Dáil Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 2 Mar 1927

Vol. 18 No. 12

PUBLIC BUSINESS. - THE SEANAD AND MEMBERSHIP OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL.

Message from the Seanad.

"That in the opinion of the Seanad it is expedient that a Joint Committee of both Houses, consisting of seven members of the Seanad and seven members of the Dáil, be appointed to consider and report upon the advisability of amending the Articles of the Constitution which prevent members of the Seanad being appointed members of the Executive Council."

MINISTER for JUSTICE (Mr. O'Higgins)

I move the motion standing in the name of the President:

Ná fuil sé oiriúnach Có-Choiste den dá Thigh do cheapa chun breithniú agus tuairisciú do dhéanamh i dtaobh ar mhaith an rud é na hAirtiogail den Bhunreacht do leasú a choisceann baill den tSeanad a cheapa mar bhaill den Ard-Chomhairle.

That it is not expedient that a Joint Committee of both Houses should be appointed to consider and report upon the advisability of amending the Articles of the Constitution which prevent members of the Seanad being appointed members of the Executive Council.

The President has asked me to put briefly to the Dáil the considerations which prompted the Executive Council to take the view that the Dáil ought not to take part in a Committee with the terms of reference set out in the resolution sent down from the Seanad. The objection to that course is in a sense two-fold. The first objection deals not so much with the merits of the proposal as with the setting and attendant circumstances in which the proposal comes before us. Deputies will remember that some time ago a Bill was passed through the Dáil, and sent to the Seanad, providing that the maximum membership of the Executive Council should in future be twelve rather than seven. The reasons for that step were explained when the Bill was before the House.

Enthusiasm for the Extern Minister idea has waned, somewhat, by our experience in the actual operations of the Constitution. I explained that the single responsibility of an Extern Minister was a matter, even under the Constitution as it stands, rather more of theory than of fact, because for every major departmental proposal the Minister must look for finance, and, looking for finance, must turn towards the sphere of collective responsibility, and as long as we retain our present system of financial control this single responsibility of the Minister who is not a member of the Executive Council is largely theoretical.

In the matter of staff also, you have a radiation from all departments into the field of collective responsibility. Civil servants hold office on a tenure dependent on the Executive Council. They are removable only by the Executive Council. The personnel of the Civil Service is controlled substantially by the Establishment Branch of the Department of Finance. There, again, you have that necessary overlapping as between the Department represented here in the Dáil by an Extern Minister and the field of collective responsibility that is covered by the Executive Council. While we felt that these considerations, cumulatively, were not, perhaps, strong enough to make a case for the complete elimination of the Extern Minister idea from our Constitution, at least they sufficed to warrant us in asking the Dáil and the Seanad for a discretionary elasticity for each succeeding President as to the extent of the field of administration that he would choose to take into the sphere of collective responsibility—that each President, judging his own position after election, would decide how much of the general administration of the country he would call into the circle of collective responsibility and how much, if any, he would leave outside that circle. That Bill went to the Seanad. Members of the Seanad took the view—the view that really underlies this resolution that is before us—that that Bill constituted an encroachment on their rights. One may wonder what rights? An encroachment on their right to be Extern Ministers? That, in so far as it is a right of members of the Seanad, is a right also of every citizen of the State. It arises under Article 55 of the Constitution—

"Ministers who shall not be members of the Executive Council may be appointed by the Representative of the Crown and shall comply with the provisions of Article 17 of this Constitution. Every such Minister shall be nominated by Dáil Eireann on the recommendation of a Committee of Dáil Eireann, chosen by a method to be determined by Dáil Eireann, so as to be impartially representative of Dáil Eireann. Should a recommendation not be acceptable to Dáil Eireann, the Committee may continue to recommend names until one is found acceptable..."

Deputies will note that there is nothing in the Article prescribing that Extern Ministers shall be members of Dáil Eireann, nor is there anything in the Article prescribing that Extern Ministers shall even be members of either House of the Oireachtas. As I interpret it, any citizen approved ad hoe by this representative Committee of the Dáil could be an Extern Minister, on complying with the provisions of Article 17 of the Constitution. So that if there is an encroachment on a right by the Bill that was passed here and sent to the Seanad, enabling the maximum number of the Executive Council to be raised to twelve, it is not a right peculiar to Senators but a right which Senators share with all citizens.

