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Dáil Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 27 May 1925

Vol. 11 No. 21

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE. - LAND BOND BILL—MONEY RESOLUTION.

I move:—

Chun críche aon Achta a rithfar sa tSiosón so chun socrú eile a bheidh níos fearr do dhéanamh i dtaobh Bannaí Talmhan do thabhairt amach fén Acht Talmhan, 1923, agus i dtaobh urraíocht agus fuascailt do dhéanamh ortha agus íoc an úis ortha, agus chun deighleáil le blianachtaí ceannaigh a híoctar fén Acht san, go bhfuil sé oiriúnach a údarú go geuirfar mar mhuirear ar an bPrimh-Chiste no ar a thora fáis:—

That for the purpose of any Act of the present Session to make further and better provision in relation to the issue of Land Bonds under the Land Act, 1923, and the guarantee and redemption thereof, and payment of interest thereon, and for the disposal of purchase annuities paid under that Act, it is expedient to authorise the Charge upon the Central Fund or the growing produce thereof, of:—

(a) aon tsuimeanna is gá in aghaidh aon easnaimh ar Chiste na mBannaí Talmhan chun ús d'íoc, agus chun fuascailt do dhéanamh ar na Bannaí Talmhan a tabharfar amach fén Acht Talmhan, 1923, agus é leasuithe leis an Acht san a rithfar sa tSiosón so, agus

(a) any sums required for meeting any insufficiency of the Land Bond Fund for the payment of interest on, and the redemption of, the Land Bonds issued in accordance with the Land Act, 1923, as amended by such Act of the present Session, and

(b) aon tsuimeanna is iníoctha fén Acht san leis an Rialtas Bríotáineach ar scór costais fé n-ar chuaidh an Rialtas san i gcó-líona aon urraíocht a thug an Cisteán Bríotáineach ar íoc colann agus ús aon Bhannaí Talmhan a cruthnuíodh chun crícheanna an Achta Talmhan, 1923.

(b) any sums payable under such Act to the British Government in respect of expenditure incurred by such Government in fulfilling any guarantee given by the British Treasury for the payment of the principal and interest on any Land Bonds created for the purposes of the Land Act, 1923.

The Message prescribed by the Constitution has been received from his Excellency the Governor-General. The sums required under the heading of (a) are not really in the nature of new provisions at all. The provisions of Section 1 of the Land Act of 1923 are re-enacted, with certain amendments, and they are dealt with under this head (a). Head (b) deals with a new point, namely, the repayment to the British Government in respect of expenditure incurred by that Government in fulfilling any guarantee given by the British Government for the payment of the principal and interest on any land bonds created for the purposes of the Land Act, 1923. This question of the desirability and the advantage of having land bonds guaranteed by the British Government has been discussed at considerable length, and I do not propose at the moment to add anything to what I have already said on the subject. It will be clear to Deputies, of course, that if we are to accept the guarantee naturally we must make arrangements to repay any sums that might be advanced on foot of it.

The last time this matter was discussed was on the Second Reading, and in the course of the discussion we were informed by the Minister for Lands and Agriculture, and particularly by Deputy Egan, that this was not a matter to be considered in any other light than that of hard business. Deputy Egan told us that he was not swayed to the slightest extent by any sentimental rubbishy talk about British interference or about the British stranglehold, and frequently in the course of his speech disclaimed that sentiment had any influence in his make-up so far as this Bill was concerned. It was pure hard business. Coming from a Deputy who sails under the flag of a party which has given itself a Gaelic name for sentimental reasons, and whose reason for existence lies very largely in sentiment, it is amusing, if not interesting, to find a Deputy insisting that, at any rate, he is not swayed by any sentimental interests or emotions. While it is well to adopt a hard business attitude in dealing with purely business affairs, I wish to submit that this is not purely a business affair, and that it cannot be considered apart from sentiment. The basis of this Bill is said to have been laid in the time of the Treaty discussions in London. I have not been able to find any references in the Treaty debates in the Dáil touching upon any bargain or undertaking that was entered into with respect to the British guarantee of land bonds. I suggest to Deputies that there would have been a different result of those debates had the House been informed that part of the arrangements with the British Government at the time was that there should be a completion of land purchase on compulsory terms, that the British Government would guarantee the bonds issued by the Irish Government and that any repayment that might be made to the British Government under that guarantee, would, of necessity, be paid in British currency. Had the contents of this Bill been laid before the Dáil that discussed the Treaty arrangements, I have no hesitation in saying that the Treaty would never have been approved. In introducing in the British House the parallel Bill which undertook the guarantee, the mover, Lieutenant-Colonel Guinness, used these words:—

The present plan is based on a financial agreement between the Imperial Government and the Irish Free State to deal with matters arising out of the Treaty, and which provided that the Free State Government should finance the completion of land purchase by the issue of an Irish stock at 4½ per cent. to be guaranteed as to capital and interest, subject to agreed provision for redemption, by the British Government. The security for the payment of interest and sinking fund will be provided in the Bill in the form of the Central Fund of the Irish Free State and on any special funds established for the purpose with priority over any future charges.

Last year, in pursuance of this agreement, the Irish Free State passed an Act to deal with the machinery of land purchase.

Mr. Runciman who had been a member of the Government, I think, which completed the Treaty, also spoke of this Bill being governed by the financial agreement which was a parallel to that Treaty. Neither the Dáil of 1921-22, nor the Provisional Government, nor the Dáil which succeeded the Provisional Government, was ever informed that there had been an agreement in respect to the purchasing of land, with a British guarantee to the bonds, and that any payment would be in British currency. That agreement was not disclosed at the time of the Treaty arrangements, or had not been disclosed until the production of this Bill. The agreement, therefore, cannot be said to be one binding upon the Dáil.

The Minister responsible for introducing the parallel Bill told the members of the British House of Commons that:—

"We are only guaranteeing Free State legislation. We stand behind their Bill (that is the Land Act) in order to see that the landlords shall not be losers by any temporary weakness of Free State finance."

