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Dáil Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 31 Oct 1928

Vol. 26 No. 10

IN COMMITTEE ON FINANCE. - VOTE 64—ARMY.

Debate resumed on the following motion:—
Go ndeontar suim ná raghaidh thar £504,433 chun slánuithe na suime is gá chun íoctha an Mhuirir a thiocfidh chun bheith iníoctha i rith na bliana dar críoch an 31adh lá de Mhárta, 1929, chun Costas an Airm, maraon le Cúltaca an Airm.
That a sum not exceeding £504,433 be granted to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1929, for the cost of the Army, including Army Reserve. —(Minister for Finance.)

I stated here on the last day on which this Vote was under discussion that I objected to the proposals contained in Deputy Kerlin's speech. In that speech I detect two proposals, one for a territorial force and the other for a volunteer force. These two things, to my mind, ought not to hang together. I objected to a volunteer force, and I approve of a territorial force, apart from the system of volunteer enlistment, under the control of the proper authorities and organised under a well thought out scheme. I do object to the volunteer system in a territorial force. It is quite possible that within the next few years the time will be ripe for this Government or any other government, to launch out into the formation of a territorial force, but I do not think that time has arrived yet. I say that for one reason only. I think that we had better get away from the atmosphere of two or three years ago, get away from the actual people who took part in the events of that time and begin with a new generation. I say that for the reasons which I advanced on the last day. Habits have been acquired, and things have been done and the people responsible would be the first who would come in if a voluntary method were adopted. I prefer at the moment to have a paid army than an army that would come together with the idea of paying itself.

Deputy Kerlin spoke on the last day as if there were no people in the State and no party in this House which had a national outlook except Deputy Kerlin's Party, but as far as I could see from his speech, the only distinction that he made was that in the achievement of national ideals he would rely altogether on force. That suggestion is contained in every line of his speech. Force, it seems to me, was his only argument, and he did not put a tooth in it. I do not know that diplomacy is a strong point with Deputy Kerlin. He is candid enough; he certainly gave warning to any enemy he had. That is a good thing for the other fellow. I would like to read some extracts from his speech. Speaking about the Army, he said:—

What purpose is it for? What can it do at present? As the Deputy said, if this country were attacked tomorrow by any big European power equipped with all the latest methods of warfare, what effective resistance could the present Army offer to such an invasion?

It might very reasonably be asked what resistance either could be offered by an Army of 500,000? Does any sane man at the moment think that the problems of this country are going to be solved by the use of force? Of course, if he has that opinion he is right to stick to that policy and to tell the country that the only line by which his object can be achieved is by the use of force. I say that 500 men will give you the same results, as far as the ultimate end is concerned, as 500,000 men. The only difference will be that you will have more corpses with 500,000 men. You will have 500,000 instead of 500 dead, and it will take a week or ten days longer to lay the country waste. That is the only difference, but it will be done more thoroughly. The country will be more thoroughly laid waste, if we come to loggerheads with any European country. I want to point out that there is no possibility of coming to loggerheads with any small Power. We are not surrounded by any small Powers. Our country is not situated in the Balkans. It is situated in the Atlantic convenient to the shores of England, and if any Power ever landed here for the purpose of conducting a war, it will be a first-class Power.

At a later point Deputy Kerlin states:—

Of course, Deputy Cooper has justified the merits of a parochial force as a real territorial force should be. It should be organised in districts under local officers, of course supervised by officers from headquarters.

There again we get his idea of what a territorial force should be; it should be in parochial units. It may or may not be effectively controlled from headquarters. It is easy to talk about control from headquarters, but I do not think you can get effective control. I said a few moments ago that Deputy Kerlin seemed to have only one method of remedying the ills of the country. He found fault with the Minister's declaration. He talks of a famous declaration of loyalty to the British Empire "a declaration of satisfaction with our present status, and a declaration that his Party intended to take no further steps in the matter of attaining complete freedom for this country." He asked: "What conclusion can we come to? The conclusion is fairly obvious that this Army and the proposed extension of it, as far as this reserve is concerned, is just for the same purpose." Evidently Deputy Kerlin's idea is that it should be an Army of aggression, that it should be an army to take advantage of certain opportunities when they arise. There we have a diversity of opinion between Deputy Kerlin and some of his own front benchers. Deputy Fahy said that a defence force is a very apt description, that it appealed to him and was what his ideal of a force should be, that we wanted to attack nobody. Deputy Kerlin and some other Deputies took a very different line. Their idea is an aggressive force ready to seize opportunities whenever they come their way.

Attack is sometimes the best form of defence.

That is a question for these great military men and not for old veterans like you or me. Deputy Kerlin seems to be the Commander-in-Chief or the Chief of Staff. We are too timid for that sort of thing. He said: "I suppose the present Government has left all thoughts of making any advance behind. What about the protestations of the Cumann na nGaedheal Party in 1922?" I am quoting the Deputy's words. If there is any fault it is with the Deputy's words, or at least the notetaker took them down in that way. Now, it is quite evident what the Deputy meant, even if he did not put it into the best language. I am not questioning it at all; it is quite good enough and quite intelligent enough for me. He takes that as evidence, that because we are not eager for a large, aggressive army we have left all thoughts of national advance behind and that there is no road open to an advance nationally except the road of force. There is one thing at least we are very anxious about—the disappearance of the boundary line. We are very anxious about unity, and when—I am speaking for myself—the individuals who say that the road to unity is through force, that unity is to be effected in our time, or in the time of our children, by force, I hope I am not offensive when I say that I do not think they are very responsible individuals, that they have more or less taken leave of their senses, that they refuse to exercise the faculty of common sense. If it ever comes that this country should go out against the British there are a few people who will go out without squealing.

I would like to know if Deputy Gorey is in order.

Deputy Gorey has been quoting from Deputy Kerlin's speech.

Yes, and commenting on his deductions.

I listened to the greater part of that speech myself and I read the rest of it. I do not recollect that the Deputy introduced the question of partition and its solution by force. That is a very wide subject. To be quite frank, I am prepared to do my best to keep that subject from being introduced into the debate by anybody. I do not think Deputy Gorey should introduce it.

It was not my intention. When these intellectuals have expended their energies in interruptions I am prepared to go on. When I hear a Deputy suggesting the formation of a large, effective and adequate army, and coupling with that the suggestion of an advance nationally, I take it that the only logical conclusion to come to is that he means to make the advance nationally by the strength of the Army, and that is force. In my opinion, physical force, the force of the Army, underlies every word that he has said and every suggestion that he has made. If that is not a correct interpretation of what he has said, I apologise. In the latter part of his speech the Deputy dealt with the formation of a territorial force and at the same time a volunteer force. He said: "Of course, the question of compulsory liability for military service is a different one altogether, and is one which should be discussed at another time. But you could have a territorial force, based mainly on a voluntary system, and perhaps you could even go as far as adopting the system that they have in South Africa, where, if they are unable to get voluntarily the number of recruits they require every year, they have a ballot by districts for the remainder." That is where he emphasised it that in the first instance his territorial force should be mainly a volunteer force, and there is where I join issue with Deputy Kerlin.

What does the Deputy suggest?

I suggest that if there is to be a territorial force at all it should be selected indiscriminately on some other basis. As I said earlier, we know that if a territorial force was decided on now, to be constituted by voluntary enlistment and voluntary rushing to the colours, it would be composed of people who, in many cases, would not be desirable. The Deputy talked about economy. I do not think there would be much difference, from the point of view of economy, between such a system and the Minister's suggested system. The Minister said that 5,000 would be the proper force to aim at. From Deputy Kerlin's point of view the proper force would be 3,000 of a permanent staff, with 5,000 for training every year. I am prepared to give credit for earnest intention to Deputy Kerlin. I think his speech, whether we agree with it or not, was a well-thought-out one. He seems to have devoted a great deal of care and a fair amount of understanding to the subject, but I doubt if the reasons that he has expressed here are the only reasons behind his suggestion. I know from the formation of his Party, with the assistance that he has in his Party, he would be delighted to put something to the test. We know that with a territorial system, apart from a voluntary system, we would have all kinds of pleas made and reasons given for not serving—using all the tricks and schemes to avoid service. That is a usual thing in any army, and on the principle that it takes a shirker to catch a shirker, or a thief to catch a thief, I think that the Fianna Fáil Party as at present constituted would have a first-hand service in that direction.

