education. The Dáil may decide that Education, Fisheries, of which we have just been speaking, and any other Department outside Finance should be reserved to Ministers who would be responsible to the Dáil directly. That, I think, was clearly the intention of the Constitution, but the Section, as it is written down, says that the President shall determine how many and which of the Departments of State shall be assigned to and administered by Ministers of the Executive Council. I think that is going past the intentions of the Constitution. After all, when a President selects his Executive Council it is persons he is looking for, rather than Departments, and I desire to ask the Dáil to agree to the principle that the Dáil should be left to choose the Departments of State, the head of which shall be responsible directly to the Dáil. The contrary, which is proposed by the Bill, would leave the Dáil either to declare no confidence in the President or its area of selection would be very much confined. I therefore beg to move the amendment.
As regards the proviso to which Deputy Johnson refers that was clearly necessary in order to prevent any suggestion that the section, as it would stand without the proviso, might affect the provisions of the Constitution. I suggest that this amendment of Deputy Johnson's so far from being in accordance with the idea of the Constitution is really distinctly against it, and would be unconstitutional and probably bad. Clearly an Executive Council is a council of persons responsible for the executive government. If the Bill is first to determine that Ministries and Departments of State, where large questions of policy may be concerned, are to be outside the Executive it may become quite futile to appoint an Executive Council at all.
In the way in which I understand the provisions of the Constitution, I should say that a President is elected by the Dáil because he has a certain policy and he associates with him the particular departments of State in which there are questions of policy involved —that is to say, questions of policy as regards executive government. It may be possible to leave certain departments outside the Executive Council because they are more matters of administration than of executive action. But it seems to me that the provisions of the Constitution would be entirely neutralised by the amendment of Deputy Johnson. It would really amount to the Dáil electing a President who would be a mere puppet. Even if he had a sufficient number of departments of State left to him to supply the minimum of Ministers with occupation, they would be simply a body of puppets. Instead of being responsible to the Dáil the Executive would be—as I believe some people advocate—scattered amongst the body of Parliament as a whole, and you would cease to have the idea of Executive Government. In my opinion this amendment cuts across the whole basis of the Constitution and would neutralise its operation.
Amendment put and declared lost.
I beg to move amendment 19:—
In Sub-Section (1) lines 57 and 58, to delete the words, "Provided, however, that the Department of Finance shall always be one of the Departments of State so assigned and administered."
The last sentence of the Sub-Section is merely a re-enactment of Article 52 of the Constitution. It is, therefore, unnecessary and also objectionable, in so far as it lends colour to the inference that the provisions of the Constitution can be varied incidentally in the course of ordinary legislation. I formally move the deletion of this sentence.
The object of the proviso is to prevent anybody suggesting that by the breadth of the terms of the Section there might be a constitutional amendment involved; that is to say, if it left at large the question of the Ministry of Finance, that suggestion might be possible. The proviso, so far from varying the Constitution, simply prevents anybody suggesting that the Section does interfere with it in any way.
Does the objection of the Attorney-General— that if the words were not there a constitutional amendment might be involved—mean that it is his opinion that a constitutional amendment can be involved incidentally?
No.
If there be a constitutional amendment during the eight years it must be by definite and specific procedure. Obviously there can be no constitutional question involved by the elimination of these words.
The only justification for the proviso is that unless you except Finance from the Departments mentioned in the earlier part of the Section there is the suggestion that it is swept in. If it were open to anybody to hold that it was possible to leave it out of the Executive or that there was any intention to make it possible to leave it out, somebody might suggest the proviso was bad and contravened the Constitution. With the proviso, nobody can suggest that there was any attempt to vary the Constitution.
This must be read with a similar proviso in the previous Section. One might possibly infer— the habit might easily be developed— that if a proviso of this kind were not inserted in the Bill then the Constitution is open to amendment.
I think that it is rather bad policy to insert such phrases as these in a Bill—"Provided it does not conflict with Article so-and-so of the Constitution." Surely a condition of that kind ought not to be placed in incidental enactments, enactments of a minor character comparatively. The Constitution ought to be presumed to govern all these enactments. I do not think the Attorney-General has given any valid reason for inserting such phrases as these in a Bill of this kind, when the Constitution must inevitably govern such legislation.
Its only object is to prevent the question being raised.
Does the Attorney-General recollect an interesting example of this which occurred in the last Dáil, when an endeavour was made to insert words to the effect "that nothing in this Bill shall be construed as contravening the Constitution," or "shall be construed as amending the Constitution"? That was ruled out of order on the ground that the Constitution could not be amended except by specific legislation directed to that end. If the Preamble of one Bill could contain a statement that nothing in the Bill was to be construed as contravening the Constitution, it might be also applied to other Bills. This is not quite the same thing; but, nevertheless, it is a matter that needs some consideration, I think.
With all respect, it is not quite the same thing as a general Preamble providing that an Act is not to be a violation of the Constitution; but, look at the words: "That the President of the Executive shall, after his appointment, declare how many and which of the Departments of State..." This proviso is really nothing more than to say "how many and which of the Departments of State, including the Ministry of Finance." It really is no more than that.
I did not state that the question of the Preamble was the same as this; I suggested the matter was something similar.
Mr. O'CONNELL
I was going to suggest that surely the President is not supposed to do things that would be unconstitutional. It is assumed he would proceed in accordance with the terms of the Constitution when he is making his suggestions. I think it is not at all advisable to put in a proviso of this kind, because if there are any other Acts which are in doubt we will look for the proviso, and if it is not there we will say it should be there, and we assume its absence means a certain thing.
I would be disposed to discourage lawyers and litigation.
I would suggest, as this is a rather important matter and involves certain considerations for the future, that if one sees a buttress placed against a wall, one assumes weakness somewhere in the wall. That would be the inclination of one's mind. When these buttresses are put in here so as to hold up the wall of the Constitution, one assumes that there is a weakness. It would be much better not to have that assumption.
The weakness is in the words "how many and which of the State Departments, including the Ministry of Finance." If the form of the proviso is objectionable to some sensibilities, it can be easily altered to read, after "Departments of State,""including the Ministry of Finance."
Would it not be better that it should read "that the President may, subject to the provisions of the Constitution."
No.
I think the objection is identical in that case. I would suggest that the amendment be withdrawn, that the matter be further considered, and that other words such as the Attorney-General now suggested be brought up later on.
I would be inclined to advise that. Let me draw attention to the last four words of the sentence, if this were acceptable—"pursuant to the Constitution." To put in a further proviso which necessarily draws attention to the Constitution seems to be very undesirable.
I beg to withdraw the amendment in view of the promise of the Attorney-General.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question—"That Section 3 stand part of the Bill"—put and agreed to.
SECTION 4.
There shall be paid out of moneys provided by the Oireachtas to the President of the Executive Council an annual sum by way of salary not exceeding £2,500, and to each of the members of the Executive Council an annual sum by way of salary not exceeding £1,700, and to each Minister not a member of the Executive Council an annual sum by way of salary not exceeding £1,700, but so that no person shall be paid more than one such salary.
I beg to move the following amendment:—
"In lines 2 and 4, page 6, to delete the figures £1,700 and to substitute in lieu thereof in each case the figures £1,500."
In view of the present conditions existing in the country and the demand for economy which we hear every day, and which has been made with regard to certain Departments of State, I feel this amendment should be self explanatory. Possibly it would have been better if this amendment had come from the Government benches rather than from those benches. In view of the fact that the Ministers appear to have made up their minds that economy shall be effected in all Departments of State, it seems to me that it would be a matter of the utmost importance that those Ministers should set an example by first getting their own houses in order and effecting economies in their salaries.
A statement recently brought before the Dáil caused a great deal of controversy. It was a statement by the Minister for Finance that the salaries of the National Teachers were to be reduced by 10 per cent., and that 1/- a week was to be taken off the dole which the Old-age Pensioners get. I think it would be extremely wrong for the Government making those cuts to maintain that the Ministers were entitled to retain the salaries which were fixed when conditions were more prosperous and the future of the country, from a financial point of view, more hopeful. The amendment I have moved is a very reasonable one. The reduction I suggest is £200, and in reaching that figure I made a cut of something close to 10 per cent. It is a little more than 10 per cent., but in all probability a demand will be made to cut salaries in Departments of State further, and I think I may be forgiven for this slight increase over 10 per cent.
In the case of a New State like the Free State there is a great tendency for the Government to take example by old-established States, in the matter of salaries amongst other things. I think the salaries paid to Ministers in England and other countries should be no criterion to what we should pay our Ministers here.
There are many considerations, and there is one matter of considerable importance I would draw attention to. It is that our Ministers are men who, by a lucky turn of the wheel of fortune, and without any great previous preparation, have found themselves Ministers of State. In such circumstances it would be advisable that they should start in a moderate way and as the finances of the State improve their salaries could be increased, just as in a business concern the salaries of men are increased as the financial position gets better. We Deputies are constantly up against statements such as this: "Why are not Ministers making cuts in their own salaries and the salaries of heads of Departments?" How can we go to the country and tell our constituents that cuts ought to be made in the wages of men working on the roads or elsewhere while at the same time we do not make cuts in the salaries of Ministers, heads of Departments, and other officials? Yesterday one of the Ministers stated it was possible, in the event of certain things happening, that the salary paid to the head of a Department might be greater than the salary of a Minister. That could be rectified by the salary of the head of a Department being reduced in proportion to the salary of the Minister. The salary of one Minister, even with the reduction I suggest, amounts to what 60 Old-Age Pensioners would draw. It also represents the wages paid to about 20 farm workers. Much as I appreciate the value of the work done by the Ministers, and the personality of our present Ministers, I do not know if in a democratic State it could be considered that one Minister is equal to 20 farm workers. In all probability those farm labourers would have an average family of five and then it would amount to considering whether or not one Minister was equal to 100 people in a rural district.
It is to be noticed that I did not put in an amendment to reduce the salary of the head of the Executive Council, because I think that the President of the Executive Council occupies a position of dignity and honour, and it would not be worthy of our country, no matter what its finances would be, that we should attempt to reduce the salary of the head of the Council below what it is. I do believe, in view of the present financial conditions, conditions that are not likely to improve for a considerable time, and taking into account the comparative youth of many of our Ministers, and the probability they have of an increase in their salaries, that they should now state their willingness to accept this amendment, and to accept the reduced salaries which have been offered in this amendment. Accordingly, I have pleasure in proposing it.
I object to eye-wash. There have been people who have invited us to announce reductions in Ministerial salaries when we were effecting economies necessary to balance the Budget. They said it would enable the country to swallow the economies that were necessary; that the amount saved was of no consequence, but that it would enable the country to swallow the economies. I have no belief in dealing with the country in that way. I have no belief that a man should not be able to insist on economies without beginning by saying: "Here I am doing something; I am going to coax you to do the other thing." I certainly think that you cannot put Ministers, or anybody, in the position of being able to insist on economies without reductions in whatever stipends they are receiving themselves. I regard the whole suggestion as a suggestion that we should, so to speak, throw dust in the eyes of the country. I think this question of the Ministers' salaries is a question that should be dealt with on the merits, and that it should not be done as some sort of apology for effecting needed economies in expenditure. I simply will deal with it in that way. It is a question of whether this salary is one that is too much in the circumstances that exist in the country. We fixed, the other day, the salaries for the judges. We fixed the salaries, including those of the Circuit Judges. We fixed these salaries fairly high, so that judges might be independent and so that they might not be subject to corruption. Now those judges have a life tenure and they have pensions. In the existing circumstances, a Minister could do far more, if he choose, in the way of graft than most judges.
You want to be able to get a fairly good class of man as Minister. You do not want to confine Ministerial office solely to what you might call the leisured rich or simply to the professional politician, who goes into politics solely for the purpose of getting office. You would find a difficulty in getting any business man of standing to take up Ministerial office with the present salary, because there is this to be remembered, that every year a Minister is in office, and every year a Government is in office, the more enemies that Minister and that Government have. What happens is, suppose you have a man who has a profession or a business and he becomes a Minister. His practice goes to pieces or his profession goes to pieces, if he has a profession. After four years, which is as long as anybody is likely to continue, he goes out. He has to start then again. If you do not give something reasonable as salary you will not get the right type of people willing to come in. At any rate, you will confine it to a certain class of people.
In this country, where we do not want to confine Ministerial office to the leisured rich, or to confine it to some people who are simply and purely professional politicians, that salary of £1,700, in all the circumstances, and having regard to the fact that a man's whole time is taken up by it, and that he is cut off from any business interests during the time, is not too much, and I do not think that any proposal to cut it down to soothe the feelings of the national teachers, or any other person either that might be affected in the economies, is wrong. We look at it in this way. These are important offices. There is no Minister who, day after day, has not to give decisions that offend people who are friends of his own. The decisions that they do give are in the interests of the State, and if a Minister is to maintain his integrity he must be prepared to do that. You want the sort of person who will do it, and in the same way, as you must be prepared to pay for ability and integrity in Judges, you should be prepared to pay for it in Ministers. This Bill is not for the present, but for the future. I do not say anything about the actual present, because I am looking definitely at the future. I would not care two pence whether this amount came off or not. As far as I am concerned, it will be easier for me to say: "Let it come off." For the sake of the amount, it would be easier for me to agree to it. But I think it is necessary to face this, having in view what the interests of the State demand. You cannot cut down the salaries of lots of heads of departments. Otherwise you come in for heavy responsibility under the Clause of the Treaty which deals with that matter. You might attempt to do that and the result would be that you would cast a heavier burden on the State.
