The purpose of this Bill is very elaborately set out in the title. A short description of it would be that it proposes to reduce the term of office for Senators from twelve years to nine, and to make arrangements for the triennial election. In order to achieve that purpose it prescribes that in respect of the election that is due to be held in 1928 five Senators will have a term of nine years to run. It fills up, in consequence, the places of the twenty Senators to retire in 1937, and it makes provision for twenty Senators being elected in 1934. The balance fall due for election in 1931. One of the first recommendations made by the Joint Committee in their report was that in which they recommended that the number should be kept as at present, that the age limit should be reduced to thirty years, and that the term of office for members of the Seanad be nine years, and that one-third of the members be elected every three years. I move the Second Reading of the Bill.
CONSTITUTION (AMENDMENT No. 7) BILL, 1928—SECOND STAGE.
The first matter that this Bill deals with is the amendment of Article 31 of the Constitution. That Article, as it stands, deals with the number in the Seanad, with the minimum age of Senators and the period of office. The amendment deals only with the period of office, but there are consequential amendments which would be completely altered were we to decide that the number of Senators should be reduced; therefore I have put forward an amendment to the effect that before we give a Second Reading to this Bill we should decide the first matter that is referred to in Article 31, namely, the number of Senators that should constitute the Seanad. At the present moment the Seanad consists of sixty members, and under cover of that a great number of Senators can pretend to do their duty—if there is a duty attaching to the office at all. They can pretend to do their duty, and let a handful carry on the work. The question of the number was discussed at the Joint Committee. The decision that was taken—as might be expected from that Committee, of which half the number were Senators, and the representatives of the Dáil divided up, the largest Party being allied, so to speak, with the Senators—was to keep the number as large as possible so as to increase their own vote when the time came.
took the Chair.
One of the arguments put up to meet the case against the reduction of the numbers of the Seanad was that if we were to have a smaller number—I proposed 35—the result would be that there would not be a quorum to carry on. I think that argument is fallacious. I believe that if you reduce the number of members, and if by their absence the business could not be carried on for want of a quorum, that would quickly call attention to the fact that the work the Senators were elected to perform was not being done. No argument I heard in Committee or since has convinced me that we need 60 Senators. I have looked through the numbers in the Senates of various States, and I found that the number that was originally proposed here for the Senate, namely, 40, was a fair all-round number, and, as far as I am concerned, although the number I put down was 35, and I believe that 36 would be a very good number, I would be satisfied if the number were reduced to 40, that is, if we are going to have a Seanad at all. I hold that every Senator above the number 40 is an unneces- sary expense, and is not going to make the Senate a more efficient body, but, in fact, is going to be used as a cover for those who do not do their work. Every one of these Senators gets an allowance and travelling facilities, which costs money. Why should we increase the cost of allowances by at least one-half more than is necessary? I would like for one to see that question debated here, to see are there any reasons whatever for having the number of Senators as high as it is. I can only see one reason why the majority party of the Seanand itself would wish to have such a number, and that is that they can vote and reproduce themselves. They will have a vote of 60 instead of 36. I suggested 36 simply because it would be easier to get down to 36 than to 35 from our present number of 60. The second reason which I have for thinking that 36 would probably be a better number than 35 is the consideration that I indicated here already, namely, that if you are going to have an election by proportional representation you would want to have something from about 10 to 12 candidates, so that the smaller parties might get their due proportion of representation. If you have a six-year period, which is the period to which I think the term of office ought to be reduced, and if you have one-third of the Seanad retiring every three years, that would give you twelve Senators to be elected every two years. I think that the plan of having a period of six years, the number of Senators 36, and the period of election two years, is a far more reasonable proposal than that contained in the Bill. As I said, I am borne out in that view by an examination of the numbers, the period of office, and so on, in other States. As it happens, in Australia you have exactly the number of 36, and if my memory serves me right, you have a similar period of office.
How many Senators?
Thirty-six for the Federal State.
What about the other Parliaments?
What other Parliaments?
In Australia.
I am talking about the Federal Commonwealth.
Will the Deputy say how many Senators there are altogether in Australia?
