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Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 4 Jun 1931

Vol. 38 No. 20

Public Business. - Town Tenants Bill, 1930—Committee Stage.

The Dáil went into Committee.
Section 1 agreed to.
SECTION 2.
2.—In this Act—
the word "tenement" means land or premises complying with all the following conditions, that is to say:—
(a) it is situate in an urban area, and
(b) it consists either of land covered wholly or partly by buildings or of a defined portion of a building, and
(c) if it consists of land covered in part only by buildings, the portion of such land not so covered is subsidiary and ancillary to such buildings, and
(d) it is held by the occupier thereof under a lease or other contract of tenancy, and
(e) such contract of tenancy is not a letting made and expressed to be made for the temporary convenience of the lessor or of the lessee;
the expression "urban area" means an area which is either a county or other borough, an urban district, a town, or a village;
the word "tenant" means the person for the time being entitled to the occupation of a tenement and, where the context so admits, includes a person who has ceased to be entitled to such occupation by reason of the termination of his tenancy;
the word "landlord" means the person for the time being entitled to receive (otherwise than as agent for another person) the rent paid in respect of a tenement by the tenant thereof and, where the context so admits, includes a person who has ceased to be so entitled by reason of the termination of his tenancy;
the expression "superior landlord" means a person entitled in possession to a tenement by a tenure superior, whether mediately or immediately, to the tenure of the landlord of such tenement;
the expression "predecessors in title" when used in relation to a tenant means and includes all previous tenants of the tenement of such tenant under the same tenancy as such tenant or any tenancy of which such tenancy is or is deemed to be a continuation or renewal, and the said expression when used in relation to a landlord means and includes all previous landlords of the tenement of such landlord;
the word "lease" means an instrument in writing, whether under or not under seal, containing a contract of tenancy in respect of any land in consideration of a rent or return;
the word "lessee" shall, where the context so admits, be construed as including the executors, administrators, and assigns of the lessee;
the word "lessor" shall, where the context so admits, be construed as including the heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns of the lessor;
the word "improvement" when used in relation to a tenement means any addition or alteration to the buildings comprised in such tenement and includes any structure erected on such tenement which is ancillary or subsidiary to the said buildings but does not include work consisting only of repairing, painting, and decorating, or any of them;
the word "business" means any trade, profession, or business carried on for gain or reward;
the expression "compensation under this Act" shall be construed as equivalent to the expression "compensation for improvements and compensation for disturbance or either of them";
the expression "relief under this Act" shall be construed as equivalent to the expression "compensation for improvements or a new tenancy under Part III of this Act";
the word "prescribed" means prescribed by regulations made by the Minister for Justice under this Act; except in Part V of this Act, the expression "building lease" means a lease made partly in consideration of the lessee having erected or agreed to erect permanent buildings, whether new or additional, on the demised premises.

Amendment 1, "In page 3 to delete line 24", is outside the scope of the Bill.

Is the Ceann Comhairle prepared to listen to an argument on that point?

It seems to me that if the term "urban areas" which is used in the Title of the Bill is to be given its ordinary meaning it is in conflict with the definition which appears in Section 2, which includes a village. There is no definition of what constitutes a village in this Bill or in any Act. I do not know whether it is not even possible that the actual definition used in the Bill may meet the purpose intended to be served by the amendment. That is not likely, I agree, but in view of the vagueness of the meaning of the term village it is possible. The purpose of the amendment is to bring within the scope of the Bill all premises that can be described as urban premises, that is, shops and residences which are distinct from agricultural dwellings or anything of that kind. I take it that there can be no reason for including in the Bill a house that is one of a group of ten in any part of the country, and excluding a similar house that happens to be situate a quarter of a mile from them.

That is rather on the merits than on whether the amendment is in order. The amendment, I take it, intends to make the Bill apply to tenancies whether situate inside or outside an urban area.

The Bill does that at present. Outside the ordinary definition of an urban area we have the word "village." That is the difficulty Deputy Lemass and all of us are up against. No one can say what a village is. As far as I know and as far as the Minister for Justice knows everyone lives in a village in Mayo.

But that seems to be no solution of the point of order. The Bill as drafted applies to tenancies in urban areas. The amendment proposes to delete the words "urban area" from the definition section, and that would make the Bill apply to all tenancies. The purport of the amendment, therefore, is to widen the scope of the Bill.

I submit that the principle of the Bill may not be defined in the Title. The principle, I take it, is to regulate the relations between landlord and tenant concerning any holding which is not an agricultural holding, in which case the amendment would appear to be within the scope of the Bill.

It is a matter of opinion. The Bill appears to me to cover tenancies in urban areas only. If you take out urban areas it extends the scope of the Bill.

What are urban areas?

Mr. O'Connell

The point can be met if we can get a definition of what is meant by the expression "urban areas."

We do not define urban areas by proceeding to delete the words "urban area." There may be something to be argued but not to a point of order.

Does it not turn on the definition of the word "village"?

Because subsequently we have an urban area defined as "An area which is either a county or other borough, an urban district, a town, or a village." The trouble is one house might constitute a village.

I am only dealing with the point of order. The Deputy may raise a question on the section. I am not concerned with the definition of a village. Nor am I concerned about what is an urban area. If this particular paragraph (a) be deleted the scope of the Bill would be extended.

If the words "or a village" were not contained in the Bill in line 36 would it be possible to introduce them by way of amendment?

That is a hypothetical question that I have not considered.

It seems to me to be the kernel of the question.

The amendment is not in order.

Mr. O'Connell

I think the point would be met by leaving in "urban areas" and then trying to define "urban areas."

The Ceann Comhairle is not in a position to define what the terms mean in any sense. Let us look at the Bill and see whether the amendment comes within its scope.

I move:—

In page 3, line 31, to delete the word "or" and substitute the word "of," and after the word "tenancy" to insert the words "express or implied or arising by virtue of a statute."

The reason for the amendment is that in the country now there are a considerable number of premises which are being held as statutory tenancies under the provisions of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Act. They are not held under contract of tenancy but under a quasi tenancy arising out of the provisions of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Act. It would, in a way, be more correct to deal with that class of house when that Act expires. It might be a more scientific way of dealing with the question if the status of tenants and their rights should be determined on the expiration of that Act. But a considerable amount of disquietude seems to have arisen amongst persons who are holding on under the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Act that they might not come in under the provisions of this Bill. It is quite possible also that persons who would be entitled to come under the Bill might be ousted from their rights before the expiration of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Act. Some landlords might be able to recover premises under that Act before the complete code expires. Though not possibly the most scientific way of dealing with the matter, I think that the most practical way of dealing with it is to decide whether tenants holding under the Act should or should not come under this Bill. I submit that they ought to come under it. On the expiration of the Act there would have been general opinion that they ought to come under it. The tenancies have not been determined, and I ask the House to agree to the amendment which will include them.

This amendment, I think, seeks to serve the same purpose which I have in mind in amendment 4.

There was what we considered a serious defect in the Bill, and this will remedy it. The Minister denied on Second Reading that there was any such defect, and I am glad that he has since seen the light.

I beg your pardon. I stated clearly that it did not apply to tenancies unless there was a contract of tenancy.

Well, the Official Report is there. The Minister has used the phrase "statutory tenancy." I understand that that is only a colloquial phrase and has no significance, that the tenant is really not a tenant and has simply a statutory right of occupation. In view of that, is the wording in the best form?

Yes, I think so. "Statutory tenancy" is used in the marginal note.

It is clear that the question could not arise in future?

No, it could not. The phrase is "or arising by virtue of a statute."

Amendment put and agreed to.

I move:

In page 3, line 34, after the word "lessee" to add the words "and (if made after the passing of this Act) stating the nature of such temporary convenience."

This amendment deals with the definition of "temporary convenience." There is another amendment standing in Deputy O'Connell's name which deals with the same question. It was represented to me that in parts of the country a habit had grown up of putting into ordinary conveyances, ordinary leases, between landlords and tenants the words "for temporary convenience," whether it was made for temporary convenience or not, while if these matters were litigated in court the documents would not hold water, and several of them were, in fact, set aside. At the same time, it led, or might lead, to a considerable amount of litigation. The best way, it seems to me, of getting over that matter is that not only should it appear in the written contract of tenancy that the letting is for temporary convenience, but that the actual nature of the letting for temporary convenience should be set out. It must be stated, if it is a temporary convenience on the part of the landlord, what that convenience is, and if it is a temporary convenience on the part of the tenant, it will also have to be stated what the temporary convenience is. In that way, words coming in when they should not be in, as a method of cheating the Act, will be done away with. Deputy O'Connell has an amendment which we might discuss on this—that is, amendment 3. I cannot accept it, but possibly it would be better if he gave his reasons for putting down that amendment now.

Mr. O'Connell

My amendment reads as follows:—

Before line 37, page 3, to insert the words "the expression `temporary convenience' when used in relation to a contract of tenancy shall be construed as excluding any lettings for a longer period than, in the case of business premises, one year or, in the case of dwelling houses, than three years.

Am I to take it that the Minister is trying to meet the point of my amendment by his own?

Mr. O'Connell

The Minister's amendment applies only to contracts made after the passing of the Act. I have in mind the cases that the Minister refers to and which seem to be particularly numerous in the constituency which both the Minister and I represent. Where this clause was put in it was put in quite clearly to defeat the purposes of the 1906 Act. I understand that there is a provision there that if the letting is for temporary convenience the tenant is not entitled to compensation. It was a habit of some landlords to put in a phrase of that kind, and it was only after considerable time that the tenants became alive to the fact that, as the Minister says, the courts would rule against it and would not allow a clause like that to be used in that way. The position is that in many tenancies, some of them existing for twelve or fifteen years, there is a clause of that kind there. I do not care how it is done, but my purpose is to see that a clause of that kind in an agreement will not defeat the purposes of the Act and will not prevent a tenant from getting the benefit of the provisions of this Bill. Perhaps it would be better to suggest what a temporary agreement is, but what about the old agreements where they are for twelve or fifteen years and where this clause exists? That is where there is a statement in the agreement that it is for the purpose of temporary convenience, although it is well known that it is not for temporary convenience. What would the position of a tenant be in that case?

The position of a tenant would be this. He would make an application and the court would decide as to whether it was bona fide for temporary convenience or not. It would be impossible to say that a claim for improvements should be allowed because certain words were not in the conveyance which was executed before the passing of the Act. Supposing there is a bona fide case of a letting for temporary convenience entered into before the passing of the Act and it did not set out the nature of the temporary convenience because it was not required, it would be unfair to bring that within the meaning of the Act. You can only deal with the future, and I do not see how you can deal with past cases, except by allowing the court to decide as to whether or not they were bona fide. As the Deputy stated, some of these agreements in court were not held to be bona fide and were not binding on the tenant. This is to make it clear that these shall not be used as a common form in future, but the Deputy's amendment provides that a period of one year, or, in the case of a dwelling house, that three years should be the limit for which a letting for temporary convenience should last.

I am afraid you cannot put any figure on it except a figure for a lengthy period, because a letting for temporary convenience might very well be for a longer period than one year. For instance, let us suppose that there is an administration suit going on and that the court wishes to make a letting. The court will make a letting to somebody until the litigation is would up. That might be a much longer period than three years. Again, I can imagine somebody inheriting property when he is seventeen or eighteen years of age. His guardian would make a letting of his premises perhaps until he became twenty-one and until he would be able to manage his own business. It would be clear that he inherited the business, but under Deputy O'Connell's amendment he would be cut out. Again, a tenant might be in a position to take a new house or he might be inheriting a house in three or four years' time. He would go to a landlord and say: "Will you let me a house until I get possession of my own house?" That may be in three or four years' time, and the landlord might say "Yes." The tenant in that case would get all the rights of the Bill although the landlord, if he thought he would, would never make the letting. Bona fide temporary convenience cases are very few indeed, but I think it would be impossible to limit the time because temporary convenience may last for a considerable number of years.

The Minister's amendment seems to meet the need undoubtedly, but I am very definitely under the impression that the wording of it is defective in some way. It is proposed to add at the end of the paragraph (e) the words stated in the amendment, but does not the negative in the first sentence of the paragraph govern the amendment, so that the paragraph, as amended, would read, leaving out the unimportant part of it: "Such contract of tenancy is not a letting made for temporary convenience and stated to be made for temporary convenience"?

Oh, no. I do not think the Deputy has read it correctly: It reads: "Such contract of tenancy is not a letting made and expressed to be made for the temporary convenience of the lessor or of the lessee and stating the nature of such temporary convenience." It must be for the temporary convenience of the lessor or the lessee and, as well as that, it must state the nature of the temporary convenience.

Yes. I agree with the Minister that Deputy O'Connell's amendment, although designed to deal with the situation that requires to be dealt with, does not appear to do so effectively. It would be very difficult to get an amendment which would limit a contract in time without risking the possibility of inflicting hardship upon individuals. The question arises, however, whether or not it is not desirable and possible to make the Minister's amendment retrospective in some way. There is a section in the Bill, Section 37, which deals with restrictions on contracting out. It provides that a contract, whether made before or after the passing of the Act, which would directly or indirectly deprive a tenant of his rights under the Act, is considered to be void. Would it not be possible to use that section?

That is the existing law. Even under the old Town Tenants Act that is the existing law. If it is stated that the letting was for temporary convenience, and the court is satisfied that it was not for temporary convenience, then it is declared to be void. What Deputy O'Connell wishes is that a tenant would not be put to the trouble of going into court. I do not think there is a terrible amount in it, because a tenant will go into court unless it is a question of a bona fide temporary convenience.

Amendment 2 (a) put and agreed to.

In regard to my amendment No. 3, I would like if the Minister would look into the matter again and see if any provision can be inserted along the lines which Deputy Lemass suggested or otherwise, so as to make certain that such tenants will not be deprived of their rights.

They are not deprived.

Mr. O'Connell

It depends on the court judge and the court decision, but there is nothing in the Act which will give them relief. They must have it litigated in the court. If they are not in a position to bear the expense of court proceedings a wealthy landlord may bring them from court to court and put them into a position in which they would have to drop their suit altogether. I quite see the Minister's objection and the danger of a time-limit of one or two years. There are cases where that would be unfair, but the Minister should look into it.

I shall, but, frankly speaking, I do not think that in retrospective cases it would be really possible, because, of course, there are cases of bona fide temporary convenience lettings which have been made before the passing of the Act.

Is it not the case that the phrase "temporary convenience" has been given a very wide meaning by the courts, and in the decided case of Cloncurry v. Finnerty a letting to a tenant for his own life has been held to be for temporary convenience? That is under the 1906 Act.

Under the Land Acts, yes. Under the Land Acts temporary convenience would go very much further than under this Act. The leading case in regard to temporary convenience under the old Land Acts was that of a dower house or a letting until such time as there would be a widow to inhabit the dower house. There were other cases of that kind. I do not see how a letting for life could be regarded as a temporary convenience in the case of a business premises. Of course, every single one of these cases will have to be regarded by itself. It we put in a limit it would have to be a very lengthy limit.

I know that the commentators of the 1906 Act held that that phrase governed temporary convenience.

No, that was decided under the old Land Acts. I do not see how you can put in a time limit, because the temporary convenience would alter.

Shall I take the amendment as having been withdrawn at this stage?

Amendment No. 3 withdrawn.
Amendment No. 4 not moved.