I want to dispute the obligation that we are under to give landlords who are being bought out under the Land Act any reason for going outside the ordinary securities which the Irish State can give and thereby formally, to however slight an extent, by an Act of this legislature place ourselves under an obligation to another State. The landlords who are being bought out now have nothing to complain about. They had their opportunity to come to agreements with their tenants under the old Land Acts. They waited until they were compelled and, being compelled, they say: "We will accept compulsion, but we are now going to refuse, in effect, allegiance to the Irish State which is buying us out; we are going to stand under the shelter, the guarantee, of the British Government, whose legislation hitherto we have refused to take advantage of."

The Minister for Agriculture told us that we should remember that landlords belong to the State and had the same rights in it as every other class. Do they? If they do, why do they want special treatment? Why do they want the treatment of citizens of Britain and the guarantees of Britain? Why are they not prepared to accept the risk that every other person with whom the Irish State entered into obligations undertakes? Why do the landlords, who are to be given the same rights as every other citizen of the Saorstát, want special treatment? The bonds that are to be issued are secured, first by the payment of annuities in respect to the sales. They are secured also by the Central Fund. The holders of National Loan are just as much entitled to security as landowners who may or may not be holders of National Loan. But the holders of National Loan did not seek the guarantee of the British Government.

There is to be another loan some time, more or less soon, in relation to the Shannon scheme, Barrow drainage, and other drainage, and the persons who are willing to lend are prepared to accept the risks that citizenship of the Saorstát carries with it, or, if they are not citizens, they are prepared to accept the security the Saorstát can give. But these other citizens, whom we are asked to remember as belonging to the State, are to continue to be granted exceptional treatment which is not in the bond. We have never contracted, as far as I know, to give to the landlords exceptional treatment.

The question was raised on the last occasion, and will be raised again, of the provision regarding currency, which is an entirely new proposition: that if it ever happens that the Saorstát is called upon by the British Government to make good its obligations, or if at any time any change takes place with regard to currency, whether the British Government enters into it or not, the holders of these bonds shall be paid in British currency. The Minister for Agriculture told us he had never heard of any loan being floated the interest on which was to be paid in any other currency than the currency of the time at which the loan was floated. I wonder can any Minister tell us what is the position, say, of pensioners whose claims for pensions ante-date or precede the claims under this Land Act? Are they always to be guaranteed to be paid in British currency, or are they to run risks that any other citizen will run as to the value of any Irish currency that may at any time within the next 80 years be in operation? The holders of National Loan stock may well, and certainly with the same amount of justification, demand that whatever happens their payments the value of their interests in the market, its purchasing power must never be lower in any case than the value of British currency in the market. I do not understand what kind of answer would be given to holders of National Loan stock or to pensioners if they demanded, at least, that never at any time must they be paid in a currency which is of less value than British currency.

I suggest that the effect of this provision is going to be to tie up the Saorstát to the British financial system, and to the British currency system. We may voluntarily decide that it is better to continue to be tied up in that way. We may. I think we shall not always but for quite a long time no doubt there will be a great deal to be said in favour of that view. But why should we enter into this bond with citizens of the Saorstát, persons to whom the Minister refers as having the same rights as any other class in the community? Why should we be binding ourselves in respect to a contract already entered into without any such obligation to pay the interest in a currency which may be of more value at the time than the currency which is operating within this State, and of which they are presumed to be citizens? I have not yet heard any argument which, to my mind, justifies the passing of this Bill or for the Dáil to agree to enter into this further compact with the landlords. They have a right to take all the risks that any other citizen of the Saorstát has to take.

I said before that the kind of obligation that is being entered into here by Britain, undoubtedly gives an added interest on their part in the doings of the legislature here. The Minister told us that there was already £130,000,000 worth of stock floated which would be exactly in the same position as this £30,000,000. That may be true. If that is one of the obligations we took over, if that was the position which we entered upon, I say we are quite wrong now in deliberately entering upon a new obligation of that kind to add another £30,000,000 to the £130,000,000, which invites the British Government to take a fatherly interest or a creditor's interest in the doings of the Saorstát.

I would like to know what provision is made, for instance—there is certainly none in the Bill—for deciding when there had been default on our part. In recent months we have seen the way nations and Governments have had to enter into arrangements with their creditors, being other states, and assuming at some future time there was depression and inability to meet liabilities on the spot, who is to say whether there has been absolute default or merely stringency? The British Government is going to determine. They are going to pay our liability under these bonds, and then we are to be in the position of being absolutely dependent on their willingness to forego payment. We would not be able to enter into a general undertaking with all our creditors for deferring payment of interest unless the British Government came along and said they agreed, and they could make their own conditions.

Deputy Wilson has his own views on this matter which, I think, are very well worthy of consideration; that by this Bill you are making more difficult the redemption of the bonds. You may be making more difficult the redemption of the bonds, but I leave that for him to develop if he has anything to say on it. I have yet to learn what value there is of a business kind—this hard business kind that the Minister for Agriculture spoke of, and that Deputy Egan emphasised—which is going to be heavier in the balance as between what may be called the political view and the desirability of maintaining to what extent we can a sense of self-reliance. I also want to know why we should give these exceptional terms to landlords that we refuse to give to any other creditor? It may be said there was an undertaking in the terms of this Bill. Will the terms of that undertaking and the date of it be made known to the Dáil? If there has been no undertaking, then I am very anxious to know what are the arguments in favour of passing this Bill or this resolution?

Deputy Johnson rightly asks why special terms should be given to the bond-holders, and I might well ask why the cost of these special terms should be at the expense of the tenant occupiers. He claims that these bond-holders should not be placed in a better position than those who have subscribed to the National Loan. I claim that the quid pro quo for which they received paper is not at all on a level with a cash payment. What does the State acquire for these land bonds? They have acquired an interest in the land held by people who at one time were spoken of as landlords, but who are now extinct in the sense of being landlords. They gave a security which was undoubtedly a non-negotiable security, and the State, as a trustee for the tenant occupiers, acquired that security, not to become a State owner, but to pass that security on to the occupiers and the occupiers will be the ultimate purchasers of these land bonds. Therefore, if by your Bill you inflate the value of the land bonds, by that much are you prejudicing these occupiers working on the land. Most of us have been astounded to find that in connection with the £130,000,000 issued for the purchase of land in Ireland, this State pays a huge sum annually to implement the Land Commission in order to become a rent collector for Britain. Is it intended that in addition we should still keep on the staff at our expense to collect this £30,000,000 and to pass over the interest on the £160,000,000 yearly to the National Debt Commissioners in London to manage how they will? I say that is a bad way. I say that we should use the Sinking Fund drawn from these tenants on the agreement that that Sinking Fund should be here and that every advantage which the fluctuation in the market, especially in the stock market, gives, ought to be obtained by those trustees for the people who are paying it.

