Skip to main content
Normal View

Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 20 Mar 1924

Vol. 6 No. 29

THE MILITARY SITUATION.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

I wish to make a short statement to the Dáil on certain decisions that have been arrived at in connection with the Army situation. At a meeting of the Executive Council held this morning, the following temporary appointments for the positions which have been rendered vacant as a result of the resignations announced last evening, were approved:—Colonel Hugo MacNeil to be acting Adjutant-General; Colonel Felix Cronin to be acting Quartermaster-General. General Mulcahy has informed me that the Chief of Staff does not propose to comply with the request of the Government for his resignation; no reasons having been given. The Government cannot accept the situation that reasons should be given when it decides that a particular Army Officer shall leave down a particular administrative position, and the attitude taken up by the Chief of Staff will make it necessary for the Government to cancel and withdraw his Commission.

The Executive Council also decided to extend to 6 p.m., on Saturday, the 22nd instant, the period within which the surrender of Officers implicated in the mutiny would be accepted. With regard to the attitude to be adopted towards these officers, the Executive Council decided to adhere to the terms of the Memorandum issued by the late Minister for Defence on the 18th inst., the text of which I read to the Dáil last evening. Between this and 6 p.m. on Saturday, no arrests, searches, or other action of an aggressive nature will be undertaken against these officers. I have further to place before the Dáil on behalf of the President his nomination of himself to the position of Minister for Defence. Deputies will understand that from the nature of the situation, it is not a Portfolio that can be left vacant, and the President thinks it necessary that in the circumstances he should take up this Ministry. If that proposal is endorsed by the Dáil, it will be communicated immediately to the Governor-General. In the absence of the President through illness, I will act for him in that Ministry.

Will the Minister now move that the assent of the Dáil be given to that nomination?

Mr. O'HIGGINS

I move: "That the Dáil assents to the nomination of the President as Minister for Defence."

I second.

I take it that it will be generally understood that on this motion a discussion may take place on the matters that were raised in the Dáil yesterday, and if the Dáil so desires, on the general policy of the Executive Council in the conduct of Army affairs. I shall not attempt to discuss the general policy, certainly not in detail, but I feel that it is incumbent upon me to say something about the situation as outlined at the sitting of the Dáil yesterday, and on the policy of the Executive Council regarding Army affairs in the past and possibly on Army affairs in the future. The form of this motion gives, perhaps, a fuller opportunity of saying what one would wish to say, than any other motion that might be moved would give. The motion is that the President of the Executive Council shall also undertake the duties of Minister for Defence. If one desired to be acrimonious and destructive in criticism, I think it would be easy to frame an indictment of the Ministry in regard to Army affairs, and to show that the motion to make the President the future Minister for Defence should not be agreed to, in view of the disclosures in the speech of the Minister for Home Affairs yesterday, whom for this purpose we might call the Vice-President of the Executive Council. It is clear from that speech that the body over which the new Minister for Defence has presided has not been harmonious, has not been of one mind in regard to army administration. Apparently its members have been at very active enmity one with another. If there is any truth, and I suspect there is, in the indictment that the Minister for Home Affairs made yesterday, much of the responsibility lies with the Minister who is now nominated to be future Minister for military affairs. I think though that perhaps one should deal first with the smaller matter, with the more acute question that arose on the night of Tuesday, and the morning of Wednesday. I think that there should be some clarification of the position regarding Deputy McGrath and the events in Parnell Street. There were two reports read by the Minister yesterday. The first document was reported to have been presented by the Minister for Defence to the Executive Council, and in that report it was stated that Deputy McGrath appeared at 10 o'clock. There was a distinct denial of that, and the denial was corroborated by Deputy McCarthy. I want to know who made that report. Was it a compilation of the Minister for Defence at the time from reports received, or was it the actual nature of the report which had been prepared by one of the officers in charge? If it was a compilation of the Minister, how did it come to say that Deputy McGrath appeared on the scene at 10 o'clock?

The second report was signed by Major-General Hogan, and appears to me, looking at it as impartially as one can, to contain a certain amount of animus, and not of the nature of a report of a military officer. I think some explanation is called for as to why, in such a report, references were made to Deputy McGrath in the terms in which they were. Then we have the matter leading up to the searching of these premises. The Minister for Defence, Deputy Mulcahy, justifies the position by saying that he and his officers were legally bound to make the arrest of men under his command and under his authority who had mutinied, and had been engaged in a conspiracy, and had stolen guns and ammunition. Deputy Mulcahy says that that was their duty under the law, and that the Adjutant-General was carrying out his duties with his, Deputy Mulcahy's, consent, acting as Minister for Defence. It is well to be informed that the Army has come to the stage when there is so much punctilio in carrying out their duties within the law. That has not always been so. The law has been stretched, and forgotten frequently, and we have been told here by Deputy Mulcahy and by other Ministers that legal formalities must, in certain circumstances, be foregone and passed by.

Now we have arrived at a stage apparently when the very letter of the law must be put into operation. I wonder whether one can say, trying to look upon this whole matter fairly, from a detached standpoint, that this whole thing was exceptional—that may seem to prejudge the case—that this very careful recognition of legal rights and legal authority and legal duties has been applied to these particular cases in these circumstances. But if the case that is made by Deputy Mulcahy is a good one, it seems to me he has failed in his duty inasmuch as he accepted the responsibility for making terms with the mutineers. Had there been the same amount of punctiliousness as this a week ago, regarding the enforcement of the law, I do not think Deputy Mulcahy could have retained his position as Minister for Defence. And when the offer of parole under certain conditions was agreed to by him, when the suggestions were made in the correspondence which was read that up to Thursday night, 6 o'clock, would be given to the mutinous officers —and if the allegations are true, thieves, I am not hesitating in words in this matter—if Deputy Mulcahy accepted part of the responsibility for making these offers to the mutinous officers, then he ought not to have stood over the action of the Adjutant-General in attempting to arrest these officers in the circumstances.

It seems to me that if the proceedings of the Dáil last Wednesday, which by tacit assent approved the course adopted by the Ministry, did not receive the approval of the Minister for Defence, then that was the time for his resignation, and the matter would have been clarified.

The Minister to-day has read a document notifying that the Chief of Staff is not prepared to hand in his resignation. I am inclined to think that that officer has much to be said for him. I cannot understand the state of mind of the Ministry in calling for resignations, except by the assumption that the Ministry has been habituated to a state of mind which thinks of the Army Council as somewhat independent in authority. It seems to me that the Executive Council, in deciding to ask for the resignations of military officers from particular posts, not in asking them to resign their commissions, was in itself a kind of admission that these officers were in a position of independence—or semi-independence—of the Executive Council, and did actually occupy a place which many of us feared they would, and uttered warnings about, viz., that the Army Council was being placed in a position of autonomy and independence.

The Minister for Defence, one would expect, would transfer officers from one post to another if he did not desire that the officers should be deprived of their commissions, but that they should be taken from their particular office. It does not seem to be a case where officers should be asked to resign from office, but that they should have been transferred from one post to another. I suggest to the Dáil that the very phraseology used by the Minister for Home Affairs yesterday suggests that not on one side only has the Army got into a position of superiority, but on two sides it has been thought to be in a position of superiority, one of those sides being the Executive Council itself. It may not have been deliberate, and it may not have been conscious, but it is a reflection of the sub-conscious state of mind at least that these high Army officers who had been appointed to specific posts within the Army had to be asked to resign rather than that they should have been transferred. That has not been the course taken in regard to other officers in the Army. They have been reduced in rank, they have been transferred to one post and another, and that has been by direction of their superior officers, by direction of the Minister for Defence, who is ultimately responsible; and I think it would have been more in accordance with one's view of the right relations between the Executive Council, the Minister for Defence, and the Army Council that these officers would have been removed from their office and placed somewhere else rather than that they should be en bloc asked to resign.

There is very much point in the claim of Deputy Mulcahy that the risk taken by the Executive Council in removing three officers of such importance could be done at this stage. It is the highest possible testimony, whether intended or not, to the administration of the Army by the late Minister for Defence and by those acting under him, if it is believed that the Army will withstand such a shock and remain true and loyal. Then, I say, that is the highest possible commendation to the administration of that Army under its late heads. I hope that faith will be justified, and I hope that the prophecy of the Minister for Defence will come true. I hope, too, that through the Army, the rank and file, as well as amongst the officers, there has developed that sense of discipline and loyalty to the State that will not allow these events to shake them.

As to the general conduct of Army affairs under the authority of the Executive Council, of which the proposed new Minister is chairman, we have it from Deputy McGrath that for fifteen or sixteen months—these are his words as reported—he had been trying to settle this matter, and we had it from the President also last week that Deputy McGrath had done everything that was possible. It appears from all that has been revealed that there have been controversies within the Executive Council of great seriousness in regard to the Army, but it is only after the pot has boiled over, in the phrase of the Minister, that this searching inquiry is ordered.

