Is the Government's reply on this amendment concluded? The Minister for Finance was replying last night when the debate was adjourned.
Citizenship Bill, 1934—Committee (Resumed).
Amendment 10.—Before Section 5 to insert a new section as follows:—
(1) The Executive Council may, if and whenever they so think proper, cause a certificate of naturalisation to be issued under this Act to any person or to a child or grandchild of any person who, in the opinion of the Executive Council, has done signal honour or rendered distinguished service to the Irish Nation.
(2) The Executive Council may authorise the Minister to dispense, in relation to the issue of a certificate of naturalisation under this section, with compliance by the person to whom such certificate is issued with all or such one or more as the Executive Council shall think proper of the conditions which are by virtue of this Act conditions precedent to the grant of a certificate of naturalisation."— (Minister for External Affairs).
The Minister for Finance is not here at present.
Question put: "That such section be there inserted."
The Committee divided; Tá, 42; Níl, 18.
Tá.
- Bartley, Gerald.
- Boland, Gerald.
- Bourke, Daniel.
- Brady, Seán.
- Breathnach, Cormac.
- Breen, Daniel.
- Briscoe, Robert.
- Cleary, Mícheál.
- Concannon, Helena.
- Crowley, Timothy.
- Derrig, Thomas.
- De Valera, Eamon.
- Doherty, Hugh.
- Donnelly, Eamon.
- Gibbons, Seán.
- Hales, Thomas.
- Harris, Thomas.
- Hogan, Patrick (Clare).
- Houlihan, Patrick.
- Keely, Séamus P.
- Kelly, James Patrick.
- Kennedy, Michael Joseph.
- Kissane, Eamonn.
- Lemass, Seán F.
- Little, Patrick John.
- Lynch, James B.
- MacEntee, Seán.
- Maguire, Conor Alexander.
- Moane, Edward.
- Moore, Séamus.
- Moylan, Seán.
- O Briain, Donnchadh.
- O'Doherty, Joseph.
- O'Grady, Seán.
- O Ceallaigh, Seán T.
- O'Reilly, Matthew.
- Pearse, Margaret Mary.
- Ruttledge, Patrick Joseph.
- Ryan, James.
- Ryan, Robert.
- Smith, Patrick.
- Victory, James.
Níl.
- Beckett, James Walter.
- Belton, Patrick.
- Bennett, George Cecil.
- Burke, James Michael.
- Burke, Patrick.
- Cosgrave, William T.
- Costello, John Aloysius.
- Dolan, James Nicholas.
- Doyle, Peadar S.
- Fitzgerald, Desmond.
- Fitzgerald-Kenney, James.
- Lynch, Finian.
- MacDermot, Frank.
- McFadden, Michael Og.
- McGuire, James Ivan.
- McMenamin, Daniel.
- Mulcahy, Richard.
- O'Sullivan, John Marcus.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Little and Smith; Níl: Deputies Doyle and Bennett.
Question declared carried.
On the section, the first Article of Section 5 proposes that a person whose Irish citizenship is dubious may go to the Minister and the Minister may, if he thinks proper so to do, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, issue to such person a certificate of naturalisation containing an express statement that it is issued solely to remove doubts or to settle a question or dispute. It seems to me that that is eminently a judicial function. The man in question is in a peculiar position. He is not quite sure whether he is a citizen or not. The question may have some relation to a case in the courts. In such circumstances a person can, according to this article, go quietly to the Minister, talk the matter over with him, and receive from him a certificate that is to put beyond further question the issue whether or not he was at a previous date a citizen of this State. Now it seems to be quite an unwarrantable proposal, if there is a case in the courts and a decision has been made, whether a man was a citizen of the State or not, that that man can come along and say: "The Minister will give me a certificate which will be binding and will remove any doubts." That seems to me eminently to be a case, even if the Minister himself had all the data, that should be referred to a judicial authority,
The Deputy is clearly misconstruing the section. It has no past reference at all. It is operative from the day of issue. We cannot settle a question that was before the courts.
I only brought that up as an extreme case.
It is not in accordance with the section.
The section says: "When a person applies under this Act to the Minister for a certificate of naturalisation and states in such application that he claims to be a citizen of Saorstát Eireann and that some doubt ... has arisen as to whether he is or is not entitled to such citizenship ... the Minister may, if he thinks proper so to do, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, issue to such person a certificate of naturalisation containing an express statement that it is issued solely to remove doubts or to settle a question of dispute."
Will the Deputy now read sub-section (2)?
Sub-section (2) says:—
The issue to any person of a certificate of naturalisation under this section shall not be evidence or an admission that such person was not a citizen of Saorstát Eireann prior to the issue of such a certificate and shall not prejudice or affect any claim by such person to have been a citizen of Saorstát Eireann at any time prior to such issue.
Reading that sub-section quickly, it seems to apply only in a negative case. The Minister gives him a certificate, but this says that that is not to imply that he was not a citizen before.
The Attorney-General
That does not mean that the Minister has decided whether he is or is not a citizen. This confers upon the Minister jurisdiction to grant a certificate of naturalisation where there is some doubt that might give rise to trouble. The Minister meets the situation by giving a certificate. He is not adjudicating on whether he is or is not a citizen. It is simply meeting a difficulty.
The man goes to the Minister and says: "I am a citizen and I want you to declare beyond yea or nay that I am a citizen."
It has no declaratory effect; it is not a declaration.
The Attorney-General
The citizen certificate of naturalisation is subject to a lot of difficulty that the natural-born citizen is not subject to.
That I am not questioning.
But the fact that the Minister is given power to grant a certificate of naturalisation does not mean that he is adjudicating.
It seems to me that there is a doubt that should be settled by a judge, not necessarily a judge in court but, perhaps, by a judge in chambers. The case of an ordinary man coming along for a certificate of naturalisation is one thing. Here, in fact, the Minister is resolving a thing in which it seems to me, if there is a doubt whether the person is or is not a citizen, the proper person to resolve that is a judge and not a Minister.
I do not think there is any use arguing this. The Deputy does not understand the nature of the section. The Minister has power to grant a certificate of naturalisation. A person can come and ask for a certificate of naturalisation. Certain conditions of time and so on would be imposed. The section says there is doubt about his citizenship and the person comes along and says: "I want that doubt resolved so far as the future is concerned. I do not want my status to be in any doubtful position. I want it beyond yea or nay that I am a citizen." The Minister examines the question and comes to the conclusion that it is a proper case in which he can issue a certificate. But he does not purport to decide the question as to whether he was or was not a citizen previous to that. If there was any question involving court action that court action would go on until he was convinced there was a decision in his favour. In this you give the Minister discretionary power to grant a certificate of naturalisation, in order that the status of a person in doubt may be put on a clearly defined position.
My point is that it is to remove doubts. There is something that is in doubt if a person in that position applies in the ordinary way to be naturalised and become a citizen. I take the words "the Minister may, if he thinks proper so to do, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, issue to such a person a certificate of naturalisation containing an express statement that it is issued solely to remove doubts or to settle a question of dispute." What are the doubts? Whether a man is or is not a citizen. If the Minister by fulfilling an administrative act makes him a citizen there is no question but that from that moment he becomes a citizen. Why this question about removing doubts? It is a case where the person himself or other persons may be dubious about a question turning on fact of law, and the Minister takes steps to remove those doubts. If it was a question of baptism, a person may not know whether or not he was baptised. A person comes to the Minister and says he is in doubt and the Minister says to him if you are in doubt whether you are a citizen, I now make you a citizen.
The Attorney-General
Read sub-section (2) if the Deputy wants to understand.
I have read sub-section (2). What is the doubt that is to be removed?
Whether from that day he is to be classed as a citizen or not.
Why not have the ordinary naturalisation?
Because in this case the Minister considers there is a sufficient element to warrant his dispensing with the other conditions.
May I raise this point, which is somewhat similar, but not identical, with the point raised by Deputy Fitzgerald. In the ordinary course, when the Minister is certifying naturalisation under Section 4, there are certain limitations. If you read the section you will see that the Minister shall not issue a certificate unless he is satisfied, sub-section (3), paragraph (a), that such person is of good character, (b) that there are certain qualifications as to residence, and (c) and (d) certain declarations. Now, I wonder why a certificate of naturalisation as provided for in Section 5 should not be at least subject to the same limitations as under Section 4. It seems to me to be left altogether too much to the discretion of the Minister to do what he likes in the matter.
If he were to proceed in the way indicated by the Deputy, it is quite clear that he would be more or less deciding the question. If he says that this person has to have a period of residence, or if he insists on anything else, he is, in fact, deciding the case, because if, in fact, the person was a citizen, he has no jurisdiction, but where there is what he considers a genuine doubt, he may give a certificate. Consequently, this is quite consistent with the position with regard to a non-citizen.
Where the Minister says that there is evidence in the case which makes it right and proper for him to give the person concerned this certificate, it means that henceforth— although this is not deciding about the past conditions—that person is entitled to the rights and privileges that belong to citizenship.
I appreciate the President's point, but for the very reason that it has reference only to the future and not to the past. The Minister, while he might not insist on a residence qualification, surely ought to be compelled to insist on the other requirements.
But what right would he have in fact?
He is not called upon to consider whether or not the person was, in fact, a citizen, because the thing has only future effect, and as it has only future effect, and as he is issuing the certificate in the same spirit as he would issue an ordinary certificate of naturalisation, I hold that he should make the same requirements that are made in that case as to good character, and the intention of the person to reside in Saorstát Eireann.
The Attorney-General
I do not think that the two cases should be put on the same footing, because the idea is to extend the class to which the Minister may grant a certificate of naturalisation. His jurisdiction arises from the fact that, to his mind, there is a genuine doubt as to whether or not the person is entitled to citizenship. If the person were a citizen, as the President has pointed out, he would be entitled to get a certificate without going under these tests, and if there is a genuine doubt as to whether or not he is entitled to citizenship, is it not reasonable that he should be allowed to receive his naturalisation certificate in order to remove that doubt without going through the tests which an ordinary applicant for naturalisation has to go through?
Is there anything to stop the Minister from improperly giving that certificate to a person who really has little or no claim to being regarded as a citizen?
There is nothing here to stop him, I agree with the Deputy; but we assume that the Minister will exercise his functions properly in that regard. If the Minister is satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, that there is a genuine doubt, he is entitled to issue a certificate of naturalisation with a view to removing the doubt. That is the principle underlying the handling of these applications generally.
What both the President and the Attorney-General have said confirms my view that the Minister in this case is exercising a judicial function. A man comes before the Minister with an application for a certificate of naturalisation. That man either is a citizen or he is not.
The Attorney-General
The Minister is acting judicially, but he is not exercising judicial power.
Well, he is acting judicially.
The Attorney-General
But he is entitled to do it.
Then, clearly, the ordinary course ought to be followed, but the Minister, while actually acting under that section, is himself judging. He says, in effect: "I define that there is a difference between the position of this man and a man who is not a citizen." In doing that, he is assessing evidence to the point of saying that this man is different from a non-citizen and that, therefore, he has not got to fulfil the conditions that a non-citizen has to fulfil in order to become a citizen. My argument is that, inasmuch as the Minister is defining the difference between that man and the man who is not a citizen, he is making the decision himself, and I hold that he is not the proper person to make that decision. It seems to me that the proper course would be to send that matter to a judge in chambers for decision. If the man says: "I am in doubt as to whether I am a citizen or not and I want this matter cleared up; will you make me a citizen?" there is the ordinary rule to be followed. On the other hand, if he says: "I am convinced that I am a citizen, but other people say that I am not a citizen," then that matter can be judged according to law. But here —not that I wish to disagree with the President or to look for a means of misunderstanding either him or the Attorney-General—both the President and the Attorney-General say that the Minister does make the decision that that man's case is different from the case of a person who is not a citizen. That seems to me to be a case which is a matter for judgment in the courts on the evidence. It seems to me that that is a matter which should be sent before a person who is qualified to judge it and who is employed or appointed for deciding such questions as this. In my opinion, if the Minister gets the evidence, he should send it on to a judge in chambers for a decision. I do not think that the Minister should be the person to make the decision or that he should be the person to say that people—who probably are not citizens at all—need not fulfil the ordinary requirements because, in his judgment, they are citizens. I feel that the right thing would be for some person in a judicial capacity to decide the matter.
Well, we understand each other, at any rate. It is quite clear that the Deputy wants this Bill to be operated by the machinery of the courts, and that is the way it is done in other countries. We, however, want it to be a matter for decision by the Minister concerned, and the Minister will be acting in a judicial manner. Acting in that capacity, he will be considering whether the people concerned are fit and proper persons to be citizens. That is the process proposed in the Bill and it is the foundation of the whole Bill. The Deputy may differ with that mode of procedure and he may think that the method of procedure through the courts is a better process. All that is necessary for us, I think, is that we should understand each other and understand what is implied in these proposals.
All I am asking is whether the Minister should be the person to undertake to remove the doubt.
The Minister is putting it with regard to the future. A citizen comes along, for instance, and says: "Look here. There is a point of view expressed which seems to indicate that I am a citizen and there is another point of view which would seem to indicate that I am not a citizen. I, however, claim that I am a citizen." He makes his case for being regarded as a citizen, and the Minister, in circumstances like that, says "I will give you a certificate of naturalisation in order to remove the doubt, it being clearly understood that that does not resolve the question of whether, previous to this, you were or were not a citizen." It is, so to speak, without prejudice. And there is nothing here to prevent him from coming along and saying, in connection with any particular action: "Not merely have I this particular certificate of naturalisation to remove doubts, but in this application I claim that I am a natural-born citizen anyway." Is not that so?
My objection is that if a man comes along in that way, the Minister could say: "If you are a citizen, well then you are a citizen and you can just go ahead and merely act on that, and if anything arises in the meantime it can be decided; otherwise, if you want to make certain for the future you can be naturalised in the ordinary way." But he goes before the Minister and says: "I think I am a citizen for such-and-such reasons but I may not be a citizen for such-and-such other reasons, and I ask you now to put it beyond doubt." By putting the matter beyond doubt in that way, the Minister certainly has decided that that person's condition is certainly different from that of a non-citizen, and the mere fact that the Minister exercises that machinery rather than the other method means that he himself is deciding the issue, and it seems to me that it is not the Minister who should decide that matter.
The Attorney-General
Might I just read for the Deputy Section 4 of the British Nationality Act of 1914:—
"The Secretary of State may in his absolute discretion, in such cases as he thinks fit, grant a special certificate of naturalisation to any person with respect to whose nationality as a British subject a doubt exists, and he may specify in the certificate that the grant thereof is made for the purpose of quieting doubts as to the right of the person to be a British subject, and the grant of such a special certificate shall not be deemed to be any admission that the person to whom it was granted was not previously a British subject."
That is a 1914 British Act that the Attorney-General has quoted. The information that he has given is quite interesting, but it does not touch my point.
We are proceeding in this particular way to give the Minister certain discretionary powers. That is quite consistent with the principle running through this. The Deputy wants this out so that there is a difference between us. All that we can do is to resolve it by the usual method.
In connection with the point raised by Deputy MacDermot —I may be right or wrong in this— in my opinion the conditions which govern the issue of a certificate of naturalisation under Section 4 apply equally to the issue of a certificate under Section 5.
This is not a certificate of naturalisation as such. It is a certificate to remove doubts.
I think that it is primarily a certificate of naturalisation. If it is, then I think there is nothing in the section to suggest that the conditions which govern the granting of such a certificate under Section 4 would not equally apply under Section 5. I may be wrong in that.
On the face of it this is of a peculiar character and the purpose of it is to remove doubts.
