Merchandise Marks Bill, 1931—Committee Stage.
(1) In this Act—
the expression "the Principal Act" means the Merchandise Marks Act, 1887;
the word "goods" has the same meaning as it has in the Principal Act;
the expression "indication of origin" when used in relation to imported goods means a word or words indicating that such goods were not produced or manufactured in Saorstát Eireann;
the word "form" when used in relation to an indication of origin includes the word or words to be used in such indication of origin.
(2) In this Act—
the expression "blend or mixture" does not include any blend or mixture produced by a process of manufacture from materials of different kinds.
(3) In Part III of this Act—
the expression "imported goods" does not include—
(a) goods produced or manufactured in Saorstát Eireann which after exportation were brought into Saorstát Eireann including any such goods which have undergone outside Saorstát Eireann any treatment or process not resulting in a substantial change in the goods;
(b) farm produce carried or driven by a farmer or his servants from Northern Ireland into Saorstát Eireann in the course of his business as a farmer;
the expression "sale" does not include—
(a) a sale of goods for consignment by the vendor to a person outside Saorstát Eireann, or
(b) a sale of secondhand goods, or
(c) the sale of any foodstuffs at any hotel or restaurant or other premises for consumption thereon, or
(d) the sale of any foodstuffs which have undergone a process of cooking in Saorstát Eireann,
and cognate words shall be construed accordingly.
(4) In Part IV of this Act—
the expression "imported goods" does not include—
(a) goods which since the date of their importation have undergone in Saorstát Eireann any treatment or process resulting in a substantial change in the goods,
(b) goods produced or manufactured in Saorstát Eireann which after exportation were brought into Saorstát Eireann including any such goods which have undergone outside Saorstát Eireann any treatment or process not resulting in a substantial change in the goods,
(c) farm produce carried or driven by a farmer or his servants from Northern Ireland into Saorstát Eireann in the course of his business as a farmer;
the expression "sale" does not include—
(a) a sale of goods for consignment by the vendor to a person outside Saorstát Eireann, or
(b) a sale of second-hand goods, or
(c) the sale of any foodstuffs at any hotel or restaurant or other premises for consumption thereon, or
(d) the sale of any foodstuffs which have undergone a process of cooking or preserving in Saorstát Eireann,
and cognate words shall be construed accordingly.
(5) For the purposes of this Act imported goods shall be deemed to have been manufactured in the country in which they last underwent before importation a substantial change by reason of any treatment or process.
I move amendment no. 1:
In sub-section (1), page 3, lines 18 and 19, to delete all words after the word "means" line 18 to and including the words "Saorstát Eireann" line 19 and substitute the following—"words indicating the country in which such goods were produced or manufactured."
This amendment deals with the meaning of the words "indication of origin." The Bill says that "indication of origin" means a word or words indicating that such goods were not produced or manufactured in Saorstát Eireann. I suggest that the meaning of these words in commonsense, and the meaning which should be attached to them in the Bill is as indicating the country in which the goods were produced or manufactured. It is intended obviously in this Bill that certain classes of goods on importation or upon sale in this country, should have attached to them an indication of origin. Attaching words stating that these goods were not produced or manufactured in Saorstát Eireann is not, I contend, an indication of origin. It is merely an indication that they were not produced in Saorstát Eireann. I am anxious to know why the Minister has adopted that particular interpretation of the phrase. It seems to me that the proper interpretation is the one suggested in the amendment.
The words which the amendment suggests may be, and in many cases would be, the words which would be applied to imported goods. The plan which we proposed under this legislation is that a commission reports, with regard to restriction orders or sale orders, and the Commission, where they report in favour of a restriction order, must specify the things set out in Section 9. The first of these is at least one form of indication of origin to be borne by such goods. The commission's report comes before the Executive Council, and the Executive Council either pass it in that form, or modify it or send it back. Eventually we get something done by the Executive Council on the report.
There has to be at least one form of indication of origin. Supposing the Commission says it should indicate the country of origin, then it can definitely, under Section 9 (1) (a), say so. There may be cases in which there will be a difficulty in determining which is the country of manufacture. There may be cases where the raw material came from one country, some manufactured process being imposed on them, say in Germany, and a further manufactured process, say in France, and it may be rather hard to determine. Even sub-section (5) of this section does not give complete guidance in that matter. It may be hard to specify which is the precise country. There is, in addition, the possibility that has to be looked forward to that there may be more intimate trade relations entered into with certain countries than with others, and it may be necessary in certain cases, for instance, to say "French Manufacture" or "German Manufacture," or, on the other hand, to say "Commonwealth Manufacture." We want, at any rate, to have the option left in the first instance to the Commission, and in the second instance to the Executive Council, to say that in certain cases they are not to be restricted to precise words indicating the precise country in which the manufacture has been carried out. I should say that in the great number of cases where there is a clear case the indication of origin would be made in a specifically mentioned country. It is better, however, to have a certain amount of latitude to meet rather exceptional cases, and even a case that may not be in such a small minority in future as it would be at this moment. But this does not prevent the Commission doing what the Deputy wants done. In certain cases it may be done, but in certain cases wider latitude is given to the Commission simply to say produced or manufactured abroad, or manufactured in a group of countries, or the precise country.
The Minister adheres to this form for two reasons—(1) that it may be difficult to determine the precise country of origin, and (2) that it may be desired to use such a description as "Commonwealth Manufacture." Somewhere in the Bill the country of origin is defined as the last country in which any process of manufacture was undergone. That seems to me to remove that difficulty. It does not make any difference whether the goods originated in Russia and had undergone a process of manufacture in Czecho-Slovakia and another process in Great Britain. As far as the Bill is concerned these goods will come in as having been manufactured in Great Britain, because that is the last country in which the process of manufacture was applied to them. The other objection which the Minister raised, however, is much more serious. If it is intended to use the phrase "Commonwealth Manufacture" then the whole purpose of the Bill will be negatived, because that description can be as misleading as any other. At present we are, unfortunately, part of the Commonwealth, and the phrase "Commonwealth Manufacture" might be misunderstood to mean of Saorstát Eireann manufacture. In so far as goods were of Saorstát Eireann manufacture, it would be an accurate description to apply to them. If that is the sole reason why it is intended to adopt this form of words in the Bill it seems to me that the case for the amendment is much stronger than I thought.
On the first point the Deputy referred to, I think the section he is referring to is Section 1 (5) which says:
For the purposes of this Act imported goods shall be deemed to have been manufactured in the country in which they last underwent before importation a substantial change by reason of any treatment or process.
