I propose asking the House to accept, without alteration, all the amendments that have come down from the Seanad.
Juries (Protection) Bill, 1929—from the Seanad.
The Dáil went into Committee.
There are on the Order Paper eight amendments to the amendments made in the Seanad. Under the provision of Standing Order No. 120, no amendment can be offered to an amendment made by the Seanad that is not strictly relevant thereto, nor can any other amendment be moved to the Bill unless it be consequential upon the acceptance, amendment or rejection of a Seanad amendment. On the grounds that they are neither strictly relevant thereto, nor consequential upon the acceptance, amendment or rejection of a Seanad amendment, the Chair is not accepting Amendments Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5. It is accepting and will put to the Committee, Amendment 1 by Deputy Ruttledge, Amendment 6, Amendment 7 and Amendment 8.
May I raise a point arising out of the relevancy of some of those amendments, because I think if you can rule these out you can rule all the others out as irrelevant just as well?
I am much interested.
If you can rule out Amendment No. 2 you can rule out Amendment No. 1. In the case of Amendment No. 2 the principle involved is that it gives a greater opportunity to the person charged to escape the death sentence, and in this particular amendment, that is, No. 2, it gives the power to the judge there and then where there is no unanimity of the jury to avoid giving the death sentence.
The amendment made in the Seanad is not concerned with the sentence.
Yes, it is. I will tell you why; if it is not it is tomfoolery. It means where there is a majority merely that the prerogative of mercy is going to be exercised to commute the death sentence to a sentence of penal servitude for life, which is 20 years. Otherwise the thing is nonsense. Therefore, I submit once you have accepted this amendment from the Seanad, we are entitled to vary the terms of that principle. That applies to No. 2, but it applies with even greater strength to No. 3, because in the case of No. 3 we are not there concerned with the judge, but are simply getting him to bring the matter before the Minister; that is, the Minister is to take the necessary steps to have the sentence commuted. In No. 3 he is simply making the Seanad amendment much more explicit, but it is almost an identical one. There is, I admit, a difference, not in principle, but in degree in No. 2. Besides, I think there are very valuable suggestions involved in these matters. I would suggest that this is a very serious matter; that it is as permanent as the building of a bridge or the making of a will; that it is going to affect the lives of people in subsequent generations, and that merely on the subtle point of procedure we should not be prevented from discussing very important matters of this kind. Of course we disagree with the whole Bill; it is a rotten Bill, but, such as it is, it is going to dominate our legal system for some time. While it is there it should not be too rotten. We should try to make it better. Even in the interests of a pleasant holiday we should take a little time over this thing to get it right.
The Deputy I presume, has been putting points of order to the Chair, although it did not seem like that at times. The Deputy will realise that the Chair is only bound to take cognisance of certain considerations. The Standing Orders are quite clear, and our procedure has been quite clear with regard to the consideration of amendments to amendments made in the Seanad. The Standing Order stipulates "strictly relevant." The word "strictly" is presumably used advisedly. The Deputy will realise that the rule as to relevancy must be strictly construed, because in this particular case, and in every other similar case, we are dealing with a Bill which has gone through five stages in this House, four stages in the other House, and then comes back to us for the purpose of discussing the amendments made, and only these amendments. Discussion at this stage must therefore be limited. Much of what the Deputy has said by way of a point of order contains matters which the Chair could not take any cognisance of at all, such as, for example, that the Seanad amendment makes nonsense, that the amendments put down by the Deputy contain valuable suggestions, and even the consideration that we should have a pleasant holiday is, I am afraid, not for the Chair.
I am afraid the Ceann Comhairle is misinterpreting me. I said if it does not involve the same principle which is in our amendment, then it is nonsense, if it does not involve the principle of giving the accused person an opportunity of escaping the death sentence.
If the Seanad amendment is not in accord with the view taken by the Deputy, then the suggestion is that it is nonsense. Seanad amendment No. 2 inserts into the Bill a provision that in certain cases a judge shall make a report to the Minister for Justice, and goes no further. It is not strictly relevant to that amendment either to insert in the Bill now a provision as to what the judge shall do when he has received the report, or what the Minister shall do. The Seanad amendment concerns merely the making of a report to the Minister. Accordingly, I could not accept the Deputy's proposed amendments two or three. We will take points on the other amendments as they arise.
I move: "That the Committee agree with the Seanad in Amendment No. 1":—
Section 5. After the word "number" in line 2 the words "(save as is hereinafter mentioned)" inserted in brackets.
That is an amendment consequent upon the adoption of a new sub-section to Section 5 which appears next.
Would it not be well to take Amendments 1 and 2 together?
I do not think so. I think Amendment 1 is different.
Question put and agreed to.
I move:—
"That the Committee agree with the Seanad in Amendment No. 2":—
Section 5. A new sub-section added at the end of the section as follows:—
"(2) Whenever a jury finds a person to be guilty of a crime for which the penalty provided by law is death, the Judge shall inquire of the foreman of the jury, and the foreman of the jury shall notify to the Judge privately in writing, whether the verdict was or was not unanimous and the number of the dissentients (if any), and the Judge shall report to the Minister for Justice the information so obtained."
Amendment No. 2 is to the effect that when a person is found guilty of a capital offence by a majority of the jury the foreman of the jury shall so inform the Judge, and the Judge shall report that fact to the Minister for Justice. The object, of course, of reporting the matter to the Minister for Justice is that it would be an element, not the only one, to be taken into consideration by the Executive Council in the exercise of the prerogative of mercy.
I move that the word "privately" be deleted. The Minister stated, in referring to this amendment that has come from the Seanad, that it is merely an element that might be considered. Does not the Minister consider that in the section as it stands there is no provision as to whether the Judge shall pronounce sentence or not? Does the Minister propose, if this amendment as it comes from the Seanad is accepted, that the sentence which the Judge might pronounce will be held up?
Of course not.
