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Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 18 Jun 1936

Vol. 62 No. 18

Committee on Finance. - Vote 67—External Affairs.

I move:

Go ndeontar suim ná raghaidh thar £54,308 chun slánuithe na suime is gá chun íoctha an Mhuirir a thiocfaidh chun bheith iníoctha i rith na bliana dar críoch an 31adh lá de Mhárta, 1937, chun Tuarastail agus Costaisí Oifig an Aire Gnóthaí Coigríche agus Seirbhísí áirithe atá fé riaradh na hOifige sin (Uimh. 16 de 1924).

That a sum not exceeding £54,308 be granted to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1937, for the Salaries and Expenses of the Office of the Minister for External Affairs, and of certain Services administered by that Office (No. 16 of 1924).

The total provision for External Affairs for the year 1936-37 amounts to £81,458, as compared with £85,277 for 1935-36, showing a decrease of £3,819. The receipts for services are estimated at £19,800, leaving the net expenditure for the year 1936-37 £61,658. As the Dáil is aware, the Saorstát maintains, besides the Legation at Washington, four Consular offices in the United States. The cost of these offices during the financial year 1935-36 amounted to 145,000 dollars, that is including the cost of the repayment office for the Dáil Eireann External Loans which amounted to 38,500 dollars. The total receipts for notarial and other services rendered by the Legation and the Consulates in the United States for the 12 months ending March, 1936, amounted approximately to 80,000 dollars. It will, consequently, be seen that the net cost of the Saorstát establishments in the United States for the last financial year was 65,000 dollars, that is including the 38,500 dollars for the expenses of the repayment office. Three-fourths of the normal cost of the Diplomatic and Consular service in the United States was paid out of revenue obtained from fees.

Apart from the Diplomatic and Consular functions performed by the Saorstát offices in the United States, these offices have in the past year, as in previous years, been engaged in assisting Irish nationals, who are entitled to money from deceased relatives in the United States, to obtain such moneys with the least possible cost to the beneficiaries or next-of-kin. During the past year approximately 300,000 dollars has been transmitted to heirs in Ireland as a result of the intervention and assistance of the Saorstát offices. The Dáil is already aware of the activities of the several offices, and as there are larger questions to be dealt with, I do not think it is necessary for me, at this stage at any rate, to enter into further details.

The Nationality and Citizenship Act, passed last year, has imposed a considerable burden on the officers abroad, as the administration of the regulations of the new Act and the keeping of registers have been part of their functions. As Deputies are aware, we have in the Department of External Affairs a special trade section which assists the Department of Industry and Commerce in the negotiation of agreements with foreign States. During the last year we made a further agreement with Germany. Last year there was a similar agreement which reduced the adverse trading ratio, which was, I think, in the neighbourhood of 12 to 1, to 3 to 1. This year we had hoped to bring it down to a £1 per £1 basis, but that has not been found possible, and we concluded an agreement which meant a ratio of 2 to 1. There was, also, during the year the coal-cattle pact. That has been discussed a number of times in the Dáil, and I do not think it is necessary for me to deal with it here. I mention these matters simply to point out that in negotiating these agreements the Department of External Affairs has an important part to play.

During the year also, and not very long ago, Deputies will remember that there was a naval conference in accordance with the provisions of the London Naval Treaty of 1930. The conference took place in London towards the end of last year for the purpose of considering a new treaty for the limitation of naval armaments. The Saorstát was represented at that conference by the High Commissioner in London. At the opening meeting of the conference, the Saorstát delegate made it clear that Saorstát Eireann was participating in it because, by an article of the Treaty of 1930, all the signatories had undertaken to meet in conference before the Treaty of 1930 terminated— that is to say, before December of 1936. The Saorstát Government had made it clear that, in their view, the conference on naval limitations should be confined to naval powers, and that as Saorstát Eireann had no navy and was not working on a naval programme, there was no reason for its participation in the conference other than for the reasons stated. As the House is aware, the conference resulted in the conclusion of certain agreements which dealt with the limitation of the size of ships, the calibre of guns carried on ships of war, and so on. Saorstát Eireann is not a party to any of these agreements. The Government felt, as I have already stated, that, not being a naval power, there would be no meaning in their entering into an agreement which could have no practical application to this country.

Some Deputies may think that this would come more appropriately under the League of Nations Vote, but as I have suggested—if there is no objection —it would be as well, I think, to take all aspects of our foreign policy together. My doing so will not, of course, preclude any Deputy who wishes to raise the matter in any form on the Vote immediately dealing with the League of Nations.

We object to the Minister for External Affairs dealing with League of Nations affairs on this Vote and not reserving League of Nations matters for the League of Nations Estimate.

I suggest that the Deputy has no basis for his objection. The matter that I am dealing with relates to the work done by the Department of External Affairs. Our attitude in regard to that matter, and our policy towards other Powers and other States cannot, I think, justly be excluded at this stage.

I presume that Deputy Dillon meant to raise a point of order.

It seems to the Chair that the League of Nations, and our attitude towards it, is a matter that does come under the Department of External Affairs. The President has already told the Deputy that he will not be precluded from dealing with this matter when that particular Vote comes on.

As a matter of fact, these Estimates have been brought forward at this stage because I understood that Deputies were anxious for an early opportunity to discuss in the Dáil the Vote for External Affairs and the Vote for the League of Nations. For that reason I am giving Deputies the earliest opportunity I can to discuss these matters. It may be no harm if I remind Deputies of what actually occurred. It will be remembered that for a considerable period attempts were being made to settle, by conciliation, the dispute between Italy and Ethiopia. The matter was mainly at that stage with the Council of the League. We are not members of the Council of the League, and, therefore, had no special part to play in dealing with that problem until September. In September we made our position clear: that it seemed to us that an aggression had taken place, that there was no doubt in our minds that the Covenant had been broken, and that we were prepared to abide by the Covenant and to do the things which the Covenant clearly indicated that we should do. That also was the opinion of 51 or 52 other States. There was no definite machinery in the League for co-ordinating or controlling the action which individual Governments were bound to take under the Covenant once they were satisfied an aggression had taken place. A co-ordinating Committee was, accordingly, set up in which all the States that held the view that Italy had committed an aggression were represented, and a small sub-Committee was formed to prepare plans and put forward suggestions.

Common action in regard to certain matters was agreed upon. We did our duty in the matter by bringing in here a Bill which enabled sanctions to be imposed as far as this country was concerned. I do not think there is any need for me to go back and indicate what the attitude of the Government was in that dispute. As I said at the time, the matter to us was a very simple one. There was the question of whether the obligations of the Covenant had or had not been broken. Having satisfied ourselves that the obligations were broken by a certain State, the consequences followed automatically. There was no question at that time as to whether we should or should not have become members of the League. That is a totally separate question, a question which, as I pointed out at the time, was one that could be appropriately discussed at this particular stage, but it certainly would not be appropriate to discuss it in the particular connection of the Sanctions Bill.

I notice that there is a motion on the Order Paper in connection with the League of Nations Estimate. With regard to the League of Nations and to our policy in it, I do not know if the Chair would agree if it would be appropriate at this stage to discuss the question as to whether or not we should withdraw from the League. At any rate, as far as I am concerned, and as far as the Government is concerned, our attitude in regard to this particular dispute is very clear. We are satisfied that this aggression occurred, and we see to-day that Italy has been successful in getting military supremacy in Ethiopia. I think it is equally clear that the sanctions policy of the League of Nations has failed to do what was expected of it by the founders of the League.

What we are to do in regard to the future then becomes a question of very great importance. As far as we are concerned we are satisfied that the League, as it was, cannot any longer command the confidence of the ordinary people in the world. It does not command our confidence. Therefore, the League of Nations, unless it is reformed, is not of advantage to us and I do not think it would be, in its present form, of advantage to humanity in general. There were very serious obligations involved in membership of the League of Nations. If there was no doubt whatever that we would be put in positions of risk without the feeling that what we hoped to gain from the League would be secured, then I think it would be madness to continue to remain a member of it. But the probability is that the League will be changed. I think what I am saying is the feeling of most people, would be the feeling of most Governments, that the League of Nations must be fundamentally changed.

The League in the past set itself an objective which clearly is not attainable in present circumstances. In my view, and it is the view I would urge upon the Government as Minister for External Affairs if the matter had to be immediately settled, the League in future will have to set itself an humbler task, and the question of compelling other States to maintain their obligations will have to be abandoned. It is quite clear that economic sanctions alone are not sufficient, and that if we are to have effective action we must go beyond the range of mere economic sanctions and consider whether military sanctions are necessary. Anybody looking at the course of the conflict that has taken place in Ethiopia must be satisfied that, if the States really wanted to maintain the independence and integrity of Ethiopia, they should have been ready at certain stages to face the possibility of military action. It might not be military action in the first instance, but it would eventually involve military action.

Before I leave that point, perhaps I should say that I do not think nations are ready for that yet. War to prevent war is a peculiar position, and there is no doubt that, in order effectively to stop the last war, the States would have had to be ready to face even a more extended war than the war in question. You saw that there was hesitation with regard to the sanctions that would be most effective. You saw that, with regard to oil sanctions, for instance, the States were very chary about proceeding along these lines, because they were told that to do so would involve war. It is clear that if there were oil sanctions it might have involved war, and if you are not going to meet a challenge of that sort, then you had better not make these threats or proceed along that line. It is obvious that if the powers were really serious and were prepared to take definite measures, the closing of the Suez Canal would have been resorted to as one measure. Consequently, it was obvious the League of Nations was taking half measures which could not in the ultimate fail to be ineffective.

The question is, are we prepared to say that the League should be reformed in the direction of imposing military sanctions, if necessary? I do not think that our people would be prepared for that, and I do not think the people of any other country would be prepared either. Therefore, the only practical line, it seems to me, to go upon if the League is to be reformed, is on the line of using the League in other directions, using it as a forum for the consideration of such question as might otherwise lead, to war, using it as a conciliatory machine, perhaps on occasion as an arbitration machine. But I certainly cannot see any Government here that would come to the Dáil and say that we would, in our present circumstances, be prepared to enter into obligations which might necessitate our sending out expeditionary forces in order to prevent aggression somewhere else.

We are not in a position to do that and I do not think the people in other countries are prepared to do it either. Certain countries with special interests abroad may be prepared for that because, in the main, their interests would best be served by it; but I do not think that the small nations are prepared for it or should be prepared for it; certainly, our nation is not prepared for it. Consequently, if this matter comes up for consideration, our position will have to be made clear. If we are to remain members of the League our position will have to be considered in the light of whether we feel it would be in the interests of our country to belong to the League.

The question of the present position in regard to sanctions naturally comes up for consideration. In that matter, too, I think the position is clear enough. It would be foolish not to take cognisance of the facts of the situation. If there was any possibility of sanctions being able to perform the task that remains, if they are to be continued, then there is no doubt they should have been able to perform the easier task which was set them before, and if nations were not prepared to run the risk of war in the situation that existed up to the present, I do not think there is any likelihood of their being prepared to run the same risk in regard to the situation we have to face now. We have to remember that we cannot deal with this question without meeting the other States that have agreed to a co-ordinating committee, but our attitude in any meeting of the sort would be that the League of Nations' policy up to the present has failed and that the League must be reformed. As regards sanctions, it is quite clear they have failed and that the continuance of them would serve no good purpose. These, I take it, are the principal matters on which Deputies wished for an expression of opinion from the Government.

With regard to the position in Europe in general, Deputies know as well as I do that that position is more tense, and that there are greater possibilities of war in it than at any time since the conclusion of the World War. Naturally, when you see all the smaller States spending large sums of money providing for their defences, looking to their defences, it provides food for thought. Some of them in the past relied, as events have now shown, altogether too much on the strength of the League of Nations. Turning back once more to the position of Ethiopia, I have no doubt Ethiopia suffered severely through the fact that it was a member of the League, that it expected certain results and did not get them.

What about the sanctions against Ireland?

I am talking of external affairs for the moment, and if the Deputy will wait and ask that question later, it would be more appropriate. The Deputy has plenty of time to ask the question.

We are observing those twists too long.

With regard to the position generally, the small States in Europe have begun to provide for their own defences. In the case of Ethiopia, there is no doubt that its association with the League of Nations instead of helping, hindered it. In the early stages when it became apparent that Ethiopia was about to be attacked, she had scarcely any defences to rely on and there was dangled before the faces of those responsible the hope that the League of Nations would assist. If her will had not been paralysed by the idea that if she took action early the case against Italy might not be so clear and they might not get such help as they expected, I think Ethiopia at any rate would not have waited until the last moment to try to defend herself pro- perly. So it is with the small States. The fate of Ethiopia has warned them of the danger in which they are, and most of them are doing their utmost to make good their defences.

That naturally brings us to the position at home. Any Government at the present time would have seriously to consider the question of the defences of the country. Our position is particularly complicated. If we held the whole of our territory, there is no doubt whatever that our attitude would be that which is the attitude, I think, of practically every Irishman, and that is that we have no aggressive designs against any other people. We would strengthen ourselves so as to maintain our neutrality. We would strengthen ourselves so that we might resist any attempt to make use of our territory for attack upon any other nation. I think that the average person in this country wants to make war on nobody. We have no aggressive designs. We want to have our own country for ourselves, as I have said on more than one occasion, and that is the limit of our ambition; we have no imperial ambitions of any sort. But we are in this position, that some of our ports are occupied, and, although we cannot be actively committed in any way, the occupation of those ports will give to any foreign country that may desire a pretext an opportunity of ignoring our neutrality. Our population in the neighbourhood of those ports are in a position in which, through no fault of theirs and through no fault of the rest of the people, they may become sufferers through retaliation of this kind as a result of the occupation of those ports.

The first thing that any Government here must try to secure is that no part of our territory will be occupied by any forces except the forces that are immediately responsible to the Government here. I have tried to indicate on many occasions that that is our desire, and that it would work out to the advantage of Britain as well as to our own advantage. I think Britain, or at any rate the average person in Britain, wants to feel that they are not going to be attacked through foreign States that might attempt to use this country as a base. We are prepared, and any Government with which I have been associated has always been prepared, to give guarantees, so far as guarantees can be given, that that will not happen. We are prepared to meet the necessary expense, and to make the necessary provision to see that the full strength of this nation will be used to resist any attempt by any foreign power to abuse our neutrality by using any portion of our territory as a base. If that situation were realised, then of course the Government here would have a definite task. All the uncertain elements of the present situation would disappear. We would know what to expect; in the main, we would know what to provide against. But in the present uncertain position it is very difficult to have any adequate scheme of defence, or to take any adequate measures which would safeguard us against the risks which we have got to face, now that our territory is within reaching distance of aeroplanes from the continent, and that we are liable, on account of the occupation of certain parts of our territory, to attack by any enemy of Great Britain.

As I have said, the whole position in Europe is one of uncertainty, and one of menace. We want to be neutral. We are prepared to play a reasonable part in the maintenance of peace. Unfortunately, as I said on previous occasions here, we are not a great power. We have a certain amount of moral influence, and we try to exert that in favour of peace, but when we think of the Kellogg pact and all the other indications of goodwill, if I might put it that way, that have been given in the past, we see how hopeless and how useless all those things become when one State is satisfied that it is to its advantage that those obligations and the policy embodied in them should be set aside. I think, therefore, that the Department of External Affairs, instead of having its value minimised in the present conditions, has its value enhanced. It is a most important Department, and we should try to extend its functions rather than diminish them. Consequently, I think the House will have no hesitation in passing this Vote.

On behalf of Deputy McGilligan, I propose that this Vote be referred back. It is not my intention to follow the President over the ground which he saw fit to travel in connection with the situation which has arisen at the League of Nations, and the general question of collective security, because I believe that that question will more properly arise on a motion standing in the name of Deputy McGilligan, which will come up for discussion hereafter. It is a source of astonishment to me that, when the Minister for External Affairs for Saorstát Eireann introduces his Estimate here, he careers over the whole Continents of Europe and Africa but manages to refrain altogether from any reference to the external affairs of this country, in so far as they are affected by the dispute which is proceeding between us and Great Britain at the present time. I suppose if you took the population of this country in groups of 1,000, it would be found that 999.9 out of every 1,000 people are interested in the future relations between this country and Great Britain. Only .001 would be interested in our reactions to the development in Northern Africa.

It is a peculiar commentary on the proceedings of this House that the Vote for the Department of External Affairs should be introduced by the President of the Executive Council and Minister for External Affairs without one word being said as to the future prospects of the relations that exist between this country and Great Britain, except the usual talk about the ports. However, I assume that the President is following the usual technique. He desires to reserve any observation he has to make on that question for his speech at the conclusion, because his extraordinarily fragile flank in that matter must never be exposed to informed criticism. Every one must criticise him first for what they can best imagine his present position may be, and then he enjoys the delicious experience of getting up and saying that all the criticism was irrelevant because he has changed his position since he last stated it. I think the President ought to tell us immediately whether he has had any further discussions with Great Britain with a view to ending the absurd position into which he has managed to manoeuvre us, and, if he has not, whether he contemplates undertaking any discussions for making an end of a situation which is now no longer founded on principle and which seems to have no substantial cause for its continued existence.