We can see cases where that would not obviate the difficulty in every case of goods of a composite nature. We can see that part of the goods had undergone a process of manufacture in one country and another process in another. What is the description to be? I think there are times when it would not be the correct thing merely to say a certain country because there has been some process of manufacture there. There are certain Russian goods to which people in this country have a decided objection, and they come through Poland. There is some process of manufacture there. Is it desirable to have it determined that these goods are going to be marked "Polish," not "Russian" goods? We would rather have latitude, and I think there is considerable latitude under Section 6.
The latitude is merely to mark them "Not of Saorstát Eireann manufacture."
We consider that the Commission and the Executive are the people who ought to determine in each case at least the form of indication of origin to be borne by such goods. The Commission must report on that. We consider that it is better to allow them to have that latitude. I have introduced the question of the Commonwealth matter and I think it is an important thing, but it has been taken up wrongly by the Deputy. There will be no question of allowing goods to be marked in such a way that people might say the Free State is in the Commonwealth and, therefore, that means home manufacture.
There will always be a specific indication of the foreign origin of the goods, that is to say, goods having their origin outside this country. There might in addition be put in the precise terms "Australia", "Canada", or the "Commonwealth". We think it is wise to leave it as it is. That is what did happen in other cases. We think it a wise thing to leave the Commission in the first instance to the Executive Council, and in the next instance to say that in the case of certain goods under peculiar circumstances, certain latitude should be given to their description.
I submit that the latitude that the Minister is talking about is contained in my amendment. If my amendment is accepted it would be possible to put this description on certain goods: "that these goods were not made in the Saorstát". The Minister's form of words prevents that description being put on the goods. That is the only difference between his form of words and mine.
I think the Commission should have the right to have this description on the goods: "not manufactured in the Irish Free State."
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I move amendment 2:
In sub-section (3), lines 41 and 42, to delete paragraph (d).
The definition of the expression "sale" is applied to Part III of the Bill. Part III of this Bill relates to goods which are made subject to a restriction order of one kind or another following the report of the Merchandise Marks Commission to the Executive Council. It is proposed to indicate here that the expression "sale" does not include the sale of any foodstuffs which have undergone a process of cooking in Saorstát Eireann. The reason I move to delete that paragraph (d) is because we think we see there a possible loophole being created by reason of the fact that certain classes of goods which are sold under a misleading description would be so sold in the future. I have in mind one class of goods that might be sold as Irish produce though imported. That is smoked ham. Whether the process of smoking is a process of cooking or not, I do not know, or whether smoked ham would mean ham that has undergone a process of cooking. I do know that in Germany smoked ham is sold as cooked ham, and the smoking is deemed to be a process of cooking. There is a possibility that the smoking of the hams here after being imported might be deemed to be a process of cooking. Therefore, we might have the practice of bringing in Chinese bacon, smoking it here, and selling it as Irish bacon allowed to continue, under this Bill, if this paragraph (d) is allowed in. I think that description should be tightened up.
The difficulty we are in about all these definitions is frankly this: There are certain industries in the country depending upon some process of manufacture being imposed upon raw material imported into the country. We have to make a decision as to whether or not there is likely to be a substantial amount of a particular type of industry carried on and which might be prevented if the Deputy's amendment were accepted. Deputies will notice a difference between paragraph (c) and paragraph (d) of sub-section (3). They will notice that one paragraph includes cooking and preserving. We cut preserving out of this particular section because there are certain processes of preserving which go on in the country and which are rather important. We would prefer not to have this held up by any absolute prohibition. Cooking is not prohibited at the moment, that is to say, goods imported into the country and which had undergone a process of cooking would not be prohibited. I do not know what the interpretation would be as to whether it is cooking or preserving in some cases, or what particular description would cover this. Supposing the Deputy's amendment were carried and that there was an application in for a restriction on the sale of goods that had undergone a process of cooking in the country: Looking at the processes as we see them now, we do not think that any application will ever be made under that, and therefore we decided that the best thing to do is not to prohibit but to apply this description to goods that had undergone a process of cooking in the country.
The point is a very trivial one, but there is just a possibility that there might be an interference with something afterwards that might drive out industries. On the matter of the application of this Bill we think that in the case of any cooked goods displayed in shops, there will be a way of getting over that by insisting that a label be attached to those goods, when exposed for sale in shops, indicating as to whether there was a substantial addition to the value by the process they had undergone in this country and that the goods were of such-and-such origin irrespective of the cooking process. The amendment, to my mind, is a trivial thing. I see no great difficulty one way or the other, but there is a possible danger if we accept the Deputy's amendment.
I do not agree with the Minister at all. Take the application made to have imported bacon and hams stamped with the country of origin. Suppose that application is recommended by the Merchandise Marks Commission. The Commission recommends in favour of making a restriction order requiring that such shall be stamped with the country of origin. If "smoking" is a process of cooking, then bacon which is imported and smoked here is exempted from the operations of that order, and can be sold as in the past under the misleading description of "Irish smoked bacon." That is the danger that we are trying to safeguard against. In Germany smoking is held to be cooking. There is some danger there, and I would like to see some safeguards erected against that danger.
Is the Deputy pressing his amendment?
Yes; I am prepared to press it.
Amendment agreed to.
I move amendment 3:
In sub-section (4), page 4, lines 12 to 15, to delete paragraphs (c) and (d).
There is this difference between this and the previous amendment, that whereas the previous amendment related only to goods which are subject to the Commission's restriction order, the definition of "sale" here relates to goods dealt with in Part IV of the Bill; that is, goods imported into the country bearing at the time of importation or offer for sale the trade mark of the trader or manufacturer, or some Irish place-name. It is suggested that we should exclude from the definition of "sale" in that part of the Bill the sale of any foodstuffs in any hotel or restaurant or other premises for consumption thereon, or the sale of any foodstuffs which have undergone a process of cooking or preserving in Saorstát Eireann. It is clear that these goods will not come in under Part IV of the Bill unless they bear the name of the trader or manufacturer or the trade mark of a manufacturer or trader in Saorstát Eireann. If it is possible for them to bear that, they should also bear an indication of origin. Therefore, I think it is necessay to delete paragraphs (c) and (d) in this part of the Bill. I think it would be possible to ensure that an egg or rasher served at any restaurant would bear the indication of origin. It will not be required to bear the indication of origin unless it bears the name of the producer. If it bears the name of the trader, it must bear the indication of origin. That is why it is necessary to delete these two paragraphs.
