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Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 14 Nov 1935

Vol. 59 No. 6

Courts of Justice Bill, 1934—Recommittal (Resumed—Amendment No. 4).

The Attorney-General was speaking when we arose last night, and I thought that he was going to continue. The situation with regard to this amendment is easy enough to state. The proposal in the Bill is to have a Supreme Court of five, and that not less than three should sit—the question of when three sit instead of five to be determined by the Chief Justice. Deputy Costello has moved to make four the quorum in accordance with the only views put forward before the Committee—the only views in relation to the fixing of the quorum. It is to be noticed that sub-section (3) of Section 4 includes judges who are, by virtue of Section 6 or Section 7 of the Principal Act, additional judges of the Supreme Court. The High Court consists of six judges. For the future the Supreme Court will have five, irrespective of the people who may be taken in from the High Court. There is, therefore, a number of 11 to be drawn from, and the Chief Justice himself asserted that, provided the Supreme Court was going to be raised in numbers—and that is now proposed to be done—the quorum should never fall below four. The only other evidence that was given, dealing with the question of numbers to any degree, was the evidence given by the President of the High Court, who had no view of his own as to the necessity for increasing the number of the Supreme Court, saying that he and his colleagues were satisfied with the constitution of the Court as it was then. He did offer the suggestion, however, that he would prefer five to be sitting rather than four, and that was founded on his view that we had better not have at any time an equally divided Supreme Court. We are getting the increased numbers in the Supreme Court, and the proposal is to have four—that is, four to be chosen out of 11 available. I do not say that the 11 are available all at once, but there will be available at any moment the five of the Supreme Court, as it will be constituted, the President of the High Court, and any other judge from amongst the remaining five of the High Court. We figure that it will be possible on all occasions to get a court of four to sit.

We are told that we have got to allow for absence through illness—we are told that all through the Bill—or any other cause. That peculiar enlargement of the provisions for supplementing or substituting judges has been made right through this Bill and will be the cause of comment later on. In any event, there is now, as the Bill will now stand, the possibility of drawing from the High Court, when the Chief Justice thinks fit, in order to get this number. We suggest that, if there is a mind that is keen on the enlargement of the Supreme Court, that mind ought to follow the line of arriving at the conclusion that four is the necessary quorum. When the evidence was given for the enlarging of the Supreme Court, it was only put up by the Chief Justice as a permanent matter, and the only other person was a member of the Bar Council who said that the Court should be constituted ad hoc for special matters, such as heavy commercial cases or constitutional cases; and surely it would be possible to have such matters arranged at a time when the High Court judges will not be out on circuit. It would be a very exceptional occasion when there would be a clash by reason, say, of a heavy commercial case or a constitutional case in the Supreme Court by way of appeal. It is only in very extraordinary cases it would clash with the High Court. So it should be admitted that a quorum of four is essential.

The Attorney-General last night referred to some remarks of Deputy Costello on the point that in this measure there is seen a conflict between two view-points, the view-point of those who, notwithstanding the economic situation in the country and in spite of that situation, are determined to make two new appointments to the Bench. Then, having decided to take that hurdle, they decide to take another contrary decision, and that is that they will cramp everything else in the Bill for reasons of economy. The Attorney-General was rather vexed because it was suggested here that the views of certain officials of the Department of Finance had been imposed upon him. Surely the words used here yesterday, particularly the words used by the Minister for Justice, showed that even if he did not think he was reading a memorandum from the Finance Department, he got their very vocabulary. He used phrases about fees and said it was a bagatelle, the very words used by the Finance people—that is their outstanding argument with regard to the matter of fees. The phrases used here last night were immediately reminiscent to me of the phrases used by the Finance people— such phrases as "made to pay their way,""these fees were a bagatelle," and so on. The very Words used by the two people on the Government side who spoke on this Bill are the words of the Finance people. It is clear that not merely has the view of the Finance Department been accepted in this Bill but their arguments have been accepted in their entirety, always with this exception, that notwithstanding anything urged in the way of economy on the Government side, there are still two new appointments to be made to the judicial bench. I suggest as a logical conclusion, and it should be so stated here, that there should be a quorum of four.

Is the Deputy pressing the amendment?

Question put: "That the word proposed to be deleted stand."
The Committee divided: Tá, 57; Níl, 28.

Tá.

  • Aiken, Frank.
  • Beegan, Patrick.
  • Blaney, Neal.
  • Boland, Gerald.
  • Boland, Patrick.
  • Bourke, Daniel.
  • Brady, Brian.
  • Brady, Seán.
  • Breen, Daniel.
  • Briscoe, Robert.
  • Concannon, Helena.
  • Corbett, Edmond.
  • Corish, Richard.
  • Corry, Martin John.
  • Crowley, Timothy.
  • Davin, William.
  • Derrig, Thomas.
  • De Valera, Eamon.
  • Everett, James.
  • Flynn, Stephen.
  • Fogarty, Andrew.
  • Goulding, John.
  • Harris, Thomas.
  • Hayes, Seán.
  • Hogan, Patrick (Clare).
  • Houlihan, Patrick.
  • Keely, Séamus P.
  • Kehoe, Patrick.
  • Kelly, James Patrick.
  • Kelly, Thomas.
  • Kilroy, Michael.
  • Lemass, Seán F.
  • Little, Patrick John.
  • Lynch, James B.
  • MacDermot, Frank.
  • MacEntee, Seán.
  • Maguire, Ben.
  • Maguire, Conor Alexander.
  • Moane, Edward.
  • Moore, Séamus.
  • Moylan, Seán.
  • Murphy, Patrick Stephen.
  • O Ceallaigh, Seán T.
  • O'Dowd, Patrick.
  • O'Grady, Seán.
  • O'Reilly, Matthew.
  • Pattison, James P.
  • Pearse, Margaret Mary.
  • Ruttledge, Patrick Joseph.
  • Ryan, James.
  • Ryan, Martin.
  • Ryan, Robert.
  • Sheridan, Michael.
  • Smith, Patrick.
  • Traynor, Oscar.
  • Victory, James.
  • Walsh, Richard.

Níl.

  • Anthony, Richard.
  • Belton, Patrick.
  • Bennett, George Cecil.
  • Bourke, Séamus.
  • Brennan, Michael.
  • Burke, James Michael.
  • Cosgrave, William T.
  • Daly, Patrick.
  • Desmond, William.
  • Dillon, James M.
  • Dockrell, Henry Morgan.
  • Dolan, James Nicholas.
  • Doyle, Peadar S.
  • Finlay, John.
  • Keating, John.
  • MacEoin, Seán.
  • McFadden, Michael Og.
  • McGilligan, Patrick.
  • McGovern, Patrick.
  • McMenamin, Daniel.
  • Morrisroe, James.
  • O'Donovan, Timothy Joseph.
  • O'Leary, Daniel.
  • O'Sullivan, John Marcus.
  • Redmond, Bridget Mary.
  • Roddy, Martin.
  • Rogers, Patrick James.
  • Wall, Nicholas.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Little and Smith; Níl: Deputies Doyle and Bennett.
Question declared carried.

On Section 4, sub-section (4) proposes the deletion of certain words of Section 2 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1928. What is the purpose of the proposed deletion?

Those words would not be appropriate in the new situation.

In what respect?

We will have four ordinary judges in the Supreme Court in addition to the Chief Justice.

I thought it was for an entirely different purpose. I thought it had to do with the transfer of certain jurisdictions to the Chief Justice.

The Attorney-General

The old provision reads: "or, in the event of both the said President and such ordinary judge"—that is, of the Supreme Court —"being so prevented, by the junior ordinary judge of the Supreme Court." In view of the additions to the Supreme Court, those words would clearly not be appropriate. The section will read: "or who is for the time being available."

Who is available?

The Attorney-General

Who of the other members of the Supreme Court is available.

Is seniority going to go, then? There is the Chief Justice and there are two ordinary judges, and they will rank presumably according to the date of their appointment. There are going to be two more appointed and they will also, I take it, rank according to the date of appointment. But one of them will be senior to the other. Does it mean that you are going to shift on down that line so that in the end you may get at the junior judge of the Supreme Court?

The Attorney-General

Yes.

I understood this whole thing was in reference to the transfer of certain jurisdictions. I want to know what are the special jurisdictions. Section 19 is the reference of the Principal Act. There is jurisdiction in minor matters and, in addition, jurisdiction in relation to solicitors. What is the position under other sections of the Bill? It is proposed to transfer lunacy and minor matters away from the Chief Justice. What is happening about the solicitors?

Solicitors, notaries public and commissioners—all that is being retained.

Is there to be any distinction as to who operates in regard to solicitors? Is there to be one division for lunacy and minor matters and another for solicitors and heterogeneous work?

The Attorney-General

Lunacy and minor matters are given to the President of the High Court.

That is not in the Bill. They are going to the High Court, but not to the President of the High Court. I have an amendment down to give them to the President. They are going away from the Chief Justice under Section 9, which deals with the transfer of certain functions. Sub-section (1) of Section 9 deals with solicitors and minor matters transferred from the Chief Justice to the High Court, and sub-section (2) with lunacy. If the President is ill, what will happen in regard to solicitors and minor matters? Will there be the same devolution of the work?

The Attorney-General

There will be.

This amendment is consequential upon Section 2 of the Act of 1928. There is nothing peculiar in it, except to provide for the changed conditions where you have an increased number of judges.

Perhaps it will be better for me to raise this matter under Section 9.

As I say, the amendment is put in here as consequential upon the increase in the number of Supreme Court judges.