The section as it stands at present does not state whether the Judge shall pronounce sentence of death, and that it shall then be referred to the Minister as regards commutation of sentence. However, that is not the real objection. We would be glad to see more matters which would lead to litigation and to the bringing of further Bills before this House to right these matters. What we are concerned with at the moment is the fact that there is brought in here another Star Chamber element which we have complained about in the various stages of this Bill. You have here an attempt to have colloguing and whispering going on between the Judge and the foreman of the jury, and the public shall not know. Where there is a division of opinion, and it is brought so forcibly to the mind of the Minister that it would be an element of consideration in regard to the commutation of the sentence in a matter of life and death, only the Minister for Justice, the Judge and the foreman of the jury shall know anything about it. One of the greatest forces that have been at work in any country is that of public opinion. Governments have erred, they have been tyrannical, and despotic, but they have been held in check by the force of public opinion. The Minister is endeavouring by this amendment to ensure that so far as this Bill is concerned, the forces of public opinion will not be able to be utilised as a check with regard to the administration of this particular measure. The question that must strike one very forcibly in this matter is that an element of doubt exists. If one, two, or three members of the jury disagree, certainly an element of doubt does exist, and we are going to have brushed aside, for the period for which this Act will be in operation, that thing which judges have always charged juries with, even in the simplest criminal cases—namely, if any reasonable doubt exists, the prisoner is entitled to the benefit of it. In this Bill that is to be brushed aside, and the public are not to know about it. In the most serious cases, cases where the death sentence may be imposed, nobody will know whether any doubt exists, except those three people.
I understand that this document that will be signed by the foreman of the jury and handed to the Judge, showing the dissentients to the verdict, will be regarded as a confidential document. Even if it was asked for in this House, if we wanted to get an opinion in regard to it, when matters of life and death might arise, we would not be entitled to get it. It would be regarded as a confidential document. The public have no check, and public opinion cannot assert itself in the way in which it has been able to assert itself in the past. I have referred here before, during the Fifth Stage of this Bill, to what has been regarded by the greatest legal authorities as the essence of the administration of law, and that is publicity. I referred to authorities with which I am sure the Minister has been familiar—Bentham and Hallam—who stated that the greatest safeguard in the administration of the law was publicity; and that, even over and above the Constitution, the greatest safeguard for the impartial administration of the law would be that it should be open and above board. In this measure the Minister refuses to allow the light of publicity, and I am sure the administration of the measure will be as rotten as the Act itself. We do not stand for this Bill, and in putting in this amendment we want to make that position absolutely clear. We recognise that it is an oppressive and coercive measure; that it is unnecessary and unjustifiable in any circumstances, and under any conditions which the Minister has been able to put before the House. We put in this amendment merely to try and improve in some little way what we regard as a very bad, unnecessary and evil measure. It is not to be taken that by putting in this amendment we are in any way identifying ourselves with this Bill. I move this amendment to try to get the cloak of secrecy that has been associated with drumhead courtsmartial removed from this unnecessary and evil measure, and so that the unfortunate people who will come under its jurisdiction will have some little chance of having the public at any rate see what is going on, so as to try and safeguard them in some way.
I will ask the House to reject this amendment. Deputy Ruttledge, in the early part of his speech, talked about the Judge not passing sentence. Of course the Judge will pass sentence when a verdict of guilty is brought in. That is the ordinary procedure. After he has passed sentence he will receive from document which he will receive from the foreman to the Minister for Justice. The Deputy tried to get rather vigorous in his denunciation of this Bill. His adjectives were numerous and rather forcible.
Not inflammable.
They were well strung together and numerous—a nice chain. One of the objects of this Bill is, of course, where there are jurymen dissenting the public will not know. That is perfectly clear by the Bill. The Deputy dislikes that principle. He has already told us so. He dislikes the fact where there is a majority verdict of that not being known. The reason we desire that it should not be known is that we do not wish jurymen to be exposed to undue risks. The Deputy's amendment, to my mind, is an entirely meaningless one. What is the difference between "He shall notify the Judge in writing," that is to say, before he leaves the jurybox, and notify him "privately in writing"? The Deputy says he is not to notify him privately. How is he to notify him? I would like to know exactly what it means.
Why then did the Minister insist in having "privately" inserted? If it is meaningless, as he says, why did he insist on having "privately" inserted? I would refer the Minister to the Official Report of the Seanad Debates.
Read what I said.
I do not want to have the Seanad Debates quoted.
I say if the Deputy wishes to have the word "privately" inserted, he is paying me a very high compliment.
The Minister said, "I think the word ‘privately' is the very essence of this Bill."
We ought to confine ourselves to our own debates, and not quote the debates of the other House.
What is the difference between handing it in writing and doing so privately? The document is handed by the foreman to the Judge. That is to be handed to him privately. The Deputy says it is not to be. What is the Deputy's alternative? I would like if the Deputy would kindly explain what would happen under his amendment. He has not attempted to do so. The Deputy talked about Star Chambers and other things. He got very vague and quite cloquent, but he kept clearly off his amendment. I ask the House to reject the amendment.
The Minister for Justice has already confuted his own argument in another place. If I might be allowed to say it, it is difficult to work without one's tools, and when an argument has been put up in another place in certain words it should be within our competence to quote these words, but no matter. The Minister now argues that the word "privately" is quite unnecessary.
I asked the Deputy to explain the difference.
The difference then as he pictured it is that if the document is handed up without the word "privately," it is open to publication in the Press that the verdict is not a unanimous verdict.
No. Will the Deputy read the amendment? It says that the number and the identity of the dissentients (if any) shall not be disclosed.
Quite so. But you have already amended that.
By saying, "save as is hereinafter mentioned."
Yes, after the writing is given to the Judge.
The verdict of the jury without disclosure of the number, "save as is hereinafter mentioned." In other words, that there can be a disclosure.
No, only the disclosure which is allowed— that is, a disclosure by the foreman to the Judge. That is the only disclosure allowed by this section.
No, because you must read the two sections together. If we get what we want, the "save as is hereinafter mentioned" will apply. It must, and what we envisage is that, at least, the public will know the jury has not been unanimous. As a matter of fact, it would be the greatest protection to the jury, because every one of the jurymen can go out and say: "I was one of those who did not sentence these people." It is greater protection for the jury to have publicity in this matter than to leave it as a Star Chamber proceeding, where the whole thing is clouded in mystery, and therefore greater suspicion will attach to the unfortunate jury. These words in the previous section are going to give a lot of trouble. I let them pass without comment because I thought they afforded a trap to the Minister. Read in conjunction with Section 6, if this Bill is going to be operated at all, the Minister will have to bring in further amendments such as we have on the Order Paper, because an amendment such as our Amendment No. 3 will be absolutely essential. The new amendment, as it stands, leaves the whole thing in the air, read in connection with the amendment now being discussed as part of Section 5. It is impossible to know whether the Judge is to act and is to give his judgment, and I will tell you why——
We are only discussing the question of the word "privately" now.