Now, the Dáil has a right to be told why that searching inquiry was not ordered long ago, and as to what was the position of Deputy McGrath, though Minister for Industry and Commerce, in relation to the Minister for Defence. We should have a little more light upon these matters before being asked to assent to the appointment of the President as Minister for Defence. I am afraid that without expecting perfection and without expecting too much in the way of administration, that the Executive Council has not conducted affairs relating to the Army with a sufficient regard for its responsibilities, and I am afraid that the Executive Council, in the sequel, has shown that it has left too much to the Army and incidentally too much to the the Army Council. I hope that before the Ministers and Secretaries Bill leaves the Seanad that an amendment will be moved to the clause in it which places the Army Council in a position of exceptional authority as compared with any other Departmental head. One wonders, for instance, how so careless a proceeding which seems to have involved us in so great a difficulty could have been allowed as to appoint and make the announcement that General Eoin O'Duffy had been appointed to the Chief Command on the 8th of March, and that his office and authority became operative on the 10th. Then we learned that his duties were only defined yesterday or the day before. If there were, as there seems to have been, a knowledge of friction within the army, and that it was found necessary to appoint General Eoin O'Duffy to a position of supreme command, surely the terms of that appointment should have been made known to him immediately, and they should have been gazetted immediately. But a week or ten days— even longer—elapsed, and the Chief Executive Command did not know what his powers were, and other officers of the Army felt that they could not obey that officer, or that they did not need to consult him, and he could not enforce his authority. That, I say, is an incident which seems to reveal a slipshod method of conducting business within the Executive Council, especially in a service which requires so much precision and care. The failure to be so careful is an indictment of the Executive Council, and the President is chiefly responsible —I mean, ultimately responsible. The story told by the Minister for Home Affairs indicates that there has been allowed to grow up within the Army two distinct bodies or associations or groups, one of which seems to have been opposing the other, one of which seems to have been in a position to exercise authority, and the other which seems to have been desirous of resisting that authority. That allegation or suggestion is denied. The late Minister for Defence, who was in the best position to know, repudiates any such suggestion or allegation respecting those who have formed the Army Council, and the main body of the officers of the Army. The fact that there was a body of opinion on one side, at any rate, was revealed by the document read to the Dáil last week.

They spoke of themselves as representing an Executive Council of the I.R.A., having distinct political purposes and intentions. Deputy McGrath announces that he has been engaged for 15 or 16 months trying to settle this. We ought to know a little more than we have been told of what has been happening, at least we should have a broad statement of the position. I have no desire to probe into details, charges and counter-charges, suggestions and innuendoes. I do not think this is the place; I do not think any place is the place to enter into any such thing. But at least we ought to be told as much as the party meeting was told; we ought to have a little more light thrown upon the situation than we have been granted, so as to allow us to feel that we are safe in assenting to the appointment of the President as Minister for Defence. The position is undoubtedly a serious one, and I do not want to aggravate it in the slightest, but there is not only the Army to be considered. Both Deputy Mulcahy by his statement, and the Minister for Home Affairs and the Executive Council by their action, combined to assure us that we need not fear the loyalty of the main body of the Army. But the ordinary citizen requires to be reassured. The Dáil has its responsibility and it requires to be reassured. We require to have some more information, and we require to know whether the action of the Army Council, or the action of the Minister for Defence working through the Army Council, in relation to Deputy McGrath had any other significance than has been indicated here in the discussion. I am sure that it is the purpose of the Executive Council to insist that the Army as a body shall be impartial in its obedience to the political authority of the State. I am sure, too, that they will exercise every means to achieve that general impartiality. I think that they will not forget that they are not dealing with an Army which has gradually grown and developed; but that it is the immediate successor of, and contains still a great majority of men who were before they went into the Army active politicians serving a national cause. I think they will not forget that efficiency of the most perfect kind may be too dearly bought, if the psychological influence is forgotten, and that they will recognise the necessity for having officers and Chief Commands who will evoke from the junior officers and the rank and file that loyalty because of the purpose for which the Army was originally established.

There is one other word I want to say; it is in regard to the inquiry which was promised and the names of the Committee to conduct the Inquiry which are announced. Deputy Hewat made a suggestion, not knowing the form the Committee would take. He made the suggestion that such an Inquiry as was promised ought not to be conducted solely by a Cabinet Committee or by people serving one particular section of the House. It seems to me that that suggestion ought to be taken account of, and that the circumstances are such that some one or more members of any such Committee ought to be men who have not been closely associated with the political party which is at present in control of the Government of the country. There would be much more confidence, and I say this with the fullest respect and regard for at least two of the members of the Committee whom I know, in the work of that Committee if at least one is a man who has not been intimately associated with the work of the Party out of which the army grew and which has been responsible for the Army's administration. I am not speaking on behalf of the Labour Party when I am putting that suggestion forward. I am not asking that any member from this side of the House should be appointed, but I think the suggestion of Deputy Hewat was a sound one and a wise one, and it ought to be favourably considered by the Minister.

I think in this troublous and difficult time there is one thing for which we may be profoundly thankful and that is, so far as the information at our disposal goes, that during the past fortnight the rank and file of the army have been absolutely true to their word. Whatever insubordination there has been, has been confined to officers. The men in the ranks, placed in circumstances of very great difficulty, with the officers they knew best leaving them, nevertheless, have seen and have done their duty unhesitatingly. I think, whatever may be the feelings of the late Minister for Defence at this moment, he has every reason to be proud of that. It is a very remarkable achievement that in such a young army, under all the difficulties of demobilisation—difficulties that very nearly provoked mutiny in the British Army in 1919—our men have shown no sign of demoralisation or indiscipline of any kind whatsoever. I think that is the one thoroughly satisfactory feature of the case.

I suppose there is no member of the Dáil who has been brought up so completely in the tradition of military discipline as I have. I was born in barracks. My father was a soldier. Both my grandfathers were soldiers. While other Deputies were learning to read "Honesty is the best policy," or "Too many cooks spoil the both," I think my first reading lesson was "Obedience is the first duty of a soldier." I do not think any Deputy will consider that I am attempting to minimise the seriousness of the crisis through which the Army has passed—I think we may say "has passed." I think now the scope has been defined and limited. I agree with Deputy Johnson, that in a new army, an army created by a political situation, we cannot have quite the same standard of discipline that we should have in an older force, with longer traditions. But I should have felt more sympathy with General Tobin and those officers who have associated themselves with him, if their action had been directed to a political end and not to a military end, because, though they introduced a certain amount of politics into that letter, the gravamen of it was directed to military ends—the dismissal of the Army Council and the setting up of an Inquiry. My instinct then was to support the then Minister for Defence in dealing with this matter drastically, but I am bound to say that, owing to the handling of the question last week, the Army Council have put themselves, in my opinion, utterly and indefensibly in the wrong. They have tried to be an imperium in imperio, and to a certain extent a law unto themselves. To my mind, the crux of the whole situation is to be found in the letter which the President wrote to Deputy McGrath, and which was circulated as a memo, by the Minister for Defence to the heads of the Army Council, thereby adopting it as his act. The policy that dictated that memo, may have been right or may have been wrong, but it was accepted by the then Minister for Defence as the act of the Government, and, once that was accepted, it was not for any Army officer —the Adjutant-General or whoever it was—to depart from that policy. Surely, nobody can say that it is not making fantastic nonsense of that memo, to say: “You have up to Thursday to surrender, and then if you do surrender you will be placed under open arrest, but, of course, if we happen to get you beforehand, you will be placed under close arrest.”

It is an absolute perversion of the intention of the Government. The late Minister for Defence said last night that he was carrying out the law; that it was his duty to carry out the law. It is the duty of every one of us to assist in carrying out the law. But there are times when law cannot be interpreted with Prussian rigidity. Exceptional circumstances require exceptional treatment. I am not an authority on the training of the Police Force, but I should not be greatly surprised if anyone who undertook the training of policemen did not include a chapter on the turning of the blind eye. I am certain from the days of Dogberry down that is what every police force has done; they have known times when it was much better not to notice offenders.

There can be only one justification for the measures taken on Tuesday night, and that is, if the Adjutant-General and the Minister for Defence had reason to apprehend that these officers, whom they went to arrest, were planning further action against the State, against Ministers, or against any individual. Then they might have been justified in arresting them. I do not think it is alleged they were planning. General Mulcahy did not say so at any rate. If that fear existed, if that was the reason for taking the action, then surely General O'Duffy should have been informed. He was Commander-in-Chief; he was the man who would be held responsible by the Government, and there can be no justification for not having informed him that these operations were being taken. The reason the ex-Minister gave last night was that the position of Commander-in-Chief had not been defined, and was not defined until after consultation with the Attorney-General that night. I do not understand this. I do not understand that in a time of crisis, a time when the State was in danger, that it should take a week for the position of a Commander-in-Chief to be defined. In soldierly good-will, that position could have been defined in an hour.