I move amendment No. 5:—

In page 4, line 5, to add after the word "return" the words "and shall include a fee farm grant."

The necessity for this amendment arises out of Part 6 of the Bill which deals with covenants and leases. Restrictive covenants are frequently inserted in fee farm grants as well as in leases. If the amendment were not adopted by the House you might have the anomalous position that a person in occupation of a tenement for a number of years could, under this Bill, escape from restrictive covenants, whereas a person in occupation in perpetuity could not. I have been advised that this amendment is necessary.

The ordinary fee farm is a leasehold. It is a curious position. Though the tenant is a fee simple owner, at the same time he is a tenant, and the relation of landlord and tenant exists between the owner of a fee farm—or feofee as he is called—and the tenant; that is the relation of landlord and tenant respectively. The relation of landlord and tenant exists in all cases of fee farm grants under the Renewable Leasehold Conversion Act and in the case of fee farms created after the passing of Deasy's Act. There are no other fee farms in existence as far as I know, and if there are the relation of landlord and tenant does not exist there at all. The ordinary fee farm relation of landlord and tenant exists, and is already covered. I do not think there are any other fee farm grants. I think the fee farm was unknown in Ireland until the Renewable Leasehold Conversion Act. In that case the relation of landlord and tenant would not exist at all, and here you are dealing with a Bill which deals with the relationship of landlord and tenant.

The amendment I was told was necessary.

However, I do not think it is any harm if the words go in, but I do not think they are in the least bit necessary.

I would like if the Minister would agree to put it in and then he could examine the question afterwards.

I have examined it fully.

I am informed that it is necessary. A number of cases in Monaghan, where there were restrictive covenants, were brought to my notice. I was told it would not be possible for the tenants to escape unless this was put in.

They are not aware of the fact that the relationship of landlord and tenant exists in all fee farm grants and certainly in the case of fee farm grants under the Renewable Leasehold Conversion Act. I am perfectly willing to have the words in but they are entirely unnecessary in my opinion. They will not do any harm if they do go in.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment 6:—

In page 4 to insert after the word "buildings", line 15, the words "and any wires, pipes, or other conduits for the purpose of providing lighting, heating, or power for the use of the tenement or in connection therewith."

This amendment relates to the definition of the word "improvement" which is as follows in the Bill:—

The word "improvement" when used in relation to a tenement means any addition or alteration to the buildings comprised in such tenement and includes any structure erected on such tenement which is ancillary or subsidiary to the said buildings but does not include work consisting only of repairing, painting, decorating or any of them;

The purpose of the amendment is to provide that the installation of wires for supplying electric light or power, or the installation of pipes for the supply of gas, should be an "improvement" in respect of which the tenant would be entitled to claim compensation. It is not clear from the definition in the Bill that the installation of light or gas or water would be included. I intended that my amendment would cover water, but it did not occur to me at the time that it was necessary to put it in. It is not clear that the installation of electricity, gas or water is an "improvement" under the Bill. Yet a tenant might have expended money and increased the letting value of a tenancy as the result of that expenditure. It seems to me desirable that the term "improvement" should be so defined as to cover such expenditure, and that the tenant who incurred such expenditure would be entitled to compensation when quitting the tenement.

I do not think that these words are in the slightest bit necessary, because obviously it is an "improvement" in a house to put in electric lighting or a bathroom. I do not like the particular form in which the Deputy is putting this forward. I will meet the Deputy if he withdraws his amendment, and I will undertake to put in a more expansive word than "improvement" on the Report Stage. When you are dealing with questions of this nature the danger is that if you put in words like those suggested by the Deputy you might cut down the general meaning of the word "improvement" in the section. That would be a question of interpretation. It may be said afterwards that that is what Parliament meant, little things of this nature and not big things. On the Report Stage I will bring in an amendment expanding the words and making it perfectly clear, though to my mind it is already clear that "improvements" such as the Deputy is suggesting shall be included.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed:
"That Section 2 as amended stand part of the Bill."

I want to ask the Minister, in view of the words he used on the Second Reading of the Bill, whether it is, as he said, perfectly clear that he did not intend the Bill to apply to tenants covered by the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restriction) Acts. The Minister then said: "I might also point out that the Increase of Rent Act applies to rooms as well as to whole houses." I want to ask the Minister if the effect of this amendment now will be practically to perpetuate sub-tenancies, and give people the right to retain those rooms by the rights conferred on them by this Bill.

There are no such rights to retain here. I want to make this clear. There are two problems before us. The first problem is the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restriction) Act, a problem which is temporary. The other is a permanent problem with which this Bill is dealing. When the Increase of Rent Act expires all rights to possession under the Act will cease, and all the rights to compensation will necessarily cease. But the persons who had been tenants and whose tenancies expire and who hold on under the provisions of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restriction) Acts will be entitled to take advantage of the provisions of this Act just as if their interest in the premises was not an interest dependent on the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restriction) Acts solely. For instance, if you have a premises, and a notice to quit is served on the tenants, and the tenant holds on after the expiration of the tenancy under the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restriction) Acts, and if you have another premises exactly the same and held under the same title as the one in which notice to quit has been served, and the tenant is holding on under a contract of tenancy, in both these instances they will come under this Act. It will only be people who can take advantage of this Act as it stands who will be able to benefit. It does not increase the number or the class of persons. It only means persons who would be able to take advantage of it if their tenancies had not been determined by notice to quit. They will not be debarred now from coming in under the Act.

Would it not mean that the holder of a room in a tenement becomes, by virtue of this provision, the holder of a contract implied by virtue of the existing statute, whereas he would not have been so considered before?

Not at all. Persons holding single rooms do not necessarily hold them under the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restriction) Acts, and any person who holds under an ordinary contract of tenancy, and who is entitled to come under this Act will be equally entitled if he holds under the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restriction) Acts.

That does not answer my point. My point is that the person who holds, and continues to hold his tenancy, by virtue of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restriction) Acts becomes, under this section, entitled to continue that tenancy.

He is put in exactly the same position as if he were holding under a contract of tenancy. He has to hold under a contract of tenancy or under the statute. The person holding under the statute is not put in a better position than the person holding under a contract of tenancy.

His tenancy will last for the life of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restriction) Acts?

Yes, and until he is put out under that Act his claim for compensation for disturbance cannot arise.

Mr. O'Connell

I think it would be well if we could get the views of the Minister on the point we were discussing at the beginning; that is, a definition of an urban area. The Minister heard the point raised by Deputy Lemass and the difficulty of finding a legal definition of the word village.

There is no definition. A village is simply a small cluster of houses. Where it stops or does not stop would be a matter for the court to decide.

There have been certain legal decisions on that point.

Mr. O'Connell

I do not know whether we should leave the matter so vague as that. I do not think we should. Is it the Minister's view that a house at a certain crossroads would be included?

Mr. O'Connell

Then it will have to be left to the court to decide whether or not such a house will be included.

The Deputy has referred to a house standing by itself at a crossroads. The Deputy obviously means an isolated country crossroads. The corner of Grafton Street might be deemed a crossroads. If a house is standing by itself at an isolated country crossroads it would not come within the provision.

Mr. O'Connell

The question might arise as to how far it stands away from another house.

I do not think that any houses of the class the Deputy has in mind would be included. I do not know that there has been any request that such houses should be included, but I bow to the ruling of the Chair.

If we can find a way of getting around the ruling of the Chair will the Minister accept an amendment to put in a definition of "village" that will include such houses as Deputy O'Connell refers to?

There is no evidence that that would be contrary to the ruling of the Chair. A definition of the word "village" would not be contrary to the ruling of the Chair.

Now that the Minister has received that assurance from the Chair, will he consider a definition of the word "village" so as to bring in the type of house for which this Bill was obviously intended, but that accidentally happens to be half a mile outside a village and is, therefore, outside the scope of this Bill?

The Deputy is really asking me to define what a village means.

I want to be clear as to what is a village. Deputy O'Connell says that in Mayo any group of houses is called a village. There has already been a court decision that five houses grouped together do not constitute a village, yet that group of houses would be called a village in Mayo. The courts have determined that five houses in a group do not constitute a village. Would ten houses constitute a village?

Mr. O'Connell

How near must the houses be in order to constitute a village?

I suggest that a village is any house held under a tenancy which does not come under the Land Acts. Let us say that a farmer at a cross-roads builds a house, and he lets that house to a publican or shopkeeper. In the case of the publican or the shopkeeper the conditions are exactly the same as in any village or town. In those circumstances I think that the tenant of the house should be entitled to exactly the same rights and privileges as any person in a village. He does not come under the Land Acts, and, therefore, he should come under the Town Tenants Act.

I am afraid I cannot define a village as being simply a single house.

I would like to put it to Deputy Lemass that, when he asks for a definition of "village," is it not quite possible that by defining "village" he would be limiting the scope of the Bill? I suggest it is better to leave the term in a somewhat vague state. There have been cases under the Land Acts where land in the vicinity of towns or villages has been held to be agricultural land. I suggest that Deputies should be very wary about putting in any strict definition of "village."

I can see the danger, and that is why I propose to amend the Bill by deleting that particular definition. It seems to me that Deputy Little has suggested a means of getting the term "village" defined without any risk of danger. He suggests that "village" should relate to a holding which is not affected by the Land Acts. This Bill is, to my mind, intended to apply to any such holding.

The occupier of a particular house built by a farmer at a cross-roads, as suggested by Deputy Little just now, might be brought inside the Bill as a tenant, but if we call his holding a village that man would then be the owner of a village, and he would automatically become a landlord.

He would really be the tenant of a village.

Mr. O'Connell

We should be clear as to what we ourselves mean. We have not had it very clearly from the Minister as to whether or not he intends the Bill to apply to such houses.

As the Bill was originally drafted, it did not. It was meant to be a Town Tenants Bill simply, and it was not meant to include the class of house to which the Deputy refers.

Mr. O'Connell

The words "town tenants" were used only for temporary convenience. There is nothing sacred about the words "town tenants." No argument has been put up to show why this particular tenant who lives at a crossroads and who is subject to the same conditions as if he lived in a village of eight or ten houses, should not be entitled to the same conveniences as the man who does happen to live in a village. If the House believes that he is so entitled, no matter where he lives, to the same benefits, and that he should be included, even though his house happens to be a quarter of a mile from another house, it ought not to be beyond our ability so to frame our Bill as to make it apply in his case. I think if we were clear on that point we could then leave it to the Minister, either by fixing up the definition clause or otherwise, to get that provided for.

I would suggest something like this to the Minister for his consideration. At the end of "village" words like this might be put in: "And shall include any tenancy not held under the Land Acts."

Mr. O'Connell

That is the urban area.

Urban area is used for the purpose of including everything under this Act under the term of urban area as it is used in the Title. It is a notional area. In a sense it applies to certain rights and duties and not to any geographical matter. We do not want tenancies to fall between two stools.

I will consider the matter. There would be very few cases, indeed, I think. I will see if there is any method of dealing with them.

The Minister has stated there are very few cases. I want to give my experience. My remarks on this particular subject on the Second Reading of this Bill were reported in the Press, and I have received a number of letters from all over the country from people who think that they will fall between two stools and will not come under the Land Act or this Act. There are also a number of followers of the Minister's Party in the same position and I advised them to write to him.

They certainly did not write to me, for which I am greatly obliged to the Deputy.

Question agreed to.

SECTION 3.

Where the buildings on any land or premises were erected by a local authority under the Housing of the Working Classes (Ireland) Acts, 1890 to 1919, or the Labourers (Ireland) Acts, 1883 to 1930, the following provisions shall have effect, that is to say:—

(a) if such land or premises is or are held by such local authority in fee simple, this Act shall not apply in respect of such land or premises;

(b) if such land or premises is or are held by such local authority under a lease, such local authority shall be deemed for the purposes of this Act to be the tenant of such land or premises and to be in exclusive occupation thereof.

I move amendment 7:—

In line 33, to delete the word "erected" and substitute the word "provided."

Amendment 7 is largely a drafting amendment. The word, as it stands, is "erected," but "provided" is a more accurate word because under the Working Classes and Labourers Act houses could be acquired as well as built. This takes in both houses acquired and built.

Amendment put and agreed to.

I move amendment 8:—

In line 35, to delete the figures "1919" and substitute the figures "1921."

It is only a verbal amendment.

Amendment put, and agreed to.

On the section. I would like to know what is the exact legal significance of the description of the section which appears on the margin. If it has any significance we must change it at once because it is inadequate. It relates to the first sub-section and not to the second.

What does the Deputy mean?

The marginal note says: "Exclusion of certain lands and premises held by local authorities." Sub-section (a) relates to the exclusion of lands. Sub-section (b) relates to the inclusion of lands. I do not know if the note has any significance. If it has it should be amended.

Marginal notes do not count in the interpretation of the Bill. As a matter of fact I think it is an accurate marginal note.

I do not purport to give a legal interpretation, but I can tell the Deputy that we are not passing the marginal note; we are passing the section.

Section 3, as amended, put and agreed to.
Question—"That Sections 4 and 5 stand part of the Bill"—put and agreed to.

I move amendment 9.

Before Section 6 to insert a new section as follows:—

Where a person retains possession of a tenement by virtue of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Acts, 1923 to 1930, the tenancy arising by virtue of those Acts on such retention shall, for the purposes of this Act (whether such retention began before or after the passing of this Act), be deemed to be a continuation of the tenancy on the termination of which such retention began.

The proposed new section simply carries on the tenancy which he has in existence before the ejectment notice was served upon him. It makes it a graft upon his old tenancy, a continuation of his old tenancy.

I would like the Minister to examine whether the term "tenancy" is right. A tenant is not a tenant in consequence of his tenancy but in consequence of his rights of occupation.

As a matter of fact we are perfectly entitled to define a tenancy in any fashion we like. It is perfectly correct here.

Would the Minister say if the object of this clause is to make permanent the disabilities of the Rent Restrictions Act?

No, it does not affect the Rent Restrictions Act at all. It only means that when the Rent Restrictions Act expires a person who has held on under the Rent Restrictions Act shall be in the same position as a person who held on under a contract of tenancy which has not expired.

That is, it really ante-dates this Act by the number of years which have elapsed since the Rent Restrictions Act was passed.

What does Deputy Thrift want? Does he want to exclude such tenants? If he does it is a most inequitable proposition.

I want to know the meaning of what we are doing.

Does this make permanent the regulations of the Rent Restrictions Act, in other words to continue them after the Rent Restrictions Act has been withdrawn?

No. When the Rent Restrictions Acts have been withdrawn then the rights which they conferred upon certain persons shall cease, but those persons shall have rights under this Act exactly the same as persons holding under a contract of tenancy would have. I took an instance a few moments ago. Supposing there are two tenants of two similar houses held under the same rent and under the same landlord. In one case a notice to quit has been served and the tenant has shown that he comes under the Rent Restrictions Act and remains on in possession under the provisions of that Act. In the other case the person remains on under his original contract of tenancy. The rights of those two individuals are exactly the same under this Act. That is all it does.

I have been trying to make myself clear, but I cannot avoid thinking that what I have said is absolutely accurate. If the Rent Restrictions Act had never been passed certain tenants would have lost their tenancy under the old Act. Now by virtue of this new amendment we get the benefit of this Act which is the same as if the Act had been passed at the date the Rent Restrictions Act was passed. That is to say, to that extent the Act has been made retrospective.

