Dáil Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 15 Nov 1933

Vol. 50 No. 1

In Committee on Finance. - Workmen's Compensation Bill, 1933—Committee Stage.

Sections 1 to 4 inclusive agreed to.

SECTION 5.

(2) Each of the following persons shall be an excepted person for the purposes of this section, that is to say:—

(a) a person employed otherwise than by way of manual labour whose remuneration exceeds £350 a year;

(b) a person whose employment is of a casual nature unless such person is either:—

(i) employed for the purposes of his employer's trade or business, or

(ii) employed for the purposes of any game or recreation and engaged or paid through a club, or

(iii) employed for the purposes of any work in or about the residence of his employer;

(c) a member of the Gárda Síochána;

(d) a member of the Defence Forces of Saorstát Eireann, including a member of the Reserve established under Part III of the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1923 (No. 30 of 1923), in respect of any accident arising out of and in the course of his military service or otherwise howsoever under his contract of enlistment;

(e) a person to whom articles or materials are given out to be made up, cleaned, washed, altered, ornamented or repaired, or adapted for sale in his own home or on other premises not under the control or management of the person who gave out the materials or articles;

(f) a member of the employer's family dwelling in his house.

Mr. Dillon

I beg to move amendment 1:

In sub-section (2), lines 17-18, to delete paragraph (b) (iii).

This has to do with the problem of the casual labourer. To follow the section is not so easy, because we have first a definition of a workman, and in sub-section (2) we have a declaration, "each of the following persons shall be an excepted person for the purposes of this section," that is to say, a person to whom this Act will not apply. Paragraph (b) states that one of these excepted persons shall be a person whose employment is of a casual nature. Paragraph (iii) brings into the operation of the Act a casual labourer employed for the purpose of any work in or about the residence of his employer.

The decided cases have given a very wide interpretation to the word "about." It is rather difficult to discuss the effect of the word "about," but it seems to be very elastic, and a casual labourer "employed for the purposes of any work in or about the residence of his employer," might mean a labourer employed within a half mile of his employer's residence. The danger of bringing casual labourers of that class within the scope of this Bill is that in effect it will prevent such persons getting any work at all. In the Report prepared by the Departmental Committee in 1925 or 1926 "casual labourer" is referred to. "Most of the witnesses representing the employers," the report says, "appreciate the difficulties in including such cases while yet excluding the type of casual worker represented by a person engaged to carry luggage, say, to or from a railway station or elsewhere." They have been segregated by confining the application of the Bill to "in or about the residence of his employer." But that definition brings in a man employed to clean the windows, and it brings in a man who might earn 2/6 for sweeping off the dead leaves in the garden, or almost everybody of the type to whom one would give a job of work, out of charity rather than out of a desire to get a day's work done. It seems perfectly clear that if by giving a man a few shillings to sweep a chimney or clean up garden paths you are going to make yourself liable under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and for everything that the Workmen's Compensation Act will make you liable, you will not be very ready to employ such persons.

Mr. Norton

But supposing the man loses his life?

Mr. Dillon

I quite see the Deputy's point. The argument can be made that a man working as a casual labourer should have the benefit of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and that he ought not be denied the benefit of that Act. But what is the use of giving him the benefit of the Act by statute if the net result of it is that he will never get any work at all? You can over-protect people so much that you can deprive a man who is getting a decent livelihood doing odd jobs from getting any employment at all. It is a nice question which side of the balance is being weighed down. The result of one action against an employer of that class of man will be that you will stop such men getting any work at all. That will be the result of telling the employer that he is liable for these men. Take the City of Dublin, for instance. There are dozens of families in the City of Dublin who are saved from destitution by the fact that members of the St. Vincent de Paul Society go round amongst their friends and ask them to give these unemployed men a day's work. You give such men a job about the house occasionally. But if these people are to be made liable for workmen's compensation in respect of these casual labourers they will not employ them any longer. We are not making them liable for the consequences of our neglect for any injury that the workman sustains as a result. He has all the protection already through the ordinary law in respect of any accident that may result by our neglect. But the liability that this Bill will impose will be a liability for the personal neglect of the casual worker himself, if a casual labourer is employed. It is a nice question, whether you are to give him the benefit of the Act and run the risk of depriving him of any opportunity of employment, or whether you will say that these people should not be deprived of earning their livelihood and getting a casual day's work here and there. On the whole I am against their inclusion in the Bill. I believe that the benefits they will derive from being included in this Bill are far out-weighed by the risk that will result to the worker by reason of losing an opportunity for employment. That is the only thing that weighs down my judgment. That is why I propose the amendment which stands in my name.

Mr. Norton

I hope the Minister will not accept this amendment. Deputy Dillon must have convinced himself that the amendment is right, because he has adverted only to one side of the case, but if he looked at the other side of the case he ought to be able to convince himself that there are sound reasons for including the person so described in the Bill within the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Acts. It is true that in existing circumstances people are condemned to obtain any employment they can in circumstances which give the employment a charitable aspect, and in circumstances where the person employed has to while away his time because somebody takes compassion upon his difficulties. But Deputy Dillon has not told the House what is to happen the dependants of that man if in the course of his employment he loses his life. Deputy Dillon says if he employs a man and the man loses his life because of negligence on the part of the employer, there is a remedy. There is a remedy, but the natural and effective remedy is his inclusion in the Workmen's Compensation Bill. The casual worker would have to prove very definite negligence on the part of the employer.

Mr. Dillon

Nonsense.

Mr. Norton

He would have to prove very definite negligence.

Mr. Dillon

Ordinary negligence.

Mr. Norton

The Deputy is surrounded by a battery of lawyers who, no doubt, have advised him, but if he had the experience of any trade unionist in the country he would know how difficult it is to succeed in law in such a case. The Deputy wants these people excluded because he says "you may endanger their employment." Possibly you may with persons of a particular mentality, but when you consider that these employers can be covered under the Workmen's Compensation Acts by a relatively small sum you will see how reasonable it is to include them. I do not see that the new liability upon an employer should operate as a reason against employing casual labourers. The weakness in the Deputy's case is that he has not told the House at all what is to happen to the wife and the four or five children that such a man may leave as dependants. He has no remedy for these circumstances and no remedy has been suggested. It is because I think it is desirable to provide for the benefit of the children in such cases that I am opposing this amendment. That is much more necessary than to consider the percentage of potential employers who may refuse to employ such men. That is why I ask the Minister not to accept the amendment.

Mr. Morrissey

I find myself in complete agreement with Deputy Norton in this case and against Deputy Dillon, and for the reasons that Deputy Norton has given, that employers of casual labour can cover themselves by comparatively small amounts. So far as I know the position at the moment is this: if I employ a man to do a job in or about my house and that man is endangered in the course of his work or killed in the course of that work, I am personally responsible in so far as I have to meet the responsibility. I would like to know from the Minister if there is any definition of casual worker or of what is casual work. I do not think it is in the Bill, and in my opinion it is desirable that we should have some definition.

Mr. Dillon

That is what I want the Select Committee for.

Mr. Morrissey

That is a different point, because neither inside nor outside a trades union, neither in the Dáil nor outside of it or from any employer have I ever yet been able to get an accepted definition of casual work or of a casual labourer. Apparently, even the Minister himself shies away from it.

Mr. Lemass

This brings in casual workers.

Mr. McGilligan

What is the Minister's definition of "casual?"

Mr. Lemass

You will find that in the dictionary.

Mr. McGilligan

Did the Minister read the Commission's report?

Mr. Morrissey

I submit that this is, perhaps, the most important point in the whole section, because, as I see it, if the section is passed with or without Deputy Dillon's amendment the whole matter is going to be left to the interpretation of the courts, and the courts will have to decide what is and what is not casual. There is no lead being given to the courts here. I want to suggest that it is not fair, either to the labourer or to the employer, that the matter should be left as loosely as it is. I think we ought to get down to that. On the amendment, I must say that I find myself in agreement with Deputy Norton. I have had a fairly long experience in the number of these cases in my own area, and I must say that I think the sub-section is necessary. I agree absolutely with Deputy Norton that it is almost impossible to prove negligence in the courts. As one who has been associated for a great number of years with workers and with trade unions, I can speak with some knowledge on this. My experience has been that not only have you to prove negligence but you have got to prove gross negligence in the courts, and so far as the ordinary workers are concerned, while that continues to be the practice, their dependants in a case where a man loses his life might as well throw their hat at it as take a case to the courts. They will get nothing and might as well go and look for outdoor relief. That, I fear, will be the result even in cases where people have a trades union behind them, and of course it has to be remembered that in very many of these cases those chiefly concerned have no trades union behind them at all.

Mr. Costello

Deputy Morrissey is anxious to have a definition of "casual labourer," and the Minister says it can be got in a dictionary.

Mr. Lemass

No, I did not.

Mr. Costello

So far as the definition of casual labourer is concerned, it may be possible to find it in the dictionary, but so far as legal decisions go dealing with the expression "casual labourer," the judges in England at all events have decided that it is incapable of exact legal definition. Here we have a few pages of definitions, or attempts at definitions, of casual labourers, and attempts at defining, in a certain state of facts, whether a particular individual was or was not a casual labourer. I think Deputy Morrissey will have to wait for some considerable time before he gets any sort of definition of casual labourer. The purpose that Deputy Dillon had in mind in putting down the amendment was really to safeguard a particular class of casual labourer. It is true that anyone with any sense, who is in the habit of employing labourers or servants from time to time for casual work or in a casual way, will take the elementary precaution of covering himself with an insurance company for a small sum, but before you can get an insurance policy you have got to tell the insurance company what particular type of individual you are going to employ or how often you intend to employ him. You cannot simply go to an insurance company and ask them to issue a policy to you for a small sum which will cover you against every possible contingency and every possible employment that you give out of charity.

What Deputy Dillon is aiming at is to cover this class of people who are given work out of motives of kindness by various people from time to time, and it is really to protect their wives and children while they are alive that Deputy Dillon has put down this amendment. Deputy Norton asked what is to become of the wife and children if a man dies as a result of his employment. The object of Deputy Dillon's amendment, as I understand it, is to try and provide for the wife and children while he is alive, because the effect of the section, as Deputy Dillon said, and I am in agreement with him, is that while he is alive he will not get this casual employment, and that is the danger. Deputy Dillon's amendment is put down in the interests of working men. I will give an instance of the kind of thing that I think is in the back of his mind. It used to be the custom in the City of Dublin, when I was a boy—I do not think it exists so much now—for people to go around with a shears to cut grass in peoples front gardens. A man would call on people asking if he might cut the grass for them. The job usually took about an hour. He would call at a number of houses. People, in order to give him employment—not because they could not go and cut the grass themselves with a machine but because they wanted to give him something to do and because he was anxious to do the work—would give him a few shillings for cutting the grass. Now that will stop if this section is put in.