The idea of soldiers invoking the aid of the Attorney-General to define the limits of obedience due from one officer to another, is what I cannot understand. That an officer cannot get himself obeyed until the Attorney-General has delimited his sphere, constitutes an intolerable state of affairs which we cannot endure. The Government have put an end to that state of affairs. Strongly as I sympathise with the plea made by the ex-Minister last night, I think the Government had no choice but to do so, and they will have my support for what it is worth in any further measures they may think necessary to carry out. In a matter of this sort, no doubt, we all have certain personal prejudices and personal feelings, and possibly personal animosities. For God's sake let us put them aside and get on with the work.

The Minister for Home Affairs spoke last night of the State as a coral island built up by the efforts of hundreds of little insects one on top of the other. I fear that it is nothing like as stable as a coral island. We are much more in the position of the crew of a ship out at sea in a storm. If we are going to start squabbling about where we are to head for, how we are to work the machinery, or what speed the ship is to go at to get to harbour, I fear that the harbour we shall sail for will be the harbour of destruction.

We are not out of the wood. Our dangers are not yet at an end. It is not a question of what the form of Government in this country will be ten years hence; it is not even a question of whether the State will consist of 26 counties or 32 counties. It is a question of whether ten years hence there will be any Ireland at all. We should stamp out our prejudices and work for the common good. Let us look to the future and ask ourselves will there be any Ireland at all or will there be only a desolate island from which all her sons who could escape have fled.

I am not going to deal with details or refer to petty matters as between one man and another, or to what has been done right by one and wrong by another. My remarks will be made in a general way, and will go more to deal with the causes that brought about this crisis, and will tend more to help in the prevention of a similar crisis again arising. Personally I must express my satisfaction that the crisis has come to a head, knowing, as we do, and as the Minister told us last night, that the causes and the elements that produced the crisis have been in existence for at least 18 months. It is a good thing that the matter has come to a head, and the sooner this abscess, as the Minister for Home Affairs termed it last week, bursts, the sooner the cure will be effected.

It is just as well to face the situation and try to effect the cure as soon as possible. The issue that has now arisen must be faced. We are facing it. The sooner we deal with it the sooner will the foundations of the State be laid upon a firm basis. I think we must all recognise, those of us who believe in democratic rule, that the military arm must be subservient to the civil authority. Any other right that the Army takes to itself will be absolutely in conflict with democracy. Deputy McGrath last night referred to endeavours he made to settle this question. He did not say who he wanted to settle the question with or whether it was to be settled in the Executive Council or in the Army. I do not understand the meaning of the word "settle" in this connection, and I would like more details. If settling the question of the Army meant that more officers and more men were to be retained than the country needed, because of some reason other than necessity, and if we are to have a bigger Army and to find more employment and more salaries for men who are not needed, I certainly am against any settlement on those lines. I do not know exactly what he meant by a settlement, and I would like to know.

The Minister also referred last night to societies, sections and cleavages—I think it was time these were referred to—secret societies in the army, secret societies perhaps in civil life and in the matter of civil appointments. We want to face this question of secret societies. We want to face the question of organisations other than organisations of the Dáil, and of this State. Now there is no room for secret organisations and secret societies for any purpose in the Ireland of to-day. Everybody could understand the necessity, the absolute necessity for these organisations before the Treaty was signed, when we were dealing with a great Power, a Power that we could not meet in the open; a Power that of necessity we were forced to have secret organisations to deal with. But a lot of water has run under the bridges since, a lot of things have happened since. Since the Treaty was signed there was no necessity, and there is no necessity whatever, for secret organisations and secret societies. We deprecate the very existence of any of these societies. They can only live and thrive at the expense of the average citizen. They can only get something through their organisation that is not available to the average citizen. I do not think there is any honest citizen or any honest man to-day who could hold that these secret societies serve any useful purpose whatever. We have democratic institutions where the voice of the people has full liberty of expressing itself. If we are going to be ruled by secret organisations, then I say that rule is absolutely subversive of democracy. The only purpose these societies can serve is to subordinate the civil authority to the authority of the society and to subordinate democratic rule to the rule of the gun or some other rule, and to put a premium on inefficiency.

And to retain incompetents in jobs and to find jobs for incompetents. To my mind, and to the mind of those who sit with me here on these benches, these are the only purposes that organisations and secret societies coming to the surface can serve at the moment. We deplore all these recent happenings and the events that led to them. We deplore a good many things, perhaps amongst them some of the things we saw and heard here yesterday evening. The only way to deal with these is to go and face them. We demand that the Army must be the servant of the State. We demand that every arm of the civil authority must be the servant of the State; we demand that men must be appointed for efficiency, that men must be appointed because they are the best fitted for the position, and not because they happen to be members of any organisation or any society. We want things plain on the surface. We want things done so that every citizen of this State has an equal chance, brotherhood or no brotherhood. We want a healthy, clean plant that can bloom and thrive in the light of day and that can come on to the surface for everybody to see. We want no secret orders and no hidden hand, and we want nothing that is not on the surface.

All brotherhoods and all organisations in the Ireland of to-day, so far as we are concerned, have the same meaning for us. They are all equally undesirable, and they are all equally objectionable. We cannot keep a bigger army than the country can afford. We cannot even keep a bigger army than is absolutely necessary. We must balance our budget. We cannot afford to keep an army that we do not want. If men claim a reward for something they have done in the past, let them say so. Let them ask for a pension and say so plainly. But we do not want to be putting on every "Major General This" and "Captain" or "Commandant That." There have to be reductions in the Army, and the sooner they understand that the better. If these men claim a reward, let them go on the civil list, and the sooner they understand that the better. We on these benches find satisfaction in the strong action that the Government propose to take on this question, not alone in the case of one section, but in the case of every section; not alone with one organisation, but with every organisation. We want the civil authority in this State to prevail, and not the authority of any section, whether it is the section of Sean or of Liam or any other section. We do not want any Army proprietorship. We do not want any section of the Army to hold itself as the proprietor of the Army, nor do we want any officers nor any of those connected with this mutiny to have their offences condoned. Mutiny, in any shape or form, is wrong and must be dealt with. I and those in the country for whom I speak, are very doubtful at the moment whether these officers are going to be dealt with as mutineers should be dealt with. It is the duty of any and every Government to deal with mutiny, no matter from what source it comes, or from what cause. There are remedies for the grievances of everybody in this State, or there ought to be. But mutiny is not a remedy. Rigid discipline in the Army must prevail. If you are going to have an Army, you cannot have an Army without discipline. Anybody who knew the Irish Army knew that that discipline that existed in other and older Armies did not exist in the Irish Army, or the Free State Army, call it what you like. We on these benches are prepared to support any Government, and give them unstinted and whole-hearted support on this question, if they are prepared to govern in the name to the people, regardless of any organisation, and regardless of any secret societies; regardless of any brotherhood, and regardless of any claims that men might make. Almost every man in the Army could make a claim. We want the Government to govern as Government is understood. We do not want Government through secret societies; we do not want Government through brotherhoods. I do not want to address myself as to who was right and who was wrong. We want the Government to prevent a crisis such as has happened; to clean out the sore that has been proved to exist, and to bring about a healthy state of affairs, to put the people in the saddle, and not to put into the saddle brotherhoods, or societies, or organisations.

I think in this matter that has arisen it is the duty of every section of the Dáil to voice the opinions that they have, and although I cannot profess to represent a large number of Deputies, I think perhaps I can express the opinion of a good many outside who are important citizens. The difficulties we are faced with to-day are only the natural outcome of what has been going on for some time. We see to-day amongst those on the Government benches—and this whole matter arises out of the Government benches—the party torn in two. And I take it that as a member of the opposition under ordinary circumstances it would be my duty, or the duty of the Labour Party, or the duty of the Farmers Party, to make political capital out of the difficulties of the Government. To do any such thing to-day would be a crime upon our part. The country behind us is crying out for peace, and the people will insist upon getting it, and to-day we are faced not with peace but with dissension—first amongst the Government themselves, and incidentally amongst their servants in the army. I say that has got to cease, and as far as the Executive is concerned, the proposal is that our esteemed President is to occupy the position of Minister for Defence. I agree that there is no man in the country who can fill the position better than the President. On the other hand, we must recognise that this job of Minister for Defence is a whole time job. We must also recognise that the President has got a very heavy weight upon his shoulders to-day. You have got your Executive reduced by two members, and by two who, while they were members of the Executive, were obviously at loggerheads on army administration. How far in other matters they were at loggerheads we are not informed, but at all events one must recognise that under the conditions prevailing in the Executive Council at that time peace, love and harmony could not prevail, and it now transpires that it did not prevail and the country has suffered from that fact.