Let us assume that thirty million pounds worth of land bonds have been issued. Were it not for these guarantees the price of that stock would be in the neighbourhood of 84 or 85, and yearly into the coffers of the Minister for Finance would flow £76,000, which he could operate by purchasing at 84 as paper, and thereby give the people who provide the Sinking Fund a benefit of 16 per cent. That 16 per cent. would operate at compound interest. The first year you would extinguish probably £90,000 worth of land bonds. The following year you would have extinguished £90,000 plus that amount of interest for the previous year. You will have the amount of £90,000 added on to your annual sum. The result will be that the operations of the Sinking Fund would become very much accelerated and the tenant occupiers would be rid of their liabilities more quickly, and in the ordinary operation of the transfer of farms from one man to another, you would lessen the amount of tax which would go on these people. If a purchaser under the Land Act of 1923 sells his farm he has to pay transfer fees on the amount of money which he receives from the buyer plus the amount of his unextinguished debt held by the Commission. That is, he has to pay interest on the amount of his unextinguished debt, added to the amount he pays in the open market, and that is the amount of money involved on every occasion when there is a transfer of a farm under the Land Acts. If the Sinking Fund were operated on the price in the market the amount of each man's liability would be so much diminished, and the amount which the buyer would pay on transfer fees would thereby be diminished also. If he desired to redeem his farm, the operations of the Sinking Fund on the Free State credit basis would give a much lesser sum.

Does not the Deputy mean the Free State discredit basis?

I have never known the Minister for Finance, nor anybody here, to take up a position to discredit our securities. I have not much to put in the National Loan, but I have put a little, and I would be long sorry that the Minister for Finance would think that I would try to diminish the Free State credit.

What is your argument?

My argument is that not alone are you giving certain special people, bond-holders, more credit than this State is able to afford, but by giving that extra credit you are taking it away from people who can very badly afford it. In other words, you are applying in the very opposite direction the principles which underlie your tariff proposals. In this case you are taxing the many for the benefit of the few. You are making them pay more. You are imposing a burden on the multitude for the benefit of the few. I will not deal with this question from a high political or sentimental standpoint. I am dealing with it as it affects the people I am supposed to speak for here, and these Deputies who prate about representing the tenants should go back to the tenants and tell them that "In the interest of Free State credit, and in the interest of floating future loans, and in the interest of the community, we are singling you out to help that particular principle and you will have to pay the burden."

I do not want to interrupt the Deputy, but he is occupying the time of the Dáil about a matter to which he does not seem to have given much attention. If the Deputy looks at the opening clause of the Act of 1923, he will see provision for redeeming at par, and there is no new principle to be introduced as regards the rate at which bonds are to be paid, unless the Deputy wants some change made now so as to reduce credit.

Will the Minister deny that I introduced an amendment on the Land Bill and that the Minister stated that its operations were exactly as I wanted?

Certainly, but there was never a business transaction such as he is proposing now. I say deliberately that sooner than benefiting any number of people in this country by the way the Deputy suggests, I would willingly retire from public life and advise every man to keep out of it. In my existence I never listened to the propounding of such a dishonest doctrine, and I know the Deputy is an honest man. I never heard it propounded by either a financier, a banker, a business man, or even a tenant farmer. If he buys a thing he will not seek to depreciate its value for the person who sells it. The Deputy seeks to parade this country as if it were a beggar before the other nations. I would not have that for the price of a thousand Acts such as this.

The President stated to me that the yearly operation of the Sinking Fund was to redeem at the market value all the land stock. That was the operation he was continuing. Now I am not anxious in any way to discredit our credit, but look at what happened when the land stock of 1903 and the land stock of 1901 and 1906——

You will not deny that the landlords got cash in 1903, and the land stock, such as it was, was placed in the market at its market value, and in order to give them cash we owe £130,000,000 for possibly £100,000,000 worth of land.

They did not get all cash. The landlord got stock in many cases. When it was over par that stock fell to 50, and that stock by its operations brought me 24 per cent reduction in my rent.

Did the landlords get it at 50 in payment for the land?

They got it at its face value. The landlord is in no way wronged. Under the position here he can keep his bond in a particular lockup and leave it there and get his 4½ per cent, and he is getting as good an interest on his property or better as a non-negotiable security in land.

That is a more honest argument than the other.

It is the same argument.

You cannot have it both ways.

The President says I cannot have it both ways. It was pointed out by the Minister for Finance that this £30,000,000 would be placed in the market. If he adopts what I suggest they will not be placed in the market but kept in the safe, and, instead of depreciating the currency or credit, you will thereby be removing from the market a lot of paper, which landlords before the passing of the Act were willing to take, subject to the fact that they would not disburse any of these bonds for ten years. I do not want to introduce any heat, or to speak as a Bolshevist, but I am speaking in the interests of the people who sent me here. I am not speaking in any way as one who is anxious to do anything wrong, but during the operations of the last ten years the stock guaranteed by Britain fell fifty per cent., and through that operation the tenants gained the benefit. The man buying under the 1903 Act, paid into the Sinking Fund, calculated at 2¾ per cent. The fall in the stock made that Sinking Fund operate at 5 per cent. Why should we not allow the same thing to occur now?

Why not do the same with the National Loan? We got £10,000,000; let us pay £8,000,000. That is your argument.

