Dáil Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 6 Nov 1935

Vol. 59 No. 3

League of Nations (Obligations of Membership) Bill, 1935—Second Stage.

Question proposed: "That the Bill be now read the Second Time."

Minister for External Affairs (The President)

As Deputies will see, this is a Bill to enable the Executive Council to take the measures that it is its duty to take in order to fulfil its obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations. Deputies will remember that fourteen members of the League of Nations were of opinion that the Covenant had been violated by one of the member States, and that that State resorted to war in violation of its contracts under the Covenant. That opinion of these fourteen members of the Council of the League of Nations was concurred in by practically all the members, as was also their statement that one of the member States had violated its Covenants. The members resolved themselves into a Committee to consider how the obligations which fell to be discharged by each individual member, in virtue of the Covenant of the League of Nations, might best be coordinated—that is, the measures which had to be taken to carry out these obligations. That Committee is the Committee referred to in this Bill as the Co-ordination Committee.

Deputies should remember that it is not the League as an organisation that is acting in this case. The obligation is an obligation on each particular member to act, and action is being coordinated by these members meeting apart from the Assembly of the League of Nations. That Committee appointed a sub-committee, which was called the Committee of Eighteen, to consider and prepare in advance a scheme for coordinating these measures—measures mainly of an economic and financial character. When these proposals have been considered and adopted by the Committee of Eighteen, they are brought before the Co-ordination Committee, on which there are representatives of all the member States with the exception of the parties to the dispute. The proposals that are here in the Schedule to this Bill are proposals that were adopted by the Co-ordination Committee.

The scheme of the Bill is simple. The main text simply empowers the Executive Council to make Orders to give effect to these proposals that are in the Schedule. Section 2 (2) empowers the Executive Council to make the Orders that I have referred to. It also gives power to make Orders that are ancillary or incidental to or necessary for the enforcement of all or any of the Orders referred to. Section 3 empowers the Executive Council to amend or revoke these Orders. In Section 4 there is provision for the exemption of religious or humanitarian bodies or organisations from the operation of these Orders. In Section 5 it is declared an offence to act in contravention of the Orders, and penalties for such action are set out. In Section 6 there is provision for the laying of the Orders that are made, with the usual conditions, on the Table of the House.

That is the scheme of the main body of the Bill. With regard to the proposals in the Schedule, Deputies will notice that the first has reference to the exporting of arms and implements of war. The second has reference to financial measures. The third proposal has reference to the prohibition of importation of Italian goods. The fourth proposal puts an embargo on certain exports to Italy. The fifth and final is the organisation of mutual support, in which is set forth what are the steps that States should decide to take in mutual support in the carrying out of these obligations.

It may be asked was legislation necessary in order that our obligations under the Covenant should be carried out. As to proposal No. 1, we could probably have, by administrative action, done everything that was necessary in regard to the arms question. As to the financial measures, by co-operation with the banks we could probably have carried out in the main our obligations in that regard. However, both because of the exception which we have made with regard to the exemption of religious bodies from the operation of these Orders, and also because certain difficulties which could not now be foreseen, might arise, it was deemed advisable to have even in their regard legislative authority. With regard to the proposals about trade legislation, I must say that was certainly necessary. In any case we thought that in a matter of this kind it was only right that the members of the House should have a full opportunity of discussing this whole matter.

I think that the Bill itself is self-explanatory. There has been a good deal of publicity of League activity recently, and I feel satisfied that Deputies, and most people in the country who are interested, have made themselves acquainted in the main with the dispute and with the obligations of the member States under the Covenant.

I do not know whether it would be wise at this time to talk of any misunderstandings that may have arisen in connection with our position. If there is to be any reference to these, perhaps it would be better to deal with them at the close of the debate. Sometimes any attempt to deal with misunderstandings at the start only gives rise to further misunderstandings.

The point at the moment is that when we joined the League of Nations we really entered on an international treaty. We accepted the Covenant and undertook the obligations which are set out in the Covenant. The moment we decide we are satisfied that a State has violated its obligations under those Articles of the Covenant which enjoin it to seek a peaceful settlement of disputes, and has resorted to war instead, then automatically we become bound to fulfil our obligations. If we refuse to fulfil these obligations we can only be held as having violated the Covenant and our international contracts. For your representatives in Geneva, therefore, there was a very simple question to decide—whether there has been a violation of the Covenant or not, and, having agreed that there was a violation, whether the State would carry out the obligations which follow on such a decision. We agreed that the violation had occurred and I hold that there was no choice but similarly to agree that the measures which are set out here in the Covenant should be taken, of course, in conjunction or in co-operation with the other States. The idea of a coordinating committee was to see that the measures which each State is bound severally to adopt would be guaranteed in such a way as would make them effective.

This is not, I think, a Bill in which much can be done in Committee. We have not in the Schedule of the Bill the complete text of the Resolutions as they were passed at the Committee. There are parts that are really directions to Governments and things of that sort. The full texts are available in the Library, and, if Deputies desire-it, we could have the full texts supplied. I have a copy here which was. published in the League documents. We could have these full texts copied and circulated. The omissions are, as I have said, simply those things that it would be quite inappropriate to have here in a Schedule to an Act. For instance, here is one omission and I take it at random: "The Governments are invited to put into operation at once such of the measures recommended as can be enforced without fresh legislation and to take all practicable steps to secure that the measures recommended are completely put into operation by October 31st, 1935...." It is quite clear that paragraphs of that sort do not refer to the measures which would be covered by any order which the Executive Council would be called upon to make.

I do not think it is necessary to recommend this Bill to the Dáil. I think every Member here will find himself in exactly the same position as your representative—as I—found himself in Geneva, that there was a clear case both as regards having resort to war without acting in accordance with the provisions set out in Article 12 and other Articles of the Covenant, and that it was clearly set out in Article 16 what we should do in such a case. I am perfectly certain that every Deputy who approaches the matter in that way can only come to the one opinion, and I expect, accordingly, that Deputies on all sides of the House will vote for this measure.

Mr. Dillon

I think we can assume that in over 30 Parliaments, all independent States who are co-operating in the work of the League of Nations, Bills analogous to that submitted to us to-day have been introduced. I venture to state that in none of those Parliaments has so inadequate an introduction been given to a measure so important as that which has been brought before us by the Minister for External Affairs. We are all aware, painfully aware, of the passion the President has for having the last word. But I think he might have overcome that passion to-day and, greatly daring, spoken his mind before Deputies were called upon to deal with the issues that arise on this Bill. He has not seen fit to do that and so it devolved upon us to state briefly our attitude towards the measure which has been brought before us. That we cannot do without referring to the circumstances under which we entered into the commitments which make this Bill necessary.

We desire to say quite explicitly that we emphatically endorse the attitude adopted by President de Valera at the League of Nations in connection with the dispute at present existing between the League and Italy. We entered the League of Nations as a free and sovereign nation some years ago. Deputy Cosgrave, at that time being President of the Executive Council, marked the solemnity of the occasion by attending in person to represent the Government of this country and on our behalf, and with the full authority of Parliament, he accepted responsibility for all the Covenants of the League. President de Valera, when faced with the duty of undertaking the obligations those Covenants placed upon us, did so and, if I may use a personal word, he did so in terms which to me seemed both eloquent and peculiarly appropriate to the occasion with which he was called upon to deal. It is a source of gratification, I should think, to every section of our community that, before the world, covenants solemnly entered into by an Irish Government have been so fully accepted and implemented by their successors in office.

I note with satisfaction that the Minister for External Affairs, in his very inadequate introductory observations, did take occasion to throw emphasis upon the fact that the action we are taking here to-day arises not directly from the Italian-Abyssinian dispute, but from the knowledge that one member of the League of Nations has failed in its obligations, freely entered into with the other members of the League of Nations. This House is not called upon, and has not been called upon at any time to examine the merits of any international dispute. We are concerned with the action our President has taken in view of the fact that one member of the League of Nations has reneged upon its undertaking and broken solemn engagements that bound it to its fellow-members of the League. I think, however, that this occasion should not be allowed to pass—and in this I am in a position to speak for my colleagues—without directing the attention of the President to the somewhat anomalous situation in which he has put himself and this country at large. He spoke eloquently at Geneva and rebuked the Government of Italy for resorting to war as a means of resolving an international dispute. He found himself associated in that rebuke with Captain the Right Hon. Anthony Eden, Minister to the League of Nations in Great Britain and with Ministers of other States attending that meeting. If Bolivia and Paraguay, when they were engaged in slaughtering one another in the swamp of Gran-Chaco dispatched their generalissimos to Geneva to read a homily to Signor Mussolini because of his action in an international dispute on this occasion, I suggest that the whole world would rock with laughter and that these gentlemen would have to retire back to their swamps to carry on their war amidst the derisive laughter of every man in the country. Does it not occur to the President of the Executive Council, and to the Minister for the League of Nations affairs, that they present a rather ridiculous appearance for the reason that while rebuking Signor Mussolini for having resorted to a war, they have themselves resorted to war in an international dispute and that it is common knowledge that these two gentlemen have been tearing one another asunder in the face of the world for the past three years?

I do not suggest for a single moment that either of these gentlemen could be deflected from his clear duty to the Covenant owing to that initial state of affairs. But I do suggest to the House that in addition to their sanctions, if our nations presented an improved position to the several nations, to assist them in their efforts to restore peace, the League of Nations as a body would then have perhaps in its armour the most effective sanction of all and that is the moral force of the world. Surely it is true to say that if that moral force is to operate to the best advantage, it must not be open to the guilty party in any dispute to say to those who would restrain him: "Take first the beam from thine own eye before thou observest the mote in mine." So I turn to the President and suggest that at this critical time when we are making a material and valuable contribution to the peace of the world by our co-operation in the work of helping the cause of peace in Europe and Africa, we have an additional reason to those already patent reasons that exist, for settling the financial dispute that exists between ourselves and Great Britain. Reason enough we have for that in the great suffering that the dispute has brought upon our own people, but there is now the additional advantage in making peace so that weight may be lent to the eloquent words of the Minister for External Affairs at Geneva; and, if he has to return there, if he is called upon to do so, in the immediate future, he will be in a position to say that we not only preach negotiations in preference to war but we practise what we preach as well. He will be able to show that we faced the situation between ourselves and our near neighbour, aggravated as it has been by bitter considerations, and a variety of difficulties arising out of the past, and that we have boldly grasped the nettle and have overcome our difficulties and suspended a war that was bringing nothing but disaster, just as this war will bring disaster not only to those engaged in it but to those all round them. Can we not think that whatever weight attached to the President's words—and I have no doubt considerable weight attached his words when he spoke at Geneva—greater weight would attach to them now if he was in a position to speak as one who could give an object lesson to the world as to how to settle difficult problems and as one who had discovered the very model such as he could recommend to the League of Nations at the present time. The President has found in this matter, and in other matters vital to the interests of this country, a ready response to his appeal from this side of the House for constructive policy. Is it necessary for me to repeat that if he desires to strengthen his own hand and this country not only economically and morally, but in any representations that he may feel called upon to make by any action that he may be required to take, he will find that we on this side have the same ready desire to co-operate in order that he may be able to return to Geneva, a model for other statesmen to follow and, fortified by the knowledge that this country is recuperating from such a war as is now disturbing another part of the world?

