I am just coming to that. Debentures were of course issued by the Company, but the National Bank did not place any great reliance, naturally, on the debentures, and they received from the Minister for Economic Affairs, in the Provisional Government, a letter, I think dated 30th January, 1923, in which he stated:—
"Every member of the Provisional Government is prepared to recommend to the Government of the Free State, when elected, the taking up of a loan to the sum mentioned if your Bank will give to the Company the temporary accommodation it requires. You will understand that we are not in a position absolutely to pledge the credit of a succeeding Government, but as individuals we guarantee that and we will endeavour to secure that the loan be taken up."
On 2nd February, the Manager of the Bank informed the Minister that the loan of £25,000 had been sanctioned on the terms set forth by him. That letter stated that reliance was not placed on the debentures issued by the Company in the way of collateral security, but that the directors felt assured that the undertaking given on behalf of the members of the Provisional Government would be carried out. Perhaps it might have been better if the Company had not been assisted. Personally I happen to know a little about the Company and I never had any faith in its possibilities, but the circumstances of the time were certainly such as to make everything that would tend to continue employment and to keep people contented of the utmost importance. There were great hopes at that time that the civil war which afterwards broke out would have been avoided or averted, and anything like the closing up of the colliery at the particular time would certainly have an effect on public opinion that would not have made it easier to do what was being attempted, to avert the very disastrous civil conflict that followed. The loan of £25,000 was made by the National Bank to the Company. It did not suffice to do what it had been represented it might do. It did not enable the Company to get over any difficulties. It did not enable it to pay its way. By June, 1924, the advance was exhausted and the Company was no nearer to working at a profit. This, however, is attributed to various troubles that were represented as troubles that might not recur—labour troubles at the works, and so forth.
The circumstances connected with the working of the mines were then considered by the Government. We were just at the end of the civil war, and I think that I might say now that no guarantee or promise of further assistance ought to have been given by the Government without coming to the Dáil. However, we were just emerging out of the initial difficulties; the ordinary procedure of government had not been brought to the point of working smoothly, and a step was taken which, as I say, I do not think could be at all justified at the present time and which, I believe, was barely justifiable then. It was decided to assist the company by way of a further advance up to £50,000. The National Bank was willing, on the same terms as before—that the Government agreed to take all the steps they could to see that the bank was recouped in the case of the failure of the company—to advance a further £25,000. However, after consideration the Government decided to request the National Land Bank to pay to the National Bank the £25,000 which had first been advanced, and to advance another £50,000 to the company. The transaction was not one that the directors of the Land Bank would ordinarily have carried out; it was not a banking transaction, and they were only willing to do it on the same conditions as applied to the National Bank.
The company, to my mind, were really working an impossible proposition. I think the conditions underground were not such that, even with the best of management and with sufficient capital behind them, the company could have made a success of the undertaking. I believe that very considerable sums of private money have been lost in this mine, and I think that while there might have been circumstances which caused the company to get through the money that was advanced more quickly than otherwise would have been the case, the end was scarcely in doubt—that ultimately whatever money was available was bound to be exhausted and that the mine would have to be closed.
In June, 1924, the company asked for a further advance when the second £25,000 was exhausted. They were refused this, but the bank agreed to let them draw certain small sums not exceeding £600 in order to keep them going pending certain negotiations. With a view to seeing what could be done, conferences were held between representatives of the bank, the Department of Industry and Commerce and the Department of Finance, to discuss the position of the colliery, and Mr. Parkinson, who had been the owner of the mine, was anxious that an expert should be appointed to examine and report on it. Mr. Parkinson himself offered to pay a certain sum for the expenses of such an expert. In August the bank came to the decision that it was bound to appoint a receiver, and on 6th December, Mr. Smith Gordon, Secretary of the Land Bank, was appointed receiver. Following the previous conferences with regard to the appointment of an independent expert, Mr. Foster Brown was appointed to examine and report on the collieries. He presented a detailed report and his advice was that the collieries should be closed down at the earliest possible moment, after taking out whatever machinery could be recovered. There were then deputations to myself from the workers and people in the district to protest against the closing down of the mine, and statements were put forward by the workers that if there was better management and other conditions were fulfilled the mine could still be made to pay. As a certain number of men—I think, a couple of hundred— would have been thrown out of work if the mine were closed down I agreed to make a certain sum available out of the Distress Grant for the purpose of keeping the pumps working until something could be done.
Meantime, attempts were made to interest people outside the country, because the expert had also reported that if a certain considerable sum—I think, £40,000 or £50,000 more—were spent it might be possible for a year or two to run the mine, make it pay, and perhaps recover the original sum, but, of course, the Government felt that to do that would be throwing good money after bad. But in view of the opening the experts' report did give, attempts were made to interest people in the collieries and to induce them to invest money in it if they could be convinced that they could recover such money and make some reasonable profit on it. But these attempts failed. I consented to having the pumping operations continued until 31st January, 1925, and then it was reported that the miners themselves were working the colliery successfully and paying themselves out of the sale of coal. We agreed then to continue further the pumping operations to 31st March, 1925, the expenditure in February not to exceed £400 and in March not to exceed £200.
However, the attempt to work the colliery in any way was a failure, and the mine is now abandoned. I have said that I happen to have heard something about this mine long ago and I was personally somewhat sceptical of coal mining projects in this country. That was a view a great many people did not share. There was a very widespread belief that there were many seams of coal in this country that could be successfully worked, and that it was really due to outside interference, either secret or open, that coal projects had not been very successful. That belief was widespread in the country. There was the peculiar situation that existed when the Provisional Government was formed, and part of the situation was that belief. The Provisional Government came to the conclusion that it was in the public interests that they should take this unusual step. It is a step that was justified, I think, in the time and circumstances; I think it would not be justified now. I believe, moreover, one cannot look on the whole of the money spent on this mine as having been wasted because the closing down of the mine, the further embittering of feeling in that district by having the mine closed down, and the coming into operation of the Provisional Government, and having all those men thrown out of work, might easily have led to destructive activity on the part of men who were engaged in taking coal out of an uneconomic mine. That might have caused the State as much as the money that is now being asked for. The sum asked for represents capital and interest.