Now I am not going to pass judgment either on the late Minister for Industry and Commerce or the late Minister for Defence, but it is possible to my mind that the Minister for Defence in the present case is rather bearing the burden of sins which perhaps are not altogether due to him but are now laid at his door. When one enters the political arena as the Minister for Defence has done, and as I suppose we all have done more or less, one is faced with consequences such as that. We see constantly political men broken on the wheel of public opinion. We all have to face that, but to-day, in expressing public opinion upon that matter or trying to express it, I say, on this controversy as far as it is personal or as far as personal influences are concerned in the matter, or as far as the societies we have heard about in connection with the army are concerned, the man in the country and the man in the street demands that these things shall be wiped away and that personality shall not count. The issue is too big. The issue to-day is, are we or are we not going to have a loyal army. I believe you are, but if you are to have a loyal army you must separate it from the political element. The army as an army must stand between the citizen and any menace that attacks the State. In that respect if the army or the heads of the army profess or even think they can by their action influence the political situation then great harm must be done and will be done. I speak as one member of the Opposition and I say to-day that every Deputy in this House has got the responsibility to join whole-heartedly with the Government in dealing with this matter and I think we as an Opposition have also to demand that the Government shall set its own house in order so that at all events they can speak with one voice as representing the people they do represent in this country. If we think they do wrong we shall not have our hands tied in dealing with them to the best of our ability. I say at the present time we can only express the opinion that things are wrong and the hope that the Government will put them right.

I would like to join with Deputy Hewat in one sentence at least of what he said, and that is that in the situation with which this country is faced, there is no question whatever,. and there can be no question, but that of common responsibility, and that the action taken by the Government is action that has been taken in the name of the entire House, and that this is hardly a question for inquests into the immediate past, or in the late past especially, seeing that an inquiry is to be set up dealing with these matters, but it is rather a question of the consent to be given by this House and the country in helping the Government through the very difficult situation with which it and the entire country is faced. And in doing this, I would like to express my sincere and considered feeling that arose yesterday that the House has to congratulate itself on the statement made by the Minister for Home Affairs in the House. I do not refer to the sorry tale he had to tell, but to the manner in which he dealt with it, and to the candour, tact, and discretion with which a very difficult and unpleasant mission was discharged. Some of us knew, and had known for the last 12 months, of the circumstances that have led to the present situation. They are not altogether news, and it is perhaps permitted to refer to the fact that attempts have been made by members of the House in the past, one way or another, to deal with different aspects of it—attempts which if they had been attended to, and if dealt with in the spirit in which they were brought forward, might have done something to prevent the situation that has since arisen.

The Minister for Home Affairs said no more than was true to the knowledge of a great many Deputies in this Dáil, and of a great many persons outside it: that the Army has been very largely divided into sections and factions owning personal allegiances— personal allegiances that were not held to be allegiances at all contrary to the national allegiance, but which might at any moment grow into such a contrary spirit, and sometimes have grown into such a contrary spirit, and have finally matured in such a spirit, and now, as the result of action taken on Tuesday, the Government has found it necessary to remove the heads of the Army, as it then existed. The implication was, and we know that implication to be true, that these heads of the Army were also the heads of one of the two rival factions—factions and organisations and cleavages to which the Minister for Home Affairs referred, whereas it was also as clearly implied, and is also well known, that those who signed the document requiring certain drastic changes in the organisation of the Army and entering upon certain political discussions, were leaders of the other. Now, I do not wish, and I do not intend, to go into these matters at all fully. I think that these matters ought not to be gone into fully at the present moment, and I refer to them now just briefly for one reason.

I would ask the Deputy to say very definitely and carefully whether he is speaking with knowledge when he says these things, because he is speaking in a casual way of very, very grave matters.

The organisation that has been referred to as the I.R.A. is an organisation which has had a President and a Secretary. That organisation has demanded the removal of certain of the Army chiefs. It has been hostile to them. I am sorry that that question has been put to me, because I do not want to go into that at all fully. All I want to say is this, that this organisation, existing inside the Army, has demanded the removal of certain persons, and those persons, I think justly, and with a great deal of courage on the part of the Executive Council, have been removed. It was very unfortunate that it should have occurred at the present moment. It would have been very much better had it occurred six or seven months ago, but the Executive Council has come to the decision that these three Generals should be removed. I want to say this, and I think the Minister for Home Affairs will agree, at least I hope he will, that inasmuch as he has referred to rival organisations that there should be nothing done at the present moment, or in the immediate future, that would lead either one side or the other to the controversy, the existence of which has been revealed, to feel that it has won as against the other. I wish to urge that very strongly. The organisation of the I.R.A. has been referred to—and persons have signed as being President and Secretary of it, and the ex-Minister for Defence stated here that he believed that the action of the Executive Council would be such as might condone and foster mutiny. I believe that the action of the Executive Council could not possibly be held in the widest sense to be capable of any such interpretation. If it be laid down, as I earnestly hope it will be laid down, as an essential factor, that any person who has participated in any form in this revolt shall not in future be permitted to have or to act under the commission of the Executive Council, and I repeat that phrase "the commission of the Executive Council of this State."

I believe that only in that way, having taken strong disciplinary action against certain men for whose removal demand was made, that it is equally essential that the persons who formulated that demand, or in any way supported or sustained it, should be put in exactly the same position, and that neither one side nor the other should be permitted in the future to hold military responsibility, and that the only persons to hold military responsibility in this State will be those persons who are purely soldiers belonging to no organisation, secret or open, but one organisation, and that is the organisation of the Free State Army, and that they shall be pledged to that. It should be in the Army as it is in the Civic Guard, that any person found belonging to any secret order or any organisation within the Army of a semi-military character or of a military character, should, on proof of that fact, be held to be guilty of indiscipline in the army.

There is one other matter that I would like briefly to touch upon and to support what Deputy Johnson has urged. It is that before the Ministers and Secretaries Bill is completed Section 8 should not continue to appear in it. I feel some difficulty in referring to this subject, because I was responsible for an amendment here in the Dáil urging its deletion, which received at the time an exceedingly rough passage as the Minister for Home Affairs will remember. In bringing forward that amendment I should say now that I was very largely at fault myself in not speaking my mind fully on that occasion, because some of the circumstances that this business has now brought out to the front were then present to my mind in urging that amendment, but I did not state them here. I do urge now that positions of that kind should not be given a statutory sanction, as they are given a statutory sanction in that Section, and that the Minister for Defence should be able to act directly through some one person or through ordinary Departments exactly the same as other Ministers, holding other large Departments of State, act through their sub-Departments. These are the two points that I wish to urge upon the Executive Council, or what the Minister for Home Affairs rather pathetically referred to yesterday "all that remains of it." Having said that let me only add this for myself: A week ago to-day —I think there were a large number of people of the same frame of mind as myself—no one knew exactly where he was; there had been unfortunately a certain withholding of information which had not been healthy. To-day a large number of people might be inclined to say that the facts look worse now than they did a week ago. That is another point of view, but my opinion is that the situation to-day is infinitely better than it was a week ago, because everyone knows what the position is, and I believe there is at the present moment a feeling of confidence in the country that there was not present a week ago. The stream then seeme to run clear, but there was an obstruction, and the stream to-day appears to be not at all clear but exceedingly muddy, but that is because the cause of obstruction has been removed. I would like to state my conviction that the stream will run clear again, and will run even more smoothly because the obstruction has been removed.

Without going into any of the rights or wrongs of the past—which has been rendered unnecessary by the candour with which the Minister for Home Affairs referred to them—mistakes have been made. The question at the present moment is not what was or was not right 15 months ago—the period to which Deputy McGrath referred—or 6 months ago, or 6 weeks ago, or even a week ago. We have to regard the situation as we find it to-day, and as it is likely to develop in the future. I am perfectly convinced that the situation to-day is one that will develop hopefully for the future, and that there is no reason at all for any of that perplexity that will naturally be aroused by the form in which announcements are made in the newspaper press. The Executive Council has taken a certain line of action. Not a single Deputy in the Dáil can be absolved of personal responsibility for that action. It is not the action merely of a Committee. It is the action of this House. It is the action that the country will be prepared to support, for this reason supremely; there is no conviction stronger in Ireland to-day than that the Army must be, at all costs, made absolutely subject to the civil power. The people of this country —I think I know as the result of some years of painful experience—are weary of anything in the nature of arms and armament. The people desire merely to have a small army—the smaller the better, the less costly the better; but an army that shall, in all points, be subject to the civil power. I believe the step the Minister for Home Affairs indicated the Executive Council has taken is such as will lead to that result. Whatever the faults in the past, the duty at the present moment is not so much to be concerned with inquests and inquiries into mistakes that have occurred on one hand or on the other, but to see that the right thing is done for the future. On the part of the Government I would urge that the precedent that has been established by the Minister for Home Affairs to-day be a precedent that be continued faithfully in the future, that precedent being that any action by the Executive Council in this matter, or any new facts of information that may come to light—those facts, those steps, and those matters will be brought instantly and fully to the knowledge of the Dáil at the end of Questions on any day.

