The necessity for this Bill arises from a decision given in the Supreme Court this year in the case of Quinn and Another v. Stokes and Another. In that case, which was a High Court action, it was held by the Supreme Court, that when costs were to be taxed upon the Circuit Court scale, the only scale in existence was the old County Court scale. That has led to a certain amount of trouble and a great deal of doubt as to the effect it would have upon decisions which had already been pronounced, or which would be pronounced in the future, until rules are introduced in the Circuit Court. I want to point out that this case did not invalidate decisions given in the Circuit Court. That was not the question which was at issue. The question at issue before the court, and the only thing the court decided was that when costs were to be measured on the Circuit Court scale, they had to be measured on the only existing scale, that is the County Court scale. But the Circuit Court Judges have different powers, so to speak, from the High Court Judges in this matter, because the Circuit Court Judges were directed by the Courts of Justice Act, 1924, to follow out the procedure, where on Rules of Court had been made up-to-date as regards pleading, practice and procedure generally, including liability to costs, as nearly as possible in the same manner as it might have been exercised by the County Court.
The Circuit Court Judges held that "as nearly as possible" meant that the County Court scale should be their guide, but that they were not absolutely bound to follow it, and that when a larger sum than £50 was at issue they were entitled to give a larger sum than the sum allowed for £50 cases as costs. I venture to think that argument is correct, because, as I have already pointed out, that did not come before the Supreme Court at all. It was not the point at issue before the Supreme Court not could the argument that the Circuit Court Judges were right in what they did, have been put before the Supreme Court. It would seem that when this Act was passed it was known that there must be some interval between the setting up of the court and the formulation of the rules; that they must have discretion to give in £300 cases, let me say, higher costs than they would have given in £50 cases. That must have been the intention of the Oireachtas.
However doubts have arisen about the matter and we do not wish to have any further leading cases on this subject. Accordingly the first section of the Bill which is now before the House limits the operation of the Bill to a period until a definite scale of Circuit Court costs come into force under the Rules of Court. Section 2 says in effect that from the date of coming into force of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924, until 31st December next, that is assuming that the Rules of Court are passed by the House as I will ask the House to do in a few minutes, the Circuit Court Judges shall be deemed to have and always to have had power to fix costs at their discretion. Therefore whatever doubts there may be will be cleared up by that declaratory section. Section 3 says that whenever between the coming into force of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924, and the appointed date—that is when the Rules of Court come into force—the costs in a High Court case fall to be taxed on a Circuit Court basis they may be taxed at two-thirds by the High Court Judge or alternatively at the discretion of the taxing master in any particular case. Sub-section (2) of the same section excludes any case where the Supreme Court has actually given a judgment, that is to say it excludes a case that has been decided inter partes, the case of Quinn v. Stokes. Difficulties may possibly arise in another case. That is where the case has been appealed and the taxing master has to tax the costs in the Circuit Court as well as the costs on appeal as part of the total costs of the successful litigant. Section 4 of the Act deals with that case and on the same principle as Section 3. In general the object of the Bill is to give legal effect to the practice actually in force prior to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Quinn v. Stokes.
