I move amendment No. 3:—
Before paragraph (c) to insert a new paragraph reading:—
"No loan shall be so guaranteed or made amounting to more than 25 per cent. of the net resources of the borrower."
The amendment which has just been defeated was an attempt to restore a safeguard which in the past has proved ineffective. The amendment in my name is an attempt to provide a new safeguard. In moving it I do not wish to tie myself to the figure of 25 per cent. nor necessarily to the expression "net resources" if some more suitable expression can be found. What I mean by "net resources" is the surplus of assets over liabilities, whether of an individual or a corporation. The need for some safeguard of this kind seems to me to be obvious. The record with regard to these loans and guarantees is exceedingly bad. We have heard that out of the first £340,000 advanced or guaranteed £215,000 was lost. If we went on the same proportion in regard to this additional million there would be another £600,000 lost. That being so, I think we ought to make a serious attempt to protect the interests of the taxpayer. When Deputy McGilligan was speaking on the Second Reading of this Bill, he made a statement that there was only one loan fully repaid of all the loans made. I presume that that means all the loans made prior to 1932. He also said:—
If one leaves out the loans that were made to public utility concerns, there has not been a successful loan yet.
He then asked:—
Has there been a case of a company keeping its commitments up to the schedule first arranged? I doubt if there is a single case.
He also remarks:—
...in the main the concerns operating on Trade Loans (Guarantee) moneys have not alone that facility but are also nearly all in tariffed industries.
Later on he says:—
I certainly think that if the test on which the Committee has been obliged to rule their decision was this: What would they do with their own money?, we would not have even the £350,000 or £400,000 of State money granted, but that it would be much more nearly one-third of that.
It seems to me that the root trouble with all these loans and guarantees has been that there has not been enough clearness of thought as to the principles on which the loans or guarantees should be made. We have heard that, in every case the Advisory Committee was consulted, they passed judgment on the loan or guarantee and agreed to it. But it is no good having an Advisory Committee, whether it consists of civil servants or business men, unless they have some sort of notion as to the principles they are to go on. As a matter of fact, the way, apparently, in which these loans or guarantees were made was so speculative that the advice of a committee of business men would not be of much use, if any. If you go on a visit to Monte Carlo and decide to spend a couple of weeks speculating on the roulette tables, the fact that you have a committee of hard-headed business men to consult does not make your chances any better than if you went alone, and I think that is the parallel that applies to what is going on in connection with these loans and guarantees. It is a fearfully dangerous thing to make a 12 years' loan at all. It is a terribly long period during which to tie up money, and the fact of this Bill being subject to reconsideration, after one year or five years, seems to me to be of much less importance than the fact that these loans are for such very long periods, and that there is at present no guiding principle as to the proportion which such loans should bear to the capital of the person or institution borrowing.
I suggest that some sort of measure, some sort of yard-stick, ought to be agreed upon. If 25 per cent. is thought too little, let us have 50 per cent., and if it is thought desirable to proportion the loan rather to the amount of capital invested in the particular undertaking than to the total resources of the individual, or company, that might be a matter for discussion and consideration as to which was preferable. I am personally more attracted by the idea of proportioning them to the total resources, because, if a man has £100,000 and has £10,000 in a particular business, it is naturally safer to give him a bigger loan in that business than the man who has nothing in it at all. It is conceivable that a man might wish to keep, for reasons of his own, part of his capital employed elsewhere. The former Trade Loans (Guarantee) Acts have turned out badly, and actually they are being enlarged by the present Act, because hitherto certain facilities have been available only for corporations and not for individuals. Now, those are being made to individuals also. Hitherto there has been a limitation which prevented such loans being made for working capital. There had to be fixed assets against them. That limitation is being removed, and all that makes it much more essential that there should be a safeguard of this type introduced.
At the present moment, for all we know to the contrary, a man may get a guarantee for a company which has no money at all. It may be that the plant has been erected with borrowed money, and he may come to the State to get money to enable it to go ahead. I suggest that, when making these loans, the principle ought to be that, even if the business turns out to be a failure, if it turns out to be an unprofitable business, the State should get its money back. We should not take it for granted that, if the business fails, the State loses its money. That is not the way in which loans are made by a bank or by any business concern. You only get your modest return for all loans. It is not as if you were investing and taking a half share in profits and the situation ought not to be that, if the business is a roaring success, you get your money back, and if the business is a failure you lose all your money. I suggest that, normally, however great our desire to encourage Irish industries, we should not have money lent to industries at the expense of the State unless there is reasonable ground for believing that the State will get that money back, even should the industry not be a success, and that there is something solid there by which the State can be recouped even if the industry turns out not to be profitable and has ultimately to be abandoned.