The Bill was referred to a Special Committee of the Seanad, which I attended. The proposal that emerged from that Special Committee was that no further progress should be made with the Bill that was passed here and sent to the Seanad; that they should mark time on the Bill; that they should pass a resolution inviting the Dáil to take part in the proceedings of a Joint Committee, the object of that Joint Committee being to decide whether or not Article 55 should be amended so as to make Senators eligible for membership of the Executive Council, the view being that if the field of Extern Ministers was to be encroached upon, as it might be under the Bill and under the discretion which the Bill proposes to give to succeeding Presidents, then the compensation for that must be that Senators must be eligible for membership of the Executive Council. Whatever may be said for or against the eligibility of Senators for membership of the Executive Council or the propriety of making them so eligible, the Executive Council objects to the bargaining complexion of this resolution, the suggestion that unless this resolution is passed—unless the Dáil agrees to take part in a Committee which would consider the alteration of Article 55, so as to make Senators eligible for membership of the Executive Council then, presumably, the Bill which was passed by the Dáil, which is at present before the Seanad, will be consigned to some Limbo reserved for Bills that fail to secure the assent of both Houses. In other words, there is underlying this resolution a threat—a leverage: Senators must be made eligible for membership of the Executive Council or a Bill, which aims at giving a discretion to succeeding Presidents as to the total number of Ministers to be included in the Executive Council, will not be passed.

We object to the setting of this resolution; we object to its bargaining complexion. We object to the underlying threat, that unless this resolution is passed, and, presumably, unless those who represent the Dáil on the proposed committee agree that Senators should be eligible for membership of the Executive Council, then the Bill that is before the Seanad will not be passed by the Seanad. We do not think that public business—important public business—ought to be dealt with along lines of that kind. That is our first objection to this resolution—our first reason for asking the Dáil not to accept the proposal embodied in the resolution. The second objection is on the merits. To accept this proposal to take part in the proceedings of a Joint Committee, to consider the alteration of Article 55 of the Constitution, so that Senators may be eligible for membership of the Executive Council is, in effect, equivalent to giving a Second Reading to the proposal that Senators should be eligible for membership of the Executive Council. Are we sure they should? The Seanad at present consists of 60 members. Thirty-one of those members were elected; twenty-seven were nominated; two were co-opted.

But none of these persons, whether nominated, co-opted or elected, were nominated, co-opted or elected with a view to their being anything else than members of a Second Chamber, a Second Chamber with powers of revision, powers of criticism, powers of suggestion, and even powers—maximum powers—of delay. None were elected, co-opted or nominated with any advertence to the possibility of their becoming members of a body which is collectively responsible to the people for major matters of administration, for the handling of the finances of the country, for the bigger issues of policy, domestic and international, that may arise. The Executive Council do not consider that the Dáil should commit itself to the principle of Senator-members of the Executive Council, even to the extent of agreeing to take part in a Joint Committee to consider that proposal.

I have been reminded that elsewhere members of the Second Chamber, or the Upper Chamber as its own members prefer to call it, are members of Cabinets, sharing in Executive responsibility. But clearly, when the Constitution was being enacted, there was very definite provision that that should not be the case here. To make an effective liaison between the Executive and both Houses it was provided that Ministers should have a right of audience in both Houses, that Ministers can go with their Bills after they have been passed by the Dáil to the Seanad, attend there at every stage and explain, expound and defend their proposals. If elsewhere you have members of the Second Chamber members of the Executive it is largely for the purpose of providing a liaison between the Executive and the Second Chamber which would not otherwise exist. I do not think it is too much to ask of any man who is ambitious to take part in the administration of the affairs of State, in deciding in the counsels of the State, the major political issues that may arise, that he should face a constituency in the ordinary way, and stand for election to the Dáil. I think it would be a wrong thing, an unsound thing for the Dáil or the country to say that persons who have been nominated in a rather haphazard way or, even persons who have been elected in the peculiar circumstances in which Senators were elected, should be even eligible to become members of the Executive Council.

Some time ago one of our daily papers committed itself to the statement that people were apt to forget that the Seanad was even in a wider sense than the Dáil a democratically elected chamber. I have the exact quotation here, and in a matter of this kind one ought to be exact:—

There is too great a tendency to forget that the Seanad is even in a wider sense than the Dáil a popularly elected body.

That statement is, of course, blatantly and demonstratively untrue.

Mr. CONNOR HOGAN

Could the Minister give the name of the paper and the date of issue?