There are two definitions in these two paragraphs (c) and (d). There are distinctions between the two. There is a further distinction that under Part IV of the Bill the name or trade mark of the manufacturer or trader must be on the label. With regard to the point about preserving, there are some industries in the way of preserving foodstuffs. Are you going to keep all these in mind and are you going to keep in mind that there are a certain number of people engaged in preserving goods that come in from outside? That is a special point. The amendment is rather a trivial thing and I do not care how it goes. With regard to paragraph (c) it is obvious that you cannot have hotels or restaurants putting on every man's plate an indication of the origin of the food on the plate.
Unless there is the trader's name.
There may be, but there are certain things served at the table. There may be mineral waters, and then there may be the question of the container of the mineral waters as opposed to the water itself. We should have this label calling attention to the fact that the container has been made somewhere and that the water has been produced somewhere else. Similarly if sweets appear on the table it may be necessary to have a particular stamp on them. Again if a box appears on the table there must be a little flag showing that the sweets are of particular origin. In that way it seems to me that there would be innumerable difficulties arising. I do not see any possibility at all under Part IV of this Bill where you could deal with the description of foodstuffs sold at hotels and restaurants. Legislation must be of a general type. If Deputies look at the possibility of something appearing on the table of a hotel for consumption it would be impossible to conceive how the origin of that article could be indicated. A thing like that is so trivial that perhaps it would not happen once in a hundred years that you could have the indication of the country of origin. I particularly would like at any rate that paragraph (c) should remain for preserving.
I cannot visualise any class of goods that may come in bearing a trade mark or trader's name or an Irish place name which undergoes a process of preservation here. In relation to the other matter, if you take this example which the Minister gives of table waters, if a lemonade were offered for sale under the title "Shamrock lemonade," if this Bill passes, it is not possible to sell that Shamrock lemonade over a counter but apparently it is possible to sell it in a restaurant without indicating the origin in the same manner as in the case of an article with a misleading title. I do not want to press the point or to appear to deal with trivialities, but it is desirable that we should see that any goods which are imported or offered for sale here and which are so described as to create the possibility of a misunderstanding as to origin, that in that case there should be an indication of origin. It seems to me that we should force that particular point of view in the case of all classes of goods and compel restaurants, hotels and the like to confine their purchases to Irish goods or to such goods the importation of which is permitted in the manner permitted under this Act.
The point in that is trivial one way or the other. The point in (d), cooking, ought to come in before, but preserving is the most important point. It is well known that there are jams made and sold here under a manufactured name and with emblems and devices which absolutely and clearly suggest Free State origin. It is notorious in these cases that the fruit comes from outside. It is a question of how that is to be marked. Does the preserving process add substantially to it, and if it does is it a thing that you want to count as sale under this definition? There may be devices in trying to get that matter amended, but there are quite a number of gaps and the maintenance of the preservation industry is a thing we think important for the moment, and there would be very serious reactions through cutting out the phrase "preserve" in this definition. Cooking can go. As far as (c) is concerned, I do not hold one way or another against it. By cutting that out we must envisage the possibility of applications being made for restriction on sale.
It is automatic in this part of the Bill.
It is automatic. We want to prevent the slightest possibility of goods being put on a hotel table which have a false indication of origin. We want to prevent that possibility, without there being a precise indication of where the goods come from.
I certainly think that fruit which is turned into jam has undergone a substantial change and, therefore, is exempted under sub-section (3).
But we do not want legal arguments as to the point. I want to have time to consider the deletion of "cooking" in this because I am not sure how far a certain process of biscuit making would be disturbed by the cutting out of the sub-section in this part of the Act. I will consider the cooking point between this and the Report Stage.
We will leave it over until the Report Stage.
I want "preserving" definitely held.
Section 1 as amended agreed.
SECTION 2.
On this section I would like to point out that a Commission will be set up which will be styled the Merchandise Marks Commission to perform the functions assigned to it by this Bill. Sub-section (2) provides that "the Commission shall consist of three members, of whom one, who shall be Chairman, shall be nominated by the Minister for Industry and Commerce, one shall be nominated by the Minister for Finance and one shall be nominated by the Minister for Agriculture." It has been suggested to me that the members of the Tariff Commission might be asked to discharge these functions. The burden that would be thrown on them under this Act will not be very heavy and the duties are somewhat analogous. The procedure I think also is somewhat analogous and we might avoid adding to the number of officials and the expenses of the State if the Minister were to nominate a Tariff Commission to discharge these functions.
On the section I would like to repeat here the view expressed in the Second Reading of the Bill. I think there should be no Commission at all and that the Minister should have retained to himself the power of deciding the applications and making the orders or submitting the orders to the Executive Council to be made here. The Minister for Local Government said yesterday that the Fianna Fáil Party had a weakness for boards. It is quite obvious that the Cumann na nGaedheal Party have a weakness for Commissions.
Bad as the boards are, the commissions are probably worse. It seems to me in this case that the sole reason why a Commission is established is in order to delay and impede the enforcement of the relevant sections of the Act. It would be much more effective if the Minister had dropped the Commission idea and had made provision whereby persons desiring restriction orders would make their case to him and he would be free to act if he thought fit so to do.
The difference between the Fianna Fáil Board and the Cumann na nGaedheal Commission is, that the Fianna Fáil Board is intended to shift responsibility while the Cumann na nGaedheal Commission is established with a view to getting expert advice and not to rush slap-dash into things. I have the same view as Deputy Good, that the Tariff Commission would ordinarily be the body asked to inquire into matters like this. The section has not been phrased so as to make it obligatory to appoint the Tariff Commission. It might be that the Tariff Commission at a certain point would be overloaded with its own special business, and there might be a necessity, for a short period, if there was likely to be a big rush of applications, to have some other body set up. Ultimately I think that from the point of view of avoiding expense, and because the two bodies, if different, will be dealing with kindred matters, the double functions should be allocated to the same body. As to the other point that I should take this responsibility on myself, if I do take it upon myself, what is to be the procedure? I must establish an advisory body to look into the applications. That body will sit and hear evidence. What is the difference between that and a Commission?
There will be legal formalities and fees.