I may remark in passing that this particular section is not in the British Bill. I would like the Minister to say for what particular reason it has been inserted in this Bill. I should welcome it, and so should Deputy McGilligan and Deputy Rice, because, in this particular two-line clause, there are vast possibilities of our earning money in the courts. Therefore I think Deputy Norton can make his mind easy as regards our advocacy of this sub-clause in the section. It is put forward in the interests of working men. If it were being put forward in any other interest there might be something to be said for Deputy Norton's point of view.

Mr. Norton

And Deputy Morrissey's.

Mr. Costello

I agree that there is a lot to be said, and I think Deputy Dillon admitted that there is a lot to be said, pro and con for this amendment. I should like to have considered impartially, whether it is not better for the class of employee intended to be covered by this that they should be left outside this Bill rather than be put into it. I can appreciate Deputy Norton's desire to have every working man get every possible advantage under this Bill. We all have that desire, that this Workmen's Compensation Bill should in every possible way be for the benefit of working people, but in carrying out that desire we have got to safeguard the position that we may be interfering with the interests of working men in our desire to protect their interests.

Though what I am about to say may not be entirely relevant, I may perhaps call Deputy Norton's attention to what, I am sure, he must have had experience of himself—that is, to cases where workmen are not able to get employment at all because of the fact that insurance companies will not take up their risk. The result is that these people are put on unemployment relief or on poor relief although they are anxious to get work and are capable and willing to work, and although the work is available for them. Despite all that, employers will not employ them because of some physical defect or for some other reason they will not be taken on as a risk by insurance companies. I can give one instance from my own experience of a man who lost his leg. He is admittedly an expert tradesman. The loss of his leg would not prevent him from carrying on that particular trade in which he is an expert. That man is being relieved by the St. Vincent de Paul Society because he is unable to get employment from any employer carrying on the business in which he is an expert, and that is due to the fact that no insurance company will take up his risk owing to his having only one leg. The fact is that although this man has only one leg, that does not interfere in any way with his carrying on with his particular trade. Similar consideration might apply to the class of people Deputy Dillon intends to protect. This amendment is for the benefit of the workmen. Similar considerations might apply in their case. I think the amendment is worthy of impartial consideration. While appreciating Deputy Morrissey's point of view and Deputy Norton's, I think that there is a lot in this amendment which should receive very serious consideration from the Minister.

Mr. Lemass

The principle of this Bill is set out in the first sub-section of section 15, which reads:

(1) If in any employment personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment is caused to a workman, his employer shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

Because of the obvious practical difficulty, casual workers have had to be excluded from the terms of the existing workmen's compensation code and are excluded from this Act with the exceptions stated in paragraphs (i), (ii) and (iii) of sub-section (2) of Section 5. What is casual work? Whether a particular employment is casual or not is a matter of fact to be determined by a court. The term "casual," as the report of the Committee points out, is not capable of exact legal definition. We all know what casual work is.

Mr. Morrissey

We do not.

Mr. Lemass

The difficulty is to get a definition that will stand the test of criticism by a court of law. It is, in any event, a question of fact whether, in a particular case, employment is casual or not. Excluded casual workers were persons, for example, who carry your handbag from the station, or other people so casually engaged. Under the existing law there were excepted from the excluded class persons casually employed for the purpose of the employer's trade or business. We cover also the persons set out in paragraphs (ii) and (iii). I am asked why we are doing that, particularly having regard to the fact that the British Act does not cover those under (iii). My answer is that we are doing it because the Committee recommended it. The assumption must always be in favour of the Committee's recommendation unless there is a clear case against it.

Mr. Morrissey

I hope the Minister will always deal with Committees' Reports in that way.

Mr. Lemass

I say that the assumption is in favour of the Committee's recommendations unless there is a clear case against them.

Mr. McGilligan

Give us the Committee's recommendation.

Mr. Lemass

The Committee stated on page 29:

"We suggest that the following clause might effectively define the class of workers proposed to be included, viz.: A person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purpose of his employer's trade or business if employed in or about the residence of such employer."

Mr. McGilligan

"Otherwise than for the purpose of the employer's trade or business."

Mr. Lemass

Persons employed for the purpose of the employer's trade or business are covered by the existing law. There is no change in respect to them. The Committee continued: So as to bring in persons employed for the purpose of any game or recreation, if engaged or paid through a club, the manager or managing committee of the club in such cases being deemed to be the employer. With regard to persons employed in or about the residence of the employer it has been argued that the effect might be to prevent persons getting casual employment in or about the residence of private persons. I do not know if there is any weight to be attached to that argument. It is true there are people who give employment out of charity to persons seeking it, and there might be the danger that, because of the liability they would have to accept under this Bill, in so doing, they might cease to give such employment. But we must not lose our sense of proportion. For one person employed, because of charity, there are nine persons employed to do work which the employer actually wants done. I should say that not 10 per cent. of those casually employed in or about the residence of the employer are employed out of charity. They are employed for the purpose of getting work done, and, in respect to such persons, it is very desirable that there should be that liability upon the employer that if the employed person suffers an injury compensation must be paid. Taking the balance between the injustice that may be done to persons so employed if they are involved in accidents, and the possibility that certain persons may not get casual work, because of the enactment of this section, I say the balance is in favour of the inclusion of these people in the Bill. The number of cases in which work given for charity will be stopped, because of the position created by this Bill, will be very few as compared with the number of cases where employment is given because work has to be done. If one person is not employed another person will have to be employed. Deputies opposite have assumed that a case should be made for the inclusion of these persons. I contend that a case must be made for their exclusion. I do not think that any case has been made for the argument that charitable employment would be refused under this clause. I think, although it may not be so in some cases, the number of persons employed for charitable reasons is a very small proportion of the people employed in or about the private residence of such employer.

Mr. Costello

I do not think it is quite fair for the Minister to say that it is merely charitable employment that will be excluded. Perhaps that was the argument that was most stressed or dwelt on, but I think that employed people working on their own will be excluded and that the tendency will be to employ big firms and that people doing casual labour will be put out of work altogether.

Mr. Lemass

I would like to ask the Deputy did the operations of the 1906 Act prevent such persons getting employment for the purpose of a particular trade or business. They are casual workers.

Mr. McGilligan

The Minister asked a question and I answered it. The Committee said:

"The present definition of a workman seems impossible of extension in an Act of Parliament to include such casual employment as tree cutting, gardening, window cleaning, etc., and yet exclude the handbag carrier if the definition is to be kept within reasonable limits."

Surely that indicates that they did feel that there were limits as between reasonable and unreasonable types of employment that should be brought within the measure, and they did allow that there was a reasonable limit to the type of employment that should be excluded. They went on to say:

"Unless particular classes of casual employment other than for the purpose of the employer's trade or business can be scheduled it would appear that an extension would have to be made in the Act to include every person performing a service for another for reward, which would lead to casuals finding it difficult to pick up odd jobs."

That is the whole argument. Do not confuse this with charity. It is odd jobs. Nobody would be reasonably excluded if it was possible to have an exact definition.

Let us have the points in contrast: the chance, because of a too wide and unreasonable definition, of people not getting employment which they might get if the definition was reasonable, and opposed to that is the chance, and it is a very small chance, of some of these classes unreasonably included, meeting with a fatal accident. That is what has to be balanced. It is not everybody who gets an odd job who is killed. We have not to consider in every case of an odd-jobs man the man's dependency. It is not in every case that there is an accident. It is not in every case where there is an accident that there is a fatal accident. So that the compassionate plea which Deputy Norton makes does not apply in a great number of these cases. The balance has to be weighed as between these two things: this particular odd-job person unreasonably included because of the impossibility of an exact definition, and the sympathetic consideration that one will have for the dependency of that person. Put against that the number of odd-job people who may not get work at all, because of their being unreasonably included in this. The calculation has to be made on that. Deputy Norton may still think, weighing these two things, that his mind goes in favour of inclusion, but he should not mis-state the case. The proper statement of the case is what the Commission said, that if you are going to extend this you are certainly not going to have your definition kept within reasonable limits, and, if it is not kept within reasonable limits, it will lead to casuals finding it difficult to pick up odd jobs. That is what we have to make a decision between.

Mr. Norton

The matter is not so easily dealt with as Deputy McGilligan thinks.

Mr. McGilligan

I suggest that it is difficult.

Mr. Norton

Deputy Costello wants something definite about "casual," and after telling us that he is anxious to get it, he told us that the whole British judiciary failed in it.

Mr. Costello

I never said anything about wanting to get anything about "casuals." I said I thought it was impossible to get it.

Mr. Norton

I was listening to the Deputy's speech, and what I heard from him was a demonstration of inquisitiveness as to what the Minister thought was "casual."

Mr. Morrissey

Is Deputy Norton satisfied with what is in the section?

Mr. Norton

I shall deal with Deputy Costello first. The Deputy can deal with Deputy Dillon after that. Deputy Dillon says he wants to help the family of the man, that he wants to enable them to live while the man is alive. The price he wants to pay for that is the price of probably starving the family if the man loses his livelihood.

Mr. Dillon

Nonsense.

Mr. Norton

I suppose the Deputy's new policy is going to save them from that horrible fate. Deputy McGilligan said that I quoted the case of a man who might lose his life. Let us take something else. Let us suppose he is injured. What happens to him? Presumably he will lose his employment, and will receive no compensation under this Bill. Deputy McGilligan says that there is very little likelihood of a man casually employed losing his life. Assuming that is so, what then is the explanation of high premiums being charged for insuring a man against the possibility of losing his life? Even if Deputy McGilligan thinks that there is very little prospect of a man losing his life when casually employed, it is possible for the man to sustain an accident, in respect of which he will receive no compensation, an accident which may not only prevent him from continuing in his employment, but probably prevent him from working for any other employer in future. That is a difficulty that Deputy McGilligan did not advert to. He did not advert to the possibility of a man being maimed in the course of his employment, and of his being not only unable to follow his existing employment, but any other kind of employment. I think that Deputy Dillon's interest in this matter is one of desiring to preserve the employment of a person who might get the kind of employment to which he refers. I think his sympathy is completely misplaced, taking the risk, on the one hand, that there may be certain opportunities for casual work of that kind denied a man in future, but bearing in mind the fact that if he is following any employment of that kind in future his wife and family will be covered in fatal cases, and he will have compensation to receive in a non-fatal case arising out of his employment, if he is maimed or in any way prevented from following his employment by any kind of injury.

