I move the Second Reading of the Tariff Commission Bill. This Bill may perhaps meet with opposition from two different angles: from doctrinaire free traders and from whole-hog protectionists. It is introduced to meet a need of which the Executive Council has been conscious for some considerable time. It may be quite frankly stated that with the passage of this Bill—if the Dáil and Seanad agree to it—we shall have said good-bye to doctrinaire free trade. The passage of this Bill will mean that we recognise that economic conditions over the country may be improved by the use of tariffs. It means, moreover, that we are prepared, in suitable instances, where a case has been made out, to use additional tariffs for the purpose of promoting employment, industry and general economic advancement in the Saorstát. The Bill also means that we feel that for the future applications or proposals for the imposition of tariffs should be examined more minutely and in a more formal and deliberate way than has been the case in the past. We feel that for the future we cannot impose tariffs without the fullest investigation and without the use of all the powers given in the Bill, particularly in Section 5, for getting at the facts.
When tariffs were first introduced, when the country had not been able to think about them, when not only individual tariffs but the whole policy was new and, in every sense of the word, experimental, it was permissible for the Executive Council, by such private inquiries as it could conduct, to come to a conclusion as to whether a particular tariff should be imposed in regard to a particular industry and make proposals to the Dáil. It has, however, been clear to all the Ministers who have been dealing with the matter for some time that with the machinery, or lack of machinery, that existed in the past it was not possible to arrive at the facts with the certainty and fullness that was necessary.
If you have only the people who will benefit directly by tariffs, and who are interested in the imposition of tariffs, coming before you, you cannot get all the facts. The people who speak to you may be entirely honest, may not wish to deceive you, at any rate, very much, but they would be more than human if they did not put the best face on their own case. They cannot be expected to call to mind any rather obscure facts or any reactions that are not obvious reactions.
Consequently, it has not been possible for us, in the past, to get as complete a picture of the whole situation as would be desirable before a tariff, with all that it means, is imposed. It has to be remembered that once a tariff is imposed, it is difficult to take it off. I am not speaking now of the political difficulty, although there is always a political difficulty in taking off a tariff But there is a difficulty that rests on equity. If a tariff is imposed and people invest money and take risks on the strength of that tariff, even though the results may not be entirely satisfactory, even though the cost to the public may be greater than was anticipated, it is difficult, without doing injustice, to remove that tariff.
Then, there is also the fact that tariffs have effects other than the direct effects which are so visible. Everybody can see the two or three hundred, or the two or three thousand, additional workers who may be employed, but it is not possible, sometimes, to see the other results — perhaps adverse results — which the burden of the tariff may have produced. For these reasons, we feel that machinery such as is proposed here should be set up before any further steps are taken in the matter of tariffs. As the Bill is drawn, proposals will only be considered when interested persons make application. They will only be considered when a substantial proportion of the people who are engaged in the industry, or when people who are proposing to engage in the industry, apply. There might be cases which could not come up for consideration under the provisions of this Bill, in which tariffs ought to be imposed. For instance, if we had not already dealt with the manufacture of beet sugar, the proposal to give subsidies or impose tariffs — and we do both — in respect of beet sugar, could not have been brought before this Commission, because there was nobody engaged in the manufacture of beet sugar and there was nobody proposing to engage in it. There were certain people advocating the manufacture of beet sugar, but they were not people engaged in the industry or who could give sound evidence, based on actual knowledge. We investigated the sugar beet scheme by means of an ad hoc committee. If anything like the sugar beet proposal loomed on the horizon again, we still think that it could properly be investigated not by a body constituted as the Tariff Commission is proposed to be constituted and operating on the lines which it is proposed the Tariff Commission shall operate on, but by some ad hoc body.
When dealing with proposals of that sort, policy is the principal thing. Schemes like the Sugar Beet Scheme are entirely experimental, however much we expect of them and however rosy our hopes in regard to them. You can only see what the industry means to other countries and you can only decide, as a matter of general policy, to try it here. Having decided that, you approach people who can undertake to initiate the industry, ask them for their terms, and then decide whether you are prepared to go on on those terms. Some investigations might possibly have to be carried out in regard to a particular manufacture like sugar beet. If that became necessary, it would not be proposed that the matter should be brought before this tribunal, but rather that we should carry out investigation by means of a suitable ad hoc Committee. The Bill proposes to deal with cases in which there are materials for detailed examination — where you can expect to get at economic facts and to come to a decision, knowing with a considerable degree of certainly what the results of your action will be. It is for that reason that we do not propose to have the Government itself refer proposals to the Tariff Commission and that we do not propose that bodies interested in protection or in industrial development or in any sort of propagandist organisation should be able to bring proposals before the Committee. There could be particular as well as general objections to allowing these parties to come along, because you might have bodies coming along and putting up a faked case, which would be undesirable. That is a particular objection. The general objection lies in this — that we want to deal with the people who have definite knowledge, who can make a concrete case, who can give the pledges of promises, if any, required, which pledges or promises can afterwards be implemented by legislation, if necessary.
It is not the idea that this Commission shall deal with general principles. It is not the idea that this Commission shall decide policy. It will not be necessary for the Commission definitely to recommend for or against a tariff in any particular case. Our view is that matters such as the imposition of tariffs particularly in a new and small country like this, are matters that should be the responsibility of the Executive Council and of the Dáil. What we do propose to get from this Commission is a thorough investigation of the facts — as complete an investigation as is possible. And we expect, under the nine heads set out in the Schedule, to get the material whereby the Executive and the Dáil can judge whether a case has been made for a tariff in a particular instance, what the results of such a tariff might be, and what its duration would probably have to be. With all those facts before them, they can come to a decision with a degree of enlightenment and with a degree of certainly that would not be possible if you simply had provided departmental investigation, which might not, even with the greatest care possible, result in the matter being viewed from all the angles from which it ought to be viewed.