That has nothing to do with the question. You might as well ask me how many county councillors there are here altogether. We are talking of a Seanad for twenty-six counties, and the example I am taking is the Federal Parliament in Australia, where you have a Senate of 36, and where you have as the period of office the same period which I suggest, namely, six years. I do not want to elaborate further the points as to the number 36. I think the number is a very good one for this reason, that it would provide for unavoidable absence, For instance, members get sick occasionally, and occasionally some things happen which prevent a Senator from being present. I call these unavoidable absences. I am leaving six on an average, and it is a high average—one-sixth of the total to cover unavoidable absences. That would give you a working House of 30, which is, I believe, bigger than the present average. I had intended—in fact I am surprised it has not appeared—putting down on the Order Paper a motion asking for a return showing the average attendance of Senators. I am confident that it would not be above that figure which could be obtained if you had really a working Seanad. If we examined the number of hours which they are supposed to attend we would find that it would not be a very heavy tax from the point of view of time. If they are interested at all, and I take it that the fact that they are going for election indicates that they are willing to make certain sacrifices in the public interest, if they are prepared to do that, it would not be too much to expect that five-sixths of the total number of members would be ordinarily present to do the work.
Thirty active members present would give you all the discussion you would require and would probably mean greater dispatch in business than you are getting at present with sixty members. You would save expense, and I believe you would get a better House. If the Seanad is to be of any value we ought to have members of the highest possible standard, and it is easier to get 36 than 60. When Parties will be nominating candidates later there will be a chance of getting a better and higher standard if you reduce the number of the present Seanad. I am not going to deal with the question of number further, except to say that I intend pressing this matter to a decision and asking that this Second Reading be not proceeded with until the Dáil has an opportunity of discussing this question of number. Unfortunately it does not come in in any Bill because the present Executive is satisfied to leave it as it is. It is, therefore, difficult to know where to move an amendment whereby the number would be reduced to 36 or other suitable number. If there was any place in this series of Bills where I could directly propose that as an amendment I would have done so. The nearest place which I can get is in connection with this amendment of Article 31.
The next question is the period of office. The trouble in all these Bills is that we have had, in the general discussion on them, to talk about various aspects in general, and now when we come to particular Bills for the purpose of getting decisions, we have to cover the ground again, so that there is, of necessity, a certain amount of repetition. I have indicated my view that a six years' period was reasonable and would give you a better Seanad than the Seanad you will get with a nine years' period. Human nature can be depended on to work out very much in averages. What we may expect here is, if you have a long period, such as nine or twelve years, you will get active work for a couple of years. I am talking in general. You will get, of course, exceptions who will be active all the time, and these will be provided for in the six-year period. You will get active work for a year or two, and then there will be a long period in which there will be comparatively little attention paid to business when the novelty has worn off. You will have a few active individuals who will work hard—leading spirits who will be constantly at work. I am talking, however, of the great bulk of members. What will happen in their case is that they will work hard for a few years and will then become ciphers until the period of reelection returns.
It is wise, however, apart from the question of the advisability of renewal from another point of view, the point of view of change in attitude, change of policy that might occur from the purely human point of view of getting the best work out of individual Senators, not to have the period too long. Personally, I would like to cut it down to the shortest period reasonable. Asking myself what is the shortest period reasonable, I first came to the conclusion that a period of seven years would be such a period. It is a long period comparatively, but not unreasonably long. I had to change from that, however, for the reason that if you had a seven-year period you would have to have an election every year, which would mean only five or six members being elected every year. That number would be too small to give the smaller Parties in this House, or in the Seanad now, an opportunity of getting candidates returned. As I say, seven years was the period I fixed on originally, but, in order that there might be a sufficient number of candidates at each term to give minorities their fair share of representation, I had to get a number that would be divisible by two or by three. A six-year period, with one-third of the members retiring every two years, will, to my mind, give you a very much better system than that which you have at present. Thus, I am opposed to the insufficiency of the reduction here. Nine years is unreasonably long. It would be unreasonably long at any time. Six years is sufficiently long to carry over from one Parliament to another. If there is a change in the electorate, a change of political opinion outside, and if there should be a change of Government, it gives an opportunity to the new Government, or majority Party, to get its fair share of representation.