Sub-section (2) of the section provides:—
The issue to any person of a certificate of naturalisation under this section shall not be evidence or an admission that such person was not a citizen of Saorstát Eireann prior to the issue of such certificate and shall not prejudice or affect any claim by such person to have been a citizen of Saorstát Eireann at any time prior to such issue.
I suppose the President considered that it was not necessary to put in the alternative, and I presume the Government are safeguarded there against any possibility of the issue of a certificate in that way being afterwards used as an argument that the person was beforehand a citizen.
The Attorney-General
Both alternatives are in the section, and the Deputy would see that if he had read the section.
Section 5 agreed to.
SECTION 6.
Question proposed: "That Section 6 stand part of the Bill."
There is no need, I think, to explain this section.
I think that the President ought to say something on this question of minors.
I might give many examples, but here is one. An Irish mother who had children might wish to have them regarded as Irish citizens. She makes a claim to the Minister for Justice that they be so regarded. He considers the claim, and if, in all the circumstances, he thinks that it is right they should be so considered, he can accede to her claim. That is one example, but there may be others.
Is the President referring to an Irish mother with children born in Ireland?
Obviously they would be natural born citizens—I mean born in Saorstát Eireann.
Take the case of a woman who marries in Lithuania. She has three children, and at a given time she wants them naturalised. She herself is a Lithuanian. What would the position be there?
All that would be taken into account by the Minister.
So far as juveniles are concerned, I do not think the President has given much reason for this.
They might want, for instance, to be at school here, and might prefer that they should be regarded as Irish citizens.
And be of a different nationality to their father? Personally, I should object on principle very strongly to that.
The mother might be a widow, for instance.
The Minister is empowered under the section to naturalise a minor without the consent of the minor's parents.
No. On the request of either parent.
On the application of the parent or guardian. It seems to me that the President wants to have it clearly laid down and understood that this would be done in a case in which a parent or guardian proposed to settle here. The sort of case that would seem to me to justify it would be if you had people living in, say, Lithuania, the mother, a widow, being Irish, and that she proposed to come and live here with her family. It might be desirable in that kind of case where the mother desired to come back here with her children. The real guiding course in this should be the fact that the guardian or parent proposed to settle with the children here, but as far as I can see there is nothing of that nature in the section at all.
You have guardian, which suggests something special.
If the section said that this certificate would only be given on the application of a parent or guardian when the Minister was satisfied that the parent or guardian proposed to live in this country there might be a case for this, but as I read the section, a mother living in Lithuania can apply to the Minister to have her children registered as Irish. They may come here for a year or so to attend school or something like that. But that gives no real indication as to where the children are likely to reside when they come of age, because then they will be able to decide for themselves. I object on principle to this section if it indicates a separation of nationality as between children and parents. There is no provision that the parent or guardian shall live here. I can see no reason for this section except in cases where the parent or guardian proposes to live here with the children. In that event I think the President would have a good case for this, but unless he makes such a provision it would be wrong in principle to do what is proposed.
I do not see anything that is wrong in principle in it. There has to be a certain amount of elasticity given to the Minister. We cannot envisage all possible cases. This Bill is already a fairly lengthy measure without trying to deal with all possible cases that might arise. If we were to follow the suggestions thrown out by Deputy Fitzgerald we would be obliged to have a Bill of huge volume to try to deal with all the possible conditions and circumstances under which certain things could be done. We have to depend largely on the discretion of the Minister who will issue the certificates. There are cases where it is advisable that he should have power to do this and we have to depend on him to exercise that power wisely without adverting to all the governing and attendant circumstances. For instance, there are people in India whose children are here. It is the intention of these people probably to come back from India and settle here afterwards, and there may be no intention on their part that their children should join them. It is better from the start to assume that their children should belong to the nationality with which they are associated. We cannot take all exceptional cases. We have given directions in various ways, but we cannot by any possible code cover all possible circumstances which would arise. The only way to deal with these matters is to give a certain amount of discretion and a certain amount of elasticity to the Minister.
The President could have brought in a much shorter Bill saying that all persons shall be citizens or not citizens, as shall be decided by the Minister in his discretion. That, I admit, would be pushing the thing to caricature. The President says that you cannot have laws dealing with every possible case. The position of the law ordinarily should be that no minor—a person not in control of his own actions—shall be naturalised. That seems to be the first thing. There is certainly a case, one obvious case, which would justify a deviation from that principle. That would be the case of the parent or guardian coming to live in this country clearly with the intention of living in the country, and whose children would also live in the country. Then you might say: "There is a case for naturalising the minors." But the President looks round and is rather hard put to it to find some sort of case that would justify this definite provision in law. It is a well-known principle that exceptional cases make bad laws. The basic law should be that no minor is going to be naturalised and, secondly, that nobody is going to be naturalised unless he comes to this country with the clear intention of living in this country. Here we have minors who are going to be naturalised when there is no clear intention that they are going to live in this country. Minors should be naturalised only through their parents or guardians living abroad and with the clear intention that they are going to reside here. The minors may not intend to live here but the Minister would seem in this case specifically to naturalise them. In principle it seems to be wrong although I admit that there might easily be cases which would make it eminently desirable to depart from the basic principle. The principle here is completely wrong on the face of it. The ordinary thing in this Bill should be that minors, who are not able to make up their minds for themselves, should not be naturalised except on the application of a parent or guardian and on the clear intention that they are going to live here.
Why should it be a principle that minors should not be naturalised? There are certain conditions attached to certificates of naturalisation in the case of minors. There are conditions by which they make declarations of alienage if they go out of the country, so as to deprive them of the certificate, but why should it be a principle that minors should not be naturalised? I see no reason for it. They should have some nationality attached to them.
By a minor I understand a person who is subject to a parent or guardian. A minor is not in complete control of his own freedom.
Are there not any things which the minor can do on his own behalf?
Certainly; quite a lot. But when a young person lives, as I might say, subject to the tutelage of a parent or guardian, then it seems to me that the judgment should be passed really on the parent or guardian. When I say that a minor should not be naturalised, I mean that he should not be naturalised in relation to himself, but in relation to the person responsible for him. Take the case, say, of an Irishwoman who was married abroad and who, on becoming a widow, came back here with her children. She intends to live here, and she asks to have her children naturalised. She does not want a divergence of nationality as between herself and her children, and with that I quite agree. But in most cases of minors, the real thing to guide judicial authority or the Minister is the parent or guardian. Here we provide that a parent or a guardian living in Russia can apply that their children shall be Irish citizens and the application can be granted. To my mind that is completely wrong in principle. When the minor ceases to be a minor, he is his own master, and can decide on his own actions. Up to that time it is the parent or the guardian who must be responsible for him, and the child should be judged in relation to the parent or guardian. Consequently, if the Minister is satisfied that the parent or guardian does not intend to reside here, he should not grant a certificate of naturalisation. The general purport of it would be to give the children a different nationality to that of the parent or guardian, which would be wrong in principle.
Again, the Deputy is arguing against a principle which he postulates and puts before us. I do not accept it for one moment. Take the case of an Irish mother who is in America.
An Irish or an American citizen?
Supposing she is an Irish citizen. She has children who were born in America and she loses her husband. She wants to have these children brought up in Ireland and she decides to send them home to her own family, to her parents. She wishes that these children should in every way become Irish citizens, should be eligible to sit for Civil Service examinations here and have all the rights and privileges of citizens. Why should the Minister be prevented from granting a certificate in such cases? Why should he not have discretion to do so, even though the mother did not come back?
I think the proper assumption to take is that the children are going to live with their mother. I object to drafting a Bill in this country to provide for the divorcing of children from their parents.
Nonsense.
It appears to me that this section gives much wider powers to the Minister than are necessary. I do not know whether there is a parallel elsewhere but it seems a very remarkable provision to give the Minister power to naturalise any minor whatsoever. Does the President not think that that is going very far?
I agree that it is wide but again I do not think it is possible for us to decide all the circumstances in which it might be extremely undesirable that the certificate should be granted.
Surely it might be limited to children of Irish born parents or Irish born grandparents or to the children of people who had complied with the ordinary conditions of naturalisation, or with some of these conditions? I wonder whether in any country absolute discretion has been given to a Minister or Secretary of State to naturalise any minor he likes. Perhaps the President could tell me?
It is wide; I am not denying that for a moment; but it is based on the belief that in these cases the Minister will take all the circumstances into account. Our marriage provisions make it extremely desirable. We have nationality descending through the father. There are cases where great hardship would result through that, and we are, in this way, enabling the children to overcome that. I gave one of the best examples possible. In regard to our people, we are in a very peculiar position. The fact that this wide power might not be paralleled in the laws of other countries is due to this reason, that we are in an exceptional position. A greater proportion of people born here reside outside than is the case in any other country in the world. Some 46 or 47 per cent. of the people born in this country are resident outside it.
That situation would be met completely if some condition as to Irish descent had been introduced. If the President would undertake to introduce some such limiting condition on the Report Stage, we might let the matter pass now; but if the section is to stand as it is, I am afraid we shall have to oppose it.
I am not so interested in the Irish descent business. I am interested in the fact that it is perfectly ridiculous giving citizenship unless the person taking it is prepared to reside in this country and fulfils the other obligations.
If he goes away for a protracted period like seven years, he loses it.
I object to the giving of citizenship unless very good reason is advanced. Settling here seems to me to be the vital thing, and as that minor is subject to the tutelage of the parent or guardian, it seems to me that the responsibility should be placed on the parent or guardian. If the woman in America is going to live with the children, well and good.
She herself may not be able.
It does seem to me that to legislate, to provide for parents and their children being separated in that way, is a wrong thing. All the stress of law should be directed towards the maintenance of the family, towards having a direct relationship and contiguity. We should not introduce a clause which will facilitate parents who want to separate themselves in a geographical sense and from the point of view of nationality from their children.
We are going to consider it. The Minister will have discretion.
We are bringing in a special clause to deal with these cases. We do not ask that the parent be an Irish national or if the parent or guardian intends to live here. We are providing that a person living abroad can apply to have the children naturalised as Irish, whether they are going to live here or not. It seems to me to be a wrong principle, and the President has made no case for it. The child can guarantee nothing.
I take the case of an Irish mother in America who took out American citizenship. Her husband dies, and she is going to continue living in America. She may have to earn her livelihood there. She breaks up her home and she decides she wants these children brought up here at home. She sends them here. Is the Minister to be prevented, by our tying his hands, from giving a certificate immediately in such cases? We are here trying to untie his hands and give him a certain amount of freedom. I can quite understand Deputy MacDermot's point. I do not agree with Deputy Fitzgerald about the basis of the thing. There is, perhaps, a point in saying that this is an exceptionally wide power and we ought not to give such power of discretion to the Minister. I promise I will look into it. We may not be able to cover the number of cases that we think ought to be covered. If we can, without tying the hands of the Minister in cases where his hands should be loose, we will try to limit it. If we can do it without unduly putting in a large number of provisos and conditions, we will limit it, but it may be extremely difficult.
There I differ from the President. If he consults with the Attorney-General, I think some reasonable limitation can be introduced.
I would not like to ask the Attorney-General. It is extremely difficult to visualise all the cases that might arise. It could not be done without considerable consideration of the various categories that you might have to provide for and it would mean unduly enlarging the Bill and having very long sections. I will have the matter carefully examined so as to try, if at all possible, to meet the Deputy's view.
I am not willing to give the Minister power to naturalise, say, the child of Greek parents, or any foreign parents you may like to mention, without any sort of condition. If the President will undertake that the Minister will not have that particularly wide power to nationalise the minor of any nationality, whatever his parents and whether he has a drop of Irish in him or not, I think we could let this pass; but otherwise, I do not see how we can take the responsibility of not opposing the section as it stands.
The President waves my point of view aside as nonsense.
I did not say it was nonsense.
That implication seemed to be there. The President says you cannot visualise everything that may turn up. It is generally recognised that hard cases make bad law. The President says we must recognise that all sorts of unforeseen things, and peculiar and extraordinary cases, may turn up, and we must be able to say whether in any one of these extraordinary cases a person should be naturalised. That seems to be a perfectly ridiculous way of approaching legislation. The President says there may be a woman in America who wants her children to be of a different citizenship from her own, and she wants them to live here, with the Atlantic ocean between them and her. We are asked to give the Minister unlimited powers to be in a position to deal with such a case if it turns up. In my opinion, every effort should be made to prevent the mother having the children of a different citizenship from herself and to prevent her having the Atlantic ocean between herself and her children. This is the natural order, although possibly the President thinks it is ridiculous. It is altogether wrong to give the Minister such unlimited power just because some unforeseen case may arise.
The Attorney-General
On the application of a parent or guardian.
The President says you cannot foresee the types of cases that may arise, and if you were to map out exactly each case that might arise you would have an enormous Bill. I quite agree. But the same would apply to every other Bill. What you do is to regard a certain thing as normal and provide for that. There might be obvious things that might require a slight extension. The President says that as we cannot foresee the peculiar circumstances that may arise, which may make it desirable that naturalisation should be given in a given case, then we must see to it that there is no possibility in any case where it would be desirable that it should be given, that it will be excluded. It is an entirely wrong way of approaching the whole idea of law making, and we are bringing in clauses here to provide for cases that are absolutely exceptional, on the face of them. The law here should be directed in the opposite direction, to see to it that an American mother has her children American, at least, during the time they are minors, and that she should have them on the same side of the Atlantic with her.
Would the President tell me what effect the words "having regard to all the circumstances of the case" could possibly have, following, as they do, the words "absolute discretion"?
In other words, the Minister would consider all the circumstances of the application—what are the grounds for the application, and what are the grounds for the granting of the certificate.
What assurance have we that he will have regard to all the circumstances of the case, seeing that he has an absolute discretion?
I can only say to the Deputy: "None—except that he is a responsible Minister." You cannot draft an Act of Parliament, as, I think, the draftsman said, if it is to be drafted on the assumption that it is going to be abused at every turn.
I was merely regarding the words as superfluous. Why have them there if they have no meaning?
Because it simply imposes a duty on the Minister to have regard to them.
I take it that the President is not prepared to give an undertaking?
I cannot give an absolute undertaking. I will promise to consider the matter in the light of the objection raised, but, if I cannot get it absolutely satisfactory to my own mind, I am not going to promise to bring it in.
The President will, no doubt, consider it on its merits, but we shall vote against the section.
Question put: "That Section 6 stand part of the Bill."
The Committee divided: Tá, 40; Níl, 19.
Tá.
- Bartley, Gerald.
- Boland, Gerald.
- Bourke, Daniel.
- Brady, Brian.
- Brady, Seán.
- Breathnach, Cormac.
- Breen, Daniel.
- Briscoe, Robert.
- Concannon, Helena.
- Crowley, Timothy.
- Derrig, Thomas.
- De Valera, Eamon.
- Doherty, Hugh.
- Donnelly, Eamon.
- Gibbons, Seán.
- Hales, Thomas.
- Harris, Thomas.
- Houlihan, Patrick.
- Keely, Séamus P.
- Kelly, James Patrick.
- Kennedy, Michael Joseph.
- Kissane, Eamonn.
- Little, Patrick John.
- Lynch, James B.
- Maguire, Conor Alexander.
- Moane, Edward.
- Moore, Séamus.
- Moylan, Seán.
- O Briain, Donnchadh.
- O'Doherty, Joseph.
- O'Dowd, Patrick.
- O'Grady, Seán.
- O'Kelly, Seán Thomas.
- O'Reilly, Matthew.
- Pearse, Margaret Mary.
- Ruttledge, Patrick Joseph.
- Ryan, James.
- Ryan, Robert.
- Smith, Patrick.
- Victory, James.
Níl.
- Bennett, George Cecil.
