asked the Minister for Justice if he will state (a) the offences with which Dr. Levison was charged at the Dublin Circuit (Criminal) Court last December; (b) the result of the trial and the sentence imposed; (c) if any appeal on the matter came before the Court of Criminal Appeal, and, if so, what was the result; (d) the term actually served by Dr. Levison; (e) whether any recommendation as to remission of sentence was sent in by the Court; (f) whether the Minister for Justice recommended any remission; and (g) the general grounds on which sentence was remitted?
Ceisteanna—Questions. Oral Answers. - Exercise of the Prerogative.
asked the Minister for Justice if he will state (a) the offence with which Charles Dullea was charged at the Cork Circuit Court Criminal Sittings last March; (b) the result of this trial and the sentence imposed; (c) the term actually served by Charles Dullea; (d) whether the trial Judge recommended for or against the remission of sentence; (e) whether the Minister for Justice recommended the remission; and (f) the general grounds on which sentence was remitted?
I propose to answer questions 19 and 20 together.
I should prefer to have them taken separately, if it is all the same to the Minister.
No.
Charles Dullea was convicted on two charges of rape (against the same person on two separate occasions) at Cork Circuit Court on 21st March, 1932, and was sentenced to three years' penal servitude on each charge, the sentences to run concurrently.
He was committed to Prison on that date (21st March, 1932) and was released on the 17th June following.
Hyman Levison was convicted at Dublin Circuit Court on 16th December, 1931, of being a principal in the second degree to using an instrument to procure miscarriage and of conspiracy to use an instrument for that purpose and was sentenced to three years' penal servitude for the first offence and to twelve months' imprisonment for the second offence. The sentences to run concurrently.
He was committed to Prison on that date, 16th December, 1931. An application to the Court of Criminal Appeal for leave to appeal was refused. He was released on 7th July, 1932.
In each case the release was ordered in exercise of the prerogative, on my recommendation.
It is not the practice to disclose the reasons for the exercise of the prerogative in such cases, or the nature of the recommendation made by the Trial Judge.
I asked with regard to question 19, whether the trial judge made a recommendation. I do not want to know the nature of the recommendation but did he or did he not recommend the remission.
The answer which I have given is as full an answer as the Deputy is entitled to. Deputies will probably agree that it would be impossible, as well as undesirable, to discuss the reasons why, or the material on which, the prerogative of mercy is exercised. I decline to say what the recommendation was; I decline to say whether a recommendation was made and I decline to say whether a recommendation was asked for. I decline to give any information in reference to the exercise of the prerogative of mercy.
With regard to Question 19, is the Minister aware that the Judge himself stated in open Court that he recommended against this remission of sentence? What is the reason for the Minister observing secrecy when the Judge did not observe it on this matter?
I wonder does the House approve of the grossly improper observation made by the Judge which the Deputy has repeated?
I am stating a fact as reported in the papers. That is all that I am doing. I can state further that the Judge was so stung by the impropriety of the Government in this case that he was forced into that remark. Does the Minister consider it more undesirable to have the reasons for the remission stated than to have people convicted for rape and abortion and sentenced after conviction by a Jury to three years' imprisonment, released after three and seven months?
The purpose of the prerogative of mercy is, if necessary in the interests of justice, to have a right to annul the verdict of juries by the responsible Minister.
Yes, if politics arise.
There is absolutely no shade or shadow of politics in these cases——
Question.
I repeat there is no shade or shadow of politics of any kind in these two cases.
Arising out of the Minister's reply, those of us who have looked into this case must assume that at the moment rape and abortion have become political offences. Does that only apply where the guilty party is a follower of the Government and the victim is not or does it also apply where both the guilty party and the victim are followers of the Government?
Would Deputy O'Neill now ask a Supplementary Question? I think it is up to him to do so.
Might I ask the Minister for Justice if his view is that the prerogative of mercy is to be exercised after a man has been rightly convicted and sentenced and does he consider that it is part of his duty in exercising the prerogative of mercy to decide on the question of fact as to whether the Jury was or was not right in the verdict brought in?
This Supplementary Question is astonishing. The earliest Statute setting up a Court of Criminal Appeal in 1907 expressly reserved the prerogative of mercy, because in exercise of the prerogative of mercy every consideration is relevant. The Minister cannot and should not be restricted by technical rules of evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeal has no right at all to inquire into the findings of facts as the Deputy, no doubt, will recollect if he only thinks for a moment.
The Minister has made an astonishing statement that ought not to have been made.
Is the Deputy putting a Question or making a speech?
I want to ask does the Minister hold that if the Court of Criminal Appeal have decided that a man has been rightly convicted and adequate sentence has followed, the prerogative of mercy should be exercised to release that individual?
It is obvious that Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney has not read the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in the Levison case. The judgment in the Levison case is officially reported in the authorised records, and in that judgment the Judge goes out of his way to emphasise that the Court of Appeal have no power to form an opinion on a question of fact.
Does the Minister hold——
We come now to the Order of Business.
Might I ask Deputy O'Neill to put a Supplementary Question?
The Order of Business is——
With your permission, sir, as regards Deputy O'Neill, I want to say that I am not asking Deputy O'Neill to make a statement. I conceive that any Deputy who puts forward a petition, or the grounds of a petition, to me is doing a public duty. It is my business to find out whether these grounds are right or wrong.
In the Minister's judgment?
Yes, while I am Minister for Justice. I take full responsibility for these cases. I went into one of these cases for days and into the other case certainly for a number of hours and I take full responsibility for them.
Were these people given a free pardon?
No.
Why not? In accordance with what the Minister says—he says he took it upon himself to revise the sentence of the Judge and the findings of the Jury—why did he not grant a free pardon?
I want to give notice that arising out of the unsatisfactory nature of the answer to Questions 19 and 20, I will raise these matters on the Adjournment.
There was an allegation made that these sentences were remitted because the people held certain political views.
That will be made quite clear on the Adjournment to-night.