If the Minister thinks that lunacy matters and minor matters ought not to be fixed to an individual judge, then this is consequential. If you do not allow the Chief Justice in future to deal with them, then whatever matters used to go to the Chief Justice will go to the judges of the Supreme Court from time to time in the order of their seniority. But by a later section you entirely take away all the jurisdiction given to the Chief Justice under sub-section (1) and transfer that to the High Court, so this can only have reference to solicitors and minor matters.

So far as lunacy and minor matters are concerned, they are transferred to the President of the High Court or a judge he shall nominate. There is nothing to prevent his retaining them himself or appointing another to do the duty.

There is sub-section (2) of the 1928 Act which refers back to a section in another Act. You are taking the 19 (1) matters and shifting them to the High Court and you are only leaving for consideration 19 (2) matters.

The Attorney-General

And 19 (3) matters.

Yes. Now we are making all these changes in regard to all these things. I was thinking first that it was only in regard to lunacy and minor matters. It was not so. However I will deal with them on Section 9. Reading through this measure there is allowance made for the substitution of one judge for another if he is unable to be present owing to illness, absence, or "for any other reason." The old phraseology brought into other Acts was "owing to other public duties or services temporarily imposed upon such judge, or on account of illness or through absence from Saorstát Eireann." The Government here wants power to substitute somebody for somebody else who is prevented attending his duties through illness, absence "or for any other reason." But we are bringing in sub-section (2) of Section 28 and there it was illness or absence. Who is going to determine the meaning of the words "or for any other reason"?

I will undertake to bring in an amendment on Report Stage dealing with this matter. There is nothing sinister about it.

Surely it is possible to define the occasion upon which temporary absence of the judge might take place, allowing for the appointment of a substitute. It ought to be possible to define illness, absence from the Saorstát or other public duties imposed upon him. The Minister has now put in the words "for any other reason." What is the necessity for these? Misadventure, or delegation of duties would be covered by illness or absence from the Saorstát. Are there any other things in the contemplation of the Government or have there been any others for the past ten years?

It is purely a drafting phrase. It was said to me there might be other things unforeseen. A judge might have to attend the funeral of a relative.

If a man is absent for one day, do you think he will have to appoint another man to take his place?

I do not. How could he appoint someone to take his place? A Circuit Court judge cannot appoint anyone to take his place. It is the Executive Council that must do it.

Why use loose words? Taking them at their worst, does it not mean that the Government during its term of office could have a great volume of patronage to distribute by sending off judges and appointing others temporarily in their places?

The Attorney-General

Why not leave that matter until we come to it in a later clause? This section as it stands is approved?

I agree, but why say this with regard to the Chief Justice? The Chief Justice will not be allowed to get a substitute for public duties imposed upon him, while other judges can.

The Attorney-General

These duties are duties that can wait. Suppose any cause did arise that prevented the Chief Justice acting, these particular duties are not such as would call for an urgent sitting of the Chief Justice to deal with them. They could readily be postponed.

I do not see the necessity for this at all.

Section 4 agreed to.

Amendment No. 5, which is equivalent to a direct negative, is out of order. I think amendment No. 6 is consequential upon that.

I should like to be allowed to move amendment No. 6:—

In page 5, Section 5 (3), lines 29-30, to delete the words "by virtue of this section."

The sub-section, as it stands at the moment, says:—

No ordinary judge of the Supreme Court who holds office as such judge at the passing of this Act shall be required by virtue of this section to sit in the High Court save with his own consent.

Can such an ordinary judge of the Supreme Court, holding office as such judge now, be required, except by virtue of this section, to sit in the High Court otherwise than with his consent?

The idea behind that is that the judges of the Supreme Court are not going to be asked to do it without their consent. What is in mind is what comes up under Section 38, and I understand that the Supreme Court judges at present have no objection to it—that is, going out on circuit.

That is not my question. My question is whether a present judge of the Supreme Court could be asked to sit in the High Court if this section were not passed? Is there any way in which a judge sitting in the Supreme Court at the moment could be asked to sit in the High Court, leaving that sub-section out of consideration?

The Attorney-General

Leaving that section out?

The Attorney-General

No. It has so been held up to this. You had an instance in recent times where one judge in the Supreme Court did not sit on a particular case for certain reasons, and it was held that he could not be called on to do High Court work. I am referring to the hearing of the Erasmus Smith case. The Deputy may remember that Judge Fitzgibbon was unable to take part in the hearing of that appeal, and his services could not be made use of in the High Court. During the whole time that appeal was being heard—I think it lasted over three weeks—he never acted as judge at all.

That is what I want to get at. I was going to ask what difference would it make to cut out those words? That is probably the best way to put the question. Suppose we cut out those words it would then read:—

No ordinary judge of the Supreme Court who holds office as such judge at the passing of this Act shall be required to sit in the High Court save with his own consent.

I understand that that is the law at the moment?

The Attorney-General

No. He cannot be required to sit in the High Court at all, even with his consent.

And what is proposed for the future?

The Attorney-General

What is proposed in this is that the present two ordinary judges of the Supreme Court, that is Judge Fitzgibbon and Judge Murnaghan, shall not be called on to sit in the High Court under this section without their consent, but they may be called on to sit in the High Court for the hearing of appeals without their consent.

So it is a change in the terms of their appointment?

They have been consulted in this.

Apart from that, is it changing the terms of their appointment? If it is proposed to impose upon them an obligation to sit in the High Court in the future in some cases where that duty cannot be imposed upon them at the moment, then it is a change in the terms of their appoint ment.

The Attorney-General

I suppose it is.

Is there not a Constitutional article against that?

The Attorney-General

I do not see what objection there can be under the Constitution. As far as I know, no objection has been raised to requiring them to sit on the hearing of appeals.

Has the attention of the Chief Justice been directed to that, and has his advice been sought on the effect of this on the Supreme Court, apart from the two judges themselves? Has he been asked anything about that section and the effect of it?

The Chief Justice has had the whole matter put before him. The question was raised that they should not be asked to sit in the High Court without their consent, but no objection was raised with regard to the hearing of Circuit Court appeals.

But the "with their consent" is not in the atmosphere of the Circuit Court appeals?

They can be made to sit for those?

That is the intention, in any case.

I do suggest that that is undoubtedly a change in the terms of appointment of those two, as they are called, ordinary judges of the Supreme Court at the moment. It would be better to have their attention specially directed to it. The attention of the Chief Justice should also be directed to the matter, and his views sought. It is not a thing which should be lightly done. If it is done in one small case it can be done in regard to other things later.

The whole thing was placed before them.

I wonder what does that amount to? Does it amount to sending them copies of the Bill and saying "We shall be glad to have your views on this"?

The Attorney-General

No; there has been correspondence going on.

Is the House going to be informed of the terms of the correspondence which went on? Are we going to be told whether the Chief Justice or the Supreme Court judges have raised any points? Will the House be told from time to time what has emerged in this correspondence?

The Attorney-General

The Deputy asks whether the judges have been consulted in a matter which touches themselves. The reason why the correspondence has been mentioned in this case is because this section touches the judges themselves. I do not think it would be proper to ask that the correspondence from the judges on these points should be quoted here without their consent.

On a point where the Chief Justice or any of the other judges is affected by this Bill, and they raise an objection, will we be told what the objection is? If the Government has been in consultation with them, surely the House, in attempting to pass this measure, ought at any rate to know the views of those people in important positions who have been consulted.

I would not have any objection. The point is that perhaps the judges would take exception to it.

They would certainly have to be asked.

I would have no objection whatever.

Would the Minister say that the judges who have been consulted——

I will take a note of any points which the Deputy raises on this matter, and ask the judges.

The only thing I can do is to put the query on every section, "Have the judges been consulted?" The Chief Justice, I would imagine, and the whole court system would be affected by anything that is in this Bill, down to the smallest point. Individual judges would be affected only on points which touch themselves, but the President of the High Court might also be affected by matters affecting the composition of the High Court or a new method of using the judges. I do not know whether he was individually consulted, but I presume he was, from what has been said. However, I can leave that over to Report Stage. By that time I certainly hope that the Minister will have been in touch with the Chief Justice and the two judges of the Supreme Court to find out whether this House can get the benefit of their views as to whether this is a change in their conditions of employment, and as to the terms on which they gave their consent, if they have given their consent.

Amendment No. 6, by leave, withdrawn.
Section 5 put and agreed to.
SECTION 6.
In page 5, before Section 6, to insert a new section as follows:—
Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 16 of the Principal Act, a person who is for the time being a barrister of at least 12 years' standing and has at any time practised as a barrister in Saorstát Eireann for a period of, or for a number of periods amounting in the aggregate to, not less than 12 years shall be qualified for appointment as a judge of the Supreme Court or as a judge of the High Court.— (Minister for Justice).

I am not moving amendment No. 7. It was suggested that such a case might arise, but I cannot visualise any such case.

What was the case which it was suggested might arise?

It was suggested that there might be the case of a person in the Service, or something like that.

What is the interpretation of "12 years' standing"?

That you must be practising at the time——

And have been called 12 years before?

There was one celebrated case, and I think the decision amounted to this—I do not know whether it is accepted as good— that 12 years' standing meant that the person about to be appointed must be in practice on the date of application for the position, and must have been called 12 years earlier. He may not have done a stroke of work in between. I certainly think there was something peculiar about a man who had intermittent periods of work. The old definition of standings amounted merely to that—in practice on the particular date and called for a period beforehand.

I take it the same applies to amendments Nos. 33 and 71?

I thought that was going to reveal some individual. I am disappointed.