- Burke, James Michael.
- Burke, Patrick.
- Byrne, Alfred.
- Cosgrave, William T.
- Costello, John Aloysius.
- Dolan, James Nicholas.
- Doyle, Peadar S.
- Fitzgerald, Desmond.
- Fitzgerald-Kenney, James.
- Lynch, Finian.
- MacDermot, Frank.
- McFadden, Michael Og.
- McGuire, James Ivan.
- McMenamin, Daniel.
- Mulcahy, Richard.
- O'Sullivan, Gearóid.
- O'Sullivan, John Marcus.
- Rice, Vincent.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Little and Smith; Níl: Deputies Doyle and Bennett.
Question declared carried.
Question proposed: "That Section 7 stand part of the Bill."
On the section, clause 5 says that "As soon as may be after the issue, under this Act, of a certificate of naturalisation, the Minister shall publish in the Iris Oifigiúil notice of the fact of the issue of such certificate and of the name of the person to whom it was issued and such other (if any) particulars thereof as the Minister shall think proper.” I think it should be laid down that the Minister should state the grounds on which the certificate was granted.
I could not accept that at all.
You could accept it as a governing ground surely.
Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 9.
(1) The Minister may at any time, on his own motion and at his absolute discretion, by order revoke any certificate of naturalisation issued under this Act.
(2) The Minister shall revoke a certificate of naturalisation whenever he is satisfied—
(a) that the issue of such certificate was procured by fraud, or by misrepresentation (whether fraudulent or innocent), or by concealment of material facts or circumstances, or
(b) that within five years after the issue of such certificate the person to whom such certificate relates was sentenced by any court (including a court in a country in which, by or under this Act, citizens of Saorstát Eireann enjoy or are entitled to enjoy the same status as citizens of such country) to a fine of not less than one hundred pounds or to imprisonment for a term of not less than twelve months or to penal servitude for any term, or
(c) that such person was not of good character at the date of the issue of such certificate, or
(d) that such person has, for a continuous period of not less than seven years subsequent to the issue of such certificate, been ordinarily resident outside Saorstát Eireann (otherwise than in the course of employment in the service of the Government of Saorstát Eireann or as agent for or representative of a person resident or carrying on business in Saorstát Eireann) without maintaining substantial connection with Saorstát Eireann, or
(e) that such person is, under the law of a country which is at war with Saorstát Eireann, a citizen of such country.
(3) As soon as may be after the revocation of a certificate of naturalisation, the Minister shall publish in theIris Oifigiúil notice of the revocation of such certificate.
(4) Whenever a certificate of naturalisation is revoked, the person to whom such certificate related shall deliver such certificate to the Minister within three months after such revocation, and if he fails so to do he shall be guilty of an offence under this section and shall be liable on summary conviction thereof to a fine not exceeding five pounds and a further fine not exceeding one pound for every day during which such failure is continued.
(5) It shall be a good defence to a charge of having committed an offence under this section to prove that the certificate in relation to which such offence is alleged to have been committed has been destroyed.
There is an amendment down in the name of Deputy Good, which I move in his name:—
In subsection (1), line 49, to delete the words "at any time on his own motion and at his absolute discretion."
The Deputy has the permission of Deputy Good?
Yes. Deputy Good asked me to move the amendment. That clause reads in the Bill: "The Minister may, at any time, on his own motion and at his absolute discretion, by order revoke any certificate of naturalisation issued under this Act." The amendment in the name of Deputy Good proposes to delete the words "at any time on his own motion and at his absolute discretion." Personally I would go further than that, and say that when the Minister has information which causes him to think it desirable that a certificate of naturalisation should be revoked he should lay that information before a judge, and let the judge decide upon it. I presume that the information would have relation to the man's conduct, and one thing or another. All the matters laid down in this clause would be matters that would affect a decision for the revoking of a certificate, and those are eminently matters that should be decided upon by a judge rather than by a Minister.
I do not think any purpose would be served by repeating all the arguments we have had as to the different procedures.
It seems to me the Minister is here making a judgment upon a man's character and conduct.
So he will be, too, when he admits him to citizenship.
No. When he admits him to citizenship he is saying in effect: "As far as my information goes I know nothing against this man." As there is nothing against him he must be presumed to be a decent person. In this case he is making a judgment.
He is making a judgment in the first case as far as the facts before him go. In the second case, he is also making a judgement on the facts before him. The facts will, no doubt, have relation to whether or not it is proper that the certificate originally issued should continue to run.
In the first case if the Minister had known, for instance, that the man was not of good character he would have refused the certificate. When the Minister gives the certificate he is not affirming that the man is of good character but saying that it must be presumed he is of good character unless there is information to the contrary. That principle always applies. You are not liable to be taken before a judge and condemned because you cannot prove that you are a perfectly law-abiding citizen; there has to be evidence to prove that you are not. In this case the Minister undertakes to decide, without any reference to a judge, that a person is not of good character. That is a judgment of the Minister there. It seems to me that it would be much more appropriate to have the decision that a man is not of good character made by a judge than by the Minister.
In the first instance the Minister has satisfied himself as to whether a person is indeed a proper person to be given a certificate of naturalisation. At that time he is satisfied that he is a fit person. Certain things subsequently happen which convince him that the person is not a fit and proper person to continue to have a certificate, and he revokes it. He is acting practically in the same manner in both cases.
The amendment which we are discussing does not really go quite as far as the principle which Deputy Fitzgerald has been defending. The amendment seeks only to lay down conditions for revocation, which after all are analogous to the conditions that have to exist before a certificate of naturalisation is granted. Is there any reason why the Minister should be given absolute power to revoke, without his being called upon to supply any reasons at all? Surely the amendment in the names of Deputy Dockrell and Deputy Good could only have the effect of ensuring that revocation would not take place unless proper causes for that revocation existed? Is there any reason why the Government should not accept that point of view?
It is quite obvious that Deputy Good did not have this principle in mind at all. It is quite a different principle. This is only an introduction to the next amendment, which deals with the question of a wife.
I do not think the President is right in that. The amendment with regard to a wife and children is something different altogether. If you like, this amendment No. 11 is introductory to amendment No. 13. Amendments Nos. 11 and 13 go together.
The Attorney-General
Even if that amendment were accepted would it put the thing very much further? Would not the section then read "The Minister may at any time by order revoke any certificate of naturalisation issued under this Act"?
Amendment No. 11 by itself would not effect very much.
The Attorney-General
No.
But if we are going to pass amendment No. 13 then amendment No. 11 would be necessary, too, because the words "On his own motion and at his absolute discretion" would be inappropriate if the conditions mentioned in No. 13 should be applied.
The Attorney-General
The whole thing should have been one amendment.
I think so.
Amendments Nos. 13 and 14?
The Attorney-General
Amendments Nos. 11 and 13.
The way to make progress now is to find out whether the Government are benevolently inclined towards this principle—that the Minister should have some reasons such as specified here before revoking a certificate.
The President seems to me to be taking up a most unreasonable attitude on this amendment. This section deals with the revocation of a certificate of naturalisation; in other words, it deals with the taking away of what is, according to the President, one of the greatest privileges a man could have —citizenship of this State. How is this great privilege going to be taken from a man? It is put entirely within the absolute discretion of the Minister. Unlike Deputy MacDermot, I think this amendment (No. 11) is one of the most important amendments in the whole Bill, because, when a man is having that privilege taken from him, namely, the privilege of citizenship, he most certainly should have the right to have that question decided in the courts. The President is reluctant, of course, to take away that word "absolute" from any line of this Bill, and it is obvious why. He has had the experience of the court here during the last six months interfering with Executive acts, and interfering rightly with them. We may easily have cases in which citizenship is wrongly taken away from a citizen of this State. I say that certainly that matter should not be within the absolute discretion of any Minister.
The Attorney-General
There is nothing in the amendment or the section to substitute the court for the Minister.
I suggest that we should discuss amendments Nos. 13 and 14 together, because they operate the principle of amendment No. 11.
With regard to the point made by the Attorney-General, surely the deletion of the words "at any time on his own motion and at his absolute discretion" will cure the defect I speak of. Is it not by these words a man is prevented going to the courts to compel the Minister to give back the certificate which he has revoked.
The Attorney-General
I do not think so.
Is not the meaning that can be given to the words "absolute discretion" that the Minister can do what he likes? If the words "absolute discretion" are taken out a man from whom citizenship is taken can go to the courts and have the question threshed out. If it was wrongly taken he can be reinstated as a citizen.
The Deputy does not want to contend that only in this case would it be proper to revoke a naturalisation certificate? It is quite clear that there are other cases in which it may be desirable, from the general point of view of public order, and so on, to cease giving a person the right to claim protection. There are numbers of other cases besides this covered, and in which it is desirable that there should be power somewhere to deal with.
The President takes up what seems to be an arbitrary attitude. If a person satisfies certain conditions, that he is of good character, he should get a naturalisation certificate, but the Minister has the right to take that away. Surely the implication is that if a person's naturalisation certificate is revoked that is a condemnation of that person on some ground. The President seems to regard any restrictions whatever on the Executive as completely bad. He may be quite right. The whole structure of the State is that while it is necessary that the Executive should have certain powers, they should be controlled by the Dáil, by the law of the country, and these arbitrary powers that the President seems to think so necessary, should only be granted when abundantly and clearly necessary. Here a Minister may decide that a man is not of good character. He revokes a certificate of naturalisation, as proposed here "at his absolute discretion." He may not like the colour of a man's hair. I think that is a caricature. Here is a judgment of a man's character in one case, and on certain factual matters. A Minister takes the power of the most arbitrary judge and says with regard to citizenship, which should be regarded as one of the greatest rights—I do not say privileges —of the people of this country, he can take it away at "his absolute discretion," whereas a court has to judge the evidence and give a reasoned judgement on it, while a Minister in his closed star chamber issues his condemnation of the man. It seems to me, the clear thing should be that if the Minister judges that a man ceases to fulfil the conditions upon which naturalisation was granted, in his judgment that might seem to justify revoking. The clear case would be to send the information to a judge, or to a judge in chambers, and let him decide. For one Minister on the Front Bench to sit down in his office, and say that man should no longer be a citizen of this country, because he is satisfied he is not a man of good character—and I do not see what right he has to condemn a man on the strength of not liking his character, and to propose to take from him citizenship of this State is different. I know that the President can get up and say that he can do that, as he has a majority, but surely the whole idea of the Dáil is that there should be some sort of discussion and reason, and that as a result a thing should be shown to be desirable or justifiable. The President does not do that. He says that we must assume that a Minister is going to act honourably and to have some sense of responsibility. In that case why not give Ministers discretionary power to behead us at will.
The Attorney-General
The proposal in the amendment allows the Minister discretion.
I am going beyond the amendment because I think it is not sufficient.
The Deputy should keep to the amendment.
I was trying to save time. I do not want to fight this amendment and then have to start the whole thing again. I want to indicate my views.
We have here a clash of opinions as to whether certain powers should reside in the Executive authority or not when terminating the right of a person who has got a privilege on a certain understanding. The Minister satisfied himself that that person was of good character, and was a fit and proper person to remain a member of the community. After a time the Minister from information at his disposal finds that this person is not conducting himself properly. He may have come in to acquire citizenship really for the purpose of engaging in subversive action, or he may be the political agent of another country. These are matters which will be decided on the information the Executive Council has. If we are going to give a Minister the power of giving a certificate, and of giving that privilege, there is no reason why he should not have equally the power of taking it away.
My desire is to support the amendment of Deputy Dockrell and Deputy Good. As regards the wider question, my point of view is that if the Minister is to have the powers that he is going to have under the Bill, of conferring citizenship he should have equally the powers of revoking it. It seems clear that he should have as much power of revoking as of conferring or, if blunders are made, as they may easily be made, they can be undone. One can take that point of view and still approve of the amendments of Deputy Dockrell and Deputy Good. It would appear from a remark that dropped from the President that he had not really considered these amendments, and whether to accept them, before coming here. He seemed to think they were connected with the question of the wife. They are not connected with that question at all. I suggest that these amendments are well worthy of study on the merits, and amount to nothing more than that in revoking a certificate of naturalisation the Minister should be called upon to take into consideration the same sort of matters that he takes into consideration when granting the certificate of naturalisation, and that he should not be given absolute power to revoke without any of the causes here mentioned existing. I do not think that is unreasonable. I think it is reasonable and logical, and that it then makes it what it ought to be, a counterpart of the power given to confer naturalisation. I ask the President to consider the matter again from that point of view.
I have considered the matter and I am quite satisfied that it is necessary. When a person has been given a certificate of naturalisation the Minister has certain information and satisfies himself from the information at his disposal that this is a person to whom a certificate of naturalisation should be granted. On his coming here, the Minister is able to get further information as to his conduct and satisfies himself, as the result of this information, that this person is not behaving himself properly. On that account, he might think that that certificate had been unwisely given, or, at least, that the person who got it abused the privilege, and he should be allowed discretionary power to remove it. As regards the other point, as the section stands, in certain cases he is compelled to revoke.
I take it that a decision on amendment No. 11 will cover amendments Nos. 13 and 14?
I think it ought.
Question put: "That the words proposed to be deleted stand."
The Committee divided: Tá, 42; Níl, 20.
Tá.
- Bartley, Gerald.
- Boland, Gerald.
- Bourke, Daniel.
- Brady, Brian.
- Brady, Seán.
- Breathnach, Cormac.
- Breen, Daniel.
- Briscoe, Robert.
- Cleary, Mícheál.
- Concannon, Helena.
- Crowley, Timothy.
- Derrig, Thomas.
- De Valera, Eamon.
- Doherty, Hugh.
- Donnelly, Eamon.
- Gibbons, Seán.
- Hales, Thomas.
- Harris, Thomas.
- Houlihan, Patrick.
- Keely, Séamus P.
- Kelly, James Patrick.
- Kennedy, Michael Joseph.
- Kissane, Eamonn.
- Lemass, Seán F.
- Little, Patrick John.
- Lynch, James B.
- Maguire, Conor Alexander.
- Moane, Edward.
- Moore, Séamus.
- Moylan, Seán.
- O Briain, Donnchadh.
- O'Doherty, Joseph.
- O'Dowd, Patrick.
- O'Grady, Seán.
- O Ceallaigh, Seán T.
- O'Reilly, Matthew.
- Pearse, Margaret Mary.
- Ruttledge, Patrick Joseph.
- Ryan, James.
- Ryan, Robert.
- Smith, Patrick.
- Victory, James.
Níl.
- Beckett, James Walter.
- Bennett, George Cecil.
- Burke, James Michael.
- Burke, Patrick.
- Byrne, Alfred.
- Fitzgerald, Desmond.
- Lynch, Finian.
- MacDermot, Frank.
- McFadden, Michael Og.
- McGuire, James Ivan.
- Cosgrave, William T.
- Costello, John Aloysius.
- Dolan, James Nicholas.
- Doyle, Peadar S.
- Esmonde, Osmond Grattan.
- McMenamin, Daniel.
- Mulcahy, Richard.
- O'Sullivan, Gearóid.
- O'Sullivan, John Marcus.
- Rice, Vincent.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Little and Traynor; Níl: Deputies Doyle and Bennett.
Question declared carried.
Ordered: That the words stand.
The decision in that case covers amendments Nos. 13 and 14. Regarding amendment No. 12, Deputy Good agreed last night that the same principle as in amendment No. 4 is embodied in amendments Nos. 12, 16, 17, 25 and 26. Amendment No. 4 has been withdrawn, and the other amendments named, having the same principle, are covered by that amendment.
Does that imply that the others should also be treated as withdrawn?