Certainly. There would have to be fees even if I were to set up this advisory body. I think it only fair that where a considerable body is going to benefit, and where certain traders will benefit, there should be some slight payment, I do not care how little, but something to mark the principle that runs through everything which is State aided in this way. There should be some contribution by the people most likely to benefit in return. If I was to have the duty myself of making a decision and reporting to the Executive Council on the various matters, I would have to select three rather expert people and to ask them to go through the same formality. These applications would have to be made in a formal way. Unless they are in a formal way you will not have the security that expert evidence will be placed before you in the way it should be placed. The only difference would be that the Deputy's sight would not be disturbed by the fact that there is a board or commission intervening. It would be hidden beneath the surface, and there would be the idea that the Minister was going to do all the work. I think on the whole the Tariff Commission would be primarily the body to whom these things would be given. There might arise exceptional circumstances in which there would be a big number of tariff applications, coincident with a very big number of applications under this Bill. The Tariff Commission, by reason of its functions, will have to deal with the very same type of material that will fall for consideration in applications under this Bill, and they will be getting the same type of expert evidence that they get at present.
Section put and agreed to.
SECTION 3.
Question proposed: "That Section 3 stand part of the Bill."
Before this section is passed I want to put before the Minister a complaint that has been made to me regarding the working of it. Sub-section (d) provides for the attendance, for viva voce examination or cross examination of persons who have made submissions or given evidence in writing. An illustration was given me of the unfairness of the procedure inasmuch as a manufacturer in the Saorstát may have a customer in a particular area who sells a considerable quantity of the commodity that he produces. This customer may have exhibited for sale in his shop, a commodity manufactured outside the Saorstát, that may be doing considerable injury to the products of the Saorstát manufacturer. That manufacturer finds that it is his duty to make a complaint to the Minister. Under the procedure laid down here, when the Commission opens its inquiry this manufacturer has to go before it, and to be subject to cross-examination. He has to appear as plaintiff against his own customer. He thereby loses the advantage of that customer's orders in the future. In other words he makes an enemy and makes a loss in his trade. I think the Minister will see the force of that argument, and I hope that between this and the next stage he may be able to devise some means of meeting it.
There is considerable difficulty in meeting that. There is the possibility of loss accruing to an individual because he antagonises a customer, by appearing in one capacity where the customer is appearing in another. The Commission, by its regulations, can make provision for any of the following matters:
The form and manner in which submissions shall be made, and evidence given to the Commission, and in particular, whether such submissions and evidence shall be given viva voce or in writing.
That is the person making the submission.
And "the admission or exclusion of the public to or from the sittings of the Commission." I think on a case being made like that it is left to the discretion of the Commission. The commission may say: "We will not ask that person to appear for a viva voce examination, or if we do we will ask him to appear at a private session." It would be very dangerous to go to the other extreme, and to set out to prevent the Commission being able to procure the attendance and the viva voce examination of people who have made a submission in writing. It is clearly a power that they should have, and in most cases exercise, seeing that these persons have made a submission in writing. There might be certain points which would require explanation by viva voce examination. It might be possible to put in some other phrase to indicate to the Commission that there were, in the view of the Dáil, exceptional circumstances in which the manufacturer who made the submission did not want to be cross-examined in the presence of a customer. That is rather a small point, and I do not know if it is wise to refer to it.
It is important that a complaint coming from a manufacturer should be kept as far as possible private so that the customer would not know. Naturally a shopkeeper against whom action would be taken would feel aggrieved if a complaint was made by the manufacturer and he would say "I have been a good customer in the past. Now you are giving information against me and you are drawing me into this trouble." Possibly the business relations in the future would not be at all as friendly as in the past. I think it is only fair to protect the manufacturer from incurring the odium of his customer seeing that it might be reflected in the business. That business might be a considerable one.
It seems to me that the best safeguard of the kind required by Deputy Good is that suggested in my amendment number 4, that in such circumstances the Executive Council on their own initiative may refer the application to the Merchandise Marks Commission so that there will be no plaintiff or applicant as it were on the spot. Any person who would give evidence would merely do so as a witness upon a matter referred to the Commission by the Executive Council.
Surely that does not meet the difficulty. A manufacturer is an expert in a certain business, the Executive Council nevertheless decide that they will take the making of the application out of the hands of that individual, and make the application themselves. What does the Commission do? They have to get expert evidence and they summon the individual as a witness.
And he cannot refuse to go.
He cannot refuse to go. Therefore he is up against what Deputy Good points out. The Commission can compel the attendance for riva voce examination, of any person who gives evidence in writing. Surely he is in the same position as before.
Have there not been cases of that kind before the Tariff Commission?
The Tariff Commission heard evidence in camera at the request of a manufacturer interested in a particular application who did not desire to give his evidence in public. Could the Minister say whether that was done at the discretion of the Commission or whether it is provided for in the Tariff Commission Act?
I think it is in the Act. In this case, the Commission can admit or exclude the public. I do not know whether that would be wide enough to cover everybody but the person actually giving evidence. But I know that what Deputy Moore has stated is correct—that manufacturers on a tariff application have made very definite complaints against retailers and have been unable to make those complaints without the retailers being present, in more than one case. I would consider the phraseology of (e) to see whether it would be necessary to put in precise words as to the admission not merely of the public or of people interested, but of anybody, while a particular witness was giving evidence, but I would leave it to the discretion of the Commissioners as to whether or not they would exercise the power of exclusion.
If the Minister does not put in some paragraph of that kind, the Bill will not be as useful as it might otherwise be. Naturally, the manufacturer will say, "If I am to deal with this difficulty, I am going to lose a customer." He will consider very carefully whether the loss he is incurring at the moment is not the lesser of two evils. From that point of view, he may not move, whereas if the procedure were different he would take action.
These orders are rather difficult. They cannot be made without expert evidence. The expert evidence must come, in the main, from the manufacturer.
Or an association of manufacturers. The evidence must come from either a manufacturer or an association of manufacturers of the goods against which the importation or sale order is sought. We must get that manufacturer or association before the Commission. The difficulty is that Deputy Good wants to let these people give their evidence and not have them cross-examined in the presence of customers.
Or brought into contact with their customers.
When the Deputy says that he does not want them brought into contact with their customers he means that he does not want them brought face to face with their customers. If the manufacturers' interest is, in fact, in conflict with the interest of certain customers, that is a fact and cannot be disturbed. What the Deputy is anxious about is the disturbance of trade that might arise because of these two persons, formerly good business friends, being made less friendly by the fact of one giving evidence on one side and the other giving evidence on the opposite side. The aim of the Deputy might be secured by giving the Commission power to exclude all persons but the person who is being cross-examined. The difficulty will be that one side must put up a case and that another side must be in a position to deal with that case. If somebody gives a bit of evidence and you want to find out how far it is true from persons interested from another angle—retailers or consumers, for instance—you must allow them to see the case that was put up against them. The Commission on the establishment of a prima facie case would want to hear the case against. I will consider the matter before the next stage. I may have to consult the Deputy more precisely and to ascertain whether the point he makes is one on which grave apprehension is founded.
