It is more or less reluctantly that I am intervening in the debate on the Army Estimate, because is has been of considerable duration, and has eaten substantially into the time available for the discussion of other Estimates. I think it has become quite obvious from the debate, as far as it has proceeded, that it is likely to prove one of the most important that will take place during the present session. I was not here on Thursday or Friday last when this debate was proceeding, but I have carefully read through the report of the speeches made on both sides of the House, as they appeared in the Official Debates, and I must say, personally, that I am much less clear as to what the Army policy of the Executive is than I was before the debate commenced. On Wednesday last, if I had been asked by any Deputy, or by any person outside, what the policy of the Government in relation to the Army was, I could have pointed to a definite statement made in this House by a responsible Minister and say: "You will find it contained within that statement." I could not refer any person to that statement now, because during the course of this debate it has been revealed that there has been, apparently, a complete reversal of that policy during a very recent period. I am intervening in the debate to ask the Minister for Defence to answer certain definite queries which I am now about to put to him. On the 6th May, 1926, the then Minister for Defence, in response to demands from various sections in this House and outside it, uttered a statement on Army policy. It was a considered statement. It was not the personal statement of a particular individual who happened to be Minister for Defence at the time. It was a statement on Army policy which, he was quite clear to convey to the House, had the approval of the Executive Council. It was as follows:
"Well, I have no hesitation in stating the policy now. It is this: The organisation of our defence forces should, in the first place, be such that it would be capable of rapid and efficient expansion in time of need to the maximum strength of the country's man-power. This will necessitate the training of all ranks in duties of a more advanced nature than those normally associated with each rank. The Army must be an independent national force, so organised, trained and equipped as to render it capable, should the necessity arise, of assuming responsibility for the defence of the territory of the Saorstát against invasion, or internal destructive agencies, or against violation of neutrality on the part of an enemy."
That statement was made by the Minister for Defence on the 6th May, 1926. In the debate upon the Army Estimate for last year that statement was referred to by the President. He moved the adoption of the estimate and said that that statement contained then a concise and clear definition of the Army policy of the Executive Council. In introducing the estimate this year the Minister did not deal with Army policy as such. He confined himself to dealing with matters of detail in relation to the Army, and he made one important and significant statement to which, in view of what happened since, I would like to refer:
"We have moved on so quickly during the last year towards the normal that we have come across many facts we were previously unaware of, and here I have to make a slight confession, and it is that our outlook on certain points, from close observation, has changed considerably."
As I said, the Minister made no reference to Army policy. That was apparently left to another Minister, the only Minister, I think, who has spoken in the debate, the Minister for Agriculture. Now, the Minister for Agriculture is a member of the Executive Council, and we know that members of the Executive Council have collective responsibility. The whole Council is responsible for the acts and words of each member of the Council, and we must assume that when the Minister for Agriculture stood up and enunciated the Army policy here on Thursday last he was speaking with the sanction of the Executive Council. I would like to remind the House now of the Army policy enunciated on the 6th May, 1926:
"The Army must be an independent national force, so organised, trained and equipped as to render it capable should the necessity arise of assuming responsibility for the defence of the territory of the Saorstát or against invasion or against violation of neutrality."
The Minister for Agriculture, speaking last Thursday, said:
"The Army is not for the purpose of defending us in a military way against any first-class Power that wants to attack us. It is quite useless for that purpose."
He also said:
"In those days and in our circumstances at the present moment force will not be a remedy between us and any other country."
Now, it appears to me that these two statements are diametrically opposed. We cannot have the Army maintained as an independent national force, organised, trained and equipped to defend the territory of the Saorstát against invasion, if a responsible Minister can come to the House and tell us that the Army which exists is quite useless for that purpose. The Minister for Agriculture is in a position to know more about the Army than we do. We assumed that the Ministry had made some attempt during the past two years to put into operation the policy which it declared to be its policy in 1926. But, at the end of two years, during which that policy was presumably in operation, we have a responsible Minister coming here and telling us that the Army is quite useless for the purpose of implementing that policy.