That is a most objectionable remark. The Deputy should not make any such suggestion. He should not couple the name of a Party in the House with the word "thief." That remark should certainly not have been made, if I understood the Deputy correctly.

I apologise, sir. I was speaking of the principle, and I do deliberately use the word "shirker"——

The Deputy's apology seems to me to make the matter really worse.

A DEPUTY

It always does.

What I desire, however, is to hear the Deputy discussing the Army Estimate without such references to other Parties in the House. The Deputy appears to be proceeding by way of analogy, and perhaps technically he was not quite out of order, but his remarks, as I heard them, seemed to me to be most objectionable. I would like the Deputy to withdraw them and to come to the Army Estimate.

I withdraw. I am absolutely in your hands. But I do point out that it may be one of the causes of their anxiety to have a new scheme. We know that there is pulling of strings, representations, influential people employed to try to get people from serving, from doing their duty to their country. There have been several cases of that. We know that in the recent great war Ministers in England were got at, or attempts were made to get at them. Whereever a string could be pulled it was pulled, and men were kept out of the Army for years. After all their representations they had to be dragged in ultimately to serve in the labour battalions. One of them is now sitting on the Fianna Fáil benches. They will have at their elbow——

A DEPUTY

What about the shirkers here in 1921?

I do not know anything about shirkers here. I know several of them——

If I have to call Deputy Gorey to order again he will have to conclude his speech. I am not absolutely clear as to what the Deputy is saying. I will have to use the remedy of asking him to resume his seat if I do not hear him on the Army Estimate.

Deputy Gorey seems to know himself fairly well.

I cannot go into the danger of war-profiteering, can I?

Certainly not.

I would like to say something about that. I am sure the present Army is well served in a matter which I rank as one of very great importance, and that is the matter of sanitation. It is of immense importance in time of action that we should have expert advice on this matter, and I know of nobody able to wield the brush or who knows the full value of disinfectants better than Deputy Flinn. We could leave that to Deputy Flinn, and I hope that the new Bill of the Minister for Agriculture—the Insects and Pests Bill——

It is more or less reluctantly that I am intervening in the debate on the Army Estimate, because is has been of considerable duration, and has eaten substantially into the time available for the discussion of other Estimates. I think it has become quite obvious from the debate, as far as it has proceeded, that it is likely to prove one of the most important that will take place during the present session. I was not here on Thursday or Friday last when this debate was proceeding, but I have carefully read through the report of the speeches made on both sides of the House, as they appeared in the Official Debates, and I must say, personally, that I am much less clear as to what the Army policy of the Executive is than I was before the debate commenced. On Wednesday last, if I had been asked by any Deputy, or by any person outside, what the policy of the Government in relation to the Army was, I could have pointed to a definite statement made in this House by a responsible Minister and say: "You will find it contained within that statement." I could not refer any person to that statement now, because during the course of this debate it has been revealed that there has been, apparently, a complete reversal of that policy during a very recent period. I am intervening in the debate to ask the Minister for Defence to answer certain definite queries which I am now about to put to him. On the 6th May, 1926, the then Minister for Defence, in response to demands from various sections in this House and outside it, uttered a statement on Army policy. It was a considered statement. It was not the personal statement of a particular individual who happened to be Minister for Defence at the time. It was a statement on Army policy which, he was quite clear to convey to the House, had the approval of the Executive Council. It was as follows:

"Well, I have no hesitation in stating the policy now. It is this: The organisation of our defence forces should, in the first place, be such that it would be capable of rapid and efficient expansion in time of need to the maximum strength of the country's man-power. This will necessitate the training of all ranks in duties of a more advanced nature than those normally associated with each rank. The Army must be an independent national force, so organised, trained and equipped as to render it capable, should the necessity arise, of assuming responsibility for the defence of the territory of the Saorstát against invasion, or internal destructive agencies, or against violation of neutrality on the part of an enemy."

That statement was made by the Minister for Defence on the 6th May, 1926. In the debate upon the Army Estimate for last year that statement was referred to by the President. He moved the adoption of the estimate and said that that statement contained then a concise and clear definition of the Army policy of the Executive Council. In introducing the estimate this year the Minister did not deal with Army policy as such. He confined himself to dealing with matters of detail in relation to the Army, and he made one important and significant statement to which, in view of what happened since, I would like to refer:

"We have moved on so quickly during the last year towards the normal that we have come across many facts we were previously unaware of, and here I have to make a slight confession, and it is that our outlook on certain points, from close observation, has changed considerably."

As I said, the Minister made no reference to Army policy. That was apparently left to another Minister, the only Minister, I think, who has spoken in the debate, the Minister for Agriculture. Now, the Minister for Agriculture is a member of the Executive Council, and we know that members of the Executive Council have collective responsibility. The whole Council is responsible for the acts and words of each member of the Council, and we must assume that when the Minister for Agriculture stood up and enunciated the Army policy here on Thursday last he was speaking with the sanction of the Executive Council. I would like to remind the House now of the Army policy enunciated on the 6th May, 1926:

"The Army must be an independent national force, so organised, trained and equipped as to render it capable should the necessity arise of assuming responsibility for the defence of the territory of the Saorstát or against invasion or against violation of neutrality."

The Minister for Agriculture, speaking last Thursday, said:

"The Army is not for the purpose of defending us in a military way against any first-class Power that wants to attack us. It is quite useless for that purpose."

He also said:

"In those days and in our circumstances at the present moment force will not be a remedy between us and any other country."

Now, it appears to me that these two statements are diametrically opposed. We cannot have the Army maintained as an independent national force, organised, trained and equipped to defend the territory of the Saorstát against invasion, if a responsible Minister can come to the House and tell us that the Army which exists is quite useless for that purpose. The Minister for Agriculture is in a position to know more about the Army than we do. We assumed that the Ministry had made some attempt during the past two years to put into operation the policy which it declared to be its policy in 1926. But, at the end of two years, during which that policy was presumably in operation, we have a responsible Minister coming here and telling us that the Army is quite useless for the purpose of implementing that policy.

Questions were raised here as to the equipment of the Army and as to its effectiveness. It was pointed out that it had no independent source of munitions, and that any enemy that succeeded in cutting our communications with England, or that happened to be in alliance with England, could render our Army inoperative in a very short period by depriving it of the munitions of war. The Minister for Agriculture was, at any rate, quite logical. He points out, or at any rate implied in his speech—I will read the quotation— that the fact that munition factories were not established here was due to deliberate design, because it would not mean that the Army would be any more effective by their establishment— that it would be useless in any case. The words are: "Will the Deputy also explain to me why it is that our Army, small, cramped, without any tanks, with a small air service, without any of the modern appliances for propagation of poison gas, if it is no good at all, what is the use of establishing a few munition factories? Is it not only playing with the situation?"

I want the Minister for Defence in his reply to tell us definitely if the Army policy enunciated on the 6th May holds good. I want him to tell us whether he, the particular Minister in charge of the Department, takes the side of the President, if the President still holds to his declaration in regard to the Army policy, or the side of the Minister for Agriculture, which, incidentally, appears to be the side of Deputy Gorey. Is the Army being maintained for the purpose of defending the territory of the Saorstát against invasion or against violation of neutrality, or is it, as the Minister for Agriculture tells us, quite useless for that purpose and is being maintained for an entirely different reason? The Minister cannot possibly reconcile both statements. I know he is a very astute debater, and he will try to, but he cannot reconcile the irreconcilable; he cannot ride both horses at the same time, because they are going in opposite directions. He has to stand by the policy declared by his predecessor and reaffirmed by the President last year, or otherwise he has to stand by what was said by the Minister for Agriculture in this debate.

The Minister for Agriculture has already been repudiated by one member of his Party. He is now being supported by another member of the Party although, perhaps, Deputy Gorey's exact affiliation to the Cumann na nGaedheal Party is somewhat doubtful. I should, perhaps, say that the Minister for Agriculture is supported by the late leader of the Farmers' Party. Is it a fact, as would seem to appear, that there is a division in Cumann na nGaedheal on this question of Army policy; that there are two sections, one believing the Army should be maintained to defend the island against invasion, and protect the people against any violation of neutrality, and the other believing that it is a waste of time, energy and money in attempting to establish an army, even an army of 500,000 men, for that purpose, as Deputy Gorey says? The Minister for Agriculture says that the Army is quite useless. He says, in as many words, that the Army is being used for the purpose of maintaining internal order; an auxiliary police force of 12,517 men of all ranks for the purpose of assisting the Civic Guard should the Civic Guard at any time require their assistance in maintaining internal order, and for no other purpose. The Minister for Agriculture was quite clear about that. It is useless to think, was his argument, if this country should be attacked by any foreign enemy, of looking to our Army for a solution of the difficulty which would then arise. He contends that we are never going to settle any of the issues in our present circumstances, under actual world conditions, until conditions change here and in other countries, and we are not going to settle issues that lie between ourselves and other countries as issues lie between practically all the independent countries of Europe, by force.

