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Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 14 Nov 1935

Vol. 59 No. 6

In Committee on Finance. - Courts of justice Bill, 1934—Recommittal (Resumed).

The Attorney-General

Deputy Costello has spoken in support of the two amendments, Nos. 15 and 17, which are designed to create a Court of Criminal Appeal consisting of three High Court judges. In the discussion of the proposed amendments, he went into the whole question of the present position of criminal appeals. The section as drafted alters the provisions of Section 29 of the 1924 Act by enabling the constitution of the Court of Criminal Appeal to be two judges of the Supreme Court and one of the High Court. That is to say, we moved in the opposite direction to that desired by Deputy Costello. I do not agree at all with what Deputy Costello has said about the desirability of moving in the direction he suggests. Section 29 of the Courts of Justice Act provides that the determination by the Court of Criminal Appeal shall be final. While there may be something in his view, that this was a tentative arrangement, that it was new and that we are now in a better position to see how it works, I do not think any argument has been advanced to show that the working of it justifies the radical change which he wishes to make. With the personnel of the High Court and the Supreme Court as they are, the setting up of the Court of Criminal Appeal had the effect of putting out of action the Supreme Court. We feel now that, with the provision that three judges of the Supreme Court can constitute a quorum for certain cases, you can have your Court of Criminal Appeal with two Supreme Court judges and one High Court judge and thus cause the minimum of dislocation both to the Supreme Court and to the High Court. As the Court of Criminal Appeal is, in practice, as Deputy Costello admitted, the final Court of Appeal, it seems desirable to have two judges of the Supreme Court on that court. Of course, he suggests that that should not be the final Court of Appeal, that there ought to be more freedom about the granting of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court than there has been hitherto. As Deputies are aware, an appeal does not lie from the Court of Criminal Appeal save on the certificate of that court or the certificate of the Attorney-General. I think that a certificate has been granted by the Court of Criminal Appeal in only one case, and on only one occasion has the Supreme Court been called upon to review the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal. There has been no instance of the giving of a certificate by the Attorney-General to enable an appeal to be taken where the Court of Criminal Appeal refused to give a certificate.

The section circumscribes very much the cases in which an appeal can be taken from a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal. The provision which states that such a certificate shall only be given where the court or the Attorney-General certifies that the decision involves a point of law of exceptional public importance and that it is desirable in the public interest that an appeal should be taken to the Supreme Court, emphasises what is stated in the first part of the section, that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal shall be final. Incidentally, Deputy Costello referred to the provision that allows a certificate from the Attorney-General to be given as being of little use here or in England. I think he is wrong with regard to England. Although there may be one case in which the House of Lords criticised the granting of a certificate, there was a very interesting case recently in which a certificate was granted by the Attorney-General and in which a very important decision was given by the House of Lords on the hearing of the appeal. There could not be any suggestion that the certificate was not properly granted because the appeal was, in fact, allowed. In practice, whatever the position may be in theory, we are all aware that the Court of Criminal Appeal is the final court that deals with criminal matters. Deputies opposite suggest that the procedure should be radically altered. One of their amendments suggests that we should alter the provision about the granting of certificates and allow the prisoner to apply to, the Supreme Court for a certificate for leave to appeal.

Only on the stated grounds—exceptional interest and public importance.

The Attorney-General

I quite understand, but I do not think a case can be made out for that amendment. So far as I can see, consideration of the application would entail the opening up of the whole case in the Supreme Court. At present, when a case is concluded in the Court of Criminal Appeal, the person concerned may, and frequently does, ask for a certificate to entitle him to go to the Supreme Court. If the suggestion made by Deputies opposite were adopted, on refusal of that certificate, the person concerned could go straight away to the Supreme Court and ask for a certificate entitling him to appeal to that court. The procedure would be almost analogous to that which prevails in connection with ordinary criminal appeals, where an application for a certificate is made to the trial judge and he refuses the application. At present, the vast majority of criminal appeals are taken from refusals by the trial judges to grant certificates entitling the prisoners to appeal. If the suggestion of Deputy Costello were adopted, I do not see how you could cut short the hearing of the application in the Supreme Court. At present, the hearing of the appeal from the refusal to grant a certificate is no shorter than it would be in a case where a certificate had been granted and the appeal proper was being heard.

Surely the court would limit the issue on the hearing of an application for a certificate for leave to appeal.

The Attorney-General

That may be so. I was thinking of how such a provision would operate, and I had in mind a recent case where application was made to the Court of Criminal Appeal and later to myself for a certificate for leave to appeal. It seems to me that it would be very difficult to avoid opening up the whole transcript of evidence on the application and having a full-dress hearing. It may be, as Deputy Costello suggests, that the court would devise ways in which the issue would be narrowed down. I am not aware of any general feeling amongst practitioners at the Bar or others who have been before the Court of Criminal Appeal that that court has declined improperly to grant certificates.

There is no such suggestion. I never made such a suggestion.

The Attorney-General

If the provision of the Act as it stands at present is satisfactory, if the Court of Criminal Appeal has considered these applications fully and fairly and no complaint can be made against its refusal of certificates, why open up another court to appellants? Why discard this practice and go to the Supreme Court for a certificate? It seems to me that a Court of Criminal Appeal, constituted of two judges of the Supreme Court and one judge of the High Court, provides a very satisfactory final tribunal. Where the questions involved are of exceptional public importance and it is desirable in the public interest that they should be considered by the Supreme Court, there is a way of having that done. There are, of course, two points of view but, in practice, I do not think it has been found that the working of the Court of Criminal Appeal has been unsatisfactory. The point that Deputy Costello makes—that it would be valuable to have the Supreme Court as the ultimate tribunal—is, to a large extent, met by the fact that the tribunal to be constituted under the provisions of the section will consist of two members of the Supreme Court and one High Court judge.

This is a matter on which I am only attempting to state views which I have gathered in conversation with other people. As a matter of experience, I myself know nothing of it. I gather that there is a distinct feeling not only in respect of this Bill but in respect of the system generally that where this procedure exists of getting leave to appeal, it is bad to have to seek leave to appeal from the court which has decided against you. In other words, in every case where there is an appeal to a higher court and where leave has to be sought for that appeal, the granting of that leave should lie with the court you are going to and not with the court you are leaving.

The Attorney-General

In another section of the 1924 Act there is a similar provision dealing with Circuit Court appeals.

We object to that, too.

I am talking about opinions which appear to be founded on the working of that Act. I can only speak of bits of impressions I gathered in conversation since this measure was brought in. There is a definite feeling amongst practitioners that it is not a good thing to be obliged to apply for leave to appeal to the court whose decision you are attempting to reverse. The application should be to the court to which you are attempting to go rather than to the court which you are leaving.

Would that not involve extra expense?

I do not think so. There would, of course, be a solid objection to this proposal if you made this procedure almost a matter of course. You would have a Criminal Court hearing, an appeal to the Central Criminal Court and the further possibility of appeal to the Supreme Court, if the case went against the criminal. But the amendment which Deputy Costello has moved imposes a very distinct limitation. That is that you must get your leave from the Supreme Court on the double point—that the decision involves a point of law of exceptional public importance and that it is desirable in the public interest that the appeal should be taken. The Attorney-General says that, when you open before the Supreme Court your application for leave to appeal, you will have to deal with the whole case and that expense will be incurred by the State in meeting the case. Surely, that is not so. The Attorney-General drags in the analogy of the cases taken on appeal from the Central Criminal Court to the High Court Circuit, but, there, the ground is that the case is a fit case for appeal. Naturally, on that ground, the whole case is open to review. The whole facts may be gone into and the whole evidence read. All you have got to substantiate is the ground that there is a fit case for appeal.

The Attorney-General

I was referring to Section 61.

Of the 1924 Act?

The Attorney-General

Yes.

That is the Circuit Court again.

The Attorney-General

I refer to the second sentence there—"If such two judges agree...".

All they have to certify is that the decision involves a question which is a fit subject for appeal to the Supreme Court. That is not as limited as the provision in the amendment. Under the amendment, two things have to be established to the satisfaction of the Supreme Court and it is not necessary to open up the whole issue. Surely the Attorney-General knows that, under the present method of hearing Circuit Court appeals, the first question one is likely to be met with on making such an application is "What are you appealing on—is it fact or law?" If there is the slightest hesitation in answering that question there is almost immediately an atmosphere engendered against you, because the court believes you are trying to bring in some matter of fact under the guise of a point of law and you are brought sharply up against the question: "What is your point of law?" In this case the court would very soon bring counsel or the prisoner up against the question: "What is the point of law of exceptional public importance," and "On what are you relying in your attempt to show that an appeal is desirable in the public interest?" That is a very narrow issue on which to have the case opened. There is a distinct feeling that right through the whole Courts of Justice system, where an appeal lies and where it is limited by a provision for seeking leave, the application for leave should be not to the lower court but to the higher court. If this is going to be the new situation there is no doubt that there is every argument for making the Court of Criminal Appeal more or less part of the High Court system and making the Appeal Court the Supreme Court.

The Attorney-General

I do not think we have had any representations from the Bar or anybody else on this matter.

There are none.

The Attorney-General

The Minister authorises me to say that he has an open mind on this question. The objections I am urging occurred to me on reading the amendment, but if there is a feeling that this would be a proper amendment to make, the Minister is quite willing to consider it. I am referring now to the certificate point and not to the alteration in the constitution of the court.

Would not that follow? I suggest to the Minister for Justice that, as he has already got recommendations from a committee of the Bar Council, he might make a reference back to them to know if they have any views on this general principle.

If the Deputy leaves the matter over I shall submit it to the Bar Council.