The first section of the Bill enables the Minister for Finance to set up a Tariff Commission. The present intention of the Government is that the Commission shall consist of civil servants. We do not bind ourselves to civil servants. If it is found desirable and possible to appoint other than civil servants, we are free to do that. But after a great deal of consideration, the Executive Council are certainly of opinion that we will get better work done and get a more impartial examination of the facts by civil servants than we could get by a body whose personnel consisted of outsiders. There are very few men in business or in industry who are not prejudiced in this matter. It would be comparatively easy, if we wanted to pack a jury in any case, to pack a jury with outsiders. It might also be possible to pack it with civil servants, but it would be less easy, because the civil servant is a man who must serve every Government that comes, in turn, whatever his point of view is, and he is a man who is accustomed to looking at public affairs with a certain degree of detachment and impartiality. In any case, our object is to get people who will go into the facts, whom we know to be thorough, who will give us a good and not merely a superficial examination of affairs and who will report reliably and honestly on all the matters that come before them. It is proposed that every serious application for a tariff that comes to the Government should be referred to the Commission. It may be that, for the purpose of saving the time of the Commission, anything which appears to be ludicrous or trivial may not be referred to the Commission. In general, however, the idea is that all proposals for tariffs should be referred to the Commission for consideration and report. It is intended that the Commission shall hear all parties who have evidence to give — that it shall get at the facts.
We give power to the Commission to make regulations governing its procedure. Deputies will notice that the Commission is given power to decide upon the admission or exclusion of the public from the sittings of the Commission. So far as possible, it is intended that the sittings shall be in public — that the broad case for a tariff shall be made in public, and that all possible information that can be given to the public shall be made available for them. But, in order to get down to the facts in regard to a particular industry, it will be necessary to have evidence about the business and the conditions of individual firms. Individual firms would not give confidential evidence — would not give information that disclosed the difficulties of their position or their secrets of business — if the information was to go to the public. Certain parts of the evidence must be confidential, and here again we see the advantage of having civil servants. Business firms, acting honestly, are quite willing to disclose all their affairs to the Inspector of Taxes.
They do not mind us knowing that they are on the verge of bankruptcy. They try to prove it, in fact, but in any case you have the state of affairs that firms know that information given to civil servants of a certain standing will be treated as confidential and will not be divulged to their disadvantage. We believe that firms will much more readily give frank evidence of their private affairs to a body constituted of civil servants than to a body constituted, say, of rival or even of friendly business men. The Commission will have to be trusted to state in general terms the effect of the confidential evidence. Apart from that, the work of the Commission can be judged by the public, because the evidence, other than the confidential evidence, will be issued in White Papers and will be available, and anybody who dislikes or the questions in the Schedule will be able to read the evidence for himself, and see whether there is support for the conclusions of the Tariff Commission.
We propose to charge a certain fee to prevent the wastage of time on trivial applications or on applications which might be initiated but not pursued. We give the Tariff Commission the powers of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of answering of questions that were given to the Food Tribunal. This power will be of great advantage, and it is a completely necessary power. So far, if manufacturers or others wanting a tariff came to a Minister to urge their case, the Minister could ask them questions, but he had no power of enforcing answers to any questions that they did not like to answer; he had no way of summoning other people in the same business, or other members of the same firm, questioning them, and checking the evidence of the applicant with the evidence of the others. In the same way he had no means of fully examining the evidence of those who were opposed to a tariff. Just as all taxation is supposed to bring ruin to the industry to which it applies, so all tariffs are supposed to ruin certain people, and when any tariff was suggested we always had people stating that they were going to be ruined in the interests of somebody else, and we had no means of checking the accuracy of such statements. We could not ask them to produce books or details of their business. We simply had to take their word, checking it as well as we could by a series of questions. But the check that was possible was a very unsatisfactory one and often left us in considerable doubt as to what the real facts of the situation were. Deputies have read the Schedule to the Bill and I am sure they will agree that if all the aspects of a proposal mentioned in the Schedule are fairly fully dealt with information will be available, not only for the Executive Council but for Deputies, which will enable them to vote very intelligently on any proposal which comes before them, if as a result of the answers proposals should come before them, or to ask why a proposal is not being brought before them if they think the evidence and the answers would justify a tariff.
I will conclude by saying that the object aimed at in the Bill is to get a business examination of a particular proposal and not to get an argument on some general principle dealing with protection or free trade. We want the Commission to get down to hard facts and to keep to concrete things in the consideration of proposals that may be put before it. So far as the question of policy may be involved, policy can be decided by the Executive and the Dáil when it has the facts before it. Other kinds of committees or commissions could be set up to do different kinds of work from which a different outlook would be expected. But here we want done the kind of work that civil servants have privately done in conjunction with Ministers in the Departments in connection with previous applications for tariffs. But we want the thing done publicly, so far as it may be done publicly; we want it done formally; we want it done with the use of powers to enforce the attendance of witnesses, powers to get full details, both in the case of those who apply for a tariff and those who are against it, so that we may deal with any proposal for a tariff that may come before the Dáil having an amount of information put before us in a regular form such as we had not in the past and could not possibly have had without the machinery which it is proposed to set up by this Bill.