If any foreign Power attempts to violate our neutrality, attempts to put maintenance parties at our ports, attempts to demand from our people an annual tribute of £5,000,000, attempts to impose on us a Governor-General whose signature and assent will be necessary to validate the acts of the people's representatives; if any foreign Power attempts to violate our neutrality and places a border across the country, saying on one side that certain conditions shall exist and that different conditions shall exist on the other side, we are not to look to our Army for a solution. We must settle it by other means, settle it, presumably, as a similar question was settled in the past, by accepting whatever the enemy is prepared to offer and by coming back here and calling it a damn good bargain. That is the only meaning which can be taken out of the speech of the Minister for Agriculture. We are maintaining this Army, we are equipping it with aeroplanes and eighteen pounders—Deputy Cooper wants us to have howitzers as well— we are building up reserve forces not to defend the country against any outside aggression, but for the sole purpose of acting as an auxiliary police force should the 7,000 Civic Guards be incapable of maintaining order.

The Minister for Agriculture said: "So what is the Army for? Why is all this money being spent? I will tell you: to see to it that the people of this country have a right to do wrong. That is all. That is what the Army is for." He added: "It exists for the purpose of seeing that the laws passed by the majority elected by the people of this country prevail in this country." It appears he is getting somewhat confused in his argument. The Army is not to prevent any outside aggression; it is useless for that purpose. If any such outside aggression should be attempted we are going to settle it by negotiations, by giving in. We are not to attempt to settle it by force. At the same time, this selfsame Army is being maintained to ensure that the laws passed by the majority elected by the people of this country shall prevail in this country.

If the majority in the Dáil decide that there is to be no Governor-General, decide that the privilege given to the British Army to maintain maintenance parties at our ports is to be withdrawn, or is to decide that the payment of a tribute to England is to stop, apparently this Army is for the purpose of seeing that the will of the majority will prevail in the matter. But the Army is quite useless and, unfortunately, it is not merely an internal question. The will of the people to decide on these matters might be contested by a foreign country, and that foreign country might forcibly interfere. It has done so in the past. It might interfere to ensure that the laws passed by the majority elected by the people in this country do not prevail in this country. It is not one hundred years ago since the elected representatives of the Irish people met in council and passed laws which did not prevail in this country, and which are not prevailing in this country now. It is quite clear that it is not such laws to which the Minister for Agriculture is referring because he, perhaps, saw that he was leaving a loophole in his argument, and he carefully modified it in another sentence: "If we were absolutely certain that you could face up to the fact that in this country no one would challenge the majority will of the people there would be no need for an army."

The Army is not to ensure that we will be free from invasion. It is useless for that purpose. It is not even to ensure that the majority will of the people will prevail in respect to the laws which they want enacted. It is only to ensure that nobody in this country will attempt to interfere with the expression of the will of the majority.

If any section of the people of this State attempt to prevent the enactment of any law that has been freely arrived at by the majority of the people's representatives, then it is only quite right that some instrument should exist to prevent them doing so. But I contend that if we are going even to continue the pretence that we are a free country then it is also necessary that some instrument should exist by which we-will be able at least to offer some effective opposition to any attempt by people outside this country to prevent the enactment of laws which are desired by the majority of the people. The policy of the Executive Council, heretofore at any rate, has appeared to be along that line. They claimed that they were endeavouring to maintain an Army that was an independent national force, and that was organised, trained and equipped so as to be capable of assuming responsibility for the defence of the State against invasion. But it was only a claim. We may perhaps be justified in assuming that the Army policy which was outlined by the Minister for Agriculture on Thursday last is not the policy of the Executive Council. Perhaps the Minister for Agriculture has already been hauled over the coals by his superiors and asked to account for the blatant nonsense he talked on that day. I do not know. I hope the Minister for Defence will tell us whether he has or not. It would be undoubtedly a very wise thing for Cumann na nGaedheal to teach the Minister for Agriculture that unless he has something sensible to say he had better say nothing. It is not the first time that the Minister for Agriculture has landed his Party in the soup and someone else had to come along to extricate it. But if I leave the Minister for Agriculture out of it, if we leave his Army policy aside as being the policy that he holds with Deputy Gorey and Deputy Gorey only, and assume that the policy enunciated by the predecessor of the Minister for Defence in 1926, and reaffirmed by the President last year, still holds good, then we must examine that policy and see if any serious attempt has been made to put it into operation. "The Army must be capable of rapid and efficient expansion to the maximum of the country's man power." That Army consists at present of 732 officers and 9,500 men in the regular Army, 1,072 in Class A reserves, and 1,213 in Class B reserves, making a total of 12,517 in all ranks. "The Army must be capable of rapid and efficient expansion to the maximum of the country's man power in time of war." That was the policy laid down in 1926, and here in 1928 we find that the maximum to which the Army can expand in time of need is 12,517. Not merely is the capability of the Army to expand limited to that number, but I see that no attempt has been made to ensure that under any conceivable circumstances would the Army be able to expand beyond that figure. What does the putting into operation of that policy require? It does involve, in the first place, that the manhood of the nation should know that they are expected in time of need to give military service to the State. Has any single Executive Minister attempted to expound that policy?

Has any campaign been conducted in the country to get that idea into the minds of our young men? Does the Government desire that the young men of the country should get that idea into their heads, the idea of giving voluntary military service to the State in time of need? Surely if the young men of the country do not know that they are expected to serve in time of need, how can you have an army capable of efficient and rapid expansion to a maximum of the country's man-power? Even if the Executive Council had succeeded in conveying that idea to the people, even if such a campaign as I have indicated had been conducted in the country, and it was generally known that the Executive Council expected such response from the manhood of the country in time of need, do you think you would get that response if there was not in the minds of the people of the country confidence in the military policy of the Executive Council? Does that confidence exist?

We have seen here in this House a member of the Executive Council stand up and enunciate a military policy completely at variance with that laid down by the President of the Executive Council. We have seen Deputy Gorey, a member of the Cumann na nGaedheal Party—I hope I am not incorrect in referring to him as such—

No; you are quite right.

We have seen Deputy Gorey, a member of the Cumann na nGaedheal Party, supporting the Minister for Agriculture in a view which was repudiated by another member of the Cumann na nGaedheal Party, Deputy Esmonde. If there is to be public confidence in the military policy of the Executive Council it is a sine qua non of that that we know what that military policy is. I hope that the Minister for Defence in reply will remove any doubts that exist in this matter and that he will say definitely what the military policy of the Executive Council is. He should know. He should state also whether it is the policy enunciated by the Minister for Agriculture or the policy laid down by the President. It cannot possibly be both. "An army capable of rapid and efficient expansion to the maximum of the country's man power." If we are to have an Army of that kind, it is surely necessary to provide that some elementary military training would be given to the young men of the country; that some scheme should be devised by which every man who is expected according to the Ministerial declaration to give military service in time of need would be capable of giving that military service; that he would know one end of a rifle from another; that he should know, as the Minister for Defence does not know, that you cannot fire half-crowns out of a rifle, that you must have certain equipment before one can go soldiering. We have had considerable military experience in this country, but at the same time I do not think it can be claimed that even if the machinery existed by which the entire man power of the country could be called up for service in time of need that we can be certain that the actual individuals would be capable of acting as soldiers.

You will never get some of them trained.

Before it would be possible for the Executive to embark on any scheme by which the manhood of the country could be given that elementary training in military matters, another condition must be provided. There must be in the minds of the Executive Council confidence in the manhood of the country. They must be prepared to trust them with military knowledge and arms. We have had Deputy Gorey saying that if we had a volunteer force in the country those who would offer to join them would be undesirable.

I said there would be a tendency that way.

We had Deputy Gorey saying that undesirable people would join such a force, or perhaps people who wanted to utilise their position to attempt to steal his greyhounds.

They have done it.