Five years is the maximum limit of the Dáil. It will probably work out at not being more than four. Therefore you pass through a Parliament, and half a Parliament, and a longer period is, I think, unwise. I am dealing with it as I would irrespective of any other consideration with respect to the Seanad, but when the Stanad is composed as it is now, as it has been composed, and will continue to be composed for a considerable time, of the most conservative section we have in the country, I think that it is most unfair to put that conservative clog upon progress.
The third question is the question of age. I will not deal with that, because it comes up in another connection, and we can deal with it then. As far as the consequential changes are concerned they are worked out, apparently, all right, but they are worked again altogether in the interests of the Seanad that exists, in the interests of the section of the community to which this Seanad was originally intended to give a privilege. I see no reason at all why the nominated element should be preserved in the position which it has got. I see no reason at all why, if this change is to come about, it should not come about and begin as gradually as possible immediately after this new arrangement for the Seanad is settled. There is no reason at all why we should ever imagine that the Seanad has a certain vested interest of its own, so to speak, that must be very rigidly safeguarded. As I said before, I wonder whether the Executive would be so careful in preserving to the last tittle all those interests if they did not think they had in that Seanad a very faithful ally, if the section that is most completely represented in that Seanad were not, in fact, a wing of the majority Party here. I hold that what the majority Party are doing by this Bill is that they are trying to consolidate their position and to put reserves of strength against the day when, as they expect, the people will gradually change and take a different view on matters that have been the subject of controversy for the last four or five years. There is no need for me to elaborate what I have said any further. The consequential changes on reducing the numbers can be very easily got over. It is a matter for the draftsman and it requires only a little study to see how best to fit them in. For my own part, in reducing it, I would start by not returning any members this year Fifteen members will retire. There is no reason why these fifteen vacancies should be filled at all. That is the first step. You can at the next two-year period, at the next biennial elections reduce the number to the 36 limit Similarly, the consequential arrangements would not cost very much. In this Bill, as in all the others, we have simply the not very carefully-hidden purpose of the Executive in strengthening their position politically, in strengthening the majority Party. In this case, as in the other cases, it is an attempt to remove from the people the right to change if they want to. I move formally that a Second Reading be not accorded to this Bill and that the Bill be not further proceeded with until the Dáil has come to a decision on the total number of members that should constitute the Seanad.
I would like to state very briefly my position with regard to this amendment and the Bill before us. The amendment suggests that the Bill be not further considered until the Dáil has come to a decision as to the total number that ought to constitute the Seanad. I think it would be well if the Dáil did get an opportunity of considering the total number that ought to constitute the Seanad for the reason that the Dáil is now differently constituted to what it was when the decision to have sixty members in the Seanad was arrived at. Without expressing any very definite opinion as to the number that should be in the Seanad, I think it is only right that the Dáil should have an opportunity of discussing now what the number should be. If, however, this amendment is not carried and the question of the Second Reading comes to be decided, I propose to vote for the Second Reading of the Bill, as the principle of it seems to be a reduction of the present term of office. As a matter of fact, I do not see how Deputy de Valera can hope to get his idea carried or even put before the House unless the Bill gets a Second Reading. It will be open to him or to anybody else if he thinks that the term of years should not be nine, to move to insert six in the Bill, and I think he can do that even if his amendment is defeated. If the Bill comes up for Second Reading I will vote for the Second Reading, and if an amendment is moved to reduce the term still further I will be in favour of that.
Unlike Deputy O'Connell, I am one of those who have very definite views as to what the period of office of Senators should be. I do not think it is sufficient merely to say that the period of office should be reduced. We should be able to indicate that definite specific advantages will accrue to the State in consequence of a particular reduction. The present period of office is twelve years, and the Bill proposes to reduce that to nine years. As Deputy de Valera pointed out, even the reduction to nine years does not remove the dangers which exist in making the period of office of members of that House of long duration. There is a general impression abroad that membership of the Seanad does not imply any obligation to take an active interest in the work of legislation; that the section of the Constitution which defines the qualifications of members also implies that election to the Seanad is a reward for services rendered and not the taking of an obligation to do definite work. This State is suffering very severely financially because the Executive have in the past found themselves obliged to give rewards for services rendered by placing individuals in offices of profit. I do not think that we can afford to keep in existence a body which could be used for the purpose of enabling an Executive to reward services rendered to the political Party from which that Executive comes by nominating individuals for election to the Seanad. If a Senator, on being elected, is independent of public opinion, and of any change which may occur in public opinion, for a period of nine years, unless he is a man of great strength of character, he will not be able to resist the temptation of looking upon his office as a gratuity and neglecting the duties which that office carries with it. There should be re-elections to the Seanad at periods sufficiently frequent to keep the members alive to the fact that their continued retention of office will depend upon the ability which they show in discharging their duty.