Mr. MacDermot

I do not propose to intervene at any length, but I cannot refrain from rising to congratulate the President and the Government warmly upon the stand they have taken in connection with our obligations under the Covenant. No doubt it was the only thing they could do, in decency or in honesty; yet I can see, and frankly admit, that from the narrow Party point of view there might be a temptation to take a different course. There might be a temptation to take a stand like that which has been taken by Father Coughlin in the United States of America, and by some of the Irish community there, namely, that the imposition of sanctions in connection with this Italo-Abyssinian war was a monstrous and wrongful deed for which Great Britain alone was responsible. The President might have sought to give effect to the old doctrine which has been so often preached in this country, that Great Britain's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity. Fortunately, he realised that the present difficulty is not Great Britain's difficulty; that it is the difficulty of civilisation; and that he was called upon to take a wide and statesmanlike view of the situation which presented itself.

I listened with much interest to the remarks of Deputy Dillon, in which he pledged to the Government the emphatic support of the Opposition on this measure. I cannot help feeling that there has been a certain change in the weather. Some of the Mediterranean sunshine has been brought back by Deputy Dillon, and the equinoctial gales of a few weeks ago have given way to the mild breezes of an Indian summer. Who would have thought, listening to that emphatic endorsement of the Government's attitude, that a month ago the Opposition leaders were after the President like a pack of wolves; that he was accused of pledging support to Great Britain; that he was warned against blindly and futilely following the lead of Great Britain; that the Irish people were told he was threatening them with conscription in the interests of Great Britain; that he was chided for lunching with Mr. Eden; or that he was warned that it was not his place to meddle in foreign affairs at all?

When I listen to what is being said to-day, and compare it with what was said a month ago, I am reminded of a story about Cicero, well known to most schoolboys who have had anything in the nature of a classical education. There is a speech of Cicero's—I think it is the Pro Milone—which has been handed down to posterity, and which is one of the most eloquent speeches Cicero ever composed. Unfortunately, it was never in fact delivered. The reason it was not delivered was because the powers that be were specially inflamed against Cicero's client; soldiery were brought into the Court and the Court was overawed. Cicero, who was a man of not very great physical courage, was also overawed, and he found himself unable to deliver the speech. Accordingly, his client was duly convicted and sent into exile. But determined that the speech should not be entirely wasted, as it had been carefully composed and written out, he sent a copy of it to his client. The client in question was in exile, I think, at Baiae, where there were excellent oysters. He wrote to Cicero thanking him very much for sending him the speech, and saying that, on the whole, he was rather glad it had never been delivered, because had it been delivered he would have been acquitted and would not then be enjoying the excellent oysters of Baiae. So, too, if the utterances now delivered from the Opposition Front Bench with regard to the policy of the Government in this matter had been delivered a month ago I should not be tasting the joys of independence at the present time.

However, I will say that their hand has been mended about as skilfully as it could be mended, and that there is a certain amount in the contention of Deputy Dillon that in these times of national co-operation in the cause of peace it would be very pleasant to see a settlement of our economic dispute with Great Britain. Of course it would be very pleasant to see a settlement of that dispute at any time, but I do honestly feel, even now in spite of Deputy Dillon's contention, that for the President to have hurriedly arrived at such an agreement at the moment when we were called upon to make an announcement with regard to our attitude on the Italian-Abyssinian dispute would not have increased our moral authority in the councils of the nations. I think there would have been considerable suspicion that our support had been purchased. No such suspicion can exist as it is, and while I pray always for a settlement of our Anglo-Irish economic dispute I cannot feel that it is a matter for great regret that such a settlement was not in some way linked up with the attitude which we have been taking at Geneva with regard to Abyssinia.

So far as I am aware, the weight which we have carried at Geneva, or the weight Great Britain has carried at Geneva, has not in fact been in any way imperilled by the existence of this economic dispute between us, an economic dispute to which foreign nations have paid very little attention. I do not think that a single word about the matter was uttered by anyone at Geneva by way of reproach either of ourselves or of Great Britain when the President or Sir Samuel Hoare or Mr. Anthony Eden was speechifying on the subject of obligations under the Covenant. I feel, therefore, that the point which has been made, while superficially attractive, is really and fundamentally a pretty bad point, even now when the hand has been mended. I think that, on the whole, the note which should be struck by all Parties in the country on this matter should be one of undiluted support and congratulation of the Government for the line they have taken.

As Deputy Dillon said, it is true that we are not called upon to inquire with great particularity into the merits of the dispute between Abyssinia and Italy. The Italians are people for whom we in this country have a very special affection and sympathy. Nobody in this country has more affection and sympathy for Italy than I have myself, but we were presented with a case of an absolutely plain breach of the Covenant. There has been no attempt to conceal or disguise the fact that there was a plain breach of the Covenant, and the only question which was open to us to consider was "Are we a Member of the League of Nations or not?" If we were, we could only act in one way. If we had started bargaining, there was no reason why 50 other nations should not have started bargaining about special problems peculiar to them.

Mr. Belton

And so they did.

Mr. MacDermot

One or two may have, but they gained absolutely nothing by doing it, and they lost a good deal of prestige by doing it. I am by no means sorry that we did not follow in their footsteps. Manifestly, the work of the League of Nations would become impossible if, every time a matter of general interest were to be decided upon, each nation began to think up whether it could not get a bit for itself out of the situation. I do not think there can be a shadow of regret in our minds that that was not done in our case. The President has said that we might, of course, have withdrawn from the League of Nations long ago. But we did not. We might withdraw from the League of Nations in future, possibly, but, so long as we are in the League of Nations, we have got to carry out our plain duty. When Deputy Cosgrave made the speech at Geneva to which Deputy Dillon has referred, he quoted, I think, the motto on the tomb of Saint Columbanus: Si tollis libertatem, tollis dignitatem—if you take away a man's or a nation's liberty you take away dignity also. But, as a matter of fact, you can lose your dignity much more thoroughly by your own actions than you can by somebody else taking away your liberty, and that is a consideration that ought not to be forgotten in judging of what is the proper line at any time for a Government of ours to take at Geneva.

We have a very special interest in the success of the League. Every small and relatively weak nation has a greater interest than a strong or powerful nation in the success of the League. I am far from considering that the League has won its battle yet. It has not; the position of the League is still terribly precarious. I doubt whether these sanctions which are being imposed in connection with the Italian-Abyssinian war will have any great effect, but even if they do not achieve very much with regard to this particular dispute, it is perfectly plain that if the League had done nothing at all and had not taken the steps it has taken, it would be down and out.

My feeling is that if penalties are certain to be inflicted they need not be very heavy. I think that if Italy, for example, had known for certain a year ago that the result of her making war on Abyssinia would be that an embargo would be imposed upon exports from Italy to all the members of the League, she would never have gone to war with Abyssinia. In America terrific penalties are being constantly decreed by State Legislatures in the effort to stop crime, and they do not succeed because it is not the size of a penalty that stops crime. It is the knowledge of the potential criminal that whatever the penalty is, it is almost certain to be enforced; that public opinion is against him; that the machinery of the law is good; and that he will be caught and punished. That is what really prevents crime; and what really will prevent acts of unprovoked aggression amongst the nations of the world will be when they feel that they cannot escape the consequences of such aggression, and that penalties, even though economic penalties, and even relatively mild economic penalties, will, as a matter of certainty, be imposed upon them. I think, therefore, that as the procedure of the League grows clearer, as the methods by which the League will endeavour to enforce peace become more certain and better known, the probability is that the League will gain strength and that the principle of collective security will win through in the end.

As I have said, all weak nations have a special interest in that principle, but we perhaps more than others, because here we are, away on the outer edge of Europe, next to an enormously powerful neighbour, and so placed with regard to that neighbour that we seem to be destined by nature always either to be a help to each other or a torment to each other. If the philosophy and propaganda that are at present popular in this country with regard to Great Britain continue to be popular, it is obvious that we have the greatest need of some sort of shield and protection against the anger that may some day be aroused against us among this nation, which is so much richer, so much more populous, and so much more powerful than ours. If we go out of the British Commonwealth and throw away the security that is implied in that membership, a security that is endorsed and guaranteed by Australia, South Africa, Canada and New Zealand, we have to find some sort of substitute, and what substitute is there, or can there be, except the League of Nations?

Need I say that I, personally, hope that we will not throw away the other and stronger safeguard? But, at any rate, if we are brought into the position of doing so, it is something to know that there is the League of Nations in reserve and that we may hope that some sort of law and justice will prevail, as against merely the rule of violence and the morals of the jungle.

An Ceann Comhairle

The President to conclude.

Mr. McGilligan

I am wondering if the Labour leader has not anything to say on the matter.

Mr. Dillon

He is a bit nervous, poor man.

Mr. McGilligan

The speaker who has just sat down has made in allusion to heavy weather, but it is not so much that Deputy Dillon has brought back to these benches any decoction of Mediterranean sun, but more that a deep depression has moved somewhat to the East. I do not fully understand the Deputy's allusion to the speech of Cicero, except possibly as awakening in his mind the reflection that sometimes it is good to write and not to publish. If the Deputy had reversed the Ciceronian tradition which he has brought forward to the House, he could remember that there are still good oysters at Baiae or. at least, as far away as Baiae is. I do not know further if he thinks that the storms that were aroused here were real storms or whether it was not so much a matter of his imagining himself like one of the old classical deities, governing the winds, and finding, in fact, that he could not unloose the storm.

I was amazed, with Deputy Dillon, at the inadequate introduction made by the President to this measure here to-night. After all, it is a big step not merely that we are taking as a nation. but that the nations of the world are helping us to take in this whole matter. I should have thought that as in the ancient long ago, when families fought, and tribes fought, and clans fought, and when somewhere there emerged a spark of reason that led the people to believe that if they appointed men of wisdom and submitted to the decision of those men of wisdom, that was a step in advance, and I cannot imagine the leader of one of those fighting clans coming to his people and marking the change from the old set of things to the new by such a statement as the President has made here to-night. Because if this thing succeeds—and it is doubtful if it will succeed immediately—there is a very big change in the world, a change which, I think, might have been recognised by some fitting words from the Leader of this country, speaking in his own House, and a change which means that nations, like the families and the clans of long ago, have seen that even the victor in a fight is sometimes too weak to gain the full benefit of what he set out for, and that there is coming a better appreciation of arbitration and conciliation as a means of ending quarrels.