Mr. Morrissey

I am not at all as easy in my mind as Deputy Norton seems to be about the word "casual." I am against the amendment moved by Deputy Dillon for the reason which I gave earlier. Deputy Norton seemed to agree with Deputy McGilligan that there was not much likelihood of a person employed in casual labour losing his life.

Mr. Norton

No.

Mr. Morrissey

I should like to know from the Minister if, as the section stands, a man employed for a day, or two or three days, by a farmer for threshing operations would be covered by clause 3 of sub-section (b).

Mr. Dillon

He would be covered by sub-section (1).

Mr. Costello

"Trade or business."

Mr. Morrissey

Would a man employed by a county council for two days, working at road making, be covered?

Mr. Dillon

Yes.

Mr. Morrissey

Are these people casual?

Mr. Lemass

I should not like to answer that without hearing all the facts.

Mr. Morrissey

I want to get a definition and something laid down in this Bill to guide the judges. All this talk that we have had about safeguarding the interests of the casual labourer is, in my opinion, so much rubbish, because eventually, whether the amendment is carried or not, the casual labourer will be completely at the mercy of the judge who has to interpret the Act without getting any guidance from the Oireachtas. There is, perhaps, a good deal in the point made by Deputy Dillon and by Deputy Costello with regard to people who give employment to individuals, not so much because they want to get work done, but for some charitable reason. I suggest, however, that that is not at all as general as Deputies would seem to suggest. I am rather inclined to agree with the Minister that in some cases it is a matter of fifty-fifty. There may be certain work which we would like to get done, but we would like to have the feeling that while we are getting the work done for ourselves at the same time we are being charitable. A case came under my notice within the last week where a gentleman wanted to be charitable, but the extent of his charity was to get a man to prune trees and to clean up half a mile of an avenue which was covered with leaves. That is not the sort of charity we want. I am satisfied that there is a responsibility on the employer, whether the employee is casual or permanent, to safeguard the employee. I cannot see my way to support Deputy Dillon's amendment and I am not at all as keen on the section as I would be if the Minister would attempt even to define what is casual work. The Minister quite frankly runs away from that. He will not go even so far as the Committee went. The Minister says he will not do it; he says he cannot do it. The Minister is putting the responsibility on the judges and we are told by men of legal experience that judges are bound to differ and when judges differ of course the dependants of the unfortunate people who may lose their lives or their limbs are going to suffer.

Mr. Dillon

It seems to me that what comes out of the discussion of the first amendment that we have put our hands to is the urgent necessity for a select committee.

Mr. Lemass

Is this in order?

Acting-Chairman (Professor Thrift)

I think that question has already been decided.

Mr. Dillon

I will not presume to reopen it, but I am now going to elaborate, in the light of that, the character of the questions which arise under this Bill. Here is a question of considerable obscurity. The simplest interrogation addressed to the Minister as to the meaning of the Bill finds him in a position where he is quite unable to answer.

Mr. Lemass

Nonsense.

Mr. Dillon

What does the Minister mean by a person employed for the purposes of his employer's trade or business? Will a man employed by a farmer for ploughing a field come within that category? The Minister does not know, and he knows that he does not know.

Mr. Lemass

That particular section has been in operation for 30 years.

Mr. Dillon

That is no answer to the question I am putting to the Minister. I know it is in operation, and the Minister has in this case lavishly taken over, in toto, British statutes, and put them in here. A great part of those British statutes cannot be improved upon. In practice they have been proved to be excellent. Other parts have proved to be cumbrous and absurd. That description applies to more than one part of this section. However, I do not want to press that aspect of the situation, but I do think it is very necessary, if we are to discuss this Bill to the best advantage, that no side of the House should regard it as a Party matter, and that Deputy Norton should at least take the view consistently that any amendments which have been put down here have been put down for the purpose of improving the Bill from the point of view of the workmen, and of everyone for whose benefit this legislation was first introduced. Deputy McGilligan has put it as clearly as it can be put. You have got to weigh in the balance the protection that this Bill will afford in the very rare cases where a casual employee will meet with fatal or grave injuries, and cannot prove negligence against his employer, as against the case of the number of men who will be unable to get casual employment of any kind in or about the premises of their employers.

One difficulty which I can foresee arising is this: We are told it is manifest that if you give a fellow a shilling to carry your bag he is not to be looked upon as a casual employee employed for the purpose of any work in or about the residence of his employer, but if you look at the case of M'Adam and Harvey you will find that a fellow who was casually doing a job nearly half a mile away from his employer's house was found by the court to be employed in or about the residence of his employer. The words "in or about" occur in another section of the Bill as the Minister will recollect. The words "about the premises" are very elastic, and the fact of it is that this sub-section (3) brings in virtually every casual employee that could be thought of. You have got to weigh the benefits that will accrue to that class against the disadvantages. I can quite believe that Deputy Norton, in making the balance, takes one view, but I must impress upon him and upon Deputy Morrissey—although I do not think I need impress it on Deputy Morrissey— that I, in making the balance, take the other view. Both—actuated by the same desires—are arriving at a different conclusion. I do not propose to press the amendment if the Minister has made up his mind to oppose it, but I should be sorry if the Minister would not turn it over in his mind between this and the Report Stage. Possibly some means could be found of reintroducing the principle of my amendment on the Report Stage, if, between now and then, the Minister comes to the conclusion that there is more force in my contention than at first there seemed to him to be.

Mr. Lemass

I should like to say that I am quite prepared to accept any amendment to this Bill—except an amendment to the principle of it— for which, in my opinion, a good case is made. Of course, I must put in those qualifying words "in my opinion" because, no doubt, there will always be differences of opinion. In this particular case we have a form of words recommended by the Committee which was set up and reported in 1926—a form which was, in fact, inserted in the draft Bill by Deputy Costello on the instructions of Deputy McGilligan. This is one of the sections I did not change, and when the responsibility was theirs they also decided to adhere to the recommendation of the Committee. There is of course, the main consideration that the only argument against the Committee's recommendation is the argument which Deputy Dillon has now made, and which, in my opinion, if pushed to its logical conclusion could be made an argument against the enactment of a Workmen's Compensation Bill at all. If a casual worker of a certain kind is to be excluded because his inclusion is likely to deter persons from employing him, is it not clear that the same argument might be used against any form of workmen's compensation? A charitable householder might give a man a job cleaning his windows, repairing a few slates on his roof or working about his garden; a charitable industrialist might give a man employment in his factory, even though there is no particular need for it. If the householder is likely to be deterred by the fact that in employing the man he is exposing himself to certain liability in the case of accident, will not the industrialist be similarly deterred? That argument— although it would be extending it considerably—could be used against the whole principle of workmen's compensation. In any event, I do not think it is strong enough, having regard to the facts I have mentioned, to justify us in rejecting the recommendation of the Committee.

Mr. McGilligan

I want again to press the fact that if there is a recommendation made by the Committee it is made with reservations, and the reservations are contained in the phrases which I read. If you are going to extend this definition you are going to extend it unreasonably, and if you extend it unreasonably you are going to lead to lack of employment of the odd-jobs man. I do not believe Deputy Costello had any hand, act or part in the draft Bill. I do not believe he ever saw it.

Mr. Lemass

He did. He should have, anyway.

Mr. McGilligan

I do not believe he should have. I know the way that Bill went from Department to Department, and it was in a definitely experimental way from beginning to end. There will be found minute after minute referring to things that were brought casually to the attention of various members of the Executive Council, referred down, and made into a memorandum as to whether they should be regarded when the Bill was finally being cleaned up. The easiest thing and the proper thing for the people who were drafting the Bill was to take the clauses and relate them to the previous legislation. Of course, in doing so, without any examination of detail, this phrase will emerge, but that the Bill had been subjected to any sort of analysis with a view to seeing what the final copy was going to be cannot be stated. The Minister also forgets that since 1928, indeed one might say since 1926, there has been quite an amount of judicial interpretation—or rather attempted judicial interpretation—of some of those phrases, and a person who was satisfied that the Committee did, in fact, report favourably on this phrase in 1926 might not just automatically find himself ready to accept that recommendation in 1933 by reason of what has happened in the interval. I want to take a test on this, the handbag carrier. Does anyone really believe that the handbag carrier should be included; that that employment should be regarded as a contract of service, because that is the basis of workmen's compensation law?

A Deputy

He is not included.

Mr. McGilligan

Is he not? Wait until the courts get at this. Why does the Committee say that if you are going to extend this provision you are going to have included the handbag carrier? That is taken from a memorandum that was produced before the Committee. They call attention to the memorandum that was put before them on the other side by Mr. J.C. McBride, who tendered evidence on behalf of the Accident Offices Association. They quoted an extract which said:

"The present definition of workman seems impossible of extension in an Act of Parliament to include such casual employment as tree cutting, gardening, window cleaning, etc., and yet exclude the handbag carrier if the definition is to be kept within reasonable limits."

That is certainly a statement of the mind of that individual passed on by the Commission. Including the handbag carrier is extending the definition to an unreasonable point. If a person is carrying a handbag in or about the residence of his employer, to have that included would be an unreasonable extension. I referred to contract of service. The idea of contract of service is a little bit beclouded when applied to some of the additions. The basis of the Workmen's Compensation Act was that if you have a man under contract of service, and if the man does some work which is dangerous, or happens to turn out dangerous, then you should pay for having caused him to injure himself. Even though we have got away from that idea, it is still included. Judicial interpretation has extended to that and has led to the refuge in the phrase "independent contractor." If you come along from a railway station with a handbag and give it to a casual to carry, rather than give him 3d. or 4d. that you might give him for doing nothing, really that person is acting under contract of service, and it is going to be interpreted on decisions given. This provision brings him in if it is about the residence of the employer. Does anyone think that that should be included? Is he being put in any danger? The Minister made the absurd analogy that you are up against a casual employee, and that he can be called a workman. There you get back to the real rock of service. Then there will be extensions of that. What is there corresponding to the man who drops off at a railway station and hands his bag to someone to take home? What is there about a factory that could make the case analogous to the one the Minister talked of? There is nothing analogous.