I understood the Attorney-General to say that he objects to any change in the composition of the court. I should like to direct the attention of the Minister and the Attorney-General to the fact that this section, as it stands, is really inconsistent with the whole scheme of the Bill. I gathered from the Attorney-General that he is in favour of a Supreme Court of five judges and that it is because of the exigencies of the financial situation that he and the Minister are averse to this compromise solution. In principle, he agrees that the Supreme Court should consist of five judges. Here you are providing that the Court of Criminal Appeal may consist of two Supreme Court judges, plus one High Court judge, and from that tribunal there may be an appeal on the certificate of the court, or on the certificate of the Attorney-General, to the Supreme Court. But two Supreme Court judges are already there, having heard the case, and one other Supreme Court judge may have heard the case in Green Street from whom this is an appeal. Therefore, all you have to get on an urgent public matter is two members of the Supreme Court, and they have to drag in two or three High Court judges to constitute the Supreme Court.

The Attorney-General

That is done now under the present system.

And I am objecting to it. I want the Supreme Court to be kept apart. This section proposes to assimilate further the Supreme Court to the High Court in the matter of criminal appeal. If there is going to be even the remnants of an appeal to the Supreme Court on a point of tremendous importance, you are not really going to get the ultimate Court of Appeal in the Supreme Court. There are two Supreme Court judges and one High Court judge there. They give a certificate of appeal but there are only two Supreme Court judges left to hear it. That is a matter of principle upon which the Attorney-General should have at least an open mind.

The only difficulty we have in this matter is that we look upon it from the other angle. What we visualise was a member of the High Court presiding at Green Street, and when you have to look for High Court judges to constitute the Court of Criminal Appeal, you have four left. That leaves a small margin in case of illness. On both amendments moved by the Deputy I have a perfectly open mind, and if representations come from the Bar Council, or if suggestions are put up, I think it is only reasonable that they should be considered. I will not say at the moment that they will be accepted, but they will be considered.

I suggest that you should ask their view on the principle of appeal. The other matter is consequential. We can discuss that with the knowledge of the judges available in the circumstances.

That is a matter for the practitioners.

While I have views on this subject from the professional point of view I have not got such strong views as will impel me to go round my brethren at the Bar and collect public opinion professionally in support of my own personal views. The matter having been raised, and the Minister somewhat impressed, to put it no further, by the points put forward, he should consult both judges and representatives of the Bar Council.

I will undertake to do that.

Amendment by leave withdrawn.
Section 10 agreed to.

I move amendment No. 16:—

In page 7, before Section 11, to insert a new section as follows:—

Section 25 of the Principal Act is hereby amended by the insertion of the words "and reasonable to be retained therein" after the words "fit to be prosecuted in the High Court" where the latter words twice occur in the said section, and the said section shall be construed and have effect accordingly.

The object in putting down this amendment was to give the High Court jurisdiction to retain for hearing a case which would appear to be and did in fact come within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, but which by reason of the issues of law that it might raise, would be more appropriately prosecuted in the High Court than in the Circuit Court. The view I take is that judges of the High Court, when there are applications to remit actions within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, which were brought in the High Court, have universally remitted these actions, once it was apparent that they are within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. There are occasions, however, not very frequently, when an action involving an amount of money which appears to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, in fact involves very serious questions of law, on which it would be desirable to have a decision of the Supreme Court. If the view of the High Court hitherto is adopted, and the case is transferred to the Circuit Court, from an appeal to the High Court, and if the persons against whom the decision goes endeavour to get a certificate from the High Court for leave to appeal, as is sometimes the case, if they get it, it goes to the Supreme Court. If it goes to the Supreme Court it is a matter involving very serious issues. The object of the amendment is to make it clear that the High Court can retain, and ought to retain, actions of that kind for hearing, without transmitting them to the Circuit Court. Under the old system where the County Court had jurisdiction only up to £50 when an application to remit an action which was started in the High Court was made, the court invariably considered whether notwithstanding the fact that the amount claimed was under the £50 mark, the issues involved in the action were such as to make it more appropriate that it should be tried in the High Court. If the court thought the action was of such a character as to make it more appropriate that it should be determined in the High Court rather than in the County Court, they retained it in the High Court. I know one case where a civil bill was issued for a penny, but it involved very serious law issues. Actions of that kind might be held in the High Court. This is merely clarifying the position and making it clear to the judges that their jurisdiction is extensive in character in this respect.

On that particular amendment the principle we are following was upheld in the case of Hosie v Lawless.

But the Committee recommends against.

It does seem as if it was to be interpreted that as far as possible future actions in the Circuit Court should be commenced there. We think that if the court is satisfied that there is reason why a case should be retained in the High Court, that is sufficient. I do not think there is very much difference between us.

A great difference in practice.

The Committee was very precise about it. They said that their attention had been called to it. Their remarks are worth quoting:—

"The Committee were, however, referred to a case of Hosie v Lawless in which the Supreme Court, reversing the decision of a judge of the High Court, held that this was not the true construction of Section 25 of the Act of 1924, and that in view of `the policy' of the Act the question for the court on an application to transfer an action from the High Court to the Circuit Court was not whether the action was fit to be prosecuted in the High Court but `whether there is anything in the action which takes it out of the general policy and makes it more fit to be tried in the High Court than in the Circuit Court.' "

That was interpreted as meaning that there should be as large a distribution of the cases as was possible through the Circuit Court. They continue:—

"The Committee were informed that the effect of this decision has been that the Circuit Court has now practically exclusive jurisdiction in all actions which are within its jurisdiction, and that no action is retained in the High Court which is within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court."

They passed over what they called the constitutional aspect and went on to say:—

"The Committee, therefore, consider that on an application to remit or transfer an action from the High Court to the Circuit Court the question for the court should be whether, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, it was reasonable that the action should have been commenced in the High Court, and the Committee recommends that this should be provided for by the necessary legislation."

I think that is evident from the questions asked the two witnesses who gave evidence, Mr. Price and the Master of the High Court. It is evident that the Committee had the view that there was no policy in the Act of 1924 such as was declared in the attitude in the Hosie v Lawless case. Their view was that if it was a reasonable matter for trial in the High Court, the High Court should retain it, but they left the decision on that point to the High Court when a remittal motion is brought before it. It does not seem to work a big change. They have recommended it and the arguments brought before the Committee were entirely in favour of the proposed change.

The Attorney-General

I represented the Bar before the Committee. I know well that the Bar are very much interested in this. Though it may seem a small matter, and though the amendment does not strike one as having any radical effect, I think that Deputy Costello and perhaps Deputy McGilligan, will agree with me that it is a very radical amendment and that its effect on the present system would be considerable. I think that Deputy McGilligan is wrong in thinking that the court in considering the Hosie v Lawless case did not very carefully consider the policy of the 1924 Act.

I did not say anything about the court. I say the Committee were apparently of opinion that the view of policy was wrong.

The Attorney-General

The Deputy's view apparently is that the Committee, considering the Act, thought that the court went too far in reading into it the policy which underlies Hosie v Lawless. I was interested at the time when the Hosie v Lawless decision was given, and at the time the Committee sat I was anxious to see that the law should be changed as Deputy Costello suggests, and that there should be a reversal to the position such as previously existed on a remitting motion. I do not think that this amendment can be lightly treated as something of very little importance or that one can ignore the fact that if this amendment were to be adopted it would make a rather revolutionary change in the courts system. It would give the High Court grounds, in fact compel them to consider grounds, for the retaining of actions in the High Court which are not at present open to them. The court considered that the policy of the 1924 Act was that persons who had actions within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court concerning amounts or concerning property of the value in respect to which jurisdiction was given to the Circuit Court, should be compelled to go to the Circuit Court unless there were reasonable grounds for retaining the action in the High Court. It was in pushing that interpretation of the 1924 Act to its logical conclusion that the court came to the decision they came to in Hosie v Lawless. In order to justify reversing that judgment I think it would be necessary to make a case stronger than was made here by Deputy Costello.

Let you make the case you made to the Committee yourself and answer it.

The Attorney-General

I admit as representing the Bar and looking at it from the point of view of a member of the Bar——

Surely as head of the Bar you are still more interested now.

The Attorney-General

I recognise that I am here in a dual capacity, and if I were to look at this from the point of view of a member of the Bar, as Deputy Costello is looking at it, I would favour the amendment very strongly because it is in the interests of the Bar that as many actions as possible should be tried in the High Court. But, unless the Government is deliberately to come to the conclusion that the spirit of the 1924 Act is to be departed from in this respect, this amendment cannot be accepted by them. I certainly do not want anybody to misunderstand the position. I think the Minister's position is that a case has not been made for a reversal of the judgment or that he is not satisfied that the intentions of the 1924 Act are given effect to by adopting the amendment. That is the sole reason why this amendment is not welcomed and adopted. The case which Deputy Costello suggests as having been the subject matter of a civil bill involving a minute amount of money, a penny, although it involved an important point of law, I do not think would justify this amendment, even if instances of that type of case could be multiplied. Supposing there is such a case, involving even far more money, and that the plaintiff desires to have it litigated in the High Court. He starts the action in the High Court and the defendant moves to have it remitted to the Circuit Court. Then the High Court even under the Hosie v. Lawless decision could retain it in the High Court if they consider that there are special reasons for doing so.

My point is that they cannot retain it, even if there are special reasons given.

The Attorney-General

The Government is impressed by this position under the Act as it stands, that it is not such a tremendous penalty for a person to have to go to the Circuit Court even if an important point of law is involved, because, as Deputy Costello knows, it may come back on appeal to the High Court, to be heard by two High Court judges. Under our proposed change now it will come back to the circuit-going judge—a judge of the High Court—and he can, under a provision of this Bill, give a case stated on a question of law, that case to be taken straight to the Supreme Court, so that though theoretically a case can be made out for the amendment, in practice I do not think there is any real hardship on a litigant who has an important point of law to argue in compelling him, in the first instance, to litigate it in the Circuit Court. He can take it to the Appeal Court if necessary and from that take the important point of law to the Supreme Court. I am afraid it would take stronger reasons than have been given to induce the Minister to adopt this amendment which, as a member of the Bar, I would like to see adopted.