I will say this, that the heads of Departments are not overpaid. There may be individual men who are overpaid. But take the Post Office, for a moment. It is a big concern employing 12,000 employees. What you might call the General Manager of that, the Secretary, is paid £1,000 a year. I think in commercial life any man who is controlling a big organisation, doing the work that the Post Office is doing, and with the number of employees that the Post Office has, would be paid far more than he is. I think if you turn to the Department of Finance, and then if you looked to the banking world, and found men who have the same responsibility that the Secretary of the Minister for Finance has, you would find he would be paid a higher salary. It is these people who are in the key positions. By the least lapse or the least neglect of duty they would cost the State very big sums. It is necessary that you should have people of ability, and that you should attract people of a certain type, and that you should not be confined to people who cannot do much good in other walks of life. I think the worst thing in which to economise is economising in a sphere from which affairs are directed. You might save £100 by some economy, and if you failed to get or to keep the right sort of man it might cost you £100,000 easily. I think that this sort of attitude that we have, that anybody who is paid more than £500 a year, is, of course, a plutocrat and ought be immediately cut down, irrespective of any other cuts or economies, is ridiculous. If you are going to have big affairs conducted rightly, you must have men of ability, and if you are to have men of ability you have to pay for them. I do not believe that the heads of Departments are overpaid. I do not think you can reduce them, and there is the fact that even at present you would have Ministers, with actual salaries less than the heads of Departments. I think this is entirely wrong, and it is the product of a sort of parrot cry that has been going round of late. I think that it is entirely wrong and should not be adopted by the Dáil. For my own part, it would be easing my own task to agree to it, but I do not think it is well to do so.
On a point of order I desire to ask, a Chinn Chomhairle, if such an amendment is in order under the Constitution. Article 39 reads:—"Ministers shall receive such remuneration as may from time to time be prescribed by law but the remuneration to any Minister shall not be diminished during his term of office."
There is no proposal in this amendment to decrease the remuneration of Ministers as fixed by law during term of office?
Mr. O'CONNELL
It may come as a surprise to the Minister for Finance and possibly to others if I say that I am against this amendment. I do not believe in a policy of economy which has only as its foundation simply the cutting down of salaries irrespective altogether of whether they are just and proper salaries or not; that is not the sort of economy I am thinking of in any case. I had occasion to object some weeks ago to a proposition of the Minister for Finance in regard to National Teachers. I do not think it will soothe the feeling of national teachers if a wrong is done to other people in other circumstances. I consider that in the Government of the country, and in the management of the country, we want the best possible people we can get, and we must remember that in looking out for these people we are competing with the business world and with the professional world. It may be just at the moment that people, as Deputy Heffernan said, are perhaps more or less suddenly put into these positions, but that is not going to happen always and even such as it is, they have, because of the suddenness with which they find themselves in these positions, very much increased responsibility which will not be there for people who come after them in six or eight or ten years time; I think it is only reasonable that the matter should be looked at from that point of view, but later on men will be coming into political life and before they enter political life they will naturally, perhaps, look to what prospects political life gives them. We are competing with the business world, as I say, and the professional world for men who will undertake the responsibilities of Ministerial positions and run the country and manage the country as it ought to be run and managed. We do not want duds in business life, and we do not want them in professional life, and even more so we do not want them in political life. I can only regret that the admirable principles enunciated by the Minister for Finance were not carried out in practice in respect of the key-positions in national life. These are key-positions undoubtedly but there are other key-positions which the Minister seems to have forgotten.
I would like on this occasion to endorse the attitude taken up by the Minister for Finance as one who, to a certain extent, preaches economy at the present time. I never suggested that the various Ministries which are in existence should have as their heads men who would not be sufficiently remunerated for the task that is before them. What I have suggested rather has been that there should be a diminution of those Ministries, and especially a diminution of the staffs in those various Ministries. What I have objected to has been redundancy rather than a proper and sufficient remuneration for the servants of the State. Now in this regard I think I may say that the amount proposed by way of salaries to our Ministers are by no means excessive, and I thoroughly agree with the Minister for Finance when he says that the State should be in a position to secure the best intellects and the best ability in the country. The mere cutting down of these salaries by a couple of hundred pounds would not effect a very great economy, and I do not think it would either effect efficiency, certainly not in the right direction. I, for one, am strongly in favour of the reduction as far as possible of the numbers and personnel of the various Ministries and the various staffs, but I believe that in these staffs and these Ministries which are necessary for the carrying on of the Government of the country we should have the best possible ability, and that the various people who undertake those duties should be properly remunerated, and for these reasons I certainly shall oppose the amendment.
I hope that Deputy O'Connell's speech will be broadcasted to all branches of his organisation, because I was attacked by the secretary of one branch of that organisation for voting for the Second Reading of this Bill. I did not vote for the second reading of this Bill because there are provisions in it which I did not wish to make myself responsible for, and I did not vote at all, but I was attacked by this gentleman, who alleged that I was voting for swollen expenditure. I will, however, vote for this amendment not because I sympathise with all the mover said. I recognise the great force of what was said by the Minister for Finance, and the whole House knows he is absolutely disinterested, but I think it is significant that he was far more eloquent in that part of his speech when he was defending subordinates than when he was speaking for the particular Ministers. I agree that those at the head of the State should be adequately paid. I do not think that Ministers are grossly overpaid, and I do not think that the difference between £1,700 and £1,500 is going to make all the difference between getting a party hack who thinks only of himself and the man who could stand outside without such a position. But beside all this there is a principle at stake. We should not ask others to do what we are not prepared to do ourselves. When I was a soldier I was taught that an officer should never ask a man to do what he would not do himself, but I am afraid that Ministers in the present instance are not on that high ground. I feel perfectly sure we would be in a far better position to face the old age pensioners whose allowance we are reducing, and we would be in a far better position to face the National teachers if we began by cutting down not only the salaries of the Ministers but also the salaries of members of the Oireachtas. I understand there is to be a Bill introduced by a Deputy upon this subject, and if so, I shall certainly support it because, as I have said already, I do not ask any man to do what I am not prepared to do myself.
There is a very obvious fallacy in the argument we have just heard. It presupposes what is not the case, that these salaries set down originally for Ministers were sufficiently excessive to allow of a cut. If the Ministers' salaries, as originally fixed, were correct, something might be said for the argument, but we know that it is not at all a correct description to say that they were adequate. They are, and always were, hopelessly inadequate, and I am glad that I registered my personal protest against the fixation of them in the beginning at this ridiculous amount. I charged the President at the time that the sum was computed somewhat in this fashion, the only way of computation that I could imagine that would reach such a result. It was this, that inquiry was made as to how much the Ministers were paid in the Six-County Parliament. It was found that they were paid £2,000 a year. Then, I suppose, it was said: "Very well, let us fix the Free State Ministers' salaries at a figure less than that." I cannot imagine any other basis of calculation than that, because the salary bears no relation whatever in reason, either to the status of the Ministerial Officer or to the character of the work that he is to do. It certainly does not indicate in terms of money value the dignity of the office; it certainly does not indicate either, the quality or the ability that is demanded for its proper discharge, and it has no relation whatsoever in proportion or in ratio to the type of work that the Minister is called upon to do, or as to the responsibilities that he must shoulder, or, in other words, as to the courage, character and intelligence that he must put into his work.
It is possible now, perhaps, in these days of sacrifice, when sacrifice for the nation is the fashion, and when the wave of enthusiasm that swept through the land in the last few years was sufficient to carry hosts of men along that in normal times would have shrunk from self-sacrifice, to get men of ability to fill these Ministerial offices now, but it needs very little prophetic vision to see that in normal times, and when stabilisation has been reached, that no man of first-class ability would accept a Ministry of the Free State at such a salary. Deputy O'Connell struck the right note, and spoke what is absolutely the truth. The men who are to fill these offices would have a very much larger income if they turned their backs upon the national service and went into business or followed their professions. There are many professional men who are quite willing to be here as private members of the Dáil, but who are not willing to be Ministers simply because they could not afford to throw away so much of their own income and take the miserable pittance, for that is really what it is to regard it comparatively, that is allotted to a Minister. It is the fashion always to look to men in high places, to officials and to others, and to complain that they are overpaid, just as members of a religious order are spoken of in newspaper reports as "the good nuns." In the newspaper account of a luncheon it is always "the good sisters" who are referred to as having provided a hospitable and delightful dejeuner, or when a clergyman dies he is usually referred to as "a saintly and scholarly gentleman." I am referring now to a Minister, and not to Ministries. A man is always saintly and scholarly when he is dead. So long as a Minister fills a responsible office, and so long as his office carries big responsibilities, then he is a public enemy and everyone's criticism may be levelled at him, and the fashionable type of criticism is to allege that he is overpaid. I believe "bloated official" is the correct description. Just as the established phrase for a deceased clergyman is "a saintly and scholarly gentleman," so I understand the proper phrase in this case is "bloated official." Anyone acquainted with life, anyone who has come to adult years, knows well how the big combines prosper in the United States. The reason is because they spare no money to get at the head of their corporations the man, whoever he is or wherever he comes from, who is able to work successfully a business combine, and a salary of £60,000 a year in pounds sterling is not too much for such a man.
I know of a certain American manufacturing firm that looked round and saw in London in the service of a rival English company a distinguished product of the London University. They offered him a high salary which fidelity to his own employers made him refuse. What did the American company do? They bought out the English company and then said: "Now we are your employers and we will take you over to America and provide you with all the laboratories you require." That is how big businesses are conducted successfully, and is there any bigger business in this nation than the business of the nation itself? It is absurd to come along with this petty criticism and suggest that economy requires a reduction of expenditure in regard to Ministerial salaries. Economy, to my mind, requires an increase in those salaries, and it is in the interest of economy that I stand here to say—and I say it with the utmost conviction—that unless those salaries are increased by some future measure you will not have at the service of the nation the best ability and the most experienced brains.
Might I just point out one thing about this amendment? If it is intended to set an example to the nation, it is doing so by deceiving the nation. This amendment, as you have clearly pointed out, does not propose an immediate cut in the Ministers' salaries—it cannot take place for four years if the Ministry remains in office. Therefore, to pretend to the nation that you are cutting them £200 while in reality you are not doing it is, as the Minister for Finance pointed out, mere eyewash.
I want to assure the Minister for Finance that this is not eyewash. The amendment was not put up with the intention of throwing dust in the eyes of the public. It was put up honestly. We put it up from the same point of view as the Ministers who have been asking the public to subscribe to the loan as an act of faith in the future of the Saorstát. This amendment was put up to ask the Executive Council to show an act of faith in their own economies, and in the economies they have been preaching wholesale throughout the country. A good case has been made by Deputy Magennis in showing why a good man should receive a good salary, and why the best men should be drawn into the service. But a good case also can be made for every man in every other service. The same case can be made for other men who are receiving salaries and for men who are receiving no salaries but are trying to eke out an existence all over the Saorstát. This is not eyewash. It is a genuine plea that the cut should come from the top as well as from the bottom, but I see very little disposition to make the cuts at the top. It is all very well to preach economy to men who are not able to defend themselves, who are not here to defend themselves, but if there is economy needed—and it is needed— it ought to be economy all round. We Deputies here are not getting a huge salary, and some of us give all our time to the business of the Dáil during its sittings. There are some Deputies here who are prepared for a cut, and it ought to be a cut all round. When men preach economy they ought to show an act of faith in what they preach. Deputy Heffernan said that he did not like to interfere with the salary of the President by reason of the dignity of his office. I agree, and I hope that in future the President will do honour to the office and let us have the usual hospitalities associated with such an office. For that reason only I agree with Deputy Heffernan.
Is that an act of faith?
Yes, it is an act of faith. I am not surprised at Deputy O'Connell. I knew Deputy O'Connell would try to make a good case for the people whom he represents, but in making that case he made a case for the Ministers. He was not thinking of the Ministers at all. Like a wise man he was thinking of something else. I want to assure Ministers that this is not meant for eyewash or to throw dust in the eyes of the public. It is trying to show the public that we believe in what we preach, and the sooner we all start showing an example the better for this country.