I want to return to what Deputy Norton said. I take him up on the point about a fatality. He now extends the class of people he wants included, and said compassionate cases could be made. There are heaps of people who under stress would go to absurd lengths to which the courts were driven on the contract of service line. Against that there is an absurd extension of the independent contractor. Of the many people classified as independent contractors by the court, which of them deserves Deputy Norton's sympathy so much as the bag carrier? The difficulty is that when you extend legislation to cover these cases you come to a certain point where certain laws will operate. People will say: "Very good, I am not going to run the risk of a certain accident happening and—possibly not being insured against casual employment—be landed for heavy damages." These people will keep their bags but others will lose a certain amount of money. People will not receive money for casual jobs, and against that is set the odd case of a man who suffered a fatality or whose dependants were left unprovided for, because, arising out of casual employment, the job of handbag carrier was not included in this measure. On any reasonable view I think the balance is not for extending this provision. We ought to have pity for everyone, but, if you are going to substitute a different thing, because people will not get casual jobs, I do not think you are doing better for these people by trying to be sympathetic. The whole thing is to balance consideration, to see which is the better. Deputy Dillon's amendment is the better way. It would probably lead to hardship but to nothing like the amount of trouble that will be caused if the Bill is left as it is.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr. Norton

On the section, I notice that amongst the persons exempted from the scope of the Bill are members of the employer's family dwelling in his house. That seems to me to be likely to impose a possible hardship on persons who are exempted. It is true that where a man employs his son or daughter, and that they are dwelling in the house, there is a case for excepting them. But when we come to the employer's family, that could extend to a stepson or possibly to a half-brother, or to a variety of people not just sons or daughters of the employer. While normally a member of the employer's family would be excluded I suggest to the Minister that provision should be made so that persons should not be excepted where it is shown that they work for wages, as distinct from contributing to the family. Where a person is an independent employee there is a case for including him as an ordinary workman. That person is taking the place of a workman and the employer is liable to have him covered for workmen's compensation. The position would be different where a son or daughter worked with their father and receives no wages, except sufficient pocket money to supply individual needs. Where a person is actually a wagedrawing employee or drawing a salary there is a strong case for including that person in the scope of the Bill.

Mr. Lemass

The phrase "independent employee" can hardly be used in relation to a member of the employer's family dwelling in his house and it is only member of the employer's family dwelling in his house who are excluded. The son of the employer or any other relation of the employer not dwelling in his house is covered by the Bill. It is assumed that in these cases there is a very special and definite personal relationship and, in fact, it would be almost impossible to prove whether or not the employment was under a contract of service for wages. At least considerable difficulty would undoubtedly arise and the assumption is that in these cases, it is not necessary to make the same provision as in the case of other persons because of the personal relationship existing.

Mr. Norton

Take the case of a business premises in town. The Minister is not unfamiliar with that kind of case. A man has a certain business premises in town, and he takes into that business a relative. He employs that relative who would come within the definition of the employer's family. He pays that person a weekly wage, and very often that kind of employer, while there might be a blood relationship, might be a much harder task-master than the ordinary employer and he occasionally is. If that person works for wages, I think he should be brought within the scope of the Bill. The Minister says it is difficult to ascertain whether that person is, in fact, working for wages, but all that information comes out quite easily when the employer approaches the insurance company to cover his workmen, and there is not the slightest difficulty about having the information provided by the employer there. There is not any difficulty at all in the workman being able to indicate to the court when the matter comes before it, whether in fact he is receiving wages or not. If the employer is paying him wages, presumably he is getting a receipt, because it would seem to be necessary for ordinary income tax purposes, and if a person is not getting wages he will surely find it difficult to go to the court and say that he was in fact getting wages. I think there is a strong case for its inclusion. The Minister may not wish to indicate his mind on it now, but I think it is a point which should be looked into.

Mr. Lemass

The Deputy is speaking about a certain class of persons which he has in mind, but he has got to do more than speak about them. He has got to find a definition for them which will stand the test of legal criticism, and which will include these persons and these persons only. I should like him to try his hand at it, but I should like to say this, that I think it is to be noted that no representations have been made to my knowledge that any amendment is required in respect of that part of the law which is, of course, merely an enactment of the existing law.

Mr. Dillon

Surely, if any step in this direction be taken, we are simply creating a cesspool of perjury. If you are going to authorise the members of a man's family who are living in the house with him to sue him for accidents that arise in the course of the employment, it simply means that every time somebody trips on the stairs evidence will be adduced that such a person was getting paid as a domestic servant, or in some other capacity, and that he or she is the person referred to in the insurance policy and is entitled to compensation. You are bound to have floods of fictitious cases coming into the courts continually—children applying for compensation against their own parents.

Mr. Norton

Only in cases in which they would be receiving wages.

Mr. Dillon

What is to prevent them swearing that they are receiving wages?

Mr. Norton

The employer is there on the other side.

Mr. McGilligan

A member of the family.

Mr. Dillon

It is the insurance company that is going to pay and not the father.

Mr. Norton

Not necessarily the father.

Mr. Dillon

The proposal here is that we should include a member of the employer's family dwelling in his house. It will scarcely be his grandmother, nor yet his grandfather. It may be his stepfather or stepmother, but we know perfectly well that it really applies to his son or daughter, his grandson or granddaughter, his step-son or step-daughter—possibly brother and sister, and half-brother and half-sister. That is the class of person we really have to consider. Here we have a man living with his sons and daughters, or his step-sons and stepdaughters. He insures himself for employers' liability against accident in respect of two employees who are his sons. He need not state in his insurance policy that they are his sons at all. They are just two employees. One of his sons, coming down the stairs in the morning, trips and breaks his leg. He never worked for his father; he never had wages, and he immediately takes an action against his father, goes into court, swears that he was in receipt of wages, and the father says that he was paying him wages. He gets compensation, which the insurance company must pay, and the father nets £1 5s. or £1 6s. a week, whatever it is the court decides must be paid to the injured son.

Mr. Norton

The premium having been previously paid against that risk.

Mr. Dillon

Certainly, but does the Deputy not see that the premium might not have been paid against that risk but against quite another risk, and that where you have the possibility of collusion between two members of the one family, father and son, who between them are going to extract the money out of the insurance company, you are simply preparing the ground for perjured litigation? Normally, you have employee and employer and the probability of their entering into a conspiracy to defraud the insurance company is comparatively remote, but where you have a son and a father living together in the same house, presumably sharing the family revenue, there is every inducement to them to conspire together to knock out of the insurance company something to which, in fact, they are not entitled at all. That, to my mind, is the only effective argument against including the members of a family living in the same house as the employer in the benefits of the Act.

Mr. Norton

Might I put this point of view to the Deputy? This whole question turns on where the member of the family lives. Normally he is insurable. He is only non-insurable if he is dwelling in the house of his employer.

Mr. Dillon

In the family circle.

Mr. Norton

There are two houses in a street and if the employee lives in No. 1, he is insurable and can be compensated; but if he happens to live in No. 2, where his employer lives, he can get no compensation. Is there not as much risk of collusion when he is living in No. 1 as when he is living in No. 2?

Mr. Dillon

No.

Mr. Norton

The Deputy is seeing fine points in his argument about collusion now. The test in the whole question is the place of residence of the employee and I say that the fact that he resides in the dwelling-house of his father, for whom he may also work, or the fact that he resides in the dwelling-house of his grandfather, for whom he may also work, should not debar him from the compensation which he would receive if he lived next door, provided he is working for weekly wages. If he is working for weekly wages for his grandfather, he ought not to be debarred from getting compensation merely because he happens to reside in the same dwelling-house as his employer. That is the simple question in the matter and I do not think that it is open to the collusion the Deputy suggests.

Mr. Corish

There is a type of person whom I have in mind and I am wondering if the machinery of this Bill is capable of dealing with his case. Within recent years it has been the practice of county boards of health, instead of giving home assistance in the way in which it has been distributed hitherto, to bring in people who are in receipt of this home assistance to do certain work in the vicinity of county hospitals and county homes. Up to this these people have not been insurable and I think they should be insurable. I know of a case in my own constituency that happened during the last two years, where a man in the course of his employment lost his eye. He applied for compensation to the county board of health and it was not forthcoming. He employed a solicitor, who went to court, but his case was thrown out. In consequence of the fact that that man lost his eye, he has not been employed within the last two years. He got a job last year for a couple of days but because of the fact that he had lost one eye he was almost instantly discharged.

Mr. Lemass

On what ground was compensation refused?

Mr. Corish

They were not insurable. The Minister for Local Government ruled that they were not insurable. I do think that at least the Minister should put something in the Bill to ensure compensation in cases like that.

Mr. Lemass

There is no question of insurance here. If a man was employed by the local authority, and if he was injured on any work being carried out by the local authority in the course of his work, he is entitled to compensation from the local authority. The local authority is not bound to insure, but it is bound to pay compensation in such cases.

Mr. Corish

The judge ruled otherwise, and it is for that reason that I am raising the matter. I think the Minister should endeavour to get that in.

Mr. Lemass

It is in.

Mr. Corish

In the beginning these people were used in certain directions, for doing work, if you like, that was not necessary in order to keep them employed, but recently the county boards of health have been bringing in those people to do work that should be done by other persons. I know cases where a contractor was brought in to do a certain job, and these people who were in receipt of home assistance were sent to this contractor as labourers. I do think in a case of that kind at any rate that these people should be insurable. Many of them may be maimed, and some of them may lose their lives in these occupations. It is certainly a very peculiar state of affairs that no compensation can be paid. I would ask the Minister to give the matter consideration and if necessary to consult the Minister for Local Government in regard to it.

Mr. Lemass

I am quite certain that there is some question of insurance in the Deputy's mind, because of the fact that the Deputy has continuously used the word "insured." There is no question of insurance here, but there is a claim for compensation as against the employer.

Mr. Corish

We are dealing with cases of exceptions, and that is my reason for raising the matter. I think that there should be something put into the Bill to ensure that provision will be made by a local authority for people of this kind whom they have employed. I am not certain if the Minister can do what I ask him to do, but I would suggest that he should consult with his colleague, the Minister for Local Government, to find out how these people are affected. I suggest it is a great scandal that a man who loses an eye in employment of that kind should have no remedy to recover compensation.

Mr. Lemass

He has a remedy.

Mr. Corish

He thought he had a remedy until he went to court, and then his case was thrown out.

Mr. Lemass

I would be very glad to get the facts of that case.

Mr. McGilligan

I wonder would Deputy Norton agree to the deletion of the expression "member of the family" altogether? Would that meet his point? The expression "member of the family" is defined in Section 6, and I understood from the opening of the Deputy's remarks that there was to be a very big extension of that phrase in relation to the exceptions. The Deputy cannot have it both ways. If you are going to have "member of the family" defined in a rather extensive way for the purposes of the amount of dependency, the reason which is behind that extension is also equally behind the extension when it comes to the matter about work, whether a man is to be called a workman if he is a member of the employer's family. The Report of the Commission, on pages 28, 29 and 30, opens by saying:—

"We have received considerable evidence with regard to the classes of persons to be entitled to compensation."