I think, too, that the President might have said something more than this—and I waited to hear his reason for the introduction of this Bill, and we got it in the meagre phrase: "There was a simple issue, and the choice of the Irish Free State delegation was a simple one, as is the choice of Members here to-night." Does anybody feel that in what the President said here to-night he knows what the effect was, and can form a judgment as to whether it was easy or difficult?

Is there anyone here with information to tell us whether, in fact, this move if successful in this present issue is likely to be of lasting good for the world, and would the President not think it quite right to emphasise that ithe issue is not an issue, as commonly understood outside, between Ethiopia and Italy but between Italy and the world in so far as the world is represented at the League of Nations.

I do not throw in this for the purpose of saying that our decision was wrong. At any rate, we might have some allusion to the fact that there is a body of opinion which thinks that if the Fascist State is stopped, and stopped severely in its present course, the Fascist State may suffer and the suffering of that State may not be confined to the borders of that country. The world may find that the issue is not so simple, although if the only standard is what was the right thing to do when Italy chose to challenge the rest of the world and if that is the only standard, then there is a simple decision to be taken. You cannot stop short of this. The President might have told us also if the members in taking the choice that they did at Geneva had any appreciation of the fact that economic pressure might not be sufficient, and had they then formed a decision that if economic sanctions failed other sanctions would be applied, and whether this country would as enthusiastically support the application of the rest as they appear to be enthusiastic in taking this the first step? These, at any rate, are some of the things that might have been glanced at.

The President in his speech, that has been praised and deservedly praised, at Geneva, said that the alternative presented to him was a saddening one. He asked if we were "to be thrown into a position of enmity with those with whom we wish to be on terms of friendship" and said:

"what more heartrending alternative can there be to the abandonment of duty and the betrayal of our deepest convictions and of words solemnly given."

I welcome those phrases: "our deepest convictions and of words solemnly given." Deputy Cosgrave was the first to record the conviction for governing authority in this country in regard to such matters and members of his Government later followed in the same line and recorded their convictions and gave solemnly their words in certain respects. Did the President regard this as a solemn assurance then? Did he believe that that expressed the deep conviction held, or one that should be held, by the people of this country? It is at any rate worth remarking here that it is some advance to have the President given to the use of those phrases and that he has not against him the vulgar abuse of his own Minister for Finance when he does use them. I do not say that the President should not have paraded the fact at Geneva that he went there as our representative, but certainly there was no appreciation in the President up to this year of the fact that we had freely taken our place amongst the nations assembled separately at Geneva. It is always an advance, and it is worth recording the advance, to have these things said. These are our convictions, and what we are now backing by economic sanctions are the words that we solemnly gave. In so far as the President is following up those convictions with this measure, showing that the solemn words so given were not merely paying lip service to the ideals of the League but that they did mean something, then this Bill, for what it amounts to, is valuable.

There is a certain amount of misapprehension, apparently, as to the common practice at Geneva. It appears to be thought that when an issue like this comes before the League of Nations at Geneva nothing else may be spoken of, or, if spoken of, that it is bargaining. If, what is suggested as possible of happening at Geneva is bargaining, there never yet was an issue before the League of Nations that was not accompanied by bargaining; bargaining through the corridors, bargaining by day and bargaining by night, and, generally, decisions were taken by people who had secured some fruit in their bargaining. Sometimes the bargaining was as crude as saying "grant me this and I will do something else." And sometimes it was more subtle: "If you will only give something to a third party we can win that third party's support." But, apart from these things that might really be called bargaining there is certainly this at Geneva that it is there not merely for the purpose of having processions to the tribune and declarations from it and meetings in council. There is frequent opportunity for gatherings of an intimate type as the President has found and as the President has enjoyed. I must say that it is again an advance that the President, without drawing upon himself the abuse of his own Minister for Finance, can meet a Minister of Mr. Anthony Eden's standing and have discussions with him. Had I done it, if there was sufficient imagination to prompt the jibe, there would be the tale of my being led up the garden of Anthony Eden, and such remarks.

We do not make any such complaint against the President. We welcome the fact, but we do complain of this that there were no results of that meeting. We do not say that the results of that meeting could have been attained by any process of bargaining, crude or subtle, but it is proper to say, as Deputy Dillon has said, that surely it was a ludicrous spectacle to have the President and Mr. Eden declaiming about Italy's contest at the League and giving, as an example of what they were saying, some of the matters that Italy was doing on Ethiopia. Deputy Dillon took one example. Suppose that Japan had hurriedly left off her further occupation of Manchukuo and sought again the chance to get her voice heard at the League in order to approve of the imposition of sanctions against Italy, would there not certainly have been a burst of laughter and would not the League have been brought into greater scorn and ridicule than even the failure to operate against Italy might have put upon it? Because this country and England are not operating with soldiers, ships or aircraft, and because there has been in operation for three years a more deadly contest, as far as its weakening capacity is concerned, we can appear there and can take our simple choice. We can believe in our sincere convictions and in the words solemnly given. We do not think that there is even an appearance of ridicule in doing all that while we persist in our quarrel and allow others to persist in that quarrel with us—the quarrel between ourselves and Great Britain.

The greatest good that would flow from the situation with Italy would be not a break-up of Italy, following the rigid and ruthless application of these and other measures, but that Italy should be stayed in her course because of the realisation that not merely world opinion was against her, but world opinion backed by the application of certain concrete measures. That would be the value of the position. Geneva has the limelight on it, and people, in their peccadilloes and in their virtues, are shown up with great clarity there. Yet our President appears to think he can parade there as an upholder of all these fine principles and submerge the whole question of the situation between this country and England.

There is one other matter to which I wish to allude. I find it difficult to understand just how, with any sense of proportion, people can carry on at Geneva as the representatives of all the nations have done this autumn. Here are the nations agreeing that they will not allow the victimisation of a particular country. They set about examining the merits of that contest, and in the end they come to a decision with regard to aggression. They take the first step towards prohibiting any such aggression. Speeches are made— all adverting to this matter. There is a recognition by the Foreign Minister for Britain that there may possibly be a source of conflict in the world arising from the fact that certain nations grip the raw materials of production. He indicates a view, and promotes a discussion, as to how far nations which have unused resources of that type should be made "free leaves" for the benefit of the whole of the world. He is joined in that by other nations.

The only pressure against Italy thought of at the moment is economic pressure. During the course of the discussions at Geneva proposals are made—all in that atmosphere that possibly the cause of conflict in the world may be the depressed state of the common people of the world and a recognition that that depressed state may be due to the fact that nations are beginning to live in isolation, that nations are keeping raw materials, one from another, and that nations are keeping finished products, one from another. A suggestion is mooted by the representative of the British Board of Trade tending towards the breaking down of all this fierce economic nationalism which is so much the habit at the moment. Before that Conference breaks up, there is a message from the United States welcoming this suggestion, approving freer international trade and definitely struck with the humanity at the bottom of the suggestion. They recognise that their own country is no better off now under rigid nationalism and isolation than it was when trade was free. All the representatives of the nations can meet and agree that, in an issue between the League and any one country, you have got to operate economics, but they seem to forget that, when they are at apparent peace with one another, they are more fiercely operating economics against one another. How can there be any sense of reality in a discussion regarding the imposition of economic pressure in a more ruthless manner on a defaulter when every nation prides itself on operating economic pressure against every other nation because it believes it is for its own good? When it is a question of preventing Italy from being the aggressor in a particular conflict, we are going to put her in the happy state of being the most perfectly isolated country in the world. At all events, it was stated that conflicts are due to evils arising from deprivation of raw materials held by certain peoples. But there was more than that said. There was a definite approach to the greater problem—the problem of breaking down this fierceness and this isolation and economic nationalism. Our country is now promoting this measure to apply to Italy. in a more aggressive and more ruthless way, something which, apparently, our Government would regard as the height of perfection if it could be brought about or achieved here at home.

I welcome the decision taken on this matter. I think it is a sound decision. I have read what I could of the matter and I realise that there is a body of opinion which fears disaster from the application of this measure—particularly if it leads to the application of further measures. I know that even people who fear that disaster think it is well to sacrifice even the security of peace and the security of Europe in that quarter rather than have the League challenged and fail to meet. the challenge. I think that the President might tell us whether he has any considered view on that question. The President must tell us whether this is the final Bill of this type—obligations of membership type—or whether, having taken the first step, we have counted the cost and are determined, no matter what it may mean, that our obligations under that Covenant are going to be carried out and fulfilled. I should like to know whether we are going to pursue that course so long as a substantial number of important nations pursue it, or whether there are any special considerations attaching to this country which would make us weaken our resolve and drop out earlier. So far as it goes, this is a good measure. So far as the President approved of the principles of the Covenant, the words were good. So far as the President attended the League and said he attended there as our representative freely—he can give us his own words; I am merely giving the meaning—it is well to have that statement from him. It is a pity the President would not apply to other disputes the standard he himself laid down when speaking at the Tribunal this year. "Why," he said, "cannot the Peace Conference which will meet in Europe when the next conflict has decimated the nations and disaster and exhaustion have tamed some of them into temporary submission—why cannot this Conference be convened now?" Why cannot that Conference be convened now? Must we believe that there is never to be a conference to end the economic war between this country and England? We believe it must take place some time. Would it not be better to have it now than later, when exhaustion will supervene?

Mr. Norton

In the course of his speech Deputy McGilligan said that he welcomed this measure. If that statement by the Deputy is intended to be a real declaration of his feelings in connection with the Bill, then I think he was rather unfortunate in the choice of his language in support of this measure, because during the whole course of his speech it was clear to everybody who was listening to him that the Deputy was walking the tightrope all the time. The language used by the Deputy in support of this Bill was the language of equivocation. He says that he supports the Bill now, but it was quite clear from the speech, and the attempt to drag the economic war into this matter, that the Deputy was only coerced into support of it because of the pressure of public opinion in this country and without this country. As Deputy MacDermot asked, is it not a pity there was not an earlier declaration in favour of this measure and in favour of sanctions on behalf of small nations? Is it not a pity, before Deputy MacDermot was compelled to resign from that Party, that it made up its mind as to where it stood in this dispute? Is it not a pity the Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenneys and other Deputies in that Party who have been allowed to run loose around the country denouncing any interference by this country in the Italo-Abyssinian dispute, had not their cards marked long before to-day, and not be subjected to the ridicule that must now be inevitable in view of the support Deputy McGilligan has given this measure? Until to-day all the spokesmen of the Party opposite have been advocating a policy of non-interference in the Italo-Abyssinian dispute. Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney, in many of his utterances in Mayo, has been pleading that we should have nothing whatever to do with the dispute, that we should frankly ignore our responsibilities at Geneva. Deputy MacDermot felt that that Party was so irrevocably committed to the line of non-interference in this dispute that he felt bound to resign from it.