This is a sham battle from the start. It seems to me that the psychology of Deputy Gorey's surname is that he must always be engaged in a conflict, always in a battle. It does not matter, as long as there is turmoil and a certain amount of dust arising from that conflict, whether there is any object to be gained or not. If Deputy Gorey insists that we must practise what we preach he should first of all see that he knows what the object of preaching is. Nobody has set out in this country to effect economies merely to penalise certain people. It was done in order to accumulate money and to save money. What money is going to be saved by Deputy Heffernan's amendment? A sum of £2,200, to come into force this time four years. There is a phrase which occurs in a play—I think it is by Wm. Boyle— which is sometimes acted in this city, where a canvasser calls on a begging expedition and the gentleman on whom he calls says he will halve his entire fortune and at the end presents a shilling. The shilling is refused and the phrase is used, that this beastly conglomeration of twelve miserable coppers cannot be accepted as a decent result of the interview. Does this £2,200 seem an economy to be effected in the present state? That is where I think the Minister for Finance's references to eyewash seem to be applicable. The sum to be saved is £2,200. We are told that the psychological effect of the lesson is going to be that the teachers will accept more readily the cut imposed upon them, not for the sake of penalising them but for the sake of the great money there will be saved by it. The same thing, of course, applies to old-age pension money. It is not merely to penalise. Deputy Heffernan's amendment does not set out to effect any economy. I cannot understand whether it is a fine on the Ministers for insisting that money should be taken from somebody else or whether it is meant as a reasonable contribution to balance the Budget next year. Personally, I have the feeling, that Professor Magennis has given expression to, that Ministers here are not well enough paid, and the analogy that was made by the Minister for Finance when he spoke of the salaries paid to the heads of Departments was not a full statement of the case. The head of a Department at present may not only be getting the same as the Minister but he has also pension rights and security that a Minister does not hope to have. Deputy Heffernan referred to those young men who at present hold Ministerial office. The effect of this amendment is not to deprive these young men, but to deprive any one who holds Ministerial office, of £200 a year. He did refer to the fact that these were young men and had many opportunities before them. That is another point in my argument against Deputy Heffernan's amendment. They are young men, most of them at the period of their career when, if they turned their faces aside from this assembly to some other business, they could certainly accumulate much more than anything they are likely to accumulate from their present office. The other argument of Professor Magennis I need not stress. We must see in this country that the occupants of the Ministerial benches are not going to be confined to the leisured class or to those with money. We pretend we are a democratic country and we should have some belief in what we preach in that respect. The Ministerial occupation at the moment is a blind alley of the worst form. If we are going to reduce salaries and leave Ministers unpensionable, as they are in this country, and without any idea of a lengthened period of office, then you do mark out these posts only for those who are wealthy.
There is one other attitude that I think Deputy Gorey might consider. He might soon transfer himself by merely crossing the floor of the Dáil. Let him treat those people who were at one time called Deputies, and who are now called Ministers, as if they were on the same level as the rest of the members. I have in mind a phrase that was used, or was put into the mouth of the late President Roosevelt when he took his army to Cuba. He said that there he was with those brave boys going out in the boat. He said he talked to them as if they were his own equals, which indeed they were, in every way, except in point of education, wealth, rank and courage. Let us treat Ministers as we would wish to be treated ourselves, if efficiency were to be demanded from us when we sit on those benches. I object to the amendment.
I think the discussion shows the difficulty of assessing the amount of salary that should be paid to a Minister. I have not yet heard from anyone any good reason for fixing the amount at £1,700 or £1,500. I do not think the stressing of the commercial argument was a good one. I do not think it is good to say that a man capable of carrying on the business of a Department of State would be able to earn three times as much if he went into banking or agriculture. I do not think the argument that because he would be able to earn three times as much as an agriculturalist or a banker he should get as much or something approximate to it as a Minister, is a sound one. If that is to be the criterion it seems to me that we have got to find out what would be the worth of such a man in an administrative capacity after going through a business career or professional career. I suppose the idea would be to endeavour to obtain the services of a man who for love of the State would throw himself heart and soul into its service, relying only upon a minimum livelihood. One may take the example of some of the monastic orders and say that here you have men who are prepared to sacrifice themselves utterly to service. We are not likely to attain that position in this country within the next five years. I think some of the criticism we have heard in the Dáil and outside is personal, and is coloured by the fact that the critics were closely associated with the men who have been placed in the position of responsibility. If, as is the case in most countries, the Ministerial elements were far apart from the people there would be no such criticism. There is a certain amount, not of jealousy but sycophancy behind a good deal of the criticism, a feeling that these men are not good enough for high office, or at least, they may be good enough for high office, but they are not good enough for high pay. I do not think that should affect the discussion or the judgment of the Dáil, in this matter. I want to say that we are not dealing with this Ministry. We are dealing with the office of Ministers of State and trying to assess the amount of salary, pay, stipend, or as Deputy Professor Magennis would like to call it, honorarium, that we should give to these Ministers. I did not like to hear the Minister for Finance saying that you must pay a certain high salary to remove to some degree at any rate the risk of graft. There is a suggestion in that, and I have heard it more than once, that the temptation to illicit payment is greater amongst those who receive small payment for work done, than amongst those who receive high payment. I think evidence would be conclusive if one tried to adduce it, to show that the danger of graft lies, at least equally as much, amongst those who have been in the habit of receiving high pay.
I think Deputy Johnson slightly misunderstood me. I said that if you did not get men who were equal to the office there was greater danger of corruption. I certainly did not mean to say what Deputy Johnson has taken me as saying. My point was that if you get men who are unfit for the office, owing to people who are fitted being unwilling or unable to take office at the rates or salaries offered, you run risks in that direction.
I think the risks are no greater amongst those who have not been in receipt of anything like these salaries than those who have been in receipt of high salaries. Deputy Cooper and Deputy Gorey, I think, made some references that if we were to preach economy and "cuts" and be consistent we should lower salaries in the Ministerial ranks and elsewhere. If I thought there was anything in that argument I would retort that because I have resisted "cuts," therefore I will continue to resist "cuts." I do not think you are going to have economy, and I do not think you are going to get the ends you seek by simply making the "cuts." I do not think that is the direction in which economy should proceed at all. In arriving at the rate of salary to be paid to Ministers I think we have not got to take into account their competitive worth, their worth in the field of commerce, or in the professions. We have to take into account the circumstances of social life of the community in which we are living, the qualifications and preparation necessary for the work that has to be done, and the risks of being thrown entirely upon their savings, after office has been vacated.
Deputies ought to recognise that that is a very considerable risk. A Minister cannot speak of the future because, under this Bill, which will operate until it is repealed or amended, Ministers would be chosen from those who have had at least some preparation for Ministerial office and not merely a preparation in the commercial world, because usually I think it has been found that that kind of preparation does not qualify for Ministerial office. The preparation required would entail a considerable amount of reading and training which involves expense, and after one, two, or four years that a man may occupy a Ministry and receive a salary, perhaps twice as much as he would have been receiving in other walks of life, the surplus might easily be lost in one year after he had vacated office. One or two years after he might be thrown entirely upon his own resources, having lost his prospects and being dependent upon what he has been able to save during his years of office. I do not see yet any argument for fixing the sum at less than £1,700; I have not, in fact, heard any argument for fixing it at £1,700, but until I hear some effective argument that satisfies me that the sum should be reduced from what it has been fixed in the Bill I will oppose the amendment. I think that we have to recognise that a citizen upon whom has been imposed the duty and responsibility of the charge of a Department of State has taken upon himself a tremendous responsibility, and I think we ought to endeavour to impress upon the country that it is a responsibility. It is not a reward; it is the request of his fellow-citizens that he should do certain work, give certain services, and absolutely immerse himself in the service of the State, and every Deputy knows that even in their own associations—and it is to a much greater degree to be found in Ministerial posts—that responsibilities are imposed upon Deputies, and more so on Ministers because of their position, that are not imposed upon the average citizen, and those are monetary responsibilities. For these reasons I am not prepared to approve of the amendment. I do not think any case has been made except the case for cutting, and that is not conclusive, either in this case or any other cases put forward here.
I would like to assure the Minister for Finance that this amendment was not put forward in any sense as eyewash. It was seriously intended and was not in any way meant to reflect on the Minister for Finance. I would also like to assure Deputy Johnson that I was not in any way inspired by such motives as petty jealousy, or spite, or personal ill-will against the Minister.
May I say that I never thought that that was in the mind of the Deputy. I was thinking of general loose talk outside.
That was made clear, I think, Deputy Heffernan.
I accept that statement, but in any case I wish to say that I was not inspired by these motives, even if Deputy Johnson did not suggest them, because I have the greatest possible regard for the capabilities and capacities of the Ministers, as far as I know of them, and I was greatly impressed and almost convinced by the thoroughly honest statement made by the Minister for Finance in regard to this matter. But I must say that I am not sufficiently convinced and I still retain, to a large extent, the opinions I originally started on. I was perfectly well aware, when putting forward this amendment, that the actual economies which would be effected on its acceptance would be trivial and would have no effect on the general finances of the country. But I was also inspired by the ideas of other Deputies that no man should ask a subordinate to do what he is not prepared to do himself, and I felt that Ministers, having asked their subordinate Departments to make cuts and to make reductions, are in duty bound to make similar reductions in their own salaries. A difficulty seems to arise with regard to an estimate of the value of the services of the Ministers, and we find it difficult to arrive at a standard on which to judge their financial worth. I am not responsible for that; if a mistake was made when the salaries were originally fixed, if these salaries were fixed at too low an amount, that is not my fault. I take it for granted that they were fixed at an amount which it was thought was the worth of the Ministers' services, and if the Dáil fixed them at too low an amount, I cannot be responsible for that. I take it for granted that they were fixed on the value of the Ministers' services of the time. The Minister for Finance made a certain statement about the value of the services of certain heads of departments, and he referred particularly to the low salaries of the Postmaster-General and the Secretary. I agree with him to a large extent. I am well aware that a man who is responsible for the conduct of such an enormous institution should be well remunerated, and I think it is quite possible that the actual civil servant he referred to does not receive a sufficient salary. But I would also remind the Minister for Finance that there are many other departments. If he looks at the Estimates he will find about 60 votes with the heads of almost all Departments getting probably £1,000 a year, and in a great many cases over that. I think there seems to be some magic in that figure of £1,000 a year. When I was a young fellow I thought that if I ever reached the enormous salary of £100 a year I would be made for life, but now the ambition of all school children is £1,000 a year, and although the value of money has considerably depreciated, I do not think it has depreciated to that extent. I do consider that although the heads of some departments may not be sufficiently paid, the heads of a great number of departments are altogether overpaid.
I deal with this largely from the point of view of agriculture, and the thing which impressed me most in hearing the speeches made in this debate was the strong, solid wall of opposition which we farmers are up against in our attempts to economise. As far as I can judge from what I hear in the Dáil, economies are very admirable things, provided it is the other fellow who is to make them. We are all willing to economise out of the other man's pocket, but when it comes to touching our own we rather dislike having our salaries reduced. We all know that agriculture at present is in a very parlous condition, that there are no profits from it, and that the people we represent are enjoying practically no salaries whatever, and there is also a grave danger that there would be built up on this superstructure of Ministers a bureaucracy which will bear down upon the country's impoverished foundation. That is what we are fighting against. My idea in bringing forward this is that the example should be set by the Ministers, and should percolate down all through the Departments of State, and that it should affect every Civil Servant, and every servant of the State who is getting a salary, and also that notice should be taken of it by other members of the community, and that they should be prepared to accept less for their services. If the present heavy superstructure is maintained agriculture, which is its basis, will not be able to support the country in the manner in which things are being carried on. Having stated these arguments, I am convinced that it would be a wise thing and a popular gesture, if the Ministers accepted the amendment instead of putting it to a vote.
I should like to say I had not the advantage of hearing Deputy Heffernan when introducing the motion. I have heard him now, and I cannot at all understand the attitude he has taken up. He says the Ministers should set an example. I quite agree. Let me correct his history. The Ministers have set an example. In spite of the protest of an Independent Deputy, such as I was, the Ministers fixed a scale of salaries at quite too low a figure, utterly inadequate. I called it, and still call it, ridiculous in the circumstances. Consequently, if the sole ground on which he rests his case be that the Ministers should set an example, he is already fully met. They have set the example. Not only has the axe of economy been applied to various departments of administration, but it was applied earlier to the Universities. That was accepted, I will not say without any murmur, but there was no protest made except by University representatives. I quite agree that agriculture is in a bad way. Is agriculture to be taken out of the wretched state in which it finds itself by introducing a scheme of Ministries, and of remuneration for Ministries, which will make us a fifth-rate State? Is the head of the national administration purposely arranged to be a man of inferior standing in any of the various walks of life? That is really what it amounts to. The fabric of government, the fabric of State administration, is being created by this Bill, and in the name of restoring to its much desired prosperity one of the stable industries of the country we should see to it now, according to the Deputy speaking for agriculture, that it shall be an inferior fabric. It is a most extraordinary idea to say when the State is being arranged that it shall be inferior. I never thought to hear in actual life the argument with which ancient logicians regaled their pupils: "Who drives fat oxen should himself be fat." Here it is enunciated: "Who makes a cut must make a cut with regard to himself."
took the chair at this stage.