They have given definitions in the Act of 1906 and lower down they say:

"With regard to the classes of persons excluded from the definition of ‘workmen' it was urged by trade union witnesses that there should be no exclusion of any wage earner from the Workmen's Compensation Acts."

I have searched through the Report and I find that they have concluded by saying, about quarter of the way down page 30:—

"No satisfactory reasons have been submitted to us for the inclusion of any of the other classes of workers at present outside the scope of the Act and we do not consider any change necessary in that respect."

I do not find that any evidence was put forward in regard to the special classes that are mentioned in relation to members of the employer's family dwelling in his own house and when I get to the back of the book, page 84, I find that evidence was given by Mr. R.S. Anthony, Mr. Denis Cullen, Mr. Luke Duffy, Mr. E.P. Harte, Mr. John S. Kelly, Councillor Thomas McGrath, Mr. J. O'Kelly, Mr. M.J. Reardon, Mr. Dermot J. Stewart and Mr. C.D. Waters. They apparently did not think fit to raise this point. I wonder is it really a very valuable point to raise in the discussion here this evening when all these people who were called as witnesses did not consider it worth while raising? The only thing that the Commission say in their Report about it is that no satisfactory reasons had been submitted for the inclusion of any of the other classes of workers at present outside the scope of the Act. It is nowhere indicated that this point was brought up.

Mr. Norton

Is the Deputy sure about that?

Mr. McGilligan

I am not, but I remember following the evidence that was given, and I do not recollect that that point was raised. If Deputy Norton tells me that it was raised specifically I shall yield to his superior knowledge of the matter. I do not believe it was. I never heard it was. Supposing we take out this exception. Then it amounts to this, that a member of the employer's family dwelling in his house may be accounted a workman for the purposes of compensation. What is he to prove? That he met with an accident, certain things about dependency, partial or complete disablement and that he works under a contract of service. With whom is he working under a contract of service? With his father or mother or some other member of the family? What does the contract of service cover? When does the contract begin or end? Would sleeping in the house be part of his work? What exactly would be the categories of employment that the Deputy thinks should be covered in this that would be capable of exact disclosure to the court and that would not be the subject of immediate suspicion because the contract of service has got to be proved in relation to the other members of the family? They are the very people who would be giving evidence in relation to this matter. There is the other side of this, that the person who is living with the family is supposed to be in a somewhat better position than an ordinary workman. He is not subject to the harshness of the outside world. That sort of compassionate thing runs all through this matter. It seems to me it would be a very big upset, without any evidence having been tendered to the Commission and without the Commission reporting in favour of it, that we should change it. I should like to point out one peculiarity that emerges from it, that although in Section 7 the question of legitimacy has been referred to from the angle of dependency it is not referred to here, so that an illegitimate child can claim under a contract of service in certain conditions, even although living in the house with his father, whereas a lawfully born child cannot. It seems to me to be an anomalous thing.

Mr. Norton

Following on what Deputy McGilligan has said, take the case of a member of an employer's family, working in a factory owned by his grandfather, but who happens to live in the residence of his grandfather ten miles away; why should the fact that he met with an accident in the factory debar him from compensation, simply because he lived in the residence of his grandfather, ten miles away?

Mr. McGilligan

Is the grandfather his employer?

Mr. Norton

His grandfather might own the whole street of houses there. There is not much difficulty in living in another house in circumstances of that kind, but if the grandson meets with an accident in the factory, the fact that he resides with his grandfather ten miles away from the factory should not debar him from compensation, seeing that if he did not live with him he would be entitled to it. I suggest to the Minister that he should take these things into consideration seeing that the list is long only apparently for the purpose of widening the scope of people who would be excluded from the purpose of the Bill.

Mr. Lemass

I would be prepared to consider any amendments suggested in that regard. The list in Section 6 is the list in the existing Act, and if there is a case for amendment we would be prepared to consider it.

Mr. McGilligan

If there is a case for an amendment that would be also a case for dependency.

Section 5 agreed to.

SECTION 6.

Question proposed—"That Section 6 stand part of the Bill."

Mr. Fionán Lynch

I should like the Minister to consider extending the definition of the class to the adopted child. There may be considerable difficulty about that and, of course, the class is a comparatively small one. It is not of very frequent occurrence, but one can easily conceive cases occurring where, for instance, a workman may take in a child of a deceased brother or sister for the purpose of rearing the child. That child is, to all intents and purposes, a member of the workman's family, and I can see no good reason for not giving him the benefits that are given to the son and daughter. I know that the definition there of a member of the family is that of the existing law and also the definition in the British Act of 1923. I also know that adoption has no legal status here. There may be this difference in England, that you have the Adoption of Children Act of 1926 which gives the adopted child a definite legal status. I do not say that it would be bringing the adopted child within the Workmen's Compensation Acts. I mean that I do not believe there has been any decision in that direction. It is possible, I should say, from the reading of the 1926 Act, that the adopted child would be considered to come within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. I merely raise the matter as one for consideration, and I do not take my stand on the word "adopted." It might be better to limit it to the child of a deceased brother or sister, who is living in the house of the workman, or something of that kind.

Mr. Lemass

The difficulty there arises out of the fact that there is no Saorstát statute legalising the adoption of children such as the 1926 Act of England, to which the Deputy referred. It would appear to me that this is a matter more properly to be dealt with by an Act here dealing with the adoption of children than in this particular Act. In another Bill, when we were faced with that difficulty, we adopted the phrase "a child in respect of whom the person has placed himself in loco parentis.” I think, however, that it would be dangerous here where it might be given a much wider interpretation. In the other Bill—the Unemployment Assistance Bill—it did not matter how wide the definition was provided there was dependency. However, I will have the matter examined.

Section 6 agreed to.

SECTION 7.

(1) In this Act the word "dependants" means such of the members of the family of a workman as were wholly or in part dependent on the earnings of such workman at the time of his death, or would but for the incapacity due to the accident which resulted in such workman's death have been so dependent, and where a workman being the parent or grand-parent of an illegitimate child leaves such a child so dependent on his earnings or, being an illegitimate child, leaves a parent or grand-parent so dependent upon his earnings, shall include such illegitimate child and parent or grand-parent respectively.

(2) A person shall not for the purposes of this Act be deemed to be a partial dependant of another person unless he was dependent partially on contributions from that other person for the provision of the ordinary necessaries of life suitable for persons in his class and position.

Mr. Costello

I move amendment 2:

To delete sub-section (2).

I am rather surprised that this amendment does not stand in the name of Deputy Norton, because the sub-section that I propose to delete is a sub-section which is really to the disadvantage of the dependants of workmen. I put down the amendment in order to see what was the justification for this sub-section, because there is practically no reason given in the Departmental Report for the recommendation that this sub-section should be put in. I quite realise that it is the same sub-section as in the British Act of 1923 and the British Act of 1925, but that fact does not commend itself to me at all. The position with reference to partial dependants has been in a certain state for the last thirty-three years in this country, and, under one of the earlier Acts dealing with Workmen's Compensation, a decision was given as to what was necessary to constitute partial dependency and it was held in the first case that it consisted in dependency for the necessaries of life. That decision was given in the year 1899, and, in the following year, 1900, the House of Lords upset that decision and reversed it, and decided that a contribution towards the necessaries of life was not a necessary element in partial dependency. That has continued from 1900 to 1933 in this country. It is a decision which was given really in the interest of the partial dependants of workmen. This sub-section that I propose to delete will have the effect, and is intended to have the effect, of upsetting the law that has obtained in this country for the last thirty-three years. On page 35 of the Departmental Report the recommendation is set out, and all the report says is:—

"In the evidence we received on behalf of the clerks of the peace, it was submitted that an amendment on these lines (that is, the lines of sub-section (2) of this section) would debar many claims which have no merit or justification. We agree with this view, and recommend that in the Saorstát a similar amending section should be adopted, as it seems to us to give effect to the original intention of the legislature."

That is to be found in the Act of 1906, and that was passed when the Act of 1900 was the law, so it seems to me to be peculiar to say that this sub-section (2) now gives effect to the original intention of the legislature when the intention of the legislature has existed for thirty-three years and was admitted to be the real intention of the legislature. I do not know what the justification for this sub-section is at all. Really, the sub-section as it operates, and all these questions of partial dependency, very largely arise under that class of case which is known as the family fund case. That is the case where numbers of members of a family are living in the one house and all contributing to the common fund.

They all contribute to the common fund and, out of that common fund, they are supported and maintained and the rent of the house is paid. The father receives certain contributions from the wages of the members of the household. Out of the fund that is made up by these contributions, the entire family is maintained. If anything happens to one of the sons arising out of, or in the course of, his employment, the question arises to what extent the father is partially dependent on the contributions given by his son. Under the old principle, laid down in 1900, it was sufficient for the father to prove that he got a pecuniary contribution from the son. While in assessing the amount to be awarded for partial dependency the fact that the son had to be maintained out of the common fund was taken into account, nevertheless, it was not necessary for the father to show that he was dependent for his own necessaries of life on the contributions of his children. It will be necessary under the present proposal in sub-section (2) for the father, in that state of facts, to show that he is dependent on the son for the necessaries of life. It will not be sufficient to show merely that he gets a pecuniary contribution out of which he may make a profit. He must show that he was dependent on the son, in whole or in part, for the necessaries of life. That appears to me to be a reactionary proposal and to be against the interest of the workman. It sets aside a principle which has been acted upon in this country for 33 years. I want to know the justification for that change.

Mr. Norton

I suggest to the Minister that this is an amendment which could be usefully accepted. I can imagine interminable litigation over this section because, as Deputy Costello says, in considering the question of partial dependency the claimant must be able to show that he was partially dependent on the injured person for the provision of the ordinary necessaries of life. To define "ordinary necessaries of life" would seem to me to be a difficult job, but when you come to construe "ordinary necessaries of life" in relation to the position and station in life of the person concerned, I can imagine one getting tied up in a knot. It would be extremely difficult to get anything like a fair definition on any dozen cases which would establish what the general legal line was on that particular section. Take the case of a workman and his wife, both employed. The workman loses his life. His widow will have to show that, although she was working herself, she was partially dependent on her husband's contributions for the ordinary necessaries of life. In addition, she has to prove that these necessaries were imperatively necessary for a person of her class or position.

Mr. Lemass

The Deputy should note that sub-section (2) relates only to cases of partial dependency.

