In speaking last night, and following Deputy McGilligan, I am afraid that I omitted to deal with a number of points of substance which were made by other speakers in the course of the debate. I propose, therefore, for the moment to leave Deputy McGilligan to one side and take up some points that were made by these others. I think that any one who has listened to this debate will agree with me when I say that from a critical point of view the best speech which was made in the course of it was made by a Deputy on the Government Benches. I refer to the speech which was made by Deputy Séamus Moore, who showed that he had, at any rate, studied the Budget: that he had studied it from the point of view of a person who was concerned about the national finances and so did not wish to make Party capital out of the result of his investigations either on one side or the other. His speech was in striking contrast to most of the other speeches made in the course of this debate which, according to Deputy McGilligan, were characterised by an absolute avoidance of ordinary facts in the discussion of this Budget, were far removed from reality, or any sort of appreciation of business methods in their application to the finances of the State. Deputy Moore's speech was not characterised by that absolute avoidance of ordinary facts, or by that want of appreciation of business finances of the State. On the contrary, it indicated that he had an acute appreciation of sound principles of public finance when he asked whether we were justified in borrowing to meet the cost of the bounties and subsidies because he assumed that if these were to be an annual item in our Budgets, then they would have to be met out of ordinary taxation. Well, we hope that these are not going to be a recurring item in our annual expenditure. "We hope," as Deputy McGilligan said, "that there will be a realisation on the part of our friends on the other side of the water that our relation to them is not merely one of geographical proximity, but that it is also one of great strategic importance to them in time of war."
The House will recollect that last night Deputy McGilligan said that
"We have our geographical position to bargain. That is not merely an asset, but it was recognised as an asset by the British Government. It will continue to be recognised as an asset by them so long as they are in the position in which they are now in the event of war. Would all the meat that Australia, Canada and New Zealand could have sent across the ocean in the days of the Great War have meant anything to Great Britain?"
We hope that the force of that statement will be appreciated not merely here in the Twenty-six Counties but elsewhere, and that the answer which will occur to the minds of all reasonable men both here and elsewhere is this: that if by restricting our imports certain people choose to strangle our cattle trade, then in times of national emergency they are going to suffer very much more than we are in consequence. I hope also there will be on the other side of the water a realisation —once more putting it in the words of Deputy McGilligan—that in a test as between ourselves, New Zealand, Canada or Australia we have many things to offer Britain in the way of trade relationship that none of those other countries can offer and that it will be seen, once more in the words of Deputy McGilligan, that these two facts are appreciated by the British themselves and that they will manifest that appreciation in a practical manner.
Therefore, because of these two facts: because we have trade advantages to offer Great Britain that other Dominions have not: because we can be of material assistance to them in times of national crises it would be from the point of view of their national security an unpardonable mistake, a mistake the consequences of which would be heavily visited upon their people, to strangle our cattle trade and to cripple our agricultural industry. We hope that through the ultimate realisation of these important facts by all parties concerned with them it will not be necessary for us to continue these export bounties and subsidies indefinitely. By a realisation of these facts, by taking the practical view of them, I am certain that in course of time—it may be sooner or later, but eventually and inevitably-a settlement of the present differences between the two countries will be arranged.
Deputy Moore also asked what was the position of the Deferred Annuities Fund and did it actually exist as a separate fund. My reply to that is that it has no separate existence as a fund but that the assets, in fact, do exist. The arrears of annuities which were not collected in the later part of 1932 or the whole of 1933, have been funded at the request of those from whom they were collectible and are now being repaid by those by whom they were originally due in a compounded annuity payable over a series of years. These annuities have become an Exchequer asset and we would be quite justified, should it be necessary to do so, to borrow against the asset which has thus been created. It has not been necessary so far to raise any money against that security. In fact, in the course of any negotiations which we have had in relation to Government borrowing, the question of offering it as Government security has never arisen and I have merely set it out in the Budget statement to show that when we do borrow to meet the cost of the export bounties and subsidies, we have already created, against that loan, an asset which in course of time will enable us, apart altogether from the ordinary sources of taxation, to repay whatever we may have to borrow now.
Then, Deputy Moore raised a point as to whether it was necessary to issue the Fourth National Loan or not in view of the fact that we had at 31st March last over £5,330,000 in the Exchequer. If the Deputy will consider the additional services which are envisaged this year, I think that he will satisfy himself that it was, if not essential, at any rate desirable, before undertaking these commitments that we should see our way quite clearly in the matter and be satisfied that we should have in our hands the finances which would enable us to carry them through. When the Loan was arranged last year preliminary estimates for the Local Loans Fund had come in. Final arrangements were being made to repay the Dáil Eireann External Loan. We knew we had commitments in regard to the sugar beet factory. We knew that an issue of debenture stock was contemplated by the directors of that concern. We knew that further moneys would possibly be required by the Industrial Credit Corporation. We also knew at that time that the obligations which fall on the Exchequer particularly about Christmas time would have to be met, and accordingly we had to choose as to whether we were going to raise the necessary money by means of an issue of short-term bills or whether we were going to issue a long-term loan. In every concern, whether it be a State enterprise or a private business, it is undesirable to enter into short-term commitments of considerable magnitude unless it is certain that one will be able to redeem those commitments once and for all and will not have to renew them as continuing commitments for an indefinite period.
We could have quite easily arranged the finances for the last year by the issue of Exchequer bills which would have enabled us to discharge the Exchequer obligations round about the end of the year, but it would have meant that we should have had to carry them on into this year and, when we came to face the Dáil here to point out that we were going to have to raise £4,200,000 for the Local Loans Fund and the moneys for the other services to which I have referred in the Budget statement, we would be obliged to say that we had not those moneys then at our disposal, but should have to go to the money market for them. I think it was a prudent thing, therefore, to float the Loan. Furthermore, most of these potential commitments would be long-term commitments. In connection with the Local Loans Fund, I think that the period of advancement is 25 years. The Dáil Eireann External Loan is paid once and for all. We shall never recover any part of the £1,000,000 which will be expended upon it, and the export bounties and subsidies will be given once and for all also. There was no possibility that any one of these commitments would liquidate itself within the ensuing 12 months. Accordingly, as they were all long-term commitments, the proper thing to do was to provide for these payments by long-term borrowing. Therefore, if we had to go to the money market here in Dublin for that money it was essential that we should go on the basis of a long-term loan.
The Deputy also raised a question with regard to the funds which we have invested in respect to the Savings Certificates Interest Equalisation Fund and the money which we have in the National Loan Sinking Fund and he asked us would it not be possible to utilise those for the constructive purposes to which the Fourth Loan is to be applied. The answer to that is that Savings Certificates constitute an obligation which is liable to be paid on demand. Any person who has a Savings Certificates can go into a Post Office and cash it there and receive both the principal and some portion of the accrued interest. I think it would be a very shady practice-at the very best, it would be a misleading practice-if we were to say that we have provided £1,600,000 for the Savings Certificates Interest Equalisation Fund and then invest it in long-term securities. That money is only invested, as far as it possibly can be, in short-term securities, or in securities which can be realised without depressing the market to any undue extent. It is not easy to find such securities here; in fact, it is very difficult. It is one of the problems which have always confronted those who are charged with the management of funds in this country. At any rate, it is an essential requirement that, if funds of this sort are to be invested, they can be quite easily realised, in case those who have invested in securities such as Savings Certificates want suddenly to realise their money and so that the Exchequer will be able to meet all its obligations in regard to them, as far as they are foreseeable, on demand. Accordingly, we should not be justified in investing the great bulk of the Savings Certificates Interest Equalisation Fund in either the Third or Fourth National Loans.