If you have not got into the minds of the governing Party confidence in the young men of the country, if they do not believe that if they issued a call to the country the right type would respond, how then can you have an army that, in the words of the Minister, is capable of rapid and efficient expansion to the maximum of the country's man power? You will have to take even Deputy Gorey's enemies into your Army if you are going to expand it to the maximum man-power of the country. Deputy Gorey himself would be called to the colours. I hope the Deputy understands that.

The Deputy's understanding is almost human. The statement continues that "the Army must be an independent national force so organised, trained and equipped as to make it capable, should the necessity arise, of assuming responsibility for the defence of the Saorstát." In the course of this debate a number of Deputies have asked how you could have an independent national force without an independent supply of ammunition? The Minister for Defence was asked that question, I remember, in a previous debate, and he replied "if we have not got the ammunition at least we have the money to buy it." When you have mobilised your twelve thousand men and put Class A reserve in Athlone and Class B reserve in Cork, the Minister for Defence, accompanied by the Minister for Finance, will proceed to issue half-a-crown or five shillings to each man to buy ammunition and fight. What else could the Minister have possibly meant? Undoubtedly while the lines of communication are open, while we can go to England, Germany, France and America to buy ammunition and to transport it here, we will have it, but we are maintaining an Army which is to be capable of defending the country against invasion. But can an Army which has no independent source of supplies be capable of defending this country against invasion?

If members of this House are prepared to vote the sum of two million pounds or thereabouts for the purpose of maintaining an army, surely they want an army that can fight. They do not want merely a collection of individuals in green uniforms who will parade with empty guns and fixed bayonets when angels of peace think it worth their while to visit the country. They will want something more than a mere collection of men wearing uncomfortable and probably unhealthy green uniforms. They will want an effective force capable of defending the country against invasion. You have not got it, and in so far as that was part of Government policy, no attempt has been made to put it into operation. That brings us, of course, up against the wider issue of what exactly that Army is capable of doing. What is the Army capable of doing if any attempt is made by an outside power to invade the country, an army of twelve thousand men organised on Continental lines. Such an army as that would not be able to stand for five hours against any force which any possible Power attacking this island would send. It could not do it. Deputy Gorey was right for once when he said that we cannot get an army capable of defending this country against invasion by any Power that is determined to invade it. We are not strong enough to do so. But I maintain that we can get an army so organised, trained and equipped that it will not be possible for any outside Power to rule in this country. We cannot keep them out They will come in in spite of us. If our Army is only 12,000 they will come in. If we had an army of 500,000 they will come, though, as Deputy Gorey said there will be 500,000 instead of 12,000 dead before they succeed. But if France, Germany, America or any of the great military Powers were to embark on a campaign of conquest no force that we could put into the field would be able to keep them out. What we could do is, we could provide, and have shown that we are capable of providing, an army that would make it impossible for that outside Power to rule in comfort here.

I say it is a wise national policy to organise, train and equip your Army on a basis that will provide the most effective resistance. That can be done on the lines that I have indicated, and that is the only effective resistance that can be offered. We can build up an army that will have its roots in the people. It must have its roots in the people if it is to be effective. We must have the confidence of the people in the Executive Council. The people must believe that the Executive Council is prepared to resist aggression on the part of an outside Power. That confidence will not be established by making such statements as were made in the Dáil on Thursday last by the Minister for Agriculture. The people of this country are prepared to resist by every means in their Power. aggression from an outside Power. Those who maintain otherwise are only trying to colour the attitude of the people by their own cowardice.

We know that there are men in the country who will take any terms an enemy stronger than they would offer. We know that there are men in this country who, in any crisis that arises, will take the safe course and go whining for mercy instead of standing up for their rights. But the vast majority of the people of the country would be prepared to resist, and be prepared now to pay whatever is required, to maintain an army capable of resisting. That army does not exist yet, but such an army can be brought into existence. It can, however, only be brought into existence on the lines that I have indicated. It must be a territorial force, having its roots in the people. It must be a volunteer force inspired with the idea of voluntary defence of the nation in time of need.

The present Executive have not that idea in view. They have another policy. I am referring now to the policy which we were told was in operation heretofore. Even that other policy of theirs, which might have been made of some use, has not been put into operation. They have now a new policy. If we are to take it that the Minister for Agriculture was speaking for the Executive Council, that new policy is to decry the effectiveness of the force that does exist, while maintaining that force whose one and only function is to act as an auxiliary police force. I hope that the Minister for Defence will tell us, when concluding, whether he believes that the existing Army is capable of effectively resisting any attempt at the invasion of this island. I hope he will also tell us whether he thinks it is possible, following his present policy, to create in this country an army capable of doing that, and whether it is the intention of the Executive Council to use the Army to resist an invasion if such should be attempted. I hope that the Minister will make it quite clear whether he personally stands for the Minister for Agriculture or the President, and which of these two represents the mind of the majority in the Executive Council even though there is not unanimity in that body.

I think this issue was very well put by the Minister for Agriculture a short time ago when he asked what was the Army to be used for. If the Twenty-six Counties are asked to contribute close on £2,000,000 for an Army that, in the words of the Minister for Defence, is to be used as a portion of the Army of the British Empire, then we know where we are; or is it that the Army is going to be used according to the policy of the Minister for Agriculture? If the Executive Council looked a little before them they would see that the time is coming when the farmers of this country will no longer be able to pay interest on the millions that are being borrowed to keep up this Army and pay the salaries attached to it. That will be the result when the agricultural policy of our Agricultural Minister for War is followed out to its logical conclusion, that agricultural policy which has let 187,000 acres go out of tillage since 1922, and caused 167,000 people to leave the rural areas. When that policy is followed out to its logical conclusion there will be no people left on the lands to pay this extraordinary sum of £1,800,000 for the upkeep of the Army. When we examine into this figure, and see how it is spent, we find that there is only £46,000 for warlike stores. Then, we wonder where we are going to arrive if the policy of the Army is the policy which was read out to us a few minutes ago by Deputy Lemass from the speech of the Minister for Defence. If that is the policy, I wonder what preparations are being made to arm the civilian population in the event of their being needed? Are any preparations being made towards providing arms for them? What preparation is being made to train the young men of the country?

We see the policy that is being adopted throughout the country towards Fianna Eireann on the one hand and Deputy Cooper's Boy Scouts on the other. When we see that we know who are going to get the arms if they are needed. When we see the persecution of any young boy who dares to have the ideal of a free Ireland in his mind, and when we see, on the other hand, how the Baden-Powell Scouts are winked at, then we know where we are. I tell the Minister for Defence that we cannot afford to spend £1,750,000 every year on the Army. The farmers are running into bankruptcy owing to the agricultural policy of the Executive Government. When it comes to the question of a volunteer army we see the volunteer army persecuted by every means in their power by their C.I.D. Utilise the volunteer army in the country, and disband your army, which is useless, and hand over your arms to the Irish Republican Army, an army that would cost you nothing and that can be relied upon whenever the country is in difficulty. Whenever it is faced with foreign aggression that army can be relied upon to fight its corner. When we realise that out of a sum of £1,800,000 only £46,000 is being spent on warlike stores, and when we further realise that the cartridges for every gun must be bought from England, we will find that at that rate the country will be in the position that it will no longer be able with a wave of the hand to conjure up another £10,000,000 to pay all the Imperial charges that have been shoved down our throats, and not only will we be no longer able to borrow the millions but we will not be able to pay the interest on what has been borrowed. This is a question that must be approached in some sane manner, and it is assuredly not doing so in a sane manner to spend £1,800,000 on an Army which, in the words of the Minister for Agriculture, is absolutely useless, and which must depend absolutely for its munitions of war on a foreign power.

I think that is a situation that must be remedied at once if the Army is to be of any use whatever. If I saw half a million of that money devoted to starting a munition factory here, then I would say there was some sense in the proposal. That factory would provide munitions of war when needed, so that we would not be, as we are, absolutely dependent on foreign powers for our arms and ammunition. There have been many schemes and proposals put forward on which the money that goes to the Army could be spent with benefit to this country, instead of spending it in an absolutely unreproductive way. I can realise the difficulty of the Minister for Defence and of the Executive Council, who are devoid of any idea of starting industries which would absorb the unemployed. I suppose they have the same idea at the back of their minds about the Army as they have with regard to the Civic Guards. They put restrictions on the publicans in order to provide jobs for the Civic Guards around the country in looking after the publicans.