Mr. Norton

I am taking as an example the case of a wife who is working. Presumably, she cannot prove complete dependency. She would have to prove partial dependency and, in doing that, must prove that she was partially dependent on her husband's contributions for the necessaries of life and that those were necessaries appropriate to her class and position. That seems to me to be a peculiarly complicated provision. It is in the British Act of 1923, but that of itself does not prove that it possesses any particular virtue. If it has been included in this Bill merely because it was included in the British Act, there is a strong case for deleting it. It is calculated, as Deputy Costello said, to restrict the interpretation here at the present time of "partial dependency." In the administration and construing of this Act, this clause will be found to complicate matters and the Minister should leave to the courts the determination of what partial dependency is. It will be easier for them to do that if they are not hampered by having to define what are the ordinary necessaries of life and the suitability of these ordinary necessaries to the class or position occupied by the claimant.

Mr. Lemass

Deputy Norton says that the insertion of this sub-section will lead to litigation. The case for its insertion is that it is going to minimise litigation. The really effective argument in favour of this section is that it is going to diminish the amount of litigation which ordinarily arises. The Committee's statement is that it will debar many claims which have no merit or justification—that was the evidence given them by the clerks of the peace and that they agreed with it. The amendment appears here primarily because the Committee recommended it. The Committee, no doubt, got the phrase from the British Act of 1923, and I have no reason to believe that in Great Britain it led to the great amount of litigation which Deputy Norton appears to fear.

It should be remembered that the total amount of compensation is a limited sum. It is not a case of handing out to all persons who are injured by the death of the workman a sum that will compensate them for that injury. There is a limited sum available, and whereas, under the existing law, the payment to a partial dependent is such portion of the total as, in the opinion of the court, is proportioned to the injury received, experience has shown that it is desirable there should be another test. The other test is that suggested here— that the sum should be divided having regard to the extent to which the parties were dependent for the ordinary necessaries of life upon the deceased person. I am unable to see upon what ground that definition is challenged. That is obviously a sounder basis upon which to go in apportioning a limited sum, than the other one which does not take into account the actual circumstances of the recipients. It is much more important that the circumstances of the recipients should be taken into account than that there should be another basis of calculation which would only take into account the loss created by the death.

Mr. Norton

Let the courts determine the matter.

Mr. Lemass

They will, but they have determined already in regard to the phrase in the 1906 Act that it is not the extent to which the person was dependent for the necessaries of life must be taken into account, but the injury. The Committee quotes from the decision in the case of Main Colliery v. Davies, to which Deputy Costello referred, as follows:—"What the family was, in fact, earning, what the family was, in fact, spending for the purpose of its maintenance as a family, seems to me to be the only thing which the county court judge could properly regard." The question of the extent to which the claimant was dependent upon the earnings of the deceased person to provide the necessaries of life does not enter into it. We think it should, having regard to the fact that there is a limited amount available. This sets a standard upon which the judge is supposed to go. It does reverse the position that has prevailed heretofore, but it has been reversed in Great Britain, and so far as I am aware, there has been no objection in Great Britain by any responsible body of persons representing the workers or employers. That is the case for accepting the recommendation.

Mr. Costello

I think the Minister is under a complete misapprehension as to the purpose underlying the recommendation of the Departmental Committee in reference to this sub-section. As I understand it, the recommendation of the Committee is not for the purpose of avoiding litigation; it is for the purpose of avoiding unmeritorious cases getting compensation. In so far as you can read any purpose into the scrappy recommendation that they did make, that purpose is to prevent unmeritorious cases getting compensation. In other words, where you have a family living together, a father and several sons and daughters, with the sons and daughters contributing to the family fund, the father, as a result of the contributions, would make a little profit for himself. The clerks of the peace seem to think that is unmeritorious. It is not the employers who make the case for this section; it is not the workmen who make the case for this section; it is the clerks of the peace. Whatever interest they have in it, I do not know. Clerks of the peace are not a class for whose opinion in this matter I would have any great regard.

Mr. Lemass

The Deputy really misunderstands the situation.

Mr. Costello

I am expressing the opinion that the Minister misunderstands it, and that is where we are at issue. Here is an extract from the report of the Departmental Committee:

"In the evidence we received on behalf of the clerks of the peace it was submitted that an amendment on these lines would debar many claims which have no merit or justification. We agree with this view and we recommend that in the Saorstát a similar amending section should be adopted as it seems to us to give effect to the original intention of the legislature."

There is nothing there saying that this will tend to limit litigation. It will not. The same sort of cases will come up again. In fact there will be more cases as a result of this sub-section than there were under the old state of law. Hitherto everybody knew where they stood in reference to partial dependency under the old Acts. Decisions had settled for 33 years what legal principles were to be applied to certain cases. The Minister referred to the Main Colliery case mentioned in the Committee's report. This sub-section, so far from giving effect to the decision in the Main Colliery case, sets it aside. The Minister cannot rely on it.

Mr. Lemass

I said it sets it aside.

Mr. Costello

Undoubtedly it does. The Minister appears to consider the Departmental Committee's report as something that is sacrosanct, that it has to be followed out. I do not accept that recommendation. If I had any responsibility for the draft Bill I would have scrutinised every single recommendation in order to see that it gave effect to the interests of the workmen. If I had any responsibility—I had not—for this Bill, even when it was being prepared in the old days, I would have applied that principle to this sub-section, and this sub-section would not have appeared. I do not know if the Minister suggested that I was responsible for the original draft. I do know that I gave one instruction only in reference to the Workmen's Compensation Bill, and that was to produce a good codifying Bill bringing the law up-to-date, so that there would be as few decisions as possible outstanding. That was my sole contribution to this work of codifying the law with reference to workmen's compensation. I retained my full power to reject, no matter from what quarter it came, any provision that in any way interfered with or jeopardised vested or other interests of the workmen.

This sub-section takes away the right which the dependants of a workman have had for 33 years. It is interesting to see the Minister standing over that. From the point of view of the defence he has made that this sub-section is going to prevent litigation, that will not bear any scrutiny. There will be more litigation out of this. Instead of having to prove that the deceased workman contributed so much to the applicant—and certain deductions had to be made from the point of view that the deceased workman had to be supported out of his contribution—you now have to consider how the dependant of the deceased workman used the contribution that he got. You have to consider if he bought bread, cheese or tobacco, and, if he bought tobacco, was that a necessary of life. One judge might think it was and another judge might think it was not.

I believe you are going to have, under this Bill, considerably more litigation because everybody knows that litigation in connection with workmen's compensation cases is fought by insurance companies and they are going to raise every point they can. This is one of the points they will very properly raise. They will fight every case of partial dependency in future whereas up to this there was every chance of a settlement between the applicant and the insurance company. If this sub-section goes through, every partial dependency case will be fought. I have no objection to that and I am sure Deputy McGilligan and other lawyers in this House have no objection to that, but it is not going to be for the benefit of the workman.

I am amazed to find the Minister standing over the sub-section. The only justification he has given, so far as I can follow his speech, is that the report recommends it, and that it will stop litigation. The report does recommend it but gives no solid reasons for the recommendation. It gives no reason that appeals to me. It deals with the matter in three or four lines. It gives no justification for setting aside rights which the partial dependants of workmen have enjoyed in this country for upwards of 33 years.

Mr. McGilligan

I would like to present to the House the position as it has been and the position as it will be if this particular section is included. If this provision were something that aimed at enlarging the scope of the insurance against workmen's compensation or against workmen's actions or at enlarging the amount of payment that might have to be made, then I would halt before I would give assent to it. It is quite clear that if there are any new claims made or any avenues to new claims opened up the reaction will be an increase in the premiums demanded for insurance, and I do not think it would be fair to put any further burden by way of insurance upon employers. But this is not extending; this is definitely going to limit. The Minister's answer is that it is not going to limit because it will restrict litigation. It will in one way. The report says it will debar many claims which have no merit or justification. That is the opinion of clerks of the peace. The Committee say: "We agree with this view," and they go on to recommend it and they add as their reason for the recommendation "it seems to us to give effect to the original intention of the legislature." Possibly it means the intentions of the legislature prior to 1906, but the world has moved since then and it is questionable whether we should regard the intentions of the legislature which passed the first Workmen's Compensation Act as something before which we should bow down.

There will be a restriction of litigation. There will be certain people who will say that they cannot have this section because any of them cannot put forward a claim to be partial dependants because they cannot claim that they were dependent for the necessaries of life on the injured person and that these necessaries were suitable for their circumstances in life or their class and description. Without narrowing the class, the litigation will be restricted if the field for litigation is in this. Up to this all that need be proved for partial dependants is some payment made, some payment received say, by the father to the wages fund of the family which that father spent in the upkeep of the family. That is all that has to be proved at the moment. There are heaps of cases on that. But there is some limit to it at any rate. For the father there has got to be proved that the person has got some money, that some question of dependency arose and that the money received was spent on the ordinary necessaries of life. No objective standard can be laid down for that, and we get a mass of cases all to be argued upon; and having got that position we can go on further to argue whether all these necessaries of life were properly spent; and are the necessaries of life to be regarded as suitable for the person in his class or position.

Will the Minister balance these things one against the other and say whether there is to be more or less litigation if this is passed? Take the position as it is in the country at the moment in the ordinary case of partial dependence between father and son. The father proved that the son was earning something and that the son gave to the father a certain sum, and that the father spent that sum on the family. That is the law at the moment. Now we have reversed that. You have got to go further. Having got that money you have to prove that you spent it on the necessaries of life and hereafter there has got to be decided what are the necessaries of life, and afterwards you have got to decide are these necessaries suitable, that is, suitable to that person in his class and position. Remember that if we leave the law as it is we do not give the insurance company any reason for saying that premiums have got to be advanced because that is what they are operating on at the moment. If we do restrict it we ought to see that premiums for insurance ought to come down. But will they? We have everything in favour of leaving the law as it is. If there was a good sound argument produced against it, it would have to be debated further. At the moment all we are told is:—

"In ascertaining the extent of partial dependency decided law has established the principle that regard must not be had to the standard of living in the district or in the class to which the family of the deceased belong. The matters to be considered were stated by Lord Halsbury in the appeal case of Main Colliery v. Davies (1900), A.C. 385 thus: ‘What the family was in fact earning, what the family was in fact spending, for the purpose of its maintenance as a family seems to me to be the only thing which the county court judge could properly regard.'"