When we embarked upon the economic conflict with Great Britain, we were told that we did so for the express purpose of retaining in this country certain moneys. A second stage was reached when the President told us that he admitted that we had not succeeded in retaining the moneys but that we remained in the moral position of being able to say that, while we admit that the money is going out of the country, it is not being sent out of the country, but is being taken. For that delicate distinction the President said it was necessary to continue suffering what he recognised to be very great hardships—overwhelming losses —but that it was worth that suffering so as to be in a position to say: "Still, they are taking it; we are not giving it." Well, it would require a mind like the President's to inflict the suffering our people have endured in order to enjoy that high moral position. However, the President is the President of the Executive Council of this country. He managed to work himself into that state of mind, and, so long as he remained in that state of mind, his position was, at least, understandable, much as one might condemn it. Then, however, we came to the third stage in which the President said: "Now I am going to Great Britain and I am going to enter into a discussion with them as to what is the most expeditious method of sending this money to England." In effect, his proposition was that heretofore we had sent the money in the form of high tariffs on a diminishing number of cattle and that now we ask leave to send it in the form of low tariffs on a larger number of cattle. In other words, heretofore the tendency of the Irish people, as a result of the situation, was to produce less and pay more, but now they would be willing to work hard and produce more in order that the burden on each particular cow's horn will be a little lighter than it was heretofore.

Now, once that position is taken up by the President as a result of which, on two successive occasions, his representatives go to London for the purpose of devising a plan for the despatch of the land annuities to Great Britain in the shape of tariffs on livestock, what conceivable reason can there be for his refusing to send the land annuities—since he now admits that they are going there—in the least inconvenient way for our people that they can be sent? If the President is determined not to negotiate on the question and to allow the whole sum to go and if he is determined to enter into arrangements as to the method by which it is to be sent, surely the most convenient way is to send it by cheque. As I have suggested to the Minister, he can send a note of protest with each cheque. He can send the money in 12 monthly instalments, and that would mean twelve diplomatic notes of protest each year, which would mean, as things are at present evidently, in perpetuity, and that would have the effect of improving enormously the circumstances of our people.

If the presidential mind is to remain in its present state, I say that it would be infinitely better to write a cheque for the land annuities and send it over to Great Britain in an envelope than to continue with the present arrangement. I do not believe, however, that that is the real alternative that lies before any person occupying the position of the Minister for External Affairs, because I am satisfied that if he would go now and enter into a discussion with Great Britain with a view to settling by negotiation the difference that has arisen between the Government of this country and the Government of Great Britain, an arrangement could be arrived at whereunder the land annuities dispute might be settled for a sum substantially less than that which is at present being paid. There is no reason on earth why negotiations to that end should not be set on foot to-morrow morning and carried to a successful conclusion except that President de Valera cannot bring himself to admit that, in embroiling the people of this country in that dispute, he made a tactical mistake which now requires amending.

I and any other Deputy of this House who lives in rural Ireland feel particularly keenly in regard to this matter, because under our eyes are brought continually the reactions upon our own neighbours of this insane policy for which the President stands. We see, admittedly, a certain measure of freedom of money and comparative prosperity in the City of Dublin, and possibly in the City of Cork and elsewhere, and we see among our own neighbours in the country a falling standard of living and a widespread measure of poverty such as was not known in this country since the time of the Land War. I know that there are a number of people in this country living in Dublin and in the urban centres who cannot bring themselves to believe that. I have heard as disinterested a Deputy as Deputy Moore— and I do not speak ironically when I refer to him as disinterested—say that, as far as he could see, everybody was better off than they ever were before.

I know it is quite conceivable that persons living in certain circumstances might get that impression. I remember speaking to a distinguished economist who was in Australia just prior to the complete collapse of Australian finance which resulted in the bankruptcy of the rural population of that great country, and he told me himself that, when the farmers of that country were hungry and showing every sign of the collapse into bankruptcy that afterwards happened, there were abundant evidences of prosperity and business and the circulation of money in Adelaide, Sydney, Melbourne, Perth, and all the great cities of Australia.

It was impossible to drive home to dwellers in these cities the conditions that were obtaining throughout the rural parts of Australia. It was only when economic disaster came on the country, as a whole, that urban dwellers realised the folly into which they had allowed themselves to be led, which left on their hands a rural population that had to be maintained with a reasonable standard of comfort, if the urban population were to survive. There they were engaged in an economic experiment. They were misled into economic folly, something like what is rearing its head in this country. At least they were engaged in an economic experiment, and they believed that in due course it would provide something permanent for the country's benefit as a whole. Here we are actively engaged in destroying the agricultural community, nominally because President de Valera says that certain agreements that were endorsed again and again in this House, that were open to this House repeatedly and that were common knowledge to this House, are secret agreements, and because he says "we do not owe the money but will pay it," we are sending it in the most inconvenient way, to use his own words, in which it could be sent, and we are torturing ourselves in the process of paying, so that we may stand before the world and say, "while we continue to pay moneys that we do not believe we owe, at least we have the decency to pay them," but in such a manner as to inflict the greatest possible suffering upon ourselves so that we may continually remember every hour of our lives that we sent something out of the country that we did not owe.

The President never has alleged, as far as I am aware, that the British Government in this matter is acting mala fides. He never suggested that the British Government at any time thought that they were doing something dishonest in entering into an agreement with the Government of Saorstát Eireann. They were entered into during the period that Deputy Cosgrave's Government was in office. The President has sometimes covertly suggested that Deputy Cosgrave, who was then President of the Executive Council, acted surreptitiously and dishonourably. When challenged to say that expressly, he has always sidestepped, prudently I think, but he has never, as far as I am aware, alleged that the British Government suppressed anything or gave any reason to anyone to imagine that they were acting male fides at any time. Therefore, we have this position, that the Government of this country, which was elected by the people, takes up the position that they are not liable to pay the bond holders under the Land Acts. The British Government say that they are not liable to pay the bonds. Both Governments are agreed that somebody must pay the bonds. Under these circumstances, both Governments admit that wherever the liability lies it is somewhere between them. Surely the sensible thing, instead of continuing the economic war, which is damaging Great Britain and damaging this country infinitely more, is to meet and to try to come to a conclusion by compromise because the whole history of international relations teaches the lesson that hard bargains are bad bargains and that the sensible thing is to share the burden in whatever way will be equitable, considering the circumstances of the two countries concerned, and considering the potentialities of the two countries, one to the other in time to come. We have had every indication from the other side that the British Government is anxious for a settlement of disputes on matters outstanding on these terms. We have loud protests from the President of the Executive Council that he is most anxious to settle, yet we have the absurd situation of the two Governments standing at different sides of the fence, clamouring to one another to come forward and shake hands, but neither will do so. In the meantime the farmers of this country have to carry the baby. It amazes me that the President did not deal with the situation when introducing the Vote, and I have no doubt we will have a long and turgid oration at the end of the debate, and that Irish nationality will be trotted out, or Caitlin Ni Houlihan will be talked of, and the Republic may get a word.

And the tricolour, the flag under which you would not stand.

I have no doubt Deputy Kehoe will intervene to say a word on that. I think it would be franker and more helpful for the President if he did not make Caitlín Nì Houlihan and the Republic responsible for airing before the House views that they do not deserve, because at the conclusion there will be no one in order in answering him. There are certain points arising on the administrative side of the Vote which, I think, he might have, with advantage, elaborated. The Minister referred to the facilities placed at the disposal of nationals in this country by our consuls in America for the collection of bequests and matters of that kind. I should be glad if the President would let us know if there is a schedule of fees which nationals in this country are called upon to pay for services rendered, and whether he can devise any method of attracting the attention of the people, particularly those in the rural areas, to the facilities available at present of a consular character which were not available heretofore. As the President is aware, many people in this country have claims for bequests in America, and they often find themselves delivered into the hands of unreliable attorneys and have suffered material loss as a result. Others, of course, have dealt with reliable and honourable attorneys in the United States and got what they were entitled to. I believe it would be of material assistance if the facilities available at the consular offices were made known to people at large, and perhaps the assistance of the Incorporated Law Society might be invoked, as to whether they would be prepared to co-operate in connection with consular matters. That is something upon which I am not prepared to express an opinion, as to whether they would place some kind of professional obligation upon themselves when communicating with professional brethren in the United States. I imagine that if consular facilities were directly brought under the notice of solicitors throughout rural Ireland, and if solicitors were willing to recommend their clients to avail of them, it would be of a very great importance all round.

Now we come to the trade agreements made, and the President disengenuously referred to the German Trade Agreement by saying that we had reduced the trade balance there from three to one to two to one. He did not state the nature of the merchandise which we shipped to Germany during the first trade agreement. Would I be far wrong if I said that as a result of our first trade agreement with Germany we proceeded to pay the land annuities not only to Great Britain but to Germany as well? Can he congratulate himself upon establishing a three to one basis of trade with Germany, when one of the provisos was that in addition to selling cattle there we are paying a share of the land annuities to the Reich? I remember that when Germany was purchasing cattle at 19/- or 20/- per cwt. here the world price was 39/- per cwt. Having bought these cattle in Dublin for 19/- the Germans got cheques for round about £10,000 every month for cattle shipped from the North Wall. In fact, I believe in regard to some cattle sold to Germany it would be cheaper to slaughter them and to dump the carcases into the Irish Sea. We are not to congratulate ourselves in succeeding in persuading the German Government to buy from us if we have to buy from them £3 worth of merchandise for every £1 worth that they buy from this country. They buy our cattle at half or less than half their market value, and then they accept with our compliments fat cheques to facilitate them in carrying them away. As far as I am concerned, I want to make this clear, that if that is the best agreement we can get with Germany, we should not have any agreement, and if that is the best in buyers that we can get from Germany, I wish to God they would stay away, because the more often they come the more damage they will do and the less they will pay. It is well to speak bluntly in regard to this matter.

If the President would come here and say that on the basis of a three to one agreement he had succeeded in reopening the German market for herring, then he might reasonably ask the House to endorse the terms of the agreement because, admittedly, salt herring is an export for which we have lost all the markets we had. We were at one time in a position to send herring to the United States, to Russia and to Germany, and I think we should have reflected very carefully before negotiating a trade agreement on the basis of three to one without salt herring constituting a part of it. If salt herring were a product of a wealthy corporation or a rich trading union it might not be of such concern, but, when face to face with the fact that salt herring was the means of livelihood of a large number of our people along the Western seaboard, who have no other means of livelihood and whose alternative was to go on the dole or to emigrate to Scotland, then I think the social advantage to be derived from maintaining that trade in existence was well worth a substantial economic concession, either to Germany or to the United States of America. I have asked the Minister for Agriculture on a previous occasion as to what steps he proposes to take to secure trade agreements that would assist us to dispose of those herring which the Germans will not take from us now, and I want to ask the Minister for External Affairs now, whether, in view of his failure to compel the German Reich to accept part of our shipments to that country as herring, he would open negotiations with the British Government to exchange with it for some economic concession a share of the export quota which they have got for the German market in salt herring?

That does not seem to be so unreasonable when one realises that the German market has consistently stipulated for Donegal matje herring, because of its peculiar quality; and at the present time that class of herring is actually being brought from the Donegal coast, where it is landed by British trawlers, into the territory of Northern Ireland, and there cured and shipped to Germany on British export quotas. That procedure deprives our fishing population of the employment they got in catching and landing the herring in our ports, because it is now all done by British trawlers, and, what is more important, it also deprives of their livelihood the large resident population of fish curers who live and work around the ports of Saorstát Eireann, and who have now to go into Derry and try to get work if they can there, and to spend a substantial part of their wages on keeping themselves and paying lodgings, or, if they cannot get work in Derry, to go to Scotland and try to get migratory labour of one kind or another there.

I believe that a trade agreement with Germany which does not provide for the acceptance by Germany of some commodities of that character which are difficult to dispose of elsewhere is perfectly useless; but I think it reflects greatly on the Government that they have consented to deal with the German Reich on the basis of two to one, when we are prepared to take from Germany commodities which we could buy very much more conveniently elsewhere, and they take nothing from us but horses, cattle and agricultural produce at their own price—an artificial price which has been artificially fixed for them in this country, and which results in their being able to cart that stuff from this country to Germany and have it there as cheap as they could buy it from practically any other nation in the world.

The President referred briefly to his German trade agreement. It was a source of some surprise to me that he did not dwell a little more triumphantly on the Spanish trade agreement, which I feel sure he regards as a feather in his cap, the famous agreement which provided for oranges and eggs. The more I learn about that agreement, the less savoury it becomes. I had occasion to direct the attention of the House frequently to the fact that the result of that trade agreement has been that, while import quota licences were issued to about 150 fruit importers in this country, the terms upon which they were issued resulted in granting a virtual monopoly of orange imports to one firm or two firms. These firms are now in a position to demand that every other fruit importer will take from their consignment so much oranges as their import quota provides. What the price arrangement between these importers is, I do not know, but the net result of the whole transaction has been that the quality of oranges available here from Spain as compared with the quality of oranges which heretofore were available from Palestine, during the season when Palestine oranges were available in this country, shows an enormous deterioration, and we are now obliged to eat bad oranges, pay more for them and what do we get in return? We get in return a market for eggs in Spain, on every case of which we have to pay an export bounty, so that we have now undertaken not only to pay the land annuities to Germany, but we have determined to deliver a share of the land annuities to Spain.

All the oranges we buy from Spain must be paid for in cash, and are paid for in cash. The eggs we ship to Spain are paid for by the Spanish importers, but, strangely enough, the payment for our eggs is not made to our shippers, but to the Spanish Government who undertake, if and when convenient, to forward the currency to this country. While we are paying cash for oranges, the Spanish Government is remitting to us the money due for the eggs, sometimes three months, sometimes six months and sometimes nine months, after the eggs are delivered. I do not know what the President thinks of a trade agreement founded on terms like that. I do not know if the President feels with me that a trade agreement which results in a virtual monopoly for individual firms is not a good trade agreement. I do not know whether the President thinks that trade agreements which are founded on a basis that we have to pay a bounty on exports of which we could readily dispose in the British market but for the economic war, at a good price without any bounty at all, is a good trade agreement, but I do not think it is. I think that if that is the best trade agreement the Minister for External Affairs can report to us as a result of his European activities, the sooner he sheds the responsibility of Minister for External Affairs the better it will be for himself and for everybody else.

I want to ask the President of the Executive Council a question to which I think we are entitled to an answer. The President has referred at some length to the agony of mind which he is suffering as a result of the occupation of our ports and there were murmurs of approbation from the Fianna Fáil Benches. I want to ask the President now if, in the future, some European power determines that it is expedient for the purpose of acquiring territorial concessions in this country to attack this country with naval forces, does the President contemplate building up a naval force adequate to protect our coast? That is one question. Secondly, suppose a naval power in Europe does proceed to attack our ports and any of the nations associated with us in the Commonwealth of Nations defends our coasts from that attack, will the President request that nation to desist from repelling the threat to our territory? I think we ought to know. I do not think we should allow ourselves to be induced to accept the position of the ostrich in regard to that matter.

Nothing to my mind is more disgusting than the attitude of the person who is willing to wound but is afraid to strike, the person who is swaggering around announcing that he does not want any association with anybody else, who wants to stand on his own legs, but the moment that dark clouds gather on the horizon, runs like a redshank to sue for protection. I think the President should state quite clearly what is his view on that matter. If it is that he believes that the circumstances in which the British at present occupy the ports are inconsistent with the national dignity, I have not the slightest doubt in my mind that negotiations with the British with a view to altering that status can be successfully concluded. If he means that he declines to afford Great Britain any accommodation whatever to facilitate the naval defence of her own territory and of this country, in the event of a threat from another naval power, then I think he should tell us what plans he himself has to provide the adequate defence which, he said, he recognised it was the duty of any country to establish in the absence of comprehensive and effective guarantees forthcoming from some arrangement of association with our neighbours. I think our position is perfectly clear. We recognise and value the terms of association provided for in the British Commonwealth of Nations. We do not believe that, in the event of an attack being made on one member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, the other members thereof would stand by and allow that attack to be carried to a successful conclusion. We recognise, as I think all sensible men must, that, from a tactical point of view, this country and Great Britain are closely associated, and that a landing by an enemy of this country, or of Great Britain, on the soil of Ireland would not only jeopardise our independence but would materially endanger the safety of Great Britain itself.