I suppose it is appropriate that we should endeavour to behave as if we thought we were an ancient assembly; that we were speaking for a State that had been in existence for many generations; that we had a Government that was the inheritor of the experience of innumerable Governments that went before it, and that we had an Army that continued the military and disciplined tradition of a long-established military institution. It is, perhaps, appropriate that Deputies, in discussing these matters, should take that line, and that we should have a standard to live up to and ideals on this point. All that does not remove the facts that we have a State that has only just come into existence, and whose fabric as a State can hardly yet be said to be complete; that we have Ministers who two or three years ago, I suppose, did not imagine, and much less was it imagined by anybody else, that they would be holding Ministerial responsibility. As for the public that we represent—the public on whose behalf we act—only within the past few months, only since the Constitution came into operation, did that public—for the first time, as a matter of fact, in its history—enter into the position of full democratic responsibility, the full exercise of democratic sovereignty. As these are the facts, if Deputies, if the Government, if the public expect that at this stage of our political existence untoward things, abnormal things, will not occasionally happen, well, then, I say those who expect that expect miracles.

We are dealing at present with the situation of the Army. It is hardly necessary for me to sketch, even in the briefest way, the history of our national army. A few years ago we had volunteers; then a situation of guerilla warfare of, I think, the most extraordinary kind. I do not think that the struggle that was maintained in this country against the British Government had ever a parallel in any other country. I think it would be impossible in history to find a parallel for it. Then a breathing space, and once again a struggle, and military forces at this time recently embodied, and no more than embodied, as a regular army, thrown into a new struggle. What was natural, what was the non-miracle to be expected, in those circumstances? It was that personal initiative, personal daring, personal resource, were the qualities that brought any man to the front? Along with that, but specially during the stages of the conflict with the British forces, you had personal loyalty and companionship of the closest kind—men trusting their lives to others, their companions alongside of them, and having nothing else to trust to—trusting more than their lives, trusting the fortunes of all they fought for and all they believed in politically. And the thing that was not miraculous at all happened under that. The natural thing happened under that. A kind of personal hierarchy, which was not by any means a unified hierarchy, and could not be, in the circumstances and a sense of chieftainship, I may call it, among men, sprang up. It was out of that material, so formed, so fashioned, which, if it had not existed that way, could not have existed at all—out of that material the new army had to be built up and officered. That being so, it also happened—and if nothing else had happened it would have been another miracle—that the personal factor remained a very large factor in this new army of ours, and that personal attachments remained a large factor, and this idea of chieftainship remained a large factor. Men remembered with pride, and, I think, in most cases, with a pride that was excusable, the battles and the perils which they had gone through in the past, and the battles that those whom they admired, and that those whom they were attached to had gone through.

That plainly was the material out of which our National Army in the main had to be officered. At the same time it was plain to those who were not so close, perhaps, to these affairs, and to most of those who were close to them, that that state of things must pass away, and that, as so many Deputies have repeated during this discussion, the Army must come to be, and to recognise itself to be, in all respects the faithful instrument of the civil power—of the democratic sovereignty. There has never been any delusion on the part of this Ministry, including the two Ministers who have resigned, on that point. We have been told here to-day that we have allowed things to grow up in the Army. That is inverting the order of facts. We have had to allow, or induce or provide, that the Army should grow up out of certain things, and those things include all the circumstances that I have stated. They include more than that. They included during the time of strife—and they necessarily included—secret combinations and an atmosphere of conspiracy. A man has had a happy and peaceful existence in this assembly, who has not been forced to go through times of secrecy and times of conspiracy. It is not right to talk about the Government allowing those things to grow up. The task of the Government has been to enable the country to grow out of these things. I think I am now putting the facts in their right and in their true perspective. In order that the country and the whole administration—and especially the military administration— might grow completely out of that state of things and come to the ideal and standard state of things which is advocated for us—in order that that might come about—changes had to be brought around, both in the letter and in the spirit.

The Minister for Home Affairs, the Vice-President, has mentioned various aspects of this Army situation as they appeared to the Executive Council before, as well as since the particular events that originated this discussion. Now, I may say that I myself in my wisdom or unwisdom had come to the conclusion that owing to the very fact that our Army had grown up out of these circumstances and out of that situation certain dispositions, regular dispositions, in the method of its administration were advisable. To put the thing more concretely, I had come personally to the conclusion that the chief administrative offices in the Army should be only short-term offices—the term being as short as would be consistent with the practical discharge of the duties of those officers; in order that it should not grow up in the mind of any man, or any group of men, or in the minds of their personal friends, or in the minds of their rivals, or in the minds of the Army officers generally, or of the public, that such a thing existed as a prescriptive right on the part of anybody to hold any Army office or any administrative post in the Army. My idea was, that as short a term as two years is quite sufficient to continue Army officers in important administrative posts; that after that time such officers should revert to suitable subordinate posts in the Army, and others should take their places. For I am certain, and I am sure that you are all certain from what you have seen of the military history of this country for the past few years, that there are as good fish in the sea as ever came out of it. I believe it to be true, that had that extraordinary document not been flung into this dramatic atmosphere of ours, I would have brought forward that very matter if no one else had brought it forward, or if anyone else more fitted to bring it forward had not brought it forward—and there are others more fitted than I am—to the consideration of the Executive Council.

When I say that about myself I have no reason to believe that any other member of the Executive Council was committed to any different view. Not the slightest. And I have no reason to anticipate that if a proposal of that kind were brought forward by me or by any member of the Executive Council that it would not have been felt necessary to give it effect at the earliest opportunity. Deputy Hewat was convinced himself and tried in consequence to convince others of the accuracy of the view which would appeal to those whom the President here in a previous discussion called "sensation-mongers." He has tried to draw a picture of an Executive Council in which the members are at loggerheads, and, I think, in fact he used the word "enmity." Well, now, we would all like the Army to be impersonal, and in order that the Army may be impersonal, it is perhaps as well for ourselves to set the example. I am going to try to set it on this occasion. Enmity! If there is a man in this assembly whom I would like to call friend, if there is a man whom I would be proud to call my friend, if there is a man whom I would hope in the future to call my friend, and who, I hope, will be my friend, it is the ex-Minister for Defence. And on the Executive Council personal friends can take decidedly opposite views as will very shortly be apparent. The ground that I would wish to cover with regard to the particular action in review now, that is to say, the removal of certain high military officers from office, has been so clearly covered in the speech of Deputy Cooper that I can do little more than echo what he has said. Perhaps I can reinforce what he has said and make things a little bit more evident if it be necessary. On, I think, the 8th of this month, and arising out of matters brought before this Dáil. General O'Duffy was appointed General Officer Commanding the Forces. I thought at the time of the appointment that the very title of that appointment carried a perfectly definite connotation; but being a non-military person I am perhaps a little innocent in such matters, and my innocence and the innocence of my colleagues in matters of that kind is described by Deputy Johnson as slip-shoddiness. Well, that is because some days later, on account of things which happened in the meantime and not before it, we had to define or it was put up to the Executive Council and the Attorney-General to define what General Officer Commanding the Forces meant.

Now, I do not believe that the ex-Minister for Defence or the officers of the Army Council were so slip-shod in their minds as Deputy Johnson thinks we were about that. I give them the credit of being military enough to know what General Officer Commanding the Forces meant, whether we knew it or not. The ex-Minister for Defence said that "General O'Duffy has been taken from work that he was very badly wanted on, and placed in an extraordinary position at a time of crisis and a time of fighting." It was an extraordinary position undoubtedly, and the Minister, by those words, shows that he recognised it. We, the members of the Executive Council, took a man like that and placed him in charge of the Army at a time of crisis. There was no doubt at all in the minds of the ex-Minister for Defence and his subordinates on the Army Council that we were placing General O'Duffy in charge of the Army, subject, of course, only to the Executive Council through the Minister.

Now, from the 8th March, or the 10th March at the latest, to the knowledge of the Minister and to the knowledge of the officers of the Army Council, General O'Duffy was in charge of the Army, and he was appointed for a particular reason arising out of the conduct of those mutinous officers, and in order to deal with the situation created in the Army by that conduct. I do not suppose there is the slightest shadow of a doubt in the minds of any one here with regard to that, and I am equally certain there was no doubt at all in the mind of the Minister for Defence and in the minds of the officers of the Army Council that General O'Duffy was appointed to take charge of the Army, and in particular to take charge of it in view of the particular crisis that had arisen, and with a view to the military action that had to be taken to meet that crisis, and for no other purpose.

Can the Minister say whether General O'Duffy was actually acting in that week? Was he acting and imposing his authority upon those members of the Army Council?

The facts of his appointment were communicated to the Minister, and, no doubt, through him to the Army Council at the earliest possible moment. If there be any doubt as to whether he was acting, there can be no doubt at all in the Minister's mind and in the minds of the members of the Army Council that it was the wish of the Executive Council that he should act and begin to act at once in that capacity.

Was he acting?

I do not exactly understand that question.

The Minister has said that the General Officer Commanding was placed in charge of the Army and that the members of the Army Council knew that was his position. It was a time of crisis, and there had been a mutiny. Can the Minister say whether it is a fact or not that General O'Duffy was in that week, from the 8th or the 10th to the 17th March, acting as the head of the Army, and were the officers of the Army Council obeying his instructions?