Yes, but this all works together.
We can take the Seanad amendment afterwards, but we have to dispose of Deputy Ruttledge's amendment now.
I think Deputy Ruttledge has dealt very amply with the word "privately." Of course the whole Bill is wrong. It is not because we are trying to improve it slightly that we are in anyway implicating ourselves in supporting the Bill or any section of it.
I want to get clearly from the Minister for Justice what exactly the Seanad amendment means. The Minister has asked Deputy Ruttledge to state what in his opinion would be the effect of the deletion of the word "privately" from the amendment; what would happen in the Court if the word "privately" were deleted? I want the Minister to tell us what would happen if the word "privately" were kept in? What does it mean there? Are we to take it that the foreman of the jury is not to notify the Judge in Court, or is to meet him outside in some lane and notify him there? If he hands him a written document in Court, is he not handing it to him publicly? He cannot do that under this section if it is accepted. I take it that the foreman is to slip round to the side door, meet the Judge coming out, and having taken precautions to see no one is looking, to slip into the Judge's pocket a notice to the effect that the jury disagreed in its verdict. Is not that the plain meaning of the wording of the section? If it is not, I want the Minister to tell us exactly what it does mean. I take it that if the word "privately" is deleted, it will involve the foreman sending a written notification of disagreement to the Judge in the Court, in the presence of the Court and in the full view of the Court. He will convey that written notification to the Judge, and the Judge will be at liberty, in his discretion, to make known the fact that there had been disagreement in the jury if he thinks it is in the interests of justice that it should be made public. I do not think it is undesirable that the public should know that there has been a disagreement. I will admit the Minister's point that the Bill is for the protection of jurors, and that it may be undesirable that the individual jurymen who disagreed should be singled out.
That is not necessary, and it is not asked for in this amendment. The only thing that is asked for in this amendment is that the public should know if a man has been sentenced to death upon a majority verdict. Why is the Minister anxious that the public should not get that information? Is it not because he knows that public opinion would not stand over, in any circumstances, the execution of a man, tried in court before a jury, when three members of that jury, having listened to the evidence, were convinced that he was innocent? It is because the Minister knows that a single execution on a majority verdict would so arouse public opinion that the whole Bill would be swept away that he is anxious to prevent public opinion from being so informed, that he wants to get this thing done in the dark instead of in the light, that he wants to keep as many words in the Bill as possible that suggest secrecy and privacy? I think that if the Minister wanted the Bill to work properly, he would accept Deputy Ruttledge's amendment. We do not want the Bill to work, and therefore I hope that the Minister will succeed in carrying the Seanad's amendment. In the first place, it means nothing; in the second place, it will involve some meeting between the foreman of the jury and the Judge in some back street or in some private house, and in the third place, I believe that, as soon as the Minister permits one execution to take place on a majority verdict under this Bill, the whole structure of the Bill will collapse.
It is with great delight I hear that when we come to vote upon Deputy Ruttledge's amendment, I will find Deputy Lemass in our lobby. It will be, I think, about the first time that the Fianna Fáil Party has split.
We are unanimous.
I will be delighted to see it, because after his plain statement a moment ago, I do not think, in spite of his mental agility, that Deputy Lemass will manage to wriggle himself out of voting in our lobby on this occasion. If he does, then Deputy Lemass's plain, open statements in this House mean nothing. He wanted to know what will happen, and he talked about the foreman of the jury meeting the Judge in a back lane, or something of that kind. That will be absolutely impossible. What will happen will be that the foreman of the jury will privately hand to the Judge——
In the court?
That will not be private; that will be public.
Oh, yes, it will be private. He will hand there in court to the Judge a paper which will state whether the jury were unanimous or whether they were divided. That is precisely the procedure that will be adopted.
Then I take it that the foreman of the jury will hand it publicly to the Judge?
It depends entirely on what the Deputy means by handing "publicly." If the Deputy means that he reads it out——
Oh, no.
It will be the same as if I were to hand a document to the Deputy here privately.
Will it not be in Court, in the view of the public?
That will be public. If the Minister can make sense out of that he can make sense out of anything.
If that is the Minister's interpretation of the word "privately" that would not prevent the reporters publishing in the papers the fact that it was a majority verdict.
Of course it would, because a paper will be handed in any event, and it will state whether the jury are unanimous or whether they are divided.
And it will not appear in the Press?
Of course it will not. It will be handed privately to the Judge.
In public.
And the fact that the paper is handed in is the only thing that will be known.
The paper will be handed privately to the Judge in public?
If the foreman only hands up this document publicly-privately that the jury are not unanimous, the public in Court will judge, if the paper goes up publicly-privately that they are not unanimous.
Amendment put.
The Committee divided: Tá, 70; Níl, 40.
Tá
- Aird, William P.
- Alton, Ernest Henry.
- Beckett, James Walter.
- Blythe, Ernest.
- Bourke, Séamus A.
- Brennan, Michael.
- Byrne, John Joseph.
- Carey, Edmund.
- Coburn, James.
- Cole, John James.
- Collins-O'Driscoll, Mrs. Margt.
- Conlon, Martin.
- Connolly, Michael P.
- Cooper, Bryan Ricco.
- Cosgrave, William T.
- Craig, Sir James.
- Crowley, James.
- Daly, John.
- Davis, Michael.
- De Loughrey, Peter.
- Doherty, Eugene.
- MacEóin, Seán.
- McFadden, Michael Og.
- McGilligan, Patrick.
- Mongan, Joseph W.
- Murphy, James E.
- Murphy, Joseph Xavier.
- Myles, James Sproule.
- Nally, Martin Michael.
- Nolan, John Thomas.
- O'Connell, Richard.
- O'Connor, Bartholomew.
- O'Donovan, Timothy Joseph.
- O'Higgins, Thomas.
- O'Leary, Daniel.
- Dolan, James N.
- Doyle, Peadar Seán.
- Duggan, Edmund John.
- Egan, Barry M.
- Esmonde, Osmond Thos. Grattan.
- Fitzgerald, Desmond.
- Fitzgerald-Kenney, James.
- Good, John.
- Gorey, Denis J.
- Haslett, Alexander.
- Hassett, John J.
- Heffernan, Michael R.
- Hennessy, Thomas.
- Hennigan, John.
- Henry, Mark.
- Hogan, Patrick (Galway).
- Jordan, Michael.
- Keogh, Myles.
- Leonard, Patrick.