The question of the payment of Ministers and Deputies was left last year, in the first instance, to a Committee to decide. The Committee was composed of Deputies, I think, from all sections of the Dáil as it then stood, and it took into consideration questions affecting other countries and salaries paid in other countries. I do not know whether it had in mind salaries then paid, or salaries which had been paid to certain officials, Civil Servants, who were in office here at the time when the Treaty was passed, and who actually were in receipt and enjoyment of those salaries after the Dáil met, certainly in one case, and possibly in two or three. There was one civil servant whose salary was either £3,000 or £3,500 a year, with residence; another civil servant had a salary of £1,800, and another a salary in the neighbourhood of £1,700 a year. Since the establishment of the Saorstát, and in fact during the time of the third Dáil, no appointment was made by the Government of any official at a higher salary than £1,500 a year. These salaries carry with them what are called Civil Service bonuses which bring up the salary, I think, to a round figure of £1,700. The position has with it all the advantages which civil servants enjoy, such as pension rights, and I am sure that the Committee in considering the salaries of Ministers at that time had that in mind when recommending a salary of £1,700 a year. I stated when I was introducing the Bill that I would entertain an amendment to reduce my own salary. Personally, I have seen no reason why there should be any differentiation. The Committee thought otherwise. I conveyed my views to the Committee, but they in their judgment and wisdom recommended the large salary for my office. I do not think it is a salary on which a person having no other sources of income would be able to keep up what is properly supposed to be the dignity of that office. It would call for very much more expenditure than is allotted in the salary of £2,500 a year, when income tax and super tax is charged on that figure. Ministers pay income tax, and I understand that the salary is somewhere about £1,400 a year when income tax has been deducted, so that in that respect they are on much the same level as officers in the Civil Service who have not, as far as I know, many of the charges on their income which attach to that of Ministers, and who have permanency of occupation, and none of those disadvantages which Ministers occasionally experience in their pilgrimages throughout the country. I would say as regards salaries, that even though there are a number of Ministers, and even though the salaries are £1,700 a year, and even though it may appear to be a superstructure of a certain amount of extravagance, it cannot be considered extravagent when they have rendered good service for the money they have received, and that ought to be one of the principal tests one would apply to a consideration of this sort. I mentioned, when introducing this Bill, that as far as the salary of the President is concerned there was a difference of somewhere about £100 a year in the net amount received in salary by the President, and that paid to the Lord Mayor of the city of Dublin, and the Lord Mayor has a residence which is not provided for the President. If the State cannot afford to pay the Ministers at the head of departments, the average responsibility of which far exceeds that of the Lord Mayor at the same rate, I think we are a poor country. If, on the other hand, by reason of a large number of Ministers certain economies can be effected, and that the State can be placed on a very secure and sound foundation, even perhaps at the expense of the political existence of some of the Ministers, I think they are rendering good services for the money they receive.
Some years ago, in discussing the possible future of politics in this country, a very able man said to me that he would not give much for the lifetime of the first Government or of the second, but that he would put his money on the third. I think we have lived that down. But Deputies generally will admit that having regard to the difficulties of the time, there is a certain limitation to the political future of those who are placed in responsible positions just now. The public may possibly say that they have achieved some good work. As time goes on, people will say that they ought to have achieved it at a much lesser price and at less cost, one way or other. But it must be remembered that the majority of those comprising the Government at the moment are very young men who, in the ordinary way, might possibly be devoting their attention to their own future. From my experience of them—as I said during the election campaign—I had never received more loyal service or had read in any country of more loyal service or of such disinterested service as these men rendered. That is so far as they are concerned in their offices as Ministers and in their work and support in founding this new State. It does not take into consideration the future. We do not know what the future may hold for us. It may be possible within a few years, as soon as reorganisation has been completed, to conduct the affairs of this State with a smaller number of Ministers who, in turn, may be able to administer their particular Departments at much less cost of time than is at present the case. But I do say that, in considering the question of the salaries that may be paid to Ministers, that one ought now and then stand up against an unbalanced public view. If there be such, it must be nurtured to a large extent by the weakness of persons who are not able to appreciate the size of the job Ministers have got and the size of the job they have accomplished.
We are not placing in comparison a Minister's salary with the allowance of an Old-age Pensioner. We regret— every member of the Ministry regrets —very much indeed the necessity for effecting economies from such a service of the State. You would not get any economy worthy of the name by a deduction of 10 per cent. from the Ministers' salaries, and in effect it would be misleading the public to say that we had ourselves borne the same cut. The proportion would not be the same. The actual effect upon the pockets of the Ministers would not be the same. At no time, I suppose, would it be necessary to cut their expenditure to the extent that they would be short of, say, a glass of wine or a cigarette or a meal, whereas the same thing may happen in regard to the old age pensioners. In this matter of Government, one must consider all the complexities of the case and one must remember that, while a Minister is reputed to have £1,700 a year, and actually handles something like £1,400, the drains and demands on that £1,400 make his salary not very much more than the ordinary Higher Executive Officer of the Civil Service. And possibly the Civil Servant has the amount with much greater certainty, because a Minister never knows what demands may be made on his purse. Some of these demands he cannot possibly refuse. The question to my mind has been admirably—and I may say very generously—dealt with by the Leader of the Opposition.
If there is one man in this assembly who has a serious responsibility to those who placed him there it is the Leader of the Labour Party, Deputy Johnson, because those who returned him here, and who worked for him may, I think, resent persons having salaries running into four figures when their own terms of employment may be very insecure, if there are any at all. It ought not to be forgotten that to the service of the State and to either Houses comprising the Oireachtas there ought to be attracted the very best material there is in the country, and it must be remembered that even good material is not always free from some taint or some complaint. If you get really honest and able men attracted to the service of the State I say they ought to be paid, and it would be very poor reward for the service these men rendered during strenuous and hard times to say at the end of that period: "You have done your job fairly well, but your salary must be reduced."
Amendment put.
The Dáil divided: Tá. 11; Níl, 66.
Tá
- Pádraig F. Baxter.
- John Conlan.
- Seán de Faoite.
- Connor Hogan.
- Tadhg S.O Donnabháin.
- Seán O Duinnín.
- Donchadh S. O Guaire.
- Mícheál O hIfearnáin.
- Domhnall O Mocháin.
- Patrick K. Hogan (Luimneach).
- Nicholas Wall.
Níl
- Earnán Altún.
- Earnán de Blaghd.
- Séamus Breathnach.
- Seán Buitléir.
- Seoirse de Bhulbh.
- Próinsias Bulfin.
- John J. Cole.
- Henry Coyle.
- Louis J. D'Alton.
- Máighréad Ní Choileáin, Bean Uí
- Dhrisceóil.
- Patrick J. Egan.
- Osmond Grattan Esmonde.
- Darrell Figgis.
- Henry J. Finlay.
- Desmond Fitzgerald.
- John Good.
- David Hall.
- John Hennigan.
- William Hewat.
- Tomás Mac Artúir.
- Seosamh Mac a' Bhrighde.
- Alasdair Mac Cába.
- Domhnall Mac Cárthaigh.
- Liam T. Mac Cosgair.
- Séamus Mac Cosgair.
- Tomás Mac Eoin.
- Pádraig Mac Fadáin.
- Risteárd Mac Fheorais.
- Pádraig Mac Fhlannchadha.
- Pádraig Mac Giollagáin.
- Seán P. Mac Giobúin.
- Seán Mac Giolla 'n Ríogh.
- Seoirse Mac Niocaill.
- Liam Mag Aonghusa.
- Pádraig S. Mag Ualghairg.
- Martin M. Nally.
- Tomás de Nógla.
- John T. Nolan.
- Peadar O hAodha.
- Mícheál O hAonghusa.
- Ailfrid O Broin.
- Criostóir O Broin.
- Seán O Bruadair.
- Próinsias O Cathail.
- Aodh O Cinnéide.
- Tomás O Conaill.
- Aodh O Cúlacháin.
- Eoghan O Dochartaigh.
- Séamus N. O Dóláin.
- Eamon O Dubhghaill.
- Peadar S. O Dubhghaill.
- Pádraig O Dubhthaigh.
- Eamon S. O Dúgáin.
- Aindriú O Láimhín.
- Séamus O Leadáin.
- Thomas O'Mahony.
- Domhnall O Muirgheasa.
- Tadhg O Murchadha.
- Pádraig O hOgáin (An Clár).
- Ailfrid O Raithile.
- Seán M. O Súilleabháin.
- Andrew O'Shaughnessy.
- Seán Príomhdhail.
- William A. Redmond.
- Liam Thrift.
- Séamus O Murchadha.
Amendment declared lost.
Question—"That Section 4 stand part of the Bill"—put and agreed to.
SECTION 5.
"Nothing in this Act contained shall derogate from the collective responsibility of the Executive Council as provided by the Constitution notwithstanding that members of the Executive Council may be appointed individually to be Ministers, heads of particular Departments of State."
I move to delete this Section. This Section merely re-enacts Article 54 of the Constitution and is open to the same objection as the last sentence in Sub-section (1), Section 3. I hope there are no doubts in the Attorney-General's mind as to some of these Sections not infringing the Articles of the Constitution. It seems to me that this Section is unnecessary. Therefore I move its deletion.
This is even more necessary than the proviso to which Deputy Johnson took exception, and for this reason: it would be a bad thing to lay down any such rule as that we must not mention the Constitution in any of our Acts. For my part, responsible for the drafting of Acts here, I could not accept that principle. The reason for this particular provision, and what makes it quite necessary is this: For the convenience of the administration of the various Departments, the Minister who is at the head of the Department is given an individual capacity in relation to doing a number of acts, which for the most part he does by order under seal. The property of the State vests in him, as an individual corporation. It is necessary, while giving him that individual capacity and status for dealing departmentally, to show that that is not in conflict with the political collectivism of the Executive Council, and in my opinion this provision is absolutely necessary.
That is a legal opinion. I bow. I cannot understand it.
Amendment put and negatived.
Question: "That Section 5 stand part of the Bill," put and agreed to.
SECTION 6.
"There shall be vested in the Attorney-General of Saorstát Eireann (who shall be styled in Irish `Priomh-Aithne' Shaorstáit Eireann and shall be appointed by the Governor-General on the nomination of the Executive Council) the business, powers, authorities, duties and functions formerly vested in or exercised by the Attorney-General for Ireland, the Solicitor-General for Ireland, the Attorney-General for Southern Ireland, the Solicitor-General for Southern Ireland, the Law Adviser to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, and any or all of them respectively, and the administration and control of the business, powers, authorities, duties and functions of the branches and officers of the public services specified in the Ninth Part of the Schedule to this Act, and also the administration and business generally of public services in connection with the representation of the Government of Saorstát Eireann and of the public in all legal proceedings for the enforcement of law, the punishment of offenders and the assertion or protection of public rights and all powers, duties and functions connected with the same respectively, together with the duty of advising the Executive Council and the several Executive Ministers in matters of law and of legal opinion."
I move amendment 22, to delete the Section. The amendment is that the Section be deleted, not that it should be merely amended. I want to make it clear that in moving for the deletion of this Section I am not touching at all, or dealing in any way, with the existence of the office of the Attorney-General, but merely that if it should be judged wise and necessary for a good reason that such an office shall exist, as distinct from the Minister for Justice, then that office should be provided for separately in a Bill of its own. I do not propose to develop this at very great length. I am rather reminded of a story of a French mayor who was called on to show cause why he surrendered his town without firing his cannon. He filed fifty-two reasons, and the fifty-second reason was that he had no cannon to fire. I will dispense with fiftyone reasons and come to the last, which is that I am fortified in my conclusion that this Section should not form part of the Bill by the opinion to that effect of the Attorney-General himself, as the drafter of this Bill, because the Bill is entitled, "The Ministers and Secretaries Bill." That is the short title. The other title is:
"an Act for constituting the Ministers and Departments of State in Saorstát Eireann pursuant to the Constitution, and for enabling the appointment of Parliamentary Secretaries and other purposes incidental thereto."
I have already put it before the Ceann Comhairle that if this Section were to stand, as part of the Bill, the title would have to be amended, but inasmuch as the title stands, as it does, it was clearly the belief of the original drafter that this Section should not stand part of the Bill, because this Section is not consonant with the title.
I do therefore urge, on separate grounds altogether, that any creation of the Office of Attorney-General should be a creation with its own Bill. It should be under its own separate Bill, and it would deal with the matter far more fully, setting forth the services and functions to be attended to by such an officer, far more completely than could possibly be done under one single section of a Bill mainly devoted to other purposes and the title of which is confined to other purposes, not including the purposes set forth in the Section. For this reason I urge that this Section should be deleted from this Bill, and that the whole question of the work to be done by the Attorney-General, and the creation of the office of Attorney-General and a matter that is not dealt with in this Bill at all, a matter that the Attorney-General would be inclined reluctantly to admit—the remuneration of the Attorney-General—would be dealt with in such a Bill, dealing separately with the existence of such an Officer of State. I think it was the President himself, or it may have been the Attorney-General, who stated that the Attorney-General was not a Minister and was not a Parliamentary Secretary. But in a Bill dealing with Ministers and Secretaries it is a very excellent thing that the Bill should be confined to Ministers and Secretaries, and that the Attorney-General should be given the privilege, which he could so well fill, of taking an entire Bill to himself.