I will put the Minister in touch with the manufacturers who have raised the point.
Perhaps the Minister will also consider whether the evidence at the Commission will be published or not. That question is related to the question that Deputy Good has mentioned.
Section agreed to.
Sections 4 and 5 agreed to.
SECTION 6.
(2) Whenever an application to an Executive Minister is referred by him under this section to the Commission, the persons by whom such application is made shall, as a condition precedent to the consideration of the application by the Commission, pay to the Commission in accordance with regulations to be made by the Minister for Finance, such fee not less than five pounds nor more than one hundred pounds as the Commission, with the sanction of the said Minister, shall fix, having regard to the length of time and the expense which in the opinion of the Commission will be involved in the consideration of the application.
(3) All fees paid to the Commission under this section shall be paid into or disposed for the benefit of the Exchequer by the Commission in such manner as the Minister for Finance shall direct.
I move amendment 4:
Before sub-section (2) to insert a new sub-section as follows:—
"(2) The Executive Council on their own initiative may, whenever they think fit so to do, refer to the Commission any matter or question which under the foregoing sub-section of this section an Executive Minister is authorised to refer to the Commission upon previous application by any person appearing to such Executive Minister to be substantially representative of persons engaged in the production, manufacture or sale of goods of a particular class or description, and the Commission shall consider and report on every matter or question so referred to them as if it were an application referred to them by an Executive Minister under the foregoing sub-section of this section."
By this amendment I propose to give the Executive Council the same power in relation to applications to the Merchandise Marks Commission that they now have in relation to the Tariff Commission. When the Tariff Commission was originally established it could only consider applications made by persons engaged in or proposing to engage in the manufacture of the goods concerned. Subsequently the Tariff Commission Act was amended to give the Executive Council power to refer to the Tariff Commission the question whether or not a tariff should be imposed on particular goods. In this Bill it is provided that an application for a restrictions order must be made by persons who are substantially representative of persons engaged in the production, manufacture or sale of goods of a particular class or description. If no such application is forthcoming, then no restriction order can be made. I think that that is most undesirable. There may be a variety of reasons why it will not be possible to have an application made in the manner indicated here. The persons engaged in the manufacture or sale of a particular class of goods may not be organised or, for some other reason, may be unable to come together, put up the fee, brief counsel and take the necessary steps to have the application brought to the notice of the Commission. There may be other difficulties of the type indicated by Deputy Good. In these circumstances, it seems advisable to us that the Executive Council should have the power that I propose to give them in this amendment—the power of sending a matter for the consideration of the Merchandise Marks Commission whether an application has been received or not, if it appears advisable to the Executive Council, of its own knowledge, that the question of imposing a restriction order on certain classes of goods should be examined. If it is intended to follow up in this Bill the procedure adopted in the case of the Tariff Commission, the Minister should have no objection to this amendment, because it is merely an attempt to amend this Bill on the lines on which the Tariff Commission Act was amended.
I said on the Second Reading that I would be prepared to consider an amendment which would put it into the power of the Executive Council to refer to the Merchandise Marks Commission any matter or question which otherwise would have to be brought forward by a body of people substantially representative of persons engaged in the particular manufacture. This amendment can be very sympathetically considered, but I want to point out the difficulties here and now. The amendment does not meet the point raised by Deputy Good. The person who does not want to be examined in presence of other people, instead of appearing as an applicant, will hereafter appear as an expert witness and will be subject to all the embarrassment that Deputy Good thinks is likely to be his lot in the other capacity. When the Tariff Commission Act was amended in this way, it was made quite clear that the main use the Executive Council was likely to make of that power was with regard to modifications or adjustments of tariffs previously granted. It was recognised, of course, that there might be an exceptional case in which by reason of disorganisation a trade body could not be got together. Certain difficulties were indicated at that time as likely to follow from the adoption of such a procedure as this. The difficulties were of two types—that traders would not come together but would say that it was the business of the Executive Council. That, we find, to some extent, happening with regard to tariffs. Secondly, where the Executive Council did take the initiative in putting a matter before the Tariff Commission, those interested, when asked to put up a case, always guard themselves by this sort of a phrase: "This is not the case that we would put up if we were making the application on our own responsibility. We have a far better case, but seeing that you are moving in the matter we rely upon you to put up the evidence for us." In these circumstances, the application is likely to be less accurately examined and we are likely to have a less just decision than in a case where a body of people materially interested in the matter come together and put up the best case they can in the best way possible.
There is not very much analogy on the whole between the Tariff Commission's procedure or, at least, the material that will fall for decision by the Tariff Commission, and the things that will arise for determination here, because under the Tariff Commission the thing to be decided is a big point of policy: Are people to be stopped from importing goods in a particular way or only allowed to import them on a fine for the benefit of certain people? What is going to arise under this measure is not a point of policy. The policy is determined by the mere introduction of the measure. There is almost the certainty, after the introduction of the measure, that goods produced outside shall be marked as produced outside. There the particular point of policy is being determined by the introduction of this measure.
The difficulty that will arise under this section is: What are the marks to be put up, and what way are they to be fixed? As regards the details, I do not think there is going to be the same necessity for the publication of evidence as there is in the case of tariffs which concern a general question of fundamental importance. Here is a matter on which you must have expert evidence. Certain points of detail have to be attended to. Otherwise that poise of trade which is so delicately balanced might be readily disturbed by a body of people, who are not acquainted with the difficulties of trade, coming in and suggesting that such-and-such a mark is to be applied in such-and-such a way. Here, in a sense, there is not a point of policy to be determined. But there is much more in the way of expert evidence required and there is consequently less reason why the Executive Council should take upon itself the task of making an application before the Commission which should be made by a body of interested persons. If a body of interested persons do not come before the Commission in the position of expert witnesses, probably the Commission would find itself involved in such difficulties in the details of the application as might throw the whole thing back. I think, more here than in the case of a tariff, there is dependence on people expert in the manufacture of a particular type of goods, and consequently they are more necessary as witnesses than in a tariff application. Although I do not object to the power which is sought under the amendment, it may result in traders not coming forward with the same alacrity as they otherwise might do. Secondly, it might result in their not putting forward a case with the same weight; and thirdly, there might be much less occasion for the Executive Council taking action in this case than in the case of a tariff.