I should like to make a few observations in support of this amendment. The present position is that it is open to a litigant to start his proceedings in the High Court or Circuit Court, even though the case may be within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. If it is within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court an application can be made to the High Court to transfer to the Circuit Court and under the decision in the Hosie v. Lawless case, which has been referred to, the High Court on that application can consider practically nothing more than whether the case is within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. If it is, then it must go there. The amendment merely proposes that in addition to determining that matter, the High Court should be able to consider whether it is reasonable that it should be kept in the High Court.

It has been observed by Deputy Costello that there are cases where the amount involved is small or, at any rate, small enough to give jurisdiction to the Circuit Court. But there are other reasons, which it is unnecessary, perhaps, to deal with at very great length, why particular cases should be kept in the High Court. One particular example that occurs to anybody is a case in the nature of a test case. The amount involved may be small, but, nevertheless, if decided by the High Court there and then, it may rule a great number of other cases. If that case has to go to the Circuit Court, is going to be tried there, and there is going to be an appeal to the High Court, certainly in the existing conditions that means a very great delay. I do not know whether the system which this Bill seeks to bring is going to make that period of delay less, but, even if it is, that case must eventually go back to the High Court to be determined.

Another example that might occur in a particular case would be where the parties desired to secure prompt hearing because of illness, perhaps, the necessity for taking the evidence of a particular witness before death might supervene, or before that particular witness might have to leave the country, or for any other reason. I think it is true, as the Attorney-General said, that the amendment is an important one; it is not a trivial amendment; but, at the same time, it is not effecting a very great change in the law to give the High Court, which I suppose would be regarded as a responsible institution, power to examine the circumstances of a particular case. If, for any reason which the court is satisfied is one which ought to be taken judicial notice of that case ought to stay in the High Court, I think that, although that may effect a substantial change in the law, it is not an unreasonable change in the law. I therefore support the amendment and urge that the Minister should take into account this consideration before he determines to oppose it.

I think on this occasion I will address my remarks to the Minister, because it is quite obvious that the Attorney-General in reference to this amendment is merely acting the part of an advocate and not actually giving his true views at all; that it is really the Minister who is the villain of the piece in this respect in opposing this very reasonable and entirely unrevolutionary amendment. What is proposed is that it should be allowed for High Court judges to say whether or not it is reasonable that a case should be heard in the High Court rather than sent to the Circuit Court. What is revolutionary in that? Is it revolutionary to give power to High Court judges to say, on a given state of facts being presented to them, whether or not it is reasonable to retain a case in the High Court. I fail to see how that can be regarded as a revolutionary proposal.

Apart from the cases referred to by Deputy Lavery, and very forcibly put by him, I should like to remind the Minister of the sort of case that may perhaps have come within his own particular experience. Take the case of an ordinary action for defamation between two people in the same town. It would be quite impossible for one side or the other to get a fair trial of that particular action in the local venue. These cases have occurred in our own experience. Either side will ask for a jury. If the plaintiff does not ask for it the defendant will. Either side will square that jury, or else they will have pals on the jury, if they do not square it. It will be quite impossible for anybody to get a just decision in that case. I am not talking treason in saying that a jury can be squared. They are very human in the country. As the Minister will agree, sometimes a jury will allow knowledge which they acquire outside the court, if I might say so, to affect their decision in a case.

I know of one senior counsel who came to me in a state of tremendous indignation when he discovered that a defamation action which he started in the High Court had been remitted to the Circuit Court. His attitude was that the only thing to do for his client was to discontinue the action because of the local feeling in the matter and the local influence of perhaps one party or the other. If that case is retained, and facts are put before the High Court which enable them to say that it is both fit to be prosecuted and reasonable to be retained—because that is what the amendment says—then if the plaintiff does not make out a fit case on the plenary hearing of the action he can be mulcted in costs and the defendant will not in any way be penalised.

One objection we had to the Committee's recommendation was that it was so vague. The recommendation says "if it is reasonable." That is not a standard to guide you in the matter. I might say, in addition to that, that no representations were made to us with regard to having any amendment brought in at the time. The Bar Council did not make any representation.

They did to the Committee by their two representatives, of whom the Attorney-General was one.

The Minister may take it that the Bar Council approve of that.

I can read the quotation if you like.

They sent the Attorney-General.

To protest against the decentralisation of business as it was going to make for lack of education in the Bar and the judges.

The Attorney-General

That was the appeal system.

On this point I will quote you if you-like.

Deputies having duly instructed the Minister, he might be allowed to proceed.

One difficulty is that there should be less ground now for making it more easy to bring cases to the High Court. Under the system which will operate under this Bill, when it becomes an Act, there will be an appeal to a judge on Circuit. There is some force in what Deputy Costello said as to a case where there is a jury in a local town. I quite agree with him in that aspect of it, at any rate, in cases of tort arising out of defamation of character. I could not, however, undertake at present to accept the amendment, but I certainly shall reconsider it in the light of what has been said.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments Nos. 17 and 18 not moved.
Question proposed—"That Section 11 stand part of the Bill."

I should like to point out that the section deals with the procedure on appeals from by-laws made under the Fisheries Act, and I know that very great difficulty did arise by reason of a rather peculiar tribunal set up under the Fisheries Act in reference to the matter, and that it did call for some sort of provision such as is contained in this section. I entirely agree with that, but I should like the Attorney-General to consider whether or not the difficulty which arose on the first case brought under the old system to that extraordinary tribunal which was set up does not still exist in this section, namely, what is the procedure to be adopted and what are the powers now of the High Court under this section, and formerly of that queer tribunal? When the first case was brought it was impossible to tell whether or not all the evidence which had been given against the by-laws when the hearing locally was being had in the first instance was to be gone all over again in the appeal, or whether there were to be notes, or what was to be done at all. I forget at the moment how the High Court ultimately determined the matter, but my recollection is that they decided on some sort of a compromise hearing and settled some sort of procedure of their own. I think I should direct the attention of the Attorney-General to that fact that, under the section as it stands, the procedure to be adopted is left ambiguous.

The Attorney-General

What is left ambiguous?

The procedure to be adopted in this matter of the appeal.

The Attorney-General

I recollect that it was that particular case which caused this section. One of the judges spoke to me in connection with it.

Well, in that particular case, nobody knew how the appeal was to be conducted—neither the appellant nor the others concerned—whether it was to be oral evidence, or evidence on affidavit, or whether it was to be merely on what counsel said. I think that, as the section stands at the moment, the procedure is not settled either.

The Attorney-General

Might I ask the Deputy this: Was not the difficulty there that there were not rules of the High Court made? When the provision which existed becomes part of this Act, will not the High Court rules provided for it?

I am not sure that it does provide for it. I think they did make rules after that decision, but I am not sure that it is provided for.

The Attorney-General

Will not the onus be on the rule-making committee to make rules to enable this section to be worked?

I am only directing the attention of the Attorney-General to a difficulty which occurred to myself in reading it. Of course, there may be nothing in it.

The Attorney-General

I think I submitted this to some of the judges to see if it met with their approval, and they have approved of it.

Oh, I think it is a good section to meet certain difficulties that existed, because I certainly could not see any justification for that other tribunal, but my difficulty is as to whether the procedure is clearly stated in the section.

Has there not been a recommendation received that, whatever appeal there is under this sub-section (2) it should not be final and conclusive, but should be subject to the decision of the Appeal Court?

That is so.

Has any account been taken of that?

It has been considered.

Considered and forgotten.

Or considered and rejected—is that it? Why should you stop at the High Court? I do not know why you should go further except——

The Attorney-General

There are very unusual cases which, no matter what procedure is followed, will be very complicated and difficult. The particular case to which Deputy Costello referred presented great difficulties and took a long time. A great mass of evidence was produced, and I think the decision was to hear evidence and they took oral evidence. This sub-section allows for the hearing by one, two or more judges in the High Court, as may be convenient. If you are going to have these long-drawn-out-cases—and cases of that nature are almost inevitably long-drawn-out hearings—it would impose a very heavy burden on the parties concerned if there had to be a further long-drawn-out appeal; and the compromise is there, that, in order to have a satisfactory hearing, the President of the High Court may assign one or two or more judges for the hearing, and it is thought that already the matter has been the subject of a hearing or a ruling by the secretary.

The Attorney-General

The orders which may be questioned in this way have been made by the Minister. They are generally made, I think, after an investigation has been conducted in the area by an official of the Fisheries Department. I know that the case to which Deputy Costello referred came up after a recommendation had been made by an official from the Department, and the Minister had made an order. So that you have the hearing before him; you have the hearing now before the High Court; and a third hearing before the Supreme Court would hardly be necessary, particularly as one, two or more judges may be assigned for the hearing.

As that amendment of mine is out of order, I should like the Minister to confirm what he partially said last night.

The Deputy can accept what I stated.

Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 12.
(1) No appeal shall lie under the Industrial and Commercial Property (Protection) Act, 1927 (No. 16 of 1927), to the law officer as defined by that Act, and in lieu thereof an appeal shall lie to the High Court wherever an appeal would have lain under the said Act to the law officer as so defined if this section had not been enacted.
(2) An appeal to the High Court under this section may be heard by one or by two or more judges of the High Court as may be convenient, and the order of the High Court on any such appeal shall be subject to appeal to the Supreme Court.

I move amendment No. 19:—

In page 7, to delete Section 12, lines 28 to 37 inclusive.