That is not so.

I thought it was going to, but apparently it has not.

Amendment No. 7 not moved.
Question proposed: "That Section 6 stand part of the Bill."

What difficulty does Section 6 remove?

The Attorney-General

There is one case the Deputy is aware of in which some doubt was raised as to whether—

A judge of the High Court is qualified for appointment? What are the grounds on which even the query was raised?

The Attorney-General

The Deputy has referred to the qualification section about being a practising barrister and 12 years' standing. There was some doubt as to whether a High Court judge could be appointed by reason of the fact that he was no longer a practising barrister.

At the time of his change from High Court to Supreme Court?

The Attorney-General

Yes; there is one case.

Does this then meet the point?

The Attorney-General

"Shall be and be deemed always to have been qualified."

But surely there is some little distinction between being qualified and having particular qualifications? If the point of dispute is as to whether a man who is sitting as a High Court judge could be called a practising barrister, is the doubt entirely removed by this phraseology?

The Attorney-General

It is considered to be and I think it is. It has been carefully considered and I think it is.

Question put and agreed to.
Question proposed: "That Section 7 stand part of the Bill."

Section 7 has this phrase in sub-section (3):—

...whenever a judge for the time being assigned is temporarily unable because of illness, absence or any other cause, to discharge the duties of the said office...

What is the possible other cause that could not be met by the phrases which have been sanctified by use in Acts previously—"illness, absence or other public duties or services temporarily imposed on him"? I do not think that the question of attending at a funeral could be seriously raised.

He might want to take some time off at that particular time. If a phrase can be got, however, I will bring it in on Report.

I suggest that there are phrases. Amendment No. 33 has a phrase which I have taken from some of the other Acts—I think it is the Act which allows for the appointment of substitute Circuit Court judges and substitute district justices. There the phraseology was—and it was an enlargement of the old phraseology— such that you thought of the disappearance of a man temporarily from his duties because of illness, absence from Saorstát Eireann or carrying out other public duties or services temporarily imposed on him. I suggest that it is a very wide enlargement to say "or for any other cause," I do not say this is going to be done, but it is possible, if the phrase is left in—and it is studded right through this Bill—that you are going to break down one of the points at which an independent judiciary is supposed to be a stronghold and buttress of the people's rights, namely, that the Government of the day cannot exercise any control or power over people who are permanently appointed, and who are given the permanent appointment so as to make them independent, but you can exercise a certain amount of sway or control over people temporarily appointed.

If there is a measure passed which allows the Government to discharge judges by temporary suspension for any cause, and to fill their places with their own nominees, surely you break down the whole foundation of the liberty of the people through an independent judiciary? It is not, I say, a thing to be lightly done. Suppose there was a multitudinous series of occurrences which leaped to the mind and which could not be covered by detailed phraseology, there would be something to be said for the comprehensive phrase, but, really is there anything that we should allow in respect of the substitution of a judge except illness, absence or other public duties of any type? I may also say that there is a considerable view, and a view that is increasing in strength, that there is too much use being made of the practice of taking judges away from the duties to which they were assigned in order to discharge other public duties. They should be left to their own duties which have been picked for them.

I do not think there is much reason for that.

The Minister will find that there is a considerable volume of opinion on that. However, that is on the side. The point is: why make it "for any other cause"?

The Attorney-General

There was no intention to widen it, and if the Deputy sees anything sinister in it, or thinks that it may lead to dangers, it can be considered and, perhaps, some other phraseology adopted.

I think it should be, because this section was not in the Bill originally. It was introduced by the Minister during his special Committee Stage, but I adverted to it on Section 17, dealing with the appointment of judges to act as additional judges of the Circuit Court. I moved to take out "for any other cause" and to put in certain eventualities. Those eventualities can be enlarged in number, and I think this ought to be looked at from the angle of the terrific gap which can be burst in the whole judicial system, and the whole matter of an independent judiciary and the rights dependent on it. I think it is worth considering.

I will consider it before Report Stage.

Will that apply to the others?

It will apply to the other clauses.

Question put and agreed to.
Question proposed: "That Section 8 stand part of the Bill.

This section has only relation to the judges because it is inserted in a Courts of Justice Bill and in the Part relative to the Supreme Court and High Court. The phrase is "judicial office". Are there any actual cases in which this is likely to be applied? Does the Minister foresee that there is going to be any case in which this will be necessary?

I do not, at the moment.

The Attorney-General

I do not think any judge has retired.

What is the likelihood of this? What arc the considerations of equity, so to speak, that have entered into the thinking out and bringing in of this section?

It has been found necessary, as the Deputy knows, in regard to a circuit judge and it might be necessary in future. There is nothing in view at the moment.

The Attorney-General

Is it not entirely reasonable?

If a case were going to occur, if there was going to be any kind of frequent recurrence of this kind of thing, but it is very unlikely ever to have application.

Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 9.
(1) The jurisdiction which was transferred to and vested in the Chief Justice by sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Principal Act shall, on the appointed day, become and be transferred to the High Court and shall thenceforth be exercised by the President of the High Court or, if and whenever the said President so directs, by an ordinary judge of the High Court for the time being assigned in that behalf by the said President.
(2) As on and from the appointed day—
(a) references in the Lunacy Regulation (Ireland) Act, 1871, and the Acts amending the same and any rules and orders made thereunder to "the Lord Chancellor entrusted as aforesaid" shall, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 3 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1928 (No. 15 of 1928), be construed and have effect as references to the judge of the High Court for the time being exercising the jurisdiction transferred to the High Court by this section, and
(3) Unless or until otherwise provided by the Oireachtas, the office of the Registrar to the Chief Justice shall, on and after the appointed day, continue to exist and be constituted as it exists and is constituted immediately before the appointed day, save that on and after the appointed day—
(d) all jurisdictions and powers in relation to the said office and the said Registrar respectively which are, immediately before the appointed day, exercisable by the Chief Justice shall become and be exercisable by the judge of the High Court who is for the time being exercising the jurisdiction transferred to the High Court by this section.
(4) The Minister for Justice may, by order made after consultation with the Chief Justice and the President of the High Court, appoint a day not later than six months after the passing of this Act to be the appointed day for the purposes of this section.

As I think I have informed the Deputy, amendments Nos. 8, 10, 11, and then 9, have alternative objects. To save amendment No, 9 I shall put amendment No. 8 in the form that only certain words be deleted.

I move amendment No. 8:—

In page 6, Section 9 (1), lines 19-21, to delete all words from and including the words "or, if and whenever" to the end of sub-section (1).

Taking these words out, with certain consequential amendments referred, would leave the sub-section in this way:

The jurisdiction which was transferred to and vested in the Chief Justice by sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Principal Act shall on the appointed day become and be transferred to the High Court and shall thenceforth be exercised by the President of the High Court.

The sub-section would be left in that state if the words that I propose to delete are, in fact, deleted. I admit that there may have to be consequential amendments made in that which may not be governed by the other phrases already in with regard to the Supreme Court, or the phrases that will hereafter be proposed to be put in with regard to the High Court. They would certainly have to cover such things as are now covered in respect to the Chief Justice in relation to lunacy and minor matters.

The main object is to have the work in lunacy and minor matters put into the hands of one person and left definitely to that person. Up to date, I think it has been found that jurisdiction in these matters has been carried out with the greatest and most anxious care by the Chief Justice. When he was giving evidence before the Courts of Justice Committee he stressed very much his view that minors and lunatics did require what amounted to a paternal sort of care, and that that could only be got when this work was, in the main, done by a particular judge. If the suggestion had been made to him at the time that there was any prospect that this work would not be handed over in its entirety to a special judge, I think he would have objected in a very strong way. The Chief Justice gave a long list of figures in relation to this type of case. I think anybody who knows the particular outlook that he has on this jurisdiction will realise the truth of what I say, that it would be a change very considerably for the worse to have these matters thrown on a High Court judge and even then left to be done by, say, a judge who might change from time to time. There is always discernible in the courts in specialist matters a tendency to divert special business into the hands of a special judge so that he may become accustomed to them and not to have that judge's work on those types of cases interrupted except on occasions of illness or complete absence from his duties. Whatever considerations apply in that respect to probate matters or to any other special type of case, there are peculiar considerations applying to minors and lunatics.

I think the Chief Justice himself was questioned before the Committee about the possibility of allowing some of these matters to be dealt with in the circuit courts, and to that I think he entered a very strong objection, holding the view that in these cases there is a great deal more than what emerges in court when an ordinary application is made by way of petition or otherwise in regard to minors or lunatics. Both these classes of people, one suffering from infirmity from age and the other infirmity from youth, require that they really should have somebody with a sort of paternal mind looking after them. I do not say that the work is going to be slung around from one judge to another. We have not yet heard as to whether this work is going to be taken from the Chief Justice. Again, that is a matter on which I would like to know from the Minister whether there has been any consultation with the Chief Justice and if he has responded in any way. But if the work is going to be transferred from the Chief Justice there is an immense amount to be said for having the jurisdiction fixed and centred in some special judge. I do not think that requires much argument. The nature of the matters that will be discussed is the ground work of the whole argument.