I would like to draw attention to sub-section (2) of Section 6, which reads:
"Whenever an application to an Executive Minister is referred by him under this section to the Commission, the persons by whom such application is made shall, as a condition precedent to the consideration of the application by the Commission, pay to the commission in accordance with regulations to be made by the Minister for Finance such fee—not less than five pounds nor more than one hundred pounds— as the Commission, with the sanction of the said Minister, shall fix, having regard to the length of time and the expense which in the opinion of the Commission will be involved in the consideration of the application."
Sub-section (3) provides that
"all fees paid to the Commission under this section shall be paid into or dispensed for the benefit of the Exchequer by the Commission in such manner as the Minister for Finance shall direct."
I take it that the underlying principle of the section is to protect the Commission from frivolous applications. I think it is hardly fair that a trader who makes a complaint shall be burdened with this penalty, which is a heavy penalty. He will have other expenses in addition. I would suggest to the Minister that if the Commission come to the conclusion that the complaint is well founded, and is not frivolous, they should have liberty to return the moneys lodged, or leave the whole matter to the discretion of the Commission. Otherwise, I think that in a number of cases this will be a detriment to referring matters to the Commission.
I am accepting the principle of amendment No. 4, but I should like to look at the drafting.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
The point which Deputy Good has raised imports a peculiar atmosphere into the Bill when he speaks of traders making a complaint. The basis of his complaint is that a certain procedure and a certain condition should not hold in particular trades; that certain people who are seeking a benefit should not pay the expense of getting it.
This is as regards manufacturers.
Perhaps to keep the discussion in order, Deputy Lemass might move his amendment.
I move amendment 5:
To delete sub-section (2) and (3).
Deputy Good is correct in saying that the one reason for having a fee is to prevent frivolous applications being made before the Commission by people who are not going to press the case in a serious way, but that is not the whole reason. The other reason is that we want to keep up the principle, which we have maintained so far, that where a section of the community gets a special service from the State there should be some payment made by reason of that service, particularly where the payment is by way of contribution towards the expenses of the body set up to give them a special benefit. It is quite possible, in fact I was considering this point myself seriously, that the minimum fee should either be lowered or taken away altogether, leaving it entirely in the discretion of the Commission—perhaps not entirely in the discretion of the Commission but in their discretion in consultation with the Minister for Finance—as to whether any fee is necessary in certain circumstances. My only difficulty is that if you delete the provision regarding the £5 and leave in the words "not more than one hundred pounds," it looks as if you are regarding the Commission as a revenue-earning body. You are giving an indication and creating an impression on the minds of the Commission that they are to charge heavy fees. I would be prepared to drop the minimum and even drop the maximum fee, leaving it to the Commission in particular cases to say what fee should be accepted from the applicants. That is my answer to the suggestion.
The Minister stated that there are two objections to dropping both figures. One is that it is necessary to have some machinery for stopping trivial applications, and the second, that it is desirable that a section of the community seeking a benefit should be prepared to pay the expense of the body set up to give them that benefit. There is adequate protection against frivolous applications in the wording of sub-section (1). The application is made to the Executive Minister, and if the Minister thinks it is a trivial application, that ends the matter. He is not obliged to refer it to the Commission unless he is satisfied that it is a genuine application. Consequently the making of trivial applications is provided for under that section. It seems to me that that section is very proper as providing against trivial applications.
On the other hand, it is not a question of providing benefit for a section of the community. It is a question of providing safeguards for an industry here which is a benefit to the whole community by its very existence. Should we put unnecessary impediments in the way of any such industry getting all the facilities and assistance which it requires in order to develop? I think it is a point of criticism of the whole draft of the Bill that all the impediments are directed against an application being granted, but once the application is granted it is quite easy to have the restrictions order removed. The difficulties and the impediments erected by the Minister in the way of applicants are not there when it comes to a question of removing the restrictions order, and that would seem to upset the Minister's contention that the whole framework of the Bill presupposes the granting of orders in all cases. The contrary impression was conveyed to me and to, I think, quite a number of other people who understood that it was the attitude of the Government that such restrictions order should not be made unless a strong case was made in support of it.
That is the objection that the Deputy's mentality raises to any Bill. The Deputy wants to see tariff walls set up, and he thinks that we wish to see if we can break them down. There are people in the country who want restriction orders in everything. I say that the whole framework of this measure predetermines the question of applications for restrictions orders. The tendency is clearly and distinctly that the orders shall be made where the facts warrant it. The Deputy refers to other sections dealing with amendments, revocations and exemptions. They are clearly to prevent, in special cases of urgency, disturbances which in the minds of the Executive Council ought not to occur in certain branches of trade. On the special point of the money paid, the Deputy says I have complete control, that when a trivial case comes along I need not refer such application to the Commission, and because I do not so refer them, no expense need be incurred. I prefer to have it this way, that I can say to a trader, who, I think, is substantially representative of the trade: "What about this order? Go ahead and pay two guineas." If the man says: "It is not worth two guineas," I know then I have something to go on.
It is not merely a matter of two guineas. Counsel has to be feed in the majority of cases.
They will have to pay two guineas in addition to whatever other expenses may be involved. If I see, according to the best attention I have given to it, that it is a good application, or if, on the other hand, I say to a man, "You will have to pay two guineas," and that he says: "It is not worth it," I think it gives me a line to go on. In all the circumstances I think that a certain fee should be exacted.
Supposing the Minister said that a fee of £100 should be paid?
Certainly I would be open to cross-examination here if such a fee was determined on. If a good case could not be made for it on account of the extraordinary intricacies of the case which was going to be investigated, the cost it was going to involve which had to be met by somebody, if I could not make my case for the charge of 100 guineas, then a case would be established against me here and there would be certain repercussions from that. On the second point, that people who get a benefit should pay for it, the Deputy says that it is not the traders who will make application who will get the benefit. They will get the benefit primarily. They will be a benefit to other people also perhaps, but somebody has got to meet the cost. If it is not going to be met by the people who primarily benefit, then the general body of the taxpayers who finance the Commission and its work, would have to bear it. I think it is right that the people who are primarily going to benefit should be the first people to whom you look for payment. Bearing those principles in mind, I think it is quite fair, as Deputy Good suggested to-day, that we should do away with the minimum charge or even the maximum charge. My mind does not run at the moment on the fees which are charged in a large number of cases that come before the Tariff Commission, but I feel certain that in no great number of cases has a fee like 100 guineas been charged.