The tenancies created under the Rent Restrictions Act are to be in exactly the same position as other tenancies. In other words, the involuntary and the voluntary tenants are to be on the same footing.

Amendment put and agreed to.
Orderd that the new section be inserted in the Bill.
SECTION 6.
"The Minister for Justice may by order make regulations prescribing any form, matter, or thing which is in this Act referred to as prescribed or to be prescribed."

I move amendment 10:

In line 12, after the word "Justice" to insert the words "after consultation with the President of the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland."

In doing so, I only ask the Dáil to follow the precedents of the various Land Acts during the last fifty years. The precedents have been found to work most satisfactorily. It is to avoid friction of any sort that the regulations are submitted to the President of the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland. He then is in a position to express his views on them. We ask that that be done here, and if the Minister would see his way to follow the precedents to which I allude he will be following precedents that have worked out very well in practice.

I will agree to the Deputy's amendment.

Amendment put and agreed to.
Section 6, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Are these regulations to be laid on the Table of the House?

In view of the introduction of the influence to be given to the President of the Incorporated Law Society, I think they should be. We might trust the Minister alone, but we would not trust him in such company.

It is being done under many other statutes.

Sections 7 and 8 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

SECTION 9.

I move:

To add at the end of the section a new sub-section as follows:—

"The amount of compensation payable under this section shall be a charge on the estate or interest of the landlord in the tenement in priority to all other charges, mortgages or incumbrances thereon."

The Bill makes the compensation awarded to a tenant under Part II a personal charge against the landlord. The landlord may be a man of straw who has mortgaged his interest in the tenement up to the hilt. It seems to us that some protection should be afforded to the tenant in such cases. That is why we suggest the addition of this sub-section to the effect that the amount of compensation payable under this section shall be a charge on the estate or interest of the landlord in the tenement in priority to all other charges, mortgages or incumbrances thereon. It seems reasonable that the amount of compensation awarded to the tenant in respect of improvements made by the tenant in a particular dwelling should be a charge upon the improved dwelling. That is what the amendment seeks to provide, and I trust the Minister will be able to accept it.

There is another similar amendment to this introduced by the Deputy later on. They stand on very different footings. As far as this amendment is concerned, I am willing to accept the principle of it, but the Deputy must not take that as a precedent for the principle being applied later on.

I recognise that.

Because here undoubtedly the premises have been improved by the tenant's work. He has expended money on that, and he should get the amount of the money. The premises will fall into the owner's hands improved by the amount of the tenant's work and his expenditure. That is assessed by the court. I agree that it is fair that they should be a first charge upon the premises. Subject to small redrafting, I would accept the principle. If the Deputy withdraws the amendment I will bring it on again. Later on there are different considerations.

I agree.

Is not that likely to affect very much certain prior charges?

I do not think this amendment will. The security has been increased by the amount of the tenant's improvement.

It might afterwards be nothing.

At the expiration of his term the court will assess what the value of the improvement is. If a house which is worth, let me say, £1,000, becomes, owing to the tenant's improvement, worth £1,100 I think it is quite reasonable that the tenant should get his £100 out of the premises, and £1,000 is left for the landlord or his mortgagees, as the case may be.

Would you lend money on it yourself?

I have no money to lend.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed: "That Section 9 stand part of the Bill."

I want to know from the Minister why the limitation of ten years was put in sub-section (2): "A landlord of a tenement who holds such tenement under a lease or other contract of tenancy shall be entitled on giving up possession of such tenement on the expiration of his lease or tenancy therein to be paid by his immediate superior landlord compensation for improvements under this Act within ten years before such expiration." What particular purpose is it intended to serve? I do not see the purpose of having that limitation there, if, in fact, when the immediate landlord surrenders the tenancy the letting value has been increased.

The principle is that after a certain time the value of the improvements will have passed away.

In that case there would be no compensation.

This is where a middle landlord is surrendering to a head landlord. Then he is entitled to receive from his head landlord the value of any improvements that he has paid his direct tenant for.

"Within ten years before the expiration of his own tenancy." What is the purpose of the limitation?

The reason is that he has had the enjoyment of the tenant's improvement for that particular period, and the period during which he has enjoyed it and during which his immediate tenant would have enjoyed it, would be sufficient to wear out the value of the improvement.

He may have paid fifteen times the annual increased letting value. Should it not be fifteen years, therefore?

In a subsequent section it may be awarded up to fifteen times the annual letting value, but the Deputy is correct in that. What suggestion has the Deputy got to make?

I do not propose to amend it. I thought there might be some reason for that limitation of which I was not aware.

The only limitation is the presumption that he has fully enjoyed the value of it.

Obviously he would not have fully enjoyed the value if the court compelled him to pay in compensation fifteen times the annual value of the improvement. The court would not have fixed it at fifteen times unless they were satisfied that the improvement was going to last for fifteen years. Yet he has to pay within ten years himself in order to get compensation on surrendering his own tenancy.

I will look into it.

I am not going to defend the interests of the landlord.

Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 10.
(1) The amount of compensation for improvements in any particular case shall (subject to the provisions of this section) be the capitalised value of such addition to the letting value of the tenement at the termination of the tenancy as the court shall determine to be attributable to the improvement which is the subject of such compensation.
(2) Where the compensation for an improvement is payable to a tenant by his landlord and the court is satisfied that such tenant and (where applicable) his predecessors in title or any of them has or have received from the landlord benefits by way of reduction of rent or otherwise in consideration, expressly or impliedly, of such improvement being or having been made, the court shall deduct from the compensation for such improvement as ascertained under the foregoing sub-section of this section such sum as the court shall think proper in respect of such benefits.
(3) Where the compensation for an improvement is payable to a landlord by his superior landlord, the court shall make such deduction (if any) from such compensation as ascertained under the first sub-section of this section as the court shall think proper in respect of benefits received by such landlord and (where applicable) his predecessors in title or any of them by way of increased rent or otherwise on account of such improvement.
(4) The capitalised value for the purposes of this section of an addition to the letting of a tenement shall be fixed by the court having regard to the probable duration of such addition, the probable life of the improvement, and all other relevant circumstances, but shall not in any case exceed fifteen times the annual amount of such addition.

I move amendment 12:—At the end of sub-section (1), line 53, to add the words "or the actual amount expended on improvements by the tenant, whichever is the greater." The section provides for the capitalised addition to the letting value. There may be cases where owing to the shortage of houses and other various reasons the house is let in a bad condition and a considerable amount of money will be required to bring the house up to the ordinary habitable standard. It might transpire at the end of twelve or fifteen years that the letting value of the house, judged in the way it is supposed to be judged under the Act, would not be very much increased at all, if anything. The tenant was compelled owing to circumstances, the shortage of houses or that sort of thing, to expend a considerable amount of money on repairs. He might find at the end of his term that he would get nothing at all for the money he had spent, because the letting value, judged on normal conditions of supply and demand, would not be increased beyond what he had paid for it under the stress of shortage. It seems fair that he should get the actual amount he expended on the house by way of compensation.

I cannot follow the Deputy in this. It appears to me that the case in which the tenant should get the amount that he has actually expended would be very rare indeed. The tenant makes improvements and for many years he gets the value of these improvements. According to this statement, when the improvements are, so to speak, run out and when the benefit is almost entirely gone, he is to get the full value of the money which he expended upon it. That would appear to be most inequitable and unjust. Suppose the tenant spent £100 on improvements and at the end of his time the value of the improvements is gone—they only add a shilling or two shillings to the annual letting value—yet the tenant is to get £100, according to the Deputy. The landlord has to pay £100 for which he is getting nothing. That would not appear to me to be fair. The principle underlying the Bill is that for what a tenant has done to the premises and which the landlord gets, the landlord should pay; but the landlord should only pay for what he actually acquires —the value of the tenant's improvements which he is getting. He should not pay for the value of improvements the entire of which the tenant has exhausted or portion of which the tenant has exhausted. He should only pay for the value of the improvements which he actually gets.

Mr. O'Connell

Yes, but the money that the tenant has expended may be such as to bring the house up to a habitable condition. The letting value of the house under the conditions set out here will not be altogether greater than it was under the stress of shortage at the time the tenant acquired it, and in that case, although the tenant has expended money upon it, he will be entitled to get no compensation whatever.

I agree that it would not be possible to pass the amendment in its present form, because, as the Minister said, portion of the improvements may be entirely exhausted by the time the tenancy is surrendered— not completely exhausted. The landlord should be only asked to pay compensation if the letting value has been increased and the amount of compensation should be in direct relation to the increase in the letting value. There is a special situation existing here to which Deputy O'Connell referred, although this amendment does not deal with it, and that is that rents are declining and we may anticipate a continuous decline over a large number of years. I may rent a house now and expend a considerable sum of money on improving it. At the end of fifteen years, in consequence of the decline in rents, the letting value of the house, although I have improved it, might in the circumstances existing of normal competition in the year 1946 be no greater than the letting value now, in which case I would lose whatever value I created as a result of the improvements.

I think there is a big fallacy in Deputy O'Connell's and Deputy Lemass's argument and it is this: that the letting value is the letting value at the time at which the assessment is made, not the original letting value. Suppose a case comes into court in 1932, what the court will decide will be the letting value of the house in the year 1932 without that improvement, and the letting value plus the improvement. Then it will take the value of the difference and capitalise it and give it to the tenant. The fallacy is that you are taking the rent as being, say, the 1915 rent, when it is the rent which would be assessed in 1932.

Is the Minister not satisfied that the basis which the court will adopt in deciding the increase of the letting value will be the rent at which it has been let?

No. It will be the rent at the date on which the court makes its inquiry. Suppose a case comes into court in 1932, it will take the increased letting value of the premises in the year 1932 owing to the improvement made, and the increased letting value in the year 1932 will have no relation at all to what was the actual letting value of the premises in 1915 or in 1910.

The increased letting value will be relevant to the rent that has prevailed up to 1932.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments 13 and 14 not moved.

I move amendment 15:—

In sub-section (4), line 12, page 6, to delete the word "fifteen" and substitute the word "twelve."

I suppose the Minister fixed on fifteen years because it was the figure used in connection with the Land Acts —fifteen years' purchase. This Bill applies to something which is of a much more perishable character than land. I have made inquiries and I am informed definitely that the basis on which these rents would sell would be from ten to twelve and a half years. Fifteen years' purchase is entirely too high a figure, and I suggest that the Minister should substitute twelve. It is as much as these will be worth.

Surely the Deputy reads the sub-section to mean that that is the maximum, and that it will be for the court to determine what it considers to be the full value.

The court will be guided by what we put in as a maximum.

Surely the Deputy would not suggest that from ten to twelve and a half years' purchase is the usual figure?

I do in open sale.

Mr. Byrne

I wonder where the Deputy got his figures. I do not know a single case in the City of Dublin where that basis has been fixed, and I ask the Minister not to accept the amendment. The system of compensation in the Bill at present is exceedingly rigid and, as Deputy Redmond has properly pointed out, the fifteen years mentioned in the Bill is only the maximum figure and it lies in the discretion of the court absolutely to give only one-half or one-fourth or one-third, as the court may think fit. I do not think that by any stretch of imagination the House could say that tenants under this Bill are receiving anything like a liberal measure of compensation for the money they spent, and to reduce this figure to twelve, as Deputy Thrift suggests, would be extremely unfair.

I personally do not think that the figure fifteen can do any harm. I do not agree with Deputy Thrift that the court will approximate necessarily to the maximum except in very rare cases. There may be cases in which the court would go up to the maximum, hut I think they would be very rare indeed. This gives full discretion to the court and I think you can trust the court not to give an undue amount to the tenant. For the money he has expended, fifteen years' purchase would not give him a very large interest.

I do not attach a great deal of importance to this for the reason Deputy Redmond and the Minister gave, that it is the maximum, but I do think that the fact that we are putting that figure into the Bill will be a sort of headline for judgment to be assessed by. I stick to what I have said. I am informed definitely that in a specific instance of a business premises in Henry Street a well-secured ground rent was put up for sale and it brought in only twelve years' purchase.

If the Deputy has been informed that these ground rents only realise twelve years' purchase surely the court will be informed of that also?

And the market value may alter.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section 10 put and agreed to.
SECTION 11.
(1) Where the tenant of a tenement proposes to make an improvement to such tenement he may serve on such landlord a notice (in this Act referred to as an improvement notice) in the prescribed form and consisting of the following documents, that is to say:
(a) a statement in the prescribed form of the intention to make such improvement, and
(b) plans and a specification of such improvement, and
(c) an estimate, verified by an architect or surveyor, of the cost of making such improvement.
(2) Where an improvement notice is served on the landlord of a tenement, such landlord may, within one month after such service, serve on the tenant of such tenement any one but not more than one of the following notices, that is to say:-
(a) a notice (in this Act referred to as an improvement consent) in the prescribed form consenting to the making of such improvement; or
(b) a notice (in this Act referred to as an improvement undertaking) in the prescribed form undertaking to execute such improvement in consideration of either (as such landlord shall state in such notice) a specified increase of rent or an increase of rent to be fixed by the court; or
(c) a notice (in this Act referred to as an improvement objection) in the prescribed form objecting to such improvement on grounds specified in such notice.
(3) Where a landlord on whom an improvement notice has been served holds the tenement in relation to which such notice was served either under a lease of which less than twenty-five years are unexpired at the date of the service of such notice or under a tenancy from year to year or any lesser tenancy, such landlord shall within one week after the service of such improvement notice on him serve such improvement notice or a copy thereof on his immediate superior landlord, and such immediate superior landlord may within one month after the date of the service of such improvement notice by the tenant on the landlord serve on the landlord and on the tenant either an improvement consent or an improvement objection.
(4) Every superior landlord on whom an improvement notice or a copy thereof is served under this section (including this sub-section) and who holds the tenement to which such notice relates under a lease of which less than twenty-five years are unexpired at the date of such service or under a tenancy from year to year or any lesser tenancy, shall within one week after such service serve such improvement notice (or such copy thereof) or a copy thereof on his next superior landlord, and such next superior landlord shall have the like right of serving an improvement consent or an improvement objection as such first-mentioned superior landlord has under this section (including this sub-section).
(5) Every improvement notice or copy of an improvement notice which is served under this section on a superior landlord shall have endorsed thereon a statement of the date on which such improvement notice was served on the landlord of the tenement to which such notice relates.

I move amendment 16:

In sub-section (1) (c), line 22, after the word "surveyor" to insert the words "or building contractor."

I put this amendment down because the case was put to me that in some rural areas it is not always easy to get the service of an architect or a surveyor, and it was thought that an estimate submitted by a building contractor should be sufficient.

I think that is in accord with the report of the Town Tenants Commission.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment 17:

In sub-section (2), line 25, to delete the words "one month" and substitute the words "three months."

This is one of a number of amendments that I put forward with the very definite object of curtailing so far as possible appeals to the courts. The Minister said he was anxious as far as possible to avoid litigation. I am informed that the periods here mentioned are in practice and as shown by experience entirely and utterly too short, and that application would have to be made to have the periods mentioned therein extended. I think that applies almost universally throughout the Bill. In practice, longer periods of time will be required for the different operations referred to in the various sections of the Bill. I move the extension contained in my present amendment.

Does Deputy Thrift think that one month is too short a period for a landlord to make up his mind whether he is going to agree to an improvement notice or to object to it, or to carry it out himself? Surely a person who cannot make up his mind in one month will not be able to make it up in three.