I am suggesting that the work should be given to the President of the High Court, that is if it is being taken out of the Supreme Court altogether. If the work is to be taken from the Chief Justice who has so anxiously looked after these matters for so many years, then I submit that it should be given to the highest authority in the High Court and that he should be given the task of substituting, if that is at all possible, for the work done by the Chief Justice up to date. The Bill seems to envisage a situation in which the work will be done more or less in relation to time rather than a situation in which the work will be done by an individual arranging the time to suit himself. In the new situation, with High Court judges going our on circuit, it may not be easy to arrange that. Some of these matters will not brook delay, and where you have two High Court judges on circuit, I think it would be well to arrange for a break in their work when on circuit, and that if necessary the President might come back to town on a Thursday and arrange to deal with lunacy and minor matters on a Friday or Saturday. I think that would be much better than to do what is envisaged in the Bill, because it is surely desirable to continue the special care that this particular type of case requires and has received up to date. I am insisting at the moment that this work should be centred in one judge. If that is agreed on there will have to be some consequential amendments to provide for a substitute during the illness of the special judge or his absence from work. What I am anxious to secure is that this type of case should be dealt with, mainly by one judge. The tendency of the Bill should be to fix the jurisdiction in these matters in the hands of one person. On the section, I propose to ask why this jurisdiction is being taken from the Chief Justice at all, and if it is being done with his consent.

The underlying idea of the section is that the Chief Justice should be as free as possible to deal with the work of the Supreme Court. It has also been pointed out that it does not seem proper that there should be an appeal from the highest judge in the State. That could happen and has happened. The Chief Justice has been consulted about this matter and has agreed that this arrangement is a suitable and proper one. I agree with the Deputy that it is desirable that the same judge should always deal with these lunacy and minor matters. I believe that, in practice, that is how it will work out. The President can use his discretion as to whether he is going to retain that business himself or assign it to a particular judge. I am quite satisfied that the President of the High Court will have in mind the desirability, as everybody who knows anything about the business has in mind, of having one particular judge to deal with that business at all times.

To fortify what I said and in an attempt to make the Minister go farther than he has gone, I should like to refer to the evidence of the Chief Justice at page 310, question 4563. He had spoken previously of the number of cases. Then he goes on to say:—

"In point of fact, there never has been an appeal in lunacy cases. There have been only two appeals in minors cases. The jurisdiction in lunacy formerly was exercised by the Lord Chancellor under a direct letter from the King. After the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, that was transferred to the Chief Justice, and it was from him transferred by our own statute to the Chief Justice of the Free State. In minors matters, the jurisdiction was formerly practically a Chancery jurisdiction. At one time, it was regarded in the position that the Crown was parens patriae and had jurisdiction over minors in that way, though, in practice, it was always exercised by the Lord Chancellor.

Then he spoke of certain changes made—the abolition of the term "lunacy" and so on. Speaking on that, he says:—

"If a change were contemplated, this particular branch of work should be a one-man job. What I mean is that one man should be always attached to this particular work. There is a very human element about it. A great deal of the work is done, not in court, but in chambers. There are a great number of conferences with relatives and so on, and, in a great many of the cases, one requires, more or less, to be personally in touch. Again, one often requires to be available in urgent cases."

There was a query as to whether he suggested that there should be a special registrar and the Chief Justice said "No, but a judge. I suggest that if there is a change made, only one judge should be attached to the position and he should be made responsible for it." A question arises as to how the staff is to be dealt with. There is some phrase in the Bill about that. The Chief Justice made a protest against the throwing of the staff of the Lunacy-Office into the Central Office. He said:—

"The staff of the Lunacy Office must be separate and independent. The business of that office must not circulate. Absolute secrecy is essential to the working of the office. So much is that regarded as necessary that, on the death of a patient, all the medical reports and other things of that sort are destroyed. Similarly, when people are cured, the medical records are destroyed. I think it will be generally admitted that that is desirable. If you have this work thrown on an interchangeable staff, you cannot maintain that secrecy. I do urge that there should be one judge with a separate staff. The registrar and the assistant registrar in Lunacy are required by law to carry out visits. That is what I regard as the most important portion of the whole of lunacy administration—visiting. A great many patients are in private care, and it almost passes belief what might happen in the case of persons in private care were it not for visitors. I have had some experience in this matter, and my experience impressed this thing very much upon my mind. I also think that a similar system of visiting should be introduced for minors. I think that those particular cases should be dealt with separately and a convenient title would be `Courts of Wards'."

There were other questions on this matter of minors and visits. Then, the Chief Justice was asked whether lunacy jurisdiction should be conferred on the Circuit Court. The Chief Justice replied: "As a matter of fact, they have it, but I am sorry to say that, from my experience of it, it has not been well administered." Then he recurred to the question of visitation, and said that the lay visitor had better opportunities to examine the wardrobes of patients, see that meals were properly attended to, and so forth.

I quote that simply to fortify the point I made. Possibly the matter will have to be dealt with in this way, and it will have to be left to the President to assign a judge to do this work. I suggest, however, that the wording of the Bill amounts almost to an invitation to the President of the High Court, if he is going to have a lot of diverse matters to attend to in his court, to allocate the lunacy business to judges ad hoc from time to time. I think we should indicate the view of the House that the President should either retain that work himself or assign to it a particular judge who would be known to be in charge of these ward matters. There should be some change in the phraseology of the Bill which would indicate the view of the House and show that they accepted the viewpoint of the Chief Justice, that, in these ward and minor matters, a great deal of humanity is required, and that they can only be successfully dealt with by having allotted to them a special judge.

I support the amendment moved by Deputy McGilligan. When we come to deal with the section as a whole, I shall have some remarks to make on the advisability of the change proposed. Dealing with the particular amendment before the Committee, the Minister will probably agree that, if the jurisdiction in lunacy and minor matters is to be properly or adequately carried out, it must be exercised continuously by one judge. We who know the practice that has obtained in reference to minor and lunacy matters during the last eleven years, know that the Chief Justice has himself taken a personal interest in each case both on the lunacy side of his court and on the minor side of his court. A practice has grown up there which differs substantially from the practice that existed in the old days when the Lord Chancellor was the head of the minors and lunacy patients in this country. The Chief Justice has given the utmost personal attention to each case. If this change is to take place at all—and I think no change is desirable at the present time—it is absolutely essential, having regard to the practice that has grown up in the Chief Justice's office in connection with wards of court and patients in lunacy, that one particular judge should be assigned to that work. It should be made clear in the section that it is only in very exceptional cases—whether the particular judge in question be the President or anybody else—that this work should be delegated to another judge. Unless that principle is clearly and definitely laid down in the Bill. I think very great hardship is likely to arise in the administration of the affairs of patients in lunacy and wards of court.

I have not heard what the Minister said in reply to the points made by Deputy McGilligan in moving the amendment, but, I do urge that amendment of the section is essential. I am entirely opposed to the change proposed in the section, and I see no reason for it. But, if there is to be a change, we should make clear and definite that one particular judge is to take over jurisdiction from the Chief Justice. He will be in a position to learn from the Chief Justice and from the officers at present attached to the Chief Justice's court who are dealing with these matters what the practice was, what individual attention is to be given to cases, and how the traditions which have grown up in that Office are to be maintained at the high level which they reached during the last eleven years.

The Attorney-General

While all that both Deputies have said may be quite true, is there any necessity to insert it in the Bill? Is there a shadow of doubt that the President of the High Court will be as much alive to the considerations put forward as any Deputy present? Anybody who has had experience of the handling of lunacy and minor matters at once realises that continuity in the judicial office dealing with them is desirable and that that personal touch to which Deputy Costello refers is of real value. As the Chief Justice has for the last eleven years taken a personal interest in every case under his control and has become familiar with the circumstances of each case, he is admittedly in a better position to deal with applications that come before him from time to time than if he had not had that continuous contact with the cases. Will not these considerations immediately occur to the President of the High Court? It is open to him, under this Bill, to assume to himself that particular jurisdiction. Perhaps that is the most desirable thing that could happen. The duties of the President of the High Court are very onerous in a good many respects, and if he feels that he must devolve his jurisdiction on someone, surely the same considerations will induce him to leave it in the hands of a particular judge, and to allow that judge to attend to that work without interruption, unless in exceptional cases which arise? I think that it is quite sufficient to leave the matter as it stands in the Bill, and that there is no danger whatever that any judge of any experience who is President of the High Court to whom this duty of assigning the work falls will not be alive to these considerations. I think the Minister is quite ready to consider putting in some words which will mark that. I understand from the Minister that he feels what I have stated is true and that there is no necessity for these other words being inserted. I am sure the value of continuity will be realised by the President of the High Court. I understand the Minister is prepared to consider the matter of having some words inserted.

I ask the Minister to look at the point I raised, now that we have got that promise from him. There is no necessity to waste more time on it. Under Section 9 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924, there were assigned to the Chief Justice minor and lunacy matters, and matters that I might call comprehensively solicitors' matters, such as notaries public and commissioners for oaths. We are now making a change. We are taking away lunacy and minor matters and giving them to the President of the High Court with certain consequential matters that we are leaving as solicitors' matters. When all three were in the hands of the Chief Justice there was special advertence to these things in the Act of 1928. It was realised that we had in the Act of 1924 given these things to the Chief Justice, but that in case he was absent through illness the work was held up. That was adverted to in the Courts of Justice Act, 1928. Section 2 implied that, when the Chief Justice was absent through illness, or absent from Saorstát Eireann, the duties had to be performed by the President of the High Court and, if he was absent, by a senior ordinary judge of the Supreme Court, so that you had definitely a hierarchy arranged for the three sets of things. Solicitors' matters and the notaries public are still with the Chief Justice. We have this rigid hierarchy that if the Chief Justice is away then these functions are exercised through the President of the High Court and the first, second, or third senior judges. When we come to the delicate matter of minors—and these things will be all construed together—when we come to human matters, minors and lunatics, we find that these are transferred from the Chief Justice and handed over to the President of the High Court to be dealt with by him, or, if he so directs, by an ordinary judge of the High Court "for the time being" assigned. I suggest that that is a most objectionable series of words, "for the time being." Undoubtedly upon anyone reading them they will create the impression that the view was that the President of the High Court should go to them one by one. We do not mean that. I suggest that the Ceann Comhairle is allowing the various amendments to be dealt with now.