We are proposing to delete the section. Since that section was inserted, a Committee has been set up by the Minister for Industry and Commerce, and we think it would be better that legislation should emanate out of the deliberations of that Committee.

So that, this whole matter, then, is being left over?

Well, at any rate, from the terms of Section 12, as drafted, we may take it that there was a definite decision that, whatever way there was of dealing with patent cases, it would not be by appeal to the law officer. It is only a question of a substitute?

That is all. We do not consider that this is the proper Bill to have it in at all. It was put in here, apparently, to meet whatever change might be required.

I think the Attorney-General will agree with me that the appeal, under the Industrial and Commercial Property Act, to the law officer, is entirely undesirable and would be a terrible burden on the law officer.

The Attorney-General

I proposed this section myself.

I am in entire agreement, and I think it ought to remain in pending the decision of this Committee, because God knows when that Committee will report.

Has that Committee got anybody to appear before it? I do not think so.

The Attorney-General

It certainly has had some sittings.

Yes, but I think they were mainly to arrange procedure or to make a sort of royal welcome for anybody who would venture to come before the Committee.

I think the section ought to stand as it is, whether the Committee that has been set up is moribund or whatever it is. I want to get the section that exists in the Industrial and Commercial Property Act killed definitely, because I think we are all agreed that, it is undesirable in principle, and, in practice, an impossible burden on the person who happens to be law officer for the time being. I think I can speak with some knowledge on that, and I think the present Attorney-General will agree with me. It is also very doubtful whether it is constitutionally permissible or not, and I think that the doubt ought to be settled at the earliest possible opportunity. I think this should be left in, and if the Committee, subsequently, determines on some other procedure, then it can be changed. I think, however, that the situation calls for urgent remedy.

I understand that this was one of the terms of reference for submission to the Committee, and it was only after it had been submitted to the Committee that it was decided to delete this section from the Bill. I will withdraw my amendment until I know more about it. When it is reported I will come back again to have this deleted.

Get the Committee a good publicity agent. There seems to be nobody bothering about it.

Amendment No. 19 withdrawn.
Amendment No. 20 not moved.
Section 12 agreed to.

The Attorney-General

Will it be open to delete it on Report?

Yes, by lines. We do not delete sections as such on Report.

Section 13 agreed to.
SECTION 14.
Where an action shall be pending in the High Court which might have been commenced in the Circuit Court, the Master of the High Court, on the application of any party to such action made at any time after an appearance is entered therein and before service of notice of trial therein and notwithstanding that the summons (in cases in which the summons is required by rules of court to be set down for hearing before the Master of the High Court) has not been so set down.

I move amendment No. 2:—

In page 7, Section 14, lines 52-53, to delete the words "the Master" and substitute the words "a judge."

I put down this amendment here and it is simply put down because it is a recommendation of the Committee. I want to achieve a certain object and it is the only way in which one can raise the matter under the Bill. It is on the question of the Master.

The Attorney-General

That amendment has been accepted.

There has been a further amendment put down. I refer to amendment No. 26. It is an amendment making a charge on the Exchequer and I presume it will fall under the axe.

That assumption is correct.

The question of the Master must be raised somewhere in this measure and it must be raised in a detailed way. As far as I can make out, in other countries there are functionaries who have duties like what were intended to be given to the Master here, but owing to a particular decision of the courts here the Master has been left almost entirely without jurisdiction. He calls himself, speaking in a rather crying way, something in the nature of a rubber stamp, a higher kind of official, court official, or something like that. That is an anomalous position. Functionaries who hold analogous offices in other countries do discharge quite a lot of functions. There is a feeling, certainly, amongst practitioners, that the Master could be made a useful court. There is a difference as to whether or not he is to discharge judicial functions—that is as to whether he is a judge. There is one way out of that and that is to make him a judge. But that is a sort of amendment or proposal that I would not be allowed to make because there would have to be some difference in the salary owing to the changed conditions. But we can discuss that. There is a way of raising it. That court could be made a useful court. There is no objection in principle, from anybody with whom I have spoken, as far as I can understand.

There is no objection to the Master himself and no criticism as to the efficiency with which he has carried out the limited duties he has been for some time discharging. There is quite a volume of opinion, and it is becoming very wide, as to the position of the Master. I know that there is a limited number of people who practise in that court on account of its limited nature and it is for that reason that the full effects of the Master's curtailed powers are not being realised. For that reason there is not such a wide body of opinion in regard to him as there is in regard to other people. If that body of opinion, however, were allowed to develop there would be as much outcry about the Master as there is about any other section of the courts—the High Court or the Supreme Court. There is a lot of useful work that could be done by the Master which would result in shortening the time that is occupied between the period when people make up their minds to bring an action in court and when the action comes on. Because of the present situation the time has been lengthened. A mass of relatively unimportant work has been sent down to the judges to discharge which could be discharged by the Master if this constitutional barrier that has been raised were removed. The judges would unanimously or almost unanimously approve of having that work sent to the Master. This is quite an anomaly which should be cleared up.

Then the question of the Master's pension and such other things arise at the same time. Has it ever been considered what reactions will follow from making the Master a judge and giving him judicial status? Let it be of some court; that can be considered afterwards, but let him clearly be a judge and capable under the Constitution of performing judicial functions. Again, I think, that when the Master's position is considered it will be recognised that certain limitations have been imposed on him. I do not think that anything can be lost by making the Master assume the position of judge and making the necessary change in everything else regarding his judicial office. I do not think we would lose at all by having the present occupant raised to the position of judge and given a judicial charge. If the Master were made a judge I have no doubt that by degree the office would grow and quite an amount of real judgment could be sought and got in that court which of course cannot be got at the moment because of the limitations put upon him. That would involve certain statutory changes. There should be a decision taken as to what branch of the judiciary he should belong. But these are the hurdles to be got over at the moment. The office has very limited functions indeed at present, but it could be made quite a clearing house or a clearing-house station for most of the detailed work. It was thought that for that detailed work an individual with the practical experience of the Master and with his capacity to discharge that work would be of much use in the courts. Instead of that we find the Master with next-to-nothing of importance given to him to do and with always that fear hanging over him that no matter what he does there may be a new approach to the High Court or the Supreme Court with regard to it, and that there may be objection on the ground that he is over-stepping his functions. The Committee's recommendation was because they had got the position of the Master disclosed. They made the recommendations in the circumstances as disclosed but they did not approach them.

The Attorney-General

I find myself in agreement with a great deal of what the Deputy has said as to the position of the Master. There is no doubt about it when the position was created it was thought that a great deal of work of the nature the Deputy has described would be discharged by the Master. Had the position been developed in the way in which it was designed a great deal of time would be saved and the Master would have been quite a useful official. As the Deputy has said, the rulings of the High Court on the position of the Master have had the effect of practically depriving him of a great part of the functions which it was hoped he would discharge. The position is, as the Deputy says, quite anomalous at the moment. I practised in the Master's Court before his jurisdiction had been challenged and the volume of his work reduced to the extent it has been. I agree with the Deputy that the practitioners before the Master were very satisfied with him. There is no doubt he is a most excellent officer. But I doubt if the solution which the Deputy puts forward will meet the situation. Apart from amending the Constitution, there seems to be no other way of solving the difficulty than by either allowing the office to fall into desuetude or making the Master a judge. That solution has not been put forward seriously before.

The Master suggested it to the Committee. He said that unless the Master is made a judge they should leave him to administer his work.

The Attorney-General

The solution suggested by the Deputy seems, I think, to have been considered by the Department, and there are many difficulties in the way which I am afraid can hardly be got over. So far as this amendment is concerned, the Minister has decided to accept it and the effect of accepting it is to render the section unnecessary. I do not know if the Chair will allow the section to be taken out as there is no formal amendment down to delete it.

If it is considered necessary to withdraw the section that can be done.

The Attorney-General

Then we will withdraw Section 14. I thought there was some difficulty about withdrawing the section.

There is no amendment to delete the section.

A most excellent way of getting rid of it would be to vote against it, if it is put to a division.

The only amendment to the section seeks to make a change in it, and that has been accepted.

The Attorney-General

Yes, and the effect of that is to render the section unnecessary. It is not necessary to give the judges jurisdiction to do what the section provides the Master should be allowed to do.

They already have it.

It would be ridiculous.

The Attorney-General

Yes, to leave the section in.

The amendment must be withdrawn and then the section.

But if the amendment is withdrawn then the section is not ludicrous.

That is not my function.

The Attorney-General

If the Chair will allow us to withdraw the section we will undertake to do so and the Deputy can then withdraw his amendment, and both will go.

Is there going to be any consideration given to the Master's position? Is there to be any thought of introducing an amendment to better his position or regularise the work he used to do? We had to pass an Act covering several thousand cases he dealt with.

The position is very difficult, because the county registrars would be in a somewhat similar position except that the Master has more important cases before him. In regard to other matters, there is a difficulty about county registrars as well and the whole thing is not so very simple.

I agree it is not simple and I would not like to have any equation between the position of the Master and the county registrars. Under the judiciary report of 1924 the Master was to have been given very definite duties; they were limited but important duties nevertheless. Those have been taken away from him. Is there no way of reinstating the position which it was clearly intended by the Judiciary Committee in 1924 he should get?

It can be considered.

So long as there is any idea of considering it——

Probably when the new Constitution is being brought in.

Apart from that, as Ministers are the only people who can bring in suggestions in relation to charges, may I take it that the Minister has had representations made to him with regard to the pension of the Master?

That is so—representations have been made.

Has the Minister any thought of dealing with that matter? Is there any thought of bringing in an amendment at a later stage?

It is not the present intention.

Is it recognised there is hardship arising from his position and that there is bound to be hardship on anybody who occupies that post, taking it for granted there will always be such a man of experience?