The same idea is at the back of their minds with regard to the Army, that the members of the Army cannot be turned loose as they can get no employment for them. If the Executive Council applied £1,000,000 towards starting an industry that would absorb more than 8,000 men in the Army. If that sum were devoted to agriculture, if, for instance, it were given as a kind of bonus for tillage, it would mean there would be more than the 8,000 in the Army absorbed in tillage work. There would be some reason in doing that rather than spending it on an absolutely useless proposition, to use the words of the Minister.

Before I begin replying to the various speeches, I would just like to say, as I am dealing with the Army Estimates, that if I refer to the Party opposite as the Fianna Fáil Party I do not want it to be understood that I recognise their right to take that name. A convention of Irish Volunteers was held, as far as I remember, in the Abbey Theatre in 1914, in the month of October. A resolution was moved by The O'Rahilly and seconded, as far as I remember, by myself, "That the words ‘Fianna Fáil' be recognised as the Irish equivalent to the words ‘Irish Volunteers.'" That was agreed to.

Will the Minister explain what that has to do with this Vote?

That though for convenience I am referring to the Party opposite as the Fianna Fáil Party, the title Fianna Fáil in this country must be recognised as applying only to the body which is the successor of the Irish Volunteers, and that is the National Army. I produce an Estimate representing a reduction of £387,734 from last year. I said that the figure estimated by the Minister for Finance as a fair sum for normal Army expenditure of 1½ million pounds per annum was certainly realisable. Naturally I awaited the policy of the official Opposition with interest. They have attempted to set forth their policy at great length. Economy of diction is certainly lacking on that side. Deputy MacEntee, who was the first speaker and who, I presume, was more or less authoritative, borrowed the voice of cataracts so that one thought that something really important would be forthcoming. He produced mostly gelatinous phrases.

His Party claims all credit for the reduction that is made. "Congratulations," says Deputy MacEntee, "are not due to the Minister, nor to the Government, but to the Republican Party upon these benches." And again, "It certainly is a very practicable tribute to the effectiveness of the criticism that the Minister has encountered from these benches that inside something like nine months the Government should so far have reconsidered their position as to come to the conclusion ... to permit three-quarters of a million to remain in the pockets of citizens." He says that "the Army is going to be reorganised on the basis as suggested from these benches," and Deputy Little says, "He has made certain reductions which I am perfectly sure are due to the strong influence which has been brought to bear on him from this side of the House."

It is, of course, quite impossible to understand what Deputy MacEntee means by nine months. More than two years ago, the Minister for Finance analysed the annual expenditure, dividing it into normal and abnormal. His purpose was to indicate how far actual expenditure should be met out of current taxation. Had he underestimated current expenditure he would, of course, have put this country in the position of meeting recurrent costs out of capital. It was necessary, therefore, that he should be conservative in his estimate of what might be regarded as abnormal. After very careful consideration and adverting to the defence force needs of this country, and to the most effective and efficient form for that force, he decided, and I and other Ministers concurred with him, that one and a half million pounds might safely be regarded as a figure sufficient to cover normal defence expenses in normal years when normality was reached. How Deputy MacEntee or Deputy Little can suggest that the Minister in prophetic vision could anticipate the long-winded speeches that were to be inflicted upon this Dáil after the lapse of two years is more than I can conceive. We decided on a form for the Army and on a cost to meet the Army in that form. During the last twelve months we have been moving rapidly towards that estimated cost and that anticipated form. The Opposition may pat itself on the back, but I hardly think anybody else will pat its back for it.

The Opposition policy is a big army. Deputy Kerlin says: "We want an adequate and efficient army to protect us against outside aggression and in particular against the Power which has interfered with our rights and liberties in the past and will have no hesitation whatsoever in interfering with those rights and liberties in the future if her own interests suggest it." Deputy Carney says: "We cannot afford to talk of total abolition of war so far as this country is concerned until such time as we are free. There must come a time when it will be absolutely essential. If our demands are not met in an honest and open way they must be backed by force." Deputy O'Reilly wants no army. Deputy Kerlin thinks that the ideal army of his dreams should cost about one and a quarter millions. Deputy MacEntee thinks it should cost less than three-quarters of a million. Deputy Carney thinks that as we are not free we must fight England by guerilla tactics. Deputy Kerlin apparently anticipates that Great Britain will attack us without any hesitation whatever when her own interests suggest it. Deputy Fahy wants guaranteed neutrality. He says: "If we were in power we should have a policy of neutrality guaranteed for this country." Deputy Little goes further and tells us that "the countries that would guarantee our neutrality would of necessity be America, England, Germany and France"; so that while Deputy Kerlin prepares to make war on England with guerilla tactics, Deputy Little would presumably take his seat in the British House of Commons and be urging that country to guarantee our neutrality, and even when he had succeeded in doing that, nothing would persuade Deputy Kerlin that the "British would not attack us as soon as their interests suggest it." I must confess that this policy leaves me a bit bewildered.

To come to what I might call practical suggestions. Fianna Fáil propose, in the interests of economy, to have conscription. It is true that their conscription seems to be an incompatible medley of compulsion and volunteering. Deputy MacEntee says: "Does the Minister accept the principle that all able-bodied men shall be compelled to give—or, preferably, give voluntarily—military service in time of danger?" He informs us that his Party have accepted, and are prepared to give effect to, that principle. The principle is that the citizens of this State would render military aid to the State without fee and without reward. Deputy Kerlin seems to go not quite so far. He suggests the South African system where, if unable to get voluntarily the number of troops they require, they have a ballot by districts for the remainder. This conscript army is to be very big—as big as the man-power of the country. Deputy MacEntee urges us to be guided by Switzerland in making our conscript army. And Switzerland is actually particularly indicated as being a country with guaranteed neutrality. The Deputy conveniently forgets his figure of three-quarters of a million and quotes the almost 3½ millions that the Swiss Army costs the Exchequer directly. He does not mention that to that 3½ millions must be added the loss to the unfortunate conscripts giving their services without fee and without reward. I presume that that form of taxation in service instead of in money would represent at least another 3½ millions, or 7 millions in all. He apparently intends to be as economical with the people's money as he is with his words. Incidentally, I may point out that his costing per man of the Army for this year is only a little more exact than his nine months. On the figures given by me in my opening statement, I think he will find that £135 per man is more correct than £146, and naturally, as the reserve grows, the cost per man of the whole Army will grow less, though, as I do not anticipate that the present Government will make conscription a part of its policy, and as I do not anticipate that in our lifetime we shall have an army of 260,000 men at 3d. per man per day, it may happen that we shall not get as low a cost per man as Switzerland any more than we shall put up the cost of the Army in this country to a par with that of Switzerland.

Deputy Little said that "guaranteed neutrality would make a reduction in the expense of our Army a possibility." It may seem strange to less enlightened Deputies that Switzerland, with its guaranteed neutrality, pays very much more for its army than does this country. I am, perhaps, more cynical, more worldly-minded than Deputy Little. I certainly would not agree to take over his job of rousing the people of four foreign countries to enthusiasm for guaranteeing our neutrality on the argument that it would make it possible for us to reduce our Army expenses, because, of course, if we are going to cut down our Army and leave it to these others to see to the protection of our neutrality, it is to be presumed that we shall also insist that they maintain sufficient armaments to give us that feeling of easy reliance in knowing that not only do they guarantee our neutrality but that they have the men and the guns to protect that neutrality against all and sundry. Unfortunately, so far, that generosity which Deputy Little so naively pre-supposes has not been shown to my knowledge by any country. I cannot help feeling —human nature being what it is—that any country pledging herself to protect our neutrality by force of arms would expect us to give some earnest of our own intention to assist in the maintenance of that neutrality. I can conceive that if, for instance, England guaranteed our neutrality, she would want to know from time to time what size army and armament we had available to do our share in protecting our neutrality, particularly at times when it might seem likely that another country was going to violate that neutrality. Our neutrality may be of interest to other countries, but we cannot complacently assure them that it is of no interest to us.

Deputies MacEntee, Kerlin, Briscoe and Lemass are much concerned about the manufacture of arms and munitions in this country. It may be that this country may at some time have large industries manufacturing machine guns, war-planes and other things implied in the cliché "panoply of war." I suppose that depends on whether they can be economically manufactured here, and whether we have a good and steady market for those products, but if, as those Deputies apparently imply, nothing can be done unless this country produces all that may be necessary for her warlike equipment, even when cut off completely from the rest of the world, I am afraid that the prospect is hopeless.