The period, of course, should not be so short that members will have no opportunity of acquainting themselves with the working arrangements of the Seanad and the general legislative provisions which all legislators must be acquainted with before they can do useful work. The Dáil and the Executive should endeavour to ensure that the medium between a period which would be obviously too short and the period suggested in the Bill, which is obviously too long, should be taken. I suggest that a period of five or six years is reasonable. It would enable members to become sufficiently conversant with their duties to discharge them, while at the same time it is short enough to compel them to keep in the forefront of their minds the fact that they have not a permanent occupancy of the office and must at some particular period be able to justify the work they did. If it is proposed to amend Article 31, and to reduce the period of office of Senators the reduction should be made to certainly not more than six years. It is a bad principle to have frequent amendments to the Constitution, and I suggest that the evil which it is hoped to remedy by reducing the period will not be remedied and that if the Executive is serious in the matter they will, after a short time, or their successors will, be introducing other Bills to reduce further the period of office.
Deputy de Valera's amendment raises another matter of great importance. We have had Bills introduced here altering the provisions dealing with the method of election to the Seanad, and also altering the provisions which deal with the powers of the Seanad. There has been a general review of the status of the Seanad, and it does not appear that proper consideration was given to its size. We must bear in mind that a very large section of the people, at any rate, are of opinion that we are not getting anything like value for the money we spend on the Seanad. It is a costly institution, and its cost increases in direct proportion to its size. The more Senators, the greater the cost. If we reduce the number, we reduce the cost. In round figures the Seanad costs us annually £50,000. One-third of the people, at any rate, are definitely of opinion that we are not getting £50,000 worth of value. If we must have a Seanad—and we have been unable to carry our proposal that there should be none—we should endeavour to get a Seanad that would involve the least possible drain upon the pockets of the taxpayers, and we could effect considerable economy immediately by taking advantage of the opportunity given us by the general revision of the Seanad's powers to reduce the number of Senators by approximately one half—certainly to the figure of 36 suggested by Deputy de Valera. The work which the Seanad has to do can be performed by 36 Senators just as effectively as it can be by 60. It is impossible to conceive what particular advantage accrues to this State by the fact that we have 60 Senators instead of 36. It may be contended that two heads are better than one, but it does not follow that 60 heads are better than 36. As a matter of fact, it is probably true that as the number increases the average standard of ability decreases. The same is, no doubt, true of the Dáil. We have stated that the number of Deputies could also be reduced with advantage. Certainly where the House in question is not really the operative part of the Oireachtas, but the part which is merely intended to act as a brake upon the operative part, it is not necessary that we should have an elaborate institution such as that which now exists. The demand for the abolition of the Seanad, which is growing throughout the country, has very little relation to any constitutional theory as to whether one or two Houses are the best form of Government. The demand is based very largely upon the fact that the Seanad appears to be of little use and very costly, and if we want to get people to consider it as a constitutional question and not as an economic question, we should endeavour to provide that their objections to the existing Seanad are reduced. Their objections would be reduced if the recommendation from these Benches was adopted and the cost reduced by one-half. I hope we will have from the Government an adequate statement as to the reasons which induced them not to interfere with the existing numbers of the Seanad. There has been a tendency on their part to give the Dáil as little information as possible as to the reasons which influenced them in introducing this legislation. They have relied upon their majority and the Standing Order which enables them to move the closure occasionally.
We are trying to save the Deputy's time.