Mr. O'CONNELL
I also had an amendment to this matter, and my reason for putting down the amendment has been practically stated by Deputy Figgis. It is because it does not seem to fit in with the provisions of the Bill. The Attorney-General is not a Minister. Or is he a Minister? We do not know; it is not clear to us. It is a Ministers and Secretaries Bill. The Attorney-General has the status of a Minister or Judge inasmuch as he is appointed by the Governor-General, on the nomination of the Executive Council, but there is nothing to show whether he is, or is not, to be a member of the Oireachtas, or in what other way he is eligible, or must he be a member of the Oireachtas in all cases? That is not stated, nor what is to be the length of his office, or whether he would go out of office with the Executive Government, whether it is a political appointment or a purely legal appointment. There is, too, the question of remuneration, which is absent from this Bill. On the whole, I think that while I agree that there is a necessity for such an officer, his position should be defined, and defined at much more length, in a special Bill.
This Section does not create the office of Attorney-General. The office itself is an old common law office that has existed, under the system of law that we have taken over, for a very long period of centuries. I believe that it dates back to the earlier part of the 13th century. It has no statutory origin whatever. Its functions practically are represented by its name. The Attorney-General was an agent originally for the King, and now represents the Crown and State in all legal proceedings. I did say that the Attorney-General was not a Minister, not because he is Attorney-General. That does not make him one of the Ministers named in the Constitution. He may be a Minister, or he may not. In England, however, the Attorney-General is, in point of fact, called a Minister. He is given in the list of Ministers. He may not be a Cabinet Minister. Here he is not necessarily one of the twelve ministers named in the Constitution, unless he happens to be one that is selected by the President of the day to be one of his Executive Council.
Therefore, what I meant, in the statement to which Deputy Figgis refers, is this, that his office does not in itself make him one of the twelve Ministers. He may be outside the Dáil altogether. The functions of the office are settled and clear. He represents the Executive in all legal proceedings; he prosecutes on behalf of the Executive in all criminal matters, and in prosecutions for State he is responsible for defending public rights. For instance, in any matter that may affect a public right of way, or a public highway, no one can proceed without his intervention on behalf of the public.
What this Section does is, it transfers to him a number of functions that were formerly vested in the previous Attorneys-General, first for all Ireland, and then for what was called Southern Ireland, and so on. A great number of these functions are statutory, and it appeared right that they should be transferred and vested in the Attorney-General of the Free State by Statute. It is an office closely attached to the Executive. It is a Ministerial office, and it is properly in this Bill, though I agree with Deputy Figgis that probably it would be nicer, as a matter of draftsmanship, to amend the title by inserting a reference to it, though I doubt if that is necessary. However, I propose, in order to meet these particular finesses, to put that matter right by introducing an amendment in reference to the title.
The appointment by the Governor-General follows on the advice of the Executive Council, because it is essential to have the office to complete the Executive, so that it may not be possible in Court to take, as a point of objection, that the whole Executive authority is not represented in the Attorney-General in any particular proceeding. This Section is really one which transfers, so far as may be necessary, the various duties and functions and business of that office as it has existed. It would be an enormous task to go through all the Statutes. There are an immense number of Statutes in which the office of Attorney-General is referred to for one purpose or another. I think this Section effectually completes the office as it is necessary now in the Constitution.
There is one point which neither the Bill nor the speech of the Attorney-General has made clear, and that is whether the Attorney-General is or is not a Minister. I think the proposed amendment, which the Attorney-General has spoken of introducing, would make it more clear that he is not a Minister. If this is called a Minister, an Attorney-General and Secretaries Bill, it would be obvious that the Attorney-General is something different from a Minister. The matter is one of considerable importance, because under Article 57 of the Constitution every Minister shall have the right to attend and be heard in Seanad Eireann. If the Attorney-General is not a Minister, then when the Courts of Justice Bill comes before the Seanad next week, he will have no right to go in there and explain it, and we know he is best able to do that. I think it should be made clear that he is a Minister attached to the Executive Council. He had better give that point some consideration before the Report Stage.
On the Second Reading of this Bill the Attorney-General referred Deputy Redmond to Anson's "Law of the Constitution" for information as to the functions of the Attorney-General. I have no doubt that Deputy Redmond, being a barrister, did not need the references. I am always grateful to the Attorney-General for his efforts to direct me. I got hold of Sir William Anson's "Law of the Constitution," and I found, as the Attorney-General pointed out, that he is really the King's Attorney-General, which is an historical position. He is not the President's Attorney-General; he is the Governor-General's Attorney-General. The reason the post of Attorney-General exists is, according to Anson, because the King or his representative were not competent to plead in Court as they did not know the law. That scarcely exists in this case. I think Sir William Anson did not contemplate such a case as now exists here. The deduction I draw is that we are facing a new Constitution which Sir William Anson never contemplated when he wrote his book, and it is not profitable for us to go delving about in a constitutional past with reference to a Constitution which has no connection with ours.
Sir William Anson's dictum is that the Attorney-General should not be a member of the Inner Council. That has since been violated in Great Britain, and it is violated here. The Attorney-General is really wasting our time when he refers to archaic works of that description. We might be better employed in studying Whittaker's Almanac.
In point of fact Sir William Anson's Book is not an archaic work. It is the most recent work on the British Constitution, but, of course, not on the Constitution of the Free State. The next edition, I should think, will bring it up-to-date. I referred to Anson with reference to the position of the Attorney-General in England, which was referred to here by Deputy Redmond. He referred to the knowledge he had gained by sitting on the Benches in Westminster, where he came in contact with that great personage. He tested our debate by the knowledge he had gained that way. I suggested he might have made his knowledge more accurate by reference to the standard work of Sir William Anson. The position of the Attorney-General in the Dominions is slightly different. The Attorney-General in England is directly the Attorney-General for the King, appointed by Letters Patent. The Attorney-General in the Dominions is the Attorney-General of the Executive Government of the Dominions. That is stated in other authoritative works on the subject. I do not quite know to what point Deputy Cooper was directing his remarks—whether or not it was to the deletion of the office from this Bill. As regards the position of the Minister, it would be impossible for me to introduce an amendment in this Bill providing that the Attorney-General shall be a Minister, because I should be assuming to myself two prerogatives of the President, one the power of appointing Ministers, and the other the power of removing them, his quota being complete. It is impossible to put in a provision of that kind. The fact is he is not of necessity a Minister, but may be a Minister, while at the same time it is a Ministerial office.
Now, as regards the Privy Council, the Attorney-General in England never used to be a member of the Privy Council, and the great distinction in Ireland was that the Attorney-General always was of the Privy Council; and that accounts for the peculiar difference between the position of Judges in Ireland and Judges in England. They are members of the Privy Council in Ireland because they first filled the office of Attorney-General, and consequently, on appointment to the Bench they remain members of the Privy Council, and in that way become associated, most improperly, with the Executive Government. In England they are not members of the Privy Council and consequently are not in touch with the Executive Government. For that reason, Judges in England have Knighthoods, but not in Ireland, because the precedence attached to the office of Privy Council was greater than that attached to the holding of a Knighthood. I do not think I could introduce an amendment, or suggest to the President an amendment to make the Attorney-General necessarily a Minister, because he is not necessarily a member of this Dáil. But if some future President has in his Cabinet a person capable of being Attorney-General, then, when constituting his Ministry, that future President may make the Attorney-General a member of the Executive.
A Minister may not necessarily be a member of the Dáil.
But an Executive Minister?
My point was that the whole thing requires more exact definition than it can get in this clause, and that the deletion of this clause would render the substitution of another clause necessary on Report Stage, where we could have a much fuller and more intelligent understanding than merely being referred to constitutional works.
This Section does not refer to constitutional works. Save by an amendment of the Constitution—I do not think it would be by this or that Bill—would it be possible to provide that the Attorney-General must be an Executive Minister because he must be an Executive Minister or one outside. It would be impossible to have the Attorney-General appointed by the Dáil in the way of an outside Minister if he is to be a legal Attorney or representative of the Executive.
I have always looked with great respect upon the law, as being formidable to the ordinary lay man; but, in connection with the discussion here in respect to the Attorney-General my respect for the law has largely increased, and my awe of the position of the Attorney-General is more profound than it was ever before. The Attorney-General, I gather from him, is and is not, was and was not an illusory person with undefined power going back to prehistoric times, derived from no Statute. Altogether, he is a most interesting personality and, as I say, I shall look upon him with greater awe and greater respect than ever before.
The Section as it stands followed by the explanation of its meaning by the Attorney-General rather bewilders me more than any other Section in the Bill. I gather from the Attorney-General's statement that, whether we knew it or not, there was always an Attorney-General. I wonder am I right in saying that when we had a Legal Adviser we had an Attorney-General; that when we had no Legal Adviser we still had an Attorney General. May I ask the Attorney-General whether I am right or not?
Does Deputy Johnson refer to a period when my title was that of Legal Adviser to the Provisional Government? Because, during that period I had an express appointment of Legal Adviser to the Provisional Government, and also exercised the functions of Attorney-General.
Who exercised the functions of the late Attorney-General? There had been an Attorney-General appointed after the usual method by the British authorities. The functions of the Attorney-General were carried through by the legal advisor to the Provisional Government. The Attorney-General now tells us that this office is a continuous office, that he was the advisor in general to the Government for the time being, the Crown, as it might have been, or the Executive for the time being. We are asked to assume now that there has been, in some informal way, an appointment of Attorney-General. This Bill says nothing about a Department of the Attorney-General, but says that the Attorney-General, who has not been created by the Oireachtas in any way, as far as I can understand, is assumed to exist there, I was going to risk saying, from the beginning of time. He is assumed to have existed and continued, notwithstanding the fact that the Dáil or the Oireachtas never appointed him, and that person is to take upon himself certain duties. There is a parenthesis here that the Attorney-General, who is presumed to have existed always, shall be appointed by the Governor-General on the nomination of the Executive Council. The casual way in which this appointment is referred to is rather amusing, and I think if any section of this kind is to be inserted in the Bill, it ought to take the place of a formal declaration, to the effect that the Oireachtas intends to appoint, or at least to institute, the office of Attorney-General. That is not done in the Bill, but we are led to believe by the Attorney-General that we are to assume the existence of this office, and then say that whoever is placed in that office shall have certain duties, including the duties and functions formerly vested in the Attorney-General for Southern Ireland.
I wonder could we have some information as to who that person was when he was appointed, or is it again that there always was such a person, that he was never appointed and was never created, but existed from time eternal. I think that the Dáil would be interested to know whether that is the position, and if it is not the position why are we asked to insert this phrase: "The Attorney-General for Southern Ireland, and the Solicitor-General for Southern Ireland." There may be legal and constitutional reasons for putting in this phrase describing persons who, I believe, never existed, but I think there is no reason for assuming the existence of the Attorney-General of Saorstát Eireann who was neither appointed nor created.
With reference to the unfortunate necessity for referring to the so-called Attorney-General for Southern Ireland, the geographical place, Southern Ireland as such, none of us ever accepted, but certain Statutes were passed by the British Parliament, and under a certain Statute which we never recognised here, but still it was on their Statute Book, certain individuals did claim to hold this particular office.
Name.
I think the last holder who claimed to be Attorney-General for Southern Ireland was Mr. T. W. Brown, who is now a Judge in Northern Ireland.
Was he appointed by the Government of Southern Ireland?
He was appointed by the Lord Lieutenant. He certainly claimed that office under that particular Statute, and by that Statute the functions of the former Attorney-General for Ireland went to him. When one says that the office existed, as regards the Provisional Government period, the matter is readily explained. In the Dominion Constitutions the Crown has an Attorney-General in every Dominion technically. It is important that that Attorney-General shall be the Attorney-General of the Executive of the Dominion. During the Provisional Government period the position that was always taken was that the Provisional Government itself had all the functions vested in it of government administration, and that the Lord Lieutenant had no function that he could exercise during that period; and the particular designation or style of the office which I had the honour to hold under the Provisional Government, owes its explanation to that fact.
The office existed of necessity, that is to say the necessity of the Executive taking executive action in the Courts being parties to proceedings and prosecutions, and in that sense it has grown up and become recognised, as legal people say, by the common law as distinguished from having any statutory origin. It is in that sense that I am to be understood to have said that it previously existed. It is now claimed here that as in the case of other Dominions the officer will be appointed on the recommendation of the Executive of the Saorstát.