No. To the extent of the encumbrances which these landlords held upon their lands they have got 20/- in the £, because we have given them paper at face value, and to the extent of the balance we agree to give them 4½ per cent. until redeemed, but these monies which will be paid away on death duties or encumbrances will come on the market. They will not be lost to the landlord, for he has got his 20/- in the £ for them. They will come on the market, and financial institutions, fire insurance companies, and others can invest if they consider that better than selling at 84 per cent. If it is sold we should be entitled with our £67,000 a year to buy it. That is what I am speaking about. Is there anything wrong about that from an ethical point of view, or is there anything Bolshevist about it?

There is, absolutely.

I cannot see it.

I cannot, either.

Deputies may laugh. I put it to the Deputies this way: that that money cannot come on the market except by people who had a bond, and the landlord on that bond received 20/- in the £. He is paid in full. The other man can hold his paper as long as he likes. If he keeps it long enough he will be redeemed at par. If he wishes to cash the security he cannot cash it before he loses 16 per cent. on his investment, and he puts it into rubbers or anything else he likes. I do not see where that man is forced to sell, and I cannot see, as I have said, where there is anything wrong from an ethical point of view.

You are a poor financier.

I may be, but would Deputy Hewat or Deputy Egan, as business men, going out to buy produce, boom the produce before they bought it?

Mr. EGAN

There is no parallel whatever.

The tenant is the ultimate purchaser and he has got to pay, and I contend——

That he should not pay.

I contend that he should pay, and pay in full; but whatever fluctuations there are in the market by the operations of the Sinking Fund, which I hope will not be sent to London, should be availed of, and to that extent redeem at a lower price the promissory notes issued on his behalf by the trustees, that is, the State.

It is not the first time we have heard a statement such as we have just listened to. It is based on wrong premises, and it is founded on a system of finance which I hope is not going to operate in this country. If I have learned one lesson from the British it is that they honour their bond, and in no case has the Chancellor of the Exchequer or the Financial Secretary of the Treasury ever propounded such a suggestion as we have heard. Now what must be in the mind of the person whose land has been compulsorily taken from him by an Act of Parliament here? If I were to take by Act of Parliament Deputy Wilson's cattle and say, "I will give you stock for it, and you can keep that and draw your 4½ per cent. every year, and if you or any other tenant farmer put it on the market it is at your loss and the State is going to benefit by it," what would Deputy Wilson say?

I would not put it on the market.

No, he would keep it in his pocket. We are all going to exist on paper. As far as that is concerned, we issued £10,000,000 worth of National Loan, and we saw when nervous people rushed into the market with a quarter of a million pounds of National Loan what effect it had on the market. What is the reason of that? I wonder did Deputy Wilson ever take into consideration the cause of such an extraordinary fluctuation in the National Loan? What was it due to? Nervousness. A few more speeches such as that made by the Deputy and that nervousness would amount to hysteria. We have always been told by the nervous gentlemen who control the banks in every country that capital is very shy and that credit is subject to the slightest winds that blow. The statement made by Deputy Wilson is not, in my opinion, a fair statement. He urges that people who were tenant purchasers have the right to get an opportunity to buy stock which is to be depreciated in value. That is not sale. They will not sell their cattle for paper, and they are entitled to honour the bonds that have been issued on their behalf.

The question of sentiment was raised. I would not allow sentiment to come into this at all. I think I have had as much sentiment in my associations with public life as any other man that was ever in it. I was one of those who, from my earliest years, built upon sentiment, and who spoke about sentiment to other people, but I never allowed it to interfere with my business. When I was engaged doing public business as a member of the Dublin Corporation, I never allowed one sixpence of the Corporation money to go astray on account of sentiment. When I made terms with the banks at that time, or when I suggested or negotiated loans, I never allowed sentiment to operate from the fact that we had the money of the Englishman. The fact that we were at war with him would never prevent me from paying him his due or from giving him his last ounce or his last penny, even though at the time he was sending over people here to slaughter our people. We kept our word with him, and we paid him, and it is only by that means that we will manage to be in a position to raise the credit and to keep the credit of this country in a stable condition.

I drew attention a few moments ago to the fact that we had £10,000,000 of a National Loan. At a time of crisis it reduced in value. We are now going to put £30,000,000 on the market. When Deputy Wilson speaks of incumbrances and says that these things are going to go on the market, I say, that in my view, they are the things that are not going to go on the market. In my view, if anything goes on the market it will be the landlord's portion. Incumbrances are held by charities, mortgagees, banks, and institutions of that kind. Why should they sell? In my view, there is no reason in the world why they should sell. They can have their 4½ per cent. in respect of this bond issue, and if they were have to pay transfer fees, which cost something.

Landlords may do that because some of them, at any rate, take some interest in their lands. A great number of them may not have done that in the past, but it will be admitted, I think, that even landlords require some sort of employment, and the drawing of interest at the rate of 4½ per cent. in a case of this sort is not the very best means of employing one's life. They are not all elderly men, and it is only natural that there should be changes in their investments. It is their money that is going to come on the market if it is going to be put on the market at all. I said that this means £30,000,000. If we do not accept this guarantee, it means watering our national resources to the extent of a paper issue of £30,000,000 worth of bonds. Is that good business? Has any Deputy here who opposes this measure, consulted any banker, financier, or man in business and asked him: "Can we afford another £30,000,000 worth of paper of our own?"

Deputies need only go and examine the bank deposits. They stand to-day at something like £180,000,000 or £190,000,000 of money. I should say that about £90,000,000 of that sum is held in easily realisable securities, and the most easily realisable securities are British securities, and for a very good reason: that they have always honoured their bonds. They have honoured their American commitments, even though people in England criticised them for doing so, but they have done it, and they have kept their credit high by reason of that.