I am prepared to give way to the President and to give him all the time that remains up to half-past ten. I think we are entitled to ask from the Government that they should at least give an explicit statement as to the reasons which influenced them concerning these decisions. They must have considered the matter. We are sure that when the report of the Joint Committee came before the Cabinet Council the question of the number of Senators came up for discussion, and some reason must have been advanced to convince the majority of the Executive Council that it was best to leave the number as it is and to maintain the Seanad at the existing cost. The Dáil would like to get that reason. It is possible that that reason would be as convincing here as it was in the Cabinet Council, though probably not, because there are more sensible men here than in the Cabinet.
Notwithstanding the increase in numbers.
I admit that that is the exception that proves the rule. As a matter of fact, I shall have to revise my opinion in that direction, because the facts do seem to contradict it. The only thing that has occurred to me is that the Executive Council is really only a reflection of the opinion of the Cumann na nGaedheal Party in this House.
Has the Cumann na nGaedheal Party, that was the tame Party this morning, become the wild Party to-night?
It is the Party without any political head for politics.
As a matter of fact, I have generally found that the tamest people are often the most loquacious and more anxious than any others to impose their views on anyone they can induce to listen to them.
Is the Deputy speaking on behalf of his Party?
Deputy Tierney is a whole platoon in himself.
I said the tamest people; I never said anything that would imply that Deputies in this Party were anything but tame. We are the mildest people and meekest people, and always open to conviction upon everything at all times. But to return to the Bill, and to get back to the argument I was advancing before the President's disorderly interruptions, it seems to us that a very strong case can be made out for reducing the number of Senators and their period of office. Before a division is taken on this amendment we hope to get from the Government a statement—it need not be long provided it is clear—as to the reasons which induced them to effect a reduction of three years only in the period of office and not to interfere with the number of Senators.
One difficulty that I find myself confronted with in speaking on matters with reference to the Constitution Amendments is the peculiar prejudice that colours practically every speech I heard from the Benches opposite. If we could get Deputies on the Benches opposite to stand out from themselves, and from their political heresies of the past few years and to look to the State, and consider what are the best means for formulating the institutions that will command respect and confidence, and to promote a spirit of good will and toleration, and attempt to bring about a great system of national co-operation between all the people, then, they would have a far different prospect before them in considering and criticising these proposals. I do not want to be personal or to hurt susceptibilities. But a good deal of the discussion that has taken place and which has been contributed to by members of the Party opposite has practically put us in this position, that it would be better to remain silent than to come in and comment upon, or contradict, or deal with the statements from the Benches opposite on these matters.
I have here the Bill introduced, in this House in 1922, dealing with the Seanad. The number of members of the Seanad at that time was 60. I shall just revive the memory of Deputies in connection with the statement that we heard—I forget exactly the name of the Deputy who made it—but that Deputy referred to the fact that the late General Collins and President Arthur Griffith brought all the blessings that came with the Initiative and with the Referendum. Well, if they did I presume they did not keep away their blessings from the members in the Seanad. We will leave that for the moment. I want to speak, if possible without hurting, in any way, the political susceptibilities of Deputies opposite. We will admit that a Treaty was signed by Plenipotentiaries on behalf of this country and on behalf of Great Britain. Now apart from that Instrument itself there was the understanding that in the Institutions that would be set up, resulting from the Treaty, special attention would be given to associating some of those who had not any connection with the public life of this country, by reason of the political differences there were for a period of 20 or 30 years, with the public life of the country in the Second Chamber if a Second Chamber was considered necessary.
The President is very far away from the Bill now.
There is now a proposal, in the first place, that the Seanad members should be reduced, and there is a criticism, in the second place, that the Seanad was a sort of institution which had amongst its members supporters of the Cumann na nGaedheal Party, the Government Party, and that that was the main reason why we were anxious to keep it there. I was tracing, as far as is possible, the history of the Seanad.
I do not want the President to go back now to 1922 and to the Treaty.
It is by general agreement.
You will admit that Deputy de Valera mentioned that the recommendation in the Constitution was something like 40. I have brought here the instrument. On page 6 it is mentioned that the number of members of the Seanad was to be 56, and that there were to be two from each of the Universities, making 60 in all.
I understood there was a more original document than that, namely, the draft sent over to Mr. Lloyd George.
I am referring to the one that was introduced into this House.
I am not going to hear anything more about 1921 or 1922—not another word.