Professor MacNeill

Does Deputy Johnson mean did he find it possible to act?

Was he, in fact, working in his new job?

Professor MacNeill

I should say he was trying to do it. Now, I do not accept from the ex-Minister, and I do not think that the Dáil will accept from the ex-Minister, the validity of his statement that these terms with regard to General O'Duffy's powers were not fully defined in writing until, not the night, but the afternoon of Tuesday, before that particular action was taken here in Dublin. I do not think that can be accepted as a valid reason for setting General O'Duffy aside altogether in the matter of the action which was taken later on that evening. Deputy Cooper has dealt quite effectively with the Minister's claim that the action that was taken on Tuesday night was taken because of the law embodied in the Defence Forces Act. "It is the personal responsibility of the Adjutant-General and the Minister for Defence to see that the law is put into effect." There was nothing in the law that prevented General O'Duffy being consulted. It would not have been enough to consult him. He should have been the person to direct any operations that were carried out. But so far from directing them, or having an opportunity of directing them, or seeing how they should be directed, or expressing an opinion as to whether they should or should not be directed, he was not brought into the matter in any way at all. His position, about which every person in the Dáil is clear, and about which, I hope, the public will be clear, was ignored as much as if it had not existed, and the Minister gives us the reason. Well, now, I am going to give him the full benefit of the reason. Here is the reason: "The Executive Council took up a certain attitude. They took a line of conduct that, in my opinion; is condoning mutiny, fostering mutiny, and is prejudicial to the discipline of the Army."

Now, the Minister and the Army Council are quite entitled to have that opinion, but their holding that opinion, even where they held also the law is on their side, does not justify them, and did not justify them, in taking the law into their own hands on Tuesday evening. What happened on Tuesday evening was another symptom of the growing-pains of this baby State. It showed that those who were in charge of the Army had not come to realise, even admitting they were anxious at other times to realise, their responsibilities to the Government, to the Dáil, and to the sovereignty of the people. They set aside General O'Duffy, and I must say, in the circumstances—there is nothing at all in the ex-Minister's statement which should make me hesitate in saying it—I must say in the circumstances they set him aside deliberately and consciously.

Now, mutiny on the part of subordinate officers in the Army may be bad, and it is bad, but the assumption of the authority of Government into their own hands, the deliberate and conscious setting aside of the authority intended to be created by this Dáil, because this Dáil no less than the Executive Council must be taken as having assented to the powers of the General Officer commanding the forces conferred upon General O'Duffy—action of that kind taken by those who constitute the General Headquarter Staff or the Army Council, or in whatever other capacity they may be said to act as head of the Army, is more serious than mutiny; it is more grave than mutiny; and I think in the circumstances, as the Minister stood for it, he had no option at all except to resign, and that we had no option at all except to make these high subordinates of his vacate their offices.

Can the Minister link up these officers in any definite act? Can he state that the three officers—the Chief-of-Staff, the Adjutant-General, and the Quartermaster-General were equally responsible in this matter?

That, sir, is our belief. We took the responsibility of regarding them as equally responsible in the matter. Now, having said so much, I do endorse what Deputy Johnson has said, and I endorse what Deputy Cooper has said, with regard to the work that has been done, and the very great work that has been done under the ex-Minister for Defence and under the direction of the recent Army Council, in order to build up for this country a disciplined army. We do not want to minimise that. I can go farther. We may differ, and I hope Deputy Hewat and every other Deputy here will thoroughly understand that we can differ, and differ diametrically, upon administrative questions, and at the same time differ without contention and without enmity.

There are few men in this assembly who know and who are able to appreciate how much this country owes to General Mulcahy. I doubt if but for General Mulcahy it would have been possible for us now to be discussing the conduct of General Mulcahy. I remember when there was a price upon his head, and we remember the extraordinary difficulty when he was covered with every obliquy that hostile minds could think of, and I do not think there is a man alive, and I think there are very few men dead, to whom Ireland owes more than it owes to Deputy Richard Mulcahy, and I think the members removed from the position in the administration of the Army as subordinates have also in their time deserved well of the country. But I would like it to be clear to army officers and ex-army officers and their friends that no man, no matter what his achievements have been, no matter what his record has been, earns the right to hold a single position of power or authority in this country. That does not belong by right to any man, nor can it be created by any achievements of his. That right must come to him by the free exercise of the public authority and by that only. I am glad the opportunity has arisen for emphasising that. I believe the people of Ireland are at the back of that view. I believe that as Deputy Bryan Cooper has said here, that the rank and file of the Army and the vast majority of the officers of the Army thoroughly adopt that view, and I think that that will be seen, and seen clearly, before we are many weeks older. If that result arises out of this present ferment it will be a most happy and desirable result. Before I sit down, I wish again to emphasise that it should be clear to those men who served their country well, served it through perils and dangers, served at the risk of their lives, over and over again, that no matter what their services have been they have no right whatever to any position of power or authority, and that no right can come to them, or be created, except, as I have said, by the free exercise of the constitutional authority of the people, and I want not only Army officers to understand that, but I want all who are their friends if they are really their friends, to understand it also.

I find it rather difficult to see the exact purpose or trend of the particular discussion here, or to realise the particular things that I should reply to. I must, therefore, take some of the points that have been made here and try to deal with them as I go along. Deputy Johnson asks with regard to the first document that was read yesterday describing the conditions on Tuesday-Wednesday night. He asked how that document came to be compiled. That document was not a report purporting to come from any officer who was actually on the operations that night. It was compiled and made up by my Secretary from replies to telephone messages received from the officers in charge, one in Collins Barracks and another in our Intelligence Department, and given for my information when proceeding to a meeting of the Executive Council at 11 or 11-30 a.m. and before the actual formal report had come in. That is the 10 o'clock point. That is how that came in, and that is how that came to be recorded in the memo, which was given to me. That matter is one that deserves to be gone into and to be put right. A question has arisen with regard to our attitude to punctilio in sticking strictly to the letter of the law on Tuesday night in effecting arrests that seemed obvious to be made.

I just want to say at this point—I may refer to the matter again—that the extraordinary circumstances that have arisen as a result of recent events in connection with army discipline are such that we have to stand on punctilio in the matter of this mutiny; it was our opinion that we had to do that in order to preserve discipline in the army. The general position of army discipline, and the position of strain into which officers thoroughly loyal had been put by the actions that had taken place in their own barracks and around them, was such as to create a very grave situation for army discipline. Deputy Cooper refers to the discipline of the men as distinct from the discipline of the officers. I want to make a point in connection with that: that the discipline of the men simply reflects the discipline of the officers, and that the officers who were mixed up in the mutinous actions were such a small fraction of the officers that they did not appreciably affect the officer fabric as a whole.

In the general matter of the position on Tuesday night the soldiers did not invoke the aid of the Attorney-General with regard to the definition of the duties of General O'Duffy. The position originally was that General O'Duffy was appointed General Officer Commanding. The position then was that he was confined by the instructions and to the duties of Inspector-General, and these duties were defined. It was only on Tuesday that it was specifically stated that his authority as General Officer Commanding, which was being left with him, reverted back to the Executive Council in the circumstances that then obtained, and it was only on Tuesday that it was decided to put him actually again into an Executive position, and to transfer to him from the Executive Council again the executive powers of issuing orders to officers and men in the Army.

It is a fact that the terms of General O'Duffy's powers were actually set down in the office of the Attorney-General at 9 o'clock, or some time after 9 o'clock on Tuesday night, with myself and the Attorney-General present, and it is a fact that I took a copy of these terms and dictated them over the 'phone on Wednesday morning to General O'Duffy, stating that these were the draft terms that had been arranged between the Attorney-General and myself the night before. I wanted him to say whether before publication of them, there was any other thing that he required to add in order that he might be perfectly clear as to the type and the extent of the control that he was going to exercise over the Forces; and also that it might be perfectly clear to everybody to whom these terms would be communicated in orders as to where they stood under his authority.

at this stage resumed the Chair.

It did not enter my mind, at any rate on the night of Tuesday, to refer to General O'Duffy in this matter. It is a fact that General O'Duffy had not taken up his duties. I would like to have an investigation with regard to the suggestion that Deputy MacNeill makes. I do not remember his precise words, but the suggestion was that General O'Duffy was prevented by some atmosphere of one kind or another, from taking up his duties. I hope I do not misinterpret the Deputy when I say that.

I have no knowledge on that matter, and I do not know how it happened that General O'Duffy, having been appointed General Officer Commanding the Forces on the 10th March, did not find it possible to take up whatever the duties of that office are until quite a number of days later. I do not know why.