I think the discussion on this amendment has rather proved the desirability of the purpose that inspired it, and that is that this matter being, as the Attorney-General has admitted, so vague it ought to be more clearly defined, and ought to be dealt with more fully than it can be dealt with under a section of a Bill dealing with another subject. No one could have a higher respect than I have for the common law; the respect can utrictly be described as vast, because it must be commensurate with the subject itself, which is vast and also inchoate. But because there is such a thing as common law in existence for a body of law that has no statutory origin, I think it would be difficult to argue that the same justification can be made for the existence of an officer that has no statutory origin. This is purporting to give statutory origin to that officer. He cannot, after the enactment of this Bill, claim a non-statutory origin. If this Bill passes with this Section in it, he will clearly take a statutory origin as from its passage in this Dáil. Clearly then, if he is going to take his stand on a Statute hereafter, as distinguished from his stand before in common law, then let that Statute be ample, complete and adequate enough for the existence of his office, and that is why I urge that seeing that this matter is now going to be taken away from these Ansonian methods, and is going to be brought clearly into a statutory definition, that that statutory definition be sharper and more precise than it is here in this Section, sharper and more precise than it could possibly be in a Bill dedicated to entirely different objects as set out in its title; let a separate Bill be enacted and if it is decided that there should be an Attorney-General, then let it be decided that he should be an Attorney-General of the Executive Council appearing for the Executive Council. That is a matter that I need not develop at any length, because it touches on subjects of some contention, but let him be the Attorney-General of the Executive Council, appearing purely on behalf of the Executive Council. For whomsoever he appears, and in whatever capacity he appears, seeing that he is now going to stand distinct from the Attorney-Generals in other States, let his status be clearly defined in a separate enactment, and it should set out the Attorney-General's exact prerogatives and duties such as has not been done in this Section.
It has been stated that the Section does not cover all the functions that appertain to this office. Let anyone point to anything that has been omitted. I submit that the Section is so worded as to cover in efficient and descriptive fashion the functions, powers and duties and so on attached to the office. I will defer and bow to Deputy Figgis if he will produce to me something that has been omitted. I submit this Section is a complete description of the office that exists. This Section defines the manner of the appointment and the manner in which it is to be made. The office exists, and as such has been recognised in the Courts, and this Section covers all the various matters which have to be vested in the holder of that office.
I have been challenged and asked a question. I now ask the Attorney-General if he is the Attorney-General of the Executive Council of this State, and if so why that is not stated in the Section?
He is the Attorney-General of the State, the Attorney-General of the Executive, and of the Executive Government.
Amendment put and negatived.
I beg to move amendment 23:
To delete all words from the beginning of the Section down to the word "Council" in line 14, and to substitute therefor—
(1) "It shall be lawful for the President of the Executive Council to appoint a person to be Attorney-General of Saorstát Eireann (who shall be styled in Irish "Priomh-Aidhne Shaorstáit Eireann") in whom shall vest on his appointment."
The object of the amendment is to remove the apparently casual form of the appointment and to make it a clear declaration in the Bill that there shall be appointed an Attorney-General, or, rather, that it shall be lawful for the President of the Executive Council to appoint a person to be Attorney-General. The Bill as it stands rather puts in a parenthetical way the fact that the Attorney-General shall be appointed by the Governor-General on the nomination of the Executive Council. The amendment gives the power to the President to make this appointment. The common law establishment of this office I do not think would be affected by the fact that henceforward, if this amendment is carried, the appointment of the person to that office will be in the hands specifically of the President. The office exists and the filling of the office is a smaller matter. If the amendment is accepted, then the President shall appoint the person to fill the office.
On a point of order, I do not think there is a House.
Yes, there is a House. There are nineteen and the Leas-Cheann Comhairle. That is twenty.
The plan of the Bill is to establish certain Departments and give the various heads of these Departments certain functions. The Attorney-General has told us that the office of Attorney-General is one that is generally accepted as being established by common law and the amendment seeks to give authority to the President to make the appointment of the person who is to fill the office. It also would have the effect, perhaps, of reducing the status of the Attorney-General somewhat. He would not be appointed by the Governor-General, would not be in the position of Judges or Ministers. I think it is, perhaps, desirable that the Attorney-General should be the Law Adviser and the custodian of these rights and responsibilities that have hitherto resided in Law Officers and Attorneys-General, but that he should be quite distinctly the officer of the Council or of the Government, not a member of the Government. The effect of the amendment would be to minimise somewhat the status of the Attorney-General, to reduce his position in relation to Ministers, and it would throw the right of appointment upon the President as distinguished from only the right of nomination.
This really is not a question of status. It is a question of having the Executive effectively represented, and I need not remind Deputy Johnson of the technical position under the Constitution. I think it is necessary the appointment should be made in this way in order that the Executive Government should be fully represented in any necessary proceedings. It is solely from the point of view of fully representing the Executive Government in proceedings that the appointment is made in that way or proposed to be made in that way. It has nothing whatever to do with status or relative status — nothing whatever. Were he outside the Dáil, he would be just the same. It is entirely from the point of view of having the full sanction of the Executive of the day— theoretic and actual—and representing them fully in his capacity of an Attorney.
Am I to understand that in the view of the Attorney-General, unless the Attorney-General is appointed in the way described in the Bill that he would not be able to act with the authority that is necessary?
I fear that technical objection might be taken.
I cannot pretend to argue these legal points, and I am not going to try on a matter of this kind, which is of very great importance I have no doubt, to controvert the position of the Attorney-General. So far as this amendment is concerned I beg leave to withdraw in deference to his statement as to the possible effect of the amendment.
Amendment by leave withdrawn.
I beg to move:—
"In line 30, to delete the word ‘Executive.'"
This amendment perhaps would not be required to be pressed if the Attorney-General makes a similar explanation, but I do not think he can. The object of the amendment is to eliminate the word "Executive" before "in matters of law and of legal opinion." Quite apart from the description, which I think is a faulty one, of "Executive Ministers" as meaning Ministers who are members of the Executive Council —inasmuch as all Ministers are Executive Ministers I take it—I am at a loss to understand why the advice of the Attorney-General and General Adviser in legal matters of the Government of Saorstát Eireann should be confined, in matters of law and of legal opinion, to those Ministers who are members of the Executive Council. It seems to me that if a matter of importance in connection with, shall I say, the Department of Agriculture, arose, that the Minister in charge of that Department should have the right to call upon the Attorney-General for advice in matters of law and legal opinion. If the Bill remains in its present form that right would not reside with Extern Ministers unless the meaning is in this Section that Executive Ministers are all Ministers. Perhaps the Attorney-General would help us on that point.
Of course "Executive Ministers" always means members of the Executive Council. We have in several cases here recently use as a convenient phrase to describe members of the Executive Council, without having the whole circumlocution imposed on the printer and draftsman, the phrase "Executive Minister." In fact all Ministers do have recourse to the law department, and cases and files come in from all these departments, but it is possible that an External Minister, who is responsible only to the Dáil, might be in conflict with the Executive, which includes the all-potent Minister for Finance, and in case of conflict it would be impossible for the Attorney-General to advise the External Minister as against a member of the Executive Council because his primary business is as representing the Executive. That is the explanation. While in fact he is at the call of any Minister, and from day to day in touch with all of them, the occasion might arise when he would be torn between an External and an Internal Minister calling upon him for opinion.
That does not meet the case, I think. The duty I am referring to is that of advising the Executive Council, and the several Executive Ministers, "in matters of law and legal opinion." This does not impose on the Extern Ministers the duty of following that advice. If that Minister does not apply for advice then, unless the Attorney-General were acquainted with the facts, he cannot be said to be failing in his duty. What I seem to see in this is that its undesigned effect, perhaps, will be to relegate the non-Executive Ministers to a position where they could not call upon the Attorney-General for advice; that it still leaves the Executive Ministers in that position of detachment, or, shall I say, leaves non-Executive Ministers in a position somewhat of inferiority. I want to guard against that interpretation. If it is the practice for the Attorney-General, at all times, to give advice when asked, in matters of law, to all Ministers, then I submit the case for crossing out the word "Executive" is complete.
There is, perhaps, really not a great deal in the objection to striking out the word "Executive" beyond the possibility of conflict. The Attorney-General might find himself in this position, that while advising the Executive as to the action the Executive should take, the External Minister who might be taking another line of action would have all the cards on the table. In that way there might be conflict. In fact, so far as mere advice and opinion go, all Ministers have recourse to the Department for advice. I am not disposed really to oppose the elimination of the word in that way.
I would like to add that one can see possibilities of acute differences between a member of the Executive Council and a Minister not a member of the Executive Council. If such a Minister, outside the Executive Council, has not the right to call upon the Attorney-General for legal advice, then his position would be an unfair one, and the Attorney-General, in refusing to give that advice, would be supported by an Act on which he would rely, containing this Section, confining his duty to giving advice to Executive Ministers.
Mr. O'CONNELL
I cannot conceive how the position that the Attorney-General speaks of could possibly arise. Assuming that there is some matter in dispute between an External Minister and, say, the Minister for Finance, and that the advice of the Attorney-General is sought, unless I am to believe that there could be two kinds of advice on one given point, I cannot conceive how, if the Attorney-General gives advice, a dispute could arise. Assuming the advice is in favour of the Minister for Finance, and against the External Minister, it will be a matter for the External Minister to accept the decision, or to proceed and get other advice and carry his project before the Dáil. Assuming it is against the Minister for Finance, and in favour of the External Minister, then I presume it is just the ordinary advice that the Attorney-General would give to the Minister for Finance in any case.
On the whole, I am inclined to accept this amendment, reading it more strictly as it is "in matters of law and legal opinion." If it came to be a matter, for instance, of proceedings, and enforcing, or attempting to enforce, any matter as between an External Minister and, say, the Executive, it would be impossible, I think, to expect the legal adviser to the Executive, and their representative in the proceedings, to advise the External Minister how he was to proceed against them. In a mere matter of opinion on principle, reading it in that sense, I am prepared to accept the amendment.
That is all that is intended.
Amendment agreed to.
I beg to move:—
To add a new sub-section as follows:—
(2) "There shall be payable to the Attorney-General out of moneys provided by the Oireachtas such remuneration by way of salary as the President of the Executive Council, with the concurrence of the Minister for Finance, may determine. The Attorney-General shall devote his whole time to the duties of his office and shall not receive payment for his services by way of fees or otherwise save as hereinbefore provided."
This amendment seeks to make sure that the Attorney-General shall be paid something for his services; it is not an economy stunt. I do not think the Attorney-General should be asked, considering all things, to carry on his day by day duties without having some provision made for remuneration. This amendment is to ensure that he shall be paid something, and that what he is paid shall be paid out of monies provided by the Oireachtas. It also is intended to define the position of the Attorney-General. A Law Officer we can understand, but when we are referred to the Constitutional position of the Attorney-General, we must not forget that for a very long time—I am nót quite sure if it was so till the end in Ireland—the holder not only drew his salary for his office, but carried on private practice.
The amendment is designed to ensure that that undesirable practice should not continue; that the salary to be paid to the Attorney-General shall be for his whole-time services and that it shall not mean salary, plus fees, for public or private practice. I hope that that argument will commend itself to the Dáil and that at least it will enable us to know where we are with respect to the Attorney-General.
While I thank the Deputy for the first sentence of the amendment I am afraid the second is quite unacceptable. It is quite impossible to provide that the Attorney-General should be a whole-time officer because, in the first place, it is in the nature of a political office. He is attached to a particular Ministry and if that Ministry—which Heaven forfend—be defeated he would be thrown back on his profession. If he had accepted a whole-time office he would have lost his position in his profession. His position is that of a practising counsel, and while I personally have found it impossible to deal with private practice during the period in which I have been engaged in work for the Ministry—that exceedingly exacting character of the position will probably not continue—no member of the Bar could accept the position as a whole-time office. He could not forfeit his position as a practising counsel. The position as regards private practice is that it may be forbidden as, I believe, in England latterly the Attorney-General does not take private practice, but in consideration of that he has fees for every appearance in court. Here we arrived at an understanding with the Ministry of Finance that appearances in court were not to be remunerated by fees but were to be included in the salary that they sanctioned for the office. But the position that would follow from Deputy Johnson's second clause would really be to make the Attorney-General a Civil Servant, and it would be quite impossible.
I do not think that he could really be a member of the Dáil under that second clause, and if one has an inclusive salary for appearances in court and the various other duties that must be discharged, then it must be considered whether one must not be at liberty to accept private practice. I have considered myself entitled to accept private practice, but the demands on my time have not allowed it, and I have had to return a very large amount of work. The question of forbidding private practice must be considered in relation to the question of whether the ordinary fees are to be allowed for appearances in court, but as it stands the second clause would fail in its object because I do not think that any practising member of the Bar would take the position under these circumstances.