That is what Deputy Good said last night. I told him that Nos. 4, 12, 16, 17, 25 and 26 were on the same principle.
I am not sure what was in Deputy Good's mind.
He withdrew amendment No. 4, and agreed that the others were on the same principle. If the Deputy withdraws amendment No. 4, and agrees that the others are on the same principle, then there cannot be any discussion on the others.
I quite accept that, but I did not have time to correlate all these things, but in amendment No. 12 the principle seems to me to be this——
There can be no discussion if the amendment is withdrawn. There could be no finality if we allowed discussion in such a case. I suggested to Deputy Good last night that these other amendments I have named had the same principle underlying them and he agreed. To-day he asked me for a list of last night's amendments, which I said were on the same principle, and I gave him that list. Amendment No. 4 having been withdrawn, amendments Nos. 12, 16, 17, 25 and 26 fall with it.
I move amendment No. 15:—
In sub-section (2), (b), page 6, line 61, to delete the words "or under this Act" and substitute the words "convention or by law."
That amendment is just to correct an error. Of course, it could not be "under this Act" that citizens of Saorstát Eireann could enjoy in other countries any privileges. It must be in virtue of the law in those other countries—the Conventions made. This is simply an oversight that came in through mistake. This is a mere correction.
Amendment No. 15 agreed to.
Section 9, as amended, agreed to.
SECTION 10.
Question proposed: "That Section 10 stand part of the Bill."
I think there was an amendment there which would incline somewhat to meet one point. We think it is hardly right that there should be determination——
To which amendment is the President referring?
I am dealing with Section 10, and Deputy Good's amendment No. 16.
We cannot discuss amendment No. 16 now.
I understand, but I am trying to explain to the House that——
I take it the President is explaining to the House that he is going to introduce a similar amendment at a later stage.
No; but we intend to take paragraph (b) out and make consequential changes in paragraph (d).
In this section there is an assumption that the husband and wife should have a different nationality. That, I think, is a hideous principle to maintain. If nationality means anything and if Christian marriage means anything, then certainly there should not be a national frontier drawn between husband and wife. This modern, ridiculous point of view of the wife having a different nationality from her husband, largely derived and became troublesome, in my experience, through the war fever in America. When America entered the war there was that hectic condition of mind where people wanted to denounce Germans. They found that that included a number of American women who were married to German husbands. In an insane way it was assumed that nationality had a greater reality than marriage. To me, it is outrageous and unnatural to assume that in the event of war you have the husband who is of one nationality fighting for his country and you may have the wife making munitions to blow him up. In this section here there is that assumption; there is that lunatic nationalism that marriage means nothing as against nationality. That is a complete denial of Christian marriage.
I wonder is the Deputy in order in this at all or is he speaking to the section? There is no question here of separating the husband and wife.
Here is the section:—
Whenever the Minister revokes a certificate of naturalisation, then, if the person to whom such certificate related is, at the time of such revocation, married and his wife or her husband (as the case may be) was immediately before such revocation a citizen of Saorstát Eireann, the following provisions shall have effect, that is to say:—
(a) such revocation shall not of itself prejudice or affect such citizenship of such wife or husband;
(b) if such wife or husband (as the case may be) was, immediately before such revocation, a citizen of Saorstát Eireann otherwise than by virtue of a certificate of naturalisation issued to her or him, the Minister may, by the order effecting such revocation or by a subsequent order made within one year after such revocation, terminate the citizenship of such wife or husband (as the case may be) and thereupon such wife or husband shall cease to be a citizen of Saorstát Eireann;
(c) if such wife or husband (as the case may be) was, immediately before such revocation, a citizen of Saorstát Eireann by virtue of a certificate of naturalisation issued to her or him, the Minister may, by the order effecting such revocation or by a subsequent order made within one year after such revocation, revoke the certificate of naturalisation so issued to such wife or husband;
(d) such wife or husband may (unless her or his certificate has been terminated or her or his certificate of naturalisation has been revoked (as the case may be) under the foregoing provisions of this section) make and lodge with the Minister in the prescribed form and manner within one year after such revocation a declaration of alienage, and thereupon such wife or husband (as the case may be) shall cease to be a citizen of Saorstát Eireann.
The Attorney-General
That is in line with your principle.
I am not so much interested in citizenship. What I do demand is that if a person is a natural-born citizen——
We are not dealing with natural-born citizens.
Then that man's wife is in exactly the same position as a natural-born citizen. If the Minister gives a certificate of naturalisation to the husband, it flows also to the wife. If the Minister refuses nationality to the husband or wife, the same thing should apply to the other person. I do not see why the President denies what I am saying.
It is not relevant to the section. I suggest that the Deputy should keep his tongue in check until we shall have passed a few sections more, when he will be in order.
What I understand from this section is that the Minister takes power——
To deal with both together, if you like.
If the President would rather discuss my point later, I do not mind.
It would be more relevant later.
But it is relevant on this section.
I submit to the Chair that it is not.
Section 10 agreed to.
SECTION 11.
Question proposed: "That Section 11 stand part of the Bill."
I think that this section makes a difference between the nationality of parents and the nationality of children. I have not time to read it now.
The Attorney-General
I suggest that the Deputy should have read the section before he came into the House.
This seems to me to be a complete attack on the family. I object to the setting up of any national frontier between the parent and the children. The Minister decides arbitarily in the secrecy of his office that he does not like the father. The father may have to be got out of the country, whereas the child will remain here.
What would happen if the Deputy wanted to send somebody to prison?
What is to become of the children? That is what I should like to know. Can a deportation order be made?
That does not arise on this section, but it can be done, as a matter of fact.
It cannot be done whether the Minister wants it done or not. Where are you going to deport the children? Of what State are they citizens?
They may be citizens of another State.
They cannot be. Are they going to have dual citizenship?
They may.
They "may" but, as a general rule, there is not dual citizenship.
Unfortunately there are many cases of it.
They only prove the rule. The general rule is that citizenship is unitary. In the main, persons have only single citizenship. Here the right of citizenship is being taken from the parent. It is also being taken from the child, who has committed no crime and no offence whatever against the State. The child whose citizenship is taken away may be a perfectly loyal citizen. I intended to speak on Section 9, but I allowed it to pass. This is complete absolutism. What is to be done with those children whose citizenship is taken away? It is bad enough to take away the citizenship of a person who has committed an offence against the State. That is going very far. My view is that the moment you issue a certificate of citizenship to a person you confer upon him an immutable right. You have taken him as a citizen for good or ill, and the right should not be taken from him. Here, you claim the right to take citizenship away. On top of that, you are going to take the right of citizenship from the children.
"May" take.
Why should they be brought into the matter? They have committed no offence by omission or commission, by word, thought or act. Yet, the Government is taking powers to take away their citizenship because the parent has committed an offence, or rather because the Minister thinks he has committed an offence, and is a bad character whose right to citizenship should be withdrawn. Deputies should ponder before they give a Government this power. Are these children to be left without the possibility of getting citizenship here or elsewhere? If they do not get citizenship here, where they were born, where their parents have had their domicile and have had citizenship, where are they to get it? It is all very well to take these arbitrary powers, but we should remember that this is a Citizenship Bill and that a very long view should be taken in respect of it. All the implications of it should be taken into account. It is a very drastic thing to take away citizenship. It is a power that, in my opinion, should not be given to the Minister, to the courts, or to any other authority except in the case of treason. Bad character should not constitute a case for taking away citizenship. If you take citizenship from a certified citizen, why not take it from a natural-born citizen? There are plenty of bad natural-born citizens in every country. Yet no court and no Government can take away the right of citizenship from them. When citizenship is conferred, it should be conferred for good or ill and should not be taken away except for treason. Under this Bill, children who have committed no offence may lose citizenship of this State, and it may be utterly impossible for them to obtain citizenship elsewhere.
The Attorney-General
I should like to say a few words in answer to the rameis to which we have just listened. It would be a good idea if a Deputy like Deputy McMenamin, who is a lawyer, would choose his words more carefully when he gets up to speak on a matter like this. He might have gone to the trouble of examining the laws of other countries before coming to the conclusion that this particular section is a drastic section introduced by an absolutist Government. It is really a liberal provision. It is far more liberal than is the case in other countries. We have Deputy Fitzgerald stating that if he had his way he would insist that the moment the parent was deprived of citizenship the children would be deprived of citizenship in order to preserve the unity of the family. Deputy McMenamin gets up and insists that the child should not change his citizenship with the father.
I did not know that this was a Party measure.
The Attorney-General
I am sorry if I gave the impression that we were treating it on a Party basis. I merely wanted to point out the vital difference between the Deputy and Deputy Fitzgerald. I should like to draw the Deputy's attention to the fact that there is provision in the section to preserve the child's nationality, and that only by a positive act on the part of the Minister can a change be effected. As I said before, this is a liberal and not an illiberal section.
This is said to be a liberal section which gives the Minister this power?
The Attorney-General
It is a liberal section, for it allows the child of a denationalised citizen to retain his citizenship.
I take it that this power would be exercised in accordance with the best interests of the children. Sometimes it might be in the best interests of the children to go with the person losing naturalisation, and in other cases, with the person keeping it.
That is the idea.
I think, in view of what we have just decided, such a discretion as this is inevitable.
I should like to say that in agreeing to pass this section I was not agreeing in principle to all that is in the section. I agreed because the main principle I am interested in will be dealt with in a later section.
Section 13?
Yes, but I do not accept the doctrine that because certain things are passed we are committed to all these things. The Attorney-General pointed out that there is a disagreement between Deputy McMenamin and myself. In this matter that I am dealing with, I am not speaking for my Party. The Party, indeed, may be unanimously against my view. I am simply expressing my own idea. I am not accepting in principle that Ministers can, by act of revocation, create a difference of nationality between the father and the children.
Is there any machinery by which the Minister for Justice will deal with this matter? The question to be decided, in this particular section, is the citizenship of the child of a person whose certificate is revoked. Extraordinary power is given to the Ministry under this section —much more power than, I think, is appreciated by the Government. I do not at all agree with Deputy Fitzgerald that the family should follow the father. If the father goes to Maryborough prison, there is no reason why the children should follow.
I did not say so.
I believe a very clear and accurate expression of these powers should be set out. I do not suggest that the Department of Justice will be unfair, though it could and might. But I think persons who are not citizens and who have children, and would come within Section 11— and other persons who would cease to be citizens under Section 11 and have children—should have some guarantee that there will be a most rigid and critical examination of the children's interest. If that is so, and if a person is a bad character and has got a certificate of naturalisation and goes to Maryborough jail, I do not believe the children should go. I do not believe the sins of the father should fall upon the children.
I should like to say a few words on this matter before we pass from it. Everybody knows the Minister would not operate this himself personally. In 99 cases out of 100 this will be deputed to members of his staff, properly chosen. They will gain experience as time goes on, and there will, in effect, be a little departmental court to examine these cases. It may be one person or it may be more. Before the Minister gives his sanction he will make such arrangements as will enable him to see that the cases are tested and approved before they are settled. He will, in ordinary administration, devise some machinery for examining all these cases. I want to stress what the Attorney-General said, that what is done here is done in the interests of the children themselves. That has to be got into the heads of Deputies. It would be unfair that revocation of the certificate of a parent should automatically deprive the child of the privilege of citizenship here. That would be directly visiting the sins of the father upon the children. If the Minister revokes the certificate of naturalisation of the person to whom he gave that privilege—for it is a privilege, not a right—he is revoking a privilege, not a natural born right. It is a privilege given to an outsider who has no natural right to it and who is given the privilege of adoption. If such a person behaves in a way which is clearly an abuse of that privilege, and the Minister has to revoke his certificate, then the question of the children has to be considered.
Dual nationality is not a rare thing. The mere fact that we will give a certificate of naturalisation to citizens of another country would not, in every case, automatically deprive such citizens of their previous nationality. In the case of Belgian citizens, the nationality or citizenship of another State does not deprive them of their previous nationality. In the case of Belgian citizens, the nationality or citizenship of another State does not deprive them of their Belgian nationality. There are other such States. Suppose we gave a certificate of naturalisation to the citizen of another State and he abused that privilege, and did not behave in a manner that would be right for a member of our community. We say there is no reason why we should continue to give this person that right, and that our Minister may revoke it. He might immediately deport him to Belgium or to whatever other country he belonged. It might be right in the interests of the children to send the children with him, not to have them parted from their parents. That might be in the interests of the children. There are other cases where it might not be in the interests of the children. Here discretion is given to the Minister to determine in every case what is the right and proper thing to do, and it is intended to exercise that right in the interests of the children so far as their interest is compatible with our country.
If a person from Hungary or Belgium comes here and asks for a certificate of naturalisation, do we not regard that as an abandonment of the allegiance that person owed to the other country?
Not necessarily.
If a person comes here and is naturalised as an Irish citizen and is found, under conditions of strained relationship, acting against this country in the interests of the country of his origin, surely this State is going to treat that person as a traitor to this country and not merely as a patriot to his own country? Such persons would be regarded as traitors acting against this country. Therefore, when a Bulgarian comes here and is naturalised here he becomes an Irish citizen and not what he was originally. Such persons renounce their allegiance to another country and become Irish. The Government would say to such a person, you are no longer Irish. We would say that man is not worth having here; we would dislike him and send him back to Bulgaria. That is a thing, as the President knows, that happens at the moment in relation to Palestine, and that is causing considerable trouble. A Jew goes to Palestine from Poland, and it was the rule, at least up to a while ago, that he automatically has all the rights of a citizen of Palestine—the British Government has insisted upon that—but if, after a time, he gets "fed up" with Palestine and goes back to Poland, the British Government were insisting that on going back he becomes a citizen of Poland. That seems to me to be very inequitable. I do not think that the children should go to jail because their father goes to jail, as has been suggested by a Deputy was my opinion. I do think, however, that if a person is living here permanently he has an ordinary right to be made a citizen. That is my view.
With regard to this whole proposal about revocation, however, and the suggestion that the wife would not be affected by it and that the children would not be affected by it, the President said that, in the normal way, a man would be deported and sent back to the place from which he came. I do not think the President can stand over that, because it must be remembered that the man has renounced his allegiance to that country.
I do not think that the President followed me in my point. I am interested in the matter of how children are to be dealt with under this section. In the ordinary course of events in this country, we know that a child is not sent—I think "committed" is the word—to an industrial school except by due process of law. There must have been abandonment, or some offence or crime must have been committed, before the child can be committed, and there is a definite judicial act. Some person, or some body of persons, sits, independent of all personal or political notions or anything else, who says, in effect: "Yes, the best thing for that child, or for those children, is that they should be sent to such-and-such a place." I do feel that this section gives a general wide scope and power to the Department of Justice to deal as they like with these persons or children and with no conditions laid down as to why or when these persons or these children should be denaturalised or denationalised—because they might be national citizens—and I think that it is a matter that should be very seriously considered.
We, and, I suppose, every other country, have had ruffians come into the country who have afterwards developed into good citizens. Their families have been good and have built up these countries—whether we talk of Tasmania or other countries. I think that this particular section is too wide in its scope. I am anxious about the actual working of the section. I agree with the principle that there should be power to deal with a man who has proved himself unfit to be a citizen; a man who got, as the President said, privileges here which were not privileges of right and who abuses these privileges. I do agree that there should be power in some way or another to enable that man to be put out of the country, lock, stock and barrel. But I believe that in doing so the machinery set up to deal with him should be such as to leave no doubt as to the manner in which it should be done; in other words, that it should be in accordance with legal principles, and so on.