That would be a very much bigger matter than anything that will come before the Commission under this Bill. I would be prepared to leave it at this that there is to be a fee and that the amount of the fee should be in the discretion of the Commission. The Commission may say that it is a simple matter and then the fee would be nominal, 2/- or 3/-, but I think we should have the principle established that there is to be a fee when there is a possibility of getting from the people who primarily benefit the expenses of the Commission that give them that benefit.
If the Minister is only thinking of a fee of two or three guineas I am not concerned. My sole concern was in regard to the possibility of fixing a fee of 50 guineas as was charged in some cases before the Tariff Commission.
I think there would be a number of 50 guinea cases before the Tariff Commission considering the extent of the work that had to be done and the expense that the Commission had been put to. A tremendous benefit flows directly to the manufacturers concerned. Considering that in the early days of the tariff at any rate the cost of that benefit has to be borne largely by the general taxpayer, it is hardly right that when a case has to be made out for that tariff, the taxpayer should also have to pay the expense of the body, before which that case is made. I am prepared to consider some phrase that will leave this matter to the discretion of the Minister for Finance and the Commission but keeping the principle in mind that there should be a fee paid.
Amendment by leave withdrawn.
Section put and agreed to.
Section 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
SECTION 8.
I move amendment 6:
6. Before sub-section (3) to insert a new sub-section as follows:—
"(3) If after consideration of a report of the Commission in favour of making an order or orders asked for in the application in respect of goods of a particular class or description the Executive Council are not of opinion that it is desirable that imported goods of that description should bear an indication of origin, the Executive Council shall refer the question to the Dáil within the next subsequent twenty-one days on which the Dáil has sat after such report has been received by the Executive Council and if the Dáil passes a resolution directing the making of a restriction or sale order or a restriction or importation order, or both such orders in respect of goods of that description such order or orders shall forthwith be made by the Executive Council."
Section 8 provides that if the Tariff Commission reports in favour of issuing a restrictions order in respect of a particular class of goods, the Executive Council may issue that restrictions order. I propose to insert a new sub-section which will provide that where the Commission's report is in favour of issuing an order and the Executive Council decide not to act upon that report, the matter shall be referred to the Dáil for decision. It seems to me that it is undesirable from many points of view that the Executive Council should have power to reject a favourable report without the matter going further, first because it means that an application which is proved to be well-founded before the Commission would be turned down by a further examination which would not be half as effective and which would, in any case, be conducted in private, and concerning the reasons affecting such rejection the applicant would have no knowledge. Secondly, we are aware that a certain difficulty in the Tariff Commission Act exists in so far as reports of the Tariff Commission cannot be considered by the Dáil at all unless the Executive Council introduces the financial resolution arising out of such report or unless some Deputy tables a motion for consideration in private members' time.
We are anxious that that defect should not be carried into this Bill and that a report from the Merchandise Marks Commission, particularly if it is a favourable report on which the Executive Council decides not to act, should come to the Dáil in some automatic manner for consideration by the Dáil: that the Dáil then should have power to instruct the Executive Council to act on that favourable report whatever the attitude of the Executive Council may be towards the report. That is the purpose of the amendment. It is not intended to compel the Executive Council to make an order where the Merchandise Marks Commission reports against. It relates only to such reperts of the Merchandise Marks Commission as are in favour of making restriction orders in relation to particular classes of goods, and where the Executive Council decides for some reason or other not to act on the recommendation.
I would like to know what the Deputy does mean. The amendment is drafted in this way, that if the Merchandise Marks Commission make the order asked for, and that the Executive Council are not of the opinion that it is desirable that goods of that description should bear this indication of origin, then there is to be a reference to the Dáil, and the Dáil may direct the Executive Council to make the order forthwith. Would that involve the resignation of the Executive Council? Surely it would.
I would like the Deputy to be practical. We are in favour on this side of government by a Government. We are not in favour of government by the Dáil—I say that frankly. The Executive Council is appointed by the Dáil for a particular purpose, and the Dáil has always its chance of rejecting a policy of the Executive Council. It can do it. If applications are made, there must be applicants to make them, except in the peculiar case where the Executive Council may forward the application to the Merchandise Marks Commission. The Commission may report in favour of that application, and the Executive Council may then turn it down. If the whole thing has been conducted in secret, without expert witnesses being present, there is no possibility of anybody knowing about it or talking about it. As it is, there is going to be an applicant or an expert witness or somebody who will be in the know, and from whom there can be publicity as to what has happened. There can be frequently used the medium of Parliamentary question in order to find out what applications have been received, what returns have been made by the Commission, and what is the effect of these returns.
If the Deputy wants to have conditions imposed in order to get what would amount to a vote of no confidence in the Executive Council on a particular issue, there is always a way of getting that. To my mind that is what his proposal means. The Deputy's intention is to secure that on any issue which may be raised by reason of a report of the Merchandise Marks Commission, a vote of no confidence in the Government of the day can be sought, relying on a particular majority in the House to decide it. If this proposal were adopted, it would simply mean that on very small matters that may come before the Merchandise Marks Commission, and to which attention may subsequently be drawn in the House by reason of certain processes, there is going to be a succession of votes of no confidence debated here in public time. The result would be the same as if the other procedure were adopted, except that the other procedure confines such possibilities to occasions, just as they should be confined.
Under this proposal votes of no confidence might be moved every day or on very frequent occasions and we consider that is not desirable. We are distinctly of opinion that the procedure should be as it normally exists in any matters of this sort. An expert body advises the Executive Council and the Executive Council takes the ultimate responsibility for any decisions as to policy. Those decisions as to policy will be quite easy of understanding and any matters relating to them can be brought up by way of parliamentary questions. There is one case, one exceptional case, in which there may be no possibility of publicity and no possibility of Deputies getting to know what has happened. With the exception of that peculiar case, I think the point of publicity is met.
There will be opportunities of getting adequate discussion, if any Deputy likes to raise the point, on various matters. For instance, the Executive Council may be forced in the Dáil to explain why it turned down a particular application upon which the Merchandise Marks Commission reported favourably. That chance may be given Deputies on a request made. Naturally, there will be certain responsibilities placed upon the person making this request. There will be the question of how frequently are those requests to be made and to what particular matters do they refer. That is the sort of responsibility I would like to put upon people who are likely to bring forward these votes of no confidence, as I call them. There has been no measure which I know of in which this procedure has been adopted of an Executive Council having automatically to refer to Parliament the reasons for an adverse decision taken by that Council in the case of a report made by the Merchandise Marks Commission on a particular matter submitted to the commission by the Council. We certainly do not think that such a provision is suitable in a measure such as this Merchandise Marks Bill. Certain evidence relating to a particular matter will be placed before the commission and will be voted upon by the commission, whose final report will later be submitted to the Executive Council.