We have got that £90,000,000 worth of their securities, which, as far as the banks are concerned, could, I suppose, be cashed in forty days on the London money market. That would not in the slightest degree affect the money market. They could pay out all that is required. But if our banks had to shoulder this £30,000,000 worth of securities, what is going to happen? The young State is bound to stagger under such a financial burden. It is too much, and if anyone doubts that I would ask an answer to this question. Why is it, in the case of the National Loan for £10,000,000, held in many instances by our own people, that the mere sale of a quarter of a million of that stock reduced it by 5 or 6 points on the market, if there is any point in sentiment? I ask Deputies who talk about sentiment and put it in the balance against this proposal, to consider what position their sentiment would be in when we had taken up such a loan as that without any security from another country, and when we found ourselves unable to take up that amount of paper thrown on the market. The position would be that other nations looking on would simply laugh at us because we had taken on more than we could bear. "The baby State cannot bear it." After, perhaps, twenty or thirty years of experience in Government, the State will be able to bear it when we have men in the country who will have a sense of decency, men with a tradition for stability and good business behind them. But this burden would be too much to ask the country to bear at this moment, and I say that in a matter of this sort sentiment in this case is false pride.

I hope the President does not attribute my argument to sentiment.

Certainly not. I am dealing with the whole thing now. I am dealing, in the first place, with the fact that even if 70,000 farmers in the country should benefit only to the extent of £5 or £10 a year, that the price is too much in my view for this country to pay if it is to be obtained at the cost of the credit of the country. Every one of these small farmers, severe though it may be upon them to pay this price, had better realise that their duty as citizens and as business men calls upon them to honour any bond to which their representatives here in this Dáil put their name. Remember this Parliament went to the country after they had passed the Land Bill and got returned. Now the British Government, through negotiations, brought up this question of land purchase. I have made it a point not to bring any people into the discussion, because I do not mean to mix up politics in discussions such as this. It may be that people outside, some of them, will contradict the statement, but there is no doubt whatever that the representatives of what are called Southern Unionists were in close consultation with Mr. Griffith and Mr. Collins during the peace negotiations. In the beginning, I believe, they were in consultation with Mr. de Valera. The question of land purchase was the main subject occupying the attention of the Southern Unionists. There were, of course, representations on other matters. Every one of these items did not come out, but I am perfectly satisfied that when the Treaty discussions were under consideration in 1921 if the question of land purchase for the 70,000 tenants not then bought were to be ventilated as a matter that would be remedied within eighteen months of the acceptance of that Treaty, I say without any hesitation whatsoever that we would have got a great deal more support for the acceptance of the Treaty for that particular reason rather than be damaged by reason of such a bargain as that having been mentioned.

The British Government has undertaken to guarantee these bonds. Are they not entitled in guaranteeing them to say that any payments that we make should be of the same nature and quality and of the same cost and value as the payments they are going to make? Would it be an honest transaction for us to say to the British Government: "We will take your guarantee but we will pay in whatever currency may be in operation in Ireland when these bonds become due"? That would not be a business transaction. I would not take a guarantee from an English House to the effect that they would pay me interest in bonds in their currency if I was under the impression that that currency was likely to be reduced in value.

Their currency is always fluctuating.

It has been fluctuating for some years past in the right direction. To-day it is one-sixteenth; seven-sixteenth is all that they are on the wrong side at the present moment.

It is fluctuating?

I hope that any fluctuation that may take place in this State will not exceed seven-sixteenth in twenty shillings, and if it does, there ought to be no objection to our subscribing to that particular transaction. Why do we subscribe to it? Simply because we are being given value for value received. What value are we receiving in this case? The value we are receiving is the value of being relieved of 30 million pounds of paper being placed upon our banks and upon our financial system. Thirty million pounds is being kept off our financial market. Are we prepared to pay for it? I say it is our duty to pay for it. We could not, unless we were dishonest people, agree to accept a guarantee by the British Government for this sum of money, and not agree to pay to the British Government the value of the guarantee they are giving us. Now it is said we owe this money to the British Government. We do not. We do not owe the £130,000,000 to the British Government in connection with the Land Act of 1903, and we will not owe this thirty millions to the British Government. We do owe it to the bond holders, and it may be that of that £130,000,000 something like twenty or thirty millions is held by our own citizens and the British Government is simply a clearing house in the transaction.

It is twenty-two years since the Land Act of 1903 was passed. At that time, although I was very young, I appreciated the gigantic minds behind such a big proposition as that was. Other Deputies in this Dáil, if they throw their minds back to that period, must agree that they must have been very favourably impressed with the magnitude of the operations under the Act of 1903. It was a great Act, a wonderful Act, but our own Act of last year was even better, and for a young State to have been able to undertake such a transaction and to perform such a transaction as that was certainly to its credit, and very much to its credit. Thirty or forty years ago, if men were told that they would have their lands bought out to-day and at such a reduction, as compared with the rents they were then paying, they would have said it was impossible. They would be prepared to pay if they got that offer, and would have said it was a great opportunity, and would not look for any fluctuations in the market price or for any diminution of their annual liability in respect of that if they were able to get it. That is all we are asking in this Bill, and that is all the British Government are asking from us. If the British Government did not ask for that guarantee, one would have to examine the offer and to see what ulterior motive there was behind it. If we had not given any guarantee in that commercial transaction, we would have to look for some ulterior motive on the part of the British Government, just as if Deputy Wilson came down to a bank and guaranteed me for a thousand pounds without asking me to show him whether I had a thousand pounds worth of security in my possession to guarantee him, I think we would come to the conclusion that he was a man who was gambling away his money. In this matter the landlords would not have been agreeable to the purchase price if they did not get this undertaking. By getting this undertaking they are only placed in the same position as their friends who sold under the 1903 and the 1909 Acts. Even with this guarantee they are not getting 20/- in the £ on their investments or purchase.

Would the President say what he means by saying that these landlords would not be agreeable to purchase at the price named?

The landlords got from the British Government an undertaking beforehand that they would guarantee the bonds.

Did they know the price of the bonds?

No. The price had not been discussed. The purchase was not discussed; no item had been discussed except one, and that was that whatever security was passed would be guaranteed by the British Government, and that they, the landlords, would get the benefit of that guarantee.

That is not what the President said earlier. He spoke of the landlords not being agreeable to accept the price under the Land Act until they knew what was coming.

I said in the beginning that this land was compulsorily taken. Deputy Wilson told me it was not, and that it was taken by agreement, that is, agreement as regards price. I said before there was no agreement as regards price, but the landlords had got an undertaking from the British Government that they would guarantee the issue of the bonds.