But very complicated inquiries may be necessary.

I do not think there is any desperate hurry in getting ordinary improvements done. If the experience of persons is that time of this nature would be required I do not see any reason why the time should not be given. I know myself it will take a certain amount of time to have complaints examined and looked into, and if people do want a reasonable time to do things and not to be rushed we ought to give it to them.

Surely it is hardly fair to the tenant that he should have to wait three months before he learns the fate of his improvement notice. I think the tenant's interest should be looked to also.

I cannot see in what circumstances, except in very exceptional cases, the landlord, unless he was deliberately putting the thing off, would require more than a month's notice.

I am thinking of the tenant as much as anybody else. If a month is too short to get the necessary information the tenant may have to go to the court to prevent the time being extended.

This relates to the period after the tenant has sent his notice to the landlord. The tenant may have been preparing plans for years.

If he has three months extra what matter?

No, the landlord has three months.

The landlord is only to get one month to consider what the tenant has taken years to consider.

I do not think the tenant or the landlord will be in a desperate hurry. They both will want a considerable time. I suggest that the House should accept this amendment.

Will Deputy Thrift compromise upon two months?

I shall not prevent such an amicable bargain.

The amendment will be altered to read: "In sub-section (2), line 25, to delete the words `one month' and substitute the words `two months'."

Amendment, as amended, agreed to.

I move amendment 18:—

In sub-section (3), line 45, to delete the word "week" and substitute the word "month."

This relates only to a formality. Where the landlord who receives an improvement notice is not concerned with it he is required within a week to send it on to his superior landlord. Surely that does not require consideration for a month.

I think it does.

Surely the landlord will not take a month to find out whether his lease has less than twenty-five years to run.

I stand by what I said. I think it is as necessary in this case as in the other.

It is purely a formality. The section provides that if the landlord's lease has less than twenty-five years to run he can send it on to the superior landlord. It does not take more than a week to ascertain that.

The man might be out of the country, or a whole lot of other things might happen.

Amendment agreed to.

I move amendment 19, with the change of "two months" for "three months," as in amendment 18:-

In sub-section (3), line 48, to delete the words "one month" and substitute the words "two months."

Amendment, as amended, agreed to.
Section 11, as amended, agreed to.
SECTION 12.
(1) Where a tenant has served an improvement notice on his landlord and such landlord has not, within one month after such service, served on such tenant an improvement undertaking in respect of such improvement notice and neither such landlord nor any superior landlord has, within such month, served on such tenant an improvement objection in respect of such improvement notice, the tenant shall be entitled to execute at any time within one year after such service (whether an improvement consent has or has not been served by such landlord or superior landlord) the improvement specified in such improvement notice in accordance in all respects with such notice.
(2) References in this Act to a tenant being entitled on consent to execute an improvement shall be construed as referring to such tenant being entitled under this section to execute such improvement.

I move amendment 20, subject to the same amendment, namely, the substitution of the words "two months" for "three months," as in amendments 18 and 19:

In sub-section (1), line 5, to delete the words "one month" and substitute the words "two months," and in line 8 to delete the word "month" and substitute the words "two months."

Amendment, as amended, agreed to.
Question proposed: "That Section 12, as amended, stand part of the Bill."

On the section I want it to be clear what would be the position in the event of there being four landlords or two landlords. I do not think it is likely, but if it did occur would not the position be complicated? Take it that there are two landlords; each has a month to forward the improvement notice, and the tenant, at any rate, must learn within two months what the fate of his notice is to be. No great complication would arise in that case, but if there were three landlords what would happen?

Undoubtedly it might take a considerable amount of time, but I do not see how you can possibly get over it if there are various interests to be consulted, but in fact that will happen very seldom.

That is not my point. Where a tenant has served an improvement notice, and that notice is forwarded from one landlord to another, this section, as now amended, provides that the tenant must learn the ultimate fate of his improvement notice in two months. If there are three landlords, each has a month in which to forward the improvement notice, so that it will be three months before the three receive it, and it cannot possibly be decided in two months. Then what is to be done? The section will have to be re-drafted so as to fix the time subsequent to the last day on which the final landlord will have received it.

Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 13.
Where a tenant has served an improvement notice on his landlord and such landlord has within one month after such service served on such tenant an improvement undertaking in respect of such improvement notice and no superior landlord has within such month served on such tenant an improvement objection in respect of such improvement notice, the following provisions shall have effect, that is to say :-
(a) such tenant may, by notice in writing served on such landlord within fourteen days after the service of such improvement undertaking, either accept such improvement undertaking or withdraw the improvement notice served by him, or, where such improvement undertaking specifies an increase of rent, object to the amount of such increase;
(b) where such tenant does not within the said fourteen days serve any notice under the foregoing paragraph or such tenant duly accepts such improvement undertaking, such landlord shall, as soon as may be after the expiration of such fourteen days, execute at his own expense and in accordance with such improvement undertaking the improvement mentioned therein and may for that purpose enter on the tenement at all reasonable times and there do all things necessary for or incidental to the execution of such improvement;
(c) if such tenant duly withdraws in accordance with this section the improvement notice served by him, such notice shall for all purposes be deemed never to have been served;
(d) where such tenant duly objects in accordance with this section to the amount of the increase of rent specified in such improvement undertaking, then
(i) such landlord and such tenant may either fix by agreement the amount of such increase of rent or agree that the amount of such increase of rent shall be fixed by the Court, and thereupon such improvement undertaking shall have effect in accordance with such agreement and be deemed to have been duly accepted in accordance with this section by such tenant, or
(ii) either such landlord or such tenant may apply to the Court and upon the hearing of such application the Court may, as it shall think proper, either fix the amount of such increase of rent or deem such improvement undertaking to be an improvement objection and deal with it accordingly or make such other order as justice may require;
(e) which such improvement undertaking is, by its terms or by subsequent agreement, made subject to an increase of rent of an amount to be fixed by the Court, such landlord or such tenant may when the improvement has been duly executed by such landlord apply to the Court to fix the amount of such increase of rent and thereupon the Court shall fix such amount accordingly;
(f) upon the completion of such improvement by such landlord in accordance with such improvement undertaking and this section, the rent payable by such tenant to such landlord shall, as from the date of such completion, be increased in accordance with such undertaking or the order of the Court (as the case may be), and any dispute as to the amount or commencement of or otherwise in relation to such increase shall be determined by the Court on the application of such landlord or such tenant;
(g) where such landlord is bound under this section to execute the improvement in accordance with such improvement undertaking but fails or neglects so to do within a reasonable time, such tenant may apply to the Court and the Court may make such order in the matter as justice may require.

I move amendment 21 where the same point of substituting "two months" for "three months" comes in.

In line 20, to delete the words "one month" and substitute the words "two months" and in line 23 to delete the word "month" and substitute the words "two months."

Amendment, as amended, agreed to.

I move amendment 22:—

In paragraph (b), page 7, line 36, to delete the words "as soon as may be" and substitute the words "within two months," and in line 37 after the word "execute" to insert the words "and complete."

Of course, I frankly admit there may be very considerable differences of opinion as to the time required but there is, I think, general agreement that a definite period for the carrying out of the improvement should be fixed. I suggest in this amendment that all improvements should be fixed and executed within a period of two months after the agreement is arrived at. If Deputies think that two months is too short we can consider that. I am not tied down to the two months, but I think it is highly desirable that a particular period should be fixed rather than some indefinite reasonable time.

Would a building contractor be able to escape his obligations by locking out his men and saying that there was a trade dispute on?

I am afraid that would have to go to the court. If the men were on strike, unless the tenant and landlord were reasonable, there would have to be an extension got from the court. Under another section the court has power to give an extension.

If the improvements were material a period of two months would be wholly inadequate, whereas that period would be all right for improvements of a minor character. That is the difficulty I see in the section. I am afraid that if the section is left in its present form it will be more or less necessary to approach the court in order to get an extension.

I suggest that a longer period be given.

What period does the Deputy suggest?

I suggest six months.

I have no objection to six months.

Amendment 22, as amended, put and agreed to.
Amendment 23:
In paragraph (g), page 8, lines 19 and 20, to delete the words "so to do within a reasonable time" and substitute the words "to execute and complete such improvement within the time limit in that behalf by this section."—(Aire Dlí agus Cirt), put and agreed to.

I move amendment 24:

To add at the end of the section a new paragraph as follows:—

"Where any part of the cost of an improvement is necessary in order to put the premises into a reasonable state of repair no additional rent shall be allowed in respect to such cost, and in no case shall the increase of rent be more than five per cent. of the cost of the improvements over and above the cost of putting the premises into a reasonable state of repair."

I put down this amendment because it seems to me the landlord should not be entitled to claim rent on the expenditure necessary to put a house into a habitable and reasonable state of repair. I hold that the amount of such expenditure should be excluded in fixing the rent. I also desire to limit the increase that the landlord should be entitled to claim on his expenditure when fixing the rent.

I do not quite follow what the Deputy has in mind in his amendment. Suppose there is a contract of tenancy and there is an obligation on the tenant to put the premises in repair. Suppose also that the tenant fails to do that, and the landlord is compelled to do what the tenant ought to have done, would the landlord not be entitled to increase the rent for the repairs that he has carried out?

Would any repairs mean improvement?

No repair is an improvement under this Bill. What I am anxious to get at is the idea that the Deputy has in mind in bringing forward this amendment. Repair is not an improvement within the definition here. I am not now so much on the actual wording of the amendment, but am rather concerned to get from the Deputy what his ideas on this are.

Mr. O'Connell

I see the point that Deputy Lemass raises now. I think that rules the thing out altogether.

If a tenant is compelled to carry out repairs that the landlord should carry out, then I think the tenant might get compensation from the landlord. If the landlord is under an obligation to put the premises in repair and fails to do that, and if the tenant serves notice upon him to do it, at present the tenant has very little remedy except to go into court and get a court order. That is a most difficult thing to do. But there certainly is a case to be argued. If the landlord is under an obligation to repair and the tenant serves notice on him that these repairs are necessary, and the landlord does not carry out the repairs, the tenant might be allowed to carry out the repairs and get a reduction in his rent to the extent of what the repairs cost. If that is what Deputy O'Connell has in mind I could meet him, but where the tenant is under an obligation to carry out repairs quite different considerations would arise.

I think one of the sections in the Bill that was introduced by Deputy Redmond proposed to give the tenant the right to execute repairs which the landlord had failed to do, subject to the approval of the court. If the Minister refers to that Bill he may be able to get an amendment on that line for the Report Stage.

Perhaps Deputy Redmond could tell us something about that.

There was a suggestion to that effect in the Bill.

Supposing there was a difference between the tenant and the landlord as to whether the repairs were necessary, would that be covered?

I think Deputy Redmond's proposal was that the tenant would go to court for an order entitling him to execute the repairs himself and then deduct the cost out of the rent.

Under the provisions of this Bill what would happen is that when the tenant served notice on the landlord the landlord might either come in or serve an objection. Then there would be the question of going to court. If the landlord did not serve the objection, and therefore was not going into court the tenant would carry out the improvements himself.

The Minister has only referred to a case in which there was an actual contract to carry out repairs.

That, I think, is the case that would have to be provided for, the case where there is a contract.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[An Leas-Cheann Comhairle took the Chair.]
Question proposed: "That Section 13, as amended, stand part of the Bill."

Arising out of the amendment introduced by the Minister, in which we extended the period from two to six months, I suggest that the words "as soon as may be" be not deleted from the section, so that the section would then read: "as soon as may be, but not later than six months from the expiration of such fourteen days." I would not like the impression to be given that there is, in any case, six months in which improvements can be effected, but that it should be obligatory on the landlord to do them as soon as may be.

With regard to paragraph (c), does the Minister think that is a reasonable provision? The paragraph provides that

if such tenant duly withdraws in accordance with this section the improvement notice served by him, such notice shall for all puposes be deemed never to have been served.

Is that quite reasonable? A tenant does not serve an improvement notice for fun, and should not the case go to the court to decide whether the improvement is a necessary one? After all, there are other people concerned in the maintenance of property besides the tenant and the landlord. The community is concerned, and I think that paragraph is unnecessary in the section.

If the tenant wishes to carry out an improvement— and again maintenance is not improvement—serves notice, and then discovers it is not to his advantage to do it, he is put in precisely the same position as if he had never served such notice. It seems to me that that is perfectly correct and fair. What does the Deputy want?

I wanted to go to court. The improvement notice has not been served for fun. It is a necessary improvement or it would not have been served.

Not necessary at all.

Section 13, as amended, agreed to.
SECTION 14.
(1) Where a tenant has served an improvement notice on his landlord and either such landlord or a superior landlord has within one month after such service served on such tenant an improvement objection in respect of such improvement notice, such tenant may, save as is otherwise provided in this section, within one month after the service of such improvement objection either—
(a) by notice in writing served on such landlord or on such landlord and such superior landlord (as the case may require) withdraw such improvement notice, or
(b) apply to the court under this section.
(2) Where a tenant has served an improvement notice on his landlord and either such landlord or a superior landlord has within one month after such service served on such tenant an improvement objection in respect of such improvement notice, and such tenant holds the tenement to which such notices relate under a lease or other contract of tenancy for less than five years or holds such tenement under a yearly or any lesser tenancy which has at the date of the service of such notices subsisted for less than 5 years, the said improvement objection shall be final and it shall not be lawful for such tenant to make the improvement which is the subject of such improvement objection.
(3) Where a tenant duly withdraws, in accordance with this section, an improvement notice, such notice shall for all purposes be deemed never to have been served.
(4) Where a tenant applies to the Court under this section and the Court is satisfied—
(a) that the improvement which is the subject of such application is of such character as to be calculated to add to the letting value of the tenement, and
(b) is suitable to the character of such tenement, and
(c) is not calculated to injure the amenity or convenience of the neighbourhood,
the Court may make an order (in this Act referred to as an improvement order) authorising such tenant to make such improvement in accordance with the said improvement notice either without modification or with such modifications as the Court shall think proper to specify in such order and, if the Court so thinks fit, specifying a time within which such improvement shall be completed.
(5) Where, on an application to the Court under this section, it appears that the improvement objection the subject of the application was served by a superior landlord and that the landlord duly served an improvement undertaking and the Court is satisfied that but for this sub-section an improvement order should be made, the Court may, in lieu of making an improvement order, authorise such landlord to execute the improvement in accordance with such improvement undertaking subject to such (if any) modifications as the Court may think proper to make in such undertaking.
(6) The Court shall not make an improvement order until it is satisfied that all interested parties have notice of the proceedings.
(7) Where an improvement order has been made and the tenant fails or neglects to execute and complete in accordance with such order the improvement thereby authorised within the time limited in that behalf by such order or, where no such time is so limited, within a reasonable time, the landlord or any superior landlord may apply to the Court and on the hearing of such application the Court may make such order as justice may require.

I move:

In sub-section (1), line 25, to delete the words "one month" and substitute the words "two months."

I am changing the three months to two months.

Amendment, as amended, agreed to.

I move:

In sub-section (2), line 36, to delete the words "one month" and substitute the words "two months."

The same change takes place as regards this amendment.

Amendment, as amended, agreed to.

I move:

In sub-section (2) to delete from the word "holds," line 40, to and including the word "subsisted." line 41, and substitute the words "has at the date of such notice been in occupation of such tenement under any tenancy."