The Attorney-General

The only hardship is that he has no work to do.

There is a hardship if a man is prevented from doing work. He might have occupied himself with some work outside that would be remunerative. He is invited to a post which means that he must have had experience; experience means the passing of years and the position is that he cannot qualify for a pension except a moderate fraction of the maximum. Undoubtedly there is hardship. I do not think it will involve a heavy charge on public funds and it should be considered.

The Attorney-General

It cannot be done until 1938.

Why can it not be done?

The Attorney-General

It would mean imposing a further burden on the Exchequer—that is your own view.

Raise the price of calf skins by 5/- and you will get plenty of money.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section put and negatived.
SECTION 15.
(1) The following provisions shall have effect in relation to the amount of the costs recoverable by the plaintiff in an action commenced and heard in the High Court, that is to say:—
(a) In any action of tort or of breach of promise of marriage, where the amount of the damages recovered by the plaintiff is not less than one hundred pounds and not more than three hundred pounds the plaintiff shall not be entitled to recover more costs than he would have been entitled to recover if the action had been brought in the Circuit Court, unless the judge hearing the action grants a special certificate under this section;
(b) in any action of tort or breach of promise of marriage, where the amount of the damages recovered by the plaintiff is less than one hundred pounds the plaintiff shall not be entitled to recover more costs than whichever of the following amounts is the lesser, that is to say, the amount of such damages or the amount of costs which he would have been entitled to recover if the action had been brought in the Circuit Court, unless the judge hearing the action grants a special certificate under this section;
(c) in any action founded on contract (other than actions for the recovery of a liquidated sum) or for damages for breach of contract (other than for breach of promise of marriage), where the amount recovered by the plaintiff does not exceed three hundred pounds the plaintiff shall not be entitled to recover more costs than he would have been entitled to recover if the action had been brought in the Circuit Court unless the judge hearing such action grants a special certificate under this section;
(d) in any action for the recovery of a liquidated sum, where the amount recovered by the plaintiff exceeds one hundred pounds but does not exceed three hundred pounds the plaintiff shall not be entitled to recover more costs than he would have been entitled to recover if the action had been brought in the Circuit Court, unless the judge hearing such action grants a special certificate under this section;

I move amendment No. 22:—

In page 8, to delete Section 15 (1) (a), lines 7 to 14 inclusive.

This is the section which deals with the limitation of costs. The whole section has, I think, been considered by the General Council of the Bar and they have made a recommendation in regard to it. They have recommended that the section as drafted really should disappear and instead of it there should be adopted provisions as to costs prescribed by Order 28, Rule 2, of the High Court Rules, 1926. If that be not accepted they suggest that there should be special provision made and there is a certain reference to sub-section (2). I think it might be better to discuss together all the amendments down to Section 15. What I seek to delete by amendment No. 22 is the following:—

(a) in any action of tort or of breach of promise of marriage, where the amount of the damages recovered by the plaintiff is not less than £100 and not more than £300 the plaintiff shall not be entitled to recover more costs than he would have been entitled to recover if the action had been brought in the Circuit Court, unless the judge hearing the action grants a special certificate under this section.

I want information as to what is the underlying reason for making these provisions with regard to the limitation of costs. Why is it necessary to pick out actions of tort or breaches of promise of marriage where the sum claimed is not less than £100 nor more than £300, and where the plaintiff was only to be allowed certain costs? The Ministry have divided up these limitations of costs under certain heads and I am asking for information in the first place.

The reason is that it is considered that the special certificate which the judge has power to give as to whether it is reasonable that the case should be brought in the High Court is a sufficient safeguard. The underlying reason is to discourage actions that might be brought in the Circuit Court from being brought in the High Court.

That is decentralisation?

That is so.

The Attorney-General was against that in the Committee.

The Committee made the same recommendation.

I am going mainly on what the Committee said. I think the view of the Committee generally was that they did not agree that it was the policy of the Act of 1924 that actions to a greater extent should be brought in the Circuit Court. An enormous mass of evidence was given on the point that if there was to be Circuit Court jurisdiction of the same limit as at the moment, there should be what is called concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court. The Committee definitely accepted that.

The Attorney-General

This section repeats practically paragraph 97 of the report.

I have a table here of the Committee's recommendations and of what we are doing. It sets out in tabular form what the recommendations of the Committee are, and what we are doing in this section.

You are discussing the whole of the section.

There is no recommendation where the sum is not less than £100 and not more than £300. The costs are limited to a certain scale unless the judge grants a certificate. Where the sum is less than £100 the recommendation of the Committee was: "Plaintiff not to be entitled to more costs than damages, unless the judge grants a special certificate." What we are doing is set out in paragraphs (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of this Section 15.

From what page of the report is the Minister reading?

The Attorney-General

From page 57—Roman type.

I think there must be some discrepancy. Would the Minister read it again?

Where the sum is less than £100 the Committee's recommendation was that the plaintiff should not be entitled to more costs than damages, unless the judge granted a special certificate. In the Bill paragraph (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 15 reads:

Plaintiff not to be entitled to more costs than whichever of the following sums is the lesser:—

(a) The amount of such damages.

(b) The amount of costs which he would be entitled to recover if the action had been brought in the Circuit Courts.

Whichever of these is lesser; that is, whichever is lower.

With regard to the liquidated sums the Committee made an identical recommendation in paragraph 31 of the report. Section 15, paragraphs (e) and (f) of sub-section (i), carries out the recommendation. Paragraph (d) goes further. It limits, in cases where between £100 and £300 is recovered, the costs to the Circuit Court scale unless the judge grants a special certificate. In contract, Section 15, paragraph (c) of sub-section (1) carries out the recommendation precisely. The next is the ejectment recommendation. Section 15, paragraph (g) of sub-section (1), carries out the recommendation precisely. Except where recommendations are carried out exactly there is a special certificate by the judge that it was reasonable that the case should be brought in the High Court and it was considered that that was sufficient.

I should like to see that table from which the Minister has read.

Yes, the Deputy can see it.

There are certain deviations from the Committee's recommendations, but only on minor points.

There was no recommendation with regard to amounts recovered not less than £100 and not more than £300.

They only dealt with under £100, but there is a slight deviation that will result in loss in certain cases, but I am afraid I must wait until I see that table.

Amendment No. 22 withdrawn.
Amendments Nos. 23, 24, 25 not moved.

Amendment No. 26 cannot be moved.

Question—"That Section 15 stand part of the Bill"—put and agreed to.
SECTION 16.

I move amendment No. 27:—

In page 9, before Section 16 and in Part III of the Bill, to insert a new section as follows:—

This Part of this Act shall come into operation on such day not earlier than the 1st day of October, 1938, as may be fixed therefor by an order of the Executive Council.

The Attorney-General

What about amendments Nos. 30 and 31?

Amendment No. 27 was dealt with yesterday.

Surely there is some difference between the date on which the Supreme Court section might come into operation and the date on which the Circuit Court section might operate.

Let us get this in order. Is this amendment being moved?

Yes, I am moving it.

The Attorney-General

I understood that the Ceann Comhairle treated them all on the same basis.

The Ceann Comhairle had that view earlier, but I do not think he held to it. The Ceann Comhairle's note to me was that he would allow amendments Nos. 1, 2, 27 and 34, but that they ruled certain others. I am quite in agreement that the remarks which were passed on Nos. 1 and 2 would be the only arguments that could be used again on this, except that there is this matter in relation to the Circuit Court. Up to date what has been decided by the House is that in so far as the measure is in relation to the appointment of new judges to the Supreme Court, available for work in the High Court, that should take place immediately on the passing of the Act, or at some appointed day. The House is now definitely faced with a decision as to whether or not it should bring in the Circuit Court provisions at the same time. They are not necessarily interlocked. It is intended, as the scheme is put before us, that they should be interlocked, but it is not necessarily so. We could have the enlargement of the Supreme Court, and those extra members of the Supreme Court allowed to do certain High Court work, without the appeal system being interfered with, and there is no special reason why the two should be joined together. I speak very definitely again against this whole system of the appeal from the Circuit Court, and all the changes which are consequent in Circuit Court procedure by reason of that. I would urge that it should be left over for some better consideration. I know there is a very big number of people who are disappointed with the present Circuit Court appeal system, and there is a very big number of practitioners who think that the change brought in by the 1924 Act was a change definitely for the worse, but there is another body of opinion. I am not sure, if opinions are canvassed in that matter, that it will not be found that they have been formed by reason of circumstances peculiar to some of the circuits, and that there is a great deal of personal point of view dependent upon what particular man travels.

I have never yet been able to get any answer to the question as to why the people of this country need a re-hearing and the parading of witnesses a second time in very small types of cases, when apparently no other country has decided to have it, and when England, who saw it tried out here, decided clearly not to have it in her own system. There has to be agreement on the other point which was urged here on Second Reading, that if you are going to have a fact appeal you have got to see the witnesses. There cannot be a proper appeal on fact taken by way of the note, but there is before us the recognised practice of other countries that in this manner of case you have your facts tried once; you have them heard by a judge who sees the witnesses and hears them giving their evidence. After that, the matter of fact is finished for all practical purposes, and there is only an appeal by way of case stated—an appeal on a point of law or something like that. The view expressed before the Committee, that the people of the country wanted this, has prevailed, notwithstanding the answer that was made to it that they only desired it because they had got accustomed to it, and had got accustomed to it because of a peculiar historical procedure—a small type of case being tried by a man who was not a judge at all. Then there emerged the viewpoint that at any rate those cases should be given one hearing before a judge. There then occurred what was called a re-hearing or a re-trial. There are other points which can be urged afterwards, but there is this point to be made at the moment—that it would be very well to let this scheme take form in the Bill and suspend the operation so as to give some better time to develop a point of view on it.