- Lynch, Finian.
- Mathews, Arthur Patrick.
- O'Mahony, Dermot Gun.
- O'Reilly, John J.
- O'Sullivan, Gearóid.
- O'Sullivan, John Marcus.
- Redmond, William Archer.
- Roddy, Martin.
- Shaw, Patrick W.
- Sheehy, Timothy (West Cork).
- Thrift, William Edward.
- Tierney, Michael.
- Vaughan, Daniel.
- White, Vincent Joseph.
- Wolfe, George.
- Wolfe, Jasper Travers.
Níl
- Aiken, Frank.
- Allen, Denis.
- Blaney, Neal.
- Boland, Gerald.
- Boland, Patrick.
- Bourke, Daniel.
- Brady, Seán.
- Buckley, Daniel.
- Carty, Frank.
- Cassidy, Archie J.
- Clery, Michael.
- Cooney, Eamon.
- Corkery, Dan.
- Crowley, Fred. Hugh.
- Crowley, Tadhg.
- De Valera, Eamon.
- Fahy, Frank.
- Fogarty, Andrew.
- Gorry, Patrick J.
- Goulding, John.
- Houlihan, Patrick.
- Jordan, Stephen.
- Kennedy, Michael Joseph.
- Kerlin, Frank.
- Killilea, Mark.
- Lemass, Séan F.
- Little, Patrick John.
- Maguire, Ben.
- MacEntee, Seán.
- Moore, Séamus.
- O'Dowd, Patrick Joseph.
- O'Leary, William.
- O'Reilly, Matthew.
- Powell, Thomas P.
- Ruttledge, Patrick J.
- Ryan, James.
- Sheehy, Timothy (Tipperary).
- Smith, Patrick.
- Walsh, Richard.
- Ward, Francis C.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Duggan and P. S. Doyle. Níl: Deputies G. Boland and Allen.
Amendment declared lost.
The question is, therefore, "That the Committee agree with the Seanad in Amendment No. 2."
We are opposed to this amendment with or without the word "privately" in it. We think that the purpose for which the amendment was inserted in the Bill was to give the illusion of a safeguard against a miscarriage of justice. I think it is obvious that it is only an illusion, that in fact no such safeguard is provided. I do not know if that is also the view of the Minister, but I take it it is—that it is only an illusion. If he thinks otherwise, we are still opposed to the amendment, because if he thinks that any safeguard is provided by this amendment, then we are to take the acceptance of it by the Executive Council as an admission that under the Bill as originally introduced by them a miscarriage of justice was possible. In any case, the acceptance of the amendment by us would or could be taken as an expression of confidence in the Minister for Justice or the Executive Council, which we do not feel. The proposal here is that if a jury, which is empanelled to hear the evidence at the trial of some person charged with an offence for which he is liable to be sentenced to death, is unable to agree as to that person's guilt, if in fact a number up to three of the members of that jury are convinced on the evidence that the man is innocent, but the remainder believe him guilty and record their verdict as guilty, and that man is accordingly sentenced to death, then the question as to whether or not he is to be executed is to be decided by the Minister for Justice. We do not believe that the Minister for Justice is capable of giving an impartial verdict upon any question. We do not believe the Minister for Justice is a fit and proper person to decide whether or not a man should die when a jury of twelve impartial citizens empanelled for the purpose are unable to decide it. Since the Minister for Justice was appointed to the post, he has repeatedly given indication that he is less concerned with the proper administration of his Department than with the making of capital for the Party of which he is now a member. If any trial of a political nature came up for decision while this Bill was in operation; if there was a disagreement of the jury and a majority verdict recorded; if a person opposed politically to the Minister was sentenced to death, and the question as to whether or not he should die was referred to the Minister, I do not believe the Minister is capable of giving a fair decision.
Perhaps I might inform the Deputy, so that he may spare himself this exhausting diatribe, that it is not the Minister for Justice who decides in a capital case, but the Executive Council, on whose advice the death sentence is commuted.
That is worse still.
As the Deputy says, that is worse. I am dealing with the amendment. I want to keep strictly in order. The amendment states that the judge shall report to the Minister for Justice the information so obtained. Why is he to report to the Minister?
In order that the Minister for Justice may inform the Executive Council of that fact, as it is a circumstance to be taken into consideration. I am afraid the Deputy did not listen to me.
I take it another amendment is required—that it shall be the duty of the Minister to inform the Executive Council if he receives such a report. I take it that as the law will stand if this amendment is passed there is no obligation on the Minister so to inform the Executive Council—no obligation whatever. The Minister can put the report in the wastepaper basket and forget all about it, and that settles the question and the man hangs. Even if the Minister does report to the Executive Council, what difference does it make? Is it likely that the possibility of an unfair decision will be obviated by having the question decided by the Minister for Justice or by the Minister for Justice's colleagues on the Executive Council? From our experience of the Minister's colleagues, our opinion of them is no higher than it is of the Minister himself. We do not believe that the Executive Council are capable of giving an impartial decision when political issues are involved any more than the Minister for Justice. It is the Minister who is mentioned here. The Minister could, I submit, settle the question for himself by putting the report into the wastepaper basket. That settles it—there is no more about it. Whether or not two or three members of the jury that tried a man believe him to be innocent, he dies, just because the Minister for Justice puts the report in the wastepaper basket, or because the Executive Council, unable to act in a judicial capacity, decide the issue on a political ground. The Minister for Justice and the Executive Council have at all times shown that they are less concerned with the respect or repute of the Department of Justice than with the political capital which they can make for themselves by the operation of that Department. The Minister for Justice has repeatedly shown that not merely is he incapable of arriving at an impartial decision where political issues are involved, but he is incapable or unwilling to control his Department where political issues are involved, if that Department is acting irregularly. It is because of that fact that we are opposed to the amendment, and because of that fact I would personally prefer that the question of the sentence to be imposed upon a man found guilty under such circumstances should be settled, not by the Minister for Justice, not by the Executive Council, but by the Judge.
It is settled by the Judge. The Judge passes the death sentence, and it is only the question of commutation that comes up.
took the Chair.
Exactly, the question as to whether or not a person whom the Minister wants to railroad out of existence dies or not. The whole Bill, as we argued repeatedly, is designed to make it possible for the Executive Council to bring before a packed jury somebody against whom they cannot get enough of evidence to convict in the ordinary way.