I believe that, in the event of an attempt being made by a Continental power to overwhelm this country by an assault based on a naval invasion, we would be absolutely powerless to defend ourselves if we had not a guarantee of assistance from Great Britain. I do not believe there is any use closing our eyes to that fact. I believe that Great Britain has no desire to avail of that position in order to put this country at a disadvantage under existing circumstances. I agree that it is good business and sound statesmanship to consult with Great Britain, as we at present do, in regard to matters of defence and to go as far as we can, consistent with the best interest of our people and the national dignity, to facilitate the perfection of such measures of defence as are now, and would for ever be, necessary until such time as universal peace is assured. If the President feels that the existing arrangement, whereunder Great Britain has certain accommodation in two ports in this country, is inconsistent with anything which he conceives to be necessary for the maintenance of national sovereignty or independence, then I think it devolves on him to say what there is in that arrangement which he thinks offensive, and what alternative arrangement he would propose for the adequate naval defence of the two countries. What alternative proposal would be acceptable to the Government of this country if the existing arrangement is a source of irritation, annoyance and increasing ill-will between the two Governments?

I do strenuously object to an annual repetition of the lamentations about our ports and about the awful misery we are enduring in regard to our ports. Nobody in this country gives two hoots about the ports. Ninety-five per cent. of the people know nothing about what ports are occupied. If the President would call his own Party together and ask them: "Can you tell me where are the two ports in this country which are occupied by Britain——"

A Deputy

There are three.

There are three, I am told. I did not know there were three. I venture to say that not 10 per cent. of the President's own Party could tell him where these three ports are and, so far as the people at large are concerned, not 1 per cent. of the people could tell him. I know where two are, but where the third is I have not the faintest idea, and I do not care. They have not cost the people of this country the slightest inconvenience. They have not diminished the international status of this country in the slightest degree. I have not the slightest doubt that if there is anything the matter with the arrangement on which that settlement is founded, whatever is offensive in it can be removed without the slightest trouble, provided a rational proposal is substituted for it by the President of the Executive Council. But there is nothing more unreasonable than to stand wringing your hands, lamenting about the awful thing that has been done here when nobody can extract from the lamentation what it is you want to do.

We are all familiar with the spectacle of the exasperating infant who stands in the middle of the floor bawling and who, when you go and ask him what he wants, will not tell you but simply goes on bawling until eventually somebody loses his temper. Can it be that the President, having observed in the course of his life the extraordinarily exasperating effect of the bawling infant and the invariable discomfiture of those who are brought in contact with him, has decided to take example this time, not from Machiavelli, but from the bawling infant, and that he is determined to go on bawling? He will emerge eventually, no doubt, as an individual who has been cruelly wronged, wickedly misunderstood and brutally ill-treated, but notwithstanding all that, he will say that he bears nobody ill-will, that he is anxious to extend the hand of friendship, asking us only to realise that he has been wickedly and brutally ill-treated. I think that the President's attitude in much of our external affairs is founded on the desire to start a row and, having started the row, to keep the pot boiling as long as he possibly can—on the ground that it is good for the national spirit. I urge on him strongly that the best contribution he could make to the welfare of this country would be to alter the orientation of our foreign affairs policy and to try to realise that what the country wants is a chance of peace, a chance to live on good terms with our neighbours, internal and external.

I remember once saying that I was glad to see the President elected as President of the Executive Council in this country, and would be glad to support him in that position so long as his policy led this country neither to war internal nor external. He was not six months in office until he had war on both fronts and he has kept it going ever since. He likes it. He is the national hero, the great white chief always facing John Bull. Some day the President will have to settle down to the everyday affairs of life, and to run this country with no war but maintaining himself as the romantic figure fighting for Ireland's rights. I wonder will he enjoy that or will he assume that his romantic purpose was greater. I tell him this, as a plain individual trying to earn his living, that, admirable as the President looks in his romantic moments, he would be a much easier person to live with if he simply settled down.

I want to take the earliest opportunity of making a few observations on the President's statement of policy with regard to the League of Nations. But first I am in a position to give some little hope, and some little cheer, to Deputy Dillon with regard to the economic dispute between this country and Great Britain. Deputy Dillon cannot have paid as much attention as he ought to the utterances of our more important statesmen, or he would have seen in this morning's Irish Press a declaration by Deputy Cooney that, in the event of Fianna Fáil's success in the Dublin Municipal Elections, an immediate and successful settlement of the economic war was assured.

They will send their dredger to sweep the seas.

Deputy Dillon may, of course, have a little difficulty in reconciling that statement with previous assurances by the Minister for Industry and Commerce, and by the leading articles in the Irish Press itself, that we had long ago won the economic dispute. That is a difficulty out of which I am afraid I cannot help him.

I also want to say a few words to supplement what Deputy Dillon said with regard to the question of the occupation of our ports. The President has said that our peace is threatened by that occupation. I suggest to him that our peace would be worse threatened were it not for that occupation. If any nation, at war with Great Britain, feels able to strike Great Britain through the Free State, it will undoubtedly do it in the absence of British precautions at our ports even more readily than it would do it in present circumstances. As for neutrality, so far as the President of the Executive Council is what he is, a Minister of the Crown, so far as we form part of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and subjects of the King, and the King is an integral part of our Constitution, so long is it impossible for us legally to be neutral in case of a war in which the other parts of the British Empire are concerned. We are under no obligation, any more than South Africa or Australia, to take an active part in such a war; but we are in the position that any nation at war with Great Britain could determine to treat us not as neutrals but as an enemy if it suited that nation to do so. I am sure the President realises enough about international affairs to know very well that it is not his protests, or his philosophy, about what the real status and position is, that will count with a nation at war with Great Britain, and that the only thing that will count with such a nation is whether, in fact, they can hurt Great Britain by invading Ireland or not. If they can they will invade Ireland if it is made easy for them to do so. It is obvious that it will be more easy for them to do so if British protection is removed altogether from our coasts as the President wishes, or pretends to wish.

As regards the remarks of the President about the League of Nations, with a great deal of what he said I agree. The action that we took last year in common with 50 or more other nations was the inescapable result of the obligations that we had undertaken by our membership of the League. Whatever may be our view now as to the extent to which that action has resulted in fiasco, and as to the futility of economic sanctions and otherwise, we have nothing to repent or apologise for. We took the only line that a country with any sense of honour could take. The position now, of course, is profoundly modified. Abyssinian independence is destroyed, and I, for one, am sceptical of the possibility of restoring that independence by any economic sanctions that could be devised, even given the maximum of goodwill on the part of the members of the League.

It is not a necessary consequence of that view that economic sanctions should at once cease, so far as Italy is concerned. Our abhorrence of Italy's action in regard to Abyssinia, of her breach of half a dozen solemn treaties and of her act of aggression, might be appropriately marked by continuing the economic boycott, which is what economic sanctions are, and continuing that boycott for such a period of time as to make plain that we had no notion of condoning or justifying or excusing Italy's deed. But that is a very difficult and doubtful question. I think that on the whole we must expect that the great majority will be in favour of stopping the economic boycott of Italy in the near future if the view is taken, as I think it will be taken, that the task of restoring Abyssinian independence by economic measures is a hopeless one.

But there is another consequence that the President seems to think flows from what has occurred; and that is that the whole effort to enforce international law, to enforce international justice, and to enforce international peace by international penalties, should be given up. I do not believe that the consequence does flow at all from what has occurred. The President says that economic sanctions have been tried and failed. There is one aspect of the situation in which, I think, they can be said not even to have failed. That is, that for, so far as I know, the first time in history, a large number of nations have shown their abhorrence of aggression, and of imperialism in the bad sense, have shown their abhorrence of these things by making the sacrifice involved by an economic boycott. However small or disappointing the material consequences of that boycott may be, it is, at any rate, something of worth and a moral gain to have so many nations putting themselves on record as being prepared to take action of that kind in vindication of the principles of peace and justice. The test of the economic boycott as a weapon against war has been a test under most unfavourable circumstances. It is not the severity of a penalty that stops the potential wrongdoer from doing wrong. What stops him is the likelihood of arrest and conviction and the likelihood, or certainty, of some punishment. My own belief is that, if Japan had known in advance a few years ago that an embargo would be placed upon her exports in the event of her seizing Manchukuo, Manchukuo would never have been seized. Similarly, my own opinion is that, if Italy had known in advance she was going to be branded as an aggressor by practically the unanimous voice of the members of the League of Nations, if she had known that the economic measures were going to be applied against her that were, in fact, applied and, still more, if she had known that all the economic measures that might have been applied against her appropriately and properly would be applied against her, she would never have dreamt of taking the action she did take with regard to Abyssinia.

The application of what are called "economic sanctions"—though "sanctions" is a word I intensely dislike— or the application of an economic boycott, was totally unexpected. It had not been done before. The nations of the world had been getting more and more cynical about the prospects of the League ever doing anything of that kind. I myself, who have always been a member of the League of Nations Union in this country, and a strong supporter of the League of Nations idea from its first emergence, had come to the conclusion a year ago that the League was hopeless. When it was plain that Italy was contemplating aggression in Abyssinia and when it looked as if nothing effective would be even attempted by the League to stop her, I went so far as to write to the London Times advocating that the nations of the British Commonwealth should give notice of their withdrawal from the League rather than continue to be associated with such a sham. When the friends of the League, the idealists, the people who were inclined to think the best they possibly could of the League, were not expecting that it would be found practicable for the League, as a whole, to apply an economic boycott against an aggressor, how much more must that have been the case with those who were cynical? How much more can we be sure that Mussolini never dreamt that he was going to incur the disgrace that he did, in fact, incur or encounter the economic difficulties that, in fact, he has had to face. The whole thing was so little planned out—there was nothing about it that was automatic, there was nothing about it that was sure in advance—that the machinery creaked from the very start and a most curious confusion of mind arose as to what was a mere economic act and what was a military act, so that people even thought that refusing to supply Italy with oil could be treated as an act of military aggression. Why, America, outside the League of Nations, has been debating during the past year the desirability of pursuing such a policy in every war—refusing to supply the combatants in any way with anything which is useful for the carrying on of warfare. If a nation has not got the right to do that, it has not got the right to manage its own affairs. It has not got the right to have any sort of moral standard of its own at all. That Mussolini was able to hypnotise a certain number of people, even in what were called sanctionist countries, into thinking that prohibition of exportation of oil to Italy would be a sort of act of war, is really most extraordinary.

Would the Deputy allow me to ask him a question?

Certainly.

Deputy MacDermot has been so interested on this whole question of the Abyssinian dispute and the League of Nations that, as he is a member of the League of Nations Union, I should like to ask him what he considers should be the League of Nations attitude to the Hoare-Laval Pact and the settlement of the Abyssinian dispute. An answer to that question might help us to find out what the League of Nations Union has done in the matter.

I am not here to explain or defend the actions of the League of Nations Union. I am here to discuss the policy of this State, as explained by the President, and to contribute such reflections as I can to enable us to judge what that policy should be in the future.

The President has stated that the League should resign itself to a humbler task, that all attempts to enforce peace and justice, even by economic measures, should be given up. I wonder just how much value will be left in the League at all if that is done. Is it really too much, in this year of grace, to ask that nations, or those of them who profess to loathe and detest the very idea of war, who profess to love peace and justice, should refrain from giving assistance— because that is what it amounts to— of an economic kind to a country that has engaged in an act of aggression?

After the appalling experience of the war of 1914 to 1918 and after all the development there has been in the minds of the plain people throughout the world on the subject of war, together with the greatest distrust of and disgust with imperialist ambitions that have become the normal feeling of the normal man the world over, I cannot believe that it is an unreasonably idealistic proposal that the body which professes to be the League of Nations of the world, existing for the very purpose of preventing war, should go so far as to accept the principle of imposing an economic boycott against a nation that is declared an aggressor. I do not think that the President should consider that the failure of the economic boycott upon an occasion when the chances were so heavily weighed against it, is a reason for despairing of ever employing such a measure in the future.

The President says that the League of Nations must be reformed. There I agree with him. But on what lines? Must it be reformed in such a way as to become more of a laughingstock than it has hitherto been? Must it be reformed in such a way that it can do nothing at all for peace? Must it be reformed in such a way that we go back to the old power politics and proceed to clasp in friendship the right hand of the most flagrant aggressor immediately after his worst aggression? Must it be reformed in such a way that when the worst crime has been committed we should go on cordially trading with the criminal to the disadvantage of the unfortunate victim? If that is the way in which the League is to be reformed, I suggest that we should give up our membership of it altogether. But it can be reformed in quite a different way. It can be reformed so that the application of economic measures against the aggressor would become easy to execute and would follow automatically the decision by the League that a nation is an aggressor, and should become so much a matter of course that every potential aggressor will know that he has to face that fact.

I think that the President should certainly make every attempt on behalf of this country to contribute to the reform of the League on these lines before he falls back on the counsels of despair which he has set before us this evening as representing his present policy towards the League of Nations. This matter will be discussed further apparently upon the Vote for the League of Nations, and the Opposition will then be declaring their views on the subject. That will give to the President an opportunity, of which I hope he will take advantage, to reconsider that portion of his speech.

I repeat that with a great deal of what the President said on the subject I cordially agree, but I do think that it is quite an unnecessary degree of cowardice and pessimism to give up all hope of being able to reinforce peace by some sort of penalties imposed by the League of Nations. The President has suggested that economic penalties must certainly lead to military penalties. I deny that. They do involve the determination to protect yourself if you are attacked— the determination to protect yourself if you are attacked in consequence of the economic penalties which you imposed. But peace is worth taking some risks for.

If you are not prepared to take risks for peace the result will be that your ultimate risks will be a great deal worse. In relation to internal peace just imagine the time when people were breaking each other's heads or robbing each other without any authority existing in that community to interfere. Suppose that the first time that a man came along and saw a strong man bullying a weak, and interfered on behalf of the weaker, it was considered a daring and perhaps an unduly bellicose act on the part of the person who interfered. I suppose before the rudiments of a police force were established in the community that there were people who said "This is asking too much of human nature. Why should people be expected to interfere in the quarrels of their neighbours?" No doubt they said that the idea of fighting to end fighting is a paradox. Just as we say that the idea of war to end war is a paradox. They said that the notion that you could get members of the community to behave well towards each other and to cease robbing each other and killing each other by setting up an authority to interfere with them was a fantastic and idealistic notion. Well, those difficulties have been overcome in internal affairs. The police force has got established and the authority of the law has been vindicated in the civilised world. The reason why crimes are not committed in greater numbers than they are is because the potential criminal expects the machinery of the law to be used against him. The same thing can be accomplished in international affairs and it can be accomplished in international affairs if those who wish to see it accomplished show a reasonable amount of determination and courage and believe in the value of what they are trying to do.

I hope that the President will himself go to the Assembly at Geneva when it meets a week hence. I hope that when he does go there, in spite of what has fallen from himself in this debate, that he will do his utmost to help the world along towards better conditions than the appalling conditions in which it is in at the present moment. That is all I am going to say on that subject at this stage.

The Department of External Affairs has also within its duties the whole question of our relations with Great Britain. It is rather unfortunate that there should be so much difference of opinion as to what ought be discussed under each of these various heads— External Affairs, the League of Nations and the Department of the President. Personally, I do not like mixing up too many subjects in one speech and I propose to speak about our relations with Great Britain under the head of the Department of the President rather than under the head of the Department of External Affairs. Our relations with Great Britain affect our whole national life most profoundly. May I take it that there will be nothing out of order in following that course? That being so, I will say nothing further on this Vote.

I have listened with a certain amount of weariness to the last speaker in his references to the League of Nations, so far as our representation there is concerned in view of recent happenings, and his suggestions and alternatives. One would imagine that we were reading the leading article of the Irish Times which we have been reading for the last five or six months repeatedly every second morning. Everybody knows and appreciates that sanctions have been a hopeless and complete failure and have placed those who have attended the League of Nations conferences— whether of the Council or the Assembly —in a very humiliating position. At the same time, the humiliating position in which we, among many others, now find ourselves has been due to all the sentimentalists and visionaries who seem to have got hold of the League of Nations Union and put aside the realists and the practical people, whose voices, apparently, were drowned by all the talk and nonsense which surrounded the whole question of sanctions against Italy. I see that Deputy MacDermot is now leaving the House. It has all been due to the bungling of the League of Nations Union. When the Hoare-Laval Pact was put forward as a reasonable settlement and was rejected, it was easy to see that there was going to be the disastrous ending which has come about with Abyssinia losing its independence. If sensible efforts were made and realistic understandings were brought about we would not have to listen to the kind of speech which Deputy MacDermot gave us to-day.

Everybody knows that the British Government should have been the last people in the world to take the lead in this question of sanctions. They had two-thirds of the world at their disposal which they had acquired by conquest. They had overcome the Boers in the Boer War and they had made other conquests by force of arms and bloodshed. They were the nation that took the leading part against Italy, with the result that, by degrees, we found other nations on the Continent sick and tired of all the cant and humbug that had gone on. The true and sincere people were not able to get consideration for any suggestions that they put forward for a peaceful and satisfactory settlement, and the whole thing ended as every sensible person knew it would end.

