I could hardly see the thing being sold without some nominal consideration being demanded. I think if the Minister is going to be given power to develop and perfect an invention you have gone a long way. Actually stopping him then from selling it or leasing it, or granting a licence is not going to be very much of a restriction upon him. Whatever restriction he has may easily turn out to be a very unsound thing. For instance, one may grant a licence to get a thing worked in order to see whether it was going to be a commercial success, and to entice somebody to take up some invention where there might be some industrial benefit gained from the application of it. We might have to inveigle someone into using it by saying: "You are skilled in this particular thing. Look after the accidentals of this particular invention. Get this used in some way and let us see if it is useful as well as having some idea in it." It may be necessary to grant a licence without valuable consideration. In the selling of a lease without valuable consideration one may look for restrictions. I am merely taking the words "without valuable consideration."
As to the powers that are asked generally, I want to preface my remarks by saying that the whole thing is very exceptional. It looks forward to a procedure that will occur very rarely. With that as a preamble, supposing the Minister is, in exceptional cases, given the power to intervene on behalf of the State and take over the benefit of some invention, it is not much good his being given the power of taking it over unless he is allowed to perfect it and develop it. And the perfecting of it may drag in sub-section (f), the forming of a company to do it. The Civil Service, as ordinarily constituted, could not do it. The company is not going to be formed of the heads of a department of the Civil Service. It will be necessary to get the thing properly developed, to see whether there is a useful application of whatever the idea is. Giving power in that way I think drags in sub-section (f) and I personally do not see any objection to (f). (b) is necessary also. It is simply allowing the Minister to take an assignment of any patent or of a share or interest in any patent, theretofore or thereafter obtained for such invention. To use it commercially there may have to be certain experimental workings which might be done under (a)—developing and perfecting it—but it might just cross the borderline, where it would have to be adjusted to ordinary conditions. Suppose someone brings an invention for perpetual motion. In its application to transport one would have to see that it worked under ordinary conditions on the roads or rails to see whether there was a useful application of it.
Again, I do not see that there can be much objection to sub-section (e), remembering all the while that if the whole of the Contingency Fund was going to be raided for the purposes referred to in sub-section (e) it is only a sum of £20,000 in all and there are nearly always claims on that Fund in any year to the extent of about £10,000 for ordinary purposes. So that there is a limitation to the extent of £10,000. Whatever additional sum the Minister for Finance may require he will get it by coming to the House and get it under a special heading or a special vote. So that the Minister is limited practically to a sum of £10,000, save what sums he may get by an extra vote or a special sub-heading. (c) and (d) would seem to me to be the phrases about which there may be some question of amendment. I am helpless myself to suggest an amendment. I do not know what the ideas are that people want to bring in, and I would like to ask the House to deal with it somewhat on the lines on which Deputy Flinn spoke. It is no secret as it has been talked of here, and it is going to be pursued, I am sure, here.
I am sure I am going to be asked about it from time to time until it proves either a success or failure. There ought to be an end to it one way or another quite soon. After that this matter will fall to be investigated and questions will be asked about what I have done in the way of so-called irregular procedure. The matter will be investigated by the Comptroller and Auditor-General and the Committee of Public Accounts. In any report that the Committee may draw up about this matter it will be, of course, for them to suggest the limitations that in their opinion ought to be put upon a Minister in the matter of expenditure in particular circumstances. Of course certain explanations will have to be made to the Committee and then it will be possible for them to suggest what restrictions should be put upon a Minister. I cannot make any definite suggestion at the moment. I would hesitate to go back to the State Lands Act and, as in the case of a lease, for example, lay all the terms and conditions before the House. As another matter has been referred to, the question of legislation that may be brought on later, I would like to make one point. Let one imagine the property which would be affected by Article 11 of the Constitution. Let us say that some mineral development is on foot—the discovery of something in the nature of important mineral deposits in a certain area and under Government ownership. Is it really considered a desirable thing that one person should come forward with an offer, that there should be a certain amount of haggling with the Department, that the Department have, say, a good offer, the best that could be got in the circumstances, that the whole thing should then come before the House and that the House, on a discussion, could refuse to pass it?