I am allowing the Deputy to move amendment No. 9 if he so desires.

They are all really on the same point. I am suggesting that the phrase used is the most objectionable in the whole of Section 9, because it only creates the impression that the President of the High Court is not to assign it to some judge.

The Attorney-General

No. This is a minor drafting phrase.

I can read that into the section. Remember someone is going to contrast it and say it is peculiar division, solicitors left with the Chief Justice and no question of his assigning someone for the time being. The President takes the work if he is ill and gives it to a senior judge. When it comes to minor matters there is no hierarchy arranged at all, just the President, or someone he assigns for the time being. I suggest that the two sections should be looked at together. This is the fault. I think, of patchwork legislation.

The Attorney-General

The hierarchy is the hierarchy laid down in the Courts of Justice Act.

This is a matter of patchwork. Who thinks that solicitors' matters and notaries public are more important than the performance of duties that should be assigned to the Chief Justice? If he is absent you have one, two, three, four or five names. When we come to minor and lunacy matters we say the President of the High Court but after that we do not care about the hierarchy. We simply say anyone he assigns for the time being. I think this arises from patchwork, and I suggest that that phraseology, when disregarded, will not in the new form have these words, and that the President will be given the duty of assigning some judge, and an arrangement made similar to what is now in the section, four members adverting back to Section 2 of the Act of 1928, allowing for a change in a case of illness or absence and only on that. Remember, we have a right to fix a point of view and not to leave it to the President to say whom he will appoint. We have a right to make the point and say "you ought to take it yourself, and if you do not take it you ought to assign a judge, and there should be no change in the judges except absence through illness or some other reason."

So far as I can ascertain from the discussion, the learned Attorney-General approves of the purport and the object of Deputy McGilligan's amendment. Then why not embody it in the Bill so that there will be no doubt whatever about it, not only during the life of the present Chief Justice but for all future time? He knows very well that an Act of Parliament is very often diverted into a channel which was never intended, and the only way to copper-fasten it is when the Bill is going through this House.

The Attorney-General

I was about to say that the argument sounds most ingenious and subtle but, as the last Deputy said, there is no necessity for an argument about a matter which the Minister through me has indicated his readiness to consider the finding of a formula to meet the criticism which has been directed to the section by the two Deputies opposite. Deputy McGilligan's last ingenious and subtle argument in which he draws a parallel, or compares the position which will now exist in relation to those matters which are left in the hands of the Chief Justice, and those which have been removed from him by the section is entirely fallacious. Deputy McGilligan seems not to realise that sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 19 of the Principal Act, dealt merely with matters relating to solicitors, the appointments of notaries public and commissioners to administer oaths. These are matters not of a similar nature to lunacy and minor matters. They have this particularly clear difference between them and the jurisdiction in matters of lunacy and minor matters, that there is an appeal from whatever judge deals with lunacy and minor matters.

There is an appeal to the Supreme Court whereas in the case of those functions which the Chief Justice still retains and which the Deputy said go down along this long elaborate hierarchy, are the particular functions assigned to the Chief Justice under the Solicitors Act in relation to solicitors. Where the Chief Justice deals with the misconduct of solicitors and acts as the supreme controlling body for the solicitor profession in matters of discipline there is no appeal from him in matters assigned to him by sub-sections (2) and (3), there is no appeal from the Chief Justice in regard to the appointment of notaries public and commissioners to administer oaths. It is quite rational that when the functions which the Chief Justice has under these sub-sections are to be passed on by reason of his absence they should follow the hierarchy which is laid down in the Courts of Justice Act. That is that they should go first to the President of the High Court and then down the ranks of the judges of the Supreme Court. I do not think there is any analogy between them and the provision in regard to lunacy and minor matters.

My whole argument is that there is no analogy. The Attorney-General says that there is an argument for transferring these functions but that there is no considered argument for transferring them in the same way. On the other point of the elaborate hierarchy for commissioners of oaths applications, that elaborate hierarchy is assented to by the will of this House and stabilised by legislation while there is no hierarchy for the very delicate matter of lunacy and minor matters.

The Supreme Court is there to appeal to.

We can go to the Supreme Court by way of appeal we are told on these matters but there is no arrangement made by which the judges who will deal with these matters are to be selected although we have this elaborate scheme with regard to commissioners of oaths.

Amendments Nos. 8, 9, 10 and 11, by leave, withdrawn.

I move amendments Nos. 12 and 13:—

In page 6, Section 9 (3), to add at the end of the sub-section a new paragraph as follows:—

and

(e) no business relating to the exercise of the jurisdictions which were transferred to and vested in the Chief Justice by sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 19 of the Principal Act shall be transacted in the said office.

In page 6, before Section 9 (4), to insert a new sub-section as follows:—

(4) On and after the appointed day—

(a) all such business in relation to the exercise of the jurisdictions which were transferred to the Chief Justice by sub-sections (2) nnd (3) of Section 19 of the Principal Act as was transacted in the office of the Registrar to the Chief Justice before the appointed day shall be transferred to and transacted in the office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court, and

(b) the Registrar of the Supreme Court shall act as registrar to the Chief Justice in relation to the exercise by the Chief Justice of the said jurisdictions which were transferred to him by sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 19 of the Principal Act, and

(c) the Registrar of the Supreme Court shall be subject to the directions of the Chief Justice in regard to the transaction of the business transferred to the Registrar of the Supreme Court by this sub-section.

The purpose of these amendments is to clarify the position. Amendment No. 12 provides that business relating to the jurisdiction which would continue to be exercised by the Chief Justice will be transacted by the office of Wards of Courts. Amendment No. 13 provides that business which will remain vested in the Chief Justice will be transacted in the office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court. These amendments were submitted to the Chief Justice and he has signified his agreement.

I suppose it is a correct assumption that minor and lunacy matters and solicitors' and commissioners' matters have hitherto been transacted in the office of the Registrar of the Chief Justice?

All these matters under Section 19 of the Principal Act have been transacted in the Office of the Registrar of the Chief Justice. Under the new proposal that office is being abolished and a new office, the office of Registrar of Wards, is being set up. He is going to act in minor and lunacy matters and the rest of the business is being transferred to the Registrar of the Supreme Court?

This means a change in his duties as a court officer. Has the Registrar any objection to that?

He has not communicated any objection. I do not know if he has been made aware of this.

I suppose such officials have certain rights. I have not looked into the matter but having certain rights, I presume, with regard to the duties, we have certain obligations with regard to retirement. Have there been any direct communications with the Registrar of the Supreme Court?

I do not think so.

He is entitled to be consulted, I think.

I shall look into the matter.

Amendments put and agreed to.
Amendment No. 14 not moved.
Question proposed: "That Section 9 as amended stand part of the Bill."

On the section, I wish to raise the whole issue of the principle contained in it. To me it was one of the most amazing sections that could appear in a Bill of this character. I pointed out on the occasion of the Second Reading of the Bill that I could see no necessity for the transfer of the jurisdiction which has been exercised by the Chief Justice for the past 11 years, in reference to lunacy and minor matters, from him to somebody else inexperienced in these matters. I also pointed out that so far as I knew there was no public demand for this change. There was no demand from any branch of the profession for tins change and no case had been made by the Attorney-General when he was introducing this Bill for this change over. I requested some information on these matters. I was anxious to know why it was thought desirable, or why it was considered to be in the nature of a reform, to transfer this jurisdiction which had been exercised in such a pre-eminent fashion by the Chief Justice for the last 11 years to some judge of the High Court. I got no satisfactory explanation of the appearance of this section in the Bill at that time, nor have I got it since, nor have I been able to find any satisfactory explanation whatever, or any satisfying reason for this change. I repeat that there has been no public demand for this change; that there has been no demand from any branch of the profession for the change. The fact, as I pointed out on Second Reading, that during the entire of the 11 years during which these jurisdictions were exercised there were only three appeals from the Chief Justice is a singular appreciation or monument to the manner in which he has carried out his duty in that connection. When the Chief Justice took up these new duties a certain practice existed in the office that he took over on the transfer—a certain practice that had existed during the old Lord Chancellor days.

If this matter were being considered for the first time, if we were now considering the setting up of a new system of judicature in this country, some argument might be advanced in favour of the proposition that the initial jurisdiction in reference to lunacy and minor matters might be placed, in the first instance, either in the President of the High Court or some judge of the High Court. But, when we find that the Oireachtas 11 years ago, having considered the matter and having had the advice of a Judiciary Committee, considered that the wise thing to do in reference to these lunacy and minor matters was to give exclusive primary jurisdiction to the Chief Justice, and when we find that that practice, not merely worked well and satisfactorily for 11 years, but had been demonstrated to have worked in a far better way than the old practice of the Lord Chancellor, it passes belief that now, without any proper reason or any satisfactory explanation, these jurisdictions should be suddenly transferred from the Chief Justice to some other people, who have not had the same experience as he has had in the last 11 years. You are putting some man, whether he be President of the High Court or anybody else, into the position of having to take up entirely new duties with which he has not had touch in the last 11 years, and you are taking these duties from a man who has had complete personal touch with every patient in lunacy and with every minor under his care in the last 11 years. You are dislocating, for no reason that I can see, and for no satisfactory reason that has been advanced, the whole practice of the office and the whole procedure that has obtained therein for the last 11 years. Why I do not know. I hope to hear some reason, either from the Minister or the Attorney-General, before this section is passed. I do feel that if the members of this House took the trouble to attend here and to consider the implications in this matter, this scheme would not be passed. No satisfactory reason, I repeat, has been given. There are innumerable reasons why the section should not have appeared in the Bill, and why, having appeared in the Bill, it should now be gracefully withdrawn.