Are we discussing the Second Reading of the Bill or the amendment? It is a pity to lose this brilliant rhetoric, but I submit this is quite irrelevant.
We will get back to the amendment. The Executive Council originally intended that when they had got the victim tried before a packed jury and a sentence of death by a majority from the jury, they should end the matter. However, certain criticisms were expressed, not by members on this side of the House, but elsewhere— in the columns of the "Irish Times" and of "The Irish Statesman," and such like Conservative organs, which, having become alarmed at the revolutionary proposals which the Executive Council introduced, expressed criticism. Even the august Seanad saw there was danger of a miscarriage of justice, and awakened from their apathy in order to express an opinion on the matter and suggest this amendment. The Minister at long last bowed his head slightly to the storm of criticism and accepted the amendment. I say he has accepted the amendment, not because it does in fact provide any safeguard against a miscarriage of justice, but because it serves as a red herring to delude the mugs in the Seanad and the innocent people who exist throughout the country. In fact there is no safeguard. The issue is decided once the jury have recorded their verdict. The sending of a notice to the Minister will not alter it unless, of course, it is a trial of no political importance, and unless the circumstances are such as to make it politically expedient for the Minister to reverse the death sentence. But, if the victim is politically an opponent of the Minister, and if it is in the interest of Cumann na nGaedheal that he shall die, then he shall die, whether this amendment is in the Bill or not. That is why we are opposed to it.
Taken in connection with the amendment already passed in Section 5, this amendment now makes the original section read: "and the verdict of such nine members, or upward, shall be taken and recorded as the verdict of the jury without disclosure of the number save as is hereinafter mentioned. In other words that, taken in connection with this amendment, is going to leave it in doubt as to whether it is to be taken that the verdict of the jury is to be recorded or not. It is open to the Judge to interpret this amendment together with the amended section, that he is not to record it as a verdict if it is only that of the majority. His duty, and his only duty, is to report to the Minister.
I can quite easily deal with the points that have been raised. As far as Deputy Lemass is concerned, I notice that all his courage oozed out when he came to the sticking point. He could not go into the Division Lobby that his speech before had obviously suggested that he should go into. Then, to show his courage had come back, he indulged in some very violent rhetoric, but rhetoric that was nicely worded. The Deputy always words his speeches nicely; but so far as effective criticism of the Bill, or of the amendment made by the Senate, is concerned, I submit the Deputy's speech was perfectly valueless. What will happen will be that when the Executive Council takes into account, as the Executive always does, whether the prerogative of mercy should or should not be exercised in a case in which the death sentence has been passed, they will have the knowledge before them that it was a majority verdict. That is the object of this amendment. If Deputies opposite think it is inadvisable that they should not have that knowledge; if they think it is a thing that should be kept from the Executive Council; if they think it is a thing that should not be known at all by the Executive Council, then, of course, they will vote against this amendment, as Deputy Lemass suggested. I would like to ask the Fianna Fáil Party seriously will they vote against this amendment, because, in spite of Deputy Lemass's rhetoric, he has completely gone back on every argument hitherto put forward by his own party on this Bill. I would be surprised if he brings his party and his leader with him on this occasion into the Lobby against this amendment.
Is there not plenty of machinery already providing for the exercise of the prerogative of mercy?
No, because, unless this amendment is inserted, even the Minister for Justice or the Executive Council would not know it was a majority verdict.
Question—"That the Dáil agrees with the Seanad in Amendment No. 2,"—put and declared carried.
I move that the Committee agrees with the Seanad in Amendment 3: "Section 6, sub-section (3). The word ‘shall' deleted in line 35 and the word ‘may' substituted therefor."
Amendment 3 has already been ruled out of order.
The Ceann Comhairle dealt with my amendments, 2 and 3, and ruled No. 3 out of order, but with regard to my amendment, No. 4, on the Order Paper, he said he would deal with that on its merits when the time came. There are powers under the Standing Orders, I think, though I cannot put my hand on the particular Order at the moment, to recall the Ceann Comhairle on an occasion like this, because otherwise it would place me in a difficult position. Having argued the case before the Ceann Comhairle up to a certain point, it would be better to complete the matter with him. Of course, I do not wish to cast any slur on the Leas-Cheann Comhairle in making this suggestion.
I shall allow the Deputy to put his points to me now.
This is a case where a person charged has refused to recognise the court, and the Judge is to sentence such a person to six months' imprisonment, it may be for one or various offences, all of which are included in the phrase, "shall act disrespectfully or contumaciously towards the court." Not recognising the court is regarded as an act of that kind. Now, while it would be impossible, without changing the present procedure, to ask the jury to decide the matter, at later stages the jury could be asked to decide the matter, because even in the course of the trial something may arise where an expression of opinion will be given by the person charged, as has happened in cases in the past, and then it would be for the jury, exercising its proper function, to decide a question of fact, and not of law. We had an amendment of this kind down at the early stages of the Bill, but the Minister chose not to understand the principle involved, because it crossed with the present practice and procedure.
The Deputy is not arguing the question of the relevancy of the amendment, but is rather dealing with the merits of the amendment, with which the Chair is not concerned.
In arguing the relevancy of the amendment, we must take it in connection with Amendment 3, which substitutes the word "may" for "shall." Instead of being a matter of obligation upon the Judge to impose a sentence, he now is in the position to form his own judgement on the matter, where you have the word "may," and we are simply adding that the principle remains exactly the same—namely, that the Judge may do that, but once the jury is sworn that he does that with the concurrence of the jury. If that is not relevant, I do not see what is relevant, and the ruling of that out of order is a thing that I cannot understand.
It makes any amendment impossible. Here we have the case where a Judge is going to exercise his power. The amendment says that he "may" exercise it, instead of that he "shall" exercise it. We say that he may exercise it in concurrence with the views of the jury. How that varies the principle of the exercise of power I fail to see. I believe that if the Ceann Comhairle were here he might be inclined to form a different view to the view that he formed at first and allow the matter to be argued in full.
I may say that the Deputy's amendment and the other amendments were very carefully considered by the Ceann Comhairle and myself. The amendment submitted by the Deputy is not a variation of any particular principle, but is the introduction on this stage of a completely new principle into the Bill. It is on that ground that it has been ruled out of order, and it is clearly out of order on that ground. The Deputy's amendment seeks to introduce a completely new principle into the Bill as it has come back from the Seanad. That is something which could not be done, or, at all events, should not be allowed to be done by the Chair on this stage of the Bill.