But to-day there is a change of front. The Party managers have now discovered that it is not a popular policy in the country to advocate the breaking of our word in Geneva, and in not performing our obvious duty. Thus, in the two mawkish speeches delivered by Deputy Dillon and Deputy McGilligan, they endeavoured to indicate that they are now in favour of sanctions. We ought to be told what induced them to take this line to-day, in view of the line which they and other speakers have been taking through the country for the past month. I see this matter very much in the same light as Deputy MacDermot. I see this is a simple issue, as to whether as a member of the League of Nations we are going to discharge our responsibility to the League, or whether in this testing time we are not prepared to discharge the obvious responsibility which rests upon us. Membership of the League was thought by the Party opposite to confer benefits upon this nation. I frankly consider that the League does confer benefit, particularly on small nations. But if it confers benefits with one hand, it also confers responsibilities, and if we want to obtain such benefits as we can from the League, we ought not to be hesitant in the discharge of our obvious responsibilities on the issues that we were called upon to decide in this dispute; whether we were going to insist that a breach of the Covenant of the League should be punished in the manner provided in the Covenant. That was the simple issue involved in this dispute. We could possibly have abandoned the Covenant; or we could possibly have decided to discharge our responsibilities at Geneva or we could possibly have decided that we would take no part whatever in compelling respect for the Covenant or the freely assumed responsibility for the Covenant.

I am one of those people who believe in the League of Nations. I believe it is an instrument of powerful good for humanity. I am one of those who wants to see the League strengthened in every possible way, believing that a strengthened League is a guarantee of world peace, human liberty and human progress. Anything that tends to weaken the League tends to endanger world peace, and tends to produce the same set of circumstances that produced the horrible catastrophe of the years 1914-18. No one wants to see that catastrophe multiplied as it must be by new devices for making war. Everybody who wants to avoid a repetition of those dreadful years must be prepared to do everything in their power to strengthen the effectiveness of the League in every way that lies at their command. The League suffered seriously through its failure to grapple effectively with the serious Sino-Japanese dispute. Not only was its moral authority weakened in this matter, but its material authority as an instrument of peace was seriously undermined. If the League were to allow defaulting nations to continue to take the road which Japan took on that occasion, and if it were to continue to have its moral and material authority flouted in that manner, then the League as an instrument of world peace must cease to have any effect in a troublous world.

It was because I felt that the League authority was being undermined, and its prestige being seriously diminished, that I welcome the stand which the League took in this dispute between Abyssinia and Italy. Having decided that, we must range ourselves either on the side of those who want to flout the Covenant of the League or those who want to maintain the Covenant. If we accept the responsibility which flows from a desire to maintain it, obviously we must make up our minds where we stand in this dispute. We could have disregarded the Covenant, we could have dishonoured our word, and dishonoured our bond. If we had done that, then the condemnation of the liberty-loving people of the world would have rightly been ours. To have taken that stand at Geneva would have made our name a by-word among the nations of the world, and if the President had by any unfortunate set of circumstances been any way equivocal in his support of Abyssinia and the Covenant in this dispute, I think he would have rightly merited the condemnation of the liberty-loving people of this country. We have, however, chosen to honour our bond and discharge our obvious duties.

In taking that stand at Geneva, the President may feel assured that he has in this country the whole-hearted support of all the people except those so blinded by political malice that they will not see good even when it is staring them in the face. An attempt has been made to suggest that the President should have used Geneva as an occasion for driving a bargain with Britain. Speakers of the Fine Gael Party have suggested that the question as to whether he should keep his word, the nation's word and the nation's bond, in Geneva should be related to the question of whether we got a settlement of the economic war or not. If the President had adopted that course at Geneva and made his support of sanctions conditional upon a settlement of the economic war, then I think the President would have been guilty of international bad manners. I think the President has rightly saved himself and the nation from having that stigma put on him and the nation in the dispute in which the world has now made its voice clear in no uncertain manner. The Opposition Party have suggested that the President is now pro-British, because at Geneva his voice happened to be on the same side as that of Britain. All the long distance Opposition speakers have been let loose to screech throughout the country that the President has sold the nation and is now pro-British. It would have been just as true to say that he is pro-Russian.

General MacEoin

Are you speaking now of Miss MacSwiney?

Mr. Norton

Has the Deputy forgotten his own speech?

Acting-Chairman

I think the Deputy ought to address the Chair.

Mr. Norton

I am sorry, but the Deputy who interrupted did not. It would have been as true to suggest that the President was pro-Russian as to suggest that he was pro-British. It would have been just as true to say that he was pro-Sweden, pro-Norway, pro-Denmark, pro-Belgium, pro-France or pro any of the other countries, who at Geneva expressed the same point of view as this country and Great Britain. All this effort of trying to suggest that there has been any newfound alliance between the President and the British delegation at Geneva is just an attempt to use a serious international crisis as an opportunity for making mean, dirty, Party, political propaganda out of the dispute.

Some people have sought to suggest that it is rather strange that nations which have been distinguished for their imperial policy up to now, are at last endeavouring to seek peace by conciliation, and that they now want to abandon all resort to war. I agree that it is rather ironic to see some of the big imperial nations that we have, now striving to secure peace through the instrumentality of the League of Nations but that development is not an unhealthy development. It is not an unhelpful development, and one would wish that that course of development had come much sooner. One can only hope that, those formerly imperially-minded nations will continue to look for peace and international adjustment through the instrumentality of the League of Nations. There are some who suggest that we should not be on the side of some of these big imperial Powers, unless there is to be a readjustment of the world, unless there is to be a surrender of the ill-gotten gains of the past, but I suggest to those people that Abyssinian liberty and the cause of world peace cannot wait until such time as the world is rearranged. A settlement of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute will, I think, help to bring about that set of circumstances in which it might be possible to rearrange the geographic groupings of countries without resort to the arbitrament of war.

The whole policy which Italy has pursued in this matter has been frankly an annexationist policy. Italy has said definitely that she must have some portion of the world for her expanding millions at home, and with no more moral authority than that she wants more freedom for her people she proceeds to take military measures to annex another independent country with just as much claim to freedom and just as much claim to liberty as Italy herself can urge. Are we to allow Abyssinia to be annexed until such time as the map of the world is rearranged? Are we to allow our voice to be silent in this dispute until such time as we can get a settlement of the economic war? Suppose those who believe that a bargain should have been made at Geneva before we committed ourselves to sanctions had their way, what would their attitude have been in the event of failure to get a settlement of the economic dispute between Great Britain and this country?

Is it suggested by the Party opposite that if we could not get a settlement of the economic war between Great Britain and this country we should refuse to be bound by our word and our bond at Geneva? If we had raised the question of the settlement of the economic war, and if we could not have got a settlement by negotiation at Geneva, is it suggested that we should then have told the League of Nations that although we freely accepted certain responsibilities, we were not going to discharge these responsibilities, that we were going to ignore our word, tear up our bond and decline to range ourselves on the side of peace and on the side of right in the dispute that has arisen between Abyssinia and Italy? If the President had taken that line at Geneva, he would have deserved the condemnation of everybody in this country who believes that obligations freely accepted by this country at Geneva should be honoured to the fullest and that by honouring our bond in that respect at Geneva this country could make its contribution to the cause of world peace and the cause of international amity.

I believe that a strengthened League of Nations is the only hope of world peace in existing circumstances. I believe, too, that the effort to strengthen the League of Nations is the most effective guarantee of the independence and the liberty of small nations of the world. It is Abyssinia's turn to be selected by Italy for annexation to-day; it may be our turn to-morrow to be singled out by some other Power for annexation. Then we may well be glad that the League will discharge its responsibilities with the same unanimity as it has rightly decided in the case of the present dispute.

The President's stand at Geneva, in my opinion, was a substantial contribution to the cause of world peace. I think his stand there has rightly merited the praise of all who want us to discharge to the fullest our obligations to the League, to the nations, and to humanity at large. I believe, too, that the President's stand at Geneva, free as it was from all that miserable bargaining suggested by the Party opposite, has enabled us to take our full place with the other nations of the world at Geneva. I believe his stand there has enhanced the prestige and reputation of this nation. I believe that not only has it done that but that it has strengthened the League of Nations in addition. By strengthening the League of Nations, I think it has strengthened the instrument which is probably the most effective instrument at our disposal to-day for guaranteeing the continuance of such a measure of liberty as we have and prevent our country from being invaded as Abyssinia has been invaded to-day by a foreign Power. We cannot, probably, play as big a part in showing Italy the error of her ways as other nations in Europe can. That, however, is not our fault. We can at least, by our action in passing this Bill, demonstrate that, so far as we can contribute materially, we are prepared to do so and that, so far as we are morally concerned, we are still the liberty-loving people we are recognised to be at Geneva. I think also that we have, by the President's stand there, enhanced our reputation as a nation and, as I said before, contributed to making still more effective the one effective instrument for guaranteeing the freedom of this country from foreign invasion in the future.

Mr. Belton

I have been rather surprised at the speeches delivered on this Bill, and at all the praise showered upon it. The President told us that forty or fifty nations met in Geneva and decided on a certain line of action. I presume that these are all representatives of free nations that decided on this course of action. Then he told us about the machinery set up, and that finally they decided on sanctions. It has been deprecated by Deputy MacDermot and also by Deputy Norton, on behalf of the Labour Party, that we should, before associating ourselves with the support of sanctions in this country, have mentioned our trouble with Great Britain, euphemistically styled the economic war. Are we not here to-day to commit this country to sanctions against Italy? Has not Great Britain imposed sanctions against this country? Are we not living under those sanctions at present? If we are a free nation, and the League of Nations is going to be a help to small nationalities, as has been announced by Deputy Norton, what has the League of Nations done in the matter of sanctions imposed on this country by Great Britain for the last three years? I take it that if we, by an Act, impose sanctions on Italy, we will have to withdraw them by an Act, and so will the League of Nations. Did Great Britain consult the League of Nations before she imposed sanctions on this country? Did our representative, the Minister for External Affairs, ask the support of the other nations at Geneva against the strong nation, England, imposing sanctions against this country, and if he did not, why not? If he did and was refused, what is the value of Deputy Norton's point that our greatest bulwark is the League of Nations?