But I suggested on the last occasion that the Senate had by agreement drawn off opposition because they knew this was coming, but the Minister for Agriculture denied it.

The Seanad did not hear officially it was coming on, but I believe it was understood, and every landlord understood it, or at least those in touch with the British Government understood that this particular issue would be guaranteed if there was no objection on our part to its being guaranteed.

I was on the committee of the Landowners' Convention at the time. I think, in 1921, and I think in 1920 the British Government had given an undertaking that they would guarantee any stock issued.

I think it was one of the matters that came up for settlement at the Convention.

You are not asking them?

No, we never ask them.

May I ask the President did the British Government guarantee a contribution to the price of land, that is, to the price to be paid for it?

I can answer that. The British Government were asked to do two things. They were asked to guarantee the stock, and they were also asked to provide a bonus similar to the bonus under the Act of 1903. They refused to provide the bonus, but they said they were prepared to guarantee any stock issued.

During the passing of the Act of 1923 was this House ever informed of the guarantee of the British Government?

The guarantee was not in existence at that time. If any member of the House had asked me if any such proposal were made, or if any discussion had taken place, as to whether there was a disposition, as far as I knew, on the part of the British Government to guarantee the issue, my answer would have been in the affirmative.

It might have been in the affirmative, but during the passage or introduction of the Bill we were never made aware of this guarantee of the British Government nor at any stage of the Bill. Whether it matters or not I cannot say, but that is what happened. None of the Deputies was informed of the intention of the British Government to guarantee this land stock.

There was no necessity. These negotiations, discussions, arrangements and agreements were all come to outside of us. We were not parties to them. We were presented with them, and we were told that this was the state of affairs: (1) that this landlords wanted this guarantee, and (2) that the British Government was prepared to give that guarantee. We thought that was a very sensible proposition, and we stand over it. We recommend it to the Dáil in that spirit, and we believe it is due to these people who in past years could not get the British Government to redeem its promise. I think as far back as the Convention some sort of resolution was passed that in addition to any settlement of the National question a settlement of this particular question should be contemporaneous with it.

I just want to add a few words to what the President said in reply to Deputy Wilson. I do not think that any Deputy here will doubt that the National credit is a most important thing. If we are to have any developments in this country, various great works of construction must be undertaken by the State from time to time. Unless the State's credit is good, none of these works can be undertaken on a fair basis. Moreover, if the State's credit is bad, the credit of individual firms and of individual enterprises in the State will also be bad. The whole future of the country will be prejudiced by bad national credit. My submission is that the State cannot maintain its credit and do the sort of dirty trick that some cheap dealer or money-lender would do. We issued bonds compulsorily. We took property from people compulsorily. We gave them bonds of the face value of £100——

I question the use of the word "compulsorily."

Would the Deputy allow me to proceed? We took land by Act of the Oireachtas compulsorily from people. We issued them bonds of a certain face value. It is our duty as a State to take all reasonable steps, at all times, to see that these bonds are kept as nearly at their face value as possible. To do anything else, either to take any injurious positive action or to neglect to take any reasonable action that would keep them at par value, would be in the nature of sharp practice—the sort of thing that no State can afford to do. Some shady individual may do that sort of thing in connection with his own business. The State must try to secure, when it issues bonds at a certain face value, that everything reasonable will be done to keep them at that.

It would be very easy for the Government to organise a scare that would run the National Loan down to 30 or 40, and to redeem at that. But nobody will advocate that that is a thing we ought do. If the National Loan went down to 50, it would not be the duty of the Government to try to keep it there, and redeem cheaply, but to try to raise it up as near par as possible. It seems to me that Deputy Wilson, in all his remarks, has only the most short-sighted idea of the interests of any class—the farming class or any other class—or of the interests of the State as a whole. He is not looking really beyond his own nose, and if he were allowed he would, so to speak, walk into the ditch. But the Dáil will not, of course, agree with him. We are not altering the terms of the bonds, so far as redemption is concerned. The 1923 Act provides that the bonds shall be redeemed at par. We are not altering that. That is a matter that has been settled. It would not be of advantage to the credit of the State that we should go back on that. Having had a shake in the National Loan, is it suggested that we should go back on the position which provided that bonds should be redeemed at par, or that we should do nothing that would help to get the bonds in the direction of par? I have no hesitation in saying that if we had not had in mind the possibility of this guarantee, we would not have put forward the terms of the Land Act as we did. We would not have regarded them as fair or reasonable terms. I am not really concerned with that now; it is past history. I am not really concerned, in introducing this Bill, with the question of the landlords at all. I am thinking really of the State and the State's credit. There is no doubt at all but the bonds will be put on the market, whether by the landlords or by people who are paid off. All sorts of people will have these bonds, and they will want cash, and the bonds will go on the market. If we had not the British guarantee, they would be most likely in the neighbourhood of 80. They would drag down any other public issues we had. There is no doubt if the Land Bonds were at 80 the National Loan, although we are paying a high rate of interest, would go down very considerably. At present it is at 93 or 94. If we had Land Bonds to-morrow in the market—even a small quantity of Land Bonds at 80— there is no doubt that the National Loan would go down four, five, or, perhaps, six or seven points. When we come to borrow for the Shannon scheme, instead of paying 5¼ per cent. interest, we would have to pay 5¾ per cent. or six per cent. interest. That would be the inevitable result of not taking the British guarantee in this particular case. It would mean that the whole development of the country would be prejudiced, and for what? It seems to me to be for a claim that there is really no reason for. We are not prejudicing our freedom in any respect, I submit. The British Government is willing to offer this guarantee for reasons of its own. We have not had to go and seek it. Everything that I have been able to find in the documents has been in the nature of a pledge being already in existence by the British Government to do this. They have offered to do it. They will, of course, only do it on terms. We have to enter into certain reasonable counter obligations when they give that guarantee. These are in the Bill. We have not had to make any secret pledges. We give nothing away except what is in the Bill.