Mr. O'HIGGINS

The "Irish Independent." I have not got the date of issue, but I can give it to the Deputy subsequently. There are 27 members of the Seanad nominated, two co-opted, 31 elected. Even with regard to the 31 elected, it is decidedly an overstatement to say that they possess in a wider sense than the Dáil a popular mandate. For, whereas the Senator who in those elections secured the highest number of votes, secured a total vote of 14,000 in the entire State, there are many members of the Dáil who secured in a single constituency very many more votes. There are members in the Dáil who secured upwards of 20,000 votes in a single constituency. The Senator who secured the highest number of votes from the whole State secured 14,000.

Mr. MORRISSEY

In a single constituency.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

On the grounds of a very definite objection to the bargaining complexion of this resolution which is before us from the Seanad, on the ground that we have a definite objection to the proposal on its merits, and that we consider the Dáil ought not to commit itself even to the extent of taking part in the proceedings of a committee to consider this proposal, I ask the Dáil to pass the resolution on the Order Paper in the President's name.

Mr. JOHNSON

I want to support the resolution, but on slightly different grounds to those enumerated by the Minister. I think it is necessary to be on our guard against a possible movement in favour of strengthening the authority of the Seanad as compared with the Dáil, and in effect altering the character of the legislature as was intended by the Constitution. I think it is clear to anyone who reads the Constitution carefully—it is certainly clear to those Deputies who were present in the Provisional Parliament which acted as the Constituent Assembly—that it was never intended the Seanad should be a mere duplicate of the Dáil. I think it is clear that the function of the Seanad is restricted to matters affecting legislation, and precludes them from responsibility for administration. The Executive Council is an Executive responsible to the Dáil. I think it would be a weakening of the position of the Dáil if we allowed it to grow into a practice, even by some amendment of the Constitution, that the character of the Seanad would be altered, and that it would be, not merely a Chamber whose function it was to consider and revise legislative proposals and make recommendations regarding Money Bills, but that it should also have something like supervision over the Executive Council. I think that would be distinctly retrograde and in conflict with the principles on which the Constitution has been built. Nevertheless, I think there is a plea that the Seanad seems to be making in this proposal which is not wholly that explained by the Minister. From my reading of the reports it seems to me that there is a desire for better facilities for the conduct of their business as a legislative assembly. I think, probably, they have grounds for dissatisfaction and complaint in regard to the facilities that are provided.

Perhaps that is merely an excuse. I do not know, but I make the suggestion that, instead of repelling this proposal from the Seanad, we should offer as an alternative suggestion that a Joint Committee be appointed to consider whether any improvement can be made in the procedure and practice governing the relations between the two Houses, and between the Ministry and the Seanad, which would facilitate the Seanad in carrying out its work of legislation. The form of any such proposal would probably have to be considered by the Committee. I think that has been the practice before, but I commend the suggestion to the House that it is worth while meeting the Seanad with a view to seeing whether any means can be devised which would allow them to keep in touch with the intentions of the Ministry regarding procedure, Bills, and the general conduct of the work of legislation. I think it is probably a case where a Parliamentary Secretary might be appointed from the Seanad who would know something of the intentions of the Ministry and be able to speak with some official authority, but I do not know whether that would stand examination. I think, nevertheless, that there is something required to be done to improve the business methods of the Seanad as of the Dáil. I think that the Seanad should not even attempt to be a replica of the Dáil, to go through Bills with the same object and the same method, and should not simply act as a duplicating, examining, and critical body, but that their function is somewhat different and was well described in the Constitution debates as that of a cooling chamber. I think they are intended to be a responsible body of earnest legislators who would examine carefully proposals coming from this House, which is made of commoner clay. I have been somewhat converted to the idea of a Second Chamber, with that function, by the experience of the last few years in this House. I think it is rather a reflection upon the business of this House that it has been necessary for the Seanad to act, more or less, as a duplicate body of the Dáil. One might suggest reasons, but I think I will refrain. I think, though, that one might say that the failure to recognise the importance of the Dáil—the authority of the Dáil and the supreme position it occupies in the Nation's life—on the part of the Ministry is responsible for some of the defects which, I think, I see in the whole legislative machinery. It is not right, for instance, that the Dáil should be deemed to be second in the mind of Minister to a Party meeting for official pronouncements of Executive policy. It is not right that a Minister, and an Extern Minister particularly, who is directly responsible to the Dáil, should think so little of the Dáil as to go direct from it to a Party meeting, a political meeting held in public, and announce an Executive decision, as was the case the other night, on the matter of fisheries. That is merely a repetition of acts of a similar kind very frequently experienced. I think that the proposal I am suggesting might well lead to a general reconsideration of the position of the Houses towards each other, and of the Executive to the Houses, and that it would probably find a means whereby any grievance that is legitimate, which the Seanad has in this proposal, might be met.