In speaking of the machinery, I was speaking of the machinery in general. The Deputy distinguishes between the general machinery set up to deal with this Act properly and the special machinery that would be necessary to deal with the interests of the children and the welfare of the children. Again, I think that, naturally, the Minister there also, in order to administer the Act properly, would give a direction that some particular attention should be paid to this. He might—I would not like to say that he would—have somebody along with him who was particularly qualified to deal with that problem. If I myself were the Minister administering this Act, in all probability I would have, besides the person ordinarily administering the question of naturalisation and the issuing and revoking of citizenship and so on, somebody particularly qualified to deal with it. From my own experience, I would not have the slightest hesitation in handing it over to certain civil servants to deal with it. If that is what the Deputy means, I think that it would follow quite naturally from the Minister's responsibilities.
I am not satisfied with the case that has been made by the President. I consider that it is a most serious thing. The President has indicated that this matter might be transferred to officials of the Department—to civil servants. I cannot think of anybody more unfit to deal with children that the junior officials, or the officials generally, of the Department. If it comes to that, I would prefer to have the Minister himself deal with it because he is a man who has been out in the world. He is a man of the world and has been accustomed to deal with such problems. I feel that in this case the utmost care should be used and that the machinery to be set up should be such as would exercise infinite care in the disposal of these children. I think that the machinery should make sure, when a revocation order was made and these children were to be deported, that wherever they would be sent provision should be made with regard to their reception and their future. How is an official in a Government Department to be expected to do that? It is all very well for Deputies to shake their heads about it. Their attitude evidently is that it is just a question of making an order about the children, putting them on a boat, and letting them take care of themselves. I think that that is a very unwise, unstatesmanlike, and a very unChristian outlook. I think that it would need the utmost consideration, and my view is that all cases of that kind should be sent to the Chief Justice. He is a man dealing with the minors of the country. He has hundreds of children under him. He has all these children coming before him constantly while he examines all the circumstances with regard to their disposal. To say that an official of the Department, or two or three officials, would know anything about children or their care, and that they should be allowed to make an order as to the destiny of these children is, I think, a very serious thing. I am not concerned with the father at all. If the father has committed a crime tantamount to treason, let us say, he has no right to citizenship, natural or otherwise. But the State should take the utmost care of these children. They have committed no crime or no offence, and it is a very old maxim that the sins of the fathers should not descend on their children.
I have heard expression given to many weird ideas as to what a civil servant is, but this is the weirdest I have ever heard, I think. According to the Deputy, civil servants know nothing about children if they do not happen to be fathers themselves and have families. I wonder what sort of people is our civil service staffed with. There is also this question of "grab." There is no question here of grabbing citizens. It is a question concerning somebody who might still continue to be a citizen of another country. There are 14 or 15 countries, I think, which do not deprive their citizens of nationality simply by reason of the acquisition of the nationality of another country. Such a person may come into the country, and the Minister for Justice, simply on an application, may say: "Well, there is no reason why we should deny this person the privilege of being one of us," believing that that person was going to behave properly. There is no question of grabbing. It means that we are giving that person a privilege, and if after a time it is found that he abuses that privilege, is it not fair to say to that person: "Very well, we will cut you off from that privilege and deal with you in the same way as you were before you got into this country, and we will send you out of the country"?
In regard to the children, there is the ordinary Christain obligation to see that innocence will not suffer: that children will not suffer, so far as we can help it. There is also an obligation to look after the interests of our own people, and if they naturally belong to another country there is no hardship in sending them back to that country. At any rate, there is no reason why we should not. I agree that this is intended to be a liberal section to be administered in the interests of the children. The Minister will set up proper machinery for doing that.
Would the President give an assurance that before the Bill is finally passed he will introduce a section giving the right of appeal from a decision of the Department?
We have turned down that principle.
I know you have in connection with another matter, but in the case of children I think my suggestion is worth considering. I do not want to join with the Deputy, who said that civil servants have no hearts.
I did not say that.
You said they had no children. I do feel that there is always a danger that children may be wronged by a Departmental accident, and I would ask the President to reconsider that particular matter—the right of an appeal from a Departmental decision, because it is the Department that will decide.
Section 11 agreed to.
SECTION 12.
Question proposed: "That Section 12 stand part of the Bill."
This section says:—
Every foundling who was or is first found as a deserted infant in Saorstát Eireann shall, until the contrary is proved, be deemed to have been born in Saorstát Eireann.
Does that apply to foundlings found, for instance, on an Irish ship in Shanghai?
This is in accordance with one of the principles agreed at the Hague. I think there is a misapprehension with regard to this question of ships which is also mentioned in Section 2. But it is only public ships, warships and so on, that would be regarded as definitely part of the territory of the State. Registered ships would not be so regarded, so that in this case it has reference not to an Irish ship on the high seas, for example.
Therefore, the word Saorstát in the Bill means merely the geographical area of the Irish Free State and no ship.
Yes, except a ship is specially mentioned.
There is a definition of Saorstát Eireann implied in what the President says, that it is just a geographical expression.
Section 12 agreed to.
SECTION 13.
I move amendment No. 18:—
Before section 13 to insert a new section as follows:—
Where a woman satisfies the Minister—
(a) that she is a widow, and
(b) that her husband, immediately before his death, was not a citizen of Saorstát Eireann, and
(c) that she was, immediately before her marriage, a citizen of Saorstát Eireann, and
(d) that she relinquished under this Act her citizenship of Saorstát Eireann on account of her marriage to a person who was not a citizen of Saorstát Eireann, and
(e) that she is ordinarily resident in Saorstát Eireann,
such woman shall be entitled to make and lodge with the Minister in the prescribed form and manner a declaration that she intends to continue to be ordinarily resident in Saorstát Eireann and desires to resume her citizenship of Saorstát Eireann, and upon so making and lodging such declaration such woman shall be deemed to have resumed her citizenship of Saorstát Eireann.
Deputies will see, on reading the amendment, that this is a provision to enable a widow to resume her citizenship on returning here. If it is evident that she is a widow and if the Minister is satisfied that she is a widow whose husband immediately before his death was not a citizen of Saorstát Eireann, that she was immediately before her marriage a citizen of Saorstát Eireann, that she relinquished under this Act her citizenship of Saorstát Eireann on account of her marriage to a person who was not a citizen, and that she is ordinarily resident here: if she comes back to be ordinarily resident and makes a declaration that she intends so to continue, then she is allowed to resume her citizenship upon making and lodging the declaration that she intends to continue to be ordinarily resident here and desires to resume her citizenship. We felt this was a proper thing to do in such cases.
Is there a distinction between the word resume and re-acquire? There is a sort of implication in the word resume that she was not specifically a citizen.
It means that it had lapsed.
I think I would prefer the word re-acquire.
This is a very important constitutional Bill, one that we should not rush through. Did the Department consider the position of divorcees? There is the serious position of girls who marry persons and acquire citizenship in other countries and then come back here, having being divorced. I think it is a matter that should be considered as to whether they should not get more or less the same treatment as a widow. I know that Deputy Fitzgerald will not agree with divorce, but it happens and it is a matter for consideration. As I have said, this is a very serious Bill. We are rushing through this matter of citizenship and I would like to hear from the President if this matter has been considered.
It has been considered, but we did not think it was necessary to make any special provision.
Amendment agreed to.
Question proposed: "That Section 13 stand part of the Bill."
On the section, I disagree fundamentally with the principle which is very clearly involved in it. I said earlier that the general view of Christendom has been that there is substantial and real unity in Christian marriage, and that there is some reality in nationality or citizenship. If there is any meaning in citizenship at all, then it seems to me perfectly clear that there must be the one nationality or citizenship enjoyed by man and wife. This situation became acute in our experience arising, as I said earlier, from a rather frenzied psychology in America when America entered the war, and it was, I think, fashionable to denounce the Huns in unmeasured terms.
Was it only in America that was fashionable?
I think America implemented that feeling, particularly in the decision that American girls who married Germans should remain American citizens. The implication, therefore, was that nationality or something more real, the State, over-rode the family and had precedence of that nationality and was vastly of more importance than marriage: that loyalty, allegiance or affection for the State was infinitely superior and more binding than the affection that should bind married people.
That was the implication clearly in it. As I say, the origin of this acuteness came from that war condition. The implication there is that if an Irish woman, if you like, or an American woman, marries a man belonging to a country engaged in a war with America, that woman should engage in the manufacture of munitions—and I think to the Cumann na mBan this would appear an eminently reasonable thing—which will be used against the army in which her husband is fighting. That seems to me to be a most diabolical principle, a principle which is directed against the whole idea of Christian marriage, a principle that would not be tolerated in countries other than those in which the ideal of Christian marriage was very decidedly attenuated, to say the least of it. If the most ardently patriotic Irishwoman marries an Englishman, a Lithuanian or a German, her allegiance to her husband absolutely wipes out and transcends completely the allegiance she owes to Ireland. That seems to flow necessarily from the conception of marriage as Christianity has conceived marriage.
Here we have a situation in which it would seem the normal thing that wives and husbands should have different citizenship and that, in case of war, with all that hideous racial hate which is created, the wife should pray for the complete downfall and destruction of the enemy army in which her husband is engaged and the husband would do his best to see that the munition works in which she, perhaps, was employed would be adequately blown up by bombs from an aeroplane. That may be all right in countries where they do not believe in even giving lip service to Christian ideas, but it seems to me a most ridiculous thing to provide here. Mind you, it is not the first time it has arisen. I remember, I think it was in 1926, the British were very much concerned, as they have been concerned recently, at the thought of British women marrying foreigners who did not, according to the laws of the countries to which their husbands belonged, acquire citizenship automatically by marriage. Certainly there was a time when the British were very anxious that there should be unanimous legislation on the point amongst the various members of the Commonwealth. If I remember rightly, we refused or we would not accept the principle that there should be this sort of national divorce between the husband and the wife.
Was it this State put forward this principle to which the British objected?
This State objected to that principle. I remember an occasion perfectly well when the British Minister came to Mr. Kevin O'Higgins and myself—and I think the officials will remember it too—and said that they hoped that the legislation of the various Dominions would be identical. We indicated that we could not legislate in such a way as would recognise what I might call national divorce between husband and wife. I remember the occasion personally. Whether it was official or unofficial I cannot say. This thing can work in the most fantastic way. The President has records of one case, the case of a woman born in Ireland and who went to America. She married a man in America who had also been born in Ireland. He did not become an American citizen although he lived there for 30 or 40 years. In the course of time, he died and as her husband had not become a citizen, she came back and lived here I think in Leitrim. After some time another American citizen came over here, met her and married her. He then went back to America to prepare the house in which they were to live. When all was ready he wrote telling her to come along. She, not being an American citizen, although her husband was, applied for an American visa, but under the American quota system of the time, aliens were not permitted to emigrate to America unless they were literate. This woman was illiterate and, by American law, had not the right to go back to America. The conception of marriage under this Bill and in these circumstances is that the husband living in Oklahoma or in Arizona writes a letter to his wife in Leitrim which is read to her by some neighbour who can read. The wife then dictates what she wants to say to a neighbour, who writes the letter to her husband in America. I just give that case as showing how ridiculously extravagant this Bill can be.
Our Bill produces something of that sort?
Our Bill recognises this situation by the mere fact that the husband and wife are not of the one nationality.
Read it.
It states:—
The marriage, after the 6th day of December, 1922, and before the date of the passing of this Act, of a citizen of Saorstát Eireann to a person who was not a citizen of Saorstát Eireann shall not of itself operate or be deemed ever to have operated to deprive the party to such marriage who was previous thereto a citizen of Saorstát Eireann of his said citizenship or to confer citizenship of Saorstát Eireann on the party to the said marriage who was not a citizen of Saorstát Eireann previous thereto.
Is that providing that the husband and wife shall automatically by the act of marriage be of one nationality?
Does the Deputy want us to legislate for America in this matter?
I want the House to legislate for this country. The argument is that this non-receipt of nationality by a woman by the act of marriage, which has been discussed amongst various countries, largely derived from America. It does not matter where it derived from. It may have begun in Bulgaria, but I say it is a contradiction of something that the Irish people affirm.
What was the British Minister's talk about? The Deputy referred to some conversation with a British Minister. That is nearer than Bulgaria.
What I was pointing out to the President was this, that this question as to whether or not the wife should automatically have the nationality of the husband or the husband of the wife was considered by this country previously. I then referred to an occasion when we took up a certain attitude, guided by no other consideration than the absolute necessity that the wife and the husband should automatically, by the fact of being wife and husband, possess one nationality. The President now comes along with a Bill which says that marriage between people of different nationalities, one being Irish and the other not, does not automatically make them of the same nationality. Personally I do not care how it goes. You can say that if an Irish person marries a person of another nationality, that person becomes Irish or that the Irish person automatically ceases to have Irish nationality and, in our eyes, should possess the nationality of the husband or wife as the case may be. I do not mind, provided we refuse to act otherwise than to assume that the husband and wife are bound together so closely that there cannot be a divorce of nationality or allegiance between them and that when a situation arises such as we saw in the case of the Great War, when practically the whole nation is mobilised—men, women and children—for fighting purposes or for activities ancillary thereto, we shall claim the allegiance and the services of the woman, say, to assist this State. We shall say that it is morally binding on her to act so as to forward the cause of this State in its war against the other State. The implication is that the Government should do its utmost to prevent her engaging in activities so as to destroy her husband or in activities by which the army in which her husband is engaged would be blown to pieces. This modern distorted view in which it is assumed that an Irishwoman is an Irishwoman without any regard for her husband is to me a completely wrong point of view and I object to our legislating to pander to that point of view. The unity of husband and wife is a much greater unity, implying a much greater loyalty than the unity of a person and the State of which that person is a citizen. I think the Government should never, even by any implication, accept the idea, which I admit is received in many countries, that the wife retains her original nationality when she has married a man of different nationality until she takes a specific act to discard her original nationality. This seems to me to imply, virtualiter, a sort of denial of the union which we recognise in a Christian marriage and I object to it in this and other clauses.
In the same way, in regard to children, the argument was made that if the father goes to prison you do not send the children to prison. I think it would be a greater penal act, considered generally, to propose that there be a hostility between the children and the father than merely that the father should go to prison. In the case of revoked nationality, the children are what they are by virtue of their parents, either through their parents having acquired nationality here or through their parents having come to reside here. The normal thing when nationality would be revoked would be for the parent to return to the country he came from. That being so, the children should have the nationality of their father and not any particular nationality of their own. Children are not free agents. Their actions and movements are decided for them by their parents or guardians and it is the will which decides with regard to the children which should be considered. Consequently, I feel our legislation should at least assume and act always to provide that the children should have the same nationality as their parents and, although my colleagues think it is a terrible thing that a child should be deprived of Irish nationality, particularly because the father is a man of bad character and has forfeited it, I think it is much better for the child to have the nationality of the father, even if it be Bulgarian, rather than have it an Irish citizen and be divorced from its father in nationality.
It is very kind of the Deputy to come here and pronounce ex-cathedra——
I was not purporting to lay down the law or to speak ex-cathedra at all. I said that to my mind it seemed right and proper that the Government should act in a certain way and I said that in my judgment virtualiter is a non-recogntion of the reality of Christian marriage.
The Deputy starts off by enunciating certain principles and assuming that they are correctly applied. He is assuming that he is correctly applying principles and that we here are incorrectly applying them. I say, on the contrary, that what we are doing is we are making every possible provision by which the parties to a marriage can be of the one nationality. We are not legislating for the world. We cannot, by saying that a woman possesses the same nationality as her husband, compel the United States, for instance, if that view was not adopted there, to regard the wife as of the same nationality as the husband. As a matter of fact, there is considerable conflict of laws on this question of nationality and that conflict has fallen very heavily upon women. It is not in America that they have suffered; they have suffered practically in every country; and it is not in war time merely that they suffer; they suffer in peace time, too. We are making provision for both men and women, but it is in the case of the women that this particular hardship occurs.