Deputy Johnson referred to the question of this disclosure and the Treaty. I think the President has dealt with that already. There is nothing that I have been able to discover in the documents left after the Treaty in the nature of a definite bargain or agreement with the British Government. I think there were certainly verbal agreements, and perhaps written agreements, with all sorts of people. But when the Government heard of an actual written promise by the British Government to guarantee the issue of Land Bonds, it was long after the date of the Treaty—perhaps fifteen months. As the President states, the proposal came from the British Government side and not from our side. Deputy Johnson talked a good deal about people not being willing to accept the same risks as other people to whom the Irish State undertakes obligations. But, as a matter of fact, the cases are different. We issue our National Loan at a higher rate of interest. We issue a moderate sum. We do not hand it out to anybody compulsorily. People take it because they want to subscribe. There is not going to be the same danger of flooding the market. There is no risk of our credit being, as it were, waterlogged by the amount of the National Loan.

I now come to the question of currency. Take the case of the National Loan. It was not stated in the prospectus that it would be repaid in sterling, but there is no doubt that the State must repay it in sterling, and must, if it has a different currency, be willing to pay the interest in sterling. We borrowed in sterling and it will be necessary for us, morally speaking, to give sterling unless we have currency that is absolutely tied to sterling. If there was no difference on the exchange you might, for convenience, give in your currency. But if people objected or if there was any difference, you would be bound to give sterling. This arrangement will not hinder us, at any time we think fit, having our own currency. I, for one, hold that when a suitable time has elapsed and when we have stabilised conditions in the country, a national currency must be established. I think there are sound reasons for that and that it must come, but this will not prejudice us any more than if we borrowed in the American market. It simply means that we will have to arrange to get sterling to meet certain liabilities, but that has really nothing to do with the question of currency. Practically all Governments have foreign loans, and they pay the sinking fund and interest on these foreign loans in currency other than their own currency.

I do not think there is really anything in the point raised by Deputy Johnson as to the procedure for deciding if there is default. If we do not pay our interest on the date due, there will be default undoubtedly. I do not contemplate that that will arise or that any action will ever have to be taken under the provisions of this Bill to provide for repayment to the British or of any payment by the British. I think there is not any danger whatever of that, but the fact is that the ordinary investor will not feel that way about it. The ordinary investor will feel that he has very substantial added security if there is a British guarantee, and he will be willing to pay up for these bonds in a way that he would not if relying on the security of the Free State alone. The question seems distinctly to be one of getting just now an advantage for this State, of relieving ourselves of a burden that at the present stage would be very heavy indeed, of relieving ourselves of a burden that would handicap the constructive activities of the State in future and place us under disadvantages. We got that opportunity simply because—wholly because, I suppose—the British Government wanted to give help to the landlords. But we would be foolish to refuse advantages, we would be foolish to do damage to the State and to the national credit or impose a strain upon the national credit simply to spite the landlords. I think there is a good deal of that spirit behind all that Deputy Wilson has said. That seems to me to be the essence of foolishness. It was all right to have our fights and wars in the past, but to keep up old feuds against our own interests seems to me to be a very unwise proceeding.

One cannot but feel that this is evidence of quite genuine, definite renunciation—a renunciation of all the doctrines that were ever taught pre-Treaty by the occupants of the Ministerial benches. The case that the Ministers—and particularly the President—has made is the case that Mr. John Dillon made and that the members of the Irish Parliamentary Party made against Sinn Féin. It may be a good one. But it is the President's case. It is a definite renunciation of the doctrine of self-reliance. Anything that has been argued by the President or the Minister for Finance could equally well be argued by them if the Ministry would go to American financiers or to the American Government and say, "Take our bonds."

No, sir.

Exactly the same position. National credit would be stronger, future loans would be more secure, if prior loans had the backing of a stronger Government. That is the position.

No, sir.

That may be good business. I am not denying that, but it is a definite renunciation of the desire to be self-reliant in the matter of finance. You can get money cheaper, I have no doubt, and you will continue to get money cheaper, if you give way a little more and a little more, and reunite with the British political system more closely than even is contemplated. The closer you are, the stronger and better will be your business arrangements. Deputy Hewat will subscribe to that. Now, if you are going to look at it from that point of view, your policy is a policy of reunion and you will get a great deal of support in the country—more than you would have got three years ago.

And from a quarter from which we would not have got it then either.

I hope that there will be a better spirit and a revival of the doctrine and policy of self-reliance which the Ministers so long and so successfully preached. This question of dishonesty for which Deputy Wilson has been attacked——

Not Deputy Wilson. I said he was an honest man.

I am not suggesting that the President made any attack upon the Deputy's personal integrity, but he suggested that his doctrine was dishonest. Now, I want to know what is the position of the landlords and holders of these bonds if Deputy Wilson's proposal is dishonest? Under the Act, which the Legislature has passed, a certain promise was made. A certain bond was undertaken by this State. That was that £100 bond would be issued and that 4½ per cent. per annum would be paid. That is, that £4 10s. would be paid to the holder of that bond year in and year out, until it was redeemed. That is the bond that we entered into. That is the bond which the landlords have been obliged to accept. The compulsion side of it is not essential to this argument at all. Presumably, in fixing your price, the element of compulsion was taken into account. This extra guarantee was not taken into account in fixing the price. It was not discussed in the Dáil or Seanad. It was not part of the arrangement. A £100 bond was to be issued under the promise of the State, carrying 4½ per cent. per annum. That is the arrangement we entered into. If the holder of that bond desired to sell or dispose of it to somebody else, he would make his own bargain with the purchaser. There was a possibility of the bond depreciating. There was a possibility of its appreciating. It is to be presumed that there is a greater possibility of its appreciating if it has a British Government guarantee. Who is dishonest? The landlord is going to be better off by virtue of the British Government guarantee. The price of this stock in the market as a security is going up because of this guarantee. Who is dishonest? It is just as dishonest on his part as on the part of the State, if there was no such guarantee. The case is exactly the same. I cannot understand where the dishonesty comes in; if it comes in at all, it is as dishonest on the side of the landlord as it is on the side of the State. The landlords sold rentals. They sold an annual income; they are guaranteed an annual income; they are guaranteed that annual income by the Irish State. I maintain that we are losing our hold upon our own financial position; we are giving away something, by accepting a formal undertaking on this side from the British Government to guarantee those bonds.

