I move the Second Reading of this Bill. I do not think it is necessary to give any lengthy explanation of it. The purpose of it is to reduce the period by which the Seanad can hold up a measure once it has passed the Dáil. As Deputies are aware, the Constitution at the present time provides that when a Bill, having passed the Dáil, is sent to the Seanad, and the Seanad does not pass it— either neglects to take action upon it or insists upon amendments to which the Dáil cannot agree—a period of 18 months must elapse before the Dáil has any remedy; that is, unless a dissolution should intervene. When the period of 18 months from the date on which the Bill is first sent to the Seanad has passed, the Dáil may, by resolution, send the Bill back and, if the Seanad does not then pass it, the Dáil by another resolution can pass the Bill into law. That means that a period of 20 months may have to elapse before the will of the elected representatives of the people can be made effective. Now, 20 months is a considerable period in the life of a single administration. I think we can say that the average life of a single parliament is not likely to be more than four years. I fancy that is putting the average rather high. Therefore, you have 20 months out of a period of four years in which the expressed will of the people may be obstructed by a body not immediately responsible to the people. That body has a longer period of office than the Dáil and the members of it may deliberately set themselves out to negative the expressed desire of the people.
We have had an instance of that ourselves. We had the Oath Bill which was before our people for a long period. Nobody could say that the desire of the people to get rid of that Oath was simply a transient whim. It represented a definite, well-ascertained state of public opinion. A Government, in the election of which that was one of the primary issues, had just been elected, yet this Second Assembly deliberately refused to agree to the passage of that Bill after it had been passed here and submitted, so to speak, to a referendum of the people. As I have said, 20 months is a considerable period in what we may regard as the normal life of a parliament and in these days, when it is important that measures that deal with matters immediately and urgently affecting the welfare of the people should find expression as quickly as may be in appropriate legislation, it is unfair that a Second House, constituted as our Second Chamber is, should be in a position to flout the people's will and prevent measures which are deemed necessary by those who are directly responsible to the people from being made law.
The history of this particular clause is somewhat interesting. I have seen the original drafts of the Constitution as presented by the Committees that were working on it at the time the Constitution was being framed. There were three drafts. A period of 180 days occurred in two of them and in the third a period of four months was mentioned. The intention was that there would be one preliminary month in which the Bill presented to the Seanad was to be discussed, and then a delaying period of three months. In the Constitution, as passed by the Dáil, a period of 270 days was allowed, but that was in conjunction with a referendum. The referendum was taken away. It was taken away by an Executive that realised that the referendum was not likely to be used. The Second House, which was largely nominated by that Executive, had uniformly, until the time the present Administration took office, assisted that Executive and assisted it even when there was every reason to believe that the Executive did not have the support of the majority of the people. It was friendly to that Executive.
That Executive, looking to the future, and seeing the possibility that they would no longer command a majority here, made up its mind that it was going to strengthen the delaying and obstructing powers of the Second House. It brought in a Bill here which took away the power of referring to the people legislation which the Second House did not agree to—a power which, as I have said, was never likely to be used, and, in fact, never was used. It took away a power the Seanad did not propose to use and gave in its place a really effective weapon, a weapon that it foresaw could be used if a new Administration more amenable to public opinion took its place. They changed this period of 270 days into a period of 18 months, with an added period of two months. At the time that Bill was proposed, and in the Committee which, previous to the introduction of the Bill, considered the advisability of certain constitutional changes, on behalf of our organisation, and expressing my own views, I opposed the lengthening of the time for which the Seanad could obstruct. In the Dáil I proposed that the period should be reduced to four months. This Bill provides for a period of three months, during which time the Seanad can discuss a Bill, make whatever recommendations it chooses, and point out the defects in any proposed legislation so that if it is advisable to revise opinions they can be revised; but after that period of three months, if the Dáil is desirous of getting the legislation through, it will pass a resolution, and the Bill will go back again to the Seanad. If the Seanad, within the further period of two months, does not pass the measure, then it can be deemed to be law by a resolution of the Dáil.
There is a period then of five months in this Bill and, in my opinion, and in the opinion of the Executive Council, that is sufficiently long to enable the Seanad as a revising Chamber to do its work effectively. If greater powers of delay are given to the Seanad, it seems to us that it is no longer a revising but a controlling Chamber. I do not think that anybody here wishes that a Second Chamber, constituted as our Chamber is, should have powers of control. There is another feature in our Constitution which makes inappropriate the argument that we usually find about Second Chambers. The suggestion is that they are necessary in order to prevent sudden changes of public opinion doing permanent damage; that it gives time for public opinion to cool down and prevents violent changes. In our case, we have a system of proportional representation which in itself prevents violent change; and with a system of proportional representation, such as we have, it is quite unnecessary, in fact it is positively wrong, to give the Second Chamber powers of lengthy delay.