Major COOPER

The Minister for Justice, perhaps, will be grieved to hear that I am going to oppose this resolution and to support Deputy Johnson. Deputy Johnson has contrived to get in as many hard knocks at the Government as he possibly could. As regards any knocks that I may get in, the Minister will not be entitled to fall back on his friends. I regret that Deputy Johnson did not embody the proposal he has made in an amendment to this motion, because that would have offered a way out to what seems to me a very serious and difficult situation which we ought to meet in a responsible spirit. The arguments the Minister made as to why we should reject this message from the Seanad and adopt the resolution on the Paper were two-fold. He objected, in the first place, to the circumstances under which the proposal came before us, and secondly, to the proposal on its merits. I do not propose to deal with the circumstances under which the proposal came before us. It is, I think, admitted that the Seanad have the right to address us at any time on a matter of this character. That right is within the Constitution and the Standing Orders. It is further, I think, admitted that they are to be the judges of the time at which they think fit to address us. We cannot say to them: "You are only to send us a message in February, March or April, and at no other time of the year." They are certainly the judges in the matter.

The Minister objects to the fact that the Seanad, in sending this message, coupled with it the consideration of a Bill which had been passed by the Dáil. I must say that in doing so the Seanad displayed more tactical ability than I have ever known them to do in the past. The Minister objects to it becoming a matter of negotiation. Is not all politics a matter of negotiation? Is the Minister himself such a stranger to negotiation? Has he had no experience of negotiation in the immediate past so that he should say, whatever we do with the Seanad we will not negotiate with it even on the subject of a Bill? I suggest that the Minister, in doing that, is asking us to adopt a standard of morality almost too good for Heaven, and certainly excessive for politicians in this world. The Minister's second objection to the proposal is on its merits which, in effect, comes to the suggestion that the objects to the terms of reference of the proposed Committee because to adopt such terms of reference would be equivalent to giving a Second Reading of the Bill. Why did not the Minister, instead of asking the Dáil to give a flat negative to the Seanad message, suggest an amendment to the terms of reference? It would have been possible to do so. Deputy Johnson, more far-seeing than myself, suggested the lines on which it could be done, but the Government preferred to offer a flat negative to a unanimous resolution of the Seanad. Let there be no mistake about it, that every Party in the Seanad concurred in this resolution, including the Labour Party. There are many matters that we could discuss, and I think ought to discuss, with the Seanad. There is, for instance, the question of Parliamentary Secretaries, an institution which has arisen since the Constitution was created. Can Parliamentary Secretaries sit in the Seanad? If so, why should not the Government allow one or more members of the Seanad to become Parliamentary Secretaries? That is a point worthy of discussion.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

This Bill deals with the Executive Council.

Major COOPER

We are at present dealing with the Executive Council. I suggest the course of the Minister should be not to offer a flat negative to this resolution, but rather to say that there are certain questions we are willing to discuss with the Seanad, including the question of Parliamentary Secretaries. If they refuse to discuss the question of the Executive Council, they might, at least, discuss the question of Parliamentary Secretaries and might possibly clarify the position with regard to Extern Ministers. Now, there is no doubt whatever that the present position of the Seanad is unique and, I think, anomalous. It is not in the same position as any other Second Chamber in the world that I know of. Ministers without portfolio sit in the Canadian Seanad. Minister sit in the Seanad of New Zealand; the Vice-President of the Executive Council and the Minister for Home Intelligence sit in the Seanad of Australia. In France the Prime Minister, Monsieur Poincaré, is a member of the Senate. In every Second Chamber in the world, except that of the United States, where the Executive is entirely divorced from the Legislature, and where members of the Executive are not members of either House, members are eligible for office, and by the fact that there are Ministers in those particular Chambers they derive a great advantage because they get guidance, if I may say so without drawing on myself a reprimand from the other House, of which the Seanad has very often stood in need. Deputy Johnson spoke of it as a cooling Chamber. I was of the impression that occasionally undue heat was generated there, and it is largely due to the fact that Ministers, coming to it from outside, have not the same knowledge as the members of the House who are taking part in its deliberations from day to day, and they cannot have the influence that a member of the body itself would have. One practical effect of adhering to the present position and refusing to discuss any change at all will be, in the end, to exclude men of ability from the Seanad. No man of ability and ambition will be willing to go to the Seanad if he is aware—I do not think the position is fully clear although it was stated in the Constitution—that under no circumstances could a member of the Seanad go for a Ministerial position. I am going to be offensive enough to take a personal illustration. The Labour Party in the Seanad are led by a member of great ability and considerable Parliamentary experience, whose energy and tact——

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

In this debate it is difficult to prevent Deputies from illustrating their remarks by reference to the present Seanad, but if Deputy Cooper can be allowed to praise a member of the Seanad and someone else to take a contrary example I feel that would be extremely bad procedure. I think if he could take abstractions and hypothetical cases it would be better.