There is plenty of poison gas.

We have had a lot during the last few days. War equipment requires many other things. Besides steel, I doubt if all the constituent elements of cordite are found in this country. Even if we had arms factories all over the country, I am afraid that in the event of a complete blockade those factories would run short of raw material. "But," says Deputy MacEntee, "take any army you can think of, multiply it by ten, and it is absolutely useless unless this country can produce all its own warlike needs irrespective of blockades." And yet Deputy Kerlin would spend one and three-quarter millions, and Deputy MacEntee says three-quarters of a million of the taxpayers' money in maintaining an army in this hopeless country whose natural resources did not include all that armament demands. What a pity Deputy MacEntee has never convinced, say, Italy, of the futility of that country in attempting to maintain an army when it has no iron mines, and what a happy idea it would be for Deputy Kerlin to explain to the French people how absurd they are in having military aeroplanes when they have no petrol wells in their country.

The League of Nations.

I will come to the League of Nations later. Perhaps these Deputies think that we should be laying in enormous stores to meet any possible needs for the future—whether the stores be manufactured armaments or raw materials makes very little difference. Apart from the absence of raw material for war stores or of factories in this country, Opposition members ask: Can the Army make a resistance to any Great Power or combination of Great Powers? I am prepared to admit that if, for instance, all the Great Powers formed a military combination against us, or even if one of the Great Powers decide to put all her resources into a war against us, we cannot foretell victory for ourselves.

You are prepared to admit that?

The truth is that no country can maintain an armament capable of resisting every conceivable combination against it. They have to rely on certain other considerations. We maintain an army because it is possible that the State may be attacked from inside or from without.

Especially inside.

And also without. But we have more recent experience of the inside sort. In the case of attack from inside—the Army met such an attack in 1922 and reduced the enemy, I will not say to silence, but to talk. The Army is better prepared now than it was in 1922.

Naturally, under this Minister.

In the case of attack from outside, I think it is possible to maintain a force capable of putting up such a resistance as to make it worth while for the enemy who was considering such an attack to think better of it.

You have not as many undesirables in the Army as in 1922.

Some joined the Fianna Fáil Party. In the case of attack from outside, I do not think that the line of reasoning is to consider what is the possible complete strength that could be mobilised by a conceivable enemy or enemies, and to say that unless we can guarantee a greater strength than they could put against us it is quite hopeless. I think a sounder line, particularly for those who like guaranteed neutrality, would be to say. what strategic or other advantage would such Power or Powers expect to gain, and what resistance here would make it advisable for such Powers to forego that advantage? I think that it is possible for us to maintain an army that will be sufficient to make any belligerently-disposed Power rule out the soil of this State as a scene for their warlike activities. I have proposed a standing army as cadre of something in the neighbourhood of 5,000 men. Of course the Opposition say 3,000. The Minister for Finance said nearly two years before the Opposition entered the House that the Army should be maintained at a cost not greater than 1½ millions. Of course, the Opposition say a lesser sum —in fact, several lesser sums. The difference between us is not a matter of figures, but the fact that we are dealing with realities while they talk in the air. Another difference is that we cost on the basis that the labourer is worthy of his hire. They propose conscription—the conscripts serving without fee and without reward. We do not propose conscription without fee and without reward.

A DEPUTY

They did it before.

We have seen that system in operation. I remember a member of the Dáil, early in 1922, explaining his habit of raiding post offices by stating that as the Minister for Defence was not forwarding money to pay men who were trying to subvert the State, he seized money in the post offices rather than have his men without smokes and without drinks. I understand from the Press that that gentleman is now likely to be a Fianna Fáil candidate for the Seanad. I think that the Government method of paying men from taxation is more economical.

Besides that cadre of 5,000 men, there is the "A" reserve. That consists of fully trained men who have been members of the permanent force. Last February the "B" reserves were started. That is the form of the Army at present. I admit that much that we are doing is frankly experimental. We have not the angelic intellection of the Opposition. We cannot assert that what we do will be successful until we have done it.

Who wrote this for the Minister—who is the author?

I am afraid I am.

Mr. BOLAND

We must have a poet in the Department of Defence. I forgot that the Minister is a reformed poet.

I am prepared to take on a bet as to the author of this document with the Opposition.

Blank verse!

He is getting back to his poetry—I thought he was reformed.

When I am satisfied that I have the legal power, I propose to start the volunteer reserve. Unlike the Opposition, I do not understand the word "volunteer" to connote compulsion.

Did you consult with Deputy Gorey before deciding?

No. It will be voluntary. I do not know what the response to it will be, and, of course, its success depends on that response. I propose organising the Army on lines that will make it capable of rapid expansion, because I believe that when the State needs it all the voluntary assistance that is required will be forthcoming. Our defence policy visualises only defence. There are no agreements concealed behind the last Imperial Conference. We are not committed to nor have we plans for military action overseas. The Army exists for the defence of this State on the soil of this State against all possible enemies of this State whether internal or external. For that purpose, the Army is the servant of the people, and is to act under the orders of whatever Government the people choose to put in power. The Army costs the people of this State less, both actually and relatively, than the vast majority of armies in the world.

I will now try to deal with the general policy of the Opposition and also try to give a fairly clear statement of the Government policy. I may have to supplement that, later, for the information of Deputy Lemass. I am, however, in a slight difficulty. On Thursday or Friday, a Deputy on the other side, named Carney, dealt with points raised in the Appropriation Accounts. I feel that I am not justified in dealing with the matter here, as ordinary good manners, if nothing else, ought to indicate that it should be left to the Committee. The Deputy misrepresented two things. He talked about horses being bought for jumping that were crocks. One of these horses won a fairly substantial prize recently for jumping at Biarritz. The Deputy read from the Appropriation Accounts to the effect that an Army officer drew pay after he left the Army without pay and that he resigned the next year. Either by accident or design, the Deputy spoke afterwards of that officer drawing pay after he left the Army, but he slurred over the fact that while the officer was in the Army the pay which he had overdrawn was repaid to the State.

Then why was it included in the statement of the Accountant and Auditor-General?

It is quite an irregular thing, but irregularity often happens in an army.

Even in a regular army.

If the Accountant and Auditor-General was wrong it was not my fault.

You will find in the Official Reports that the Deputy, having read out what was in the Appropriation Accounts, misrepresented what was in them by saying that the officer drew pay after leaving the Army. That was not stated in the Accounts. That was an invention on the part of the Deputy.

Do you say that the officer was entitled to the money he drew?

I say that the Deputy misrepresented what was in the Appropriation Accounts, or deduced from them something that was not in them. He was wrong. Whether by ignorance or design, I do not know.

I was dealing with irregularities.

I have spent a lot of time trying to prevent irregularities.

A DEPUTY

You would not prevent much.

These are matters which good manners should have left to the Committee.

Deputy Anthony suggested a system of deferred payment. Under the existing law I have no power to withhold pay from soldiers except in cases arising out of offences against discipline. If the soldier desires I can hold back a certain amount of his pay, but we can only do it when he desires it. We have no power of enforcing that. Since the last estimate was introduced, early this year I think it was, we did make an arrangement whereby soldiers who have two and a half years or more of continuous service get twenty-one days' leave at the end of their service. That is to say, they really leave the Army with three weeks' pay in their pockets. Those who have served one and a half years continuous service get fourteen days' leave. In other words, they leave the Army with two weeks' pay in their pockets.

Deputy Lemass asked me a whole lot of questions about the speech of the Minister for Agriculture. I take my mind back to many years ago, when I lived in very close proximity to certain graphic artists who became famous afterwards. They had often to tell people who came and talked with them that in order to produce character you have to have a certain amount of caricature. We know that the Army, as I have said, exists for the defence of this country and all that it implies, whether against external or internal foes. If we saw external aggression threatened I would naturally stress, or caricature, if you like, the function of the Army against external aggression. Now, the Minister for Agriculture, like myself, suffered listening to a lot of speeches, very relevant most of them, and he wished to bring out to the Deputies opposite one side of their function, if you like, like the painters' caricature. He stressed that to the exclusion of character Deputy Lemass, who, I believe, is the sole Deputy on the other side with a glimmering of a sense of humour, would have understood the thing perfectly well if he were here, granted he is honest. Of course we know that when we get up and wish to bring out one side of a thing it puts the other people in the position of saying: "You said so and so," whereas it often depends on the tone of voice or the look in the eye. The Minister for Agriculture wished to bring out to the Deputies opposite, and through them to other people, that the Army was in no way to stand any nonsense anywhere. He stated that side convincingly, and he left the other side to imply things that were not there.