I think it is a variation in degree and not of principle. It says that the Judge may do such-and-such a thing.
The Chair is allowing that. As I have already pointed out, the Deputy's amendment to the Seanad amendment seeks to introduce a completely new principle into the Bill—a principle which was not in the Bill when introduced, or inserted at any stage when it was going through this House or through the Seanad. The amendment is not relevant and is therefore out of order.
Amendment 3 from the Seanad put and agreed to.
I move:
That the Committee agree with the Seanad in Amendment 4: Section 7, sub-section (1). The word "shall" deleted in line 6 and the word "may" substituted therefor.
Amendment to Amendment No. 4. 5. In Amendment No. 4 after the word "may" to insert the words "upon hearing such further evidence as he shall think proper."—(Patrick J. Ruttledge).
Is my amendment being ruled out of order?
I cannot add anything to what Deputy Little has already said. It is not a question of principle. If it is a question of principle, then that question of principle was introduced by the Seanad. In this matter, the Seanad have changed what was peremptory in the Bill as the Bill went before them. The Seanad amendment gives a discretion. As regards any variation of that discretionary power, we are merely seeking that, instead of the Judge having a discretionary power with regard to the evidence of the superintendent, there should be power to call other evidence. I think that the Judge always has that power to call other evidence if he wishes.
The Deputy is now speaking on the merits of his amendment. The Seanad amendment merely substitutes the word "may" for the word "shall." Deputy Ruttledge's amendment seeks to introduce a new principle altogether. That is the view of the Chair on the matter. As the Chair takes that view, I cannot allow Amendment 5 to be moved.
Do you suggest that for a Judge to hear evidence is a new principle in law?
The Chair has nothing to do with that.
Amendment 4 from the Seanad agreed to.
I move:
That the Committee agree with the Seanad in Amendment 5:
"Section 7, sub-section (1). Before the word ‘shall' in line 7 the words ‘in that case' inserted."
This is a consequential amendment.
Amendment put and agreed to.
I move:
That the Committee agree with the Seanad in Amendment 6: Section 8, sub-section (1). After the word "often" in line 1 the words "(but not more than twice in respect of any one trial)" inserted in brackets.
I move Amendment 6 to this amendment from the Seanad.
"In the amendment to delete the word ‘twice' and substitute therefor the word ‘once.'" Perhaps the Minister would deal with the amendment from the Seanad first.
As the Bill was originally drafted there was no limit to the number of times. If a jury were intimidated, or if a Judge were satisfied that it came under this section, the trial may, at the discretion of the Judge, be adjourned. In this amendment from the Seanad the adjournment is limited to two occasions, that is, the trial of a prisoner on the same charge for the same offence can only be twice adjourned for the grounds stated in the section.
In this case, we suggest the limit should be not "twice," but "once," for even as it is the power is abused by the courts, particularly in political cases. We wish to limit that as much as possible, and we, therefore, propose that "twice" be changed to "once."
I cannot accept the amendment, and I ask the House to reject it. Consider the section:—
"Whenever and as often as a Judge presiding in the Central Criminal Court or a Judge of the Circuit Court, sitting for the trial of criminal issues, is satisfied that, by reason of intimidation or attempted intimidation of jurors or witnesses either in relation to the trial of criminal issues generally or of any class of criminal issues or in relation to the trial of a particular person...."
In other words, when the Judge is satisfied on the matter of intimidation he can give an adjournment, but he must be satisfied that there is intimidation going on, that there cannot be a fair trial, and that the jury have been intimidated, and cannot bring in a verdict, or that it is putting too big a strain on them to ask them to bring in a verdict according to their conscience. The Judge, under these circumstances, has power to adjourn. I think twice is as short a time as possible in order that justice should be done. If intimidation exists an adjournment for three months would be too short. Six months would be the shortest possible time.
What about the poor, unfortunate man in jail all this time?
If the poor, unfortunate man or his friends did not intimidate the jury he would not be in jail. I hope the Deputy does not approve of intimidation.
How can a man in jail intimidate?
His friends could.
This is giving the power to the Judge to remand and remand on what he imagines to be intimidation. It does not say evidence is to be produced, but merely as long as the Judge is satisfied, whatever that means, he can go on adjourning.
I cannot explain the English language to the Deputy if he does not know it.
Question put: "That the word proposed to be deleted stand part of the Seanad amendment."
The Committee divided:—Tá, 65; Níl, 40.
Tá.
- Aird, William P.
- Beckett, James Walter.
- Blythe, Ernest.
- Bourke, Séamus A.
- Brennan, Michael.
- Byrne, John Joseph.
- Carey, Edmund.
- Collins-O'Driscoll, Mrs. Margt.
- Conlon, Martin.
- Connolly, Michael P.
- Cooper, Bryan Ricco.
- Cosgrave, William T.
- Craig, Sir James.
- Crowley, James.
- Daly, John.
- Davis, Michael.
- De Loughrey, Peter.
- Doherty, Eugene.
- Dolan, James N.
- Doyle, Peadar Seán.
- Duggan, Edmund John.
- Dwyer, James.
- Egan, Barry M.
- Esmonde, Osmond Thos. Grattan.
- Fitzgerald, Desmond.
- Fitzgerald-Kenney, James.
- Good, John.
- Gorey, Denis J.
- Haslett, Alexander.
- Hassett, John J.
- Heffernan, Michael R.
- Hennessy, Thomas.
- Hennigan, John.
- Henry, Mark.
- Hogan, Patrick (Galway).
- Jordan, Michael.
- Keogh, Myles.
- Leonard, Patrick.
- Lynch, Finian.
- Mathews, Arthur Patrick.
- MacEóin, Seán.
- McGilligan, Patrick.
- Mongan, Joseph W.
- Murphy, James E.
- Myles, James Sproule.
- Nally, Martin Michael.
- Nolan, John Thomas.
- O'Connell, Richard.
- O'Connor, Bartholomew.
- O'Donovan, Timothy Joseph.
- O'Higgins, Thomas.
- O'Leary, Daniel.
- O'Mahoney, Dermot Gun.
- O'Reilly, John J.
- O'Sullivan, Gearóid.
- O'Sullivan, John Marcus.
- Redmond, William Archer.
- Roddy, Martin.
- Sheehy, Timothy (West Cork).
- Thrift, William Edward.
- Tierney, Michael.
- Vaughan, Daniel.
- White, Vincent Joseph.
- Wolfe, George.