In order to see what we are doing here, just imagine an Irishwoman living here and some person from a country on the Continent comes here and marries her. He does not acquire Irish nationality. Are we to forbid him to marry her? Are we going to say, "You must not marry unless you belong to the same legal community." Surely all the traditional affection which a person has for the country of his birth, his origin, the country of his parents, is quite consistent with the unity of marriage? One of the mistakes the Deputy seems to make is to consider that this question of nationality, being of the same nationality and the same legal community, is essential to the idea of the unity of the marriage tie. I am willing to admit it is one of the various factors which might be considered in regard to the unity of the family. I admit it would be preferable, as I would in general principles say it would be preferable, for people to marry others of their own legal community. But it is new to me, if it has become a Catholic principle, that in order to secure the unity of the family you should marry only within your own legal community. So far as I know it has never been stated in that particular way, nor was there any suggestion that it should be so.
Not by me.
There was an implication that there was something wrong in persons of two different nationalities marrying.
Not at all.
There was the implication that if they continue their connections or ties with their respective countries, that if that occurs we are somehow sundering the unity of the family. In principle I do not agree with the Deputy, and in the particular application here the Deputy is wrong. We are making provision, in so far as we can, to make it easy for the husband and wife to be of the same nationality. Take the case of an Irishwoman marrying a German, a Frenchman or a Belgian. If the husband did not become Irish this Irishwoman would become immediately, according to the Deputy, a Belgian or either of the other nationalities. According to the Deputy she would have to become an alien in the land of her birth, an alien with all her relations about her. She would be, for instance, put in a position in which she could be immediately deported. She might, for instance, as an alien, be prevented from getting employment. She might, for instance, as an alien, be prevented from continuing the occupation or trade in which she was engaged before marriage. If war broke out she might have her goods confiscated—all that in order to preserve this phantom idea of the Deputy to prevent some sundering of the marriage tie. If the marriage tie was not affected by the fact that the Belgian was a Belgian or the German a German at the time of marriage, I do not see how it was going to be affected afterwards. The only way in which it could be detrimentally affected would be if there was some automatic law operating that operated irrevocably and irresistibly in all situations.
What we are doing here is we are giving the amount of elasticity that is necessary in order to prevent hardship of that particular kind. We say to the Irishwoman, "You do not by your marriage, by that act of itself relinquish your Irish nationality. You are still an Irishwoman amongst your people in your own land. You remain so and your children, if they are born here, are natural born citizens of this country," but we say: "We are willing to adopt your husband, who has come in here, into our community. We are going to give him, because of the fact that he is married to one of our citizens, the privilege of belonging to our community on special terms." On a two years' or a very short period of residence he will have all the rights and privileges of our citizenship. We are making it possible for him and for her to come here and be united in the way the Deputy thinks is desirable and ideal. Is there any severance of the marriage tie in that? Is that not a better position than to make, in the case of a couple residing here, our Irish girl an alien amongst her own people? We cannot make it a condition precedent to marriage that the Belgian should have given up his Belgian nationality and we are not going to deport them. We may regard her husband as a very good citizen, as an addition to our community, and we do everything, therefore, to make it possible for these people, who married because they wished to be together, to remain here without any sunderance of the ties.
Again, I ask the Deputy where, in our proposals, is this sundering of the marriage tie? Where is this separation of husband and wife? Is it not making it possible for husband and wife to become a unit in the legal as they would be in the social community here? Take the opposite case. Suppose an Irish girl goes abroad. In some cases, she might be Stateless, if we said to her that she relinquishes her nationality. The country of her husband might not be willing to accept her. They might not be as generous— and some States are not as generous— as we are in that matter. If her husband died, she would still perhaps be in a strange land, as they might not have been for any length of time in that country. What we say is: We will deem you to have desired to adopt the nationality of your husband unless by some positive act, within a specified time, you clearly indicate that you wish to retain your Irish nationality. Remember that we are not interposing by law any barriers, but there may be, in the circumstances of the case, a question of returning again; there may be reasons why this might be regarded as a short period of residence or something of that sort. There may be an intention of returning and the person in that case, if he or she wishes to retain his or her nationality, can make a declaration to that effect within a specified time and we will not deprive him or her of his or her Irish nationality. In any case, we do not propose to deprive her of her Irish nationality and leave her Stateless.
In this Bill, the provisions are that if a woman, when she leaves this country, does not acquire the nationality of her husband, she continues to have our nationality and she only loses it when she gets the nationality of her husband. Again, where is the hardship? Which is the more Christian and proper thing to do? We are proposing these sections in the Bill not, as the Deputy would suggest, in response to some general vague sentiment of equality or anything of that kind. What we are doing here is making what I would call Christian provisions, so as to prevent hardship on women, and the more the Deputy will examine these sections, if he is minded the way he suggests, the more he will be compelled to agree that that is so; but in accordance with some vague ill-defined principle, he would have us, first of all, act as if we could legislate for other nations and, in accordance with his principle, he would have us not to do our part to end these hardships. I say "our part" because a number of nations met at the Hague to consider this conflict of laws. They did not meet, as was suggested last night, in order that they might get some common basis of nationality, to get some such idea accepted everywhere as the idea the Deputy has put forward, or the contrary idea. They came to deal with a very pressing problem—the conflict of nationality laws and particularly that conflict as it affected the interests of women. They came to certain agreements and this Bill is in accordance with the general spirit and provisions of these agreements by which we intend to prevent that Statelessness and also to make it easy for one party to be adopted into the community to which the other party already belongs.
Again, the Deputy spoke as if he were voicing general Catholic opinion.
I did nothing of the sort. The President can prove, if he likes, that I gave the contrary of general Catholic opinion. I know that the President talked, in a wireless broadcast to America, about inventing the Christian State but I do not undertake to do otherwise than to give an opinion or judgment.
The Deputy said he was very fallible in these things and I want again to remind him that he could have looked these matters up. He was Minister for External Affairs for a period and he spoke as one who was fully aware of these problems and principles that were in question. He said that at a certain time, on behalf of this community, he resisted certain proposals because they cut across what he called, as I understood him, a certain Catholic and Christian principle. The records show that the Deputy is completely wrong. There was an advisory committee set up by the League of Nations. Representatives of eight world-wide organisations of women were represented on that committee. Four of these organisations were so widespread that they claimed to speak for 45,000,000 women. These pressed, because of the hardships on their sex, for a change in some of the laws and for an attempt to get some equality for women in this matter, and equality not merely on the ground that they were human and had to obey the laws of the various States and that the obligation of the law is on the individual. The Deputy would not hesitate, as he indicated a short-time ago, to go into the family and take the father, if the father was a person who had acted against the law. The obligation of the law bears upon the individual and bears upon the woman equally with the man and it is not any mere sentiment of equality, that is in question but the hard fact of the affect of the law on individuals. They pressed to have their grievances redressed and there was a certain measure—not as much as satisfied the women—of agreement that they had a good case. A convention was signed by a number of States, of which we were one. The convention was not to come into effect until it was ratified and accepted. It was signed by the representatives of the different States, but was not to come into effect until it was ratified.
The President has implied, and I do not think he meant to do so, that was while I was Minister for External Affairs.
Oh, no. Perhaps it is possible that my words would be interpreted in that way. I do not want to suggest that, but a representative of our Government signed that convention. We are carrying it out in spirit here. There was a great Catholic organisation of women which approached the League on this particular matter, representing, as the Attorney-General informs me, 25,000,000 Catholic women. They pressed for a law, such as this law here, in order that the hardships which bore upon their sex would be mitigated. They met this question of unity of the family, and its bearing on Christian principles. There were petitions independent of that, signed by thousands of representative Catholics, laymen and clergymen, throughout the world; signed by Benedictines, Jesuits, Franciscans, and a number of the regular Orders; signed by thousands of clergy; signed by very many bishops and archbishops, urging that the hardships which have been indicated should be mitigated. Here is the burden of the petition: "That a woman, whether married or unmarried, should have the same right as a man to retain or change her nationality."
On behalf of what corporate entity is that petition?
I said, first of all, that you had eight international organisations——
Which of them is that? The President read something. I want to know who takes responsibility for it.
That was the burden of the petition which was signed by thousands——
Under what auspices?
It was signed by thousands of persons representative——
Representing what?
Representative, in the sense that they were people of standing in the Catholic community.
Surely it was organised by somebody?
It does not matter whether it was organised or not. We do not get petitions without organisation. The point is whether representative people have put their names to that petition or not. We find there, for example, the name of a great Irish Archbishop, the Coadjutor Archbishop of Sydney. We find there the names of the Bishop of Nice, the Bishop of Oklahoma City, the Archbishop of Tokio, and the Archbishop of St. Andrews and the City of Edinburgh. Those are names of people who were not going to be associated, we may well presume, with a petition which was contrary to any Christian or Catholic principle. As I say, any attempts to attack the measures of this Bill on that basis are bound to fail because the facts are against them. Any attacks on the principles of this Bill, on the grounds that it tends to sever the unity of the family, are bound to fail because the principles of the measure have quite the contrary effect. Nobody who examines the measure, and who does not want to get off cheaply on some glib suggestion that we are acting in an anti-Christian or an anti-social manner, would attempt to criticise the Bill on that basis. I, for one, am proud of the section in the Bill. I am delighted that we have got an opportunity of starting afresh, untied by traditions in the opposite direction. I am delighted that we have an opportunity of dealing fairly with women in this matter. I am not working on any question of mere abstract equality. For example, I have refused—because of the confusion which I thought would arise from it—to accept the principle of nationality descending through both the father and mother, but we have in the Bill attempted to see that no hardship would result to women because of it. We have made provisions by which women can return here. We have made provision by which in the case of minors, children of widows and others who would be affected by it, there would be resumption or acquisition of our citizenship. There are a number of good principles in the Bill, of which I am proud. I am very glad to be the medium of putting into practice what a large number of people have wished to see in practice in all the nations of the world.
The President has a very peculiar way of arguing. He quotes a certain document there, which, of course, I quite accept. Those women's organisations have been presented with a situation in which women, because they did not automatically acquire the nationality of their husbands, were placed in a position of great hardship. My objection is that the principle should be that the wife automatically assumes or acquires the nationality of her husband. The President says we make it easier for a woman or man who is married to an Irish national to become an Irish citizen, than for a person who is not, and that therefore, we are to be congratulated. I disagree. The President says that if a foreigner marries an Irishwoman he can, in only two years, become an Irish national. I say that we should assume that the two automatically become of the one nationality on marriage. I know perfectly well that if, for instance, an Irish girl marries an American she does not acquire American nationality. The President, to begin with, wiped away my argument that the thing should be automatic unless otherwise provided for. He thinks it is a splendid thing that when people of different nationalities get married they retain their own nationality, but it is made comparatively easy for one to acquire the nationality of the other. That is not enough. I think the basis should be that they would automatically acquire it.
Will the Deputy apply himself to the question: How can you force that?
Here is a corporate Act of this State making a law with regard to its own citizens. That law says that as far as marriage is concerned it does not actually make the two of the one nationality, though with great generosity and Christian spirit we are so good that we will allow the man to acquire Irish nationality within two years if he is living here. That would be two years during which the national laws would be such that the wife might be making munitions to shoot her husband, and the husband might be trying to drop bombs upon the munition works. The President says that that is splendid. He says it is the very thing that the Archbishops, Benedictines, Jesuits and everybody else are looking for. All this came about quite naturally; they were dealing with a contingency; I was dealing with a principle. We know it is a fact that because women did not automatically acquire the nationality of their husbands great hardship has been experienced, and women have suffered a great deal. I have been arguing that in our laws we should apply the general principle that the woman on marriage becomes automatically of the same nationality as her husband. The President says we cannot. I quite agree. He goes on to assume that a State can only give privileges and services to its own citizens. That condition existed, and the British assumed by their law, and if I may say so—without looking upon it as the President would say, pontifically, or speaking ex-cathedra—a much better Christian principle was enshrined in that than in this Bill.
The Attorney-General
Since when?
The position was that a woman automatically got the nationality of her husband. That is why there are many British women, when married, without British nationality.
The Attorney-General
Since 1844.
Long before I was born, or before the Attorney-General was born, that was the position. The President talks about what hardships a woman could suffer if she has legally and in the eyes of the law, shed her Irish nationality by marrying a foreigner. There is no reason why she should suffer hardship. This State can say, so far as we are concerned, that we consider it right that in our eyes an Irishwoman has the same nationality as her husband while recognising that certain other States refuse to do that, holding that she automatically forfeited her rights of nationality. That is the case of a woman who has not in some way acquired the nationality of her husband. There is nothing to prevent the Government here giving that woman every service it gives to its nationals, as an act of courtesy. But the Government say they think she should have acquired American nationality. As she had not done so, until such time as she does, all the services she would have got as a right as an Irish national, she could get until she acquires another nationality. It is perfectly simple. The President went on and talked about some foreigner coming here and marrying an Irish girl, that she remains Irish and he remains Belgian, or whatever he may be. The President suggested that I suggested that that would break up marriage. It would not. It does not make disharmony in the fissure between the two. He asked: Are we going to make her an alien amongst her friends? She is not to be an alien amongst her friends but she is to be an alien to her husband. That was the President's argument. Personally, she is the same person. The truth is that the naturalisation of nationality does not amount to as much as the President would like to make it.
The Attorney-General
Or as the Deputy would like to make it.
I think it amounts, not to as much as some people think, but I object to any difference, no matter how small or exaggerated ideas people have. The President said it was ridiculous for me to say that it was going to interfere with marriage. He offered a positive argument and asked, are we going to make her an alien amongst her own people? To my mind the President makes the point for me. He said it was a terrible thing that an Irishwoman should be an alien to other people living in the same street. Consequently, it is right that she should be an alien to her husband. That is the sort of wrong principle I object to. He said that this man married this girl and that according to me she should acquire his nationality. Would that be fair? He says that she would not be deported and would not lose her nationality, but that the husband could be deported. If anyone is going to be deported and told to go to hell out of here, and to get back to Belgium, then, to quote an imaginary conversation, to my mind the wife should be on the ship too. The President thinks she should retain her Irish nationality and stay here.
The wife can go too. We are not going to keep her.
The President says: "How terrible it would be if she had to go." Other countries are doing what the President wants to do here; creating a law by which a wife does not automatically possess the nationality of her husband. I think that is a rotten system. He said that she may be Stateless and talked of the awkwardness of her position, in consequence. There is nothing in a natural-born citizen claiming certain services as a right. If you go to France you have the right to claim the protection of the Minister because you are a citizen. We do not recognise that a woman who married, to use the President's words, is an alien to her husband. That does not deprive the Government here of the power of giving her every service she could possibly have had if she had retained her Irish nationality. If she acquired other nationality there would be a difference. For instance, a girl who married an American, and becomes an American, this Government would not give her the same service, because the American Government would claim certain rights over her as a citizen, and would say that it was their business to give that service. As long as she is Stateless this Government can do everything for her. There is nothing to prevent this Government giving every service and protection to a person born here who is Stateless. I see nothing in the President's argument. It seems to me to be laid down in our law, except in so far as it may be altered, that the wife has automatically the nationality of her husband. The President says that can be done and that special provisions can be made. To my mind the law should be that wife and husband are of the one nationality. I do not think the difference of nationality is nearly as important as the President thinks it. He thinks it would be a terrible thing for an Irish girl, married to a foreigner, to be an alien amongst her own people. If it is a terrible thing to be an alien amongst her own people, it is a much more terrible thing to be an alien to her husband. The President is talking in the realm of contingency. Accepting the principle that we recognise only one nationality of husband and wife, why advert to the special circumstances in the world to-day? Certainly we should do that. We might say that as an American husband does not automatically give his wife, an Irish girl, American nationality, we are going to make it easier to acquire it. That could be done while, at the same time, the basic law here will be that the wife automatically acquires the nationality of the husband.