I was not present in the Dáil when the vote was taken on the question of sanctions, although I possibly would have agreed with the rest of the House then. But, in view of what has been said by Deputy MacDermot, I could not resist stating what I thought of the whole thing and who is mainly responsible for it. I hope the League of Nations, as it exists to-day, will be bundled out bag and baggage, and that when the President goes to Geneva he will speak in a realistic way and take up a strong, firm attitude. Those who were leading this campaign against Italy were the least sincere and had the least reason to be leaders in the campaign. I refer without any hesitation to the British Foreign Secretary and the British Government.

I should like to refer on this Vote to a question I asked here some few years ago when the economic war started and that was—was this dispute only a question of money or was it also political? I believe that the President answered that it was more than financial. We understood at that time that there might be a possibility, in view of statements made on political platforms during the election intervening, of this dispute being settled in a reasonable way. We find now that, instead of any advance being made towards a settlement, we are still as far off as ever. Naturally, we come to the conclusion that business is submerged completely by politics and that both are interlocked in such a way that they cannot be separated. I recollect joining with one or two other speakers on that occasion in asking why we should not, without giving away our national status, make a cash offer to the British in a sensible way to settle this dispute. I think £25,000,000 was suggested. That brought jeers from the House. That was some years ago and by a simple calculation one can see now that we have already paid something like £80,000,000. If this is to go on and on, the £25,000,000 which probably would have been accepted with thanks at that time and the whole thing closed, will be spent over and over again until we reach the full payment of the sum in dispute away off in the distant future.

I wonder if even yet there is not some possibility of settling in a businesslike way the business dispute between this country and Great Britain. I am not one of those who would say that all the trouble arises on this side. Anybody who has followed the political situation, read the cross-Channel newspapers, and met people from the other side, knows that the British Government have not made very much of an attempt to settle this question with us. On the contrary, most irritating speeches have been made and most irritating articles written. They have, in their turn, denounced this country wherever their Press has any power. We know that their Press has power in many countries. There is the tied Press in the United States, and in Australia, South Africa and elsewhere. To my mind the British did not create a decent atmosphere for a general settlement of the dispute.

In case our attitude may be misunderstood, I think I may say that we on this side of the House, although we did not agree that this dispute should have arisen, since it has arisen do not entirely blame this Government for the position and do not think that the British Government are altogether free from all blame. I hold, as I have said, that they did not, under the previous Administration, make any advance which it would be worth while for us to take up with real sincerity.

I hope that the new Administration will make some advance. All sorts of complications have arisen in connection with this matter. There is nothing but confusion. If the big main political issue is to be one of the things to be settled, then I can see no end to this dispute. I can see nothing but more trade pacts, with the £5,000,000 still going across the Channel. Deputy Dillon rightly remarked what we have all experienced, that the towns are undoubtedly prosperous. We can all make that admission when we are away from the political hustings; but, on the other hand, we must all admit that the rural areas are suffering and will continue to suffer as long as the economic dispute with Great Britain remains unsettled. Why not make some effort to settle the business side of this dispute and let the political side go to the dogs or to the devil? That situation will have to be faced up to sooner or later, and if we could make some progress along that line I think it would be a good thing for the country. It is not my wish to speak of the President as a Minister of the Crown or to exploit our position as far as our relationship with the King is concerned. I do not believe in bringing in references of that kind, because I think the position is delicate enough as it is. We all know that the country is trying to progress constitutionally. We know what the aim is, but we realise how difficult it is to achieve that aim.

Deputy Dillon referred to trade pacts with Spain and Germany. A few days ago I met three Russian representatives who were over here buying horses. They were accompanied by a leading Irish trainer, one of our leading horse exporters. One of these gentlemen told me that Russia was prepared to take from us all the herrings and salt fish that we could supply to that country on a fifty-fifty basis. When I mentioned that later to some people here it was suggested that this country should not do business with Russia. If so, why are we selling horses to Russia? I hope that the President will take note of that and see that the matter is taken up. In connection with some trade pacts that we have made, I have had the pleasure and privilege of discussing them with some of our Ministers. In the case of a trade pact with Germany, it was found at first that the export of horses from this country could not be fitted in under it, but after some discussion and by the application of a little commonsense it was later found possible to do so. In connection with the export of herrings and salt fish to Russia, I would be glad if the Department of External Affairs, of which the President is the responsible Minister, would look into that, and see if some agreement could be come to under which a tremendous amount of help could be given to poor fishermen along the western seaboard. I am told that at present many of them are on the dole, not for weeks but sometimes for months. Owing, I suppose, to the absence of a market, I heard recently that on one or two occasions they had to put their catches back into the sea.

With regard to the routine work done by the Department of External Affairs, I do not feel competent to speak on that. When the Vote for the League of Nations comes on, I hope to have something further to say on the position which the League of Nations has landed itself into. I hope that, when the President next goes over to a meeting of the League, he will have nothing to do with those in the League of Nations Union who made sure that the independence of Abyssinia would be completely wiped out.

The most pitiable and astonishing part of the President's statement here to-day referred to our defence policy, or, rather, to the complete absence on our part of any defence policy or of any ideas on which to base it. The President told the House of that want of policy and want of ideas at a time when he came before it to say that the League of Nations as a machine has completely broken down: that if it is going to be anything in the future it cannot be a thing that will definitely step in and stop war: that it is to be some kind of a conciliation or an arbitration body, but that it can do nothing beyond that: that, except it is in some way effective in that direction, we here have no business for it: that, as a result of that, the smaller nations throughout Europe have been driven to fall back on themselves to create their own defence resources and make their own defence plans: that they should be warned by what happened Abyssinia, which, relying on the League of Nations, did not make its own preparations, and was, therefore, destroyed.

The President told us that in Europe to-day we are nearer war than at any time since the Great War. He did not elaborate the reasons which have led him to form that opinion. Therefore, we have to look outside the President's statement—to the opinions expressed in the Government Press—to get some of the implications, at any rate, as to what is in the atmosphere, and as to what we may have to face up to in the matter of war. On the 10th February last, the Government Party Press drew attention to the fact that the British Government had decided to embark on a policy of increased armaments on a scale such as had never been known across the Channel before, and that it had decided to raise a loan of between £400,000,000 and £500,000,000 for that purpose. It went on to point out what a huge drain on the national resources such an expenditure on non-reproductive work was, and it went on further to say:

"What is most significant about this decision is the evidence it affords that the conviction has been brought home to British Ministers that war in the future is, if not inevitable, at least highly probable, and that they must be prepared for such an eventuality. It is only the belief that, if war did come, it would be, as in 1914, a struggle for existence which would justify spending nearly £100,000,000 extra on armaments during each of the next five years. When this fact is taken in conjunction with the circumstance that arrangements have been made for distributing from 30,000,000 to 40,000,000 gas masks among the civilian population of Great Britain, it will be realised that the heads of the British Government are convinced that another Armageddon is more probable than most people imagined to be the case."

The President tells us that the situation is nearer an explosion into war than at any time since the Great War. The Government Press paints that picture, and the things that must have been in the minds of the British Government when they proposed to embark on a gigantic expenditure on armaments. With the League of Nations gone from us, we have the President informing us that we are not a naval nation and are not likely to be a naval nation, nor are we likely to embark on any expenditure for a navy. He tells us that in the present circumstances of this country we have not complete control over the whole of Ireland; that British military occupy some of our ports and are in certain places in the North of Ireland; that the uncertainty with regard to the situation prevents us having any defence plans of any kind, except one which, to some of us, seems to be not a plan but an irritant, leading more to political disruption than to anything in the nature of organising in any way the resources of the country for defence purposes.

There is the one idea that if Great Britain does enter into a war she may strengthen or she may place military forces in occupation of those places that she now holds as naval defence ports occupied by maintenance parties, and that if that happens we are going to attack any British troops that are landed in that particular way. There is no person in this country who does not realise that it would be madness for any British Government to take such action as that, to send back British troops to occupy for any purpose any part of this country that they have evacuated. I do not believe anyone sitting down calmly to think over it would consider that on our part it would be anything but even greater madness, in circumstances in which Great Britain would be attacked by a strong power and so forget herself in her anxiety as to land her troops back again in this country, that we should at that particular time throw such military resources as we have in on the side of the enemy that was attacking Great Britain. The one would be madness, the other would be greater madness; the one might lead to loss and danger to Great Britain, but the other would lead to even greater loss at that time and in the future for the people of this country.

What we want is to see circumstances got over and a situation avoided that would ever make it possible for a thing like that to happen and what we want is to get out of our people's minds, those in authority here, any necessity for dwelling on the possibility that the British Government might in such circumstances land British troops here. We have an army that is less than 10,000 and there was a new Volunteer force launched a couple of years ago, but that has already been destroyed by the policy pursued in connection with it, a policy, on the one hand, of excluding from the ranks of these Volunteers men who do not agree politically with the Government Party and, on the other hand, of absolute carelessness and absolute indifference on the part of the President and the Minister for Defence as to what was being done with that body and how it was being organised. The new Volunteer force was set up, if you like, on absurd lines, but having been set up it was treated in the most absurd way that any military body ever was allowed to be treated. They were expected to go on parade and drill and they were never to see a rifle. The President looks astonished.

It is absurd.

Will the President talk to any of the Volunteer officers throughout any part of the country and see if what I am saying is absurd?

I have had intimate association with the Volunteers and I know all about them.

The Volunteers in certain parts of the country would be very glad to hear that the President is taking an interest in them and has had intimate association with them. It is easy enough to give rifles to a Sluagh in a barracks in Dublin or Cork, but I would like the President to indicate in what other parts of the country the members of the Volunteer force have had military training of any kind. If he made inquiries he might find out why their numbers in various parts of the country have dwindled so appreciably. With our defence forces in that particular position, the only thing the President indicates as a possible line of defence that he may have to pursue is that he may have to attack British troops that may be landed in this country.

The President tells us that the full strength of the nation will be used to safeguard our neutrality. Have we nothing better to safeguard? Will the full strength of this nation be used to preserve its people and its interests, and what are the dangers to our people and their interests that lie in the war situation that the President and his Press people see so imminently around us? What does "our neutrality" mean? It is one of the detached ideals that, like some of the other detached ideals the President has, he would like to get the people to bow down before and occupy their minds with, so that there might be obscured to them the very disastrous social and political losses that they are suffering at the present time.

The President tells us that it would be foolish not to take cognisance of the facts of the situation in Abyssinia and its relations with Italy, and that sanctions should come off. Are we to reserve attention for the facts of situations only as they concern things that are very far away from us? Are we not to take cognisance of the facts of the situation so far as this country and its interests are concerned, and this country and its relations with Great Britain, and the interests it has in Great Britain are concerned, in the face of the type of war situation or war threat on which the British Government is to-day spending from £400,000,000 to £500,000,000.

It is part of the President's approach to the political and economic problems which exist between this country and Great Britain that he presumes to take, as it were, the map of Ireland and the map of Great Britain and sponge them of every trace of past or present, wiping out the characteristics of the people, their political outlook, their differences on matters of religion, as well as their interests in social and economic matters, and says to the people of this country and the people of Great Britain, both the rank and file and those in authority: "Now let us settle the relations between those two countries as the relations ought to be between any two separate countries." He gets into his difficulties, he gets his people into their difficulties, and he gets the British people into their difficulties, because the sponge will not work. If the President is in the position of facing facts in regard to foreign situations, and facing facts with regard to the possibilities of a European war and what it may involve, I think he himself ought to do what he thinks it possible for other people to do, that is, forget something of the immediate difficulties and look at the case of two peoples living alongside each other, one a population of 4,000,000 and the other a population of 60,000,000, or whatever it is.

The 4,000,000 are our people, whether they be in Antrim or in Cork, with very definite economic interests in Great Britain—one being that our people are not going to be able to exist in present circumstances in this country except they find in Great Britain the market for their agricultural produce which they have been accustomed to find in the past; and the second being that our people are not going to live in any kind of well-being except we can get from the investments of our people in Great Britain the income we have been able to get in the past. Yesterday we were discussing here how important in preserving the resources of this country and keeping those resources was the fact that we had an income from investments abroad. The President knows, as well as anyone in the county, that the greater bulk of those investments is investments in Great Britain.

The possibilities of war being such as they are, would the President not consider that if our interests here have to be defended with the full force of the nation's resources, our interests are involved too in whether Great Britain is going to be attacked? If he considered that, he would come to the conclusion that the spirit which should exist between those two countries is the spirit that if Great Britain were threatened by any of the war tyrants who have made Europe the place it is to-day it would be as much in our interest to defend Great Britain against that attack as it would be to defend our own country against that attack. We should be, as the President said, ready to use all our national resources to defend our own country here—not so much to defend our neutrality, but to defend our country and its interests. We should know, and do know, that if the type of war, the possibilities of which are foreshadowed in the Irish Press or in the President's statement here to-day, is likely to come near us, we will want the assistance of Great Britain—not only its navy but its air force—if we are going to defend the integrity of this country. We should be equally prepared, within the limits of our resources, to give our assistance to Great Britain to defend her against any chance of being destroyed by that type of invasion which it is suggested might happen when we see that Great Britain is spending such enormous sums of money on armament for her own protection.

That might mean an agreement between those two countries that, in the case of an invasion of one or other of those countries, we would treat Great Britain and Ireland as a unit from the military point of view, and would not be squeamish or sensitive as to the forces that were available— whether they were Englishmen or Scotchmen or Welshmen or Irishmen— to defend those countries. We ought to grow up, and we ought to know that if Great Britain is attacked, in the spirit in which war is apparently capable of breaking out in Europe, this country might be as hard hit by damage done to Great Britain and to its people as if damage were done directly to our own people. To deal with a serious situation such as the President speaks of as existing in Europe and likely to develop in Europe, to tell us that we have no defence policy in connection with it, and then to drag the occupation of our ports by Great Britain across that pitiable and astonishing story, shows the type of mind which is looking after our national interest to-day. We have people of our country in Canada, South Africa, the United States, Australia and Great Britain, and I doubt if among them or among the people with whom they have found their homes and whose countries they are building up, there is any radical difference in outlook on what should be our social ideals, our economic ideals or our political ideals; those ideals are the soundest and truest that exist in the world to-day.

If the President has been studying the lines of thought either at the League of Nations or in the United States or in any of the countries of the British Commonwealth, on how world economic conditions can best be improved, and if he has been studying the lines of thought on that subject which enshrine themselves in certain of the Papal encyclicals, he must be aware that there is not any country in the world to-day pursuing sounder lines of thought, or endeavouring to pursue sounder economic policies, in line with the best economic thought in the world, and in line with the best ideals enshrined in the Papal encyclicals, than Great Britain. If we cannot, in a dangerous situation such as the President indicates, have a common understanding as to where our interests lie mutually, and what we are prepared to do both by ourselves and with mutual assistance, what can we expect from any other part of the world? What can we expect from Australia, from South Africa, from Canada, or even from the United States? It is a pitiable business, if the situation is such as the President states, that he should speak to us of defence and tell us nothing of those matters. It would be nearly time for us to grow up and make up our minds that, if we are to face facts in respect of Abyssinia and Italy, we shall face them in respect of ourselves and our neighbours.

The President has been quoted about our economic relations with Great Britain, too. I notice that the President is leaving the House. I should be prepared to be quite short in my statement if he would remain, as I particularly wish him to hear what I want to say now. Well, I ask the Attorney-General to convey it to him. On one particular occasion, as part of our External Affairs Vote, we voted money to send some Cabinet Ministers to Ottawa. Very considerable progress has been made politically and constitutionally in the conferences that had taken place around the Imperial Conference table, and, following the depression of 1929 and 1930, it was clear that conferences had to take place between the various representatives of the British Commonwealth of Nations as to how these countries could assist themselves and one another to get back to the better conditions that existed before the economic depression of 1929 and 1930. The Minister for Industry and Commerce, the Minister for Agriculture, and the Vice-President went to Ottawa, and they went there with the shadow of the economic war hanging over them. However, conversations did take place at Ottawa, and the Vice-President is recorded, in the Irish Independent of the 20th August, 1932, as giving an interview.

The Estimate before the House is for the year 1936, not 1932.

I submit, Sir, that the matter before the House is concerned with what steps are being taken to fix up the economic dispute between this country and Great Britain, and I want to show how close we were to a settlement in 1932. I want to show that proposals were made in 1932, that were admitted by the Vice-President to have been made and that have been withheld from this country ever since. I want to read the exact words of the Vice-President on that subject, because I want to say this: that if we were as near a settlement as these statements show, in 1932, we should be nearer a settlement of these things now, because the members of the Executive Council and the members of the Fianna Fáil Party—if the members of the Fianna Fáil Party have been allowed to know these terms at all—know better now what they were worth. I submit, Sir, that I am in order in referring to the statement made by the Vice-President, in 1932, as bearing on our external relations here to-day.

If the Deputy quotes the Vice-President, yes.