This amendment is designed to make the sub-section express what I presume its framers intended it should express, but which, I think, it does not. I take it that the intention of the sub-section was that unless a tenant has in fact been in occupation of a tenement for five years or under contract for five years the improvement objection would be final. That is not what is in the Bill. The sub-section only relates to tenants who are under contract to remain for five years, or have been there for five years under a yearly or any lesser contract. A situation may arise where a tenant who has been in occupation for 20 years, and whose tenancy expired at the end of that time, then made a new contract for four years. If during those four years he desires to effect an improvement, the improvement objection would be final in his case, although he has been in occupation for 22 or 23 years, if he was there under a yearly or lesser tenancy. The five years give him the right to go to court and to defeat the improvement objection. If the contract were for two, three or four years, he could not go to court to defeat the improvement objection. It seems to me there is a defect in the drafting of the section, similar to defects contained in a number of later sections. Provision is made to deal with contracts for tenancies of five years, but no provision is made for those with contracts for two, three or four years. That is why I suggest the amendment. What the sub-section meant was that if a tenant was under a contract for five years, or if he had been there for five years under any tenancy, he could go to the court for the purpose of defeating the improvement objection that was served on him. It is merely a defect in the drafting.

I think the Deputy is really defeating his own intention by the words which he suggests should go in. The intention of the section is, "unless a person holds a tenancy under a lease or other contract for less than five years or holds such tenement under a yearly or any lesser tenancy which has at the date of the service of such notices subsisted for less than five years then it should be final." The object of that is that if a person is only there for a short time he should not be entitled to execute very large improvements in a house that he does not intend to keep very long. I think the only effect of the Deputy's amendment would be that if a person took a lease for 25 years or for 100 years, for the first five years he would not be allowed to do anything under the amendment.

There are two alternatives.

Not in the Deputy's amendment.

The lease or other contract of tenancy for less than five years. If a lease is for more than that he has a right to go to court. I will take the case of a person under contract in a tenancy for four years who has been in occupation for 20 years.

If he is in occupation for twenty years he is entitled under the section.

The notice is not final.

It is final unless his occupation is for more than five years.

Will the Deputy take the whole section:—

(1) Where a tenant has served an improvement notice on his landlord and either such landlord or a superior landlord has within one month after such service served on such tenant an improvement objection in respect of such improvement notice, such tenant may, save as is otherwise provided in this section, within one month after the service of such improvement objection either:—

(a) by notice in writing served on such landlord or on such landlord and such superior landlord (as the case may require) withdraw such improvement notice, or

(b) apply to the Court under this section.

(2) Where a tenant has served an improvement notice on his landlord and either such landlord or a superior landlord has within one month after such service served on such tenant an improvement objection in respect of such improvement notice, and such tenant holds the tenement to which such notices relate under a lease or other contract of tenancy for less than five years....

That disposes of your first point.

"Or holds such tenement under a yearly or any lesser tenancy which has at the date of the service of such notices subsisted for less than five years." That is to say if he has not been five years in occupation.

Under a yearly or lesser tenancy if he has been 20 years in occupation, and holding under 2 years' tenancy.

There is no such thing.

There might be, and there will be if Section 17 is passed in its present form.

Two year tenancy is completely unknown.

Not statutorily impossible.

If there is a termination at the end of every two years and a new tenancy is created, I do not think there is any likelihood of anything of that kind happening. It is highly hypothetical. The Deputy's amendment would be fatal.

If the contract is for less than five years the notice is final.

The Deputy's amendment runs: "Has at the date of such notice been in occupation of such tenement under any tenancy."

For less than five years.

I will consider the Deputy's amendment.

I think that the Minister will find that it is all right.

I will consider it, anyhow.

In that case I withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 27, by leave, withdrawn.

I move:—

In sub-section (4) (b), line 53, after the words "tenement and" to insert the words "for the trade or business carried on in such tenement."

In this amendment an attempt is made to make sub-section (4) (b) a little more definite, and I think it will improve the section if the amendment is added. "Suitable for trade or business carried on." I think that is the important consideration.

Is it the Deputy's view that it is only in respect of business premises that compensation should be given?

Mr. O'Connell

No.

Would not the amendment have that effect?

It would. I think that the amendment is not at all acceptable. "Suitable to the character of such tenement." Any improvement made in a shop, or anything of that kind, would be suitable to the character of the tenement. Suppose you insert the words "suitable to the character of such tenement for the trade or business carried on in such tenement."

Mr. O'Connell

What trade?

"And for the trade or business carried on in such tenement."

Mr. O'Connell

It is only additional.

I think that these words would mean considerably more than that. I think that it would have to be both trade and business. If you had a person carrying on a shop and he wanted to put in a bathroom, it would not be any improvement for his trade or business, and, accordingly, if he is not carrying on any trade or business he could equally be put out. I think that the words "suitable to the character" should remain in the Bill, and that these proposed words in the amendment would deprive tenants of a considerable number of improvements.

Has there not been a lot of litigation on the question "suitable to the character of the tenement"? Has there not been a tremendous amount of confusion?

I would not say that there has been a tremendous amount, but there has been some confusion.

Amendment No. 28, by leave, withdrawn.

I move:—

"In sub-section 4, lines 60 to 61, to delete the words `if the court so thinks fit.' "

I think that the Minister will probably admit that it will be found desirable always to have a time fixed, and that it will prove more convenient in working. It may repeatedly save applications to the court. If the words "if the court so thinks fit" are left in I think it will mean that the courts will always specify a time. I think that it will be found that the words in the Bill are practically ineffective, and if they are deleted it will mean that the court must necessarily fix a time.

Mr. Byrne

I ask the Minister not to accept the amendment. In my opinion it gives discretionary powers to the court which it may or may not use as it thinks fit. As the Bill stands, it cannot operate unjustly either to the landlord or the tenant.

I agree with Deputy Byrne. I see no reason for compelling the court to specify a time in which improvements are to be made when the tenant is the only person concerned, and when the landlord refuses to do so. Surely in such cases the tenant should be allowed to complete the improvements in any time he thinks fit, unless there are circumstances under which, in the opinion of the court, the time should be specified.

I think that the amendment will save applications to the court.

Who will apply to the court?

I think that when you do not go into court it is well that there should be a time limit fixed. The court will be able to decide if a time limit is necessary. I think it is better to leave it to the discretion of the court, and I believe that it will work out all right.

I will withdraw the amendment for the present.

Amendment No. 29, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment No. 30 not moved.
Section 14, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
SECTION 15.
(1) The tenant of a tenement to which the Town Tenants (Ireland) Act, 1906, applied immediately before the passing of this Act shall not be entitled to compensation for improvements in respect of an improvement made on such tenement on or after the 1st day of January, 1907, and before the passing of this Act and in respect of which he would be precluded by sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the said Town Tenants (Ireland) Act, 1906, from claiming compensation under that Act.
(2) a tenant shall not be entitled to compensation for improvements in respect of an improvement made before the passing of this Act on a tenement in contravention of the lease or other contract of tenancy under which such tenement was held.
(3) A tenant shall not be entitled to compensation for improvements in respect of an improvement made, whether before or after the passing of this Act, in pursuance of a contract entered into for valuable consideration, including a building lease.
(6) Neither of the two next foregoing sub-sections of this section shall apply in respect of an improvement which is a work executed in pursuance of an order of a sanitary authority under the Public Health Acts, 1878 to 1930, or the Housing of the Working Classes (Ireland) Acts, 1890 to 1919.

I move: "to delete sub-section (1)". Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Act of 1906 provided that a tenant would not be entitled to compensation for improvements unless he had given notice to his landlord of his intention to make such improvements and had received the consent of the landlord or, in default of that consent, the sanction of the court. There may be, and, in fact, there are, cases of tenants who in their ignorance of the law or for any other reason failed to give such notice and carried out improvements at their own expense. These improvements have increased the letting value of their holding. Is it fair that such tenants should be debarred from the right to get compensation for these improvements by this sub-section? Is it fair, in other words, that the landlord should be allowed to take advantage of a technical default in order to confiscate the tenant's improvements? We must remember that under the Bill these improvements must have increased the letting value of the holding and must be suitable to its character and also must comply with other conditions specified in different sections of the Bill. It seems to me equitable in such cases, although the tenant has not complied with the strict requirements of the Act of 1906, that he should be entitled to claim compensation from the landlord in respect of the increased letting value of premises when they are surrendered. I admit that there may be a perfect legal right to deprive him of such compensation, but justice and the law do not always coincide. In this case the claims of justice are sufficiently strong to override the strict legal arguments that may be advanced. We ask for nothing but that tenants who have improved their holdings should be compensated in respect of the increased letting value arising from these improvements when these premises are being surrendered to the landlord at the expiration of the tenancy. The Bill proposes to give all tenants that right, but certain tenants are excluded by this sub-section because they failed to give notice to the landlord under the 1906 Act. We want to bring them in, we want to wipe the slate clean, and let them start as from the passing of this Bill.

It appears to me that under the Town Tenants Act of 1906, for the first time, town tenants received certain privileges. They were entitled to claim for improvements which they had done to premises, but that Act, like this Bill, hedged that right round with certain restrictions which I think were reasonable restrictions. The improvements which the tenant made were the subject matter of compensation to him by the landlord if he did certain things. One of them was that he should serve notice upon the landlord that he was going to carry out these improvements and the landlord then had his rights. He had the right to go in and inspect the improvements and argue whether or not they should be carried out. He had the right to carry them out himself if he wished. Those rights which the landlord has are very similar to the procedure which we are setting up under this Bill. If a tenant was negligent under the Act of 1906, if through his own fault he acted to the detriment of the landlord, I cannot see why he should now come in and take advantage of his own default at the expense of the landlord. There are of course improvements which would come under this Bill and which did not come under the 1906 Act. To those I take it this sub-section does not apply, but the improvements for which he could have claimed under the 1906 Act if he had served notice, it seems to me, are improvements for which, if through his own fault he has not served notice, he should not now be entitled to claim.

We must look at this matter not only from the point of view of the tenant, but also from the point of view of the landlord who has suffered injury by the fact that the tenant has not given notice of the improvements. If we are going to say that the tenant can carry out improvements without giving notice of them, and that he will exactly have the same rights as if he did, all the provisions which we have in this statute would be simply so much waste paper. If we wipe out that in the Acts already passed, nobody would dream of serving notice under this Bill. They would simply say that the necessity for serving notice under the 1906 Act was done away with by the Act of 1931 and that if we had not done it by an Act of 1931, we would simply come along with an Act in 1941 or with some other Act and exactly the same thing would be done. The safeguards which we have set up under the Bill would then become just as nugatory as the safeguards in the 1906 Act.

I do not see how the Minister can describe the tenant's default as injury to the landlord. It seems to me that the landlord suffers no injury because of that default. He is going to get the premises with an increased letting value and for that he must pay compensation. No compensation would be paid unless the premises had been improved in value. He can let them subsequently at an increased rent. The tenant has improved the premises and we are asking that the landlord should pay for the increased letting value of the premises. The tenant's default does not mean any injury to him.

He might have carried out the improvements himself.

That is the only case the landlord could advance.

He could have seen at the time whether they were suitable.

If they are not suitable the compensation is reduced accordingly. The improvements must be suitable to the character of the premises and under the 1906 Act, the improvements may not be such as to decrease the value of any other premises which the same landlord had. The landlord might put up the defence that he did not know of these improvements, but he will be able to recoup himself by the increase in the letting value. Instead of doing the work himself he is asked now to pay for the present value of the improvements when the premises are surrendered to him. It seems to me that the balance of justice is on the side of the tenant in this case.

Mr. Byrne

I would ask the Minister to agree to the amendment. There were so many restrictions and so many conditions under the 1906 Act, with which the tenant was obliged to comply, that unless he actually obtained the advice of a solicitor, in nine cases out of ten he would be found to be in default on one or other of these conditions. Deputy Lemass's contention, and it seems to me reasonable, is that the landlord is not asked to pay for anything which he did not get. He is getting certain improvements, improvements which confer an increased letting value on his premises. I might astonish the House if I suggest that I have personally been a victim of these very provisions. I expended some hundreds of pounds on premises which I occupied. I gave notice to the landlord of these improvements, but I did not submit plans or specifications of them. I therefore did not comply with the conditions of the Act of 1906 and I find that I am not now entitled to one penny compensation.

I do not make any appeal to the Minister for any personal or selfish reason but I know that there are many people who are in the very same position under that Act. I know the Minister may be in a rather difficult position because he has to consider each side of the case but if it were possible to give this amendment sympathetic consideration I think it would not mean any injustice to the landlord or the tenant. The Minister knows better than I do that all these complications existed under the 1906 Act and that they operated to the detriment of the tenant. I think that where there has been a default, owing to the technical nonobservance of the 1906 Act, the Minister should try and remedy this injustice which undoubtedly exists in numerous cases. I think he would not be inflicting any injustice on the landlord.

It appears to me that underlying this rather dangerous proposal is the principle of retrospective legislation.

You always vote against retrospective legislation.

That is so. That is not the only difficulty that arises. Supposing a tenant has been lax in carrying out his duties and the present landlord has only recently purchased his premises, understanding that there was no claim to be made of this character and no charges against the landlord, because of the default of the tenant, it seems to me that that is unreasonable.

I think Deputy Byrne has hit the nail on the head. The Town Tenants Commission in their report stressed the fact that the compensation provisions under the 1906 Act were wholly inadequate. In fact the whole Act fell through. It certainly did not achieve its purpose. The arguments can of course be put up that the tenants were defaulting by not carrying out the provisions of the law. Surely when the whole matter is being established on what we hope is a permanent basis, if the tenant can claim as Deputy Byrne has claimed, and he has instanced his own personal case, that he has been at a loss it is not the purpose of the Minister for Justice to exclude him. If the landlord has a fair case the court will take it into account and in the long run all these matters will be settled by the court. I think it would be inflicting an unnecessary hardship and it would be a very retrograde step if we were going to make the Act of 1906 part of this Bill. If sub-section (1) of this section is carried it seems that that Act will be there as a definite barrier. I think the feelings of the Commission were that there should not be any such limitation and they certainly did not intend that these types of tenant should be excluded from the operations of the new Bill.

I am sorry enough as it is for the Minister, but I wonder what my feelings would be if he were to try now to pass a Bill which would make law what may be argued should have been done by the 1906 Town Tenants Act. That is why retrospective legislation is so objectionable. It is almost impossible to tell what the reactions of it may be. I think there are many cases where it may turn out to be most unjust and instead of removing some grievances it might bring about a great deal more injustice. Deputy Good has instanced one case, that of a landlord actually in possession who would have bought a house on the improvements effected in it with the knowledge that he was not going to be liable for any extra charge for those improvements. If this amendment were accepted, we would put a most unjust charge upon him.

I do not think the amendment can be described as retrospective legislation. The claim for compensation will not arise except in respect of a tenancy terminated after the passing of the Bill. The point made by Deputy Good is one that requires consideration, it is a point that can nevertheless be met. I wonder would the Minister be agreeable to leave the sub-section stand, but to insert in it words to the effect that the tenant shall not get compensation, unless the court determines in view of all the circumstances of the case, that justice should demand that he should get compensation? There may be a case in which the balance of hardship can be shown to tell against the landlord though I believe that in the majority of cases the tenant will suffer a great hardship if the Bill goes through in its present form. If the Minister does not see his way to accept my amendment to delete the sub-section would it not be possible to devise machinery by which the tenant who has carried out substantial improvements but who has defaulted in sending a notice to the landlord under the 1906 Act, could come to the court for compensation, and if the court considered that he was justly entitled to compensation, it could be awarded to him?