The Attorney-General referred to the fact that the President of the High Court has onerous duties to perform. In the last 11 years he has had very onerous duties to perform. He is the head of the High Court, he has to attend to jury actions, he has to attend to appeals in the Circuit Court, he has to attend in Green Street at the Central Criminal Court, he has to sit in the Court of Criminal Appeal, he has to attend to certiorari, mandamus and State matters, and all matters that come before him. With all these onerous duties which he had to fulfil in the last 11 years, we now propose in this Bill to impose upon him the duty of going at least twice a year to the Assizes; and we propose to put further onerous duties on him of a very personal character, requiring personal contact with the individual patient, if the continuity of the tradition which has been maintained by the Chief Justice is to be kept up. We propose to put these very onerous duties on the President of the High Court for no reason that has been given and no reason that I can see. I should like to have some reason. As no reason was given in answer to my questions on Second Reading, I can only conclude that there is no real reason for this section.

There was one reason given, an absurd reason, that it was felt by somebody, who was not named, and whom I do not know, that it was not right that in the case of the jurisdiction exercised by the Chief of the Judiciary there should be an appeal from him to the Appeal Court. That is the only reason that was given. As I said earlier, that might have been a good reason in 1924, but, after the lapse of 11 years, when the office has built up a new practice and tradition, and it has been handled by one particular man who knows every patient in the lunacy side of the office and every ward in the minor side of the office, that it should be transferred now for that ridiculous reason passes my comprehension.

This section, in my view, is one of the worst sections in the Bill. I should like to know to what extent the Chief Justice was consulted about this matter. I should have thought that whoever was responsible for initiating this particular section would have taken the trouble to inquire into the position as it exists in that side of the court at present. I gather from the remarks of the Attorney-General on the Second Reading, when he was introducing it, that the Chief Justice had no objection to the proposal provided certain safeguards were given to him in reference to the staff. I should like to know, apart from being asked whether he had any objection to this proposal, whether he was consulted as to whether this was a desirable thing to do, in the present circumstances, and after the lapse of 11 years, or whether his experience over those 11 years in dealing with these matters was availed of by the Department of Justice when they made up their minds to bring this revolutionary proposal into this Bill, unasked, unsought for, and undesired.

If there is anybody in this country who knows that particular branch of the jurisdiction it is the Chief Justice. I think the House is entitled to know from the Minister or the Attorney-General what the views of the Chief Justice are in connection with this transfer. It is not enough for the Attorney-General to tell the House that the Chief Justice has no objection. Nobody would have any objection when the Minister says to him: "We wish to transfer portion of your jurisdiction to another branch of the courts." No judge would feel perhaps that he was entitled to object. Once the head of the Department of Justice said: "In the exercise of my duties as Minister for Justice I think this ought to be transferred," no judge would feel it his duty to object. Even if he felt it his duty to object, he would only do so to the minimum degree. If he were asked for his views as to the desirability of such a transfer, then it might be an entirely different matter. I think the House is entitled to know whether the Chief Justice was or was not consulted on the specific point that I put, not as to whether he had any objection to the transfer, but what were his views as to the suitability, in present circumstances and after the lapse of 11 years, of making the proposed change. I think we are entitled to get some specific answer to that question, and if the Department of Justice have had the advantage of hearing the views of the Chief Justice on this matter, then I think the House is entitled to hear what these views are.

Certainly I see no reason for this transfer. I described it, I think, on the Second Reading as a vicious proposal; if I did not, I so describe it now. By itself it might have been, again I repeat, a good thing or a bad thing to give this jurisdiction originally to a member of the High Court. But I say that it is entirely unsound and uncalled for when a practice has grown up in an office of this nature, of the delicate kind required in connection with these matters, over a period of 11 years, suddenly to change that entire procedure and practice and to transfer it from one judge to another. It should not be done unless there are very grave reasons indeed for doing it, and no such reasons have been given.

Now, when the Chief Justice took over these jurisdictions, he found that to a large extent the affairs of patients in lunacy and wards in minor matters were regulated by the officials. He conceived, in his wisdom, and very properly as I think, it is admitted on all sides now, that it was his duty to interfere personally and to control personally each individual case and every aspect of each individual case. The result was that he revolutionised the entire practice in reference to the care of patients in lunacy and the care of minors in minor matters, and he has had, according to his evidence before the Joint Committee, a very busy time in connection with the transaction of this jurisdiction. We all know that he sits there on a Friday— sometimes until 6 or 7 o'clock in the evening—and that after court every evening he interviews people in connection with these lunacy and minor matters. He has a peculiar and personal knowledge of each individual case that has gone through his office and that is in his office at the present moment. That is all going to be taken away at one stroke by one section in this Bill and transferred to a man who has not been dealing with such matters, who cannot have the same intimate knowledge, who has been out of touch and too busy to give the same personal attention as the Chief Justice has been able to give and who, because of the additional duties that will be imposed on him by this Bill, will be unable, in my view, at all events, to give the same personal attention as the Chief Justice gave. I do protest very strongly, Sir, against this section. I have heard no reason for it and I await with some interest the reply of the Minister as to whether he has any reason for the introduction of this section.

I can only give the reason that I gave when the Deputy came in, and that is the reason he himself gave; that it does not seem proper that the decision of the Chief Justice should be subject to appeal to the Supreme Court. Another reason is that I consider the Chief Justice should be freer for the ordinary business of the Supreme Court. The Deputy is well aware, and has mentioned it himself, that this matter takes up one day of the Chief Justice's time—every Friday. He is engaged on the whole of the Friday dealing with lunacy and minor matters, and the other two judges are not occupied. Surely, that is not a desirable system. It means that the Supreme Court is not working as it might work under the arrangement proposed here. That is all that is behind the section. It only proposes to allow the Chief Justice to be freer.

If that is so, this section should never have been introduced, and the Minister's remarks bear out everything I have said about the section. The first reason the Minister advances is that it is not proper that there should be an appeal from the Chief Justice to the Supreme Court. What is being done in this Bill? Provision is being made that there will be an appeal from two Supreme Court judges to three of their colleagues. The Minister objects to an appeal from the Chief Justice to his colleagues, the President and the other two members; but here in the new Bill he is going to make provision which will lead to appeals being had in very small cases, perhaps, from two members of the Supreme Court to their colleagues, or perhaps their colleagues plus some members of their colleagues in the High Court. The second reason that the Minister puts forward is equally fatuous. He says that the Chief Justice should be freer for the work of the Supreme Court and that the result of his being engaged on Friday is that the other two members are not free for that court. Again, I would refer the Minister to the evidence of the Chief Justice before the Joint Committee, in which he said that, when he was sitting on a Friday dealing with these lunacy and minor matters his two colleagues were engaged together working on the cases standing at that day and preparing their judgments and that, when they had prepared them, they all three sat on Saturday to confer on the judgments that were awaiting determination. In this case, what the Minister is going to do is to impose on judges, who will be already over-worked if this Bill comes into operation, additional duties. Some judge, be he President of the High Court or anybody else, will have to give the same amount of time—I think more time, if the work is to be done as well—as the Chief Justice has given in the past. So that, instead of two members of the Supreme Court not being occupied, one member of the High Court will be fully occupied and he will dislocate, for one day at least, the remaining business of the High Court.

The Attorney-General

Surely, the Deputy does not suggest that the dislocation of the High Court will be anything like the dislocation of the Supreme Court caused at the present time by the absence of the Chief Justice?

It may very well be so. What is to happen to lunacy matters and minor matters when all the judges of the High Court and two of the Supreme Court are out on circuit twice a year? Who is to do the job while they are away?

The Attorney-General

The situation which the Deputy mentions will surely be quite easily dealt with by allowing such matters as arise to be dealt with by the judge who is sitting here in Dublin. I really think the Deputy allows himself to be carried too far by some of the views he holds with regard to this and other sections of the Bill. Everybody agrees that the Chief Justice has been an admirable Judge in charge of lunacy and minor matters. Everybody who is familiar with the work done in that court knows that he has taken a keen personal interest in each case before him. I cannot see, however, why it should be so unlikely that the President of the High Court, or such other judge of the High Court as may have these duties cast upon him, will not be equally alive to those considerations which induced the Chief Justice to take this personal interest in those who were committed to his charge. Is it suggested that the Chief Justice has more free time to do that work than a judge of the High Court will have? As regards the question which the Deputy put to the Minister as to the views of the Chief Justice on this proposal, if the Deputy looks at the evidence which the Chief Justice gave before the Committee, he will see that the Chief Justice, without having the proposal put to him in any concrete way by the Committee, apparently contemplated that a change was proposed, and he did not suggest any reason against it or any of the reasons which the Deputy seems to think he is ready to give against it.

I did not say the Chief Justice was ready to give reasons against this. I did not say whether he was ready to give reasons or not. I do not know what his views are on the subject. What I want to know is: Was he consulted, and, if so, what were his views as to the desirability of this change?