Mr. Coburn

Very little. A few years ago the Fianna Fáil Party and the Labour Party shouted, "Up Germany"; they wanted Germany to rule a few years ago.

Mr. Belton

My view is that we are taking an important step to-day and we should consider what we are doing. Until this matter is cleared up we will have no freedom with honour after to-day. We are free to-day to say whether we shall pass this Bill or not, but as sure as we pass this Bill it will inevitably become a Conscription Act in this country. This is a Conscription Bill to send the youth of this country out to be slaughtered on some battlefield that will be chosen by the two chains of Allies now forming or which have been formed in Europe. We are committing the youth of this country to slaughter on that battlefield. That is the issue and let us face it.

Mr. T. Kelly

Not at all.

Mr. Flinn

Let him talk.

Mr. Belton

I am glad I have roused some people from their slumbers. There is no sign that you are hitting home unless somebody squeals. I feel I have hit a bull's eye.

Mr. Coburn

They will not fight over there anyhow.

Mr. Belton

Are we prepared when we pass this Bill to carry out everything that naturally and logically flows from this Bill? In the schedules here sanctions are enumerated. It has been stated by Deputy Norton and Deputy MacDermot that we should not strike a bargain on the sanctions imposed on this country by Great Britain, that we should not try to have the economic war settled. Deputy Norton was eloquent in telling the House that it would dishonour this country if the President as our representative in Geneva tried to make a bargain. Did Mr. Anthony Eden not make a bargain for British interests? Did M. Laval not make a bargain for French interests? Did Great Britain not ask France whether, in the event of sanctions being imposed and naval action being taken against the British Fleet in the Mediterranean, the French fleet would support them? There was a lull in the negotiations for a few days. Then we were informed in an oblique kind of way that France would say "yes" if Great Britain would stand behind France in the case of a German invasion of Austria?

They all lined up in this thing because they got something out of it. But we, who are the only country in the world against which sanctions are operating to-day, are going to commit the youth of the country to be slaughtered in a war that will be of no concern to this country—a war of slaughter and revenge, looking for colonies, looking for an outlet for the surplus population of certain European countries. We are going to commit ourselves to that. After every nation put up its price and got its price, it would be dishonourable we are told to ask for equitable treatment for this country before we entered into this thing. If there was ever an instance in our history when this country was let down, it was when it was let down by the President at Geneva, and this House is to-day asked to sanction that betrayal. The President may smile, but, if my argument, that our youth will be conscripted ultimately if this war goes on, is not sound, I should like an indication from the President as to what time he would advise that this country should betray those other nations which draw out. Let us suppose for example, that war breaks out between two different groups, arising out of these sanctions in Europe, and that those nations, side-by-side with which we now claim to be carrying out our obligations, line up on one side; that the war lasts a year or two, as the Great War did, and the standing armies are decimated and volunteers are not coming forward; and that those nations have to conscript their youth to fill up the gaps in their armies, is the Free State then going to let down her colleagues of the League of Nations, or will the President come in here with a Bill to say that he will conscript the youth of this country to go out and fight on a European battlefield? I think that question should be answered by the President, and that it should be answered by the President here to-day. I think this House should demand an answer on that point, and not only demand an answer from the President, but from the Leader of the Opposition.

If this Bill is going to be supported, as has been substantially indicated already, at what stage does any responsible man—any leader in this House— suggest that we should withdraw? Does he suggest that we should carry it out to its logical conclusion? If we are going to carry it out to its logical conclusion, then you are here to-day taking the first step in conscripting the youth of this country. There is no blinking the fact. We are all old enough to remember when, at the beginning of the Great War, a brigade or a division was promised by the then Irish leader. We know how the War dragged on and how it developed. Now, if this country was unanimously behind that leader then in making that declaration, did this country not dishonour itself when it refused to have conscription? If that was Ireland's war, and if Ireland should make the sacrifices that other nations fighting that war should make, why not face, then, what the other nations had to face, and have the youth conscripted? We are starting now on the same slippery slope, and if a stand is not made now, and if the position is not fully stated and fully appreciated and understood, we will be committing ourselves, in passing this Bill, to going down that slippery slope.

Mr. Davin

Why conscription?

Mr. Belton

The Deputy wants the i's dotted and the t's crossed?

Mr. Davin

Yes.

Mr. Belton

Very well. Let us assume, for instance, that these measures we are passing here to-day, and when applied by all the nations concerned, do not prove effective and that more stringent measures have to be taken—military measures. Once these sanctions are imposed, a loose shot, or a bomb placed in a ship in a harbour, may precipitate, as it precipitated the Spanish-American War, a European war, and that means that we are into it. The cry or the propaganda for that war will be to vindicate the League and to support the Covenant of the League. Are we going to answer the call and send out our Army shoulder to shoulder with the armies of the forty or fifty countries that, the President tells us, made this stand in Geneva?

Mr. Davin

Not conscription.

Mr. Belton

Wait a moment. Are we going to send out our Army? If we are, and if other nations leagued with us send out their armies and these armies are thinned out and in danger of being wiped out, are we then going to show the white feather or are we to fill the ranks?

Mr. Davin

The Blueshirts will fill the ranks.

Mr. Belton

Oh, now, talk seriously. This is a very serious matter, and there is no use in soap-box orators, a couple of years hence, perhaps, when the youth of the country are face to face with conscription, getting up and saying: "We will not send out our youth to fight in these battles." You are doing it to-day and not in years hence, and no cheap jibe about Blueshirts or Blackshirts or hair shirts will get you out of the hole you have just got into with your eyes open. Would it not have been much easier, when, a year or two ago, another nation violated the Covenant, for the League of Nations to show its authority then? It is very strange how there were no sanctions imposed on Japan when she kicked over the traces and pitched the League there. Of course, Deputy Norton was eloquent that we will not—"we," mind you; he emphasised it— allow Abyssinia to be overwhelmed. That is a historical saying. The Deputy will go down in history for that saying—"We will not allow."

Mr. Davin

The Deputy did not use the word.

Mr. Belton

Oh, all right. That is what I understood him to say.

Mr. Davin

Quote him.

Mr. Belton

I have not a copy of his speech, but I was listening to him.

Mr. Davin

I was listening to him also.

Mr. Belton

I was listening to him, at any rate, but I think the Deputy was not listening to him.

Mr. Davin

I was, and listening much better than Deputy Belton was.

Mr. Belton

Well, the Deputy can read Deputy Norton's speech later on and can correct what I am saying.

Mr. Davin

I want to correct the Deputy now.

Mr. Belton

Well, then, did Deputy Norton say: "We will allow Abyssinia to be overwhelmed?" He must have said one or the other, and I will leave it to Deputy Davin to explain to the House which he did say.

Mr. Davin

Deputy Tom Kelly will deal with you.

Mr. Belton

Deputy Tom Kelly tried that before and has given up.

Mr. T. Kelly

Oh, now, not a fear of it. However, I do not want to be wasting time.

Mr. Belton

Now, no attempt was made to stop the first breach; and, when big nations have left and are outside the League, will not the position in the world gradually resolve itself into something like this: that those inside the League will line up together, and those outside the League will line up together? That is what it is coming to. Those who read the daily papers do not want any further information. They saw that thing coming. The position is precisely what it was from the close of the Boer War, particularly from the close of the Russo-Japanese War, to the outbreak of the Great War. This has resolved itself into precisely the same thing. We are committing ourselves now to the position of being in the fray and we are doing that of our own free will. But we are not free. We are told by the same people in the next breath that we are not free, that we have not our own freedom and yet we are going out to fight for Abyssinian freedom. If it were not so serious would it not be a joke?

Mr. Davin

Hear, hear.

Mr. Belton

Deputy Davin says "hear, hear," but he is voting for it.

Mr. Davin

I am not voting for conscription.

Mr. Belton

Let the Deputy make up his mind when he is voting for it, what is going to be its effect.

Mr. Davin

The Blueshirts will do that.

Mr. Belton

I do not know what was agitating Deputy Norton's mind when he suggested that President de Valera might as well have been accused of being pro-Russian as being pro-British. It is a very strange thing in this crisis that all the Imperialists of the world are linked up with all the Communists of the world in support of Abyssinia. That is quite true. Russia was the first to impose sanctions, the very first. Is not that a very strange coincidence?

Mr. Davin

Not half as strange as Deputy Belton and Deputy MacDermot being on the same bench.

Mr. Belton

We are not on the same bench, but if we were on the same bench, it would not be a quarter so strange as seeing Deputy Davin back again with the Labour Party——

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

Now these things have nothing to do with the Bill.

Mr. Belton

——after these Kilkenny speeches. After that anything may happen. I still think it would not be too late before this Bill is passed if we were to say that if we have freedom here and freedom to exercise our freedom, we would then whole-heartedly support the League of Nations to preserve the peace of the world. President de Valera a thousand times has stated on public platforms, and dozens of times I have myself listened to him stating it—that there will never be peace in Ireland until Ireland is free. Well, then, she must be free now according to his latest definition of freedom. In that case, let us have freedom here and let this question of sanctions between us and Great Britain be settled. I want it understood that my view of the dispute between Great Britain and this country is not in that plan of sanctions. But that is the plan in which the President and his Party wanted to put the matter from the beginning of these troubles. Now they have run away from that. They have in effect said: "We will support the League of Nations, but we will not ask the League of Nations at all to settle the dispute between ourselves and another nation." If Italy were going to invade Abyssinia, and the Abyssinian representative put up that as the Abyssinian case to the League of Nations, what would be thought of it? President de Valera, side by side with Mr. Anthony Eden, supported Abyssinia. But why did not the President say to Mr. Eden: "What about the sanctions you have imposed on us—is it only a matter of degree between that and what Signer Mussolini wants to impose on Abyssinia?" But the President is silent, not a word from him, and I suppose his Party are silent behind him, and the little Labour Party is silently trotting behind them, with Deputy MacDermot bringing up the rear.

Mr. Davin

He is bringing up the rear behind Deputy Belton.

Mr. Belton

Not behind me; for I will not be behind the Labour Party.

Mr. Davin

Well, Deputy Belton is moving around gradually.