I propose, Sir, to quote the Vice-President and questions put to him.

The Deputy quoted it before several times, and we do not want to hear it any more.

It has been challenged by the President, but the President has never discussed it beyond the simple challenge, and when we see the condition in which this country is to-day and how that condition in bedevilling the political relations that should exist between the people of Great Britain and ourselves—particularly at a time of such crisis as the President speaks about—I think that a few moments of this House's time will be well spent if we can get some further clearing up of the situation and something that will indicate what exactly happened in 1932 that gave us the four years of increasing misery that have come along since and the four years of deepening misunderstanding between the people of this country and the people of Great Britain. The interview in the Irish Independent of the 20th August, 1932, was an exclusive interview with a special correspondent of the Irish Independent. It was as follows:—

"Mr. O'Kelly: We have, of course, no agreement with the United Kingdom, but the path towards a settlement of the dispute with Great Britain has been smoothed.

Question: Would it be correct to say that the presence of the Irish delegation at Ottawa helped to pave the way towards a settlement or bring it nearer?

Mr. O'Kelly: I think I can safely say that is so. We have very friendly and pleasant contacts and undoubtedly we have made progress. We have, I believe, reached a basis of settlement. It is impossible to fix the date on which agreement will be arrived at, but it is measurably close."

I submit that the Vice-President repudiated that interview here and in the presence of all the members.

I submit that the Irish Press got an interview of the very same kind and that it was torn up by agreement with the President of the Executive Council at the same time. The President has repudiated that, and the Minister for Agriculture has said that these words were never spoken, but the Vice-President, who is reported as giving the interview, has never repudiated it.

He has, and I heard him distinctly.

Deputy Tom Kelly may have heard him in places where we are not permitted to go.

I distinctly heard him repudiating it here.

The Deputy is drawing entirely on his own imagination.

I am not. I have no imagination.

If it can be controverted on one occasion, it can be controverted now; but I think that, four years after the interview was given, with the accumulating distress that has resulted, it should now, at least, be possible to fix the date to which the Vice-President referred when he said that although it was impossible to fix the date on which agreement would be arrived at, it was measurably close. And that was on the 20th August, 1932! On the 19th August, 1932, in L'Evenement, of Quebec, another interview is reported between the Vice-President and M. Barrés, a representative of Le Matin. After the Vice-President had indicated that they were not going to pay the land annuities M. Barrés asked:

"What method of discussion are you going to follow?

Mr. O'Kelly: We have accepted in advance the decision of a committee of arbitration. England also accept it in principle, but the difficulties come in making the choice of arbitrators, whence arises the actual contention.

M. Barrés: What outcome do you foresee?

Mr. O'Kelly: Since our recent voyage together from Ottawa to the Niagara Falls, I and also Mr. Lemass, Minister for Industry and Commerce, have had frequent and cordial conversations with Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Thomas. These conversations have been accompanied by conversations between Dublin and London (Mr. MacDonald has met Mr. de Valera) of which I have been informed by telephone from Dublin. I think I can say clearly that a solution by arbitration will be found in the suggestion made three weeks ago by the English Labour Party.

M. Barrés: What is that suggestion?

Mr. O'Kelly: A Committee of Arbitration of four members, nominated two by London and two by Ireland."

M. Barrés: It seems to me that that is no solution, for the English arbitrators will give the case to England and the Irish arbitrators will give the case to Ireland.

Mr. O'Kelly (smiling with an air of a man who knows more than he says): Perhaps! But it is the solution that can put an end to the tariff war on which England has just embarked.

M. Barrés: Do you think you are on the eve of a solution more in accordance with Irish wishes?

Mr. O'Kelly: Yes."

Who is M. Barrés?

He was the representative of the Paris newspaper Le Matin, and he was given an interview which was printed in a Quebec paper on the 19th August. The interview with the Independent representative was printed on the 20th August. It is quite clear that proposals were made then. I repeat for Deputy Kelly's information that the people who are denying that that interview was given are probably the people responsible for the interview that came to the Irish Press being dropped quietly into the waste-paper basket there. It is nearly time the House heard from the Vice-President what he was taking about, and what proposals had been made, arising out of which he gave his interview to the Irish Independent and to the representative of Le Matin.

I wish to say a few words on this Vote. I want to make special reference to the dispute between Great Britain and this country in connection with the payment of the land annuities, because I represent here sections of the community that are suffering sorely from the effects of the dispute, namely the farming community and the farm workers. I listened to the President's speech and in sentence after sentence I was expecting to hear something, little as it might be, about the dispute between Great Britain and the Free State. He told us about the dispute between Abyssinia and outside countries, but he never touched on the dispute that concerns this country more than any other. For the last four years we have been expecting week after week, and month after month, to hear something about a settlement. We have been disappointed all these years and we are disappointed to-day. When I consider the conditions under which farmers have been striving to live for the past four years, and find that not one word was said to-day about this dispute with the British Government, I can assure the Government here that I am very disappointed. If there are difficulties in the way of a settlement— and I am sure there are—why should not the President make some reference to them, and tell the House what they are? From my own experience in this House, and from what I can hear, in my opinion no real effort is being made to bring about an improvement in the conditions under which we have been living for the past four years. The position is a bad one and it was put before the President on several occasions. I am not going into it now. This dispute will have to be settled some time, and I look upon the fact that it has lasted longer than four years as a disgrace to the President and the Goverment of this country. Even to-day if the President could give some indication that there would be a real attempt made to bring about a settlement, it would satisfy us in a small way. However, there was not the slightest reference of that kind and I do not believe that there was any real attempt made at any time to bring about a settlement. Deputy Mulcahy referred to something that happened in 1932 but that was a long time ago. All I have to say now to the President and to the Government is that farmers and farm workers are hard workers whose hours are not six or seven but twelve a day, with no half holidays. They are prepared to work hard to earn a living but there appears to be no respect for them.

I had no intention whatever of intervening in this debate but, having listened with attention to the various speakers, I want to say that I have the greatest possible sympathy with the last Deputy who spoke, because I think he is an intensely sincere and honest man, who put the case of the farmers he represents better than the political end with which he is mixed up. He put the case with a clarity and a sincerity that I respect. How often may I ask has the economic war been discussed here within the last three years?

It is not settled yet.

Mr. Kelly

How often was it discussed? I intervened two or three times in connection with the economic dispute and I appealed to men like the Deputy and his colleagues to say how in their opinion it is to be settled.

We do not know what they are doing.

Mr. Kelly

Do not mind what they are doing. What is your suggestion for a settlement of this dispute? If I represented Irish farmers here I would certainly make some suggestion.

Ask Deputy Cooney.

Mr. Kelly

Never mind Deputy Cooney. You have some experience of municipal elections in Dublin now, and I hope you like it.

I do. I have been very well received.

Mr. Kelly

Let it rest at that. I would certainly make some practical suggestion for a settlement if I were in the Deputy's position. How is the dispute between England and Ireland on economic questions to be settled? England will not give in; Ireland cannot. That is the position as I view it.

That was the position of Abyssinia.

Mr. Kelly

Never mind Abyssinia. The crew looks to all ends of the ship.

That is what the President has been doing.

Mr. Kelly

Let us get away from that. It is only three centuries since a chieftain in the North of Ireland asked this question: "What right have the English here, anyhow?" That was Seoirse Buidhe MacDómhnaill, and his head afterwards garnished Dublin Castle. I think the same question is being asked in effect by the policy of the Executive Council, led by President de Valera: "What right have the English here, anyhow?" There is no fear, however, of their heads garnishing Dublin Castle.

There are questions that might be more usefully asked.

Mr. Kelly

That is the real issue behind the economic war, and if Deputies would get that into their heads we might view this question in a different way. Does not the Deputy know very well what happened some years ago in connection with the Feetham Inquiry? I referred to that situation before, when a judge from South Africa sat with Irishmen at a council table to deal with a very difficult question. What was the settlement arrived at? Was it not a scandal for Ireland? Do Deputies want President de Valera and the Executive to submit again to arbitration, and to have the arbitrators appointed by England? The President is willing, and he has so declared over and over again, to have this question submitted to a fair arbitration board, but the judge must not be selected by England. I think that is fair, and I ask the farmers in this House why, if they do not agree with that, and they do not, do they not themselves submit suggestions as to how a settlement can be arrived at?

Will you guarantee that it will be carried out?

Mr. Kelly

I will guarantee nothing. I am only a humble back bencher, and I cannot guarantee anything. I am a faithful follower of a Party, and that is all I propose to be, but I have some sympathy with the farmers' position at present. We had references to-day to the state of the country, and to the social conditions to which the farmers are being reduced. We had it stated that Dublin has every appearance of prosperity, and to-day I heard that Cork, and perhaps other cities, have the appearance of prosperity. As a Dublin man, I say that I have never seen the city of Dublin look so well. It has all the appearance of prosperity, and a great deal of that must be genuine prosperity. If Dublin is the heart of Ireland, surely the rest of the body must be sound? Where would this great prosperity come from if the country were as rotten economically as the Opposition suggests it is? I have stood in O'Connell Street, especially during the autumn and winter months, when the great Gaelic matches are being played, and seen contingents of young men and young women coming from all parts of Ireland, and I am glad to say that they bear on their persons special evidence of the prosperity of the country. On such occasions, you cannot go within a radius of a mile of Croke Park with all the motor cars that are parked around it.

You are looking at it from the point of view of Sunday. Look at it from the point of view of Monday.

Mr. Kelly

I cannot see any difference between Sunday and Monday. On Sunday they wear their Sunday clothes and on Monday they wear their working clothes, so they have two suits and cannot complain of poverty. The Irish Times is a very responsible paper. It was founded in the days of high respectability here, I think, somewhere about 1865. We were then in the heyday of the Victorian prosperity, or very near it, of the British Empire, and it has been a British Empire paper, I think, all through. It was quoted here to-day, and its respectability nobody doubts. It has the real old air of Dublin respectability that I knew as a boy—top hat and frock coat, no shirt but a tommy—and the houses embellished beautifully outside, but inside even the cats used to contemplate suicide because of the starvation they were faced with. That respectability has been maintained, but now and again the Irish Times gets a bit wobbly, and on municipal affairs, from time to time, it almost goes balmy. The other day an article appeared in it relating to the question I was invited to speak about, Abyssinia. I think it appeared on Monday, or if not, on Saturday. It referred to the treatment which the Emperor of Abyssinia had received while in London, and said it was ashamed to record the facts that he was waited on only by a third-rate statesman; that a prince of the kingly house deigned to wait on him only for half an hour, because the aforesaid prince had attended some function in Abyssinia some years ago; that the high British statesmen treated him with disrespect; that royalty did not touch him at all; and all this after the tremendous declarations made some months before as to what England and the British Empire were to do to help Abyssinia. It went on to remind its readers of what happened in connection with Sir Somebody Hoare's resignation some time before, over an arrangement proposed to be made between France and England to bring about a settlement of the war. The language of that leader reminded me very strongly of John Mitchel's “Jail Journal.” No language that John Mitchel used in his journal could be so strong, against France and England particularly, as the language in this Irish Times article.

What happened to change opinion in England which was so strong a few months ago and which brought about the retirement of one of their principal statesmen because he dared to try to make peace when the war had been in progress a certain period? What became of that great spirit that existed amongst the democracy of England? Why did they allow this little man—I think that was the phrase used—to be let down? They allowed it simply because it suited them, and they would treat this country the same way if ever it happened that Ireland got into the difficulties Abyssinia got into, which I hope she will not. No matter what the President would do here, whether in relation to domestic affairs or as representing this country abroad—and no man has ever represented the country as well as he has— it would not find favour in the eyes of many. The Party opposite spend their time digging up every possible thing they can dig up for years back. They read their Doomsday Book here day after day and they produce documents and hold them up, saying: "This was said three years ago," and "This was said five years ago." That is how they spend their time. I submit that they could spend their time more effectively in discharging the duties to the country which they are asked to discharge. What has the President done wrong in connection with this country during his office as Minister for External Affairs?

He has taken £11,000,000 a year out of one of the pockets of the farmers.

Mr. Kelly

I dealt with the farmers position as well as I could, and there are a number of farmer Deputies here from all over the country.

They are very silent.

Mr. Kelly

They are honest and truthful men. I am of an inquisitive turn of mind and I ask them questions as to the social position of the farmers. I say to them: "Is there any truth in the statements made from the opposite benches?" and they assure me there is not.

Why do they not assure this House?

Mr. Kelly

Because they do not want to be wasting the time of the House. Our job is to get through the business. The job of the members opposite evidently is to obstruct the business, to keep it going with talking and talking, as I said here yesterday with reference to one Deputy who sits over there. Our job is to see that the business is done as quickly as possible and in as business-like a way as is possible. Very few of us ever trouble the House with long speeches. We are perfectly satisfied to leave the administration and conduct of affairs here in the hands of the Executive Council. We believe our Ministers are able men, capable of handling any questions that the Opposition may put to them, but, at the same time, we do say that the business could be got through much more quickly and much more effectively if there was less talk, but we cannot control that.

As I say, I do not wish to interfere in debates of this class at all. There is a lot of the militant spirit abroad. I am not a militarist in any shape or form and I never was. Nature did not make me as a fighter, and any fights I was ever in, I got the worst of them, and I do not intend to get into any more. If there is any fighting to be done, I will not be there or near it. We hear talk about aeroplanes and forts and such things. There is one fort on Dalkey Island which could be used at any period to defend our coasts against any invader. I think the questions raised on this Vote are questions that really do not relate with much interest to Ireland at all. I would rather have thought that speeches made here in connection with this matter should be speeches directly concerning our own country. I leave entirely in the hands of the President of the Executive Council, with the utmost confidence, dealings with external affairs and with the League of Nations. I do not want to know very much about them, being perfectly satisfied that in his hands they are safe, much more so than in the hands of any man I know.

I should like to say a few words on the question of the League of Nations. Personally, I regard the Association of the League of Nations as a great ideal. Whether any advance can be made along the principles underlying the League of Nations in our time is a matter of opinion, but certainly I voted for sanctions and I approve of the attitude taken up by this country in that regard. There are a number of people who think that the failure of the sanctions imposed on Italy is a humiliation, and that they should be given up. I think the President was very wise because he did not say as far as I can recollect—and I listened very carefully to him—whether or not they should be given up. In my opinion the question is not whether sanctions should be given up. The important matter in this connection is that 52 nations came together to declare that the war on Abyssinia was a war of aggression. I consider that their association together should be continued. I do not know how many years have elapsed since wars first started. They have been going on for thousands of years. They have been waged by every nation on the face of the earth, but I think this was the first time in history that there was an association of nations banded together to try to stop war. I think that was a great ideal and the fact that their actions did not result in stopping this particular war is really beside the question. This was the first crusade waged by the League of Nations. There is a lot of nonsense talked by enthusiasts who thought that everything should have been right the minute the League of Nations intervened. Some people expect too much from it; some people expect too little.

I agree with the President, as a realist, when he says that any nation which imposes sanctions must be prepared in the final resort to back them up with military action. There is no doubt that, for a small country such as this is, there is the danger that perhaps even the application of economic sanctions would lead to war. That is a very real danger and in so far as the President seems to apprehend that, and considers that that situation should be faced, I entirely agree with him, but I cannot agree with some other speakers that we are humiliated or that sanctions should have been declared off, one by one, the minute the conquest of Abyssinia was accomplished. It seems to me, as a realist, that some ideals which the President holds cannot be carried into his association with other nations. A great deal has been said about our association with Great Britain, and as to what we should do if our ports were only free. It seems to me, and I would invite the President to contradict me if he thinks it is not so, that any nation that wishes to go to war with England—or, to put it in plainer language, have a rap at England—will not hesitate to occupy this country if it suits that nation. I should also like to say that I believe— and I hold this view quite as sincerely as Deputy Kelly holds his views— that if England, to-morrow, declared that she had no interest in this country, that she did not care what happened to this country, or did not care what any other country did to this country, within half an hour after that statement was made, we would have started along the road that Abyssinia has just travelled. That is why I say I should like to invite the President to become a realist and to face the position we occupy in this part of the world, a part of the world that we did not choose. Providence put us here. I suppose we could leave here, but we cannot take our native country with us. It will have to stop here in an important strategic part of the world. How we are to avoid being a desirable possession for warring nations in time of war, I do not know. Deputy Tom Kelly said that he did not want to have any war or to do any fighting. I shall tell you what Deputy Kelly ought to do. He ought to buy a gas-mask.

We get plenty of it here.

Take good care that you might not want masks.

Mr. Kelly

When we can stand it here we do not want gas masks.