- Wolfe, Jasper Travers.
Níl.
- Aiken, Frank.
- Allen, Denis.
- Boland, Gerald.
- Boland, Patrick.
- Bourke, Daniel.
- Brady, Seán.
- Buckley, Daniel.
- Carty, Frank.
- Cassidy, Archie J.
- Clery, Michael.
- Cooney, Eamon.
- Corkery, Dan.
- Crowley, Fred Hugh.
- Crowley, Tadhg.
- De Valera, Eamon.
- Fahy, Frank.
- Flinn, Hugo.
- Fogarty, Andrew.
- Gorry, Patrick J.
- Goulding, John.
- Houlihan, Patrick.
- Jordan, Stephen.
- Kennedy, Michael Joseph.
- Kerlin, Frank.
- Killilea, Mark.
- Lemass, Seán F.
- Little, Patrick John.
- Maguire, Ben.
- MacEntee, Seán.
- Moore, Séamus.
- O'Dowd, Patrick Joseph.
- O'Leary William.
- O'Reilly, Matthew.
- Powell, Thomas P.
- Ruttledge, Patrick J.
- Ryan, James.
- Sheehy, Timothy (Tipperary).
- Smith, Patrick.
- Walsh, Richard.
- Ward, Francis C.
Tellers: Tá, Deputies Duggan and P. S. Doyle; Níl, Deputies G. Boland and Allen.
Motion declared carried.
Amendment 7 inserted in the Seanad is consequential on the amendment that has been passed. It reads:
Section 8, sub-section (3). The word "more" deleted in line 26 and the word "two" substituted therefor.
My amendment to amendment 7 is also consequential.
Amendment to amendment No. 7 not moved.
Seanad amendment No. 7 agreed to.
I move that the Committee agree with the Seanad in amendment 8:—
Section 13, sub-section (3). The words and figures "31st day of December" deleted in lines 68-9 and the words and figures "30th day of September" substituted therefor.
That alters the date of the expiration of the Bill from the 31st December to the 30th of September.
I move the following amendment:—
In the amendment after the word "September" to add the figures "1929" and consequentially to delete the figures "1931" in Section 13 (3) of the Bill.
This amendment is to the effect that the period of the Bill shall terminate on the 30th September, 1929. It is about a month too long for the Bill to last. Already we have seen the effect of this Bill. It has created an atmosphere in the country which has done a great deal of harm, and the quicker it is brought to a conclusion the better. It is reeking with secrecy where publicity is the very essence of justice. It is imposing sentences of imprisonment on persons simply for holding strong political views where they refuse to recognise the authority of the Court. The whole Bill is a degradation of justice in the country and a prostitution of the jury system. You can see the effects of it even at present, where sentences of two years with hard labour have been imposed in cases which were obviously political.
On a point of order, has this anything to do with the date of the expiration of the Bill? I respectfully submit it has not. The issue before the House is as to whether this Bill is to expire in December, 1931, or in September, 1929. I submit that is the only question and not the merits of the Bill.
I am in agreement with the Minister on that point. I am prepared, however, to allow the Deputy to make a case for his amendment, but he should realise that he must not make a Second Reading speech. I cannot allow the Deputy to go into the matter as thoroughly as he would be permitted if the occasion were a Second Reading.
I had that in mind. That was why I said that even at the present time one can see the effect of the Bill—the shadow cast by this Bill—because already it is prejudicing——
The Deputy must not, on this or any other Bill, criticise judgments of the courts.
If I cannot argue the merits of the Bill as it is, and if I cannot argue the effect it is already having upon the administration of justice, I am in a difficulty to know what I can argue.
I have not suggested that the Deputy cannot argue the merits of his amendment. I have informed him that he cannot criticise judgments of the courts.
This Bill helps those who wish to do so to confuse the cases of real criminals with those of persons who, according to the present Administration, are political offenders. It adds to that atmosphere the cloak of secrecy. That is about the vilest principle that could be introduced into a judicial system. We have here people who are honest—some might say they are too honest—victimised as criminals because they feel it is their duty in open court to say that they do not recognise the court. Because of that they are to be victimised; they are to be confused with people guilty of the vilest crimes who may be sentenced for various periods with or without hard labour. There is no clause in this Bill which gives it any redeeming feature. One can take clause after clause, and ask one's self: "Would it not be better for that clause to have ceased to be in existence by the end of September?" One could examine each clause and each sub-section of that clause, and be quite clear in one's mind that there is nothing in the Bill which deserves a continued existence after September. It will add to bitterness instead of reducing it. It will make the name of the Minister for Justice, who introduced it, more odious in the country than it has been in the past. I submit that in the interests of justice and in the interests of fair dealing with political opponents, the Minister should, even at this late hour, accept my amendment, and put an end to this Bill as quickly as possible.
Nuair a tháinig an Bille seo os cóir na Dála ar dtúis, dubhairt an tAire Dlí agus Cirt go mbeadh saol fada roimhe— go leanfadh sé chó fada agus leanfadh réim an Rialtais. Tar éis tamaill, dubhairt sé nách leanfadh sé ach ar feadh dhá bhliain. Ba mhaith an smaoineamh san agus tá a fhios agam cad fá ndeár an t-ath-arú tuairime sin. Ba mhaith an smaoineamh anois deire do chur leis an mBille i gcionn míosa. Dá thúisce a cuirfear deire leis, is amh-laidh is fearr é agus tuigeann an tAire an méid sin. Thar aon ní eile, is gá í gcúrsaí dlí gach rud a bheith ós árd, i dtreó nách mbeidh droch-amhras ag na daoine fá na cúirteanna. Chonnaiceas le déanaí sna páipeirí tuarasgabháil ar a thuit amach i gcúirt i mBéal Feirste. Tathar ag cainnt ar an Rialtas annseo agus chó maith agus atá sé. Tugadh ós cóir na geúirteanna i mBéal Feirste beirt nár aithnigh an chúirt. Leigeadh saor an bheirt ach dá mbeadh siad in a gcomhnuidhe san Saorstát gheobhadh siad sé míosa. Is mór an náire é an scéal a bheith mar sin. Tá daoine ann nách n-aithníonn na cúirteanna; ní coir sin a rá agus ní ceart sé míosa do chur orra.