The Attorney-General

I should only like to say one thing in reply to what the Deputy has said. I wonder if he has gone through the evidence which was given before the Committee. If he has, he must have been struck by the almost unanimous views put forward by the witnesses there with regard to the present system. The views given expression to were those of people who were not all drawn from the legal profession. I have looked through the list of witnesses, and every one of them was there in a representative capacity. Some of them represented the Chambers of Commerce. Take, for instance, Mr. Clark, who represented the Chambers of Commerce; at question 2329 it will be seen that he gave his view that the system of appeals was unsatisfactory. Mr. Cobbe, who represented the County Councils' General Council, said that his body was unanimously opposed to the present system. Mr. Cogan, representing the Dublin Chamber of Commerce, gave the same view.

Do you remember on what it was based?

The Attorney-General

The overwhelming majority of the witnesses who gave evidence before that Committee voiced dissatisfaction with the system of appeals on stenographers' notes. One witness—I think it was Mr. Ryan—said that a vote of his Bar association showed them almost unanimously against it. You have the evidence of men like Mr. Binchy—I forget whether he was at the Senior Bar at the time—Mr. William Carrigan and Mr. Patrick Lynch. Mr. Fitzgerald gave his opinion in favour of an oral rehearing, and he at that time had experience of sitting as a commissioner hearing appeals. District Justice Cussen gave his opinion against the present system. Mr. Gaffney, solicitor, Limerick, favoured re-hearing; and so on, with very few exceptions. Some of them, of course, were important exceptions, such as the Chief Justice and the President of the High Court, but it is striking with what unanimity the other witnesses condemned the present system. While Deputy McGilligan may have satisfied himself from examination of the statistics, and from approaching the matter from the viewpoint of wondering why this country wants a system which apparently is not to be found elsewhere, there are the plain facts with which his Government was faced at the time this Committee reported, and upon which, I understand, they were prepared to act. I understand that a Bill giving effect to this particular recommendation of the Committee would have been introduced by his Government——

As an individual, I was never informed of that, and I do not think it could have been so.

It did not get as far as the Cabinet, but it was being prepared in the Department. It had not been sanctioned.

The Attorney-General

I do not want to make any point about what stage the Bill was at. This was a Committee which that Government had set up, and their report favoured this change. Their report was based upon the evidence of this large number of persons who as I say were drawn from every walk of life. They were not merely country solicitors, who might have an interest in changing the system, or members of the Bar, who might have an interest in changing the system, but even such bodies as the General Council of County Councils and the Dublin Chamber of Commerce pronounced themselves dissatisfied with the system of appeal on the notes. Why there should be such a complete reversal of that opinion by some people, I do not understand. I believe that had the Deputy's Government come into office at the general election which was held the following year, some such Bill as the Bill we have here would have been introduced. It might have gone the length which Deputy Costello wishes us to go in this Bill and increased the Supreme Court and High Court, but certainly, unless they wished to ignore the findings of their own Commission, they would have had to meet the demand for this change which was so clearly voiced by the witnesses who came before the Commission and which was given effect to in the report.

However, whether it is a matter to be deplored that the country should demand the appeal by way of rehearing, there it is, and those of us who have had experience of the working of such a system do not see anything like the objections to it that Deputy McGilligan sees in theory. I have heard urged against the system—and the Deputy, I think, repeated the statement frequently made against this system of appeals without the stenographer's note, by way of rehearing—that it encouraged perjury. That is grossly exaggerated, from my own practical experience of the working of the system of appeals. It is quite unlikely that, in any case of any importance, a witness would have the hardihood to change his story between one court and another, and risk the exposure which he must suffer at the hands of a vigilant solicitor or vigilant counsel who had been in the court below. I do not know if the Deputy has had experience of a witness attempting to change his story, and being faced with a person who he knows was listening when he told a different story in another court.

A little thing like that would not trouble him.

The Attorney-General

It might not trouble him, but I have no recollection of any case in which a witness got away with a case on appeal by changing his story or in which he hoodwinked the judge on appeal into the belief that the story he was telling in the appeal court was true. I have had no practical experience of that particular evil which has been so much referred to in these discussions as to the advantage or disadvantage of the appeal with the stenographer's notes. There the matter stands. I said last evening when discussing this, and I have said it before, that it may be that the present system has not got a long enough trial to enable us to judge as between it and the old system, but when this Committee sat, the body of opinion was altogether in favour of a return to the old system, and witnesses of the standing I have just mentioned, men who cannot have had any reason for giving their opinions beyond a belief in the statements they made and their desire to see the change made, all favoured the proposals which are embodied in this Bill and which have been so roundly denounced here as something emanating from a perverse and uninspired Minister for Justice. The Minister for Justice has taken the Committee's report and attempted to give effect to its recommendations, and I do not see why there should be such a fierce attack upon them as there has been.

I do not think it is quite right for the Attorney-General to say that the attack, if it can be called an attack, on this change back to the old system was made in any sense along the lines he has stated, as being brought in by a perverse and uninstructed Minister for Justice. The criticism has gone along the lines of principle, as to whether or not, in principle, the new system set up by the Act of 1924 was better than the system it superseded. I think it was along those lines that the discussion went, and it is on those lines that there are very considerable grounds for differences of opinion on the matter. I think it is quite correct for the Attorney-General to say that a number of people had very strong views on the virtue of the old system as against the evils of the new system. I look forward, I confess, with considerable perturbation to having to trek around the country again on assizes. It offers no inducement to me, either from the point of view of comfort in a country hotel or of the remuneration that might ensue, but other people think that they are going to make their fortunes. Other people want the new system because they object to the particular circuit judge dealing with the case at the moment, and when you discuss this matter with them, and push their reasons down to bedrock, you find that it is not the system they object to but a particular individual or individuals.

When the Attorney-General refers to the number of eminent gentlemen who gave their opinions before this Joint Committee, I think everybody will recognise that most of these opinions were coloured, either by conservative ideas or their own hopes of what might ensue to their practice as a result of the change in the procedure of the Circuit Court. I think the Attorney-General is not at all correct in his statement that the attack on this system is actuated by any suggestion that this decision to revert is in any way a perverse decision. There is, undoubtedly, room for differences of view on this thing. I take the view that the system under the Act of 1924 has not been a success, much as I am in favour of it. The reason why that system has not been a success is not because of the system itself, but because of the methods by which that system was operated and construed by High Court judges. I think the system did not get a fair trial, not because of the lapse of time, but because of the way in which it was administered and construed by High Court judges. They gave, in my view, too narrow an interpretation to their powers.

It might be that that could be met by enlarging their powers and by making it clear that they had powers of hearing these cases on appeal on questions of fact as well as on questions of law, but I certainly think that, in a few years' time, when people have had experience of this new system, we shall have a demand in this House for a commission to inquire into the question of whether we ought not to go back to the system under the Act of 1924. I can envisage what is going to happen. When assizes go out for the first time, there will be a grand crop of appeals. A lot of legal gentlemen will perhaps have a little rake-off for the first time, but these will disappear like snow before the sun; at the second assizes, there will be fewer appeals; and at the third assizes, there will be practically none.

Might I point out that it is quite wrong to speak of the proposal in the Bill as being a reversion to the old principle? The old County Court had jurisdiction of £50, but the procedure then existing was that, from the hearing by the County Court judge, there should be a rehearing by a judge of assize. £50 is a substantial sum but it is still only 1/6th of £300 which is the present jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, and there never has been in this country, or in any country, a system which allowed litigants to have substantial cases involving a sum of £300 tried twice, and, if they failed to secure a decision in their favour at the first trial, to put the whole matter in issue again before another judge. I do not know why it should be thought that a better decision is going to be got that way. I do not know, when a circuit judge has heard witnesses, has given careful consideration to the case and has made his decision, why that decision is to be nullified and wiped out by the simple service of notice of appeal which will bring the case before another judge.

Having regard to the present constitution of the Circuit Court, and the expectation that in the future the Circuit Court will be manned by persons of equal ability, I do not know that it is likely that you are going to get better results by that system.

Now an appeal, by way of a rehearing, is a very suitable method of appeal in very small cases, and at present, under the 1924 Act and, I think, under the Bill at present before the House, an appeal from the District Court to the Circuit Court is by way of rehearing. No person can quarrel with that because the district justices have to try a very great number of small cases. Decisions have to be come to rapidly and, in most cases, a decision is quite simply arrived at. But, if and when a very complicated, difficult or doubtful case arises, the litigant who has had his case summarily disposed of before the District Court can take an appeal to the circuit judge and make his case before him. But, what is true of the £10 civil bill or even the £25 civil bill in the District Court has no relation to the circumstances where people have to litigate about such large sums as £300, and I respectfully suggest to the Minister that it is well worthy of consideration that no case of that kind, which ought to be carefully prepared and presented to the Circuit Court judge, ought to be wiped out by the simple service of notice of appeal.

The Attorney-General is not in the House. He has said that he has no recollection of difficulties being found under the old system or of its being discovered that witnesses changed their evidence. Well, I think that both the Minister for Justice and the Attorney-General are long enough in the profession to remember the civil bill appeals as heard by judges of assize. Certainly, in my experience, one of the commonest questions asked of witnesses on the hearing of civil bill appeals was: What did you swear in a court below? The question was so often asked that it became absurd and no judge paid any attention to that question, or made any attempt to discover what the witness had sworn in the court below, because there was no record and no means of testing what he had sworn in the court below. It was only counsel who could not think of a better way of presenting his case that addressed that question to witnesses because it became so much discounted. I think this question is really worthy of reconsideration, whether the present system ought not to be maintained, and, if possible, improved upon by extending the powers of the High Court judges in the hearing of appeals on notes, or whether some alternative could not be discovered of allowing rehearings in certain small cases, while preserving the present system as regards the substantial cases, say, of over £100.