It might be the cheapest thing you ever bought in your life. But that is beside the question. Coming to the question of realism, and our association with neighbouring countries, some of the Deputies have trod the well-worn path about the dispute with England and the coal-cattle pact. I would like to ask the President one question about the details of that pact, and I hope he will give me an answer. My question, is this: I understand that we made an agreement that more of our cattle were to be taken by Britain in return for coal that we were to take from her. I am now only speaking broadly. But, as a sort of make-weight, cement was thrown into the scales, and we were to take one-third of our requirements of British cement. What I want to ask the President is this: Is that to be taken irrespective of the price of cement, because, if so, it was a very foolish bargain. I see the President shakes his head. I hope he will be in a position to contradict me and I hope he will tell me what are the facts. But as he has shaken his head in dissent from what I said I will not pursue that matter further. I would like, however, to know what would arise out of a promise such as that, and I hope the President will give us details as to what our position is with regard to that one-third of cement and how it is to be worked out.

I heard a lot of talk in the last 48 hours about realists and realism. There is one aspect of realism we are certainly not inclined to forget, and that is in reference to Abyssinia. There we had a small nation that put its faith and trust in the League of Nations. A splendid ideal! The League of Nations was pledged to defend and stand over it, and yet we find that that small nation has been burned and bombed and drenched in mustard gas. And what then? Do the realists tell us that it must be so, and say "let it be so"? I hardly believe that that is to be the result of all our fine talk and all our high trust which we placed in the League of Nations.

I was glad that the President took the strong line that he did when he dealt with that matter at Geneva, and I was proud of what he did. I realised that the situation was a difficult one. In our own case, I hope that an honourable and honest solution, that will not humiliate us, will be found out of our present difficulties, and that in finding that solution we will not forget that unfortunate country Abyssinia.

In common with Deputy Tom Kelly, I wish to say that of the many speeches delivered here to-day the speech of Deputy Holohan struck me as most sincere, and also, I may add, the speech of the previous speaker. The speech of Deputy Alton was concise and to the point. The drift of most of the speeches delivered by Deputies on the Opposition Benches was with the view to gain kudos for themselves at the expense of the Government. Perhaps it is not unnatural that that should ordinarily be the trend of speeches from the Opposition, but bearing in mind the importance of the Vote now under discussion I think these speeches were unworthy of the occasion. Deputy Holohan brought in the economic war. Like King Charles's head, if one may make a bull, it always troops across the stage. The League of Nations and everything else is mixed up with the economic war. Deputy Holohan expects a solution. He was asked, very pointedly, by Deputy Tom Kelly on what basis he expects a solution. We have a right to expect an answer but not, perhaps, from a plain farmer who cannot be expected to go into all the subtleties of the question. We are however entitled to ask what solution is expected by Deputies on the Front Bench opposite. What line can we give to England or any other country for a solution of the question that Deputy Tom Kelly summed up by saying "England will not surrender and we cannot surrender"? Certainly we cannot surrender. If I wished to go in at length to this matter and to inquire into the causes of the economic war I would incur the censure of the Chair and I would be boring the House. Consequently I will not do it. I think it is enough to say that every possible effort has been made to settle this dispute. We make that statement and we are entitled to stand over it. Any assumption to the contrary by the Opposition is futile, vicious and impolitic.

Into the high politics of the League of Nations I have no desire to go. There is a certain element of humour in hearing some members of the Opposition talking of the woes of Abyssinia. They have suffered, and suffered greatly, as other small nations have suffered. The great nation to which we are now asked to appeal, and virtually to surrender, has been celebrated in her attitude towards this country by the poetess, Miss Emily Lawless, in this connection:

"Your decree,

Bade all her budding commerce cease;

You drove her from your subject sea,

To starve in peace."

More than that was done in Abyssinia. She will suffer now, no doubt about it, against her will.

That is what the British said about this country.

She will at least be fed in peace; she will not be allowed to starve in peace. It savours of hypocrisy for people talking now about the danger of Abyssinia and the fate that has overtaken her. A sad fate undoubtedly has overtaken her, but it sounds hypocritical that the apologists should be found on the Opposition Benches. I do not know whether Deputy Mulcahy, who went out in 1916, thought then as he does now. If so, he was a greater hypocrite then than now. Deputy Mulcahy said that there were indications of war and he quoted the Irish Press. It struck me he thought he was quoting Scripture. Anyone who runs may read the signs of war. It is not the Irish Press alone nor the Press of Ireland nor the President nor anyone in this House only who sees the danger of war. The British Press are constantly harping upon the dangers of war and insisting that they should prepare for that war in every possible way. Some Deputy said that if Britain said to us: “We will have nothing more to do with you,” we should have another country treating us as Abyssinia was treated. Surely Britain's interest in us is not the outcome of any altruism on her part. Surely, it is because of self-interest that she keeps her connection with this country, and I think there is very little danger of Britain washing her hands of us.

Is the Deputy speaking the President's mind?

The President can speak for himself. I cannot interpret the President's mind. I am quite content to follow him. What is the gravamen of the President's offence? Does it not consist in this—that he "has voiced in no uncertain tone his mother's cause, holding it no offence that she asserts her right and claims her own"? So far as I can see, that is his only offence. The Vote for the League of Nations raised a momentous question, and into that question there have been introduced domestic issues. I think that that is most unfair. These domestic issues have been raised a thousand times, and wearisomely raised, by Deputies opposite. For the sake of throwing dirt and giving vent to the usual political innuendoes, the economic war must be dragged across the path. I think the debate would have been maintained on a higher level if the economic war had not been dragged in. As it has been dragged in, we can only discuss it.

Deputy Mulcahy said that there was no indication, except what the President and the Irish Press gave, of an approaching war. I daresay he did not mean that literally. He went on to speak of the efforts we have made, or have not made, to meet that situation. He said that we had a small army, and he went on to sneer at, belittle, and pour ridicule on the Volunteer force. I do not think that it behoves Deputy Mulcahy or any member of the Opposition to speak in that way of the Volunteer force. When that idea was first proposed, it did not meet with any favour from the Opposition Benches. No doubt, they are within their legal rights in attacking a force they did not help to create, but it comes ill from them. The Volunteer force is doing good work, and it is only a matter of time until it is perfected. At its inception, the Volunteer force, like every other force, had some little flaws, but the machine will eventually run smoothly and the volunteers will be an asset to the country if the necessity for using them should arise. We were asked what was the danger to our interests. If I wished to be sardonic, I should say that I saw no danger to our interests except the Opposition. When one bears in mind their attitude during the past four years, I think that observation is not without a certain amount of truth. Deputy Dillon says that we embarked on the economic war. I do not think that we ever embarked on the economic war. We were shoved into it, or jockeyed into it, if you like. Deputy Dillon advised us to negotiate. Have we not negotiated ad nauseam? Is it because the other side would not agree that we should be taken as being obstinate and unreasonable in our demands? Not necessarily. I do not see why Ireland and the people who negotiate on her behalf must always be held necessarily to be in the wrong. I do not see why our opponents on the other side should brand us in that way while revelling themselves in the odour of sanctity, and placing an aureole over their own heads. Members of the Opposition were not quite so fulsome or laudatory in their comments in respect of the British connection some years ago as they are now, but “other times, other manners.”

The standard of living has come in for comment. There never was a time when there was not some poverty somewhere. The farmer's woes were referred to. I shall make a brief comment on that, though it may not be very satisfying. I am a farmer myself and I found it rather difficult to live by farming. So far as actual farming is concerned, I find it easier to live now —much easier—than it was some time ago. It is true that farmers have been hard hit by the cattle situation. On the other hand, they have had compensations. Farmers have spoken to me on this matter. They told me that they felt the brunt of the economic war and that they felt it severely. But they recognised that it was inevitable, that they would have to go through with it, and that they could not possibly desert the position that had been taken up. I have had not one or two farmers but scores coming to me and telling me that, and I do not say that for the sake of political advantage. Nobody feels more for the farmers than I do. Being a farmer myself, I appreciate their difficulties, but there has never been a time when the farmers were well off in any country. In every country, it is recognised that agriculture is the cinderella of the sciences. There are too many people engaged in it. If the tariffs imposed by the present Government for the protection of agriculture were thrown down and the floodgates opened to competition again, it is easy to visualise what would happen to the farmers. However, that is not really relevant to the Vote. I think that all the work in connection with the League of Nations and all that is germane to the League of Nations has been conducted as well as it possibly could be conducted on our behalf. The President, as Minister for External Affairs, has, by his dignity, reflected credit on this country in his handling of political situations abroad. Why a motion should be moved to refer back the Vote, I do not know, except it is with the idea of letting the country see how futile and how impotent the views of the Opposition are.

The last speaker gave us a little more information than we got from the President regarding the position taken up by the Government and the Government Party. The Deputy was highly incensed at anybody on this side of the House daring to mention the economic war on the Vote for External Affairs.

Merely amused—not incensed.

The Deputy said that this dispute was merely a domestic matter. So, Great Britain is not an external country, and we are not in external association with the British Government. The President is amused also. I take it that it is because it would not be relevant to this Vote he made no mention of the economic war or of the coal-cattle pact. On this Vote, the President could not tell us about the economic war, although he was irrelevant enough to take in matters appertaining to the League of Nations which have a separate Vote. Deputies were, however, allowed by the Chair to raise this matter and to deal with it. The Deputy from Wexford says he was only amused. He spoke as if he were very angry with Deputies on this side. He talked about their keenness for the connection with the British Empire, and he suggested that anybody who dared question the wisdom of the Fianna Fáil Government or the Fianna Fáil Party was an enemy not alone of Fianna Fáil but of the country. To question the wisdom of the Party on the opposite side is to be guilty of treachery and treason to your own country. The Deputy admitted immediately afterwards that there are people in this country who have been suffering, and suffering very heavily, as a result of the economic war. They are suffering very heavily. Deputy Kehoe told us that he was glad to say that he was doing very well on his farm.

Quite well, thank you.

I am glad to hear it. But the Deputy is doing well upon his farm because of certain crops that are highly subsidised at the expense of other sections of the community. But Deputy Kehoe ought to realise that you cannot have throughout the whole of the Free State the type of farming he is lucky enough to be able to carry on in Wexford, or that farmers are able to carry on in my own constituency of Tipperary. The majority of the farmers in this country cannot take advantage of the highly subsidised crops that are grown in Wexford and Tipperary. Therefore, they are losing heavily. They have to subscribe towards the subsidies for the highly subsidised crops that the Deputy and a few lucky farmers like him are in a position to grow. The Deputy might have a different opinion of the economic war if he had to make ends meet on the unsubsidised products of his own farm. He would then know what it was to bear the full brunt of the economic war, and he might have a different opinion about it. I am sure he would not then object so much to the matter being raised in this House.

Deputy Tom Kelly intervened in this debate and told us what he knew about the prosperity of the country. He said the people were affected only to a very slight extent by the carrying on of the economic war. He told us about the thousands of young men that he saw wearing fairly decent suits of clothes going to Croke Park. That, he said, was an indication of the prosperity of the country. The country would want to be very badly off, indeed, if some 30,000 or 35,000 of the young men of this country could not go to Croke Park once a year for the Gaelic final. Deputy Kelly went on and talked about the prosperity of Dublin City. No one will question the Deputy's knowledge of Dublin City. He said he never saw the city looking so well, or so many signs of prosperity. Well, I invite the Deputy to read the proceedings of the Dublin Board of Assistance yesterday. If he does so, he will find that over 7,000 people in this city that he tells us is so prosperous are in receipt of outdoor relief or home assistance. He will observe that that is an increase of over 500 persons on the relief lists over the corresponding period of last year. That appears to me as not showing much sign of that prosperity that appears to be so real to the Deputy. If Deputy Kelly would further keep in the back of his mind that in the last fortnight over 40,000 men have been deprived even of the small sums they were getting by way of unemployment assistance, and that for a period of nearly six months they will not even have that to fall back upon, he would have some realisation of the conditions in the country. We are challenged by Deputy Tom Kelly from Dublin, and by Deputy Kehoe from Wexford, to say in what way we would have the economic war settled. They challenge us to give them the solution. I suggest that Deputy Eamonn Cooney ought be asked for the solution which he had in mind when he told the people of Dublin last night that a settlement was to be looked for in a very short time if the people returned a Fianna Fáil majority to the Dublin Corporation. One recollects that that particular Deputy made another famous speech upon the occasion of another election in Dublin when speaking in Grangegorman——

The local elections in Dublin are not now before the House.

I can assure you, Sir, I am not responsible for bringing that matter in here. I quite agree that the people have got enough of them outside.

Deputy Kelly introduced them into the debate.

Deputy Kelly wandered far beyond the Dublin elections. Not alone did he go back 12 months, but he went back centuries. I do not attempt to join issue with Deputy Kelly on historical questions, or, indeed, on his knowledge of the features of the Irish Times and its writers at the present time. I notice that the people on the opposite side are a little more interested and a little more appreciative of the Irish Times latterly than they used to be some years ago. Deputy Kelly said— and he was joined by Deputy Kehoe in this—that the position so far as the economic war was concerned was that the British will not surrender and we cannot surrender. The British will not settle and we cannot settle. Are we to take it from that that we have to reconcile ourselves to the continuation of the economic war so long as the Fianna Fáil Government is in power? I suppose that is the interpretation that we must place on that statement. The present Government is satisfied that there is no possible hope of bringing about a settlement of this economic war, and the farmers have to reconcile themselves to the position of high tariffs and low prices. They must pay high tariffs on what they purchase, while they are to receive low prices for what they have to sell. Are we to have another coal-cattle-cement-steel-and-iron pact next year? When Deputy Kelly says we cannot settle or attempt to settle, we cannot surrender or attempt to surrender, he should ask himself this question—“To what extent was the position surrendered or compromised by the coal-cattle pact of last year and more so by the coal-cattle-cement pact of this year?”

The President dealt in rather a vague way, I suggest, with the defence of this country. He indicated that small nations could no longer depend upon the League of Nations. He said that small nations would have to take measures for the protection of their own countries and their own peoples. But the President did not indicate what measures, if any, were to be taken by his Government to protect the lives of the citizens of this State in the case of war. He talked vaguely about the occupation of the ports. The President said that the British had no right there, that they endangered our neutrality. So long as the British remained in these ports our neutrality would, he said, be endangered; we would be much safer if they remained away, and if we ourselves took the necessary measures to provide for our own defence. I think in view of the statement that the President made afterwards that the position in Europe was to-day more serious than it has been at any time since the Great War, we are entitled to know whether our Government is in a position to take adequate steps to safeguard the lives of the people of this country. We know very well that the army of any European nation that desired to attack this country could manage to eat their breakfast in Europe, drop bombs on any part of this country they liked, and then be back in time for lunch in their own country. So far as I know there is nothing to prevent their doing so. Deputy Kehoe told us that his solution was "Clear out of the ports." That was the Deputy's solution. Answering the question that was asked by Deputy Mulcahy as to what the Government was going to do to protect the shores of this country, Deputy Kehoe said: "Make the British clear out of our ports; there is no fear of us because in order to protect themselves the British will have to protect us." Is that what the Deputy is falling back upon now? I suggest that is what is at the back of the President's mind, but he will not say it. Deputy Kehoe was honest enough to tell us— but indeed there was no necessity— that he was not able to interpret the mind of the President. I can assure him that I accept that statement absolutely. That is one statement which, I think, will be accepted not only by the members of this Party but by most people in this country. It is no reflection whatever upon the Deputy's ability or intelligence.

I do suggest to the Deputy with all possible respect, that he might have considered his words a little when he told us that it was a good thing that the Abyssinians were conquered, because they are now going to be civilised, and they are going to be fed in peace instead of being starved. That came immediately after the Deputy's denouncing us as hypocrites for mentioning Abyssinia. He told us to remember the way in which this country had been treated for centuries, and he proceeded to use, in support of Italy as against Abyssinia, the very words that were used by the British when they sought to justify the occupation of this country, to civilise it and feed us in peace, rather than allow us to starve wrangling amongst ourselves.

On the Vote for External Affairs only, because I want to separate the League of Nations matters entirely from the points raised in the discussion on this Vote. There is only one outstanding matter to be discussed on this Vote for External Affairs in a situation which has been described as one verging upon war. We are more nearly approaching war than at any time since the end of the European War. It is, at any rate, useful to find that Mr. Pecksniff, though presumably dead, can still speak in this House in the person of Deputy Kehoe. Deputy Kehoe thinks Abyssinia will now be civilised; Abyssinia will now be brought under discipline with a regard for law and order. Deputy Kehoe might think a little bit and see if this phrase would not awaken an ugly memory. It does not need very deep historical research to find the point I am after. Deputy Kelly tells us that the cause of the economic war is in the answer to the rhetorical question: What right have the English here anyhow? I did not know that the economic war was being waged to put the British out of this country. I never heard it stated yet.

Mr. Kelly

You are not too old to learn.

I like to learn from a good teacher. I did not choose the Deputy.

Mr. Kelly

You are not asked to.