General O'Duffy was present at the Executive Council meeting on Tuesday, having sent in a long document to the Executive Council with regard to his position, and that question was not raised. I do not know if he made it clear to the Executive Council that he was not acting, but he certainly made it clear to me that he could not actually take up the discharge of his duties until his duties were definitely defined to him, and definitely defined to those persons who were to act under his authority. In that particular matter the question that Deputy Johnson raises is very pertinent, bearing in mind the action of the Executive Council in calling for the resignation of three officers. What is called an Army Council was set up when we had certain circumstances necessitating military action in the country. That Army Council lapsed with, let us say, the introduction of the Defence Forces Bill, at any rate, with the issue of a statutory order calling into being a Defence Council. The Defence Council, according to that statutory order, advise the Minister, and carry out the duties that may be assigned to them. As regards the three officers whose resignations have been called for, arising out of the events of the night of Tuesday-Wednesday, the Chief of Staff was absent. He was down the country at the time dealing with matters of organisation and settling matters of unrest that had arisen out of the events of the last week or so. He had nothing at all to do with the events of that night. Neither had the Quartermaster-General. The action took place as a result of the responsibility for taking action on the officers in charge of the Dublin District, under the instructions of the Adjutant-General.

I do not want to interrupt Deputy Mulcahy. He referred to a Statutory Order. I presume he is referring to Defence Order No. 38. If not, would he state what Order, and under sanction of what Statute the Order was issued?

I regret that I have not a copy of the Order. A copy of the Order was duly placed in the Members' Room. I can have copies of it circulated to the Deputies.

Did the Adjutant-General advise you before he took action on Tuesday night? Were you in possession of the fact before he took action that he was about to take action?

I was in possession of the fact that there were troops disposed in certain positions, and I gave permission for the making of the arrests.

Before Deputy Mulcahy gave permission for these arrests to take place, had he already passed the President's letter, addressed to Mr. McGrath, to the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General?

Yes; but it was not my interpretation, and it was not the interpretation of the Adjutant-General that that instruction interfered in any way with action that would be taken in the ordinary way in the matter of arrests. It advised them of certain action that, I think, I explained yesterday might be expected would be taken voluntarily by persons who had absented themselves from their duties or committed other offences, and it gave instructions as to how they should be dealt with generally. It was simply advising what might be expected.

As regards the general question of civil control of the Army, I regret simply on the part of the men who have been associated with me, that circumstances have arisen that allow so much to be said here by Deputies, as if it were teaching the men in the Army as to what their position was. The men in the Army thoroughly realise their position and, as I say, and have said often and often before there ever was the established Government that there is here, and before there ever was the very definite civil authority that there is here, the responsible officers in the Army at that particular time who are the responsible officers of the present Army, were clamouring for, and pressing on, the Ministers of the then not very well established Government who had civil responsibility to exercise their civil responsibility and to take up the carrying out of the duties that should be carried out by the civil power in order, in the first place, to help the army in its work, and in the second place, to keep the army in its proper position. As I say, I do regret that circumstances should have so arisen that the Dáil is put in the position in the eyes of men who have been working for the construction of civil government here and the setting up of civil authority here, of turning around and trying to explain and trying to teach them the A B C that they know too well. I regret those circumstances very much.

Deputy Gorey is out against brotherhoods and secret societies. I hope what Doctor MacNeill has said will convince him that they have had their uses and that things cannot be to-day and be absolutely non-existent to-morrow. I could say something with regard to some of these things, but I take it that the proper place to say those things and the proper place to put the general information at our disposal, and to deal with those matters, is before the inquiry that is to be set up. I support, in the circumstances that have now arisen, the suggestion of Deputy Johnson that the personnel set down for the inquiry is not adequate, because of the statements that have been made here both yesterday and to-day.

I can assure Deputy Hewat that the burthen of sins, whether of our own or of other people, that either myself or any Army officers are bearing to-day, or will bear to-morrow, is a very light one. We have never been, and never left ourselves to be, in the words of Dr. MacNeill, in any position that we had not a right to be in. We have never felt ourselves in any position of power or authority except the position of power or authority that we were forced into by the express or unexpressed desire or want of the Irish people. If lessons can be taught by us in sitting on back benches, or working outside a military organisation, that will be more effective and more useful than lessons we could teach sitting on front benches or wearing even Irish Army uniform, there will be no group of people more content to do their duty and teach whatever lessons they have to teach in those particular places, and no group will feel the burthen of their duty lighter than will the men who are under discussion as a result of the present situation.

The people are tired of arms, it is said. Well, now, do not get too tired of them. It does come badly even under particular stress or particular strain to have a representative of the people appearing to shut his eyes to what has been the necessity for arms in the past, whether it is the fairly remote past or the immediate past. To turn now, simply because of the difficulty of demobilisation and because of matters that are apparent in any country after, say, a war is over, when the soldiers are more under the public eye in ordinary ways and the people have greater freedom to think about things—to turn and to say that is ungrateful. Forgetting the necessity for arms, people might allow themselves to be irritated into a position in which they would say: "We want no more arms; we want no more soldiers we simply want to forget about those things." That is a wrong and a dangerous frame of mind. The Army, unfortunately, comes into public prominence now when it ought to be passing, as it were, out of public ken, when the soldiers ought to be withdrawn to their ordinary barracks, and a very definite and quiet school of discipline set up, through which the youth of the country would pass, to the benefit of the country. Unfortunately, as I say, the Army is dragged out in circumstances such as the present, and there is a very great danger that the Army is at the present moment going to be dragged into what may turn out to be a political dispute. That would be a much bigger disaster than anything that has happened recently or than much that has happened, say, within the last 12 months. I would ask that, in the development of the present situation, responsible Deputies would see that the Army is not dragged into a political dispute and that, as far as possible, action is not taken with the Army that would make it appear to the Army that it was being involved in a political dispute.

To get back to the question of discipline again, Dr. MacNeill speaks of the guerilla warfare that was carried on here during the British occupation as of an extraordinary kind. The warfare that was carried on subsequent to June, 1922, here was quite as extraordinary, and the fact that the Army did its work in the circumstances in which it was called upon to act then, discloses, I think, or should suggest, that it had the greatest possible elements of discipline in it. I doubt if Deputy Cooper would be able to say that any Army he has known would in similar circumstances have shown as high a standard of discipline. Dr. MacNeill spoke of proposals that he felt like making himself with regard to changes in Army administration. Proposals of the same kind from the Defence Council were made early enough to suggest their embodiment in the Ministries' and Secretaries' Bill: that was that the three military heads of administrative Departments would only hold office for a specified term of years. I am not clear as to why the matter was withdrawn. It was probably understood that the Defence Forces Bill would be the proper Bill for it, but, at any rate, a proposal was made not exactly to avoid chieftainship in the Army— which I am not convinced exists—but so that you might have a rotation of duties amongst all the higher officers in the Army, and so that you might have a thorough understanding on the part of a large number of officers of the various duties that had to be performed in different branches, both on the administrative side of the Army and the military side—that there might be a thorough rotation of duties, thereby giving you a fairly large number of officers competent to take up any duties on the military side whether administrative or fighting, and that the country would never have to depend on one, two or three persons to stand as its military leaders or its military props in the time of any crisis.

In that connection too I think it fair to say that nominations to every position in the Army, including those to the positions of the Chief of Staff, the Adjutant-General, and the Quartermaster-General, were before the Executive Council about the 23rd or 24th of February, and there was nothing, in my recollection at any rate, to be said then as to their unsuitability for their offices or their having outlived their period of utility there. I should also like to mention in that connection that the present Quartermaster-General took up his position after the post had been refused by two of our senior officers, and prior to that he was asked to take up the commissionership of the Civic Guard by the President, a position which he declined. I wonder if he had taken up the position of commissionership of the Civic Guard at that time would we be finding now that he had been too long in office and had outlived his utility. As to the matter of the Inquiry, it is important that the Inquiry, which is proposed, should get to work at once. It is important that the personnel would be such as to give us and give the Dáil complete confidence in it; that is the Inquiry with regard to the genesis of the mutiny. There is another matter that is being referred to freely and that has been insinuated freely and that is the general administration of the Army. It is not a time when one would naturally ask to have a body set up to inquire into the administration of the Army or to inquire into the work that has been done by the Army. The Army has been administered and worked under the three officers whose resignations are now asked for since, say, the middle of 1922. During that time petty reorganisation after petty reorganisation had to take place in order to deal with the problems of the day, and whether they rose out of the actual circumstances or out of the number of men you had to handle is an army matter. Your first main reorganisation is only taking place now. The actual movement of troops in connection with that reorganisation is taking place now. I say that now is not the time that anybody wishing to have his work in the Army judged, would ask to have an inquiry as to whether his Army administration was good, bad, or indifferent and whether sufficient results had been achieved. I think in view of the whole atmosphere that has been created here and in view of the statements made here, it shall have to be asked before very long that a body will be set up to inquire into what has been done by the Army and to inquire into the actual state of Army reorganisation and administration. It is only proper as the question is being tackled that it be tackled thoroughly. It is only right and just that the officers whose resignations have been called for by the authority of the Executive Council and who will, and must, vacate their positions at the wish of the Executive Council, should have it known whether or not the Executive Council had any valid or just reason for removing them from their offices. I think I have made it plain that neither the Chief of Staff nor the Quartermaster-General could have had anything to do with the events of Tuesday night. I submit that the reason why they have been asked for their resignations is that the mentality of the Executive Council to them for some time past was a mentality that was shaped by complaint, rumour and story of varying kinds.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

The exact motion before the Dáil is the President's nomination of himself as Minister for Defence. Beyond certain general remarks passed by Deputy Johnson, that motion has received no very detailed discussion or criticism. It has been used rather as a peg on which to hang references to the general Army situation. It is no doubt a very proper and convenient course to adopt, but I would like to address certain remarks to the exact motion that is before the Dáil—namely, this nomination of President Cosgrave as Minister for Defence. It will be understood that that is a temporary provision, or shall I put it in another way, that it is not necessarily a permanent provision. It is a provision made in the immediate set of circumstances, and to meet an existing urgent situation. The ex-Minister for Defence is naturally anxious to be relieved from a difficult and anomalous situation. Two officers who administered the military departments of the Minister for Defence, who were his selection and nomination, have resigned. These two officers resigned not merely the administrative positions which they filled, and which they were called on by the Government to resign, but they have also resigned their commissions. Their resignations, both of the administrative positions and their commissions, have been accepted. The Chief of Staff adopted a different course. He refused to tender his resignation of the administrative position he held, and, as a result of that, it was necessary to withdraw and cancel his commission, and he has been informed of that withdrawal.