According to the statement of the Attorney-General it has seldom, if ever, happened that a person won a case by changing his evidence. There is no possible way by which a judge can get official cognisance of what exactly a person said in the court below. There should be some means of securing that. That is a very important point and one worthy of reconsideration.

From the opposite side speakers have persisted in describing this as a vicious attack on an uninstructed and perverse Minister. I entirely disclaim the use of that phrase for myself. The Attorney-General told us of the big number of witnesses who appeared before the Committee and wanted a change. Why did they want it? If you go deeper than merely counting heads, why did the two representatives of the Dublin Chamber of Commerce and other commercial organisations speak as they did? For this reason: the time delay in the hearing of appeals. That was the point that weighed with them. The attitude of certain classes of commercial men in this city and Cork is: give us an immediate hearing for our cases and hang the expense, but when you set up a system they are the first to complain about the expense involved. They were impressed by the delay as between the first hearing and the hearing of the appeal. I quoted statistics about the business in the courts. You were thinking then of the mass of appeals which never got below 200, and 200 was regarded as about a year's work. Those were the appeals that were coming from about 14,000 cases, then the average work of the Circuit Courts. They were going to the High Court that was dealing with a number of cases originating in the High Court and averaging about 7,000. The situation we have now is that these appeals have been so eaten into that, even with certain mishaps with regard to the illness of judges and so on, there are only about 150 appeals outstanding. The volume of Circuit Court work has dropped by about one-third and so also has the High Court work. There is less High Court work and less Circuit Court work to be done. There is not the same probability of appeals, so that even if we get an improved procedure there is not likely to be the same number left over.

The other thing was the expense. Of course, the cases that the Minister quoted the other night were quoted and made great use of by the Committee, but the Committee having heard a number of these examples formulated this opinion. They believed that in the smaller case, the £10 case, the costs were undoubtedly much more severe than they used to be but that that was a fallacious comparison, and they said this that there was no evidence produced which impressed them that in the higher range of cases the cost of appeals was anything more than what it used to be. The costs were mainly due to the stenographer's notes and to the fees of solicitors and counsel. They recommended the keeping of the notes. The Ministry have now added a new item, and that is that they are going to increase court fees, and if litigation is going to be cheapened, that is going to be at the expense of the legal people employed. That is the aim of the present Government.

A number of people who gave evidence before the Committee were in favour of going back to what is called the old system of appeal because they were impressed by the point of delay and the point of expense. The Committee had not made the point of expense because they recommended a type of rehearing which would involve as much expense, and the time question, I hold, would solve itself. The judges would get on top of the appeals, and as the appeals were likely to diminish in number, with less work in the High Court to be done, there would be an opportunity of dealing with the appeals and getting rid of them.

The question of perjury was undoubtedly raised before the Committee, and the Committee was impressed by it despite what the Attorney-General thinks. They say in the report that they thought that the arguments about perjury were rather strained and exaggerated, but remember they did this—they changed suddenly in their recommendation. Look at what they did. They had been impressed by the talk of expense, and particularly the expense relating to the notes. Yet they recommended keeping the notes. Why? I think that anyone who goes through the evidence and studies it in detail will find the reason: that there is a growing impression revealed towards the end among the members of the Committee in which they express the view that there is one way of meeting the perjury aspect and that is by keeping the notes. They changed away from the other view which they had held when economy was uppermost in their minds at one time, and recommended the retention of the notes because they were impressed by the arguments about perjury.

I do not care what view one may have about how naturally truthful the people of this country are, but if a man has a case in court and sees that it is going to be tried again, that he suddenly discovers he is going to be given an opportunity of mending his hand, then that is going to be a terrible temptation to him. The Attorney-General takes the point about a man going to be blatant in his perjury. That is not what happens. I am a novice in this, but I have read the report and the comments of experienced people and I am satisfied that it is not what happens. I think it was the President of the High Court who, in the course of his evidence, spoke of the artful perjurer trimming his case, taking away a little of the things that he found were against him at the first hearing and coming in at the second hearing with a story well arranged and all the small points cleaned out. It was to meet that kind of thing that the Committee recommended the keeping of the notes, even although the retention of the notes meant that they were going to involve a new type of appeal and an expenditure which, first of all, they wanted to avoid. Reading through the Committee's report, I was impressed by the number of people who stood against that current of opinion and were definitely in favour of keeping the new system. A very large number were in favour of that course. I do not want to make odious comparisons between the witnesses who appeared there, but I certainly thought there was more reason given by those who wanted the new system held than by those who wanted to return to the old system. The people who wanted to return to the old system founded themselves on the argument that the people have got used to it, that they do not understand the procedure of appeal in Dublin many months after the first hearing and that they wanted to go back to the old system. I want to quote from the evidence of one witness —I mentioned his name last night— the Registrar in County Monaghan, who had been a solicitor of considerable experience and eminence. He was quite definite and clear about this proposal. In the first place, he said that he did not think the system of appeal on stenographer's notes should be altered. Then he said:—

"I admit, if you like, that there is some advantage in a judge looking at the witness but it seems to me such a strange thing that a number of people are anxious— cost what it will to peasant or small shopkeeper — to enjoy the great privilege of having two judges of appeal looking at them face to face instead of the present method. If that be a good thing and if it be necessary to have judges of appeal, why is it then that the large merchants and people of high standing who are litigants in the High Court are not also given the same privilege?"

I have never heard an answer to that question. The registrar went on:

"Never, so far as I know, in the history of the High Courts in either England or Ireland have these people been favoured with an appeal by way of rehearing. Their only appeal in the biggest cases tried in England or Ireland has been an appeal on notes, and these were the judge's notes."

Then, he spoke of his experience of certain judges. I pass from that. He was asked what the remedy was if the stenographer's notes were wrong, and he said that that would be obviously a case for a new trial motion. He indicated later another point of view for which there is a great deal to be said. Speaking of appeals generally, he said:

"I respectfully submit that, if I may use a County Monaghan phrase, we are `polluted' with appeals all over Ireland."

He said the reason why there were so few of these appeals in Dublin— he was referring to the evidence of the Registrar of County Dublin—was that the bulk of the litigants in Dublin were intelligent and fairly educated people, whereas, in the country, the appeals were concerned largely with small family feuds, or "title cases," as they are called. He thought that these appeals should not be facilitated. He expressed the view that there should be as free an appeal on questions of fact as, and no freer than, there is in the High Court on questions of fact from the verdict of a jury or the judgment of a judge of first instance in the High Court sitting without a jury. He explained that that really meant no appeal at all on questions of fact. Again, he adverted to the historical reasons for the old form of appeal and he very definitely agreed with what the President of the High Court had said, that there was hurry and rush in connection with the old civil bill appeals, particularly towards the end of the assize period. Some of the witnesses—I think it was this gentleman—adverted also to the fact that it was never possible to quote the decisions on the old civil bill appeals, that they were not regarded as authorities. He alluded to his precis of evidence and said:

"The County Court was merely a trial gallop, a morning canter before the real race, and the real race was at the assizes. That is the way the people looked at it. So long as you give them an easy appeal by way of rehearing at their own doors, no matter how good a judge you give them in the Circuit Court, the people will appeal to that tribunal."

He was asked if he considered it unwise to give a real appeal on fact and he said he thought that cheap appeals were as bad as cheap drink. I am merely quoting from answers to a series of questions, and I am not quoting them in sequence. Mr. Murphy was tackled on all ends of that problem. As to the question that has been raised about the likely decline in the education of practitioners and, eventually, of the bench if you have not judges going on assize, he derided that point of view and gave reasons for his attitude. He tackled this question generally on grounds of principle. There has been no answer to the question I have asked on several occasions: "Why is this appeal on matters of fact required in this country when it is not required in any other country?" If we decide to have it in these small cases —£50 was the limit formerly — why should we not have it in the bigger type of case? When we have enlarged the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to £300 and enlarged the scope of the appeal by way of rehearing to £300, why do we stop there and not give the same rehearing on questions of fact in High Court cases? The whole thing is illogical and the only reason that is given for it is that it was the old system. The researches which the Attorney-General has carried out in departmental records must not have been satisfactory. That report was presented to the last Executive Council early enough. On every point, other than about three, on which the Committee made recommendations, there was almost a unanimous feeling and that feeling was by way of approval. There was the question of increase in the numbers of the Supreme Court and there was the question of Circuit Court appeals On that, there never was a decision taken and the reason why there was no decision taken was that we felt the new system had not got a sufficiently long trial. There was a cleavage of opinion. Some people thought that the new system should be abolished and that we should get back to the old system. Others were impressed by the views of the Chief Justice and the President of the High Court as well as by the views of persons like Mr. Henry Murphy, that the new system had not been given a fair trial. But a decision was never taken by the last Executive Council to reintroduce the former system, and I doubt very much if the present Bill would have been introduced in so far as it deals with the scheme of appeal from the Circuit Court. There never was any decision taken on that and the reason was that there was a definite body of opinion in the Executive Council that the new system had not got a sufficient trial and that there was no argument on principle which should drive people back to the old system. I do not know if there is another view as to the mentality and morality of the people. But we were certainly warned by a number of people that perjury was rife enough in the country and that we were going to increase it if we adopted the recommendations of the Committee. We had that put up to us by a number of people but some people were not impressed and thought that that danger was exaggerated. It seems that there is a desperate temptation to mend the case on the rehearing. We had no definite opinion taken on that. Our view was that the new system had not been sufficiently tried, that it was a good system and that it should be given a further trial. The Government now take this further swerve. The Committee, no matter what they thought, decided in favour of the stenographer's notes, because they were impressed by the evidence. The Government is throwing aside the stenographers and is opening the door still wider to the evil that we have discussed. I cannot speak from experience in this matter, but I said previously on this Bill, and I say now what is the layman's view, and not from a particular study of it, that anything I gathered in conversation makes me still more definitely of opinion that I should like to see the new system tried out for a while longer. I recognise that there are numbers of people keen on a change. I think you can get reasons here and there to pick and choose in different circumstances.