The Deputy will find more to teach than himself. He will have to teach his own Party and the Government because, if that is the excuse, they have not yet put it forward—the economic war being waged for some reasons framed in the question: What right have the English here anyhow? At any rate, the Englishman, faced with that question, might say that if he were bere he would pay more for Irish butter than he pays in England and a heap of other things. He gets these cheap in England by being out of this country. He was put out about the period in which the present Government were not here. The Deputy is also convinced that the country is in a good condition, because men come to Gaelic matches at Croke Park and the city is looking lovely, like the way Lucan used to be. I wonder would he apply that standard if I asked him to pass judgment upon a community and picked out two or three people glittering with a certain amount of ease and asked him simply to translate that down to the ranks of the poor, who are to be always with us.

Why should not the city look well? The only bit of activity there has been since the Government came into office is building activity. The only people who have got employment, outside the two or three members of farmers' families put on to the land by the subsidisation of certain crops, are those who have got it through building. Where is the main building activity? Does the Deputy ever realise that, at the period which just preceded the worst phase of misery Germany ever had, there was gaiety and glittering in the capital? It is the same psychological reason that causes much the same thing here to-day. Money was coming easily, because it was dole or subsidy; money was spent easily; it was not spent productively; spent merely to get some increase in consuming goods, nothing in the way of production. The Deputy had better read the signs a little more accurately before he ventures into speech here, if that is the only foundation he has for his belief and his loyal support of and adherence to the President.

There is only one topic that should be discussed on external affairs and that is our relationship with the neighbouring island. The President says we are near to war—at least the omens point towards war, and most people as well as the newspapers use the same sombre sort of language when speaking of the present situation. What is the President's lead to this country in regard to the threatening war situation? While the League of Nations will discuss his attitude to that, I do not think I distort his view by saying that he has despaired of the League as an effective method of preventing the use of war as an instrument in national policy. He has only a backward glance at the League, possibly with a certain amount of sadness, and only looking to it in future as a debating society. Now, the shattering of the League may mean that people may have to face up definitely to realities. How does the President face up to the reality of the situation that is then before us? Rather shamblingly.

Some time ago, when there seemed to be no reason for the phrase being used, he did definitely cut adrift from what were supposed to be the ancient traditions of this country—traditions that might have been carried on one time, but certainly, when carried into modern times, were absurd, the traditions summed up in the phrase of England's difficulty being Ireland's opportunity. He announced that neither this Government nor, from what he conceived, any other Government, would allow the shores of this country to be used as a means of aggression against England. That is a half-hearted attempt to get at the problem, to meet the situation. We are not going to allow the shores of this country to be used for aggression against England. Are we going to stand alone? Do we think we can stand alone? If we are not going to have the League of Nations, with some weakness or strength in collective security, where do we look for security? Is it in our own country? If so, what money do we propose to spend on armaments, and on what type of armaments? What are our defensive works to be, and what will they cost? What are going to be our preparations to withstand the attack that must be envisaged, if an attack is contemplated upon this country from the air, and the use, to which countries have now become somewhat callous after Abyssinia, of the most terrible forms of gas poisoning of all descriptions—poisons which, if used in this country, will be used on a completely defenceless nation? Is there no necessity, under these circumstances, for the President to look a little bit further ahead than merely to say that "the shores of this country will not be permitted for use aggressively against England"? Does the President contemplate any alliance, and if so, with whom? In these circumstances, when that sort of question has got to be faced realistically, it is surely futile to talk of the ports being controlled by care and maintenance parties.

The President, I understand, stated to-day that the fact that these ports were so controlled gives a potential enemy of England a better right to make us an enemy also. The President must know, if there is any realism in his composition, that whether we were with care and maintenance parties in our ports, whether we were a dominion fully fledged in the British Commonwealth, or whether we were a republic fully fledged, in or outside the British Commonwealth, what we have in our ports, except we have terrific engines of defence, will not matter if any would-be belligerent thinks it would be worth while attacking this country as a method of getting in a blow against England or any other country. The only way in which care and maintenance parties in our ports will ever arise will be in the interesting blue and green and yellow book issued after the war, when academic minds will discuss whether or not there was some greater colour of belligerency about our situation because of these people having been there. As far as practical politics are concerned, the fact that there are care and maintenance parties in our ports matters nothing. Historians later will write about it. Those who hold sympathy with us will say it was a pity they were there. Those who will have no sympathy with us will say that we deserved it because they were there. They will all know that, if it was of use to a belligerent to attack us in order to attack England, we would be attacked as Belgium was attacked.

If it does appear to be a matter of urgent policy to try and get rid of these care and maintenance parties in our ports, where do we stop logically in the argument? Apply that argument to the North of Ireland. If an enemy has the right to attack this country because there are care and maintenance parties in our ports, has it not equally the same increased right because there are English troops along the Border? If there was a war, or a threatened war situation, we know that British troops there now would be increased in numbers and in military strength. If an excuse be required in the event of war breaking out, and an excuse under international law for making us a belligerent because of certain reactions of the Treaty and of the presence of care and maintenance parties in our ports, and in old disused forts, is there not the same justification because part of the territory is occupied and under the control of British troops? Must we wait for the application of the minds of our Government to practical politics and realities until we get the care and maintenance parties cleared out of the ports and the British troops cleared out of the North of Ireland?

Possibly, I went too far in saying that the presence of care and maintenance parties in our ports meant nothing. If anything it means a safeguard. One does not like to admit that, but, surely, in a real world we have got to think of ourselves as geographically close to England and likely to suffer in any war in which she is involved on one side and only able—it is not certain that even that will happen—to sit calmly by if Britain becomes the aggressor in a war, making the theatre of the conflict something far removed from these shores. But on any occasion in which, whether Britain is the aggressor or not, the theatre of war is somewhere contiguous, or where the foe attacks England, this country is in that war whether it likes it or not.

The President has so far forgotten, or perhaps I should say wisely put aside, the old catch words that used to rule and ruin Irish life, the rule and ruin that was carried forward from the old bad past to the new times. He has so far forgotten these things that he can say what any man prior to him would have been derided for saying, "that the shores of this country will not be permitted to be used aggressively against England." Can he not become more of a realist and admit that this business of neutrality, of this country becoming a neutralised State, is possible, or, if possible, is safe and secure for this country? Belgium was neutral, but it saved her nothing. Indeed, it drove the forces upon her. I do not know whether the phrase the President used to-day is to be taken to mean that the aim is some sort of perpetual neutrality for this country. I do not know if he believes that that is a feasible policy. I do not know if he has any belief whatever that, even if it were feasible, it would be a secure policy, and, if it is not, can we stand alone? If we cannot stand alone and cannot be perpetually neutral, must we have an alliance, and, if so, with what country can we possibly get an alliance except the one? Can the President give a lead to the country on these matters and tell us what his forebodings are? Can he tell us what are the necessary sacrifices that this country may be called upon to make in order to make even although it be ineffective preparation, at any rate the sort of preparation that people in a state of desperation might be asked to make if the hour of their evil destiny is on them. The President should not stop short at saying that the country will not be used against England. We cannot prevent other people regarding us as an ally of England in certain circumstances. Whether they regard us as an ally or not, they are certain to embroil us in any conflict that takes place. What are our preparations? If they are not such preparations as will give us some chance of survival for a period until we get some echo of public opinion in our favour throughout the world, what are we going to gain by an alliance with any country other than England?

In view of the statement made by the speaker who has just sat down, I do not know whether I should reserve what I have to say on the League of Nations until the Vote for the League of Nations comes before the House.

I am prepared to discuss the League of Nations now if that is considered preferable.

The Deputy was not here at the opening. I suggested then that on this Vote we should deal with the whole question of foreign affairs: our relations with Great Britain, the question of the League of Nations, the question of defence and external affairs generally. The reason was that it would be rather hard to separate one thing from another, and as it was almost certain that all these questions would be referred to, it was suggested that it would be better to take them all on this Vote and allow matters of detail to be raised on the Votes when they came separately before the House. Perhaps as I am on my feet now it is just as well that I should continue. What I have to say may knit debate on the question of the League of Nations afterwards.

This morning I spoke in the main on the question of the League of Nations and the position in which we find ourselves. I indicated the line that I would take in regard to these matters if I were representing this country at Geneva, as possibly I shall. I said that it was clear from what happened in the case of Abyssinia that those who depended upon the League of Nations for their security were depending upon a broken reed. I differ with Deputy MacDermot in the view that the case was a bad one for the League of Nations. My view is that there was never a better chance for the League of Nations to be successful against a great Power as there was in that case, and that if it failed in the case of Italy it was bound to fail in the case of other Powers. I believe that if there was between two of the great Powers, a harmony of view, and if they had the same view about obligations under the Covenant, and approached the matter with a singleness of mind for the preservation of the Covenant and its obligations, there would not have been the debacle in Ethiopia that we see now. I feel confident of that. I do say that the conditions were, perhaps, the best conditions one could anticipate for the successful application of sanctions.

Except for the fact that the application of sanctions was totally unexpected.

We will deal in a moment with the question of their being known in advance. It was not the first case. We had the case of Japan. As many Deputies are aware, I happened to be President of the Council just at that period, and I know pretty well what were the considerations that were affecting the attitude of the representatives of the different nations at that time. The truth was that they believed they could not impose their will upon Japan and make Japan do what it was her duty to do under the Covenant. To be quite frank about it, they quite feared the consequences of any attempt in that direction. They did not do it, and Japan went forward on the road of conquest, and you had the State of Manchukuo set up. I think there has been, so far, no formal recognition given to it, but still it did not stop Japan. There was no serious attempt made to stop Japan, and, of course, Italy afterwards made a grievance of the fact that she was being singled out for the application of these sanctions, while Japan was let go. It became clear to anybody, after the case of Japan, that if a State were strong enough to defy other States, that is, if it was in such a position that the other States would not face the risk of attacking her militarily, that she could get away with it.

In the case of Bolivia and Paraguay, a case of small States, you had a similar position of ineffectiveness, and why? Because there was the question of interference. One of the things that held it up for a long period was the question of interference by the League on the American Continent. That dispute ended, not through the good offices of the League or by League intervention, but through the weariness of war, exhaustion through war.

We have now, finally, the case of Italy. We loyally did our duty in the matter, and I hold that what we did do we were bound to do and there was no question whatever about the position. I certainly do not, for one moment, share the view that Abyssinia is going to be civilised, and all the rest of it. If that was the simple aim of any power, there were ways of doing it other than by taking away the liberty of the country. The League of Nations had ample machinery by which, if there were powers interested in civilising Abyssinia or in bringing about better conditions for the unfortunate people of Abyssinia, they could do it and the Abyssinian people would still be allowed to retain their liberty. I have no doubt at all that it was aggression pure and simple, and it was because I was strongly of that view that I felt we were bound to take the action we took.

We have the present position in Abyssinia. We do not want to condone what has been done. Deputy Alton asked us were we to leave the unfortunate Abyssinians to their fate. The fact is that we are not able, by ourselves, to assist them, and unless the States are prepared to do now what they were not prepared to do then, that is, to face a much more difficult task now than the task they shirked during the progress of hostilities, we can do nothing for Abyssinia. That is the truth. The continuance of sanctions, in my opinion, is not going to relieve Abyssinia. It may be a gesture. If I were speaking at the co-ordination committee in Geneva, I would say that as sanctions had not been successful, and as there is no prospect that they will be successful, there is no point in keeping on sanctions purely as a gesture. I do not think all the other States would do it, in any case, and we might be realists in this. The Deputy who has just sat down spoke about realists. When I come to deal with him I think I will be able to show that he is the person who is not the realist in this matter because he is omitting one important factor in the whole situation.

In regard to Abyssinia, realism would lead us to this conclusion, that we are not able to help Abyssinia. There is no suggestion of a crusade to go and free Abyssinia and, if there was a suggestion of a crusade, I do not believe any Government here would be strong enough to lead the Irish people into such a crusade. Perhaps in our case there would be greater difficulties than in most cases: in our case there is the difficulty that people will say "Charity begins at home." The same statements that were made at the beginning of the Great War would be made again and we would be told, "If there are small nations to be liberated, then ours is a small nation which is not completely liberated." We ought not to ask other people to do, at any rate, that which we are not prepared to do ourselves. We are not prepared, as a nation, I believe, to join in a campaign of military sanctions because no other sanctions are effective. There would be effective sanctions which might not be called strictly military, but it is obvious that the nations that knew most about what would be the result and the nations that would have had to bear the brunt of the result were convinced that if they did two or three of the things that obviously were the things that should have been tried if there was a serious mind to prevent the conquest of Abyssinia, namely, the putting on of oil sanctions, oil being an important part of the material of war, and the closing of the Suez Canal, there would be an extension of hostilities. The moment that there was a shirking of taking those measures it was obvious that the threat of war and the extension of it to the European Continent was sufficient to negative any movement in that direction. That is the real position.

I do not believe that economic sanctions will ever be useful or ever be effective unless there is the will to follow those sanctions with whatever military measures may be necessary to make them effective. When you want to strengthen the League of Nations in the direction that Deputy MacDermot, I take it, would like, you must have the people ready to follow up economic sanctions by military sanctions, and if you stop short of that you might as well let the thing go. I am speaking now of when it is a question of a big nation being the aggressor. A small nation might be crushed out rapidly enough, and, of course, the military sanctions would not mean the same thing in their regard. But that is the position with regard to the big nations. Then, of course, there is always suspicion; the big Powers are suspicious of each other; the smaller States are suspicious of the big States. That state of suspicion is going to be abroad as long as you have those rival ambitions, and as long as you have either the will to aggrandise oneself or the will to pursue a national aim by any means that are necessary for the securing of that aim. That is, unfortunately, the world we live in. I wish that it were otherwise, and I think it is the duty of everybody to strive to make it otherwise, but you will never make it otherwise, I hold, without taking account of the position as it is.

Apart from the League of Nations altogether, I believe that the States which have vital interests in Abyssinia would themselves have taken action on account of their own interests, were it not for what modern wars mean, and what the extension of a modern war to the countries of Europe would mean generally for all the peoples of Europe. I believe that the ultimate thing which stopped action on the part of States that were interested was the fact that modern war is terrible for all peoples. Perhaps a realisation of what modern war is will cause Governments to hesitate. There is another difficulty, of course, in the world of to-day. If we were all democratic States, where you had directly elected representatives immediately responsible to the people, you might have a check on Governments that might want to lead nations into war for any object whatsoever, unless it was an object that was generally approved by the people to such an extent that the people were prepared to make whatever sacrifices were involved. But when you have some States which are democratic, and others which are not, it is quite obvious that the play of public opinion is not uniform, and therefore you will have suspicions. The natural suspicions that are there to-day will be intensified.

In view then of the situation as it is, my view at least is that the League of Nations has set itself a task beyond its power to accomplish. It was not set up on a foundation which would give reasonable hope, I think, that it could accomplish that task. The League of Nations was bound up with a Treaty, which itself was designed to perpetuate a position brought about by the victory of military forces. Because it was bound up with that, and because it was designed to keep static a position which was an unreal position inasmuch as it represented a temporary weakness of one nation, through war—a weakness that was not likely to continue—it had in itself certain injustices, and as it was founded on what would be felt by large sections to be a basis of injustice, it could not last. Unfortunately, the principle of self-determination is not applicable generally; it is extremely difficult to apply. It could be easily enough, in my opinion, applied in this country. If there was ever a country where the principle of self-determination could be applied it seems to me to be this country, but on the Continent of Europe it is a very different matter; the principle of self-determination seems to me to be one that you could hardly apply there. The only way I can see that it could be done would be by some form of concentration; the various groups might be gathered together in one form or other and represented in some sort of centre. If the principle of self-determination, which was at the back of President Wilson's mind, were generally applicable, and you had States whose territory corresponded to the national territory, and the boundaries of your States were the boundaries of nations, then you might possibly have on that foundation a league which would guarantee the boundaries of those nations. But even that would hardly do, because you would have the problem of increasing populations to deal with, and a number of other problems of that sort, which would make even a League of Nations founded on the basis of the Wilsonian theory find it almost impossible to carry on in practice.

I think, therefore, that the League of Nations, if it is to do useful work, must begin on the things it can do, and hold out no hopes to people beyond hopes that can be realised. The very fact of the frightfulness of modern war will bring people to think twice and try to settle their differences if some reasonable chance of doing it is available to them. I think every chance ought to be made available through the organisation of the League of Nations, but compulsory powers, I think, are out of the question.

What advantage does the President suggest that the League of Nations would then have over the old methods of diplomacy, and the use of one's ambassadors?