In addition to appointments which I announced this morning I am now in the position to announce Major-General Joseph Sweeney to be Acting-Chief of Staff. I did make it clear this evening that the events of last week or ten days and the resignation of two Ministers, constitute for the Government a problem calling for very close consideration. I pointed to two factors which make it impossible at the moment to give the situation that attention, full discussion and examination which it requires. The illness of the President, Deputies will appreciate, is a very important factor in the existing situation. I pass from the motion before the Dáil into the more general discussion that centred around it. Last night, Deputy Mulcahy represented that his resignation was due largely to the fact that he, the strong man, the stern disciplinarian, the upholder of law, felt his arm paralysed by a weak and pusillanimous Government, and that that was an intolerable situation, one which he had felt very keenly for the last twelve days, and which ultimately compelled him to take the course which he has taken. Deputy Mulcahy must be well aware of how thin that ice was. I do not know why he took up that position unless, indeed, it was due to a desire to instil some little quiet mirth for some of us into a position which is otherwise sombre. No one knows quite so well as Deputy Mulcahy that that is not the role which he has played throughout the last year. No one knows quite so well as Deputy Mulcahy that if I were so minded, I could cite cases here which would blow that interesting fiction sky-high, and no one knows quite so well as Deputy Mulcahy, the considerations which prevent me from doing that. They are the same considerations which caused me to agree that very great pressure should be put on Deputy McGrath, and even substantial concessions should be made to Deputy McGrath to prevent him from making the statement here which he contemplated making some time back, because the citing of those cases would be discreditable to the country. Deputy Mulcahy knows that I could say here, were I so minded, why the names of certain officers which he put forward some time back for renewal of rank and position in the army were struck off the list.

I am perfectly prepared that anything the Minister for Home Affairs wishes to say here should be said. I am perfectly prepared to support the demand of the three officers that this enquiry be public, and I submit it is a mean way to come along and endeavour to say by innuendo and suggestion what the Minister for Home Affairs admits or suggests he is not prepared to say simply because of public policy. I did not, and do not, ask for any enquiry to be a private enquiry. Any enquiry there may be at the present moment I am perfectly satisfied should be a public one.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

The cases to which I refer will be raised before the Committee.

And evidence will not be given before the Committee that the charges are facts.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

In view of the fact that cases like that will need to be sifted by this Committee, it is better that the proceedings of the Committee should be private. Further than that, I do not propose to go. With regard to the incidents of Tuesday night, Deputy Mulcahy made certain statements and suggested almost that on that night General O'Duffy was not the General Officer Commanding the Defence Forces of Saorstát Eireann. It might be interesting to ask in what capacity General O'Duffy interviewed the President on Monday last, together with the Minister for Defence, as a result of which the President wrote that particular letter to Deputy McGrath, and the Ministry for Defence issued a memorandum to the Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General and the Chief of Staff. Was it in his capacity as Inspector-General that General O'Duffy was interviewed by the President together with the Minister for Defence, and what would the Inspector-General have to do with the action that would have to be taken with regard to mutinous officers?

Do you want an answer to that?

Mr. O'HIGGINS

No, it is not addressed personally to you. This is a memorandum issued by the Minister for Defence on the 18th March:—

"The President has instructed that all persons who left their posts, or unlawfully took away military stores during the recent mutiny, be dealt with from the point of view of arrest on the following paragraphs:

"(1) By Thursday, 20th inst., at 6 p.m., all arms and equipment removed be returned to the place or places from which they were taken.

"(2) Persons concerned in the removal of such material to surrender at the places where such material was taken to the officers in charge of these places.

"(3) After such surrender to present parole to the officer in charge, such parole to be accepted, and the persons concerned to be allowed out under open arrest.

"(4) Absentees from duty shall also surrender by 6 p.m. on Thursday, 20th inst., and present parole, which will be accepted. They also will be allowed out under open arrest.

"(5) Thursday is only mentioned as a convenient date to allow of a certain amount of time, but it is desirable there should be no delay in giving effect to the terms of Pars. 1, 2, 3, and 4.

"Suitable instructions were wired to the G.O.C. and officers to secure effect being given to these instructions so far as they are concerned."

That is a memo, issued by the Minister for Defence following on an interview which he had with the President and at which General O'Duffy was present. By Thursday, the 20th instant, at 6 p.m., certain things are to be done. It is a clear implication, an obvious and necessary implication of that document that action such as the action that was taken on Tuesday night would not be taken, and the action that was taken on Tuesday night cut straight across the policy outlined in that document, and outlined by the President in his letter to Deputy McGrath.

Is this a point of explanation?

It is a question.

Perhaps Deputy Mulcahy would wait until the Minister for Home Affairs concludes.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

And this document on Tuesday morning had received what I call the post factum ratification and endorsement by the Executive Council, that is, it was submitted to us by the Minister for Defence, as he then was, as an instruction issued by him resulting from that interview which he had with the President on Monday, and which was ratified and approved by the Executive Council on Tuesday morning. On Tuesday night you have the antics in Parnell Street cutting straight across this document, calculated—shall I say deliberately calculated—to set the heather on fire and creat a war situation in a greater or lesser degree throughout the city, and possibly throughout the country. And the next morning the Executive Council regarded it as such, was not willing to stand over or take responsibility for the action on Tuesday night, and the Executive Council then took the view, without singling out this officer or that officer for any particular notice or any particular censure, that a complete change at the top of the Army was eminently and immediately desirable. I have stated that that view was held by some before that date, and long before that date, but there was agreement about it on that date. And so I was authorised to inform the Minister for Defence that the resignations of these three officers were required, and a message notifying the President of that decision and also recommending him to take the resignation of the Minister for Defence was conveyed. It is commented by Deputy Hewat that there was an absence of peace and love and harmony in the Executive Council. I could wish the country no better than that it would never see the day when there would be all peace and love and harmony in its Executive Council. An Executive Council is a deliberative body, a committee of the people, with a mandate from the people to do certain things, to make certain conditions prevail. Its members being human, having only human judgment and human limitations, will naturally and inevitably differ as to means and ways, and there have been differences within the Executive Council. There always will be differences within any Executive Council that you may get, even the Executive Council over which Deputy Figgis will preside.

I have no desire to prolong this debate, and I find that I have nothing in particular to add. I announced when we met this afternoon that the policy of the Government, the attitude of the Government, with regard to this Army trouble was to adhere to the terms of the memorandum issued by the late Minister for Defence on the 18th inst., the text of which was read to the Dáil last night, with this difference: that the date mentioned will be extended from 6 p.m. this evening to 6 p.m. on Saturday, the 22nd inst. People have been appointed to acting positions to carry on the work in these three Departments. If the Dáil now approves the nomination of the President to the position of Minister for Defence it will be conveyed to the Governor-General for ratification. In the absence of the President I will act for him in that Department. That is not a satisfactory position, just as it is not a satisfactory position that as yet no successor has been appointed to the Minister for Industry and Commerce, but the President's absence must be taken as a very real excuse for any delay in facing up to this position as a whole. It is recognised that if possible before we would meet the Dáil next week we should have arrived at a very definite line to be adopted, and a definite reconstitution of the Ministry. We should at least have given mature reflection to the whole situation as it exists, and to all its reactions and repercussions. This week has been a crowded and difficult one, and the head of the Executive Council has been unfortunately laid up, confined to his house, and in such a position that we were told that it was not advisable to trouble him unduly or unnecessarily with public matters.

Question: "That the Dáil assent to the nomination of the President as Minister for Defence"—put and agreed to.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

I move the adjournment until 3 p.m. on Tuesday next.

The Dáil adjourned accordingly at 6.35 p.m. until 3 p.m., Tuesday.

Top
Share