The Attorney-General

I am reading by implication from the evidence of the Chief Justice that he did not regard it as an astonishing proposition or one to which grave objection could be made, or a proposition against which he had any personal objection. All the Chief Justice said was that if a change were contemplated one man should always be attached to this particular work. And then he gives the reason that should be given here as to the human element in the business and so on. I fail to see why it should be anticipated if the President of the High Court feels that he has enough time at his disposal, or if a judge of the High Court is assigned to another court, why it is that an equally keen personal interest will not be taken in the wards of court or patients in lunacy as has been taken by the Chief Justice up to this. It may, of course, be difficult to get someone who takes such a deep interest in the cases as the Chief Justice does. But I am quite certain it will not be found that if any judges of the High Court have this work assigned to them they will not be alive to all the considerations put forward here. I am sure that they will continue the tradition that has been set up by the Chief Justice, and that they will give personal care and attention to the work. The dislocation in the High Court would not be as much as the dislocation in the Supreme Court, which is put out of action one day in the week by reason of the fact that the Chief Justice is dealing with minors and lunacy cases. I am unaware, from anything that I have seen from the Chief Justice, from what I have read in his evidence, from any correspondence I have had from him or from what I have heard from him in personal conversation, that he has any aversion to this change arising from such considerations as the Deputy has mentioned or from any other reason. I rather think that on the whole the Chief Justice favours this change, subject to the conditions he mentioned in his evidence and on which he feels very strongly. The matters to which the Deputy takes such very strong objection are matters about which I am quite certain the Chief Justice does not feel any objection.

If the Attorney-General says that the Chief Justice favours these proposals—if he will state that now—then my attitude would be changed. But I have not got an answer to the question I asked as to whether the Chief Justice was personally consulted. The point is not that the Chief Justice has no objection. Was the Chief Justice asked whether he thought this change was desirable or not in the interests of patients in lunacy and wards and minors in Chancery?

I do feel that we are being somewhat fooled by phrases at the moment. The Attorney-General on the Second Reading said that he had certain doubts as to whether this change was possible or not in the case of minors and in lunacy cases. He told us that the Chief Justice was approached and that the matter was discussed with him. The Chief Justice expressed his willingness provided that certain safeguards were given—such as that there should be one judge to deal with lunacy and minors' affairs, and that subject to these safeguards he expressed his willingness to have these matters transferred from him. The Attorney-General returned to that, but he dealt with none of the objections raised by Deputy Costello. The Chief Justice said: "If it is going to be changed from me, I suggest that in such matters as the registrar there should be continuity through one judge." It is pertinent to inquire whether the safeguards were adopted, and I am clear now that they were not, from what the Attorney-General has said. He talks of the dislocation of business. But what will happen when eight judges are out at assizes on business during the year? Who will look after these matters then? There are going to be regular changes in the judge dealing with these matters. Is not that so?

The Attorney-General

There has frequently been a broken interval in the administration by the Chief Justice.

There was none for ten years. I do not think he was absent one day for ten years.

If I am personally told that the Chief Justice thinks this is a desirable change, I will not for a moment give my opinion against his. The Chief Justice has experience, and none of us are fitted to give an opinion contrary to that experience. But if I am being told that the Chief Justice offered no violent objection to the change, I take it that he was delicately dealing with what he thought was a bad change, and not that he was acquiescing in it or favouring it in any way. The peculiar thing to me is that from the evidence given before the Joint Committee the Attorney-General quoted the Chief Justice as saying: "if a change were contemplated." It was not put to him that it was contemplated. He was all the time speaking on the point of continuity in connection with the one matter requiring the attention of one man who had enormous experience and a tender feeling for humanity. The whole text of his argument is "keep it in the hands of one man," and then he threw out the statement, "if a change were contemplated." He might have added "keep it in the hands of one man." The Committee heard his evidence on that point, and they made minor recommendations. Recommendation 95 reads:—

"If provisions are to be made for a graduated percentage charge for the administration of the assets of minors and a system of visitation of minors be adopted similar to that in existence in the case of persons of unsound mind."

They adverted specially to the question of minors and lunatics.

The Chief Justice was questioned as to the taking up of his time and the dislocation of the Supreme Court, and as to whether, taking the other side of the argument, if the Supreme Court was not interrupted or the minors' work interrupted, and he said: "No: there was no actual hold-up of business; everything was up-to-date there." He said that the minor and lunacy matters were up-to-date, and he gave an answer that may not commend itself to the Department of Finance; I think their memorandum is still in the back of the minds of the two people who are speaking for the Government on this Bill. I know that the idea that the judges do no work except when sitting on the bench, was always paraded by the sort of finance mind which appears to be rather accepted by the two people with legal experience. They accepted the view that the High Court is being put out of action. I did not think they would give a lodgment to the thought that because the judge is being absent from the bench, his colleagues are not doing any work. The whole matter was thrashed out before the Joint Committee.

I do not know what the view of the Chief Justice is, but I do know that his way of administering these matters has met with universal approbation. He has got praise from everybody for his administration of these matters. Why is the change being made? Two points are being stressed: one of these is the illogical situation that a member of the Supreme Court is subject to appeal.

The Chief Justice also sits in the Court of Criminal Appeal, which is subject to an appeal to the Supreme Court. There have not been any of these, but that is because an unfortunate decision ruled that leave to appeal was in the control, not of the higher of the two courts, but of the lower. There is a recommendation from the Council of the Bar against that. Deputy Costello has pointed out that there is a new illogicality being introduced, that members of the Supreme Court are being sent out on circuits as High Court judges and they will be subject to appeal, so that the occasions on which this illogical procedure will take place are being multiplied. Then there is the dislocation of business. I think the Chief Justice's answer must commend itself to anybody who knows the work of the Supreme Court. The position is that we are going to have the High Court now with more work to do and the Supreme Court with not more work to do but with more people to do whatever is to be done. It is proposed to take away business from the Supreme Court and hand it to a member of the High Court, which in the ordinary course is going to be given more work. The Attorney-General made an answer which reveals a bad tendency and that is that, whoever is sitting, the High Court judge on circuit in Dublin will attend to these minor matters and matters of lunacy.

The Attorney-General

Urgent matters.

It certainly means a lack of continuity. There is no argument from the Committee, and there is no argument based on any evidence given before the Committee. There is no argument on the illogical proceeding, when the occasions for illogical proceeding are multiplied. I would like to stress this point again. There was always present in the minds of the people who were opposed to any enlargement of the court system, always running through their writings or arguments, the view that nobody in the legal profession did any work except when he was in court. There is no such thing as a man requiring time to make up his mind or form a judgment. The recommendations of the Finance Department in all this matter amounted to making the judges sit oftener, earlier in the morning and later at night. Apparently they thought they would get court work better done. There was the sort of attitude of mind that you could rule the work of a judge more or less as you rule the work of a manual labourer— what time did he spend on the job in the open. That mentality is apparently part of the make-up of the Attorney-General and the Minister for Justice.

The Attorney-General

No, it is not; I certainly repudiate any such suggestion.

If the Attorney-General has the view-point that the Supreme Court is put out of action when the Chief Justice is not there, it surely is accepting some of the viewpoints of the people who think you measure a judge's work by the hours of sitting in court? The Attorney-General spoke about the time the High Court may have to spend. Are there not entirely different considerations? The Chief Justice, after 11 years, faced with any problem in relation to minors, will surely occupy less time on it than the most experienced High Court judge faced with the same problem and having had no experience? Is not the question of dealing with this a matter of the association of experience and the time that has to be spent? I cannot accept the view that anybody is going to deal with these matters, lacking experience, either as efficiently or as speedily as the Chief Justice after 11 years.

On the point as to whether or not the Supreme Court is put out of action by reason of the Chief Justice sitting on minor and lunacy matters on Friday, I would like to put the practitioner's point of view to the Attorney-General. To anybody engaged, particularly in the Supreme Court, it is an intense relief to have the Friday to do other work which must be done and which was neglected in preceding days. It also gives one an opportunity to make up further arguments for the following Monday in the event of a case continuing. I regard myself from the point of view of a practitioner who looks upon the Friday intermission in the Supreme Court as really a blessing.

In the old days the Lord Chancellors took very little or no interest in the welfare, the comfort or the treatment of patients confined to mental homes. As a matter of fact, when Sir Edward Sugden, afterwards Lord St. Leonards, was appointed Lord Chancellor here, he took it into his head to visit the Richmond Asylum, as it was then called. It was a marvellous change for a man in his position at that time to make a visit of that sort. He arrived at the institution, walked in in all his power, majesty and glory. He was detained for some time and he lost his temper. When the resident medical superintendent came up, he (the resident medical superintendent) eyed him very suspiciously. He looked around to see if there were any attendants in the neighbourhood, and he said: "My dear Sir, what brings you here?" He said: "I am the Lord Chancellor of Ireland." The resident medical superintendent had never seen any Lord Chancellor, and he said: "My dear Sir, we have exactly 17 Lord Chancellors already in this house."

Now, the present Chief Justice has revolutionised all that. He has taken a keen, an active and a personal interest in every case, either on the minor side or the lunacy side of his court. Everybody in the country knows that quite well, and I know many relatives of mentally afflicted persons who never tire of praising him for the charitable interest he has taken in their friends. I do think that, apart from any other consideration, it would be very unfair to deprive him of the jurisdiction hitherto exercised by him as more or less the successor of the old Lord Chancellors without at least consulting him and getting from him a clear expression of opinion that he is in favour of the change. That has not been done, so far as I am aware.

Question —"That Section 9, as amended, stand part of the Bill"— put.
The Committee divided: Tá, 56; Níl, 36.

Tá.