On this subject I sympathise with Deputy Johnson in regard to the first portion of his proposals, and, on the other hand, I sympathise with the Attorney-General in his view of the second portion. The Bar is a very old trade union, and, no doubt, the Attorney-General would be considered a very bad black-leg if he were to give his time and services as Attorney-General for nothing. But in regard to the second suggestion, that he should be a whole-time officer and not be allowed to engage in any private practice, that would certainly render his position untenable, unless, as the Attorney-General has said, he were placed in the position of a permanent civil servant. It is well known that Attorneys-General, in the past, not only in England, but even in Ireland, amassed considerable wealth, not from the fees derived from the Crown as much as from the private practice they enjoyed during the period of their occupation of that office, and, with the salary as I understand it at the moment, I think the present Attorney-General is asking almost too little. If fees were to be given for every appearance of the Attorney-General in court, certainly the amount would be considerably over the proposed figure, and the arrangement come to with the Minister for Finance, which has just been outlined by the Attorney-General, is, I think, both a credit to the Minister for Finance in the way of economy and a credit to the Attorney-General for sacrificing what might be his due remuneration. I am sure that when Deputy Johnson put down this amendment he could not have fully realised its purport, and having received the Attorney-General's explanation I hope that he will not press it further. Everyone knows, as the Attorney-General has stated, that the position is a political one, and all political positions are temporary—temporary in the extreme. At any time he may be deprived of his office by the defeat of the Ministry, and it would be asking too much for a person of the practice, ability, and experience suitable for the position of Attorney-General to give up that practice for an uncertain period with no certainty whatever of resuming it. Practice at the Bar is like every other kind of business. If you lose touch with your clients your business goes, and, I am certain that, bearing all these circumstances in mind, Deputies generally will recognise that the position taken up in this regard by the Attorney-General is both a just and reasonable one.
The attitude adopted rather surprises me, and immediately makes this question one of major importance. Deputy Redmond is unfortunate in his references to trade union practices. A term of opprobrium, which I will not apply to lawyers, is common in the trade union world, when a man who is paid for a certain job is devoting his time to ordinary daily work and then taking home private work. If Deputy Redmond wants to argue this case on grounds of trade unionism he will have to get in touch with some of the people around the Mechanics Hall in Waterford or elsewhere. I do not know, and I do not know that the House knows, what financial arrangements have been made regarding payment to the Attorney-General, but I ask the Dáil to bear in mind in discussing this question the attitude taken in regard to salaries of Ministers. It was stated as a justification for the salaries fixed that Ministers gave up their ordinary occupation, ran the risk of losing their practice, and because of that they ought to have a certain sum commensurate with the office, and taking into account the risks of monetary loss. But who will be impressed for a moment with the argument that a barrister who has been appointed to the office of Attorney-General on relinquishing that office has thereby suffered in his reputation amongst the legal profession? The impression amongst laymen at least is that the fact that he has been chosen for the office of Attorney-General enhances his position when he resumes practice at the Bar. I do not think there is very much in the plea of Deputy Redmond that the acceptance of office means a loss of subsequent practice. I think it has been looked upon as a scandal in England, and in Ireland too, that Attorneys-General and Solicitors-General should be able to draw the amount of money reputed to have been paid to them. I think a very notorious person lately announced that he had sacrificed a great deal of money by accepting a judgeship, an office which he held up to recently, and that he was able to make £40,000 a year at the Bar. I do not think the most ambitious or imaginative lawyer thinks that fees amounting to that would be available in this country, but it seems to me that if a barrister is prepared to accept the office of legal adviser, or Attorney-General, that he should be asked and required to devote his whole attention to the work of that office. If his time has to be occupied with private practice, what assurances have we that he is giving sufficient time to the elaboration of his case when it is a State case? His interests may be divergent; he may be looking to the future, and he may say that this particular client will have big cases coming on after he has lost his office, that he must devote special attention to this case, and, as a consequence, he would devote less attention to the requirements of the State.
The question of fees for State services again seems to me to leave us in the position that we do not know what our law will cost, and that if we are to have an officer of the legal profession who will advise, and take upon himself the responsibilities of Attorney-General, he should be paid a sufficient sum to attract the best men, or at least good men, who are willing to serve the State without having to hold out inducements that not only are they to get State work and fixed salary for State services, but are to look for the emoluments of fees for every case in which they appear for the State, and in addition such private practice as they can gather to themselves.
If the practice of the past in Ireland led to abuses, which abuses were difficult to overcome because of the strength in the councils of the State of that profession, I think it is very necessary that we should, at the initiation of this business, guard against those evils, so that our successors may not have to undo, at a very much greater cost than would be necessary to-day, the evils of duplicate employment and the taking of salaries as officers, fees as legal representatives in State cases, and private fees for private practice. I would stress upon the Dáil the necessity for defining the position, in the financial sense, of the Attorney-General, and I withdraw what I said in introducing this motion, that this was not an economy resolution. I find now it is very much an economy motion, that it may, and very likely will, save the State a considerable amount of money. On that ground, if on no other, I press the amendment.
I think the argument which Deputy Johnson has brought forward here is very strong indeed, and I am perfectly convinced that the principle is sound. When I first saw this amendment a parallel occurred to my mind exactly in that form, but in a precise instance which I would like to mention. Deputy Redmond, with whom I am unable to agree in this matter, said that the Attorney-General's position was a political one, correctly inferring that it had all the precariousness of a political position.
Let us compare it precisely with the position of the President of the Executive Council. I compare it in this way because we know from the Estimates that the remuneration attaching to the two positions is the same. Suppose a lawyer enters upon a political career and rises by the esteem of his fellow-countrymen to the position of President of the Executive Council, is he to be allowed, while holding that position, and receiving remuneration as President of the Executive Council, to engage in private practice? Is he to be allowed to receive the incidental remuneration that would come to him from that private practice? It should not be tolerated for a moment. Let us assume that the same lawyer becomes Attorney-General, which is also a political appointment. There is nothing fundamentally different between the two. The qualifications may be different, but the qualifications may in the given instance not be greatly different. There have been cases in England where very eminent counsel have chosen rather the more strictly political appointments than the semi-political, semi-legal appointments. If it be a sound principle that a lawyer, raised to the position of President of the Executive Council, is not to be permitted to take any other moneys than those he receives from that office, and if a commercial man who holds certain directorships, on appointment to the same office, has to surrender them—if that principle is sound for one political appointment it should be sound for all. It cannot be said that the position of Attorney-General is more precarious and more political than is the position of President of the Executive Council. In point of fact, it carries greater advantages for the future, as Deputy Johnson has pointed out, because whereas a person filling the position of President has to make a definite, clear surrender of continuity with the past and has to make a new start for the future, all the time the Attorney-General is carrying on his legal continuity. Therefore, when the precarious nature of his position enforces itself by the surrender of his office he stands in a much better position in respect of his future career than he stood in the past. Deputy Redmond knows the scandal created across the water owing to the large moneys received by law officers of the Government that are not received by purely political officers of the Government. Seeing that both are political in character they should be judged the same. It would be better for the present and for the future if this principle were accepted.
I would like to say a word to correct a misapprehension apparently in the mind of Deputy Johnson. When I was referring to trades unions, I was referring to the first paragraph of his amendment, which was that the Attorney-General should be paid. I never in any way suggested that trades union principles applied to the rest of my proposals. In regard to the statement that has been made by Deputy Figgis about the large sums of money which are being paid to Attorneys-General across the water— and I think he might have mentioned here in the past—so far as I understand the present arrangement between the Attorney-General and the Minister for Finance will obviate the possibility of that taking place, because it appears from the Attorney-General's statement that he is not to be paid fees for appearance in Court but rather that the sum fixed is to be a sort of compounded sum which shall include anything in the nature of what otherwise would be paid in fees. That being so, I think that is a very desirable arrangement in the interests of economy. I can congratulate the Minister for Finance and the Attorney-General on its introduction. I must say that I failed to follow Deputy Figgis when he stated that the President of the Executive Council, or a person in his position, say a Prime Minister of England, would not be enabled to hold directorships of companies or to have any interests outside his salary. I never heard such a suggestion made before. It certainly is a well-known principle, which I am afraid has sometimes, or may have sometimes, been infringed upon in England, that no Government Minister should have any interest in a company which would contract directly with the Government, but to say that a Prime Minister, or any other Minister, should derive his income from no source but his salary as occupant of that office is, I think, stretching the matter rather far. Therefore, I cannot see, to use Deputy Figgis's analogy, why if the President is not confined to the enjoyment of his salary, but is allowed to pursue his own private business affairs in his own way the Attorney-General should not be treated in the same way. The proposal, so far as I know, is that the Attorney-General should be paid a fixed sum. The Attorney-General stated, in reply to a question I asked some time ago, that the sum in this regard was £2,500 per annum. Taking that as inclusive of fees and salary, it is, I think, an exceptionally moderate figure. It certainly would pay this Attorney-General in the circumstances to take even a Judgeship in the Irish Free State, with the moderate salary that that carries. That being so, I suggest that the Minister for Finance and the Government have made an admirable proposal in regard to the position and to the payment of the office of Attorney-General.
Perhaps the President, when he replies, would tell us what the financial proposal is affecting this office—not the present occupant of the office or the present circumstances. Deputy Redmond has spoken of certain proposals. I have not heard them.
They were outlined by the Attorney-General.
If I understood aright, the Attorney-General said there had been a certain arrangement made in respect of his occupancy of this office. But he also said that that was due to the exigencies of the times, and that there would be perhaps less call upon the attention of future Attorneys-General, suggesting to my mind, at any rate, that the arrangement that Deputy Redmond referred to is quite a provisional one, personal to the present Attorney-General, and by no means binding. I want to make a similar arrangement, plus the deprivation of the right to enter into private practice, for Attorney-General in future.
The arrangement that was made in connection with the salary of the present Attorney-General was £2,500 per year and no fees in respect of any appearances on behalf of the Government in Court. It appeared to us, at the time, that it was certainly a good bargain for the Government. I do not quite agree with the criticism that has been passed or with the subject matter of this amendment. This office, as is well known, is an office which sometimes has potentialities and at other times has no potentialities at all. Let us take the case of a Ministry with six months to run. They appoint an Attorney-General. He possibly ceases to hold office when a new Government is elected. He has not been provided with a Judgeship. There is no Judgeship vacant, or any other suitable office, and I do not think it would be a good principle to adopt that because a man was Attorney-General he naturally took any vacancy which might arise in the Judiciary. I do say that in so far as the present Attorney-General is concerned, I would have been most happy to have offered him the Presidency of the Supreme Court— the highest office in the State so far as the Judiciary is concerned. But, considering the matter with him, from the point of view of the State, I prevailed upon him to contest South Dublin and to come into the Dáil to give us that assistance here which we required. I am not at all disposed to say that while the salary of £2,500 is considerable that it is excessive, considering that we are taking a man out of his ordinary practice and placing him in a position in which there is no security of tenure and in which there is not, and ought not to be, that natural pilgrimage to the Bench which has been the practice in the past. To treat a man otherwise would hardly be treating him fairly if he be absolutely essential to the State and if the practice he has enjoyed—which would probably very nearly run to the figure we are going to pay him in this case— is thrown into chaos by taking up duty on behalf of the State. I do not think it is at all likely within the next few years that the Attorney-General will have any chance of having private practice. During the whole period of our experience, which very nearly runs into two years, there has not been any private practice on the part of the Attorney-General. There have been, I understand, arrears of work, which he has not yet been able to clear up. I do not know that it would have been humanly possible for him to have undertaken any private practice. I am not at all satisfied that there is any likelihood of his being able to take up any private practice in the future. It is possible that you might have an Attorney-General admirably suited for that particular office who might not be perhaps as equally suited to the Bench. One cannot regulate those vacancies on the Bench to synchronise with the exit of Governments from power.
I do not think it would be at all advisable that judicial appointment should be looked upon as the reversionary interest of Attorneys-General in the future. We have had experience in the past of rather rapid changes before Governments came into power or went out of power. I think that never really increased the confidence of the people in the Government of the State. My case for not having any prohibition on the Attorney-General having private practice is, that at a particular moment if we require the services of a particular Attorney-General, he should not have to cut himself off from his practice but should be free to take it up should he cease to occupy that office. The cases that have been mentioned of the large sums earned by Attorneys-General in England do not constitute a fair parallel at all. You have there ordered Government extending over a great number of years. You have a very large circle of aspirants for the office to draw from Naturally about the office there are opportunities for business which are unlikely in a much smaller country like this. I do not expect that at any time now, or within ten years to come. any Attorney-General here could possibly earn more than £1,000 a year outside his salary.
It may seem too much that he should be allowed to earn even that much. But I have been very, very much impressed with the necessity for a particular type of person for this office. It is more than possible that with a change of Government the same attractions might not appear to another person occupying the same office, or another Executive Council functioning such as we have been functioning, and in that case I think that should the ordinary business of the Attorney-General's office get lighter during the next year or two or three years—and I have no such hope at present—it would be unfair that he should be precluded from getting some connection with the particular class of business which he had been accustomed to transact, before we took him out of it and persuaded him to take up this very thankless and very onerous and responsible position of Attorney-General.