I know that Deputy MacDermot has an amendment down to this motion. It has not been formally moved, but, I take it, it will be before the House, and I might just anticipate it as it is on the Order Paper. The suggestion is that the Dáil should refuse to give a Second Reading to this Bill until the final proposals of the Government with regard to the Seanad are made known. Our attitude towards the Seanad, as at present constituted, is, I think, well known. My own view is that it serves no really useful purpose; that there is a waste of public money in maintaining it. There is a sum of £28,000 in the estimates directly for it. As for incidentals, I did not get a closer calculation in connection with this Bill, but I remember that formerly, as a result of a calculation which I had carefully made at the time, the cost of the Seanad was given as between £30,000 and £40,000. I think it was nearer to £40,000 at that time than £30,000. I think that is quite true. I think that the cost of the present Seanad is such that we must have a much more valuable body from the point of view of its constitution than we have at present; a body that will have differentiated functions; a body that will not be a mere reflection of this House, as the present Assembly is bound to be.
I think that the Seanad, as at present constituted, is not worth the money; that it has no really useful function, and does not, in fact, perform any really useful function—any function which could not as well be performed by a Committee of this House, or something of that sort. So that, as far as the Executive Council is concerned, we intend to bring in proposals to end the present Seanad, at any rate. The question that has caused delay is whether we should substitute another form of Second Chamber for it. I confess that there have been considerable difficulties. I have myself, from time to time, given the matter a certain amount of thought, but I have found considerable difficulty in getting a constitution for a Second Chamber that would really make it worth while.
As I have already indicated, the powers of a Second Chamber ought to be those that would compel reexamination, prevent sudden action by the Dáil, hasty action; action, let us say, overnight, if such could happen. It would mean a certain revision of opinion, a revising Chamber. But it would be very much more valuable, of course, if we could have a Chamber with differentiated functions. I think it is absurd to have a mere reflex, as I have said, of this Chamber. I do not think it is going to have any really useful function at all. I can imagine types of Seanad that would have a useful function. To make a constitution for them, and to get them properly elected is the difficulty. I can imagine a Seanad, for instance, in which the members would represent vocational groups. The difficulty there would be to get the constitution of these groups and a mode of election which would give us a Seanad of reasonable dimensions. By reasonable dimensions I mean a Seanad that would not consist of more than, say, 35 members, which, I think, would be sufficiently large for our purpose. I give that just to indicate the lines along which I have been thinking—about 35 or 40 members, if we were to have a Second House. I have no difficulty in coming to a conclusion myself as regards a Seanad, that if we cannot get a Seanad which is completely different in its constitution, so different that it could not be at all said to be a reflex of this House, it would hardly be worth having.
There is a Senate besides the type of vocational Senate I have indicated, a Senate that would consist of experts of one kind or another. There have been Senates in the past composed of those who had immediate experience in public administration. Again, we have the difficulty there of the election of such a Senate. I must confess that at present, if we were compelled to take action quickly, if we were compelled to bring in a Bill within a very short period, the type of Bill we would have to bring in would be simply a Bill for the abolition of the Seanad, without any alternative; that is, to have, instead of the present two-Chamber system, a single Chamber. We then get immediately into the question of constitutional theory. There is no doubt that there are differences of opinion as to whether two Chambers are necessary or not, and whether they are valuable or not. Again, as far as I am concerned at any rate, that would depend on what type the Second Chamber is. I am not at all impressed by some of the arguments put forward by those who write on constitutional matters in advocating a Second Chamber. I think they largely apply to a period that is gone, and to conditions which are very different from our conditions. I can well understand a Second Chamber, for instance, where there is a federal system. The direct representation of States, as apart from peoples, can be effected in that manner. It is helpful in giving to the States represented the feeling that they are units with equal rights, no matter how they may differ in size, in wealth, and in other ways. In a unitary State conditions are quite different. I do not think there is anything gained in these States by a Second Chamber unless, as I have several times indicated, that Second Chamber has a character all its own. The position, therefore, is that, without wishing finally to pronounce on the question of a Second Chamber, we are coming here to prevent the Chamber that exists from interfering with the expressed will of the people. That is our attitude. I hope it will commend itself to the members of the Dáil, and I hope that the Deputy who proposes to delay will realise that delaying action in this matter might possibly mean rushing another question, on which it would be just as well more time were taken and the immediate position remedied. I promise that we will not allow the matter to be delayed unduly and that the present position will be met adequately by this proposal. I also think that this proposal has the support of the people of the country as a whole. We made it quite clear at the last election that the Seanad as at present constituted would not remain if our will was to be effective. That is our view, and I have expressed it here, and I have expressed it in public. It was the wish of the people at the last election. They did not hold any views contrary to ours in this matter. I accordingly recommend the Bill to the House.