Questions were raised here as to the equipment of the Army and as to its effectiveness. It was pointed out that it had no independent source of munitions, and that any enemy that succeeded in cutting our communications with England, or that happened to be in alliance with England, could render our Army inoperative in a very short period by depriving it of the munitions of war. The Minister for Agriculture was, at any rate, quite logical. He points out, or at any rate implied in his speech—I will read the quotation— that the fact that munition factories were not established here was due to deliberate design, because it would not mean that the Army would be any more effective by their establishment— that it would be useless in any case. The words are: "Will the Deputy also explain to me why it is that our Army, small, cramped, without any tanks, with a small air service, without any of the modern appliances for propagation of poison gas, if it is no good at all, what is the use of establishing a few munition factories? Is it not only playing with the situation?"
I want the Minister for Defence in his reply to tell us definitely if the Army policy enunciated on the 6th May holds good. I want him to tell us whether he, the particular Minister in charge of the Department, takes the side of the President, if the President still holds to his declaration in regard to the Army policy, or the side of the Minister for Agriculture, which, incidentally, appears to be the side of Deputy Gorey. Is the Army being maintained for the purpose of defending the territory of the Saorstát against invasion or against violation of neutrality, or is it, as the Minister for Agriculture tells us, quite useless for that purpose and is being maintained for an entirely different reason? The Minister cannot possibly reconcile both statements. I know he is a very astute debater, and he will try to, but he cannot reconcile the irreconcilable; he cannot ride both horses at the same time, because they are going in opposite directions. He has to stand by the policy declared by his predecessor and reaffirmed by the President last year, or otherwise he has to stand by what was said by the Minister for Agriculture in this debate.
The Minister for Agriculture has already been repudiated by one member of his Party. He is now being supported by another member of the Party although, perhaps, Deputy Gorey's exact affiliation to the Cumann na nGaedheal Party is somewhat doubtful. I should, perhaps, say that the Minister for Agriculture is supported by the late leader of the Farmers' Party. Is it a fact, as would seem to appear, that there is a division in Cumann na nGaedheal on this question of Army policy; that there are two sections, one believing the Army should be maintained to defend the island against invasion, and protect the people against any violation of neutrality, and the other believing that it is a waste of time, energy and money in attempting to establish an army, even an army of 500,000 men, for that purpose, as Deputy Gorey says? The Minister for Agriculture says that the Army is quite useless. He says, in as many words, that the Army is being used for the purpose of maintaining internal order; an auxiliary police force of 12,517 men of all ranks for the purpose of assisting the Civic Guard should the Civic Guard at any time require their assistance in maintaining internal order, and for no other purpose. The Minister for Agriculture was quite clear about that. It is useless to think, was his argument, if this country should be attacked by any foreign enemy, of looking to our Army for a solution of the difficulty which would then arise. He contends that we are never going to settle any of the issues in our present circumstances, under actual world conditions, until conditions change here and in other countries, and we are not going to settle issues that lie between ourselves and other countries as issues lie between practically all the independent countries of Europe, by force.
If any foreign Power attempts to violate our neutrality, attempts to put maintenance parties at our ports, attempts to demand from our people an annual tribute of £5,000,000, attempts to impose on us a Governor-General whose signature and assent will be necessary to validate the acts of the people's representatives; if any foreign Power attempts to violate our neutrality and places a border across the country, saying on one side that certain conditions shall exist and that different conditions shall exist on the other side, we are not to look to our Army for a solution. We must settle it by other means, settle it, presumably, as a similar question was settled in the past, by accepting whatever the enemy is prepared to offer and by coming back here and calling it a damn good bargain. That is the only meaning which can be taken out of the speech of the Minister for Agriculture. We are maintaining this Army, we are equipping it with aeroplanes and eighteen pounders—Deputy Cooper wants us to have howitzers as well— we are building up reserve forces not to defend the country against any outside aggression, but for the sole purpose of acting as an auxiliary police force should the 7,000 Civic Guards be incapable of maintaining order.
The Minister for Agriculture said: "So what is the Army for? Why is all this money being spent? I will tell you: to see to it that the people of this country have a right to do wrong. That is all. That is what the Army is for." He added: "It exists for the purpose of seeing that the laws passed by the majority elected by the people of this country prevail in this country." It appears he is getting somewhat confused in his argument. The Army is not to prevent any outside aggression; it is useless for that purpose. If any such outside aggression should be attempted we are going to settle it by negotiations, by giving in. We are not to attempt to settle it by force. At the same time, this selfsame Army is being maintained to ensure that the laws passed by the majority elected by the people of this country shall prevail in this country.