Of course my difficulty is two-fold. First, as I have already pointed out, under this Bill if you simply do away with certain safeguards which existed under the previous Act you are weakening the safeguards which you retain in this Bill and that is a very dangerous thing to do. Secondly, as Deputies Good and Thrift are perfectly correct in saying, when a person is purchasing premises he always sends in requisitions on title and he asks the vendor various questions about his title. One of the questions naturally would be "has any notice of improvements been served under the Town Tenants Act?" The vendor would answer "no" and the purchaser would be entitled to assume that none of the improvements were improvements that the tenant could claim. Deputies Good and Thrift were perfectly entitled to point out that in all these cases the purchaser would be very seriously damaged.

If you take the section, you have certain rights under it; those rights are given by the statute with certain restrictions. I do not think we can go back upon the matter at all. Deputy Lemass suggests that I might consider points to the effect that if the landlord was not damnified, if he was not sure that he was not in any way damnified by the non-service of the notice or by any other defect on the part of the tenant, the tenant should have his right to compensation. I will undertake to see if anything of that nature could be done, but I will not hold out any hopes to the Deputy that I will be able to do it. In view of the arguments put forward, I will consider the matter.

I think the balance of justice is on the side of the tenant, and I think I will press the amendment.

Question—"That the sub-section proposed to be deleted stand"—put and agreed to.

Mr. O'Connell

I move amendment 32:—

"To delete sub-section (2)."

The sub-section provides that "A tenant shall not be entitled to compensation in respect of an improvement made before the passing of this Act on a tenement in contravention of the lease or other contract of tenancy under which such tenement was held." I think it is unreasonable to put in that provision—at least, to put it in that bald fashion without making any condition as to whether or not the improvement was made, even if it was in contravention of the lease, with the tacit consent of the landlord. There have been cases of that kind where improvements were made although the lease indicated that there should be no such improvement. Many improvements are made with the tacit consent of the landlord. You will have numerous cases where consent may be unreasonably withheld. The report of the Town Tenants' Commission indicates that the members of that Commission did not recommend that the exclusion should be so absolutely rigid as is put down here. They suggested, "unless the court shall be of opinion that the consent of the landlord or the next superior landlord should not have been reasonably withheld if same is applied for." There is no such provision here, and the effect will be that in such cases as I have mentioned the landlord will get the benefit of any definite improvement. I think it is unreasonable that the landlord should get the benefit of that improvement in the circumstances to which I have referred. I have in mind cases where there was no definite objection made by the landlord to the improvement, and also cases where his consent was unreasonably withheld. I do not think sub-section (2) should stand in its present bald fashion without some qualifying phrase.

I will consider how far I could modify it. We are establishing the principle in this Bill that consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, and I will consider if I could modify it so as to take in very rare cases.

Perhaps the suggestion that Deputy Lemass made in connection with the last amendment would meet the case? That suggestion is "unless the court shall be of opinion that the tenant had certain justification for his action."

I will consider what can be done.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment 33:—

"To delete sub-section (3)".

I think that in drafting this sub-section we went a little bit too far. A contract for a valuable consideration may be a contract for a very trifling consideration indeed, and I think it might work out that a tenant might have made a very substantial improvement and he would not be able to come in at the same time under the building lease portion of this Bill, and he might be cut out from getting the value of his improvements altogether. I think the landlord is adequately protected by Section 10 (2). That is the section which gives the landlord any value that he may get for such improvements as he himself has made.

Amendment agreed to.

I beg to move amendment 34:—

"In sub-section (6), line 56, to delete the figures `1919' and substitute the figures `1921'."

This is merely a verbal amendment.

Amendment agreed to.
Section 15, as amended, agreed to.
SECTION 16.
(3) An improvement certificate shall, as against the landlord by whom it is given and every of his successors in title, be conclusive evidence that the improvement mentioned in such certificate was duly executed and completed by the tenant to whom such certificate is given and that all relevant provisions of this Act or any order or notice thereunder were duly complied with by such tenant in respect of such improvement.
(4) A landlord to whom an application for an improvement certificate is made under this section may demand, as a condition of the giving of such certificate, that the reasonable expenses incurred by him in relation to the giving of such certificate to recoupe to him by the tenant by whom such application is made, and any dispute as to the amount of such expenses shall be determined by the court on the application of such tenant.

I move amendment 35:

In sub-section (3), line 28, to insert after the word "certificate" the words "or order of the court under the foregoing sub-section."

I think this amendment is necessary also in order to correct the drafting of the Bill.

Sub-section (2) gives the tenant the right to come to the court for an order to the effect that the improvement had been carried out while the landlord has refused a certificate to that effect. Sub-section (3) provides that the improvement certificate shall be proof that the improvement has been carried out. The order of the court shall similarly be regarded as proof of that. It seems a defect in the drafting.

I do not think that this amendment is necessary. I do not see what further effect the Deputy wants than what is in the section. You have got your certificate.

The proposed sub-section deals with the case where a landlord refuses to give a certificate, in which case the tenant has the right to go to the court to get a certificate that the improvements were carried out.

That is the certificate.

It is not so described in the sub-section. It is described as an order of the court as distinct from the certificate and is not clear.

I think it is. As a matter of fact, if the Deputy just goes on to his next amendment——

I call the Minister's attention to the reading of the previous sub-section: "The court may make such order as justice shall require, including an order declaring that such improvement was duly made." It is not reasonable to say that that is necessarily to be an improvement certificate.

What does he proceed to the court for in that case? Is it not for an order to get the certificate?

To get the order.

To get a certificate.

Improvement certificate is defined in the Bill.

"The landlord of such tenant shall, on the application of such tenant within six months after the completion of such improvement, give to such tenant a certificate... in writing in the prescribed form." That is under sub-section (1) of this section. That is a document which the tenant has and that is the only document which he requires.

No. Sub-section (2) deals with the case where a tenant has duly applied under this section to his landlord for an improvement certificate, and such landlord does not give such certificate to such tenant within one month after such application, such tenant may apply to the court and get an order of the court to the effect that the improvement was duly made.

That will be the certificate.

If that is clear the amendment is not necessary. In fact, the purpose of the amendment is to make it clear that that order will have the same status as the certificate.

It is the certificate.

It is not clear.

If in sub-section (2) the wording were "and as the Court shall direct the landlord to give such certificate," this amendment would not be necessary. There is an order there instead of a certificate.

The improvement certificate mentioned in sub-section (2) of the section is qualified by the words "as against the landlord by whom it is given," so that it could not refer to an Order of the Court made under sub-section (2). Strictly speaking I do not think there is any necessity to bring in an Order of the Court within sub-section (3), because it is a matter of record as between the parties and would be conclusive as between them.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I move amendment 36, "to delete sub-section (4)." This sub-section provides that the landlord may withhold a certificate until he has received from the tenant the reasonable expenses incurred by him in relation to the giving of it. It is not a very big point but we think that the cost of meeting that certificate should be one of the obligations of ownership and should be defrayed by the landlord.

I do not think that would be fair because it is part of the tenant's title, one of the necessary proofs that a tenant has. The object of introducing this improvement certificate is to save a considerable amount of litigation between the landlord and tenant and it is entirely to the tenant's advantage that he should have this certificate as part of his title. I think it is only right, if he wishes a certificate, that he should pay for it. The landlord derives no advantage from the granting of the certificate.

I will not press the amendment if the Minister is accepting the next one in the name of Deputy O'Connell.

I move amendment 37:—

"In sub-section (4), line 37, to insert after the word `expenses' the words and brackets `(not exceeding twenty shillings)' and to delete lines 40 and 41."

I think even if the tenant has to pay the expenses there ought to be some reasonable figure named as the limit. I think we ought to put what we consider reasonable ourselves into the Bill and avoid all this going to the Court to have the amount determined and all that kind of thing. It is quite possible that the landlord may, for vexatious purposes, try and increase that Bill by adding all kinds of legal expenses and all that kind of thing. I think it would be well to make it a purely nominal charge.

I do not think it should be a nominal charge. It would be very difficult to say what would be a fair charge. If you fix the figure without knowing the exact amount of work which is to be done it is a most difficult thing to do. I think it is an impossible thing not only here but in other parts of the Act. There are amendments down but very much the same problem would arise. I do not think it would be possible to fix a definite figure as to what the expense of a certificate would be.

Mr. O'Connell

I think we can fix an upper limit.

What would expenses be? Would they include the employment of an architect by the landlord to report on the improvements?

It would depend very much. Suppose there is a very substantial improvement, say an improvement costing £700, £800, or £1,000, and that goes in. I think it would be reasonable that the landlord would see that such a very large sum of money had been properly expended and that he would have some expert advice. On the other hand, if it were a very small improvement I think the architect would be an unnecessary expense. Remember you would have to have something in the nature of a sliding scale of costs in that matter and it would be a matter rather more of expenses under the rules than of putting it in the statute.

Mr. O'Connell

I think something ought to be done to prevent the landlord building up an unnecessary bill against the tenant for the land certificate whether it is done in the rules or in the Act.

I am sure it is not suggested that the court will not be acting as fairly towards the tenant as towards the landlord.

Mr. O'Connell

No.

It is provided in this sub-section that reasonable expenses incurred by the landlord shall be determined by the court. It is to be left to the court and I suggest the court is the proper authority to determine it.

Mr. O'Connell

It is only in cases of dispute.

If there is no dispute there is no reason for us to fix any sum. It is only in case of dispute that the amount has to be fixed. If the Deputy is in a position to fix it, I think he is very lucky. I think it is a very difficult matter to declare, so difficult that I think it ought to be left to the court to be determined upon the merits of the case.

Is not there an inducement to the landlord to go to the court to claim higher expenses than the tenant should reasonably be expected to give, seeing that the tenant has got to bear the full cost of such litigation?

Might I suggest to the Minister that under Section 6 power is given to the Minister to make regulations regarding any matter that may be prescribed. It would seem that the question of mere expenses is a very small matter indeed to bring to the court, and if the parties had to go and contest the fee payable to the landlord in respect of the certificate, the amount involved in disputing that matter might be altogether greater than the amount payable to the landlord. I would suggest that the Minister would consider the maximum scale to be prescribed, and he can do that under the regulations which he is empowered to make under Section 6. It would depend on the amount expended on improvement in respect of which improvement it was sought.

Amendments 36 and 37, by leave, withdrawn.

I move amendment 38:

To add at the end of the section a new sub-section as follows:—

"A memorial of every improvement certificate and of every order of the court under this section shall be entered by the landlord in the Registry of Deeds Office, Dublin, within one calendar month from the giving of such certificate or the issue in writing of such order or within such further time as the High Court or the Circuit Court may by order permit."

I think it is obvious that an amendment of this kind is necessary. The Minister himself proved it by his remarks on the amendment to Section 15. The purpose is to protect purchasers of property in respect of which the improvement certificate has been issued, to the extent of providing that such certificate will be registered and that it will be possible for them to ascertain its existence. If no such amendment is inserted in the Bill it might be possible for a dishonest vendor to withhold the information relating to that certificate from the purchaser and thus obtain an enhanced price.

I follow quite well what the Deputy is at and I might be able to meet him to a considerable extent, but as the amendment stands it would be completely impossible because in the Registry of Deeds they are regulated by certain statutes and you would have to amend right away the Registration Acts before you could have registration of certificates of this nature. Then there is a very elaborate procedure laid down in the Registry of Deeds because you are dealing with deeds of which you have to make an abstract and various other things. What I think might be done would be that there could be offices opened in the Circuit Courts where all these certificates could be filed and indexed. That would be a simple procedure. At the same time it would do away with the possibility of the tenant losing his certificate or after the lapse of many years its being forgotten, or anything of that kind, which may arise if an improvement is carried out. Twenty-five or thirty years afterwards when the improvements come to be valued what was done might be forgotten unless there was some place where the certificate could be left. I will see what can be done in the way of working in an amendment which will provide that the certificates may, if the tenant so desires, be filed in a local court.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
SECTION 17.
(1) On the termination within the meaning of this section of a tenancy in a tenement, this part of this Act shall apply to such tenement if such tenement complies with any one of the following conditions, that is to say:—
(a) such tenement was, during the whole of the three years next preceding the termination of such tenancy, used by the tenant for the time being thereof wholly or partly for the purpose of carrying on therein a business and, immediately before such termination, either was held by the tenant thereof under a tenancy from year to year or under a lease or other contract of tenancy for a term of not less than five years or a lease for a life or lives or had been for not less than seven years continuously in the occupation of the person who was the tenant thereof immediately before such termination or of his predecessors in title, or
(b) such tenement was during the whole of the period of forty years next preceding the termination of such tenancy continuously in the occupation of the person who was the tenant thereof immediately before such termination or of his predecessors in title, or
(c) at the termination of such tenancy the reversion of the landlord in the tenement does not exceed three years and such tenement was, during the whole of the period of fifteen years next preceding such termination continuously in the occupation of the person who was the tenant thereof immediately before such termination or of his predecessors in title, or
(d) improvements have been made on such tenement and the tenant would, if this part of this Act did not apply to such tenement, be entitled to compensation for improvements in respect of such improvements and not less than one-half of the letting value of such tenement at such termination is attributable to such improvements.
(2) References in this section to the termination of a tenancy as a point in time shall be construed as referring:—
(a) in the case of a tenancy terminated by notice to quit, to the date of the service of such notice to quit; and
(b) in the case of a tenancy terminating by the expiration of a term of years or other certain period or by any other certain event, to the day which is three months before the expiration of such term or period or the happening of such event; and
(c) in the case of a tenancy terminated by the fall of a life or any other uncertain event, to the date on which such event happens.

I move amendment 39:—

In sub-section (1), (a), lines 50-51, to delete the word "partly" and substitute the words "to a substantial extent."

I suggest to the Minister that the term "wholly or partly" in lines 50 and 51 is too indefinite, that it really opens the door for the pretence of making an ordinary house into a business house. There should be some words such as I have indicated, to the effect that the business shall be of a substantial and true character. A case occurred, for instance, where somebody put up a bottle of sweets for sale in the window of a room and said he was carrying on a business. What is intended is that the premises are to be used in a substantial way for business purposes.

I think this is the most dangerous amendment that has been introduced in the whole debate, an amendment which the House could not possibly accept or the Minister could not possibly accept, because I feel sure if this amendment were accepted it would reduce the operation of the Bill practically to a mere farce. Anybody who represents the interests of the town tenants in this House could not accept the amendment proposed by Deputy Thrift. What does it mean? It means that a business premises where the ordinary tenant resides will be cut out from the operation of this Act. That is practically the meaning of it.

Mr. Byrne

All the little difficulties that Deputy Thrift appears to imagine exist, in my opinion, only in his imagination. The meaning of "business premises" is well known under the operation of the Rent Restrictions Act and I do not think there is any need for the deletion of this very important word in this section. I certainly ask the Minister not to accept the amendment.