If that be so, is it to be concluded that we are to have no reference from Deputy de Valera or from any Deputies on that side regarding the political complications of the Seanad or those who compose it, because that was the matter that was referred to?
They did not drop their politics in 1922.
That is as far away from the point as the Six Counties.
I said last night, during the debate on one of these Bills, that it was undesirable that any Deputy should discuss the present Seanad or the personnel of the Seanad. Also, it is very undesirable to discuss the Treaty or the events of 1922, or anything that happened in 1922, on this Bill or the amendments.
We are all agreeable.
The President is contradicting Deputy Tierney.
Very much so.
I was suggesting to Deputies on the opposite Benches that it would be well to consider what, in their minds, would be a good Seanad. As far as I could judge from the speeches that have been made, the Deputies opposite would consider the Seanad a suitable institution in this country if its members were composed of their political supporters solely and entirely. They would have no consideration for anybody else; everybody else in the country as far as they were concerned would be people who had not the best interests of the country at heart. The rest of the people other than the supporters of their own Party would be people who were not continually making prophecies that they were going to come into power, that they were gradually advancing towards that end and, as their Party grew in numbers, they were appalled by the fact that they did not gain any intellectual advantage from the increase in numbers. That is the sum and substance of what I gather from the speeches of the Deputies opposite.
The position with regard to the Seanad is that if it is to be of use in the country it ought not to be constituted in exactly the same way or be selected in the same manner as the First Chamber. It is not usually an institution which marks progress or which is regarded as marking the progress which Deputy De Valera would desire. It is an institution which considers with much less political heat legislative proposals which are brought before it. In our experience of the last five or six years it has been of considerable advantage to the country. As far as the numbers of it are concerned, that is a question which might be considered if it were considered without political prejudice. It is no part of the policy of the Government to establish in the Seanad a strong political support for the Cumann na nGaedheal Party. It does not require it. It never did require it. The Cumann na nGaedheal Party is sufficiently strong of itself to withstand any of the onslaughts which might come from even a combination of other Parties in the State.
They are wise in their generation.
They are providing for the rainy day.
It is advisable, very advisable, to reduce the term of office of the Seanad. That is the proposal that is in this Bill and that is the proposal which is being opposed.
No.
It may be that Deputies will give a colouring to the amendments which they have down, but the fact of the matter is that if this measure does not pass, the term of office of the Seanad for the future will be twelve years.
Unless another Bill is introduced.
And the term of office being twelve years, that will mean that 15 Senators will go out at different periods.
I would like to ask for an explanation. If the particular Bill before the House were beaten and the majority expressed themselves in favour of a six years' Seanad, does the President say that he would stick to the twelve years?
That would be unconstitutional.
No, but if the amendment is carried the matter will be in limbo for several months before a proposal comes up, and in the mean-time——
You could repeal it in 24 hours.
In the meantime the twelve years will run.
We could have another all-night.
It is merely another means adopted by Deputy de Valera to make the Seanad unpopular by leaving the term twelve years. Our idea is that the Seanad as well as every institution ought to have the maximum amount of public confidence. That public confidence is increased by the more perfect manner in which those institutions are founded and continued, and in consequence there is a good case for this Bill, and there is no case for the amendment.
I would like to ask the President a question. At the begining of his speech the President said we in this Party should stand outside ourselves and sort of have a look at ourselves. Deputy Tierney, I remember, in his speech one evening here, talked about the Fianna Fáil Party standing on three legs. I ask the President now how are we going to stand outside ourselves and look at ourselves unless Deputy Tierney turns us into a centipede?
We have heard— and I suppose the House ought to be grateful for it—what I think is the first justification for any of the Constitution Amendment Bills that have been offered to the House since this batch of legislative proposals was introduced. We have heard a speech from the President, but I submit we have not heard a single justification for the proposal contained in the Bill. If we had not been gratified to hear the President expound to us that political wisdom which he carries locked up within himself; if we had not been glad to hear for the first time in the heavy silence of these debates a voice from the Government Benches telling us upon what grounds this House should consider these proposals, I think that some of us would have suggested that the President was not strictly in order in so far as he did not at all consider the principle in this Bill, which is to reduce the period of office of a Senator. He discussed the number of Senators.
It is in the amendment and therefore was quite relevant.