Amendment put and declared lost.
Amendments Nos. 28 and 29 not moved.

I move amendment No. 30:—

In page 9, to delete Section 16 (1) (d) and substitute therefor a new paragraph as follows:—

Assign to the Dublin Circuit from among the judges of the Circuit Court holding office on the appointed day (i) the judge assigned under the Principal Act to the Dublin City and County Court and officiating therein during the year 1934 and (ii) the judge temporarily assigned under sub-section (2) of Section 9 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1928 (No. 15 of 1928), to the Dublin City and County Circuit and officiating therein during the whole of the year 1934.

I should like to get an expression of opinion from the Minister on this matter. I am sure he understands the point of view expressed in the amendment. I want to ensure that judges at present assigned to circuits will not be moved from these circuits, or to areas corresponding with these circuits, without their consent.

I think the Deputy means Dublin, and so far as that is concerned, there is no intention whatever of making any alteration. There is no misunderstanding about it. We cannot tie ourselves down so that we may not alter other circuits. There were originally eight circuits in the country, and later two judges were appointed who were supposed to be movable judges, who would go about the various circuits when arrears had accumulated. In practice it has turned out that the two judges appointed were assigned to particular areas. It is not intended to do so under this section without prior consultation with the judges. We asked them for their views about this matter and nothing will be done without that. There may have to be alterations in the areas. The statistics will show that in some areas there is a certain number of cases, while in other areas there is a smaller number. I suppose it is quite right and perhaps proper to say that some judges may operate faster than others. Whether that accounts for some of the arrears it is not for me to say. The intention is that the areas will have to be altered in some way to try to fit them in, and instead of having eight circuits it is intended to have nine. It is intended that movable judges will be assigned to circuits.

The amendment deals with Dublin, and the answer upon that is clear. On the other hand, I referred to the judges assigned by the Principal Act and I was not thinking of the two later appointments. I think the Minister can give me an assurance on that. I recognise that the circuits are going to be changed so that there should not be any difficulty in framing an amendment to meet the changed circumstances. I ask that a judge should be given this choice, that he will be left in the area which most nearly corresponds with his old circuit if he so desires.

I think that is so. There is no desire otherwise.

The judges were assigned originally to certain areas and were not to be movable hardly under any circumstances.

That will be kept to as far as possible, but there may be changes in the areas.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment No. 31 not moved.
Section 16 agreed to.
Amendments Nos. 32 and 33 not moved.
SECTION 17.
(1) Whenever it appears to the Executive Council that, owing to the temporary absence from duty for any cause of a judge of the Circuit Court, or an unusual and temporary increase in the business of the Circuit Court on any circuit, or any other cause, it is necessary, in order to prevent the work of the Circuit Court getting into arrear either generally or on any particular circuits or circuit, to increase temporarily the number of the judges of the Circuit Court, one or more persons who are practising barristers of at least ten years' standing at the date of appointment may be appointed to act as judge or judges of the Circuit Court for such period as the Executive Council shall think proper in respect of each such person.

I move amendment No. 33 (a):—

In page 10, Section 17 (1), lines 5-6, to delete the words "for any cause" and, in substitution therefor, to insert after the word "Court," line 6, the words "owing to other public duties or services temporarily imposed on him or on account of illness", and in line 8 to delete the words "or any other cause".

This refers to a point that I raised previously.

It seems to be similar to the principle in amendments Nos. 87 and 88. The Deputy might guide the Chair on that.

I suppose this question will arise later. I raised a point already on the section with regard to the Judicial Commissioner of the Land Commission. The point is this, that the Principal Act and amending Acts allowed for the substitution of a temporary judge instead of a permanent appointment, but allowed for such substitution only when the permanently appointed judge was ill, or out of the country, or possibly engaged on some public duties which were imposed upon him, and which it was found necessary that he should take up. The Government have studded through the Bill the words "or any other cause."

Did I not give an undertaking to look into this to see if we could manage to get some suitable wording?

Does that apply to all these cases?

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I move amendment No. 34:—

In page 10, at the end of Section 17, to add a new sub-section as follows:—

Every person appointed under this section to act as a judge of the Circuit Court shall, during the period for which he was appointed hold office by the tenure by which a judge of the Circuit Court holds his office.

I want to get information about the position when persons are appointed temporarily as judges in the Circuit Court. Is it to be understood that they have any tenure or are they appointed for a particular period, or from day to day?

A warrant of appointment is issued by the Executive Council and it sets out that they are only holding the temporary position of Circuit Court judge during the period that the other judge is absent. If he is absent through illness, then, according to the warrant, they only hold until the other judge resumes duty.

Let us take the Circuit Court, and that a person is temporarily appointed to that court for a period. Is it the practice that the appointment then is, so to speak, that of a new Circuit judge, and only limited by time; in other words that the position as regards salary, emoluments and removals, are just the same as if he were a Circuit Court judge?

That is how I understand it.

I tried to get a general phrase to deal with the position. I do not think this phrase is a happy one. I want to say that while a person is in the office he has the same tenure and the same rights as if he were a permanently appointed judge of the Circuit Court; in other words that he cannot be influenced.

The Attorney-General

That is how it is regarded at present.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Sections 17 and 18 agreed to.
Question proposed: "That Section 19 stand part of the Bill."

Is this section for the purpose of enabling arrears that may accumulate in one circuit to be discharged?

That is so.

And the assignment is always subject to the consent of the person concerned?

The Attorney-General

That is in the section.

The reason for bringing forward this section was that we found that judges of certain circuits were available and were quite willing to deal with arrears in the City of Dublin where the business of the Circuit Courts had got into arrears. These judges, however, had no jurisdiction except in the areas to which they had been first assigned. The object of this section is that if we find that there are arrears in Dublin, and that there are judges in other circuits who have disposed of the business in their areas then, if these judges are willing to place their services at our disposal in Dublin, we can assign them to the courts here in order to enable arrears to be wiped out. That also applies to other areas where the same position in regard to arrears arises.

Question put and agreed to.
Section 20 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Question proposed: "That Section 21 stand part of the Bill."

Certain representations were made to us in regard to the matter dealt with in this section and I gave some sort of undertaking that it would be dealt with. It appears that in the last ten years there was only one winding-up case in Cork. You cannot expect officials who are not getting practice in such work to be able to deal with it with the same expedition as it would be dealt with in Dublin. Such work is now being transferred from the Circuit Court.

Question put and agreed to.

I move amendment No. 35:—

In page 11, before Section 22, to insert a new section as follows:—

Paragraph (ii) of Section 48 of the Principal Act is hereby amended by the insertion of the sum of £150 in lieu of the sum of £300 mentioned therein.

This amendment, as appears clearly on its face, aims at reducing the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court from the present figure of £300 to £150. The Attorney-General, in the course of his observations on this stage of the Bill, has repeatedly referred to the fact that he can support his arguments by reference to strong bodies of opinion in favour of the point of view he has put forward. I think there is the strongest possible body of opinion in favour of the amendment I am now putting forward. Certainly I think he would find practically complete unanimity in both branches of the profession for the reduction of the Circuit Court jurisdiction from £300 to £150. While it is possible to make a case on the merits for the reduction of the Circuit Court jurisdiction from £300 to £150, and while the experience of the working of that system also tends to confirm the view that the jurisdiction should be reduced, I think it is unarguable that the system which is now proposed to be reintroduced, the system of rehearing which is embodied in the Bill, will inevitably require that the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court should be reduced from £300 to £150. I am quite convinced and satisfied in my own mind, however much I object to the new system of rehearing, that it will never work unless the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is reduced.

You have the position that experience has shown that the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is rather too high. The evidence given before the Joint Committee was to the effect that the vast majority of cases that came before the Circuit Court were in fact cases involving amounts less than £150, and that there were very few cases coming before the Circuit Court that involved £300. I believe that evidence was given and it satisfied the Committee. In this country an action involving anything over £150, certainly an action involving £200 or £300, is a very substantial action indeed. Across the water there are actions involving bigger sums of money, but here in this country anything involving a claim of £200 or upwards is a very substantial action. The argument that the costs of such an action in the Circuit Court are considerably less than the costs of a similar action in the High Court, is wholly fallacious. If there is an action involving a considerable amount of money, such as an action for £200 or £300 is in this country, it will be found in practice that the litigation of such an action in the Circuit Court, followed by the inevitable appeal, will ultimately result in costing both parties to the suit very much more than if the action had been started in the High Court.

I think if there is any objection to reducing the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court from £300 to £150, that that objection, in so far as it has any substance, can be met by applying a special scale of costs in actions up to £150 or £200 which are determined in the High Court. There can be no possible objection if an appropriate scale of costs is provided in the High Court. As I say, there is a case apart from the provisions of the Bill, for reducing the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. The evidence before the Joint Committee was that the vast majority of the cases heard in the Circuit Court, since the new system was set up, were in fact equivalent to the old £50 civil bill in the county courts, having regard to the fall in the value of money in recent years. When you consider that you are going to have a complete rehearing for cases within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, the argument for the reduction of the jurisdiction, in my submission, is conclusive.

Progress reported; Committee to sit again on Wednesday, 20th November, 1935.
The Dáil adjourned at 10.30 p.m. until Wednesday, 20th November, at 3 p.m.
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