  • Aiken, Frank.
  • Bartley, Gerald.
  • Beegan, Patrick.
  • Boland, Gerald.
  • Bourke, Daniel.
  • Brady, Brian.
  • Brady, Seán.
  • Breen, Daniel.
  • Briscoe, Robert.
  • Concannon, Helena.
  • Corbett, Edmond.
  • Corish, Richard.
  • Corry, Martin John.
  • Crowley, Timothy.
  • Derrig, Thomas.
  • De Valera, Eamon.
  • Everett, James.
  • Flinn, Hugo V.
  • Flynn, Stephen.
  • Fogarty, Andrew.
  • Gibbons, Seán.
  • Goulding, John.
  • Harris, Thomas.
  • Keely, Séamus P.
  • Kehoe, Patrick.
  • Kelly, James Patrick.
  • Kelly, Thomas.
  • Kilroy, Michael.
  • Lemass, Seán F.
  • Little, Patrick John.
  • Lynch, James B.
  • McEllistrim, Thomas.
  • MacEntee, Seán.
  • Maguire, Ben.
  • Maguire, Conor Alexander.
  • Moane, Edward.
  • Moore, Séamus.
  • Moylan, Seán.
  • Murphy, Patrick Stephen.
  • Murphy, Timothy Joseph.
  • O Briain, Donnchadh.
  • O Ceallaigh, Seán T.
  • O'Dowd, Patrick.
  • O'Grady, Seán.
  • O'Reilly, Matthew.
  • Pattison, James P.
  • Pearse, Margaret Mary.
  • Ruttledge, Patrick Joseph.
  • Ryan, James.
  • Ryan, Martin.
  • Ryan, Robert.
  • Smith, Patrick.
  • Traynor, Oscar.
  • Victory, James.
  • Walsh, Richard.
  • Ward, Francis C.

Níl.

  • Alton, Ernest Henry.
  • Beckett, James Walter.
  • Belton, Patrick.
  • Bennett, George Cecil.
  • Brennan, Michael.
  • Broderick, William Joseph.
  • Burke, James Michael.
  • Dolan, James Nicholas.
  • Doyle, Peadar S.
  • Fagan, Charles.
  • Finlay, John.
  • Keating, John.
  • Lavery, Cecil.
  • Lynch, Finian.
  • MacEoin, Seán.
  • McFadden, Michael Og.
  • McGilligan, Patrick.
  • McGovern, Patrick.
  • Coburn, James.
  • Cosgrave, William T.
  • Costello, John Aloysius.
  • Curran, Richard.
  • Daly, Patrick.
  • Desmond, William.
  • Dockrell, Henry Morgan.
  • McMenamin, Daniel.
  • Morrisroe, James.
  • Mulcahy, Richard.
  • Murphy, James Edward.
  • O'Leary, Daniel.
  • O'Sullivan, John Marcus.
  • Redmond, Bridget Mary.
  • Rice, Vincent.
  • Roddy, Martin.
  • Rogers, Patrick James.
  • Wall, Nicholas.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Little and Smith; Níl: Deputies Doyle and Bennett.
Question declared carried.
SECTION 10.
Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 8 of the Principal Act, the Court of Criminal Appeal constituted under that section may, on any occasion, consist of two judges of the Supreme Court (whether the Chief Justice and an ordinary judge or two ordinary judges) and one judge of the High Court (whether the President of the High Court or an ordinary judge), and the said Section 8 shall be construed and have effect accordingly.

I move amendment No. 15:—

In page 7, Section 10, lines 9-14, to delete all from and including the words "may, on any occasion" down to the end of line 14, and substitute the words "shall consist of three judges of the High Court."

The object of this amendment is to provide that the Court of Criminal Appeal in the future shall consist entirely of High Court judges in the first instance.

At the moment the practice is and for some time past has been that one at least of the Supreme Court judges comes into the Court of Criminal Appeal, and sits on the hearing. We take the view that the Supreme Court should be entirely aloof; that it should be completely apart from the High Court, and that by reason of the fact that it would have or ought to have five permanent members in its composition, and of the fact that it is aloof, it would command more respect than if it were to perform functions both as an appeal tribunal and as a tribunal of first instance. It is in accordance with this principle that we put down this amendment. That principle is carried through in our amendments throughout this Bill. We believe that the Supreme Court should be entirely apart; that the High Court should do its own work, and that there should be appeal from the High Court to the Supreme Court even in the case of criminal matters.

As things stand at the moment there is no appeal from the Court of Criminal Appeal except on the certificate of the Attorney-General, or the certificate of the Court of Criminal Appeal itself. We think it is a bad principle that the prosecutor in the case should be the person to say whether or not there should be an appeal. We think it is a bad principle that the court from which the appeal is being taken should itself say in any case, and particularly in a criminal one, whether the case they have just decided is or is not of such importance as to warrant an appeal to the Supreme Court. Our idea is that the Court of Criminal Appeal should consist in the first instance of three members of the High Court, and that in so far as there is an appeal from their decision the giving of a certificate should rest entirely with the Supreme Court and not with the High Court, or the Court of Criminal Appeal constituted from the High Court; in other words, that instead of this Court of Criminal Appeal, as it stands at the moment, giving a certificate, it is the Supreme Court itself that should give that certificate for leave to appeal. We think that is in accordance with principle, and would be a good reform. When the Court of Criminal Appeal was being set up in this country for the first time, the majority of the members of the High Court were new in their judicial functions. A new system was being set up to a great extent, and new judges were being assigned to the new posts in the High Court. It was felt that it might command confidence in the Court of Criminal Appeal, that it might lay down the lines along which the Court of Criminal Appeal should direct their attention in hearing criminal appeals, and that by reason of the fact that there was really no effective appeal from the Court of Criminal Appeal it was right and proper that the Chief Justice or a member of the Supreme Court should normally sit with the Court of Criminal Appeal. We think the time is now ripe for the further development of the whole system in connection with criminal matters. We do not at all suggest that in criminal matters there should be unlimited appeals. It would be waste of public time, and waste of public and private money, that there should be that interminable system of criminal appeal which one understands exists in the United States. We do not stand for that at all, but we do think that in a very important case there should be appeal from the Court of Criminal Appeal to the Supreme Court.

The position as it stands at the moment is that the Attorney-General, who is the prosecutor in the case and consequently an interested party to some extent, although he represents the public, is the person to say whether or not he will give a certificate. Since the State was founded here, and the Court of Criminal Appeal established, I do not think there has ever been an instance where the Attorney-General did in fact give any such certificate. In practice, I think the Attorney-General would never give such certificate, because it would in fact mean, or may be regarded as, some sort of vote of censure on the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal. It really puts the Attorney-General in a very invidious position. On one occasion when the Attorney-General in England gave a certificate—one of the few occasions on which he did give it — for leave to appeal to the House of Lords from the Court of Criminal Appeal, he was very severely censured by the House of Lords for giving it. I think the Attorney-General should be relieved of that task of having to make up his mind in a case of death — because those are really the cases where the matter becomes most important— whether or not he would give a certificate for leave to appeal. It is indivious, as I say, for the Attorney-General to have that power. In the case of death there is an application in practically every case for such a certificate. In practically every case he must refuse it. In every case which comes before the Court of Criminal Appeal, where a death sentence is imposed, it is certainly a matter of supreme importance for the person against whom the sentence is pronounced that he should have an opportunity of going to the highest tribunal in the country.

The Attorney-General

Is the Deputy discussing amendment No. 15?

I am discussing the amendment which provides for a new system of hearing by three High Court judges.

That is amendment No. 15.

I am justifying that by stating the foundation of what we believe should be the new system; that instead of having a system by which a Supreme Court judge sits with two High Court judges — and from whose decision there is no appeal to the Supreme Court except on a certificate of the Attorney-General or by leave of the Court of Criminal Appeal — you should have three High Court judges, with an appeal from them to the Supreme Court; that the Attorney-General should be relieved of his duty of considering whether he would give a certificate, and that if the procedure by certificate is to be preserved at all, it is before the Supreme Court that that application should be made. In the ordinary case the Court of Criminal Appeal is applied to, by whoever is appealing for the convicted person, for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

The Attorney-General

That is in amendment No. 17.

They dovetail into each other. We feel it is not right that the court which has just decided a case should be called upon to say that perhaps their decision was wrong, and that there is something in it which the Supreme Court might set right. Consequently, we are putting those amendments down with a view to consideration by the Government as to whether — now that the judges of the High Court have had considerable experience in criminal matters and in relation to appeals in criminal matters, now that the public mind has become accustomed to appeals in criminal cases, and that the practice and the law have become more largely established in the last 11 years by the Court of Criminal Appeal — the time is ripe for a further advance in having a Court of Criminal Appeal consisting of High Court judges, who have had experience of hearing cases in the Central Criminal Court; and then, in very exceptional cases, an appeal to the Supreme Court, such appeal, perhaps, only to be allowed on the certificate of the Supreme Court.

Progress reported.

The Committee will sit again possibly later to-day, when items 7, 8 and 9 have been disposed of.

It will not sit until items 7, 8 and 9 have been disposed of?

What I understand is that items 7, 8 and 9 will be disposed of before this Committee Stage will be resumed. Some difficulty may arise, which should be settled outside in the usual manner, regarding the Slaughter of Animals Bill. I understand that there is anxiety to facilitate certain Deputies for an hour or two. The Chair will be in a peculiar position if a division is challenged on sections of the Slaughter of Animals Bill, and that matter had better be settled outside the House through the usual channels. Certainly the Committee Stage of this Bill will not be resumed until items 7 and 8 have been disposed of.

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