Mr. Belton

If we had our freedom— and by freedom I mean the unity of the country, and even a united country as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations would be far ahead of the freedom we now possess—we would be as good, or perhaps better, than if we had a 32-county Republic. If we had that measure of freedom, then I would say that this Bill should get the unanimous support of this House. But we have not got that freedom. And we have no court to appeal to for that freedom—not even freedom for the Twenty-Six Counties. We have no court to which we could appeal if our freedom were threatened. Unless our President wants to make a case that there has been no attack on our freedom and no imposition of sanctions against us, I do not know what he means. I am putting the case from the President's point of view, for he has maintained from the beginning that the British are responsible for the economic war and for the imposition of sanctions, and that we are not in any way responsible. He has put the case that the British are the guilty-parties. Since he came into office he has done nothing of which I have read in print, or anything so far as I have heard to bring his case against the British before the League of Nations. After that attack on our economic well-being—an attack depriving us of our freedom and imposing on us tariff sanctions, the worst kind of sanctions— the President wants to join up with the country that is imposing them on us, to aid that country and its allies in imposing sanctions on another country without at the same time asking for any relaxation of the sanctions imposed on us. I think the President is in an impossible position. He cither accepts the position that the row between this country and Britain is a purely domestic one—one that cannot be brought before any international court—or alternatively he feels that if he brought it before an international court he would not get the support there that France is looking for on the Continent, or that Britain is looking for in the Mediterranean. Why did not the President as our representative at Geneva put up some case there for our economic freedom at home? He did not do that. Now he brings in this Bill and asks the House to ignore that position as between us and Britain. I questioned Deputy Norton when he said that the country is whole-heartedly in support of President de Valera in the stand he has taken up. I do not believe it is. The more the country understands the significance of the President's statement and what is following as a direct consequence of that statement, the more the people realise what this Bill means, the sooner they will alter their opinion. I repeat, if they have any leanings towards the opinion that the President was right at Geneva, they will alter that opinion.

In conclusion I want to say that I do not think that we should pass this Bill unless the economic war is first cleared out of the way. If we seriously mean all the talk we have about the Border, and if we seriously mean that we want to unite the country, we should put up two conditions before we co-operate with the League in support of the Covenant. We are getting the same benefits out of that Covenant that other countries are getting. If that Covenant is able to rally 30 or 40 nations behind it to support it in the case of the infringement or invasion of Abyssinian liberty, why does Ireland not get the same number of nations to support it, and thus get some benefit out of the Covenant? Is the independence of Abyssinia, the freedom of Abyssinia, a more sacred thing than the freedom of Ireland? If it is not, why not invoke the assistance of the League of Nations for Irish liberty? It has not been done by President de Valera, who has committed this country to fight for Abyssinian liberty and is asking the Dáil to support him in that fight and give legislative sanction to the sending out of an army, if necessary.

My view of a nation's duty is that when it considers taking a decision of such an important character it should weigh all that flows from that decision. I submit that to-day we are asked to take a step, though it is not set out in print in the Bill, and the logical sequence of events from that step is that we shall conscript, if we must, in order to defend this Covenant. I think enough wild geese have been sent out of Ireland to fight for the liberties of other nations, and if we are going to fight now we should make the bargain and we should have the goods delivered before we commit ourselves to fight. We are all old enough to remember the lesson of the Great War, and we know that the freedom we were asked to fight for was not granted to this country when Belgium was liberated. We had the Black-and-Tan war and a terrible lot of things since. We have not to go into history to read of those things, because we went through the events ourselves. Why do we forget the lesson then taught us? Can we not make our bargain now?

I would like to hear the President indicate if he has put up any case, or has he taken the view that it was not an opportune time to put up a case? If he has taken that view, I am sure he has taken it honestly, and we can only differ with him and argue against him on the basis on which he took that view. I would like to know the reasons that brought him to that frame of mind. If he had not that view, why did he allow the case of Ireland to go by default? There was no question of honour at stake because the other nations were doing it. It was either Sir Samuel Hoare or Mr. Anthony Eden who said that if they had not collective support they would not be prepared to support the Covenant or fight for it. It was a case of everybody for himself. We were the only people who did not look after our own interests. The President may laugh at that, but what has he got for his promise? Let him put his cards on the table.

Mr. MacDermot

What has anybody else got?

Mr. Belton

Deputy MacDermot is not so innocent as that. He asks what has anybody else got. Deputy MacDermot has read the history of the world, of the Mediterranean and of Africa. Does he think for one moment that all this hullabaloo is being kicked up out of natural love and affection for the Abyssinians? If he does, well he is merely a grown-up baby. Not one member of the League of Nations cares whether Abyssinian liberty will be preserved. Their own interests are at stake, and they are looking after their own interests. Read the English Sunday papers and what is the case set out there? "We cannot allow Italy in Abyssinia or Italy in Libya." Is not that the case?

Mr. MacDermot

It is not.

Mr. Belton

Then Deputy MacDermot knows more than all the editors and the correspondents of the British Sunday papers, and if he does, I bow to his superior knowledge, though I differ from him. I suppose Deputy MacDermot will tell us that the Great War was fought for Belgian liberty. Why, he could not tell a schoolboy that now, and neither could he tell a schoolboy that in 1914. We know that when it comes to war no nation is going to tell anybody its intentions. Is not that the art of diplomacy? Is not that the first victory? What leads more to ultimate victory than concealing your intentions? No nation ever yet won a war that did not conceal its intentions. The intentions are pretty well concealed in the present dispute. It must have been a master stroke if Deputy MacDermot is convinced. I would like to hear an unequivocal expression from him—does he really believe that Britain and France care a brass farthing whether Abyssinian liberty is or is not preserved?

Mr. MacDermot

They care about peace.

Mr. Davin

Because they do not want to fight.

Mr. Belton

One extract I read of the President's speech at Geneva, and that I entirely agree with, was substantially this, that in order to preserve peace in the world the causes of war should be removed and the Council of the League of Nations should apply itself to the removal of the causes of war. In the Great War you had the victor and the vanquished. You had one group with the spoils of war, possessing colonies extending over hundreds of thousands of square miles and having nothing in them but policemen. You had and still have other highly-civilised nations in Europe on comparatively poor soil, crowded out. Does any sane man think that those countries that have a surplus population with no outlet for them and that want to live Christian lives can stand by and say to the victor, "We will have peace in the world and everybody will retain the goods he has no matter by what method he got them"?

Mr. MacDermot

Does the Deputy think the Italians will go and live in Abyssinia?

Mr. Belton

I know the British did not go to live in South Africa, and I remember that war.

Mr. Davin

They got the gold.

Mr. Belton

No, the Jews got it, and I daresay there are Jews there or thereabouts in Abyssinia, too. It beats me to see that after the lessons we have had—not the lessons of history, you might forgive a person for that, but the lessons we have had within our own experience—we are going to repeat the same thing. The President should bear in mind that no Irishman. perhaps, was ever in the position that he is in at the moment. The late Mr. Redmond could promise a brigade, a division, or something like that, but he could not send out one man; all he could do was to ask him to go, use his influence to get him to go. But the President here can order out an army, and where that army goes conscripts can follow and the President can order them. That is the serious step we are taking to-day and I am amazed that Deputy MacDermot cannot see it in that light.

Deputy MacDermot has always been very eloquent inside this House, and outside it, and rightly so, and I admire him for the labour he has gone to on the question of the abolition of the Boundary. Does Deputy MacDermot take up the stand that the Six Counties arc not part of Ireland; that they should not be united with the Twenty-Six Counties and form the Irish Nation? If he takes the stand that we would be justified if we were to go out to save Abyssinia from being taken by Italy, if we are going to shed our blood in defence of Abyssinia, will the British nation with whom we are co-operating restore to us the Boundary? Charity begins at home. If we are to give our sympathy to Abyssinia to repel the Italians, and if sanctions are applied to Italy because of its action, why are sanctions being applied to ourselves? Deputy MacDermot said it would be dishonourable, when this matter arose about Abyssinia, for the President to raise the questions of sanctions. Surely Deputy MacDermot knows enough about the country to know the privation, and the almost starvation and bankruptcy the agricultural community have been brought to by the application of sanctions against this industry. The agricultural community has not the means of providing to-day for the men and women who have grown up in recent years. They have no chance of giving these young people an opportunity of starting in life. Is the only hope that is to be held out to that population that is growing up that they are to join the conscript army which is inherent in this Bill?

This is one of the most serious decisions that any representative body of Irishmen, not to mention an Irish Parliament, has ever been called upon to make. Has it been fully considered that if we pass this Bill we are committing this country, step by step, in one way or another, to conscription or dishonour? To-day we cannot see whether we are justified in going on with it. I am far behind, in the work of preaching hostility to Britain, President de Valera and other members of his Party—I have no hostility to Britain. I lived ten years in Britain, and I say that the British people are as fine a people as any in the world. They love liberty but we should love it too. If the British want freedom and integrity in their country the Irish people should want freedom and integrity in this country. Why was not that put up? I cannot understand the mentality of Deputy MacDermot when he says it would have been a dishonour if we put up our case. Every other country is perfectly free. There is no partition in these countries. They were all victors in the Great War. They put forward their price demands and got them. But it would be a dishonour, according to Deputy Norton and Deputy MacDermot, for us to do so. I say it was foolishness and not dishonour for us not to put up our case.

There is no greater sinner in the world than he who knows that he sins against justice. We sinned when we did not make a deal when we had the opportunity. The President took a step and a false step and he wants now to retreat from it. I do not think this is the first false step the President has taken. However, we will pass from that. Immediately after he made that false step in Geneva, he, and his followers, put their ears to the ground. A telephone message came from Geneva that a weighty pronouncement was to be made in this country by the President and that he would make it at Ennis. The whole country was waiting to hear that pronouncement and to learn what he had to say.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

Is not all that irrelevant?

Mr. Belton

I suggest the President made a speech in Geneva in which he promised support for the Covenant. This follows from the Covenant and I think, and the whole country thinks, that what was not said, but was to be said at Ennis, was a retreat from the President's speech at Geneva. He was received by the people at Ennis but he said nothing, and the people of Clare went home having heard nothing. I hope that one day after his speech in favour of this Conscription Bill he will say what he failed to say in Ennis.

General MacEoin

I think the President should have explained a little more fully the consequences that are likely to flow from this particular measure. There seems to be some doubt as to what exactly this Bill means. I have heard the Labour representatives say that it does not mean war but the chances are that it does mean war.

Mr. MacDermot

Why?

General MacEoin

That the chances are that it may mean war. If sanctions are not sufficient, the Covenant of the League lays it down clearly what further steps are to be taken. While not opposing the Bill, I want the House to understand what they are committing themselves to. I do not want any doubt about it after.

Article 16 (i) reads: "Should any member of the League resort to war in disregard of its Covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the Covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the Covenants breaking State and the nationals of any other State whether a member of the League or not.”