Mar gheall ar uimhreacha do chur ar lucht an ghiúiré, an gereideann duine ar bith nách féidir na h-ainm-neacha d'fháil amach? Agus má bhíonn uimhreacha ar na coisteoirí, is déine a bhéas daoine ag obair chun fháil amach cé hiad. Má bhíonn naonbhar ar thaobh daortha agus triúr in a aghaidh, an saoileann duine ar bíth nách mbeidh sé i gcumas duine ainmneacha an triúir d'fháil amach? Nách gcuirfidh an triúr in úil do chách nách raibh siad ar thaobh an daortha? Is olc an plean é ar fad.
Níl aon dabht nách ceart duine do dhaora chun báis ar thuairim furmhór an ghiúiré. Thiocfadh liom a lán a rá ar an mBille seo ach deir an Leas-Cheann Comhairle nách mbeidh cead ag Teachta mórán do rá ar an leas-rún so. Ach deirim go mba cheart deire do chur le gach alt den Bhille seo chó luath agus is féidir é. Is dó liom go mba cheart deire do chur leis i gcionn míosa agus, mar gheall ar sin, táim i bhfabhar an leas-rúin seo.
I submit to the House that this is a childish amendment. The House is asked to insert an amendment in a Bill which will have the extraordinary effect, that the Bill will cease to act before it has ever become operative.
Hear, hear; excellent.
If this were to be inserted in the Bill it would mean that this Bill would cease to be operative before a single criminal court would sit under its provisions. Bringing forward an amendment like the present is simply turning the whole procedure of the Oireachtas into a farce. I ask the House to reject it.
The Minister does not make any case for the continuance of the Bill. Does not the Minister realise that this Bill has served its purpose? It has served its purpose at two by-elections and having served that propagandist purpose which was the only purpose ever genuinely intended that it should serve, would not the Minister agree now to let this amendment of Deputy Little's go through?
Mr. T. Sheehy (West Cork):
The Deputy who has just spoken, Deputy Ruttledge, made a very unfair suggestion with regard to this Bill. He said the Bill was promoted for propagandist purposes at two by-elections. That is not so. The Bill was introduced because a juror was shot and because a witness who had given evidence in a court of law was shot. The Government had no other alternative open to them but to introduce this Bill in the Dáil, and we here, elected by the people, have no alternative but to pass this Bill into law. The time that has been spent over these silly amendments to this Bill is time that could be put to better use. I have no hesitation in saying that there has been a pure waste of public time here in presenting objections to the placing of this Bill on the Statute Book.
I would point out to the Deputy who has just spoken that he should reconsider his attitude towards this Bill. It is really several months since these unfortunate incidents to which he referred occurred and there is no question of an alternative at all. Nothing has happened since and what did happen then was of such a sporadic nature as not to justify the upheaval and the destruction of the whole system so far as penal law is concerned.
Amendment to Seanad Amendment 8 put.
The Dáil divided: Tá, 41; Níl, 65.
Tá
- Aiken, Frank.
- Allen, Denis.
- Blaney, Neal.
- Boland, Gerald.
- Boland, Patrick.
- Bourke, Daniel.
- Brady, Seán.
- Buckley, Daniel.
- Carty, Frank.
- Cassidy, Archie J.
- Clery, Michael.
- Colohan, Hugh.
- Cooney, Eamon.
- Corkery, Dan.
- Crowley, Fred. Hugh.
- Crowley, Tadhg.
- De Valera, Eamon.
- Fahy, Frank.
- Flinn, Hugo.
- Fogarty, Andrew.
- Gorry, Patrick J.
- Goulding, John.
- Houlihan, Patrick.
- Jordan, Stephen.
- Kennedy, Michael Joseph.
- Kerlin, Frank.
- Killilea, Mark.
- Lemass, Seán F.
- Little, Patrick John.
- Maguire, Ben.
- MacEntee, Seán.
- Moore, Séamus.
- O'Dowd, Patrick Joseph.
- O'Leary, William.
- Powell, Thomas P.
- Ruttledge, Patrick J.
- Ryan, James.
- Sheehy, Timothy (Tipperary).
- Smith, Patrick.
- Walsh, Richard.
- Ward, Francis C.
Níl.
- Aird, William P.
- Beckett, James Walter.
- Blythe, Ernest.
- Bourke, Séamus A.
- Brennan, Michael.
- Byrne, John Joseph.
- Carey, Edmund.
- Cole, John James.
- Collins-O'Driscoll, Mrs. Margt.
- Conlon, Martin.
- Doyle, Peadar Seán.
- Duggan, Edmund John.
- Dwyer, James.
- Egan, Barry M.
- Esmonde, Osmond Thos. Grattan.
- Fitzgerald, Desmond.
- Fitzgerald-Kenney, James.
- Good, John.
- Gorey, Denis J.
- Haslett, Alexander.
- Hassett, John J.
- Heffernan, Michael R.
- Hennessy, Thomas.
- Hennigan, John.
- Henry, Mark.
- Jordan, Michael.
- Keogh, Myles.
- Leonard, Patrick.
- Lynch, Finian.
- Mathews, Arthur Patrick.
- MacEóin, Seán.
- McGilligan, Patrick.
- Mongan, Joseph W.
- Connolly, Michael P.
- Cooper, Bryan Ricco.
- Cosgrave, William T.
- Craig, Sir James.
- Crowley, James.
- Daly, John.
- Davis, Michael.
- De Loughrey, Peter.
- Doherty, Eugene.
- Dolan, James N.
- Murphy, James E.
- Myles, James Sproule.
- Nally, Martin Michael.
- Nolan, John Thomas.
- O'Connell, Richard.
- O'Connor, Bartholomew.
- O'Donovan, Timothy Joseph.
- O'Higgins, Thomas.
- O'Leary, Daniel.
- O'Mahony, Dermot Gun.
- O'Reilly, John J.
- O'Sullivan, Gearóid.
- O'Sullivan, John Marcus.
- Rice, Vincent.
- Roddy, Martin.
- Sheehy, Timothy (West Cork).
- Thrift, William Edward.
- Tierney, Michael.
- Vaughan, Daniel.
- White, Vincent Joseph.
- Wolfe, George.
- Wolfe, Jasper Travers.
Tellers:—Tá Deputies G. Boland and Allen; Níl: Deputies Duggan and P. Doyle.
Amendment declared lost.
Seanad Amendment 8 put and agreed to.
The Dáil went out of Committee.
Agreement to Seanad amendment reported.
Question—"That the Dáil agree with the Committee in its report"— put and agreed to.
Message to be sent to the Seanad acquainting them accordingly.