I would like to say that he did not leave the other side unsaid. "The Army is not for the purpose of defending us against a first-class Power. It is quite useless for that purpose."

If I wanted to be as casuistic as Deputies opposite I could say, and have said, that if any first-class Power proposes to throw all its resources against us in our isolated position we cannot promise you that we will overwhelm it and beat it.

The Army is not for service against a first-class Power, the Minister for Agriculture says. He said it is not for the purpose of defending us in a military way against a first-class Power. It is not a question of capabilities.

One could be casuistical about it and one could assume, ex egesis, that it is not for that purpose by saying that it is not primarily for that purpose. He wanted to bring home, being interested in history and having in mind a certain amount of recent history, that it is very much more for the purpose of preventing any internal aggression.

Does the Minister for Agriculture accept the Minister's explanation of what he said?

I am sure he does. He is most amenable.

I referred to the figure of 20,000 rifles on Thursday, but if the Minister would look at the report of my speech on Friday morning, he would find that I mentioned that the figure was increased to 60,000, and I asked the Minister to indicate whether there was a limit to the amount of rifles that we might have in this country at any one time.

None that I know of.

At no time?

A Quarter-master-General who was trying to get rid of a nuisance might tell him any amount of lies to get rid of him for the moment.

That is the way you get rid of your nuisances.

Deputy Cooper suggested that we should get howitzers. We already have some howitzers. Poor Deputy Maguire talked of how wrong we were in maintaining an army and how hypocritical it was to imply, in going over to the Peace Conference in Geneva, that we believed in the abolition of all war. One of the League of Nations' methods is the application of sanctions, and, strictly speaking, as far as the League of Nations is concerned at present, it does imply the maintenance of a certain kind of armed forces by a certain number of countries. There is nothing hypocritical in that. I would like to explain some time how harmful people are to the League of Nations who talk about it as if it were something which it is not.

A DEPUTY

A League of Hypocrites.

People object to our buying horses for jumping. Quite frankly I do advert in this matter of jumping to the matter of national advertising, and to the fact that we produce horses in this country, and that the selling of those horses is a matter of business. It may be considered rather beneath the dignity of an army to consider such commercial matters, but I am only a civilian in the Army, and I do advert to those things. Deputy Anthony and Deputy Tubridy referred to my recent uniform order. Deputy Anthony said that it excluded the poor man's son. I cannot see how that arises. The officers, just as the men, are under military law, and I consider that it is good for discipline in the Army, that the men should realise that all the time. I know it is only human nature that if you wear a uniform, which implies that you are under a rigid discipline, as you take it off, you have the feeling that you shake off discipline at the same time. Officers get a grant of £50 the first year, and £20 every subsequent year to assist towards paying the difference between the cost of ordinary civilian clothes and the cost of a uniform.

I am quite satisfied that if an officer wears a uniform for the time that he would wear his ordinary clothes, the cost to him for this uniform will not exceed the cost that he would have incurred in buying civilian clothes, by more than £20 in the year. I consider that the order was very good and very beneficial in the interests of discipline in the Army, and in the interests of the Army in every possible way. It does not exclude the poor man's son. It does not seek to set up an officer class. It does not imply that officers must incur expense that they otherwise would not. The only rule, as I might say, governing whether an officer travels first class or third class, or where he goes to in a theatre, or the only indication he receives from the Minister is in the matter of the pay he gets. He is only expected to live at the ordinary standard indicated from the pay he gets. Nobody asks an officer to maintain a standard beyond the standard implied by his salary.

I think you might leave the question of good manners to Deputies.

Deputy Fahy spoke about the proportion of officers to men. As I said the other day, we are reducing the size of the Army. From 50,000 we are moving on to a standing Army of 5,000, and we are comparatively near that number. In reducing an army like that there must be a certain amount of symmetry between the various branches. It is impossible to reduce an army in a given time to one-fifth its size and make the reduction in the various branches identical. As an army gets smaller it follows that the proportion of officers to men will be greater than is the case in countries where the major part of the army is a standing army. As to Deputy Dr. O'Dowd's statement, I would not like to hurt Deputy Davin's feelings, but I might say that the epithet used in the reply given in the Seanad to a speech of his here might also apply to Deputy O'Dowd. It is easy to get up and fling figures around. Deputy Dr. O'Dowd said that whereas a dispensary doctor deals with 5,000 people, a doctor in the Army—his figures were, of course, wrong—only deals with 194 men. There is no parity between the work of a dispensary doctor and that of an army doctor. To begin with, Deputy Dr. O'Dowd took the number in the Army, divided it by the number of the medical staff, and said that that was the number of people a doctor in the Army had to deal with. Although I believe that the Deputy has some experience of an army not of this State, he, did not advert to the fact that besides soldiers there are soldiers' wives and families. I do not know a great deal about dispensary doctors, but I believe that when a case is fairly bad it is sent to hospital. We have cases coming to hospitals from all parts of the country. In the Army, hospitals are included in our costs. As a matter of fact, the cost of our hospitals compares favourably with most hospitals of which we have accounts. We pay all our medical members whereas the hospitals, with which the Deputy drew comparison, do not pay their senior members. Hospitals usually charge a certain amount to their patients and they also have charitable bequests and money from other parts.

The Deputy was wrong in the number of medical officers. I do not want to go into the details of his argument, but since the last Estimate was produced we have reduced the medical staff by 15 medical men and 12 nurses. I cannot undertake to reduce staffs more quickly than that relatively. There were comparisons also between the cost per man in our Army and that in the British Army, but, just in the same way as Deputies opposite do not seem to be able to read our own Estimates and will quote Estimates of previous years, so they do not seem to be able to work out their figures. The average cost per man in our Army, according to the Deputy who referred to it, was, I think, £146 per man. Of course, it is not. It is about £133.

I was the Deputy who put up these figures, and my calculations were made as a result of the figures used by the Minister when introducing the Estimate. Therefore, I would not be expected to be exact, but I was near enough.

I am giving it on the figures which I mentioned when introducing the Estimate. The Deputy will see that there is a difference between £146 and £133 per man. The Deputy went on to compare the cost here per man with that in the British Army, and he was wrong again.

By how much?

If you take the cost of the British Army, including Territorials and Reserves, but excluding those serving in India, the average cost per man in the British Army is £214.39, while, including Territorials and Reserves and including those serving in India, it is £181.7; so that the Deputy's argument, as he tried to base it, is rather creditable to us. The cost of our regular Army along with the Reserves is £133 per man. Deputy MacEntee spoke about the economy which there was in Switzerland, where they ran a conscript, non-full-time army at £22 per man. The average cost of the Reserve with us is £10.2.

What was the cost of the National Army per man without the new Reserve?

That would bring it higher. It would be about £171. Of course, Deputy Briscoe is what you call anti-Treaty. I have an idea why he is——

Now, now. It has nothing to do with this Estimate.

He does not happen to be a poet, and does not draw on his imagination.

He does draw on his imagination. He stated on Thursday that under the Treaty we are not allowed to have more than 20,000 rifles in this country. I suppose that that is one of the reasons why he is against the Treaty. Deputies opposite have, I know, been fed on fairly tough propaganda, and I do not know how far these ideas are abroad, but if Deputy Briscoe is right I am breaking the Treaty every day of my life. I am prepared to sell more than 20,000 rifles.

It would not be the first time the Minister had something to do with rifles. He should remember the place which he absented himself from. Keep off that topic.

He has been brought to book, I presume.

Does he like to be called a caricature artist?

This is what happens with the other side: When one makes a statement and draws an analogy they try to make the analogy a direct statement. That I regard as a certain form of mental dishonesty.

He has been spanked and put away.

Let him come in when this is over.

I think Deputy Lemass said that we have no independent source of supplies, and Deputy Briscoe said that we were bound to buy all our munitions and all our warlike equipment from Woolwich Arsenal. That is like his 20,000 rifles. Deputy Lemass, who, I believe, is more serious and more important, says that we have no independent source of supplies. That is capable of two explanations. He may have meant that we have not within this country sources of supplies making us independent of the whole outside world, or, on the other hand, he may have grown up in the school of Deputy Briscoe and he may believe that we have no independent source of supplies because we are bound to buy from Woolwich Arsenal or from England. If it is the first that he means I am sorry. I did not make this country; God made it. If this country does not produce all that is required I cannot be blamed for that.