Then we are asked to reverse that and the only reason submitted to us was the general evidence from the clerks of the peace. We have that here in the report. They say:—

"In the evidence we received on behalf of the clerks of the peace it was submitted that an amendment on these lines would debar many claims which have no merit or justification. We agree with this view and we recommend that in the Saorstát a similar amending section should be adopted, as it seems to us to give effect to the original intention of the legislature."

What is the recommendation of the clerks of the peace on that? That unmeritorious claims would be debarred and that that seems to be going back to the intention of the legislature which passed the first Workmen's Compensation Act. It is the law as it is at the moment and ought not to be disturbed. There should certainly be a vast amount of extra litigation arising out of the change. In itself it is not a desirable thing to have the law suddenly changed and to have cases that have been accumulating over 33 years' experience of the law as it stands at the moment changed, and changed merely on the basis of that report. To me it does not seem a good reason.

Mr. Costello

May I add one observation to the report of the Departmental Committee in view of the importance attached to this report by the Minister? I want to say that one of the grounds of this recommendation is clearly wrong because they say that this section should be adopted because "it seems to us to give effect to the original intention of the legislature." In 1889 a British court decided that that was the decision of the legislature. But the House of Lords said that that decision was wrong. The House of Lords said what was the original intention of the legislature. You are giving effect to the intention of the legislature, to the intention of the House of Lords, by accepting this amendment.

Mr. Lemass

The Bill is designed to provide compensation for dependants of deceased workmen. When the legislature originally talked about dependants it must have meant persons dependent upon the deceased person for the necessaries of life.

Mr. McGilligan

Why "must"?

Mr. Lemass

It is the obvious interpretation. This section appears in the Bill because it was recommended by the Committee and because no effective case has been made against it. I have a feeling about the two Deputies opposite that they are arguing about this section because it is in the Bill.

Mr. Costello

Take it as far as I am concerned that that is not so.

Mr. Lemass

Under other circumstances we might have had the same section defended by the Deputies opposite.

Mr. Costello

Not by me.

Mr. Lemass

The amount of compensation is limited. Let us get that clear. The more of that compensation that goes to distant relatives of the deceased the less will go to the real dependants. Persons who are merely the recipients of some of the earnings will get more and the more they get the less will go to the real relatives.

Mr. Costello

Surely the Minister is not serious. If I may interrupt the Minister for a moment I would like to be informed how is it that because there are partial dependants, the amount they will get will affect what the total dependants get?

Mr. Lemass

I am not talking about total dependants. I am talking about the number of partial dependants. If there is a total dependant the total dependant gets the adult's lump sum to which under Rule I, Schedule 2, he is entitled. Rule 2 says: "Where the workman does not leave any adult member of the family wholly dependent on his earnings but leaves any adult members of the family in part so dependent the adult's lump sum shall, subject to Rule 5 of this Schedule, be such sum not exceeding in any case the amount of the adult's lump sum which would have been payable under the immediately preceding rule," and so on. That is to say if there is a series of partial dependants, the more we give to those dependent on the earnings of the deceased for the necessaries of life, the more the lump amount is going to be given to the people who need it. If you bring in the other standard, the standard which is established by the existing law which ignores dependants for the necessaries of life and brings in injuries inflicted in consequence of the loss of the man, then you are spreading the total sum wider and the more that goes to one class then naturally the less will go to the other.

If there is a total dependant, the total dependant gets the lot. It is only where partial dependency comes in that this position has to be considered. This is not going to mean more litigation. I contest that entirely. Obviously, the number of claims will be less. But, in any event, there is the fact that this has been the law in Great Britain for ten years, and it has not led to a very considerable amount of litigation. The Deputies opposite appear to contemplate that there will be a big amount of litigation.

Mr. McGilligan

There is a fierce amount of litigation on that particular point.

Mr. Lemass

There is litigation on a number of matters.

Mr. McGilligan

But a very big amount of litigation on that particular point.

Mr. Lemass

Not to the extent the Deputies would lead the House to believe.

Mr. Costello

We do not fear litigation.

Mr. Lemass

Although the decision of the courts in Great Britain would not bind the courts here, at the same time the decisions given there are likely to prevent litigation taking place here, because it is to be assumed that the same form of words will be interpreted in much the same manner here as they have been interpreted in Great Britain, and people are likely to be deterred from taking a case to court by the knowledge that the case they propose to have argued here has already been negatived in the British courts. Let me say that this is not a matter on which we need get agitated. The question is, what is the best course to take? There was the existing law which provided for the payment of compensation to persons who were injured by the death of a worker. The payments made did not have regard to the extent to which those persons were dependent for the necessities of life upon the earnings of the worker. The Committee recommended that the extent to which those persons were dependent for the necessities of life on the worker should be taken into account, and that the compensation available should be distributed on that basis.

Is there a case in favour of turning down the Committee's report? What is the case? The case is that it is wrong, in any event, that dependency for the necessities of life should be the standard, and that injury should be the standard. I do not feel convinced about that. The rest of the case is that the change in the law is going to lead to litigation. One argument in favour of a change is that it will reduce litigation by reducing the number of claims. In Great Britain it has not led to that great volume of litigation which the Deputies opposite appear to contemplate will take place here. At any rate, the litigation that has taken place in Great Britain will operate to prevent a very great amount of litigation arising here. In these circumstances, my inclination is to leave the Bill in its present form, embodying, as it does, the Committee's recommendations.

Mr. Costello

I wish to press this amendment, because I feel, as I have said again and again, that this is taking away something that the dependants of a workman have had in this country for 33 years. They have had it for ten years in this country since it was taken away from British workmen.

Mr. Lemass

What does the Deputy mean by "dependant"?

Mr. Costello

What is said in the Bill. You assess compensation in another way if you could show that you are a dependent person partially in reference to contributions that he makes to you. Then you got compensation anyway under the 1906 Act, and under the earlier Act. The Minister was incorrect in stating that it was adduced as an argument in favour of this amendment that the sub-section as it stands would bring about litigation. I did not adduce that as an argument in favour of my amendment, but I gave it as an answer to the Minister's argument that the sub-section he is inserting in the Bill will prevent litigation.

Mr. Lemass

That it would minimise litigation.

Mr. Costello

I did not support my amendment by saying that it would prevent or minimise litigation, but I gave that as an answer to the Minister's proposition that the sub-section would prevent or minimise litigation. In the case of a family living together, the sons and daughters contribute through the father to a common fund or pool, and out of that common fund or pool the members of the family are supported, with the father, perhaps, having a few shillings over and above for himself. He has got to go into court and show how he spent every penny and half-penny, and even every farthing of the contributions that he got from his family, before he will be able to establish the fact that he was partially dependent on those contributions. Not merely will he have to show how he expended every half-penny of those contributions, but he will have to prove that the things he spent them on were, in the opinion of the judge, spent on the ordinary necessaries of life. As we know, people may differ as to what are the ordinary necessaries of life. That is going to happen, and that father who was in receipt of contributions from his children, and who was able to make a few shillings profit, if you like, is going to be deprived of getting anything by way of compensation for the death of his son or daughter who has made these contributions.

I fail to see how there is anything unmeritorious in a father who has been able to save a couple of shillings out of the contributions given to him by his son or daughter getting compensation for the death of those who were contributing to him. He has undoubtedly lost something. I fail to see any justification for the Committee's statement or the statement of the clerks of the peace that people of that kind have no merit. I think they have every merit. I think that children who contribute in that way to their parents are doing a very meritorious act, and that the father who gets it, is getting it, perhaps if you like, as a sort of payment for the services he has rendered in bringing those children up on his hard earnings. To say that the few shillings he has been able to save, if he has been able to save them, are not to be compensated for when he loses them by the death of his son or daughter is, in my view, unmeritorious. In my clear and emphatic opinion this is a most reactionary sub-section. It is a nice thing to see a Fianna Fáil Minister standing vigorously over this reactionary sub-section.

Mr. Lemass

I asked the Deputy what is a dependant. He did not answer. He dodged the question.

Mr. Costello

I did not. I could speak for hours giving the Minister legal definitions of it. I have had much more experience of these matters than the Minister is ever likely to have.

Mr. Lemass

But the Deputy did not do it. I do not care what experience the Deputy has had, he did not answer the question. He ran away from it and made a ridiculous speech about a father and his few shillings, appealing to the sentiments of members of the House. What does the Deputy mean by dependant? If the contention is that money should be paid out on the death of a workman to those who are not dependants, let him say so. The intention of this sub-section and of the Committee's recommendation is that there should be payments to people who are dependants. What is a dependant? Can the Deputy produce any other definition of dependant other than what is in sub-section (2)?

Mr. Costello

It was defined 33 years ago by the British House of Lords in favour of the workman and you are setting it aside.

Mr. Lemass

What does the Deputy mean by dependant? I want to draw attention to the fact that this sub-section was in the Bill when I came into office. I found it in the form of a white print which came from the Deputy's office when he was Attorney-General, prepared on the instructions of Deputy McGilligan. If this is reactionary, then the Deputies opposite have only become progressive since they found themselves on the other side of the House.

Mr. McGilligan

The Minister talks about the white print he came across in connection with the Bill. That is the excuse the Minister puts up for standing in a white sheet.

Mr. Lemass

No; I am simply showing the hypocrisy of Deputies opposite.

Mr. McGilligan

The Minister is a good judge of hypocrisy.

Mr. Lemass

I am getting a fair amount of experience of it from Deputies opposite.

Mr. McGilligan

No doubt he can produce minute after minute to show that the Bill was headed in white prints in order to have it better considered, but the Minister should not get into a white heat about that. What is the definition of dependants? Let us see the 1906 Act and the reaction of the House of Lords' decision upon it. What about that as a definition of dependency? The Minister wants to change things. It is not hard to see his change is a reactionary one if he wants to change back from one definition to another to suit his purpose. Dependency at the moment, according to the decision of the House of Lords in the earlier case, means that if a father or mother was, as a matter of fact, receiving from the son's wages something which that father expended upon the support and maintenance of the family, there was dependence. The Minister now wants a new definition. To get dependency clearly proved there must be proof that money was received and expended, not upon what the father thought necessary, but what some court afterwards would think proper and necessary to the person's position in life. That is more liberal. There are two definitions of dependency. The Minister then attempts to make a case this way. He takes the sum of money coming in as giving partial dependency and he argues that to the extent that people have counted on you have partial dependency, and you have to divide the money.

Mr. Lemass

The total sum is limited.