I would ask the Dáil to remember that we are not dealing in this Bill with the present occupant of this office. I do not know if I am to be accused of being an incorrigible idealist, but I have a high opinion of the average lawyer. I hold that the average lawyer is as likely to be a man willing to serve the State as the average merchant or shop-keeper or a man in any other occupation or profession. We have been rather insisting during the afternoon that Ministers had to give up certain chances in life, but that they were willing to do that to serve the State. They were willing to take risks of certain pecuniary advantage in the service of the State. But now we are told that you cannot get that kind of man amongst the legal profession.
I do not believe it. We were told that lawyers will not sacrifice their private practice though ship-owners or shop-keepers might, or though country solicitors might. We were told that lawyers will not accept a stated salary for the service of the State unless they see a chance of pickings. I do not believe it. I believe there are as many men amongst the legal profession quite willing to give their time to the service of the State for a fair reward as there are in other professions. I believe that it has been found bad in principle and practice that the Legal Adviser—the man who above all is most responsible for keeping the Executive from falling into legal pits—should have one purpose in his work and one interest, and that is advising rightly and not running the risk even of having conflicting interests placed before him. I say it is undoubtedly true there are conflicting interests coming before lawyers, between clients who may to-day or next year be in controversy with the State. The amendment, the new sub-section, which I propose, does not state what the salary should be. It does not even confine it to £2,500. It says "such salary as the President of the Executive Council, with the concurrence of the Minister for Finance, may determine." If £2,500 a year does not seem to these two Ministers to satisfy the requirements in any particular time, they may agree upon making it £5,000 or £10,000 or £20,000, and when that time comes when the office does not require so great an amount of time a sum quite within the limits of this amendment may be varied. The amendment does not fix the salary of the Attorney-General, but it does seek to stipulate that the Attorney-General shall not be placed in a position which is in truth an inferior position morally to that of any other Minister because we do trust all other Ministers to devote their whole time, interests and services to the office to which they are appointed. In the practice of the past and in the proposal of the Bill, we are assumed not to be able to trust the Attorney-General to devote the time and attention to the business of advising the State, unless he can at the same time be secured in getting such private practice as he can find. I hope the Dáil will accept this amendment and will express its views upon the desirability of leaving the Attorney-General free to take private practice which may be in conflict with his duty to the State or free to take such pickings as legal controversies might place in his way.
There is only one comment I want to make. I would join in saying that in whatever I said I for one had nothing whatever personal in its application to the present occupancy of the Attorney-Generalship. I had hoped that would have been accepted as having gone without saying. Nor did I imagine for a moment that the large additions that have been earned in England were ever likely to be earned in Ireland. I only referred to it because of the size of those earnings, and because of the kind of comment that they had created. I am perfectly sure that the President will agree—although he did not agree that the amendment is right—that it is desirable to avert that kind of comment if it can possibly be done. It is a comment that can only arise when there are additional earnings of the size that no one knows. I rose mainly to make one statement and it is that the parallel that I have drawn between the position of a Minister and that of the Attorney-General is a correct parallel so far as earnings are concerned.
I am puzzled to understand why Deputy Redmond, who knows those matters very well, should have some doubt about them. I will only refer to a comment made in the London Times, some two or three months ago. It was with regard to a recent Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was expected to be brought into the present English Government. The statement was made that if he undertook this post it would entail the surrender of the many lucrative Directorships that he held in the City of London, and therefore it would not be worth his while to do so. If it be sound that the Minister for Finance is compelled to surrender Directorships and additional remunerations of that responsible kind, then the same principle applies to the Attorney-General.
I presume Deputy Figgis is referring to Mr. Reginald McKenna?
Sir Robert Horne.
In either instance it is, of course, only too obvious that neither of these gentlemen could occupy at the same time the position of Government Minister and also the great commercial position that he now holds. I should say, in the case of Mr. McKenna, that he is certainly drawing a larger salary now from his position as Chairman of one of the biggest, if not the biggest, banks in England, than he would draw if he were Prime Minister.
at this stage resumed the Chair.
There is no doubt it would be physically impossible and mentally impossible for any man to occupy the two positions. I do not think it is seriously suggested by that instance that the principle should apply that a Government Minister could not draw his income from any other source than that of his salary, or, indeed, that he could not engage in other classes of work but Ministerial work. He could not certainly engage in such a gigantic task, and one which would require such attention and such energy as well as ability as Chairman of one of England's greatest banking concerns, and at the same time be a Minister. That is very different from saying he could not do his own business, if he was a business man in an ordinary way. With all due respect to Deputy Figgis, I do not think that the instance he has quoted in any way increases the validity of his argument.
The way this matter strikes me is simply that the Minister for Finance, and the President of the Executive Council for the time being, will from time to time be making arrangements with some man who is to occupy the position of Attorney-General. If it happens that the work of the Government is not sufficient to occupy a man all his time, and at the same time if the Government has to get, as it ought to, one of the best men at the Bar, it may be able to get him at a much less salary if he is allowed to carry on a private practice than if he were not allowed to do so. Nothing I have heard in the course of the debate has convinced me that there is any danger to the State in allowing the Attorney-General to take private practice. It does not seem to me that there is anything in the suggestion that he will be thinking of the feelings of some possible client. I do not think a barrister wins his way at the Bar by any other means than by fighting each case to the best of his ability, and getting a reputation for success in, and good management of, cases. Even if he were to get practice in future by doing his own work well and using his ability to win all the cases on behalf of the Government, rather than to lose them in the hope that he would soothe the feelings of some future client.
Would the Minister for Justice, if he were a lawyer, as he very likely would be, be free to carry on a private practice?
I do not think so, but I have not thought over that. I do not think there is likely to be any danger arising. If it is felt necessary that the Government should have the sole services of the Attorney-General in order to get straight advice from him and fair service, then I think the ordinary person who goes to law can have no chance whatever of getting any sort of reasonable service from the counsel they employ. It seems to me there is nothing in the suggestion that there would be danger of neglect or unfaithful service to the State because the Attorney-General would be allowed to take private practice.
I do think, on the other hand, the fact that he might be allowed to take private practice if we were arrived at a time when the Attorney-General would be likely to have sufficient leisure from Government work, that that would enable the Minister for Finance and the Government to drive a harder bargain in the matter of salary.
May I remind the Minister and the Dáil—it has been quite frequently alluded to in the Courts and announced by judges—that counsel have made a practice, to an extent that is becoming a scandal, of accepting duties and not fulfilling them, and accepting payment for briefs and giving them practically no attention. It is possible, under the arrangement here, to perpetuate that practice.
May I make a further intervention in this discussion, and I hope that in anything I have said or shall say about it it will be understood entirely that I am speaking as one of the Deputies of the city of Dublin and in no other capacity. It seems to me that the thing that is lost sight of in the first place in this discussion is this: that the Attorney-General must be a practising barrister during the time that he holds the office of Attorney-General. If he ceases to be a practising barrister then several consequences must follow. In the first place he would lose his right of audience in the Courts, and in the second place he would lose his status and standing at the Bar, so that he might have to come back in the new as if he never had been there. That may amuse Deputy Johnson, but it is a very serious consideration that his whole status and seniority is gone if he comes back owing to the fact that his Government has gone out of office or that he resigns because of a disagreement with them upon some important question.
Is not his position this: that he has got one client and can still practice all the time.
As this amendment stands he would be debarred from occupying the position of a practising member of the Bar and he would cease to be able to appear and he would lose his entire position, and the result of his years of labour and so on, and he would have to commence all over again as though he had never been a member of the profession. It is, I admit, possible upon the form in which Deputy Johnson has put his amendment, to frame it differently and exclude private practice, and leave him still his status as a practising barrister. No man would take the position otherwise, and when it comes to excluding a man from private practice it involves a very serious sacrifice, and speaking as head of the profession I say—and I do not think the President meant to convey anything to the contrary—that there are in the profession, as there are in other professions and businesses and occupations, men ready to make sacrifices. I will not say whether the idealist is always the best lawyer—one may have different views upon that subject—but when it comes to the question of the exclusion of private practice it merely becomes a matter of the stipend that will attach to the office, and whether or not the occupant of it is to be allowed to conduct cases on behalf of the Government at ordinary fees and ordinary remuneration. It is possible to make the salary such a figure as will make it worth a man's while to sacrifice his private practice. There has been reference here to comments on fees. This reference was made by Deputy Figgis, but in that connection it must be remembered that the comments made on fees were comments on fees earned in Government cases, not in private practice. I never saw any comments anywhere on the income made at the English Bar by men who presumably because of their pre-eminent position, because they were scarce and had a scarcity value were able to extort big fees before they rendered the services they gave.
I have never seen any adverse comments upon that except by the people who could not afford the luxury of retaining them. The adverse comments have been made on the subject of earning fees in Government cases, and that at one time in Ireland was, as a matter of fact, carried to a very exorbitant extent. I remember we used to hear of one particular man many years ago who was so ingenious that he made £50,000 in one year. Under the present arrangement that cannot be done. The question of receiving fees for Government business is one, and the question of retaining private practice is another. The views expressed on these matters have been, in my judgment, very much confused and mixed up in the course of the discussion. I do not know that the position of one who has held office, and no longer holds it, is at all the enviable thing that Deputy Johnson suggests. I have seen ex-Law Officers, men who had gone out of practice under the old regime, come along and take up the position of a Law Officer, hoping that it would lead them to rather enviable positions, but fate belied them, and they returned to their practice. They can say that the position is not an enviable one at all. The man who has been in office is not the attractive proposition that Deputy Johnson suggests.
Was that a proof that he was a bad lawyer?
The thing to be remembered is that at the Bar, as in other things, and especially among leaders of the Bar, there are fashions. I know of one member of the Bar, now a very eminent Judge, who at the zenith of his practice at the Bar retained a very small position which brought him in about £20 a year. He was rather noted for his desire to accumulate money, but someone put it to him and asked him why he kept this small position which might have gone to some man who needed a small annual sum of that kind. He said that he lived from day to day and in real dread of going out of fashion. So that, in addition to merit, a Barrister sometimes succeeds because of his industry, and industry succeeds to a considerable extent. There is another element, and it is that I think uncertainly rather rests upon the man who has held office and no longer does so. However, the issue really here is first of all, as to the form in which Deputy Johnson's amendment stands. If it were inserted in the Bill no member of the Bar could accept office, and I myself could not continue to hold office. The other matter is a matter that is a rather delicate one for me to touch upon. It was dealt with by the President as to whether there should be a statutory prohibition on receiving private practice, rather than an arrangement made from time to time with the Minister for Finance measuring the stipend accordingly. It seems to me that the arrangement indicated by the Minister for Finance and the President is really the most workable and satisfactory. As things stand it is not possible to accept or to attend to private practice.
Amendment put.
The Dáil divided: Tá, 14; Níl, 47.
Tá
- Seán Buitléir.
- John Conlan.
- David Hall.
- Tomás Mac Eoin.
- Risteárd Mac Fheorais.
- Pádraig Mac Fhlannchadha.
- Tomás de Nógla.
- Tomás O Conaill.
- Aodh O Cúlacháin.
- Liam O Daimhín.
- Eamon O Dubhghaill.
- Domhnall O Muirgheasa.
- Tadhg O Murchadha.
- Pádraig O hOgáin (An Clár).
Níl
- Earnán Altún.
- Earnán de Blaghd.
- Séamus Breathnach.
- Seoirse de Bhulbh.
- Próinsias Bulfin.
- John J. Cole.
- Bryan R. Cooper.
- Henry Coyle.
- Louis J. D'Alton.
- Máighréad Ní Choileáin, Bean Uí
- Dhrisceóil.
- Patrick J. Egan.
- Osmond Grattan Esmonde.
- Henry J. Finlay.
- Desmond Fitzgerald.
- John Hennigan.
- Connor Hogan.
- Tomás Mac Artúir.
- Seosamh Mac a' Bhrighde.
- Domhnall Mac Cárthaigh.
- Liam T. Mac Cosgair.
- Séamus Mac Cosgair.
- Pádraig Mac Fadáin.
- Pádraig Mac Giollagáin.
- Seán P. Mac Giobúin.
- Risteárd Mac Liam.
- Seoirse Mac Niocaill.
- Liam Mag Aonghusa.
- Martin M. Nally.
- John T. Nolan.
- Peadar O hAodha.
- Criostóir O Broin.
- Seán O Bruadair.
- Próinsias O Cathail.
- Aodh O Cinnéide.
- Séamus N. O Dóláin.
- Mícheál O Dubhghaill.
- Peadar S. O Dubhghaill.
- Pádraig O Dubhthaigh.
- Aindriú O Láimhín.
- Séamus O Leadáin.
- Séamus O Murchadha.
- Seán M. O Súilleabháin.
- Andrew O'Shaughnessy.
- Seán Príomhdhail.
- William A. Redmond.
- Patrick W. Shaw.
- Liam Thrift.
Amendment declared lost.
I move to report Progress.