The Attorney-General
At the risk of provoking the Deputy into making another speech I should like to say a few words by way of comment on what he has said. The Deputy of course has got a peculiarly unhappy facility for delivering speeches in the Dáil, and is tempted on every occasion to make speeches which, as far as I can see, are repetitions of the same thing over and over again. He has made three speeches on this amendment, and would have no trouble in making a fourth, and saying the same thing in different words. He seems not to be quite familiar with regard to English law.
I think it has been changed.
The Attorney-General
It has been changed. The Deputy mentioned the British as an example in this particular matter. I do not know if he adverted to it or not. He must realise that since 1933 the British have enacted provisions which are as objectionable from this point of view as almost anything contained here.
It may be more so.
The Attorney-General
Then he abandons the British.
All I said was that we had British law.
The Attorney-General
Will the Deputy allow me to say what I wish to say? I am sure the House understands quite well what the Deputy has in mind. During the course of his speech he referred to the British position — the automatic loss of citizenship and the automatic gaining of citizenship on marriage as an example of the high ideals to be followed in this type of legislation. I pointed out by way of interruption that that was only since 1844. Before that under the common law rule, the alien wife of a British subject did not become a British subject. England was much more a Christian country before 1844 than she has been since; so that the fact that that particular principle did formerly appeal to them does not help Deputy Fitzgerald. Coming down to last year — 1933 — they have amended the Acts of 1844 and 1914 and have provided that
"Where a woman has (whether before or after the commencement of this Act) married an alien, and was at the time of her marriage a British subject, she shall not, by reason only of her marriage, be deemed to have ceased to be a British subject unless, by reason of her marriage, she acquired the nationality of her husband."
They have thus done away with the automatic laws of citizenship.
I am glad they moved back towards Christianity in 1933.
The Attorney-General
The President has dealt so effectively with the Deputy's argument on the general principles that I consider it hardly necessary to refer to that part of the Deputy's speech. However, I would like to refer to this point. In the course of the history of the petitions directed to the League of Nations, which the President referred to, there was some trouble about the wording of the Catholic petition, and it was pointed out by way of explanation of these people "that the memorandum had given rise to misinterpretation since in certain quarters it has been understood that affirming that unity of the family necessarily involves identity of nationality."
That is the fallacy at the basis of the Deputy's speech. He seems to identify these two things and treats the identity of nationality as essential to the unity of the family, whereas at the end of his own speech he pointed out that a great many people attach an exaggerated importance to this idea of nationality. With that I whole-heartedly agree. If the Deputy was here last night he would have heard Deputy McGilligan say from his experience that during war time the laws about nationality do not matter. He said it does not matter what provision you have as regards the acquisition of nationality by the wives of aliens and that during the time of war they are treated just as badly, rounded into internment camps, deported, etc., and without any regard to what are the precise provisions of the law.
There is only one other thing, which is rather personal to the Deputy, to which I should like to refer, and that is, that a great man for whom he cherishes admiration both as a Catholic thinker and a writer—M. Jacques Maritain — was one of the signatories to the petition the President referred to. That ought to satisfy the Deputy's Catholic principles.
In the realm of contingency.
Section put and agreed to.
SECTION 14.
(1) Where one of the parties to a marriage solemnised (whether in or outside Saorstát Eireann) on or after the 6th day of December, 1922, and before the date of the passing of this Act was, immediately before such marriage, a citizen of Saorstát Eireann and the other of such parties was, immediately before such marriage, not a citizen of Saorstát Eireann, and such parties have for at least two years immediately before the passing of this Act or, where such marriage was solemnised within those two years, continuously since such solemnisation been ordinarily resident outside Saorstát Eireann and intend to continue ordinarily resident outside Saorstát Eireann, the party to such marriage who was immediately before such marriage a citizen of Saorstát Eireann shall, at the expiration of one year after the passing of this Act, cease to be a citizen of Saorstát Eireann unless he or she shall during that year make and lodge with the Minister in the prescribed form and manner a declaration of election to retain Saorstát Eireann citizenship as his or her post-nuptial citizenship.
(2) Where one of the parties to a marriage solemnised (whether in or outside Saorstát Eireann) on or after the date of the passing of this Act is, immediately before such marriage, a citizen of Saorstát Eireann and the other of such parties is, immediately before such marriage, not a citizen of Saorstát Eireann, and such parties intend permanently to have their ordinary residence outside Saorstát Eireann after such marriage, the said party who is, immediately before such marriage, a citizen of Saorstát Eireann shall at the expiration of one year after such marriage cease to be a citizen of Saorstát Eireann unless he or she shall during such year make and lodge with the Minister in the prescribed form and manner a declaration of election to retain Saorstát Eireann citizenship as his or her post-nuptial citizenship.
The following amendments appeared on the Order Paper:—
19. In sub-section (1), lines 45 and 46, to delete the words "expiration of one year after the passing of this Act" and substitute the words "time appointed by the next following sub-section of this section."
20. In sub-section (1), line 47, to delete the words "during that year" and substitute the words "before the expiration of one year after the passing of this Act."
21. Before sub-section (2) to insert a new sub-section as follows:—
"The time at which any particular person shall cease to be a citizen of Saorstát Eireann by virtue of the next preceding sub-section of this section shall be whichever of the following times is applicable to his or her case, that is to say:—
(a) if such person has, before the passing of this Act, acquired the nationality of his or her spouse— the expiration of one year after the passing of this Act, or
(b) if such person, within one year after the passing of this Act, acquires the nationality of his or her spouse — the expiration of such year, or
(c) if such person has not, before the expiration of one year from the passing of this Act, acquired the nationality of his or her spouse — the date on which he or she acquires such nationality."
22. In sub-section (2), line 59, to delete the words "expiration of one year after such marriage" and substitute the words "time appointed by the next following sub-section of this section."
23. In sub-section (2), line 61, to delete the words "during such year" and substitute the words "before the expiration of one year after such marriage."
24. To add at the end of the section a new sub-section as follows:—
"The time at which any particular person shall cease to be a citizen of Saorstát Eireann by virtue of the next preceding sub-section of this section shall be whichever of the following times is applicable to his or her case, that is to say:—
(a) if such person shall, on or within one year after his or her marriage, acquire the nationality of his or her spouse — the expiration of such year, or
(b) if such person has not, before the expiration of one year after his or her marriage, acquired the nationality of his or her spouse — the date on which he or she acquires such nationality."— Aire Gnóthaí Coigríche.
Amendments Nos. 19 to 24 might be debated together.
These amendments look rather formidable but in fact they are not. What they are aiming at is a very simple matter. They are really to prevent one of the things we have been trying to avoid all the time, that the automatic operation of the law would not create hardships. We are trying to secure that the automatic operation of the Bill as it stood before we introduced these amendments would not cause an Irishwoman to lose her Irish nationality before she acquired the nationality of the State to which her husband belonged.
Or an Irishman?
Yes. We are dealing with the two. I am dwelling on the case of the woman because that is the case in which there is particular hardship. This deals equally with either spouse. The whole spirit is that of equality of treatment of either spouse, though in the main what we are most interested in is to prevent the hardships from which women suffer by the automatic operation of laws of which Deputy Fitzgerald seems to be in favour. As it stood in its original form, after a certain period was reached the Irish nationality of a woman would have lapsed. We are here providing that that cessor should not take place until the person affected should actually have acquired the nationality of the other spouse. If you have that idea, you will find you will understand the meaning of all these amendments. In regard to the first, the most important one would be No. 21 which defines the period after which Irish nationality would lapse. In the case of the other, the important one in a similar position would be No. 24. If the Deputies have noted the construction of the Bill as it stood and read with it these amendments, I think it will not be difficult to follow.
They explain themselves. I have only to say that I warmly support the amendments. Without the amendments I would certainly have strongly opposed Section 14. The amendments change the situation altogether and make that a reasonable section. The President spoke of the hardship that might otherwise have be fallen a woman. As a matter of fact, under the original section there would have been much more danger of hardship befalling a man, because a woman who married a foreigner would not be taken by surprise on losing Irish nationality, whereas the man would very much. He would probably not have taken any steps to acquire any other nationality.
Amendments put and agreed to.
Section 14, as amended, agreed to.
SECTION 15.
Question proposed: "That Section 15 stand part of the Bill."
I raised a question with regard to the time limit. The question applies to both Sections 15 and 16. In Section 15 (b) there is a time limit of 12 months after the passing of this Bill, and in Section 16 (c) there is a time limit of 6 months after marriage. I suggested the other day, and, I think, my suggestion appeared to meet with some friendliness over there, that there was really no need to insert a time limit at all and that it should be left open to the alien married to a citizen of the Saorstát to acquire citizenship at any time, without having to do it within a certain period after the passing of this Bill, or after marriage. I do not know why there should be a time limit. I do not know whether the Government have any reason for inserting this time limit in the Bill.
Personally, I think it is desirable. I know what the Deputy is thinking of — he is thinking of the penalisation of the person who did not apply in time. Is not that so?
No.
What we are looking for here is to try and induce the incoming spouse to adopt Irish nationality as soon as possible. There is this view about the short time limit — that if you leave it without limit, and if it is indefinitely open there might be a failure on the part of the incoming spouse to acquire nationality.
Why should the Government wish to force the inclinations of the incoming spouse? I do not see that there is any need for the State to be peremptory in this matter at all. There may be substantial reasons for the alien spouse not seeking a change of citizenship. There may be some reason connected with property why an American citizen say, may wish to remain an American citizen. These reasons may vanish at a later stage. I think the mere fact of being married to an Irish spouse should make it easy for the alien to become an Irish citizen, no matter how long after the passing of this Bill or after marriage. The State should make it easy for the alien.
I support Deputy MacDermot's argument. If we take the cases of those Irish people who went to America and deliberately decided not to become citizens because they had intended at some time or other to return home, how does it look?
These are inside. This relates to persons who are going to reside in their ordinary residence here.
Yes, but suppose there was a law in America requiring our people to become citizens in two years?
I am anxious to follow the argument on the other side. I have not been quite able to follow the argument of Deputy McMenamin.
His argument is that in a similar case in America where an Irish citizen marries an American spouse, that citizen should also be given plenty of time to make up his or her mind.
This time limit does not serve any purpose. An alien may have a very definite reason for not becoming a citizen. On the other hand, there might be cases where it would be an advantage to this State that an alien was compelled to become a citizen, but, after all, it should be a question for the person concerned. We leave a lot to those people themselves. We are leaving a man or woman free to become a citizen or not. Then, why are we using compulsion in this matter? What is the object of it? Is it not contrary to the principle running through the rest of the Bill? I would like to know what is behind 15 (b) and 16 (c)?
What is behind these sub-section is this: there is an idea that we are offering a privilege in virtue of an alien marrying one of our citizens. We are offering the privilege of citizenship to a stranger coming amongst us. We think that that offer and that privilege should be readily accepted. If it is not availed of, we say: "Very well, this offer is not to be open indefinitely." We want the alien to decide what he is going to do. We say to him that: "We want you to consider the circumstances and we do not compel you to decide one way or the other. If you decide on a certain way, we give you an offer of our citizenship up to a certain date." Deputy MacDermot asks why should we take up that attitude. I think it is advisable for us to know what is going to be the position in regard to that particular person. Dallying with citizenship after such an offer is made is a thing that we should not countenance. In fact, the general spirit behind the Bill is to enable the people to decide, on marriage or within 12 months after the passing of this Bill, whether they would become citizens. The shortest possible time of probation was to apply. The probation period after marriage was to extend to the shortest possible time.
Perhaps we could meet the point raised by Deputy MacDermot by giving discretion to the Minister for Justice. Deputies do not like giving discretion to the Minister. I do not want to commit myself in matters of this kind, but I think if there were special circumstances it might be got over in that way. It is all very well to talk in general principles, but when you examine the consequences of some of these principles in detail, you may find that they do not work out nearly so well as one would imagine at first. In this matter, I want to consult the Department of Justice, who are closely connected with this measure, as to how the point raised by the Opposition may be effected. I do not like leaving the matter indefinitely open. I am inclined to think that it should be possible to get over the difficulty by allowing the Minister for Justice in special circumstances to keep the offer open. I am thinking of cases where say, a person made representation after marriage and that that representation set out that becoming a citizen at that time would involve certain losses or that certain consequences would flow that would be particularly damaging to the person. There might be cases where a heavy penalty, never contemplated by the Legislature, would follow. It is not the intention that a person should pay dearly for this privilege. But if the person said: "If I get an extended period of time, then these consequences might not necessarily flow," I could imagine in such a case it might be well if the Minister had discretionary power. Suppose he had power to permit the intimation by the person that he or she wished to become an Irish citizen. If that were indicated and accompanied, say, with the request that it should not become effective as early as we have it now in the Bill, discretionary power might be left to the Minister to consider it. I do not want to commit myself to that.
The difficulties in connection with this Bill are that Opposition Deputies wait to present their objections until we come here. The more normal way would be to put their objections in the form of amendments. There ought to be no complaint from the Opposition that time was not given. When we were in Opposition we were not treated in the same way as I have been attempting to treat the Opposition on the question of this Bill. At a moment's notice, we are asked questions which no Minister could take it on himself to answer right off. He could not have all that information as to the results that might follow from general principles a priori. While not committing myself, I say there is a case made for having some dispensing power residing somewhere, but I would not like in general terms to extend the period of the Bill because there would be then an unnecessary inducement to delay applications for citizenship. The only way I see at all, at the moment, of trying to meet the points raised by the Opposition is to give dispensing power to the Minister for Justice.
I see no reason why the State should wish to induce people to become citizens hurriedly and why the State should not adopt an attitude of indifference.
I wish the Deputy were here when Deputy Fitzgerald was speaking.
I can see no necessity for the time limit and, therefore, the suggestion of dispensing power being given to the Minister for Justice does not appeal to me. When the President uses a phrase like "dallying with this question of citizenship" I think he is sentimentalising and that he is merely rhetorical. The phrase does not mean anything.
I am afraid the sentiment of Deputy Fitzgerald affected me. I think that there is value in having husband and wife of the same nationality if it can be accomplished with the will of both parties.
I think that it is entirely a matter for the husband and wife and for nobody else. I think that the State should make it easy for husband or wife at any time to change from being an alien to being a citizen. It should not make change difficult by imposing a time limit like this. I see no case for a time limit. I agree that the President has a right to complain that I did not deal with this matter by putting down an amendment, as, perhaps, I should have done. However, it is too late to alter that. The President has time between now and Report Stage to give further attention to the matter. I appeal to him not to close his mind to the idea that a time limit is unnecessary and, on the whole, undesirable. May I hope that he will think that point over with an open mind.
Whether the Deputy hopes so or not, having mentioned the matter, the point is bound to come under notice.
Sections 15 and 16 agreed to.
Amendment No. 26 not moved.
Sections 17 to 20 agreed to.
SECTION 21.
Question proposed: "That Section 21 stand part of the Bill."
Has the President any further elucidation of his ideas on this subject to offer the House?
I do not think that it is necessary to dwell on this section. The provisions, in our conception, represent the most appropriate way of implementing our independent and equal rights. We think that it is the only way, in fact, in which we can have association of that sort without surrendering precious rights which we are not prepared to surrender. Generally, I think that the principle is a good one. We are prepared to treat on equal terms and give in return for what we get.