Major COOPER

I bow to your ruling. I will assume a hypothetical Party led by an abstract leader who is possessed of great ability, energy and tact, and who had rendered considerable service not only to his Party but the State; at the same time when that hypothetical Party came into office they would be debarred, whatever the ability of that member of the Seanad, from appointing him to any post in the Executive Council however will they may think he would be qualified for it. The only condition on which he could obtain it would be to resign his seat in the Seanad, to wait for a bye-election and then contest it, with all the doubts and difficulties that attend it under proportional representation. Is it not the logical result that that man of ability who may aspire to office will not go to the Seanad at all and we shall have—am I in order to speak of fool amendments?—more ill-considered amendments sent to us from the Seanad than at the present time? I do not think that is desirable.

One argument I expected the Minister to stress and he did not, as strongly as I expected, was the non-representative character of the Seanad. He did stress the point that the Seanad election was not a real representative election, because so few people voted.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

I did not say that; I queried a particular Press comment, which was: "There is too great a tendency to forget that the Seanad is even, in a wider sense than the Dáil, a popularly elected body."

Major COOPER

I do not endorse that claim or any claim made in that particular paper or in any paper unless I put it over my own signature, but the Seanad is partially non-representative now. That is a passing condition that will change rapidly; within eight years it will be a popularly elected body. Surely it will, then, be very difficult to deny the Seanad any claim to a share in the Executive power? Surely if any change is to be made it should be made now, because a change made eight years hence in the constitution, will only be made at great inconvenience and expense by means of a referendum, whereas up to 1930 a change can be made merely by Acts of the Oireachtas. Surely if there is to be a change made, consideration of whether a change should be made should be given to it before the Seanad election next year so that there may be no misconception in the minds of the electors as to the conditions under which they elect their Senators. Is not that an argument for a committee on more general terms than are set out in this message—a committee of some kind to consider the relations of the Seanad to the Executive power and of the Seanad to the Dáil?

It seems to me, so far as I could catch it on hearing it once, that Deputy Johnson's suggestion offered a way out. I hope it may commend itself to Ministers instead of this flat negative. If it does I urge them to see, and there is considerable urgency in the matter, that such a committee would be more useful and produce more valuable results if it is composed, at any rate on this side, of Deputies who had four years' experience of the work rather than of Deputies newly elected to a new Dáil, and that even if the Dáil passes this motion they will not say that it is the last word, and will not say that they are unprepared to consider a suggestion of any kind whatever on the lines that Deputy Johnson made, because, if so, I see acrimony and embitterment between the relations of the two Houses. I see a definite lowering in future of the character of the Seanad and I do not believe either of them would be of benefit to the State.

Mr. HEFFERNAN

I approve of the motion put down, that we disapprove of the recommendation of the Seanad that we should appoint members on a Joint Committee to meet them to consider this question of the appointment of Executive Ministers from the Seanad. I object to it from the point of view that the Minister stated, of the element of bargaining in that regard and the fact that the very important Bill dealing with the amendment to the Constitution will be held up for some considerable time owing to that element of bargaining. I think, in view of the public happenings which have taken place in recent times, it is of the greatest importance that immediate legislative action should be taken to ensure that the Extern Ministers shall be members of the Executive Council. I suggest it be compulsory that they should be members of the Executive Council.

I think the people of the country have a right to expect a unified policy from the Government which is in power; and we have the extraordinary state of affairs which exists at the present time of a member of the Government making one statement with regard to the policy of the Government differing fundamentally from that laid before the country by the members of the Executive Council. The statement put before the country by an Extern Minister differs from the policy of the Executive Council. The passing of this Bill, which is at present before the Seanad, will have the effect of wiping out that ridiculous anomaly, and people will then have a right to expect what they do not get at present, that is, a unified declaration of policy from the Government in power.