If the majority in the Dáil decide that there is to be no Governor-General, decide that the privilege given to the British Army to maintain maintenance parties at our ports is to be withdrawn, or is to decide that the payment of a tribute to England is to stop, apparently this Army is for the purpose of seeing that the will of the majority will prevail in the matter. But the Army is quite useless and, unfortunately, it is not merely an internal question. The will of the people to decide on these matters might be contested by a foreign country, and that foreign country might forcibly interfere. It has done so in the past. It might interfere to ensure that the laws passed by the majority elected by the people in this country do not prevail in this country. It is not one hundred years ago since the elected representatives of the Irish people met in council and passed laws which did not prevail in this country, and which are not prevailing in this country now. It is quite clear that it is not such laws to which the Minister for Agriculture is referring because he, perhaps, saw that he was leaving a loophole in his argument, and he carefully modified it in another sentence: "If we were absolutely certain that you could face up to the fact that in this country no one would challenge the majority will of the people there would be no need for an army."
The Army is not to ensure that we will be free from invasion. It is useless for that purpose. It is not even to ensure that the majority will of the people will prevail in respect to the laws which they want enacted. It is only to ensure that nobody in this country will attempt to interfere with the expression of the will of the majority.
If any section of the people of this State attempt to prevent the enactment of any law that has been freely arrived at by the majority of the people's representatives, then it is only quite right that some instrument should exist to prevent them doing so. But I contend that if we are going even to continue the pretence that we are a free country then it is also necessary that some instrument should exist by which we-will be able at least to offer some effective opposition to any attempt by people outside this country to prevent the enactment of laws which are desired by the majority of the people. The policy of the Executive Council, heretofore at any rate, has appeared to be along that line. They claimed that they were endeavouring to maintain an Army that was an independent national force, and that was organised, trained and equipped so as to be capable of assuming responsibility for the defence of the State against invasion. But it was only a claim. We may perhaps be justified in assuming that the Army policy which was outlined by the Minister for Agriculture on Thursday last is not the policy of the Executive Council. Perhaps the Minister for Agriculture has already been hauled over the coals by his superiors and asked to account for the blatant nonsense he talked on that day. I do not know. I hope the Minister for Defence will tell us whether he has or not. It would be undoubtedly a very wise thing for Cumann na nGaedheal to teach the Minister for Agriculture that unless he has something sensible to say he had better say nothing. It is not the first time that the Minister for Agriculture has landed his Party in the soup and someone else had to come along to extricate it. But if I leave the Minister for Agriculture out of it, if we leave his Army policy aside as being the policy that he holds with Deputy Gorey and Deputy Gorey only, and assume that the policy enunciated by the predecessor of the Minister for Defence in 1926, and reaffirmed by the President last year, still holds good, then we must examine that policy and see if any serious attempt has been made to put it into operation. "The Army must be capable of rapid and efficient expansion to the maximum of the country's man power." That Army consists at present of 732 officers and 9,500 men in the regular Army, 1,072 in Class A reserves, and 1,213 in Class B reserves, making a total of 12,517 in all ranks. "The Army must be capable of rapid and efficient expansion to the maximum of the country's man power in time of war." That was the policy laid down in 1926, and here in 1928 we find that the maximum to which the Army can expand in time of need is 12,517. Not merely is the capability of the Army to expand limited to that number, but I see that no attempt has been made to ensure that under any conceivable circumstances would the Army be able to expand beyond that figure. What does the putting into operation of that policy require? It does involve, in the first place, that the manhood of the nation should know that they are expected in time of need to give military service to the State. Has any single Executive Minister attempted to expound that policy?
Has any campaign been conducted in the country to get that idea into the minds of our young men? Does the Government desire that the young men of the country should get that idea into their heads, the idea of giving voluntary military service to the State in time of need? Surely if the young men of the country do not know that they are expected to serve in time of need, how can you have an army capable of efficient and rapid expansion to a maximum of the country's man-power? Even if the Executive Council had succeeded in conveying that idea to the people, even if such a campaign as I have indicated had been conducted in the country, and it was generally known that the Executive Council expected such response from the manhood of the country in time of need, do you think you would get that response if there was not in the minds of the people of the country confidence in the military policy of the Executive Council? Does that confidence exist?
We have seen here in this House a member of the Executive Council stand up and enunciate a military policy completely at variance with that laid down by the President of the Executive Council. We have seen Deputy Gorey, a member of the Cumann na nGaedheal Party—I hope I am not incorrect in referring to him as such—