Section agreed to.
Sections 22 to 27 agreed to.
SECTION 28.
I move amendment No. 27:
To add at the end of the section two new sub-sections as follows:—
(2) The common law relating to British nationality, if and so far as it is or ever was, either wholly or in part, in force in Saorstát Eireann, shall cease to have effect.
(3) The facts or events by reason of which a person is at any time a natural-born citizen of Saorstát Eireann shall not of themselves operate to confer on such person any other citizenship or nationality.
There is a question as to whether this amendment is necessary at all. My own opinion is that the sub-sections are not necessary. However, certain criticism was levelled at the Bill on the ground that it did not do certain things. We believe it did. However, where there is any shadow or suggestion of difference of opinion which might be presented to a judge in court, it is a very good thing for us in the legislature to resolve the doubt and make the matter particularly plain. Deputies who have been following this debate will appreciate the full import of our amendment to Section 28. The first part makes clear that we are putting an end to the operation of the common law here which might be regarded by some people as having been brought over here by Article 73 or some such provision and running side by side with the statute. It is possible that, in the second part of the amendment, the phrase "shall not of themselves operate" may require a little comment. What we mean is that we might have in this country children born of American parents who, by the law of their country, would be Americans. We do not want to seem to cut across any recognised general principle of that sort. The idea is that these facts shall not in themselves operate to confer on any such person either citizenship or nationality. We intend to make clear that henceforth, by Irish law, no person born in this country will be anything but an Irish citizen.
I do not propose to detain the House with a speech on this section, or on the amendment, but I may say at once that the Opposition are opposed both to Section 28, as it originally stood, and to Section 28 with the amendments proposed to be added. Until the day comes, if it ever does come, when a republic is declared in this country, we see no advantage and no point in passing a section of a law which purports to deprive the citizens of this country of the common status possessed by citizens of every part of the British Commonwealth. Of course, we are all acquainted with the fact that, under British law, what we do here on that subject has no effect. That makes it all the more hypocritical and undesirable. We cannot see that any useful purpose whatever is achieved by Section 28 or by the amendments proposed to be added to Section 28. We shall, therefore, oppose it.
Question put: "That the proposed sub-sections be there inserted."
The Committee divided: Tá, 40; Níl, 19.
Tá.
- Bartley, Gerald.
- Bourke, Daniel.
- Brady, Brian.
- Brady, Seán.
- Breathnach, Cormac.
- Breen, Daniel.
- Briscoe, Robert.
- Concannon, Helena.
- Crowley, Timothy.
- Derrig, Thomas.
- De Valera, Eamon.
- Doherty, Hugh.
- Donnelly, Eamon.
- Geoghegan, James.
- Gibbons, Seán.
- Hales, Thomas.
- Harris, Thomas.
- Houlihan, Patrick.
- Keely, Séamus P.
- Kelly, James Patrick.
- Kennedy, Michael Joseph.
- Kissane, Eamonn.
- Lemass, Seán F.
- Little, Patrick John.
- Lynch, James B.
- Maguire, Conor Alexander.
- Moane, Edward.
- Moore, Séamus.
- Moylan, Seán.
- O Briain, Donnchadh.
- O'Doherty, Joseph.
- O'Dowd, Patrick.
- O'Grady, Seán.
- O'Reilly, Matthew.
- Pearse, Margaret Mary.
- Ruttledge, Patrick Joseph.
- Ryan, James.
- Ryan, Robert.
- Smith, Patrick.
- Victory, James.
Níl.
- Beckett, James Walter.
- Bennett, George Cecil.
- Burke, James Michael.
- Burke, Patrick.
- Cosgrave, William T.
- Dolan, James Nicholas.
- Doyle, Peadar S.
- Esmonde, Osmond Grattan.
- Fitzgerald, Desmond.
- Fitzgerald-Kenney, James.
- Lynch, Finian.
- MacDermot, Frank.
- McFadden, Michael Og.
- McGuire, James Ivan.
- McMenamin, Daniel.
- Mulcahy, Richard.
- O'Sullivan, Gearóid.
- O'Sullivan, John Marcus.
- Rice, Vincent.
Tellers: — Tá: Deputies Little and Smith; Níl: Deputies Doyle and Bennett.
Question declared carried.
Question proposed: "That Section 28, as amended, stand part of the Bill."
I wish to state that we oppose the section as well as the amendments.
Question put.
The Committee divided: Tá, 41; Níl, 19.
Tá.
- Bartley, Gerald.
- Bourke, Daniel.
- Brady, Brian.
- Brady, Seán.
- Breathnach, Cormac.
- Breen, Daniel.
- Briscoe, Robert.
- Cleary, Micheal.
- Concannon, Helena.
- Crowley, Timothy.
- Derrig, Thomas.
- De Valera, Eamon.
- Doherty, Hugh.
- Donnelly, Eamon.
- Geoghegan, James.
- Gibbons, Seán.
- Hales, Thomas.
- Harris, Thomas.
- Houlihan, Patrick.
- Keely, Séamus P.
- Kelly, James Patrick.
- Kennedy, Michael Joseph.
- Kissane, Eamonn.
- Lemass, Seán F.
- Little, Patrick John.
- Lynch, James B.
- Maguire, Conor Alexander.
- Moane, Edward.
- Moore, Séamus.
- Moylan, Seán.
- O Briain, Donnchadh.
- O'Doherty, Joseph.
- O'Dowd, Patrick.
- O'Grady, Seán.
- O'Reilly, Matthew.
- Pearse, Margaret Mary.
- Ruttledge, Patrick Joseph.
- Ryan, James.
- Ryan, Robert.
- Smith, Patrick.
- Victory, James.
Níl.
- Beckett, James Walter.
- Bennett, George Cecil.
- Burke, James Michael.
- Burke, Patrick.
- Cosgrave, William T.
- Dolan, James Nicholas.
- Doyle, Peadar S.
- Esmonde, Osmond Grattan.
- Fitzgerald, Desmond.
- Fitzgerald-Kenney, James.
- Lynch, Finian.
- MacDermot, Frank.
- McFadden, Michael Og.
- McGovern, Patrick.
- McGuire, James Ivan.
- Mulcahy, Richard.
- O'Sullivan, Gearóid.
- O'Sullivan, John Marcus.
- Rice, Vincent.
Tellers:— Tá: Deputies Little and Smith; Níl: Deputies Doyle and Bennett.
Question declared carried.
SECTION 29:
I move Amendment No. 28:—
Before Section 29 to insert a new section as follows:—
"Every person who is a citizen of Saorstát Eireann by virtue of Article 3 of the Constitution and every person who is or becomes a citizen of Saorstát Eireann by or under this Act shall be such citizen for all purposes, municipal and international."
This, like the other amendment, is probably unnecessary, but as certain doubts were cast upon the universality of this Bill or the extra territoriality of the law we propose here, I thought it well to make it quite clear. Of course, the fact is that it is clear that our laws apply outside the immediate territory of this State and that our laws can have extra territorial effect. But to make it quite clear, because of any suggestions that might go abroad to the contrary, we state definitely here that everybody
"who is a citizen of Saorstát Eireann by virtue of Article 3 of the Constitution, and every person who is or becomes a citizen of Saorstát Eireann by or under this Act, shall be such citizen for all purposes, municipal and international."
There is no doubt whatever that our law would be respected abroad. At The Hague Convention, here is one of the general principles which were accepted:—
"That it is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be recognised by other States in so far as it is consistent with international convention, international custom, and the principles of law generally recognised with regard to nationality."
And secondly:—
"Any question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a particular State shall be determined in accordance with the law of that State."
As I say, I think it would be well to have it here actually in the body of the Bill.
Amendment No. 28 put and agreed to.
New section ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Section 29 put and agreed to.
LONG TITLE.
An Act to provide for and regulate the acquisition by birth or otherwise of citizenship of Saorstát Eireann, and the forfeiture or loss of such citizenship, and to provide for divers matters connected with the matters aforesaid.
I move amendment No. 29:—
In page 2, line 6, after the word "regulate" to insert the words "for all purposes, municipal and international."
In the same way I move this amendment here so as to make it consonant with the last amendment and also to make it clear in the body of the Bill itself that our laws have extra territorial application.
There was a point raised by Deputy McGilligan — I do not know if the Leas-Cheann Comhairle is familiar with it — that the change in the title of the Bill as here proposed might necessitate a new Money Resolution. The Ceann Comhairle said that he would consider the submission that Deputy McGilligan made to him. The suggestion was that it would enlarge, possibly, the expenses under the Bill and that as the Money Resolution already passed had reference to a particular title it might be necessary to have a new Money Resolution corresponding to the proposed new title. I do not know whether that matter has been considered.
I do not think the Deputy is quite correct in saying that it was at this particular stage we would have to deal with that. It is quite obvious that the Money Resolution had to deal with the expenses arising immediately and directly out of this Bill. It is not a question of whether this Bill would involve policies which might lead to further expense. I do not think the Chair suggested that at this stage we were going to consider that.
At what stage then?
I think the Ceann Comhairle indicated that this amendment did not enlarge the scope of the Bill.
He indicated that the amendment was in order. I quite agree as to that, but he seemed to be somewhat impressed by the submission that Deputy McGilligan made but not the submission that Deputy Esmonde made to him, and that even though it was in order the effect might be to necessitate a new Money Resolution. I frankly admit that I am not sufficiently skilled in procedure to argue the point, but the point was mentioned and the Ceann Comhairle said that he would take it into consideration. I am merely asking whether the results of that consideration are yet to hand.
What I understood was that the Ceann Comhairle ruled that if it would increase, extend or enlarge the scope of the Bill the submissions put forward by Deputy McGilligan would be considered when it became effective.
Does that mean that the decision of the Ceann Comhairle was that he would consider the matter when the Bill passed through Committee, and when he saw it after it had been amended in Committee?
It is not for me to construe what the Ceann Comhairle said.
Possibly we can raise this matter with the Ceann Comhairle on the Report Stage.
The Long Title, as amended, put and agreed to.
Bill reported with amendments.
When is it proposed to take the Report Stage?
On Tuesday.
Why the rush?
There is no rush. The Bill was circulated on the 5th November.
The President agrees that he introduced radical amendments on the Committee Stage, amendments of such a nature that the normal amendments that might be proposed to the Bill were not proposed by the Opposition Party.
I do not agree with that suggestion—good, bad or indifferent. There is no foundation whatever for it. There were no radical amendments. The amendments introduced were of a type that might have been introduced on the Report Stage. They were the normal type of amendment introduced into a Bill of this, I will not say, complexity, because the principles underlying it are not complex, but the necessary length of the drafting may hide some of those principles. Take, as an example, the last two amendments. These were only to insist on the view which had been held on our side, a view which is supported by the best opinion I could get. But lest there should be any doubt about it, the amendments were introduced though they are not valuable amendments at all. Then we have four or six amendments dealing with nationality, with the position of a married woman and her spouse where one was a citizen of ours and one a citizen of another country. All these amendments were simply to deal with one very simple thing and that was the automatic operation of the law, which is one of the things we have been trying to avoid all the time, would not create hardships. All these were the normal type of amendment. There was nothing in the way of a drastic amendment introduced in the Bill at all. As regards the time, if I recollect, we circulated the Bill on the 5th November. We had a Second Reading debate on the 12th November, and that was adjourned and carried over to the 28th. Now, we are in the middle of December. I do not think that anybody can suggest from the opposite benches that there is any real truth behind the suggestion that we are rushing this Bill. I was anxious, I admit, to have the Bill completed before Christmas.
Despite what the President may say, we happen to have the right and the ability to think for ourselves. To say that the Bill has not been radically altered is simply ridiculous. Yesterday, amongst other things, the President stated that he was going to consider certain proposals put forward by Deputy McGilligan. We have the case under this Bill of a person of Irish extraction and Irish blood marrying a person belonging to another country, A son is born in that other country, a second son is born in Great Britain and a third son is born here. The son born here has Irish citizenship and the other two cannot get it until they are 21.
Why not?
Until they live here.
That is all nonsense.
That is the manner in which this Bill is being presented to the House.
It is quite clear that the Deputy has not read the Bill or tried to understand it.
I presume the President has made up his mind that he is going to introduce the amendments he promised?
They are going to be very few.
When are we going to get them? Presumably, not tomorrow. Will we get them on Monday, and at what hour?
As the Deputy well knows, in the case of amendments introduced at the request of the Opposition after Committee there is just one simple debate on them. There is not the usual long Committee Stage debate. They will be amendments to meet, so far as it is possible, the views of the Opposition.
That evades rather than answers my question. I asked at what hour we were going to get the amendments on Monday.
I do not know.
We are facilitating the work of the House in every way and now we are asked to take this Bill on Tuesday and be presented with the amendments to it on Tuesday morning. We will vote against the taking of the Bill on Tuesday.
We do not mind in the slightest.
I asked at what hour we would get the amendments on Monday, and I cannot be told that. It is not treating the House fairly to circulate the amendments on Tuesday morning and take the Bill on that day.
You will get them when they are ready.
The Deputy knows that amendments can be taken at any time without notice, if the Chair thinks it desirable to do so.
The position is that we are going to get Ministerial amendments to this Bill, without notice.
Do not construe me as saying what the Government may do.
We cannot get an hour to consider the Bill on Tuesday.
If the Deputy had been here he would have known in advance what the amendments are likely to be.
Would the President tell the House what is the urgency for this particular measure?
That does not arise.
Perhaps he will tell us why it is urgent.
I want to have it completed during this Session as far as the Dáil is concerned.
Question —"That the Report Stage be taken on Tuesday, 18th December,"—put.
The Dáil divided: Tá, 38; Níl, 20.
Tá.
- Bartley, Gerald.
- Bourke, Daniel.
- Brady, Brian.
- Brady, Seán.
- Breathnach, Cormac.
- Breen, Daniel.
- Briscoe, Robert.
- Cleary, Micheál.
- Concannon, Helena.
- Crowley, Timothy.
- Derrig, Thomas.
- De Valera, Eamon.
- Doherty, Hugh.
- Donnelly, Eamon.
- Geoghegan, James.
- Gibbons, Seán.
- Hales, Thomas.
- Harris, Thomas.
- Houlihan, Patrick.
- Keely, Séamus P.
- Kelly, James Patrick.
- Kennedy, Michael Joseph.
- Kissane, Eamonn.
- Lemass, Seán F.
- Little, Patrick John.
- Lynch, James B.
- Maguire, Conor Alexander.
- Moane, Edward.
- Moylan, Seán.
- O Briain, Donnchadh.
- O'Doherty, Joseph.
- O'Dowd, Patrick.
- O'Grady, Seán.
- Pearse, Margaret Mary.
- Ruttledge, Patrick Joseph.
- Ryan, James.
- Ryan, Robert.
- Smith, Patrick.
Níl.
- Beckett, James Walter.
- Bennett, George Cecil.
- Burke, James Michael.
- Burke, Patrick.
- Cosgrave, William T.
- Dolan, James Nicholas.
- Doyle, Peadar S.
- Esmonde, Osmond Grattan.
- Fitzgerald, Desmond.
- Fitzgerald-Kenney, James.
- Lynch, Finian.
- MacDermot, Frank.
- McFadden, Michael Og.
- McGuire, James Ivan.
- McMenamin, Daniel.
- Mulcahy, Richard.
- O'Sullivan, Gearóid.
- O'Sullivan, John Marcus.
- Rice, Vincent.
- Rowlette, Robert James.
Tellers:— Tá: Deputies Little and Smith; Níl: Deputies Doyle and Bennett.
Question declared carried.
The Dáil adjourned at 10.50 p.m. until Tuesday, 18th December, at 3 p.m.