I just want to make one or two slight comments with regard to the technical aspects of the case—what the Minister refers to as the merits of the case. I agree with the Minister to a certain extent that the Seanad cannot be regarded as a thoroughly representative body, even bearing in mind Deputy Cooper's statement that after the expiration of eight years the members of the Seanad will be elected. I would point out that in view of the limitation as to the method of nomination, the Seanad can never, at any time, be regarded as representative in the sense that the Dáil is representative. I think it is essential that the Executive Ministers shall be so placed that in the event of the Government having to resign and appeal to the country on a policy on which they have been beaten in the Chamber here, that all the Ministers should have to resign and should be forced to appear before the country and get elected on the policy which they have propounded. The effect of the appointment of Ministers from the Seanad would be that we would have Ministers on the Executive Council who would not have to receive the suffrages of the people perhaps for a very considerable period and would not, in any sense of the word, be responsible to the electors for their actions as members of the Executive Council.

I disagree with Deputy Cooper when he says that we should put forward an alternative suggestion or amendment. My suggestion is this—we have a definite claim put forward by the Seanad and we should meet that in a definite way, either by a negative or affirmative. There should be a better liaison between the Dáil and Seanad, and that should issue from this Chamber in the form of an independent document and should not in any way be regarded as a bargaining factor in this matter. This particular suggestion should be decided upon its merits. The opinion that I hold, and I am sure it is the opinion of my Party, is that we ought not to appoint members on the Joint Committee in this connection.

Mr. HEWAT

I think we are asked to consider what seems to me to be a rather serious matter as it concerns the relationship between the two Houses. I take it that the reply of the Minister and the request practically to throw back the resolution that has been submitted on behalf of the Seanad rather points to the beginning of a controversy between the two Houses. What occurs to me really is this, that the resolution which has been passed by the Seanad expresses the dissatisfaction which is felt in the Seanad at the present state of things from their experience in connection with the business that has been developed in the Dáil. The suggestion is that there is an alternative and that some means should be found of putting the Seanad in the position of closer intimacy with the work of the Dáil through the service of Parliamentary Secretaries. Whatever the solution may be, I think the position is quite clear. You have a Bill of a highly contentious nature discussed in the Dáil, and probably discussed in a combative fashion as between the different parties and the Government, and the Minister after all that, has to go up to the Seanad and go through a similar process in the Seanad. He is not in exactly the frame of mind to pay due regard to the reiteration, if it may be so, of the objections that he has to meet in this House, and to face them again at a meeting of the Seanad. I would ask, at all events, that a bald resolution of refusal by the Government should, if possible, be tempered with a recognition of the difficulties as between the two Houses.

How that difficulty is to be got over is a question that I do not think the House could be expected to solve to-day. But the point that I would emphasise, if I may, is that a recognition shall be given in this House to what is obviously a feeling of dissatisfaction in the other House with the proceedings as they have developed. Now, of course, the question arises on a Bill dealing with Extern Ministers, but is it really in connection with that Bill that that resolution is being sent down to us? I do not think it is. I think it is an expression of the Seanad's dissatisfaction as it exists.

As regards the Extern Ministers. I do not think that at present it would be very much in order for anybody to criticise the Bill that has already passed from us and gone up to the Seanad, but I would add, if I might, a request that the House will recognise a certain difficulty and leave an opening, at all events, for that difficulty to be discussed as between the two Houses, before we come to a deadlock where a feeling of resentment will be felt by the Seanad and which will react on the business to be transacted in the Dáil in the future, unless some settlement is arrived at.

Mr. CONNOR HOGAN

I am not in a position to subscribe to the opinions expressed by Deputy Heffernan. In my opinion, the Dáil ought to agree with the resolution sent down to us from the Seanad, that we should appoint seven Deputies to meet them at a conference. Remember, we are not committed to anything when we send these seven Deputies. The Committee must report back to us. We are not even aware that agreement may be reached by the Joint Committee. But in any case, even if it were unanimous in its agreement, the Dáil is not committed to the agreement from that Joint Committee. It can deal freely with the report of the Committee when it comes before it. I say that that courtesy is due to the Seanad. I really dread to provoke a constitutional crisis, and the language of the Minister for Justice was, in my opinion, extremely unwise. He imputed intentions to the Seanad which, I think, ought not to be given expression to—that they were in a measure bargaining, threatening us to hold up a Bill until they achieve their bargain. I would direct Deputies' attention to the concluding part of Article 38 of the Constitution:

"When a Bill other than a Money Bill has been sent to Seanad Eireann a Joint Sitting of the Members of both Houses may, on a resolution passed by Seanad Eireann, be convened for the purpose of debating, but not of voting upon, the proposals of the Bill or any amendment of the same."

The proposals of the Bill or any amendment of the same! The Minister for Justice gave us the genesis of the resolution that has come from the Seanad. He pointed out that one of the Constitution (Amendment) Bills passed here provided that the Extern Ministers may, at the discretion of the President, be included in the Executive Council.