But could you not equip the Army with bows and arrows, which would be almost as useful as empty rifles?

The rifles are not empty. We have the whole world to buy in, except we are blockaded. Once we are blockaded we have to depend on the resources of this country. I am trying to answer Deputy Lemass and Deputy Briscoe—not that Deputy Briscoe matters a great deal—but I am trying to answer them both if they mean the same thing. We have an independent source of supply inasmuch as we can draw on those parts of the world that, either in raw materials or in finished products, are in a position to sell us things that are required.

And there is no agreement about keeping regular types of arms amongst the various forces of the British Empire? Am I correct in assuming that an agreement has been arrived at by which the forces of the various units of the British Empire are kept in uniformity as regards equipment and training?

No; we have no agreement.

And any statement to that effect would be wrong?

Any statement to the effect that we have made such an agreement?—I think so. The Deputy said that we must have the confidence of the people in the Executive Council. Well, I am sorry. Deputies opposite always seem to think that any Government but a Government of theirs cannot have the confidence of the people. They may be right. The mystery to me is: how it is that in every General Election—in 1922, in 1923, and in two last year—the people who cannot have confidence in us, and who apparently have all confidence in them, apparently show that confidence in every possible way except by voting for them.

A DEPUTY

What about Jinks?

You forgot that when you were sweating.

I do not usually sweat. I am afraid the Deputy opposite has a more sweaty look than I have.

We made Jinks sweat.

Deputy Lemass asked me to state if I believed it was possible to create an army in this country capable of resisting invasion. I think it is possible to create an army in this country capable of resisting any invasion that is humanly likely to happen, but, as I said before, we cannot undertake in this country, any more than any other other country can, to be able to assert that we are able to resist all and sundry who may come against us.

Can the Minister state what would constitute invasion? Would foreign maintenance parties at our ports constitute invasion?

No, not necessarily. Years ago I had to explain in a previous Dáil that Spain was not invaded because the British had Gibraltar, and that, as a matter of fact, a country can make an arrangement by treaty with any other country. An invasion is coming by force of arms to seize without any treaty arrangement at all. That is what I mean and understand by invasion. I think Deputy Lemass will agree that between the policy of the Army now, and the policy on the 6th May, 1926, that he quoted, there is not a great deal of difference. I gathered from most of the Deputies opposite who spoke that when it was stated that the Army was capable of expansion, they understood by that an idea of conscription or universal military service. That is not implied in the statement. Deputy MacEntee complained of the small progress made with reserves. As a matter of fact, I suppose in one year the reserves moved from practically none to about 5,000. I think that is moving fairly quickly. If we had 5,000 every year we would almost move up to Deputy MacEntee's or Deputy Kerlin's figures. The idea of the expansion of the Army was that you could have an Army of only 5,000 capable of absorbing and training men quickly in their various units. It can do that. But it does not follow when you say that the Army must be capable of expansion to the greatest possible limits that you should apply universal military service. I was asked to accept the principle that the Government should expect the people, in case of emergency, to give military support. Of course, it does. That is ordinary ethics. Deputy Lemass complained of people going around and telling young men that in the event of the country being threatened with subversion inside or outside they had a duty, to give whatever service they may be called on to give. That is ordinary ethics. I presume they learned that, more or less, in the Catechism. I have spoken at considerable length, but in dealing with heads one takes longer than one might usually be justified in doing.

Question put.
The Committee divided: Tá, 82; Níl, 56.

Tá.

  • Aird, William P.
  • Alton, Ernest Henry.
  • Anthony, Richard.
  • Beckett, James Walter.
  • Bennett, George Cecil.
  • Blythe, Ernest.
  • Bourke, Séamus A.
  • Brennan, Michael.
  • Brodrick, Seán.
  • Byrne, Alfred.
  • Byrne, John Joseph.
  • Carey, Edmund.
  • Clancy, Patrick.
  • Coburn, James.
  • Cole, John James.
  • Collins-O'Driscoll, Mrs. Margt.
  • Colohan, Hugh.
  • Conlon, Martin.
  • Connolly, Michael P.
  • Cooper, Bryan Ricco.
  • Corish, Richard.
  • Cosgrave, William T.
  • Craig, Sir James.
  • Crowley, James.
  • Daly, John.
  • Davin, William.
  • Davis, Michael.
  • De Loughrey, Peter.
  • Doherty, Eugene.
  • Dolan, James N.
  • Doyle, Peadar Seán.
  • Duggan, Edmund John.
  • Dwyer, James.
  • Esmonde, Osmond Thos. Grattan.
  • Fitzgerald, Desmond.
  • Fitzgerald-Kenney, James.
  • Good, John.
  • Gorey, Denis J.
  • Thrift, William Edward.
  • Tierney, Michael.
  • Vaughan, Daniel.
  • Haslett, Alexander.
  • Hassett, John J.
  • Heffernan, Michael R.
  • Hennessy, Michael Joseph.
  • Hennessy, Thomas.
  • Hennigan, John.
  • Henry, Mark.
  • Hogan, Patrick (Galway).
  • Holohan, Richard.
  • Jordan, Michael.
  • Keogh, Myles.
  • Law, Hugh Alexander.
  • Leonard, Patrick.
  • Lynch, Finian.
  • Mathews, Arthur Patrick.
  • McFadden, Michael Og.
  • McGilligan, Patrick.
  • Mongan, Joseph W.
  • Mulcahy, Richard.
  • Murphy, James E.
  • Murphy, Timothy Joseph.
  • Myles, James Sproule.
  • Nally, Martin Michael.
  • Nolan, John Thomas.
  • O'Connell, Richard.
  • O'Connell, Thomas J.
  • O'Connor, Bartholomew.
  • O'Donovan, Timothy Joseph.
  • O'Hanlon, John F.
  • O'Leary, Daniel.
  • O'Mahony, Dermot Gun.
  • O'Reilly, John J.
  • O'Sullivan, Gearoid.
  • O'Sullivan, John Marcus.
  • Reynolds, Patrick.
  • Roddy, Martin.
  • Shaw, Patrick W.
  • Sheehy, Timothy (West Cork).
  • White, John.
  • White, Vincent Joseph.
  • Wolfe, Jasper Travers.

Níl.

  • Allen, Denis.
  • Blaney, Neal.
  • Boland, Gerald.
  • Boland, Patrick.
  • Bourke, Daniel.
  • Brady, Seán.
  • Briscoe, Robert.
  • Buckley, Daniel.
  • Carney, Frank.
  • Carty, Frank.
  • Cassidy, Archie J.
  • Clery, Michael.
  • Colbert, James.
  • Cooney, Eamon.
  • Corkery, Dan.
  • Corry, Martin John.
  • Crowley, Fred. Hugh.
  • Crowley, Tadhg.
  • Derrig, Thomas.
  • De Valera, Eamon.
  • Fahy, Frank.
  • Flinn, Hugo.
  • Fogarty, Andrew.
  • French, Seán.
  • Gorry, Patrick J.
  • Goulding, John.
  • Hayes, Seán.
  • Holt, Samuel.
  • Houlihan, Patrick.
  • Jordan, Stephen.
  • Kennedy, Michael Joseph.
  • Kent, William R.
  • Kerlin, Frank.
  • Killane, James Joseph.
  • Killilea, Mark.
  • Kilroy, Michael.
  • Lemass, Seán F.
  • Little, Patrick John.
  • Maguire, Ben.
  • MacEntee, Seán.
  • Moore, Séamus.
  • Mullins, Thomas.
  • O'Dowd, Patrick, Joseph.
  • O'Kelly, Seán T.
  • O'Leary, William.
  • O'Reilly, Matthew.
  • O'Reilly, Thomas.
  • Powell, Thomas P.
  • Ruttledge, Patrick J.
  • Ryan, James.
  • Sexton, Martin.
  • Sheehy, Timothy (Tipperary).
  • Smith, Patrick.
  • Tubridy, John.
  • Walsh, Richard.
  • Ward, Francis C.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Duggan and P.S. Doyle; Níl: Deputies G. Boland and Allen.
Motion declared carried.
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