I agree with Deputy Byrne. I think that this amendment certainly should not be accepted. If it were accepted no one could be certain what was the precise meaning of the section until several cases had been fought out in court and decisions given. In view of the experience of the 1906 Act and of the danger that the intentions of the Oireachtas might be defeated by faulty drafting, I think we should try to be as crystal-clear as possible in everything we put into this Bill. The result of Deputy Thrift's amendment would be to make it uncertain as to what we were passing.

That is the very last thing that I desire. I think the words in the Bill open the door. I do not think any of the Deputies intend to suggest to the House that a pretence to be a business house should allow a premises to come under the provisions of the Bill in so far as it deals with business premises. Probably no Deputy means that, yet it would be perfectly easy for people to come in in a false way under the Bill. The indefinite word is the word that is in the Bill at present. I merely ask the Minister to make it clear that what he is legislating for are premises that are purely business premises and not for those that pretend to be business premises.

Mr. Byrne

I think we have got the kernel of the word now—premises which are solely business premises.

I did not say "solely business premises."

I do not think the word "partly" to which Deputy Thrift objects really causes any matter of difficulty of construction because we have had examples of its use already in legislation dealing with houses and they have not offered any difficulty of construction to the courts. I do not think that what Deputy Thrift really desires in his amendment is to open, as it were, the door of inquiry into the character of the business which is conducted by a tenant. He said his motive in introducing this amendment was to close the door on certain frauds which might exist. As the sub-section is drafted, it deals merely with the user of the premises, what the ordinary person going into those premises would say they were used for. I certainly think that the only proper way, and the only satisfactory words under which any court could come to a conclusion, is where the tenement was used not in a complete manner for business purposes. The substitution of the words "to a substantial extent" for the word "partly" would undoubtedly open up an inquiry as to the volume of business and the character of business carried on by a tenant. For that reason, I would suggest that the amendment be rejected.

I am very much afraid that if this amendment were accepted the word "substantial" would be taken to mean a very large portion of the premises. Deputy Thrift is a little bit afraid of the word "partly" and cannot think of a better word. He admits that "substantial" is not a suitable word, and "substantial" would not be, because a very big business can be carried on in a comparatively small part of a premises. Personally, I do not think the word "partly" gives rise to any difficulty. It will have to be used partly as a business premises. It will not be used as a business premises if there is a jar of sweets in the window. The courts are not fools. No court will hold a premises to be a business premises unless there is actually a bona fide business being carried on in these premises. So we may take it to start with that the courts will satisfy themselves that a business is being carried on, and then they will decide as to whether it is a bona fide business or not. If they decide that it is a bona fide business, Deputy Thrift's difficulty will never arise. The only reason for putting in “wholly or partly” there means that part of the house may be a dwelling-house and that part of it may be a business premises. That is the real meaning of the words.

If there were any words in the Bill such as the Minister has used, that the premises were being in any way used as a bona fide business, I would be perfectly satisfied, but there are no such words there.

"Wholly or partly for the purpose of carrying on a business" means a real business.

Will the Minister undertake to look into it? I do not want to press the amendment, but I think we ought to do all we can to prevent advantage being taken of the word.

Very well, I will consider it without giving any undertaking.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I move amendment 40:

In sub-section (1) (a), line 51, to delete the word "therein."

This is designed to meet the case of persons such as doctors, lawyers, nurses, midwives, veterinary surgeons, certain insurance agents and certain commercial canvassers who might not be said to carry on their business in the premises, but, nevertheless, for whom the possession of a particular premises is a definite business asset. I can give a case of a nurse who has been residing for a number of years in a particular house. Her clients know that they can get her at that house whenever they require her services. It is as important for her to retain that address as it is for a business man to retain his shop. The possession of that house is a definite asset for her. Yet it could not be said that she carried on her business therein. It seems to me, therefore, that the section will be improved by the deletion of that word "therein." It would not weaken it in relation to ordinary business premises, and it would definitely provide that classes of the nature I have indicated would receive the protection which they require. These people would otherwise probably be regarded as in occupation of ordinary residential dwellings, and under the Bill as drafted would require forty years' occupation before becoming entitled to fixity of tenure. I think that these classes, to whom the possession of a well-known address is an asset, should be regarded as business people, and should be given the right of fixity of tenure after three years' occupation, as in the case of business premises.

I do not know that in fact there would be cases of what the Deputy says, because after all even a nurse who received telephone messages at a house or got messages at the door could be said to be carrying on part of a business therein and I think that certainly a barrister would carry on a considerable part of his business in his house, even though he did his work in court. I do not think from any point of view that the word "therein" is important, and I am perfectly willing that it should come out.

Amendment put and agreed to.

I move amendment 41:

In sub-section (1) (a), lines 51-52, to delete all words after the word "business" to and including the word "title," line 59.

The purpose of the amendment is to clarify the section, which in my opinion is badly drafted and liable to be misunderstood. If the words I propose to delete are struck out the paragraph would read as follows:—

Such tenant was, during the whole of the three years next preceding the termination of such tenancy, used by the tenant for the time being thereof wholly or partly for the purpose of carrying on therein a business.

These words, I think, express the intention of the paragraph and by the addition of a number of provisoes the Minister has succeeded in making it exceedingly ambiguous, that the right of fixity of tenure will be given in all cases to persons who have been in occupation of business premises for three years and using them for the purpose of business during that period. There are three different classes specified in the remaining portion of the paragraph (1) those holding under a tenancy from year to year; (2) those holding under a lease or under a contract of tenancy for a term of not less than five years; (3) those who hold a lease for a life or lives. The persons in these three classes if they have been in occupation of premises for business purposes for three years, get the right of fixity of tenure. It is obvious that there are certain classes omitted.

Anybody who has been in occupation of a tenancy for seven years gets a similar right. But I want to bring to the notice of the Minister a case similar to that which I mentioned on a previous section, of a person who might get a contract of tenancy for two, three or four years. The Minister says, and I agree, that such contracts are not usual, but if the Bill becomes law in its present form I think they will be fairly usual. A person who has a contract from year to year gets the right of fixity of tenure if he is there for three years. A person who has a contract operating for two years must have entered into that contract four times and must have been there for seven years before he gets the right of fixity of tenure. There is no sense in putting a person under a contract for two, three or four years in a worse position than a person under a contract for one year. I am satisfied that this is merely a fault in the drafting of the section, and that the whole section would be improved by the deletion of these words. I do not think that a person who holds under a contract of tenancy of less than year to year should be required to have seven years' occupation either. I think that a case of goodwill of substantial value might easily be built up in three years and he should not be deprived of it without compensation or good cause. That is the purpose of the amendment and I ask the Minister to accept it.

The Deputy is aware that this section is taken entirely from the report of the Town Tenants' Commission. The Town Tenants' Commission went into this matter very fully, and they have given us their report after they have heard the evidence on each side and after having heard the case put forward by every side. To begin with, I would be rather inclined to think these figures were chosen on an arbitrary basis, but you must have some sort of a figure somewhere. A person cannot go into a business premises for a month and then suddenly acquire rights in it.

He must be there for three years.

You have to take a figure; therefore you have to take three years. That is the figure that they arrived at and we have followed. Also they came to the conclusion that if there was a fixing for a definite period of time it was meant to expire at that termination, whereas a letting from year to year is a letting which in their view the parties have meant to continue for more than that particular period, but that when there is a letting for a definite short period then it was completely in the minds of both parties that a term should expire at the end of that short period. And therefore no tenant would take it who had any desire to build up a business on the premises, and there would be no bona-fide business built up and no bona-fide good-will. They having heard all the evidence came to the conclusion that these were the correct terms to fix, and I have not heard anything in what the Deputy has put forward that would lead me to consider that they who heard the evidence were wrong, and indeed I see no reason why we should abandon the figures that they so very carefully arrived at.

One must, of course, attribute a good deal of weight to anything to be found in the report of the Commission that seems to have gone into this whole matter with such care and in such detail. But reading the report of the Commission, or reading this sub-section, the reason is not apparent for the exclusion of the two-yearly and three-yearly contracts. There may be a good sound reason, but it has not been revealed. I do not dissent in any way from some of the observations that have fallen from the Minister as to the practical results that would flow from that sub-section as it stands in the Bill if no attempt were made to misuse or to abuse the sub-section. It is fairly common knowledge that the Town Tenants Act of 1906 was defeated in many instances by conveyancing devices. The plain purport and intent of that Act was defeated by conveyancing devices, and the favourite device adopted was to make lettings from half-year to half-year, because the Act of 1906 provided that only yearly tenancies or greater really came within the ambit of the Act. Accordingly we found that all over the country the advisors of the landlords, quite legitimately, advised their clients, instead of making lettings from year to year, to make them from half-year to half-year and they would be outside the provisions of the statute. There was one estate where that prevailed to such a very large extent as to become a matter of widespread comment.

The reason that I draw the attention of the House to that is to show how this clause could be abused if it finds its way into this statute. We may find that a tenancy, apparently on paper quite all right for two years or three years, is made for the purpose of defeating this Act. It is quite possible, with a little ingenuity, that you merely need to have recurring tenancies of that duration with a merely trifling gap between them, or perhaps with only a notional or ideal gap between them, to defeat the purposes of the Bill. Some section of the House, or the whole House, might be glad if before the Minister would absolutely close the doors against this amendment that the House would be put in possession, either now or at some later stage, of the reasons that prompted the drafting of this section in what, at first sight at all events, seemed to be a very peculiar form, and that whatever is done, whether the amendment is accepted or not, that something should be done that would prevent these very extraordinary words being turned into an instrument for the complete defeasance of such an important section of the Bill as this is.

I have very little to add to what I have already said. There had to be some period fixed and the Commission fixed upon these periods. I am asked why these periods should go into the Bill. They go into the Bill because we consider there should be some period fixed, and that these are the periods which have been selected by the Commission after very careful thought. I completely agree with Deputy Geoghegan to this extent, that we should not be completely bound down by the findings of the Commission. The Commission sat and reported to this House, and then the duty, the obligation, of the House is to decide whether the Commission is right or wrong. It should not blindly follow the Commission, but if the Commission examined into the matter and heard the evidence, and if it is a Commission that we can trust, then it seems to me that prima facie the case is in favour of the Commission. They have balanced all the various reasons, and they thought that a person who merely goes into a house for a short time or for a definite and specific time should not be entitled to a renewal of the tenancy, because really the whole thing at issue here is a question of renewal of the tenancy in these business premises under Part III. of the Bill. It is not considered that a person who is only there for a very short time and who was meant by both parties to be only there for a short time, should then be entitled to be in practically for all time, and to have a renewal after renewal of the tenancy. Judge Meredith and the other members of the Commission decided that they would have to recommend a figure which would give a person in equity practically a permanent tenancy in a house. They fixed these figures. They heard, I suppose, a considerable amount of evidence. We must fix some figures, and they must be rather arbitrary figures. We want to have a reasonable time in equity for renewal. The mere walking in in the door would not do that. It is a difficult thing to lay down any definite time. I grant that the figure must be semi-arbitrary. The Commission laid down those figures, and I do not see any reason for departing from them.

Speaking for myself I want to say that if there was embodied in the section the principle that has just been enunciated by the Minister I would be satisfied, that is if I rightly understand him. In the case of some tenant who was merely let into a house for a definite period of two, three or four years for a specific reason, more or less in the nature of an emergency or for convenience or for anything like that, then speaking for myself I see no very great reason why such a person should not be kept outside the provisions of this Bill. The words in the section as they stand would, I think, embrace a wider class than the Minister has indicated.

When I was speaking I did not refer to tenants holding under a temporary convenience. We discussed that question earlier in the afternoon at some great length.

It seems to me that the Minister is devoting his time to a defence of that part of this paragraph which is not being attacked. The essential part of it provides that a person who has been in occupation of business premises for three years and has during those three years carried on a business and built up a goodwill in the premises should be given fixity of tenure. No one has criticised that. As far as this party is concerned the period of three years is accepted as just and equitable. We agree that in any shorter period it could not be deemed that anything like a valuable goodwill could be built up. The question, however, is, should the three years' occupation for business purposes be not sufficient to give the tenant a right to a new tenancy, or must he hold under certain forms of contract or for certain periods as well? There are three classes of tenant provided for: those who hold under a yearly tenancy, those who hold under a tenancy of not less than five years, and those who hold under a tenancy for life or lives.

There may be tenants from month to month and week to week who would come in under it, too.

The right to a new tenancy after three years' occupation for business purposes is only given to the three classes I have mentioned. Those who hold from month to month or week to week must be seven years in occupation before they get that right, while those who hold under contract of tenancy for two, three or four years must have seven years' occupation. I feel sure that was not the intention of the Commission, that it was merely a defect in the drafting of their recommendations. I am sure that what they had in mind was that those who held yearly, or for a greater tenancy, should be entitled to a new tenancy if they had, in fact, been in occupation of business premises for three years, and, secondly, that those who held under a lesser tenancy should have seven years' occupation, during three years of which the premises had been used for business purposes.

It seems to me that if the paragraph was amended in that way it would be an improvement, although I suggest that even in the case of those who held for six months or from month to month that if they were three years in occupation for business purposes it should be sufficient. If a person holding from year to year can build up a valuable goodwill in business premises in three years, so can a person holding from six months to six months. In the case of the one as in the other they should be entitled to a new tenancy or, in default of that, to compensation in respect of disturbance if they are compelled to surrender the tenancy after the expiration of the three-year period. That is the purpose of the amendment.

I am afraid I cannot accept that.

I feel that if the section goes through in its present form we may find, when the Act comes to be put into operation, that the intention of the Oireachtas and the expressed intention of the Minister will be defeated by certain devices which can be easily contemplated. I would like to escape responsibility for letting it go through in that form.

I am afraid I cannot accept the amendment, though I would be prepared to consider a simplification of it if possible. The general principle of the amendment I could not accept.

Is the Minister adhering to the principle that a tenant who agrees to rent premises for three years may be debarred from the benefits of the Act, but that a yearly tenant is not to be so debarred?

The Commission put forward the view that in this country a tenancy from year to year is considered to be a continuing tenancy, and is, in fact, that. We all know that there are people holding for 50 and 60 years under a tenancy from year to year. On the other hand, a short tenancy for three years means that it was definitely in the minds of the parties at the time that the tenancy was going to be for three years and no longer. If it was not, then it goes on as a yearly tenancy. If they so decide to continue relations they always do so as yearly tenants.

In my experience the reverse prevails. In the case of premises that it is worth taking a tenancy of, most landlords will not consider any offer unless it is for a term of years.

A long term of years?

No. It depends entirely on the demand for the premises. Take a district like Marino. If there are a number of shops there a lot will depend on the demand there is for them, but it is quite possible that the landlord of one particular house would say—he is in a position to do so—"I am not going to let that house unless you take it for three years." The Minister's statement and his quotation from the Report of the Commission implies an inferior tenancy, one where the tenant comes along and fixes up a rent from year to year. The Minister's argument is utterly unconvincing. I very much doubt if the Dáil realised that is the question at issue that it would sanction what is proposed in the Bill.

I think the Minister should reconsider his attitude in this matter. It seems very unfair that a tenant in for three or four years should be put in a worse position than a tenant who is in from year to year. The tenant who goes in for three years to build up a business puts in expensive glass shelving in the hope that he is going to do good business and that he will stay there. If a tenant is doing a fairly good business the landlord takes it that the tenant is going to be there permanently. It is a cause of expense and a nuisance to a landlord to have tenants changing. That class of tenant should get the same privileges as a tenant from year to year. Looking at it from the point of view of one who has had some little experience in these matters, I think there is no comparison between a year-to-year tenancy and a three-years' tenancy. Much more importance is attached to a person who gets a three-year tenancy. In fact some landlords refuse to give any tenancy for less than three years.