That Bill has gone before the Seanad. The Seanad have considered it, have set up a special committee to deal with it and, in pursuance of their policy, they now request a joint committee. They request a committee of this House to meet a delegation from their Chamber to form a joint committee. The Dáil, if it wishes, can refuse, but remember that the Seanad—and we have no option, as we are powerless— can convene a joint sitting of both Chambers.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

There could not be a joint sitting on this. If this motion we are discussing were passed, that could not possibly lead to a joint sitting.

Mr. CONNOR HOGAN

This resolution, I submit, is part of an amendment to a Constitution (Amendment) Bill that was before the House.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

It might be necessary to put Deputies right on the particular question at issue. The only way in which we can receive a communication from the other House is by means of a message. The only thing we properly know about the other House is what is communicated to us by way of a message. Communications cannot be made to us, for example, by means of speeches from the other House, but only by message sent in this particular way. We are only concerned with actions the other House takes.

In this instance the other House has taken particular action. It has passed a resolution and sent a message asking us to appoint a committee to join with a committee of the Seanad to discuss a particular thing. We need not, in fact, send a reply; but it would be only right and proper that we should send a reply, and our reply must certainly concern this matter. This matter, the question of a joint committee to consider and report upon the advisability of amending the Articles of the Constitution which prevent members of the Seanad being appointed members of the Executive Council, must be disposed of, and the disposal of that particular matter cannot lead to a constitutional crisis. In fact, I do not know how a constitutional crisis can arise at all between the two Houses, because the Constitution exists for the purpose of seeing that a crisis will not arise.

With regard to what Deputy Hewat and Deputy Cooper said, and indeed Deputy Johnson, when this matter has been disposed of it will be still open to a member of this House to move for a joint committee on any other matter except this particular matter. This matter will have been decided, but any other matter, such as was mentioned by those Deputies, would be open, and a Deputy could put down a motion suggesting that we send a message to the Seanad bearing on any other matter he pleases, but excepting, if we take a decision on this resolution, this particular matter.

Mr. CONNOR HOGAN

I realise this is an official message and that we have no official knowledge. I thought the statement of the Minister for Justice was communicating to us officially what transpired in the Seanad.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

The Minister for Justice was simply giving the genesis of the resolution passed by the Seanad. The only statement of the Deputy to which I take exception is that this motion is an amendment to a Bill. It is a request for a Joint Committee, not an amendment to a Bill.

Mr. CONNOR HOGAN

It has arisen out of a Bill.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

I quite agree.

Mr. CONNOR HOGAN

To come to the merits of the proposal. Deputy Johnson took the line that we ought to be careful not to strengthen the position of the Seanad. I altogether disagree from that view-point. There is nothing more dangerous than to have a top-heavy majority in one House. I believe the Constitution is best served by having a number of checks, a number of safeguards, upon the activities of one Chamber. We ought to accede to the opinion expressed by the Seanad. It is not an unreasonable proposal, as I pointed out. We are committed to nothing. Let the position be examined freely and frankly and let the Committee report.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

What I intended to point out chiefly has already been pointed out by you, sir. A specific request is before us from the Seanad and, if there is one thing more than another that the Seanad in common courtesy is entitled to expect, it is an explicit reply to that request. To treat this matter in any other way is, as if when asked for the loan of £500, you were to say "No, but I have an excellent volume of Shakespeare's poems that I could lend you for an evening or two."

The Seanad invite the Dáil to take part in the proceedings of a Joint Committee which will consider the desirability of eliminating from the Constitution those Articles which preclude the possibility of a member of the Seanad becoming a member of the Executive Council. That is a matter of very real interest to the Dáil. It is to the Dáil that the Executive Council is responsible, and, through the Dáil, to the electorate, and it is a matter of genuine concern to the electorate and to the Dáil what the composition of that Executive Council is to be, and whether it is to contain the members of the Second Chamber.

The Provisional Parliament enacted this Constitution. Only after its enactment did the Seanad come into existence at all. It came into existence with certain prescribed functions, functions of revision, of criticism, of suggestion, and, as its maximum power, the function of imposing a certain delay to measures of which it disapproved. Now we are asked to take the view that it is desirable to explore, at any rate, the possibility that some members of that Assembly so constituted, constituted for this purpose, to those ends, should be made suddenly and gratuitously eligible for quite other functions. None of the 31 members of the Seanad who were elected were elected with a view to their becoming members of the Executive Council, even potentially.