Mr. McGilligan

The total sum is limited by a maximum, but there are many cases in which the maximum is not given, and there are many cases in which a very small sum is given. There are cases in which the arbitrator says there are so many people depending on the person. Does the Minister realise that? Where does the point come in about dividing the sum of money for a number of people? Who divides it? The Minister tried to mislead the House. The point argued about here is this: What is going to affect an arbitrator, or a judge's mind, in determining what sum up to the maximum, or less than the maximum, is given in a case of partial dependency, if given? We hold that the judge or the arbitrator should be allowed to take into consideration the sum to be given, whether the maximum be big or small amount, and that he should take this into consideration. As a matter of fact, in the ordinary course of family life the workman and the children subscribe to the family fund, and so the father expends it on the maintenance of the family. If so, the arbitrator will have his mind on that, and will give a certain sum.

Mr. Lemass

Is not that in the Bill?

Mr. McGilligan

No. When you come to the Bill the arbitrator has to make up his mind and see whether the father got from the son money, and whether this money was expended on necessaries, and on necessaries such as the arbitrator, or judge, thinks were fit for the person's station in life. There is a distinction, and the effect on the arbitrator's mind in deciding what compensation is to be is the principal thing. It is nonsense to introduce that idea of division over the larger class of dependants. The big thing is: What is the sum to assign or award? That is what the Minister has to keep his mind on.

Mr. Lemass

What does the Deputy mean by a person's dependants?

Mr. McGilligan

I mean what the House of Lords meant. I am in good company at last.

Mr. Lemass

What was that?

Mr. McGilligan

A person receives some money from his son's wages. That is put into the family wages fund and it is expended upon the maintenance of the family. In that case the father is a partial dependant on the son.

Mr. Lemass

The Deputy is misinterpreting the House of Lords' decision.

Mr. McGilligan

I would like to hear the other interpretation. That is what I consider to be partial dependency in this particular case. What the family was, in fact, earning and spending for the purpose of its maintenance was what the county court judge could take into consideration. The arbitrator or judge is going to have other things in his consideration hereafter, not what the family was, in fact, earning, or, in fact, spending, for the purpose of the maintenance as a family, but what money was properly spent and whether it was spent in necessaries appropriate to the situation in life of the people under consideration. The Minister has limited it. He may have found a better definition, that dependency should mean dependency for necessaries as in fact shown by the practice of the family. But we have our view that the other is a better standard, and this amendment will set up that better standard.

Mr. Norton

If this particular section were introduced in the interest of insurance companies I could understand it. The effect of the section would be definitely to limit the possibility of receiving compensation in the case of persons partially dependent upon the injured workman. It is totally different to the case put forward by Deputy Costelloe and Deputy McGilligan in the case where the son loses his life, if the son is contributing to the maintenance of the home. It is necessary under this section, as now drawn, for the family to come into court, and for the father or the mother, as the case may be, to be able to show that the family was definitely dependent upon portion of the earnings of the deceased son. And when they make a statement to that effect in court, the court then comes along and says: "We must ascertain whether that contribution was necessary for the provision of the ordinary necessaries of life." An unchangeable standard—and under existing circumstances there are a variety of standards of life—might be involved in that; and the court has to decide what is necessary or not necessary. The court has to say: "Is this necessary or suitable for persons in the class of life or position of the claimants?" I think that is unnecessarily limiting the power of the court in the matter. I think the section as drawn in this way is calculated to enable insurance companies to avoid the payment of compensation in circumstances where they would be liable to pay under the existing law. It is possible, as I pointed out to the Minister, that in case of a deceased worker who loses his life in the course of his employment, if this section stands, that his dependants will have to come into court and prove that the wife, for instance, was depending upon the support of her husband for the provisions of the necessaries of life, and that these necessaries were such as were needed by persons in her class or position. If she fails to show that these necessaries of life were provided by contributions from the husband and were necessary for her class and position in life it is quite possible that that woman has not only lost her life's companion but that she will get no compensation for the loss of her husband and for the loss of the reserve which he would be to her in old age or for the loss of the security which she was able to get from the combined earnings of both of them while the husband continued to live. This seems to be narrowing completely the whole position as it exists at present.

I suggest to the Minister that he ought not to press this matter. The fact that clerks of the peace discovered that this was necessary or desirable is no justification for introducing it. The fact that the Minister found it in a white print of this Bill when he came into office is still no justification for the introduction of the section. The fact that it is in the British Act of 1923 is less justification for putting in the section. The Minister might well have left the position where it was when Lord Halsbury decided the matter. That judgment was a better one in the interests of the injured workman and better than will be possible under this particular section. If the object is to limit the liability of the insurance companies I can understand this particular section, but if the object is to be fair to the workman and not to limit the possibility of his getting compensation in circumstances that the court in the ordinary way would give him compensation, then I suggest that there is a very strong case for reconsideration of the section, which is only limiting the chances of the workman getting compensation, and the people who will gain under this will not be the dependants but the insurance companies.

Mr. Lemass

This section is not inserted because the clerks of the peace discovered that claims might be made which had no merit or justification. It is appearing in the Bill because it is recommended by the Committee which included a number of prominent members of the Labour Party. It appears in the Bill because a similar section has been in operation in Great Britain and no evidence has been forthcoming that it has had an undesirable effect on the dependants of workmen. It is appearing in the Bill because twice during the past few weeks I met deputations from the Trade Union Congress, the members of which had gone into the Bill with great thoroughness and raised points with me relating to every section, but they did not raise that point and had no objection to make to it. It is appearing in the Bill because in fact some definition of dependency must appear.

Deputies opposite have dodged the issue of giving us a definition of dependency. I am quite prepared to accept the decision of the Dáil upon this section. As I said, this is a matter upon which opinions may differ, and whichever side has the majority of opinions with it, will no doubt carry the day. Whatever that decision is, I am quite prepared to accept it. The section is in the Bill, because the Committee recommended it; not because the clerks of the peace recommended it to the Committee, but because the Committee were prepared to stand over what the clerks of the peace had suggested. It is there because it seems to be essential that there should be a definition of dependency. The original Act of 1906, the main Act in operation, refers to people who are partially dependent on a deceased workman. What is meant by "dependent on"? Deputy Norton apparently agrees that compensation should only go to people who are partially dependent on a deceased worker. Is it suggested here, where a worker is killed in an accident in the course of his employment, that payment should be made to people who were not dependent on the earnings of that worker? That is apparently the suggestion. If the payments are to go to dependants of the workers, what do you mean by "dependant"? A person who is dependent on the earnings of the worker for the necessaries of life, or what do you mean?

Mr. Costello

What the House of Lords said in 1900.

Mr. Lemass

What did they say?

Mr. McGilligan

Will you tell us?

Mr. Lemass

If people are to be regarded as dependent on the earnings of a deceased workman then they must be dependent on him for something. Dependent on him "for the provision of the ordinary necessaries of life suitable for persons in his class or position." If that phrase is objected to I am prepared to consider any alteration suggested. I do not, however, gather that that is the case. I gather that the aim of Deputies opposite is to secure that in the event of the death of a workman resulting from an accident, payment will be made to people who were not dependent.

Mr. McGilligan

No.

Mr. Costello

To leave it as it was for 33 years.

Mr. McGilligan

Persons in fact dependent.

Mr. Lemass

That is not an argument. That is merely a statement of what the Deputies want. Is there any argument in favour of leaving it in that position, or in favour of rejecting the recommendation of this Committee? Deputy McGilligan talks about a white print being rushed into existence. If five years' preparation is, in the Deputy's mind, rushing into existence, I should like to know how long it would have taken him to produce the Bill.

Mr. McGilligan

About five times as long to rush into this blunder. That is the answer.

Mr. Lemass

The Deputy did rush into the blunder.

Mr. McGilligan

Not as a recommendation to anybody.

Mr. Lemass

He left as a record of his opinion at the time of his departure that the Bill should be in this form.

Mr. McGilligan

When an angel fears to tread something happens.

Mr. Lemass

The Deputy rushed in and is now trying to rush out. The section says that the word "dependants" means such of the members of the family of a workman as were wholly or in part dependent on the earnings of such workman at the time of his death, or who would have been so dependent. "A person shall not for the purposes of this Act be deemed to be a partial dependant of another person unless he was dependent partially on contributions from that other person for the provision of the ordinary necessaries of life suitable for persons in his class and position." I submit that it is undesirable that we should leave the Act in the form in which the Deputies want to leave it, where we talk of a person being dependent on the earnings of such workman at the time of his death, unless we say dependent for what. If the Deputies wish they can withdraw the amendment and see if they can produce a form of words which will define dependency. If we are going to pass an Act that, as Deputy Dillon said, is to stand for a generation, we should have a definition of dependency, if our aim is to secure that on the death of a workman the compensation would go to his dependants.

Mr. Costello

The Minister has twice stated that we dodged the issue as to the definition of dependency. I have once denied that and for the second time I wish to deny it again. The definition of dependency that we want is the definition of dependency that is in Section 13 of the Act of 1906, which has remained the definition of dependency in this country for 27 years, and which gives effect to the decision of the House of Lords given in 1900.

Mr. Norton

Lest the point might crop up again, perhaps I ought to give this explanation. The Minister referred to the fact that certain labour and trade union people signed the report of the Committee on Workmen's Compensation, presumably, because of that fact everything in the report is to be sacrosanct.

Mr. Lemass

I did not say that. The Deputy made a suggestion that this section had been inserted in the interests of insurance companies, and my answer was that the section had been recommended by prominent members of the Labour Party and not objected to by the Trade Union Congress representatives when they came to discuss the matter with me.

Mr. Norton

I did not say that it has been inserted in the interests of insurance companies. I said I could imagine its being inserted by somebody speaking on behalf of insurance companies. What happened is that there are many bad sections in the report of the 1926 Committee on Workmen's Compensation and there are many sections in the report with which the Labour Party disagreed. One of the Labour members is a member of the Oireachtas, and I am sure he will have no hesitation in telling the Minister that many objectionable sections in the report were tolerated in order to get a unanimous report. That does not mean that the report in itself was necessarily a good one. Many objectionable things were tolerated in order to get a unanimous report, and we spoke of a Workmen's Compensation Bill based completely on the report.

This Bill is not based completely on the report, and if we put up with bad sections in the report in order to get a uniform report, we are surely not being asked still to tolerate those bad sections when the Bill itself is not based on the report. The Minister makes the point that this matter was not mentioned to him by the trade union delegates, who made representations to him. It was marked on the Bill which I had with me on the day I went to discuss the matter with the Minister in the first instance, and were it not for a meeting which I had to attend on the second occasion the matter would have been specifically brought to his notice, because I was charged with the responsibility of doing so. The point is not a new one, and is not now referred to for the first time.

Progress reported. The Committee to sit again to-morrow.