If we do it with this, I cannot conceive of any argument which would resist a claim that we should seek British guarantees for the next issue of National Loan. It will still be a good business transaction if they are willing to give guarantees. That would still be a good business transaction. It could be argued that we should take the fullest possible advantage—the fullest pecuniary advantage—out of the association with the British Empire. That is arguable, and a very strong argument it is from the business point of view. Is that the position that the Minister wants us to accept now? The President has given a very frank avowal of his position in respect to the present loan, and the value to the State that this acceptance will have on succeeding issues. Does the President take the view that because we are in association with Great Britain under the Treaty and the Constitution, we should take the fullest possible advantage that that association will give, and bind ourselves closer for the sake of the financial benefit? Will he follow up that position and advocate it through the country?

If I am to answer that question, I may as well do so now. I do intend, and I have always intended, to take the fullest possible advantage of any position that we have got by the Treaty, whether it was credit, financial or otherwise. I do say that this particular transaction is not on a par with the potential case that has been mentioned by Deputy Johnson. This is something that the British Government left undone, and for which they accepted, for a period of years, a certain liability which is undischarged until they have given this particular guarantee. That is in respect of an order in the community for whom they accepted a certain responsibility. It so happens, as I have already explained, that the discharge of their obligations under that heading suits our convenience now admirably. But I do not, for a moment, stand for a policy which would involve this State seeking the guarantee of the British Government in connection with any loan for the development of the State. If the State is unable of itself to finance such schemes of development as the Parliament of the nation may suggest, I say it is not worthy to be a State. I would not ask, and I would not propose that any Government should ask, for a British Government guarantee in respect of these loans for development. This particular transaction, however, is outside, independent of, and quite apart from that altogether. I am still just as convinced that we should be self-reliant and self-supporting. A horse may carry a good load, but it cannot carry two loads at the one time without doing itself some damage.

The Minister has made it quite clear that this is an engagement the British Government entered into with the landlords. We cannot interfere. Let them carry out their obligations. But the British Government say: "We are not prepared to fulfil our obligations to the landlords unless you—the Free State Government—do certain things." Notwithstanding the President's argument, I submit that we are not bound in honour, for security sake, or in any other way, to pass this Bill. I say, further, that the landlords would be just as secure whether we pass this Bill or not, because the British Government, having entered into their agreement with the landlords, did so, not subject to the Free State passing this Bill, but simply because they had made the promise. If we do this, we are entering voluntarily into a new obligation with the British Government. It is an obligation for the benefit of the landlords which was not disclosed to the Dáil or the Seanad when we were discussing the Land Act.

I am, to a certain extent, an interested party in this question, but I am not speaking from an interested point of view. I want to suggest to the Dáil the implications of Deputy Johnson's argument. The British Government created the land question in this country. The British Government accepted responsibility for the settlement of that question. Deputy Johnson wishes one of two things: either to release the British Government from the obligation they have undertaken, or else to allow the British Government to carry out the termination of land purchase in this country. If you follow Deputy Johnson's argument to its logical extremes it means that the British Government, to fulfil its pledges, should not have any negotiations with our Government, but should carry out land purchase itself and have tenants all over the country paying annuities to the British Government.

What would we be doing?

What would we be doing? We should, presumably, if the British Government had a legal claim which could be enforced in a court of law, be executing it by the forces of the law, otherwise you would have anarchy. This measure will do two things. It will, to begin with, render somewhat more stable the security under which Irishmen of a class with whom Deputy Johnson has no sympathy, but still Irishmen, citizens of the State, are being paid and, in the second place, it will strengthen the credit of the State. I suggest that the Dáil would be ill-advised to listen to Deputy Johnson's argument. It is not an argument based on reality. It is not an argument such as Deputy Johnson generally uses. If that were his normal standard of argument, he should not be here but chasing rainbows in Suffolk Street. We must look at this thing from a materialistic standpoint because it is a matter of cash and land, hard and real things. Nobody in Ireland will gain by the rejection of this Motion. A considerable number of Irishmen will be losers and the State will be a loser.

Question put.
The Committee divided: Tá, 35; Níl, 13.

  • Earnán de Blaghd.
  • Thomas Bolger.
  • Séamus Breathnach.
  • Seoirse de Bhulbh.
  • John J. Cole.
  • John Conlan.
  • Bryan R. Cooper.
  • Máighréad Ní Choileáin Bean
  • Uí Dhrisceóil.
  • Patrick J. Egan.
  • John Hennigan.
  • William Hewat.
  • Liam Mac Cosgair.
  • Séamus Mac Cosgair.
  • Maolmhuire Mac Eochadha.
  • Pádraig Mac Fadáin.
  • Patrick McGilligan.
  • Seoirse Mac Niocaill.
  • Liam Mag Aonghusa.
  • Pádraig Mag Ualghairg.
  • Martin M. Nally.
  • Mícheál O hAonghusa.
  • Parthalán O Conchubhair.
  • Máirtín O Conalláin.
  • Séamus O Dóláin.
  • Peadar O Dubhghaill.
  • Eamon O Dúgáin.
  • Donnchadh O Guaire.
  • Aindriú O Láimhín.
  • Séamus O Leadáin.
  • Fionán O Loingsigh.
  • Risteárd O Maolchatha.
  • Pádraig O hOgáin (Luimneach).
  • Máirtín O Rodaigh.
  • Seán O Súilleabháin.
  • Liam Thrift.

Níl

  • Seán Buitléir.
  • Connor Hogan.
  • Tomás Mac Eoin.
  • Risteárd Mac Fheorais.
  • Risteárd Mac Liam.
  • Tomás de Nógla.
  • Tomás O Conaill.
  • Mícheál O Dubhghaill.
  • Seán O Duinnín.
  • Domhnall O Mocháin.
  • Domhnall O Muirgheasa.
  • Tadhg O Murchadha.
  • Pádraig O hOgáin (An Clár).
Tellers: Tá, Eamon O Dúgáin, Séamus O Dóláin. Níl, Tomás Mac Eoin, Risteárd Mac Liam.
Motion declared carried.
Resolution ordered to be reported.
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