None of the 27 members who were nominated was nominated with that in view, and the same applies to the two who were co-opted. We are asked to change all that and to say that men, elected, nominated and co-opted to perform particular functions, are now to be made eligible to perform quite other functions. One can conceive that a man might be an excellent member of a cooling chamber and not necessarily an equally excellent member of an Executive Council. But when Senators were appointed or in whatever way they became Senators, I submit there was advertence to the functions they would have to perform as members of the Second Chamber. It conflicts with my conception of democratic government, that members of a House, to some extent arbitrarily nominated by the President of the Executive Council, should be eligible for membership of the body that takes collective responsibility for the major portion of legislation and administration. Deputy Cooper talked about negotation and said that I ought to understand negotiation. Certainly, but I have tried to preserve throughout all negotiations a sense of the public interest. We have passed a Bill; rightly or wrongly we have decided that the next President and succeeding Presidents ought to be free, each one envisaging his own position, to say how much of the sphere of administration he would take collective responsibility for. Surely that is a matter on which the Seanad could say "yes" or "no." Instead of that, they raise a side-wind and say: "Oh, but theoretically we are eligible to be Extern Ministers, and, in so far as this Bill is an encroachment, or a possible encroachment on the field of Extern Ministers, our rights are infringed." They are infringed in common with those of Patrick Murphy, of Skibbereen, if there is such a person, as I am sure there is.

I object to that attitude. I object to the Seanad threatening, or implying that they will not deal with that Bill on the basis of public interest; that, in fact, they are more concerned with the question of whether or not they are to be eligible for membership of the Executive Council. That is another matter that can be raised at another time. I submit it should be raised at another time, but the question of the desirability of leaving discretionary elasticity to each succeeding President on the question of how much of the sphere of collective administration he would take responsibility for, should not be complicated by what many people would consider the individual ambitions of individual Senators. There is a question put to the Dáil. We should answer that question, and not some other. There are vague suggestions about Parliamentary Secretaries coming from Deputies who, in other circumstances, would probably be lecturing about the unnecessary multiplication of Parliamentary Secretaries.

Major COOPER

There is a vacancy within the law for a Parliamentary Secretary. I agree that the number be four.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

All credit to us for that vacancy. If the Seanad needs, or thinks it needs, a Parliamentary Secretary, it is quite another matter from this suggestion of eligibility for membership of the Executive Council. But does it, in fact? All Ministers have the right of audience in both Houses. A Minister goes to the Seanad in charge of every Bill and in charge of every proposal that emanates from any Department. If that is not an effective liaison I would like its imperfections to be pointed out. That is not the issue before us. The issue before us is, that the Seanad has a Bill from the Dáil which proposes to increase the maximum membership of the Executive Council. The Seanad has put that Bill on one side and said to the Dáil: "Join with us in discussing the desirability of making Senators members of the Executive Council, and, in the light of your attitude at that Committee, we will determine our attitude to this Bill." That is a procedure which is not in accordance with my conception of a decent stewardship of public interest. I think that the Seanad should declare on this Bill on its merits, and that afterwards we might discuss the executive and administrative heights to which Senators should, or should not, rise.

I consider that it would be much more satisfactory to give a "yes" or "no" reply to the Seanad on this matter than to answer some other question which is not before us. I ask the Dáil, therefore, to accept the motion that stands in the President's name on the Order Paper.

Motion put and declared carried.

Message to be sent to the Seanad accordingly.

Major COOPER

Before we discuss the Telephone Capital Bill may I point out that you, sir, stated from the Chair that it would be open to any Deputy to put down a motion to send a message to the Seanad suggesting any other form of conference? I take it that you would require notice of motion to do that, and that such notice of motion should not be given until the Seanad has considered the message?

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

The position is wider than the Deputy states. A Deputy can put down a motion to send a message to the Seanad on practically any subject, but the particular matter which we have decided cannot be raised again under Standing Orders. That is the only restriction.

Major COOPER

In the event of such notice of motion being put down and the Government taking private Deputies' time, would the Minister give facilities for its discussion?

Mr. O'HIGGINS

I think we would need to see the motion. I want to put it to the Deputy that we ought not surmise or speculate about the needs or discomforts of the Seanad. I think we ought to assume that if they have any matter to raise, other than this matter, they will avail of the facilities they have to raise it.

Major COOPER

Does the Minister not consider if the Constitution is working badly that it is our duty to try to amend it?

Mr. O'HIGGINS

If the Constitution is working badly, I would, at all times, be interested to know in what particular it is working badly.