I think I might be able to meet Deputies to an extent.

Perhaps the Minister would like time to consider it?

I will consider how I can simplify it.

Possibly a tenancy from year to year or a greater tenancy would meet the case.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I move:—

In sub-section (1) (a), line 52, to delete the word "either" and in line 53 after the word "thereof" to insert the letter and brackets "(i)"; in line 54 after the word "or" where it first occurs to insert the letters and brackets "(ii)"; in line 55 after the word "or" to insert the letters and brackets "(iii)"; and in line 56 after the word "or" to insert the letters and brackets "(iv)."

This is a minor amendment, because someone expressed a doubt whether three years occupation of business premises govern seven years total occupation referred to in the latter part of the paragraph. The words in brackets were intended to be inserted to make it clear that it did. Some doubt was expressed as to the exact meaning of the section. Perhaps the Minister would consider the re-drafting of the section in order to clarify it.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I move:—

"In sub-section (1) (b), line 61, to delete the word `forty' and substitute the word `five.' "

We come up now against one of the vital provisions of the Bill.

I notice who is moving it.

The Bill requires that the tenant of residential premises must have been in occupation for forty years before he can secure fixity of tenure, and have the statutory right to demand a new tenancy from his landlord. As I said on the Second Reading debate, and as a number of people said before, and since, in this House and outside it, that period is altogether fantastic. I feel certain that the Minister does not hope to get the Bill through with that period in it. He is merely putting the figure high so that if he reduces it he will be appearing to concede more than he intends to concede. The amendment suggests that the period should be five years. It is suggested that a tenant who has been in occupation for five years, who fulfils all the other conditions required of him by the Bill, or by his contract of tenancy, should be given the right to a new tenancy subject to a rent to be fixed by the Court, as the Bill proposes, on the basis of free competition, and provided that the landlord does not require the premises under any of the paragraphs of Section 20.

Surely it cannot be contended that that is unreasonable. The tenant must be in every respect a good tenant. Whether or not the period be five years or forty years, his tenancy can be always terminated if he fails to pay the rent; if he violates any condition of his tenancy, if he surrenders his tenancy, or if his tenancy is terminated for any good or sufficient reason at all. Surely its terms are wide enough, although qualified to the extent that good and sufficient reason must emanate from him or be traceable to some action of his. The tenancy can be terminated under any one of the provisions I have mentioned. What is more, the landlord can at the end of the period escape from the obligation of giving a new tenancy altogether, if he satisfies the court that he intends or has agreed to rebuild or reconstruct premises; requires possession for the purpose of carrying out a scheme for the development of property; or if he could prove to the court that the retention of the premises by that tenant was not consistent with good estate management. Surely there are in this Bill sufficient loopholes for the landlord to escape from the obligations to give a new tenancy, or if he is obliged to give it to terminate that new tenancy.

To make the qualifying period suggested by the Minister, forty years seems altogether ridiculous. It is the Minister's contention, apparently, that a tenant who has been in occupation of the same dwelling-house for thirty years, who during that period paid the rent regularly, and observed all the conditions of his contract, who never gave the landlord any reason whatever to justify his ejectment, can, nevertheless, be ejected without reason stated at the end of the period. I am sure there are very few Deputies who will contend that that is either equitable or fair. We are not proposing to inflict any hardship on the landlord. The tenant to whom he will be obliged to give the new tenancy after five years by our amendment, if it goes through, must under this Bill be a person who paid him the highest rent he could get in free competition on the basis of vacant possession for the premises. The landlord is secured that rent by statute. If he had invested his money in industrial securities rather than in house property, he might have lost it in a happening such as the Hatry crisis, or lost a considerable portion of it in some industrial slump. But if he invested his money in house property after this Bill becomes law, he is secured by law, the highest return he could get on it on the basis of free competition subject to his observing the other conditions of the Act.

I want to urge upon the Dáil, and particularly on the Minister who, no doubt, has the decisive voice, why the amendment I propose should be accepted. There are other amendments dealing with ten years and twenty years. Any case made for them can be made with equal strength in favour of five years. Except that some qualifying period must be there, I would say that any tenant who goes into occupation of premises and complies with the conditions of Section 19, should be allowed to remain in occupation without fear of disturbance. In other words, it should not be at the discretion of the landlord to put out of occupation a tenant who is paying the rent, observing all the conditions of a contract of tenancy, and against whom the landlord cannot advance in the words of the Bill "any good and sufficient reason" for ejectment. That has been the demand of town tenants for a number of years. It was supported by people of all sections of the community as just, and I think the Dáil, to which the town tenants have been looking for the amendment of the Act of 1906, should not refuse them what they ask. I do not want to go into the matter at any greater length. I am sure most Deputies have received representations concerning this particular matter from their constituents, and from persons intimately affected by the proposals in the Bill. I am sure that the farmer Deputies in particular, who have secured not merely fixity of tenure, but the right to purchase for themselves, remember how the town tenants assisted them in fighting their battle against the landlords in the days of the Land League. They subscribed to the funds, went to jail, and did other things that made the land war successful, and they will not now turn down the town tenants when their own battle is being fought and reject reasonable claims which are being advanced on their behalf.

I support the amendment. May I explain to Deputy Lemass and the House that the amendments which are down in the names of some members of our party embodying ten, twenty, or other figures, have been put down in case this amendment embodying the period of five years is defeated.

You will not get £20 for a cow if you declare your intention of taking £10.

Mr. O'Connell

It is always well to be prepared for the worst. I strongly support the views of Deputy Lemass. All through the years during which the town tenants have been agitating they always put in the forefront of their demands this claim of fixity of tenure, the right to their homes. It should be remembered that a person who lives in a house for ten, fifteen or twenty years, regards that house as a good deal more than four walls or a collection of bricks and mortar. It is a home, with all the associations which that word conjures up. It may be that when he got married he rented that house, lived there and reared his family there, and it has, as I say, all the associations for him which we associate with the word "home." There is much more than material interest involved. There is a sentimental interest. There is a feeling that if he is put out of that home, while he is willing and ready to meet all the obligations which he had undertaken, a grave injustice is being done to him. In essence, his claim is very much the same as that which the farmers put forward, fought for and won, forty or fifty years ago, namely, the right to their own homes.

It seems to me that there is no sound argument whatever for fixing the period at such abnormal length as forty years. No adequate case seems to have been made for it in the report of the Commission. Talking of the report of the Commission, it seems strange to me that the Minister, following so rigidly the recommendations of that report, has forgotten altogether the recommendations found on page 25. He has made provision in the case of business premises and accepted forty years and fifteen years in paragraph (c), but the recommendations in the third case, giving a right in seven years in certain conditions, has been left out altogether and nothing has been said about it.

That has reference to the Increase of Rent Act.

Mr. O'Connell

The Minister brought in some sections to-day that had reference to that Act.

Mr. O'Connell

In any case, the claim made in the amendment stands on its own legs. It is a very strong one, and I cannot see on what grounds Deputies could support the section as it stands, to the effect that a man who occupies a house for any period less than forty years has to go out, just on the ipse dixit of the landlord, without any right of renewal of tenancy or anything else. That is a most unjust and unfair proposition, and I hope that the good sense of the House will reject it and accept the amendment.

In the two Bills which I introduced here dealing with the matter of town tenants the principle of fixity of tenure was embodied. According to the sub-section as it stands, the period is fixed at forty years. I do not know how the Minister arrived at that figure. With the principle underlying this amendment I am in entire and strong agreement. What Deputy O'Connell has said must, of course, be admitted by everyone in this country. There is not a great shifting population in the Free State, such as exists in industrial nations like England and other countries. People have been residing in towns in the same houses for a very considerable period, but, at the same time, I do not think that it should be necessary that the period should be forty years. I think it is well that there are other amendments down here suggesting that the period might be longer than five years, if this amendment is defeated, and less than the forty years suggested in the sub-section. Possibly the Minister may be open to compromise on this matter as it is not really so much a question of principle. Perhaps a good deal of discussion might be saved if the Minister would be prepared to state now at the outset whether he is willing in any way to meet the proposers of these various amendments by suggesting a period less than forty years. That period does seem wrong and undoubtedly this Bill will lose a considerable amount of its effect if this section is passed without amendment. I think that the town tenants generally will regard the Bill as almost nugatory. I think that the period should not be as long as forty years. Perhaps something in the nature of a compromise say, ten or twenty years, would be acceptable to the Minister and also to the various proposers of these different amendments. There is really very little to say in favour of the forty years' proposal, and, perhaps, there is also little to say in favour of the five years' period.

Because five years is a very short time. I think there might be a compromise arrived at and that would shorten the proceedings here. The debate is being conducted in a very amicable fashion here and we have, in fact, refused to go into the Division Lobby several times. I trust that the Minister will be prepared to continue the good work he is doing and bend to some extent to the views expressed by the proposer of the amendment.

I see great danger in the amendment if it is passed. The section itself even is objectionable. We must bear in mind the fact that there are very poor people who are judicially, and perhaps unavoidably, described as landlords in this Bill. There is the case of an owner who owns only one house which might be worth from £500 to £700, and which was bought, not for the purpose of rent-charging or earning dividends, but with a view to occupation by the purchaser at some time. The Rent Restrictions Act, however, was passed and prevented that. I know widows owning houses from £500 to £700, or perhaps £1,000, who have to keep orphans on some £60 or £70 a year— you can call them landlords or landladies if you like. In the event of their wanting to sell such houses the provisions in the section, which is further aggravated by this amendment, will prevent them selling the house in the very open market in which they bought it. I have an amendment down later dealing with this class of house. I think it would be very unfair to such people of whom I speak. We have been appealed to in this case on the ground of fixity of tenure.

The farmers are appealed to. I am a farmer myself, in addition to following other occupations of not much profit to me. There is no analogy between the two cases. In fact the analogy with the farmer lies in the case of the owner of the house whom I described. Such owners came into ownership either by purchase or perhaps through a dead husband, as in the case of the widows of whom I speak, building the houses. Are you going to tell the farmers of Ireland who came into the possession of their houses, or who have inherited their farms, that you are going to restrict their market in the case of sale? Are you going to say that they cannot sell their farms to the highest bidders? If the amendment is carried it will mean this in the case of these very poor people—I could cite the case of lots of them—it will mean that if they put up their houses for sale—they may have to put them up and be compelled to do it—they will have to take any price the occupying tenant offers. I doubt, having put that case before you, whether you will at least include these people. So far as the owner of twenty or thirty houses is concerned, he has them merely for the legitimate rent profit. He does not sell them, and I cannot imagine him, if he has a good tenant, being in the least anxious to get rid of that tenant. In regard to the cases I have mentioned, the section in the first place is at fault, and the amendment makes it very much worse. If you are talking of any compromise, you ought to bear in mind the very poor people I have mentioned.

Might I say in reply to Deputy Dr. Hennessy that the case is not as black as he paints it because under this Bill, to begin with, the rent is fixed according to the market value and in the open market that man will sell for the capitalised value of the rent of his house. It does slightly restrict the market because he cannot sell it to a person who may want to occupy the house, but the market value of it is made fairly stable under the Bill and if the occupier wants to buy it he buys it at that figure. If he does not buy it, it may be sold in the open market and he sells it at the capitalised value of the rent to the new landlord. Provided a person who owns the house gets a fixed rent out of the house, if there is a good tenant in it, I cannot see that any grievance is incurred by such a landlord. As a matter of fact, the particular section with which we are dealing has done more to discredit the Bill than almost any other section in it. People all over the country, one might almost say, have ceased to take an interest in the Town Tenants' Bill when they heard that the terms in the case of householders meant that they should have had a tenancy lasting for forty years. If I wanted to be malicious with the Minister, I would request him not to make any compromise, but to stick to the period of forty years. I am sorry that Deputy Redmond did not take up as strong a stand as he did on another Town Tenants' Bill because we want to pull as hard as we can in this House in order to get the fairest bargain for the tenant. I think that so long as houses remain a good investment from the landlord's viewpoint no great grievance is suffered by the landlord, and, on the other hand, the amendment gives security of tenure to the tenant, which he has never enjoyed before.

I am rather surprised at the speech delivered by Deputy Dr. Hennessy and also by the speech delivered by Deputy Redmond. I remember being in the House in 1924 and again I think in 1926, and, speaking from recollection, I am sure that at that time, if even the five years qualifying period were suggested, Deputy Redmond would hardly be prepared to accept it, because as the Deputy knows quite well one of the main planks, if not the main plank, in the platform of the Town Tenants' organisation for over thirty years has been security of tenure in the home. As Deputy Lemass and Deputy Little have pointed out, the landlord's interest is safeguarded very fully under the Bill in Section 19. What we are asking is merely this: that after a period of five years—and surely the landlord should be satisfied within a period of five years whether the tenant is or is not a satisfactory tenant—the tenant should have security in his home as long as he paid the rent, and satisfied all the conditions laid down by the law. We hear a good deal of talk in this country from Ministers and others about the necessity for stability, and the necessity for good citizenship, about people having a stake in the country so that they may have some interest in it, with all of which I agree.

I ask the House how can we expect a man to become a good citizen, or how can we expect him to have a stake in the country if he feels that, notwithstanding the fact that he has complied with all that is required of him towards his landlord and paid his rent, he does not know the moment he is going to be evicted? I put it to Deputy Dr. Hennessy, as a farmer, that if, notwithstanding the fact that he is paying rent for his farm and for his house for a period of 30 years to the Land Commission as his landlord, let us say, and that during that time he has worked his farm to the best advantage, that he has paid for the house and paid his rent and rates punctually, and that at the end of 30 years he gets notice to quit——

I would have the right to sell in the open market.

We are not asking for all the rights the farmers have at the present moment. All we ask is that there should be a clause in the Bill to give the tenants the right to become the owners of their houses.

There is no analogy. The only analogy would be with the eleven months' grazier.

I put it to Deputy Dr. Hennessy, if he were a tenant of a house here in the City of Dublin for which he was paying £100 a year, a good tenant, that he paid his rent regularly, that he had lived in the house for ten, twenty or twenty-five years, and that at the end of that time the landlord, for no reason, served notice to quit on him, would he not be satisfied that he had a great grievance against that landlord?

He might desire to sell the house to pay the debts due by him to the State. That is what I wanted to advert to.

Deputy Hennessy wants us to enable him to take full advantage of the shortage of houses for the purpose of profiteering.

I want to put it from the other point of view. Deputy Dr. Hennessy is talking about the landlord or the landlady who is the landlord of one house. These are not very many, taking them with regard to the whole number, but I think he should remember that this section affects hundreds of thousands of householders throughout the country at the moment and if and when the Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act ceases to operate it will affect hundreds and hundreds of thousands. So far as the town tenants of this country are concerned—and when I say town tenants I am thinking of the ordinary residents in towns not so much the business houses—they are covered by this section. I am thinking of those and it is for that reason I say that this is the most important section of the Bill for us. I move to report progress.

Can the Minister say when the debate on this Bill is likely to be resumed?

I cannot say now.

Progress reported.
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