The Deputy points out that the Executive Council are less fit than the members of the Merchandise Marks Commission to report favourably or unfavourably upon the subject matter of an application that has been submitted for the consideration of the commission. If they are not fit, can it be said that the Dáil is any fitter than the Executive Council to deliberate upon the commission's report and take a decision one way or the other? The object underlying this proposal is to make trivial matters the subject of a vote of no confidence in the Executive Council. Such opportunities should not be taken advantage of arising out of reports from the Merchandise Marks Commission. I dare say many small points that could be debated will arise on those reports. The policy of the Executive Council in relation to some application, whether it be favourable or unfavourable, will no doubt be discussed, but I certainly disapprove of the idea of those votes of no confidence to which I have referred being moved on frequent occasions.
The Minister supposes that there will be frequently cases of favourable reports by the Merchandise Marks Commission being turned down by the Executive Council. If the amendment is carried, and if such incidents occurred and if such a question was referred to the Dáil and the Dáil decided that the Executive Council was wrong, then the Executive Council should resign.
The Minister has asked me to face up to the realities. I am asking him now to face up to the realities. Unless it is a very serious issue that is involved the vote of no confidence would not be passed. What would happen is that an opportunity would be given to the Dáil to consider the matter; an opportunity which it otherwise would not have. Let me remind the Minister that reports have been issued by the Tariff Commission recommending against the imposition of certain tariffs, so that no financial motions arose. I put down motions on the Order Paper disagreeing with the decision of the Executive Council in some cases, and certainly in some instances the motions remained on the Order Paper for a period of eighteen months before they were brought forward for discussion.
Why did not the Deputy ask to have them considered earlier?
The Deputy did not except in one case—the one dealing with fish barrels. That was recognised to be such an absurd one that it remained on the Order Paper for 18 months.
It does not make any difference.
It did to the Deputy on that occasion.
It merely meant this: that if anybody else wanted to raise it they were debarred by the fact that my motion was first on the Order Paper. If what the Minister says is true, then I was preventing somebody else from raising the question. In my opinion, it would be better that these reports should come up for consideration by the Dáil in Government time, and within a reasonable period after their appearance. The main purpose of the amendment is to ensure that that would happen in the very special cases where the report of the Commission is favourable, and in which the Executive Council decides not to act.
[An Ceann Comhairle resumed the Chair.]
I feel that the section as it stands is all right. In my view it is comprehensive enough. I think it does not need any amendment if we could be satisfied that the indication of origin would be translated in the proper way. I feel that it is upon the application of the words "indication of origin" that the success or failure of this measure will depend. We are now, I take it, discussing Section 6 of the Bill.
We are discussing Section 8.
I take it that under Section 6 the phrase "representative persons engaged in the industry" can be translated to mean operatives in industry.
The House is not now discussing Section 6 of the Bill. We are dealing with an amendment to Section 8.
As I said a moment ago, I feel that the success or failure of the measure will depend largely on the application of the words "indication of origin." We are all aware that goods to the value of millions of pounds are coming into this country without any indication of their place of origin. The printing industry, in which I am particularly interested, suffers severely from that, from laxity, if you like, on the part of the Government. I would like to hear the Minister explain at greater length the meaning of the words "indication of origin." I pointed out to the Minister on a previous occasion that very large sums of money are expended on printing matter imported into this country. I can tell the House that the chief sinners in that respect are not the merchants and the shopkeepers. Some of them are amongst the importing printing concerns in the country. I want to get an assurance from the Minister that when printing matter is imported into this country the imprint on it will be in type sufficiently large to indicate the country of origin and that magnifying glasses will not be required to enable one to discover that. It is quite a common experience here that a very large amount of the printed matter imported does not bear the name of its place of origin.
There is another matter that I think it is quite appropriate to refer to in this discussion. It is this: where orders are placed in this country for certain kinds of printing and stationery, printing and stationery which in many cases cannot be executed let us say in Kilkenny, Wexford or some other provincial town, there is never any attempt made to see if it could be produced in Cork or Dublin, but immediately the order for it is placed with cross-Channel firms or with some firm in Belgium or Czecho-Slovakia. That is a thing that I want to see stopped. The only way in which it can be prevented is by having the imprint on it in type sufficiently large that the ordinary person can read it without glasses. The imprint should be as large at least as the name of the publisher. As regards certain classes of commercial printing known as shop dockets and printing work of that kind, it frequently happens that you have a block which suggests that the printing has been done abroad. The customer who buys it gets the other end of the block on which there is no indication as to where it was printed. I hope that the words "indication of origin" will be translated in such a way that the industry for which I am speaking will now get the protection that it has been seeking for quite a long time. We are not looking for a tariff, but if what I suggest is done the effect of it will be as useful as a tariff.
The Deputy has accomplished a great feat.
I will endeavour to emulate that feat.
What about the amendment?
The amendment has reference to the indication of origin and that is the point to which Deputy Anthony referred. The only difference between the amendment and the section is that Deputy Lemass wants the Dáil to be the final arbiter on a precise motion brought before it by reason of an application being turned down by the Executive Council following its favourable consideration by the Merchandise Marks Commission. I want to have it that if the Dáil is to have the final say it should not be by way of a vote of no confidence.
The exact way in which the indication of origin is going to be applied is somewhat outside the scope of this section. The precise way in which the indication of origin is going to be indicated comes under the next section. The Merchandise Marks Commission must specify at least one form of an indication of origin and the manner in which that is to be borne by the goods to which it relates. On that, I can go into the special points raised by Deputy Anthony. Any question relating to a decision of the Executive Council after considering the report of the Merchandise Marks Commission will have to be raised in a precise form and on a particular case. As regards the other matter, we believe in government by a Government not in government by the Dáil. We think the analogy Deputy Lemass sought to make with regard to a Tariff Commission case shows a weakness in his own case. Even in a big matter like a tariff on fish barrels the Deputy himself recognised that as an absurd case. He put down a motion with regard to fish barrels and left it on the Order Paper for 18 months without making any special effort to take it earlier.
During which period the entire situation changed.
Progress reported.
The Dáil adjourned at 2 p.m. until Wednesday, 25th November, 1931, at 3 p.m.