The position might easily be that a certain man, knowing a good thing was coming, would not make an offer, but would allow some other person to go ahead. The matter would come before the House and there would be a process of lobbying on the part of this man who is biding his time. He could hint broadly that he was offering something better to the State than what was about to come under the consideration of the House. Then the man who originally developed the idea of making the discovery good, and who would have reached a certain point, whose plans would be prepared and who probably would have a tentative lease ready for the consideration of the House, would be turned down because the man waiting in the background was ready to go one better. I do not think that we will get much development that way, or that there will be much in the way of a scurry over the development of good business propositions if the full details have to be placed on the Tables of both Houses for thirty sitting days and are to be subject to various motions and criticisms and a whole course of cross-examination of the Minister in both Houses as to what was expected to come from the schemes about to be developed. Obviously there would be an attempt to get at the applicant's plans and ideas.
I do not think that the procedure under the State Lands Act would work at all. State property, which is controlled by Article 11 of the Constitution, is administered in accordance with legislation passed by the Oireachtas. It was really because I was feeling my way towards suitable legislation that I was anxious this particular measure would be drafted in the widest possible way. If Deputies give me suggestions I will certainly endeavour to get the draftsman to deal with those suggestions and see if they could not be embodied. That would be preferable to falling back upon the State Lands Act simply because people might feel themselves incapable of approaching this very difficult and technical matter from the point of view of drafting suitable proposals. We should try to get away from the State Lands Act. That Act is all right where it is a question of houses or fixed buildings—something that is to be sold and where the economic value is readily ascertained. The outlook is quite different where it is a matter of property that is going to be developed. I do not think the State Lands Act will aid us very much there.
When we get back to Section 5, I may say there is the danger of its being applied in exceptional cases. It does not bind anybody except myself, but it may be used by me to do all sorts of things. What is the best the House could ask for? There could be a secret session, if the House felt that every Deputy could be relied on not to disclose one single item of what had passed at that secret session. At the secret meeting the House might ask for the details of an invention, and then, after these details would be put before them, you would get over one hundred people fighting, not alone about the details, but as to whether or not it would be a good bargain and whether a little more could not be got. One Deputy might propose that a little more should be sought than what another Deputy would be agreeable to accept. On the other hand, the Minister might give away, without receiving valuable consideration, an invention which he had previously purchased out of moneys passed by the Dáil. You may say that he can prevent the unauthorised use of powers, but there is the possibility that the Minister might come gaily along and say: "I have done this thing, and I am going to walk the plank for it; but I have done it, and you people will have to put up with it." There must be some sense of responsibility.
A Minister takes his political life in his hands when he engages in any transaction such as this, and if he is not successful he almost inevitably damns himself. If he hands over anything that is valuable and that has been bought with State moneys, and does not get good value in return, he almost inevitably damns himself. I admit it is a meagre sort of explanation to offer to the House for the granting of these large powers. I may say I would not like to see Section 5 lasting for all time. There is only one invention under consideration at the moment, and a certain amount of money has been passed towards it. I do not say that there will be any more money asked for the development of this invention. If it is a question of working it, then possibly there would be some other application made to the House.
If this invention is to be a tremendously successful one it might be possible to go on with the working of it without coming to the House. Again, there arises the question of money. Can the Minister spend out of the Contingency Fund? I think the matter might very well be left where it is. I could consider any suggestions put forward between this and the Report Stage in the sense that I would get the draftsman carefully to consider them. I think it would be really wise to leave Section 5 as it stands. The Committee of Public Accounts could have its attention specially directed to the matter, and the House could afterwards direct its own attention to the matter when it had so far advanced that there might be more information given about it. Then there could be an amendment and a tightening-up so that the Minister could not operate to the detriment of the State, as, undoubtedly, at the moment, he would have power to do.