That is the step we are taking in this Bill. But that is not sufficient because paragraph 2 reads:

"It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the Covenants of the League."

Mr. Belton

This is a conscription Bill.

General MacEoin

There is an amendment to that. Article 16 is amended, but it is practically the same thing, and it has this addition to it if the financial sanctions or the economic sanctions fail to secure the objective. I think it is imperative that the President should tell us whether he regards this as the first and final step, or whether it is only the first step, and where exactly it is going to land this country. I have followed with great care the speeches made by everybody. Whether the President should or should not have done something at Geneva is a matter about which I am not going to say anything at the moment, but if support of the Covenant is going to impose upon us certain further obligations than are contained in this Bill I do want to say that owing to the economic war we are neither economically nor militarily prepared for such an obligation. Whether in the hotel or at dinner with Mr. Anthony Eden, or wherever the opportunity arose, I think the obligation rested on the President or on the delegates from this country to say to those people that while we were subscribing to the maintenance of the Covenant it was true that we found ourselves in such an economic position, owing to their conduct, that we might not be able to subscribe to it as whole-heartedly as we should like. That might not have the desired effect, but at the same time it is true that if a man has been beaten pretty severely, and is called upon to fight another battle immediately, it is no harm for him to say to his seconds: "I think you ought to give me a breather. Give me a chance. Let me recover my wind before I am put into it again." Well, it seems we are to continue the present war and go on into another. That may appeal to theorists, and to people who are not bearing the brunt of the economic war in this country at the moment, but there are people in this country at the moment who are very hard pressed, and it is too much to ask them to throw up their hats in joy because we are going into another war.

I do not like to attack anybody, but Deputy Norton said that this Party here were trying to make political capital out of a certain situation. Well, Sir, in the course of his speech he should have made an effort at self-examination of conscience, because I never saw such an attempt as that made by Deputy Norton to derive political capital out of the present situation. He tried to make political capital out of the situation, there and then by referring to some of the red herrings that were thrown across the floor here between Deputy MacDermot and members of this Party. Of course, Deputy MacDermot said that somebody ate oysters, but I think the wrong fish was mentioned. It was certainly red herrings, as far as the debate was concerned. Deputy Norton knows quite well that it is quite a common situation for contracts to be entered into by certain employees, and that because of a change of circumstances or some such thing they have no hesitation whatever in declaring those contracts as of no effect. They make a demand in regard to the continuance of those contracts under certain circumstances, and rightly so. They seize the opportunity and make use of it.

Now, I say that the President had an opportunity. It would not, I admit, be wise to have taken it at the League of Nations itself, but I know that the delegates of this country and the delegates of Great Britain were not 100 miles apart all that time. They were not in separate locked cells in a prison. They must have met and did meet, as it is customary to do prior to meetings of the League itself, and there were exchanges of views as to what each one was able to do. I respectfully submit, Sir, that at that particular time it would be quite legitimate for the President to say that owing to the economic position in which we found ourselves we were not able to enter into this matter with a light heart. I think the President had that in his mind when he said at Geneva that it was a greater hardship upon us than on most nations to take the step that he was taking, and that it was likely to impose greater hardships upon us. I believe that in his heart of hearts that is what the President had in mind, and that that is what he was referring to. I maintain that it would have been no dishonour, or no breaking away from national or international obligations if he had put that case to the representatives of the other nations, and in particular to the British representatives, before we were fully committed. to this particular line of action.

In conclusion, I want to say that I think the President ought to tell us now whether he thinks the financial sanctions or the economic sanctions which are imposed will be sufficient to achieve our objective, and if not, whether any further steps are likely to be undertaken. I think it is essential that the people of this country and the Deputies of this House should know exactly what is being done. We should not be run into the thing blindfoldedly. I think the obligation rests upon the President to give us that information, and I respectfully submit. Sir, that he ought to give it.

Mr. Kent

I never listened to a more faint-hearted debate on the introduction of any Bill than I heard this afternoon in this House. The enforcement of a boycott—as it was commonly spoken of here years ago—of the Italian Government is no concern of the Irish people, to my mind at all events. This is only the first step. If this war extends to a great European or world war, the Irish people are committed to uphold the Covenant, and the pledges which President de Valera, as representative of the Irish people, has given in Geneva. Does any Deputy in this House imagine for one moment that the passing of this Bill will bring the Italian-Abyssinian dispute to an end? It will be of no assistance whatever to Abyssinia. Any resolutions passed by any Government or any people when two nations are at war will not in any way bring about the conquest of one nation or the other. Deputies in this House have alluded to the economic war in this country, and stated that the President should have made more use of the opportunity presented by the present situation to bring about a satisfactory settlement of that economic war. What is the cause of this trouble in Abyssinia to-day? Is it the fact that Italy, with her teeming population, wishes to extend her territories to a country where Italy, France and other great powers have already established themselves? Have they not done in the past what Italy is doing to-day? We heard but very little condemnation of the Japanese when Japan went to war with China and flouted her obligations to the League. We heard no hullabaloo in Geneva with regard to the conquest of territory in China. This country at the present moment is a nation which has been crushed down by a foreign Government for the past 700 years. Where was the freedom extended to this country which they now wish to extend to Abyssinia? Is it for love of the Abyssinians that the British Empire and the great and mighty power of England and France is ranged on the side of Abyssinian freedom? No. It is for the extermination of the Abyssinians, for the conquest of their country, and for the purpose of grabbing all the mineral wealth they can lay hands on. England is ruffled now because she was not the first in the field to grab the valuable gold mines and oil fields in Abyssinia. Would they have done what Italy is doing to-day if they were in a position to do it? My honest belief is that they were not prepared, as Italy was, to go into darkest Africa to exterminate peoples and to confiscate valuable properties which they had their eyes on. Mussolini did not give them time to do it.

As regards this League of Nations, I have always looked upon it as the greatest farce of all time. There is no sincerity behind any member of that League of Nations, and they are only pulling the wool over the eyes of the common people of the world. They are biding their time and conserving their man power for the purpose of grabbing, at their own sweet will, all the mineral resources they can lay hands on. I think there is no doubt that President de Valera, as Minister for External Affairs, acted in an honourable manner under a hereditary obligation to carry out the wishes of the people of this country, but I think he is in a very awkward position at present, because if this war develops, and, to my mind, it will, the resolutions we pass here and this very Bill before us will commit the manhood of this country to a bloody conflict in foreign lands.

The League of Nations is out for the freedom of small nations. What freedom did we ever get from them or any other power in Europe? Here we are to-day with a boundary question unsettled and our country torn to pieces by internal strife. I think it would be the duty of this Government and of the Irish people to unite and to put our claims before the League of Nations with a view to getting England to stop the economic war which she is pursuing in a ruthless manner. Her penal tariffs are bleeding the unfortunate farmers of this country and reducing them to a state of misery and poverty. She should put her own house in order before attempting to get the manhood of this country or any other small nation to fight against a grand Catholic country like Italy. As an Irishman and as a Catholic—a humble one, I must say—I will oppose this Bill, because I will not agree to the application of sanctions against Italy, who is going out to civilise and to Christianise a pagan race. I sincerely hope that the Italian race, and Mussolini, the great leader of the Italian people, and defender of our faith in Italy, will be successful in this war.

Sir Osmond Esmonde

I think we are all very grateful for the fact that the President, when he was in Geneva. succeeded in getting agreement amongst the other members of the League that the sanctions should not apply to funds being sent to Italy for religious purposes. There is, however the further question which has not been decided—the position of Irish students and professors in religious establishments in Rome in the event of Italy becoming involved technically in a war with this country. It is quite possible under international law that these students and professors would be interned and the colleges seized and confiscated. I think that is a matter which the Government might look into. There is that difficulty. It is probably only a legal difficulty, which would apply to a great number of nations besides our own, but, in view of the importance of our historical institutions in Rome, we should be very care ful to ensure beforehand that their life and continuance should not be imperilled by any action on our part.

With regard to the general question, I can only say that I am in sympathy with the Italian people, as I believe this is a just war on their behalf. Unlike any other member of this Parliament, I have studied for the last 20 or 30 years the history, culture, art, literature and social and political conditions of Abyssinia, and I am satisfied that there is no such thing as an Abyssinian nation. There is a collection of peoples there dominated by an ascendancy group who have depopulated that vast area, just as the ascendancy here depopulated this country during the last 80 years and reduced its population by half. The methods adopted by the ascendancy in Abyssinia have been more ruthless and more cruel than those adopted by the ascendancy in this country. There are great mounds in Abyssinia, of which I have got photographs, mounds of sand covering the bones of countless thousands of children who died as a result of the slave trades conducted by the Abyssinian ascendancy and their Arab associates. The Emperor of Abyssinia may pretend to be a descendant of King Solomon of Jerusalem. It is more likely, in my opinion, that he is a descendant of King Herod of Jerusalem, who is famous in history for his slaughter of the Innocents. I think that in this war Signor Mussolini is the Abraham Lincoln of Africa, and that he is out to abolish the slave trades in spite of the sentimental sympathy of Great Britain, which was also displayed in support of the Southern States during the American Civil War when Great Britain supported, financially and militarily, the cause of the slave trading and slave owning classes of the Southern States as against the will of the American people.

Mr. MacDermot

So did, John Mitchel.

Sir Osmond Esmonde

He was mistaken. I do not know whether John Mitchel admitted his mistake, but undoubtedly England did. Then there was the case of the "Alabama," the boat which the English sent to support the slave owners. It caused great damage to the ships of the American people. That case was afterwards decided by international arbitration. It is one of the outstanding cases in international law. The English, in a very sportsmanlike manner, acknowledged their mistake. They acknowledged that they were not justified in what they did, and paid the full indemnity of, I think, £2,000,000, imposed by the international court. I have great hope that in this cause, which is a cause between the slave traders and the Northerners, the English will in time acknowledge their mistake as handsomely as they did in the case of the Southern States of America. I can only hope that God will bless the banners of Italy and so bring to an end, once and for all, what is a real crime and a very real blot on those States which are trafficking in human bodies.

Mr. MacDermot

May I ask the Deputy one question before he concludes? Does not his argument simply amount to this, that Abyssinia is not fit to be a member of the League of Nations? Is he not overlooking the fact that Abyssinia was admitted to the League of Nations mainly because of the advocacy of Italy? Is he not also overlooking the fact that since she was admitted the other nations of the world took certain obligations in her regard, and will he explain why Italy, and Italy alone, should be allowed to disregard those obligations?