I submit it was not relevant for him to discuss that. It was relevant for the mover of the amendment to state why this thing should be held over.
Does the Deputy submit that it is not in order for any member of this House to discuss an amendment which is properly before the House? That is what the Deputy is submitting.
The President discussed it from the point of view of the person who proposes a motion. He can only discuss that amendment relatively to the motion.
The Deputy is trying to deal with this matter in a frivolous way.
I am not dealing with it in a frivolous way. I am dealing with it in a serious way. I am suggesting that the President found himself in this position, that he could not tell us why he wanted the term of office reduced to nine years and not to six years or three years, and that therefore he proceeded to discuss something else. The President is responsible for the Bill, not responsible for the amendment. He has got to justify the Bill as against the amendment and he has got to say why the Bill should not be held up, because there is nothing in the amendment which would compel the House to hold up the Bill until the amendment has been discussed and has been decided on. He did not do that. He talked about the number of Senators. He did not talk about the number of years in which the Senators would hold office which is the principle of this Bill. And why not? What mystical virtue is there in a period of nine years that compels the President to come here and under a threat of the closure, and with the coercion of physical exhaustion to guide him to point his argument? What justification has he for coming here and saying that the period of office for a Senator in Seanad Eireann is going to be nine years? In other legislatures, in the American Senate which most people consider to be the one great practical example of a successful second chamber in existence, a Senate which those who have considered and analysed these matters have lauded——
Successful?
Does Deputy Gorey want to make a point of order?
Deputy MacEntee will continue his speech.
I would ask the Deputy if he wants to carry on a conversation to go outside the House and to do his talking there. It is difficult enough to examine and criticise a proposal that has not been explained to us. This idea did not originate in our minds. We do not know the advantages of it. We are in the dark, asking for information and for an explanation, and in view of the difficulties under which an Opposition labours I think that we are entitled to some consideration. I was now referring to the fact that in the Senate of America, which Viscount Bryce praised as a masterpiece of constitution-making, and which men of great authority on the origin of constitutional law say is the one thoroughly successful institution which has been established since the tide of modern democracy began to run, the term of a Senator is only six years. In Australia the term is six years; in South Africa the maximum term is ten years, and I ask——
Would the Deputy say what it is in Canada?
Perpetual.
No.
Yes, I think it is perpetual in Canada. I am speaking subject to correction. I believe that a Senator in Canada holds office for life. The Senate in Canada bears a certain very remarkable resemblance to the Seanad here—at least, to the Seanad here as we knew it before these Constitution Amendment Bills were introduced. The Senate in Canada is practically powerless. The Senate there has not, it is true, the great power which under Article 47 our Seanad was given.
We are not discussing the powers of the Seanad under this Bill, and the Deputy must not go into that.
I think I can, for this reason——
The Deputy must not discuss the powers of the Seanad under this Bill.
I submit that we are entitled to consider the period of office for the Seanad, and that we are to consider it in relation to the powers and authority which that Seanad exercises. I think that is perfectly relevant to the amendment.
I am satisfied that it is not relevant.
Before the President goes, I would like to ask a question. He suggested that if this question of the numbers of the Seanad were dealt with in a non-political way, or a calm manner, that an opportunity would be afforded to the House to consider the method of reducing the numbers. That is the only object I have in the amendment. I am prepared for an all-night sitting to give an opportunity of discussing that. No time will be lost.
We have lost enough time on it already.
Am I to continue?
If the Deputy is looking to me for advice, I would advise him to go home.
I do not propose to go home at the moment. I was proceeding to say that the term of office for a Senator must be considered in relation to this very pertinent point—will that term of office be such as will promote the functions which under the Constitution are entrusted to the Seanad. (The Deputy then ceased speaking, but remained standing.)
The Deputy must either continue his speech or sit down.
I am appealing to you——
Does not this amendment deal with the numbers, not with the term of office—does it not deal with the total number of members who are to constitute the Seanad?
And the term of office.
The amendment says that the Bill be not further considered until the Dáil has come to a decision on the total number who are to constitute the Seanad.
I have already explained to Deputy Redmond that the Bill deals with the term of office. We can discuss the Bill in relation of the amendments. I would like to do that on another occasion. I now move the adjournment of the debate.