Sir Osmond Esmonde

To begin with there is no doubt that Italy made a mistake in advocating the admission of Abyssinia into the League of Nations. The fact that a mistake was made only means that the members of the League of Nations must try to find a solution to remedy that mistake. I think Italy made that mistake. Abyssinia was admitted a member of the League of Nations about 1923, the year in which the Irish Free State was admitted. That does not mean that Italy should be blamed for being too generous. She hoped, I suppose, that when Abyssinia was admitted to the League of Nations she would become civilised, that she would take her responsibilities seriously and would become an active member of the community of nations. I think that is a matter that should be realised by Deputy MacDermot. I do not think there is any provision in the Covenant of the League of Nations whereby a mistake of that kind can be remedied. The League of Nations is not a legislative body. It cannot pass legislation to change its own Constitution. I certainly think that if the League of Nations was, in fact, a parliament, it should by this time have introduced provisions to enable it to exclude nations which were found to be unsuitable or incapable of membership just as there are rules in our Constitution which prevent certain persons being elected as members of this Assembly. That is a matter for the future, and, possibly, this crisis will draw attention to these defects in the Constitution of the League of Nations and attract the attention of all nations to the need for amending the Constitution of the League and the Covenant.

The President

I have been told for the hundredth time by Deputies on the opposite benches how I should have made my speech, what I should have done, how I should have introduced this Bill and the subjects about which I should have spoken. In deciding to introduce the Bill in the way I did introduce it, I very deliberately made up my mind that I would not go into the thousand and one subjects I could have dealt with. I might have talked about the whole idea of a League of Nations, the difficulty of ever getting such a League to work, the difficulty of having obligations undertaken carried out when the selfish interest of any particular member might suggest to that member that it would be well to violate the obligations, and the necessity, in order to counteract that natural tendency, for action of one kind or another in case that tendency led a particular member to violate the obligations it had undertaken. I could have pointed out that the moment you tried to impose sanctions of the magnitude which would be effective, a loose organisation, such as the League of Nations, would, in all probability, break down. I could have discussed all these questions, but I submit that these are questions which should be discussed not on this occasion but on another occasion. Speeches such as have been made by Deputy Belton, Deputy MacEoin and other Deputies would be very appropriate when the Estimates for the League of Nations were under discussion here. They would have been proper questions for examination at the start, when application was made for membership of the League of Nations by this State, and they would have been proper questions for examination when the new Government took office and proposed to continue membership of that League.

Again, I say this is not the time for consideration of these questions. There is a very simple question now before the Dáil. That is, whether or not, having deliberately undertaken certain obligations, we are, in fact, going to carry these obligations out. That is the only question we have to decide here. We are free to say whether we shall or not carry them out. We are free to give any reasons we like for not carrying them out. But I believe that if we refused to carry them out we would be violating the obligations to which we committed ourselves when we joined the League. What is the extent of these obligations? It was suggested this afternoon that this was only the first step and that we might be led on to military and other sanctions. Somebody called this a "Conscription Bill." I attempted to explain our position in regard to the whole question of these obligations in the broadcast statement which I gave in the interval between the first meeting I attended at Geneva and my second journey there. I have only to say to those who talk about conscription that, in my opinion, we have no legal or moral obligation to engage in military sanctions. That is the position as I understand it.

What we are doing in this Bill is very definite. There is nothing vague about it. The representatives of the various Governments, having come to the conclusion that a violation of the Covenant had taken place, agreed on certain measures. These measures were considered with a view to making them effective. To be effective, it was desirable that they should be universal, if possible. The purpose of this Bill is strictly limited to the carrying out of the recommendations which are scheduled here. I could also have gone into the merits of the dispute and examined into the substance of the allegations made by each of the two parties—one against the other. Again, I regarded that as foreign to this debate, as not a matter we had to enter into except in this respect: whether, in fact, one of the two parties had violated the Covenant. That was the simple issue and I confined myself deliberately, in my introductory statement, to that particular question. I hold that Italy did violate her obligations under the Covenant. The view I took was the view taken by the representatives of 54 out of the 58 States in the League of Nations. I think that nobody looking at the obligations that were entered into by members of the League and knowing that Italy and Abyssinia were both members could arrive at any other decision than that there had been a violation of the Covenant. I said that we, perhaps, more than most other peoples, would regret being put into a position—as measures of this kind inevitably do put us—of enmity with another people. We have no quarrel with Italy. We have far more relations with Italy than with Abyssinia and know the Italian people far better than we do the people of Abyssinia, who are scarcely known to us. But if there had been any complaint by Italy against Abyssinia in regard to the practice of slavery or anything else, there was a perfectly proper way of dealing with it. That way was not the taking of the law into their own hands, as Italy appears to have done. Abyssinia entered into certain obligations when she became a member of the League. If it was held by any State that Abyssinia was not acting up to these obligations or acting in an unbecoming manner or in a manner dangerous to the peace of the world, there was a way of dealing with that complaint. If necessary, there was a way of getting united League action to settle the matter, so far as practicable. Those in other countries who are opposed to Italy's attitude and who propose to engage in measures such as we propose to engage in here would have assisted in providing remedies if there were evils to be remedied.

Again, I say the merits of the dispute, as such, are not before us. The question is whether or not in fact a certain obligation was broken, and if so what we are to do about it in accordance with our own obligations. I am asking the Dáil to decide that the Government was right in co-operating with the Governments of other nations in fulfilment of these obligations which were freely undertaken by all the members of the League. If there is any objection to the taking of this action, or if there is any suggestion that the measures taken, either in the present dispute or in any other dispute, might lead us too far, then the only remedy for us is to leave the League of Nations. You cannot have it both ways. I am not going to say that membership of the League of Nations is all to our advantage and that there is no other side to it. I recognise that there is another side to it. When we were in opposition, members of our Party frequently spoke here about the other side. There is a nice balance, and the balance is one to be determined by each nation for itself. The question ultimately is whether or not this Society or League of Nations is going to be an advantage to the world, and whether, if the advantage is general, it is going to be an advantage in particular to each nation engaged in it. An organisation such as the League of Nations is a loose one, because the nations naturally are jealous of their sovereignty. As was pointed out, the League of Nations Assembly is not a Parliament. Cooperation on the part of each of the States must be voluntary if you want to get any action. Knowing what human nature is, there is grave doubt always in the mind of each particular member as to whether other members will do their duty. Bargaining that we heard of between France and Great Britain recently in this matter was not about some third or outside issue. Bargaining in all this has to do with the question of the extent, if one should become involved, to which the other will fulfil the obligations of mutual assistance. That is the real question. It is a very serious matter for every nation to know whether or not, when engaging in any particular action, and in carrying out the obligations of the Covenant, it will have the support of other nations. It is not enough to get one or two to engage in actions of this kind. One of the things that will have to be considered here is the degree of unity and solidarity there is amongst the nations in the carrying out of any of these measures. Up to date the position with regard to the measure before the House is this: that in regard to proposals one and two, 51 nations voted for; in regard to the next two proposals 49 States accepted them, and in regard to proposal five 44 States accepted. Some of the States not included in these numbers are considering the matter, but for one reason or another have not given their final reply. So that in regard to these measures there is substantial solidarity. One of the things that naturally will be taken into account by any State considering any measures that may be proposed for carrying out the obligations is the extent to which other States agree to co-operate.

I have tried to keep the discussion here as closely as possible to the Bill. I was fully aware that the discussion could be widened and that there could be talk about all sorts of issues. We had the question of the economic war and our attitude with regard to Great Britain brought into this discussion. I think the Leader of the Opposition spoke outside about the inconsistency of Great Britain and ourselves in having, so to speak, a conflict which was not settled while proposing to take part in any action that was being taken by the League of Nations to settle other conflicts. Well, there may be some blame, to put it that way, in not bringing the question to the League of Nations, assuming that there was no difficulty about bringing it there. But that is outside the issue before us now. I do not object to its introduction at the moment, but I am not going to be led at this stage into a discussion of all the questions involved in that matter. For instance, one of the things told us was that the League put us on an equal level. Great Britain and ourselves are not on an equal level in that matter. It is very interesting to see all who are so ready to find fault with us willing, even in this matter, to say that we are not on the same level. At an early stage we indicated our readiness to have that matter brought before an international tribunal. There was no reference to that here to-day. I am submitting this Bill in the belief that everybody who seriously examines it knows what we committed ourselves to in joining the League of Nations, and knows what we committed ourselves to in continuing to be a member of the League. Every such person has no option, in my opinion, but to vote for this Bill. Anyone who votes against the Bill will have to tell the people why he should not have voted for it. We heard some members talking about their sympathy for Abyssinia, and others talking about the question of our not making a bargain. Sometimes when there is a possibility of further steps, each of them, no matter what these steps are, will have to be brought here for consideration. Let those people tell us what we were to do in this matter. Were we to refuse? Were we to say: "We will not carry out our obligations"?

Mr. Belton

On equal terms, yes.

The President

I should like to see people who talk about bargaining try it. It would be most interesting. If they put themselves into that position for one or two months to see what would be the consequence of acting like that, possibly there would be no bargain and they might have quite a different opinion. I am putting it as a challenge to every member in the Dáil to say what ground there is for voting against the Bill. This is a plain carrying out of obligations that we entered into by being a member of the League of Nations, and of the obligations that we have by continuing to be a member of the League. No one can vote against the Bill conscientiously, except those who stood up each time the League of Nations Estimate was before the Dáil and said that we should have nothing to do with it, because a certain state of circumstances might arise in which we might be involved in the question of sanctions, which might lead to serious results. No one can have any reason for voting against the Bill except such persons. If Deputy Belton had taken up that attitude in the past, I say he would have a right to oppose the Bill.

Mr. Belton

Will the President deny that it will inevitably lead to conscription?

The President

If the Deputy had been here when I was replying he would have heard what I had to say on that.

Question—"That the Bill be now read a Second Time"—put.

Sir Osmond Grattan Esmonde

I dissent.

Mr. Kent

Take me as dissenting.

Mr. Belton

I also wish to dissent. If Deputy Kelly had pluck, he would dissent too.

Question declared carried.

The President

If we could get agreement, I should like to have the Bill dealt with in Committee to-morrow. As I have said, we cannot really amend the Bill in Committee. Most of the schedules are simply the text of documents which have been agreed to and which would have to be either accepted or rejected here. With regard to the text of the body of the Bill, if there are suggestions as to amending it, we shall see what we can do with them, but at present it does not seem to me easy to amend the Bill in any way.

General Mulcahy

As far as we are concerned there is no objection to taking the Final Stages of the Bill to-morrow.

Ordered: That the remaining stages of the Bill be taken to-morrow.