I think the fact that there is a venue which brings together statesmen from different countries would have an advantage. There would be a place in which they would meet to consider problems in common, and so on. I think at any rate you would have a foundation which would get respect, and it might develop bit by bit as it was found possible. I may say that I originally approached this problem—not for the last year or two but I originally approached it —from the point of view of making sanctions more complete, and trying to bring about that certainty in application which Deputy MacDermot would like to have. But knowing our people and knowing our conditions, there is no use whatever in entering into pacts that we could not work loyally. In view of that fact I have had to realise that it was impossible for us here loyally to carry out our obligations under an arrangement of that sort, if it involved sending expeditionary forces outside this country. The same is true of the other States; it was obvious the moment sanctions were being applied. In view of the possibility of having to apply similar sanctions against other countries, the Scandinavian States, which are the States of all others that have been most faithful to the League principles in my opinion. immediately made it clear that they could not be a party to any sanctions of a military character, and made it quite clear also that they were not bound under the Covenant to pursue any such sanctions.

These countries, of course, have to consider what their position would be if, for instance, a neighbouring country of theirs—a neighbouring large State—were a State against which sanctions were to be taken. When you take into detailed consideration the position in Europe to-day, I think you will have to come to the conclusion that I have come to—and I have come to it regretfully and sorrowfully—and that is that the League of Nations, as at present constituted, cannot do the work that is expected of it, and that it is better to realise that quickly instead of having some further humiliations—to use the word that has been used by some Deputies with regard to the position of all the States that have taken sanctions in the Abyssinian affair— that it is better to realise that quickly if we are to save ourselves from humiliations of that sort in the future and save some of the States from the unfortunate position in which Abyssinia finds itself to-day. I think that, of all the things that have happened, it is not the humiliation of the States that have taken sanctions that is the worst feature at all of the failure of the League. It is the fact that a State whose independence had been guaranteed solemnly, not merely by the State that invaded it, but by all the other States, has now lost its independence. That is the sad feature about the whole situation and, as I said this morning, I believe that Abyssinia would have put up a far better defence and would never have waited as long as it did had it not been relying on the League of Nations. If it had been relying on its own strength, the first moment it saw an attempt being made at the concentration of troops for an attack upon it by another State, it would have struck at least before that other State had got together the huge forces that it did get together in this case. Of course, I may be quite wrong about that. I am not pretending to have any special knowledge of it, but it seems to me that that is what the Abyssinian people and the Abyssinian Government would think to-day if they were to ask themselves what would happen if they had to rely on the League of Nations. As I said this morning, they waited beyond any reasonable time in order that there might be not the slightest doubt as to who was the aggressor. They were afraid that if they took action earlier they would be regarded as the aggressor and they wanted to have a clear case so that the League of Nations might act. They did that and as a result they are in their present position.

There is no use in other States being led into a situation of that sort and I think that what I am saying is the feeling of most people in this country. We would like to think that there was in the League an assurance of security. Long before the present position arose, however, we tried to get the League to realise that machinery was necessary in order to deal with the developing situation. There was no attempt, for instance, made to revise treaties and bring them in accord with the needs and position of the States that were affected by them to-day. We heard talk of the possibility of making the raw materials available. When? We heard it in an eleventh-hour moment when it was obvious that the suggestion, or the gesture, was going to be of very little use. As I said on that occasion, and I think I could repeat it here, the unfortunate thing is that, when grievances exist and when they are there obviously crying for redress, there is no attempt made to redress them until a crisis is created, and the method by which you try to get wrongs remedied that have been crying for redress is by creating a crisis. You had that in another part of Europe a short time ago, and that is because there is no machinery attached to the League for dealing in advance with such problems as I have mentioned. I do not know if there is any machinery of that sort that could be attached to the League because nations, like individuals, are selfish and will hold on to any special strength or superiority that they may have until the last moment, and they are only content to give it up when superior force compels them to give it up and they think that they are serving the national interest by doing that.

To summarise, anyhow, in this present situation, I think that there is no use in a continuance of sanctions. Continuance of sanctions, as far as I can see, is not going, unless other sanctions were to follow, to do what they have failed in doing up to the present, and the wisest thing, therefore, is to let them go and forget about them. The next thing, I believe is that the League of Nations, as it is constituted at present, is a danger rather than a benefit.

A mockery, a delusion and a snare.

If we had the choice to-morrow of continuing on with the old League of Nations as it was or withdrawing from it, the advice I would give our Government would be to withdraw—unless it is reconstructed, and reconstructed on some lines that give greater hope than has existed up to the present.

Does the President believe in regional pacts as a substitute for the League of Nations?

Well, I do not know that there is any substitute in that direction. What I mean is that I do not think anything is going to save us in the immediate future from another war of some kind or another. People are ready to forget so rapidly. It seems to be a very pessimistic attitude of mine but the more our people and every other people realise the direction in which we are going at the present time, the better, in my opinion. I do not want to suggest that we should abandon hope, but my own view is that there is no substitute. Nothing that you can put in place of the League of Nations will do what the League of Nations has failed to do, if I may put it that way.

Well, then, I think I can pass on from the League of Nations. Now, on the question of national defence, I suggest that anybody looking at our position must realise that, although in theory we cannot be actively committed, according to the Constitution, to any war without the express consent of Parliament, the fact is that we are liable to be dragged into war against our will, and must realise that the position of our ports is a grievous factor in the whole situation and a dangerous factor in the whole situation. I would suggest to Deputy McGilligan, if he really wants to be a genuine realist, that he should take into account what is going to be the attitude of our people. Is not the fundamental thing here, in any crisis, the attitude of our people as a whole? I do believe that public opinion can be created and that the public can be led to see certain things, but the one thing that will stand out to our people in the future, if there is a situation of war, is the fact that certain of our ports are held against our people's will. I do not agree with Deputy McGilligan for one moment that it is an advantage. From the point of view of our people's attitude, it is a serious disadvantage, and if to-morrow we had these ports—at least those in the Twenty-Six Counties—we could take measures of defence which would have the support of the whole of our people.

The question of the Volunteers was raised. A couple of years ago the Government started to recruit a force which would be available here for defence in time of need. I wanted particularly to have a force which would enable us to say that we could defend our own shores. What was the campaign from two sides against that force? It was suggested by our opponents that the force was intended to be a political force; that it was intended to be a Party force. To-day we had Deputy Mulcahy suggesting that there were some political tests applied to members joining that force. There was no test of any kind applied, so far as I know. The only test was that those who joined would do so for the express purpose of adding to the national defence and fitting themselves to be available to defend the national interests in a time of crisis. It was opposed from another angle, that it was intended to be a British force, a force to supplement the British forces somewhere. Neither idea was in the mind of the Government. The sole idea in our minds in starting that force was to have a force here which would enable the manpower of this country to be available for the defence of our own interests at home and nowhere else. Perhaps the organisation of the force has been slower than was wise in the national interests, but we thought it better to go slowly and to allow people to come in in sober moments, so to speak, and not in any wave of national enthusiasm—that we were likely to get a better class of recruit if we had young men who were attracted into the force, because they saw in it a means of carrying out what is the duty of every one of us, to defend the national interest. If those who have been talking about the necessity of defence would only tell the truth with regard to that force, I have no doubt that we could get—if we wanted to increase the force rapidly—twice or three times the present numbers without any difficulty. That we could defend ourselves against the attack of any great Power, I do not think anyone is foolish enough to imagine that we could do so for any length of time, but we may presume, if a great Power were to attack us that there would be interested parties in such an event, and that in a case of that sort it is almost certain, in the world as it is to-day, a position like that would not arise in which we alone were being affected by such action. In such an event, it is obvious that if we had control of our ports we would be able to mobilise our own forces to defend them, and any other country interested would be only too willing to give aid also.

But what is the present position as it seems to the mind of any Irishman? What are you going to defend yourselves against? If we had our independence, if we had something precious that we did not want to lose to any Power the position might be different, but we are not in that position because our ports are held obviously against the will of our people, and our nation is partitioned, and how then do you expect you could mobilise the strength of this nation in a case of that kind? I say, as far as the British are concerned, if they have any wisdom whatever, they will realise that if there was a serious threat to them through us, or through our territory, that serious threat could be met ten times as effectively, if this nation was in the position that it had its independence to protect than it would be met if there were British troops here against its will. Might not our people say: "Very well what are we to defend? Are we to defend ourselves against one master when we have got another, maybe under worse conditions?" I am not going to suggest that the conditions under some other Power might not be infinitely worse, as far as this country is concerned, than they are at the moment, but until we have complete independence the man power and the full resources of this country will not be available for our defence and, consequently, would not be available to prevent an attack on Britain through us. Deputy McGilligan makes light of the old forts; that they are useless, and my answer is: "Why do the British hold on to them? Why are the British anxious to retain them? Why do they not hand over these useless things to us?" In case there was a serious threat on our independence, as there might be if we were independent, and there was an attack on us, it would immediately bring all our strength to bear, and there would be on the part of the British the same reason for getting all her forces to prevent it as there is to-day. It is a question of having A plus B instead of having A minus B as it seems to me. We have tried to get the British Government to understand that if to-morrow we could promise security, that security could be far better attained by having the independence of this country recognised and the defence of this country, in so far as we are able to man it, left to ourselves. The whole situation here would be changed from the point of view of defence if we could succeed in that. Until we succeed in that I do not care what Government is in office they will have the difficulties that we have.

Does the President envisage a Twenty-Six County republic or one for the whole of Ireland?

I am not talking about that. If my will was going to prevail, I would have a republic for the 32 counties, and I think that is the attitude of three-fourths of our people. What their foreign policy in that position would be is another matter. Whatever their foreign policy would be, it would be one into which they deliberately entered, and one to which they could be loyal. The trouble at present is that the majority of our people cannot be loyal to a situation which they feel is being forced upon them.

I follow the President, but when he said A plus B, compared with A minus B, did he refer to B as the Twenty-Six County republic?

I said if this country were completely free. As far as I am concerned this country is this island.

That is clear. That is what I wanted to have made clear.

Will the President make provision for the safety of his own citizens instead of making provision against possible foreign foes?

Deputy Anthony, I take it, is on the same point as Deputy McGilligan.

I wanted to clarify the position.

I think Deputy McGilligan made a point that everyone has to have in mind. You could argue much better if you had got the three forts which the British occupy with care and maintenance parties, and that under the Treaty they try to claim the right to ask for facilities. If we had these as our own, are we much better off so long as the Six Counties are not under our control? My answer is that we are somewhat better off. That we are not completely in the position in which I should like to be, in which the whole of this nation could be mobilised, I will admit, but the first thing I want to see, at any rate, is that the territory which is immediately under our jurisdiction would be one for which we would have, and could undertake freely, the responsibility of defending.

I have said so often in public that there is really no need to repeat it, that, so far as this Government is concerned, they can never feel that a genuine lasting peace between Britain and ourselves can be brought about so long as a portion of this country is unjustly divided from the rest. If anybody wants me to say anything further upon it, I would say that to see this country reunited should be the primary objective of national policy. If those on the opposite benches want that as a common point of agreement, I am with them. We can all agree upon that, I hope. I think it was back in 1917 or 1918 that one of the things uppermost in the mind of all the people was the question of the reunion of this country and the securing of this country to be a single State. I do not think there was anybody here who supported that at the time who was not prepared then, as they are prepared now, to consider, as a matter of external policy, agreements with other countries, and making the best agreements they could so far as matters of common concern were affected. With regard to the present situation then, I say that, mainly on account of the fact that portions of our territory are held by British forces—they claim they have a right there—our whole defensive position is complicated. I say that it is a position that we have a right to demand should be remedied, and that, looking at it from the point of view of the interests of our people, and of the people across the water, so far as I can do so, it would be to the interest of both people that that should happen. Anything we can do to bring that about, we will do, as we have been trying to do. To think you can do anything in a direction which is contrary to the general national spirit here is a mistake, and any Government that would depend upon forcing some sort of agreement or alliance, which is contrary to the traditional feeling of our people, is attempting the impossible. The sooner we come to realise that the better, and it is with feelings of grave apprehension that I have seen the position develop in Europe that is developing for the last couple of years.

Now, with regard to our relations in general with Great Britain, so far as we are concerned, and I think I represent in this, not merely the attitude of the vast majority of the Deputies here, but the attitude of our people in general, we want to live with the neighbouring people in amity. We recognise we have certain interests in common, but we want to be in a position in which we can face those interests in the proper manner and in the proper spirit. We hold that it is they by the unrighteous continuance of aggression—and I regard the holding of our ports as an act of aggression against our people; our people do not want it and have a right to their own territory; and I regard the partition of this country as an act of aggression against our people—who have brought about the difficulty of working in harmony for mutual interest. I say that we are not the aggressors and the problem for us is: In our desire to bring about good relations, are we to surrender the things that every Irishman knows are his and do not belong to the people across the water? It is we who are asked to surrender these things. We are asking that the others should surrender only that to which they have no right, and there is no use in talking about right in the League of Nations, or elsewhere, if people try to turn a blind eye to the wrong being done to our people here. Anybody who does that is in an impossible position when he tries to talk altruistically of justice and fair-play and all the rest of it in other courts.

The question of the economic war was raised. Again, that is an effort by our people to get what is theirs, in their opinion. We were prepared to let it go to an international tribunal for settlement. The British immediately, in order to put us into a certain political situation, demanded that the tribunal should be a Commonwealth tribunal. Some of their spokesmen pretended that we were bound to do that by agreements already made. We were bound to do no such thing. Our attitude with regard to these moneys is that we are retaining moneys which we are satisfied are moneys that belong to the Irish people and if the alternative is to continue as we are or to pay over those moneys, so far as this Government is concerned, we will continue as we are. We are doing everything we can. We have shown in every way a readiness to negotiate, but when we go into negotiation, we are told that if we abandon the position we think it is our right to hold and admit certain obligations, there might be some mitigation of the payments. That is all negotiation has brought us.

That is the first time we have heard it.

It is about the one thousand and first, as the Deputy will find if he looks it up. I have said that almost every time. If the Deputy is interested in the question of the bringing into the matter of political issues, I say that it was not we who did so. We were quite prepared to deal with it as a separate, single and distinct issue, and it was not we who tried to involve political questions in it. The British did it. Read the statements which Mr. Thomas made. The Deputy will then realise who it was was responsible for connecting this issue up with other issues—an attempt by economic measures to force us to abandon the position we have taken up as the rightful position politically for the Irish people. At any time we were prepared to deal with it as a separate issue. We were prepared to deal with the financial question as a separate question, and we were prepared to deal with the trade question as a separate question, but the British Government, for their own reasons, wanted to link it up with political questions. If they want a settlement of the political question, they will have to be much more courageous in dealing with it than they appear to have been up to the present, because so far as we are concerned there are things that will have to be done for this nation; otherwise, this nation cannot loyally co-operate. There are certain things we may have to submit to, bow our heads to, as being the best we can do for the moment, but there cannot be any genuine loyal co-operation between our people and the people across the water, or between any Government of our people and the British Government—and I would say the same thing of the previous Government as of our own—any loyal co-operation in the right sense, in the sense in which there is a genuine will to co-operate, the sort of will that regards the matter in question as of really common interest, so long as our people feel that they are being deprived by a stronger power of things, which, if they were strong enough, they would seize and hold for themselves. They would simply not be doing it because for the moment they are not strong enough, but they would be hoping and waiting for the day when they would be strong enough, either by a weakening of their opponent or by an increase of their own strength. That is true. If anybody wishes to avail of the opportunity in the House later to controvert what I am stating, he can do so. If there are people who do not take that circumstance, which is the real factor in our relations with Great Britain, into account, do not say they are realists because they are not.

There were some minor questions raised by Deputy Dillon about the German Trade Agreement. Of course, he was talking nonsense, as usual. The price that has been obtained for cattle, I am informed, is reasonable, considering the prices paid in Germany. There is no question of paying any bounty. With regard to the question raised by Deputy Dockrell about cement, questions of quality, price, and of sufficient supplies, were all taken into account and the matter is under review. If the Deputy would like to get more detailed answers, I would ask him to put down a definite question addressed to the Minister for Industry and Commerce, and he will give the information. I think I have covered the main matters that have been raised. This is a very important time for all of us, and any help that can be given by Deputies, who are naturally interested in easing the situation, by way of elucidating the position generally, will be welcomed.

There was a question raised during the debate in regard to the interview given by the Vice-President to the Independent in August, 1932, and to a representative of Le Matin.

All I can say is that the conditions under which that supposed interview was given were already explained by the Vice-President himself.

There has never been an acceptance of that by anybody as a fair representation of anything the Vice-President said.

The interview has been denied by the President and by the Minister for Agriculture——

And by the Vice-President, to my recollection.

The Vice-President has not denied or discussed the explicit statements he makes there. We are told that in the interview with the representatives of Le Matin he was asked:

"Do you think you are on the eve of a solution more in accordance with Irish wishes?"

The Vice-President replied "Yes." Prior to that Mr. O'Kelly said that a solution by arbitration would be found in the suggestion made three weeks previously by the English Labour Party, namely, a committee of arbitration of four members, two nominated by London and two by Ireland. M. Barrés then said:

"It seems to me that that is no solution, for the English arbitrators will give the case to England and the Irish arbitrators to Ireland."

The interview goes on:

"Mr. O'Kelly (smiling with the air of a man who knows more than he says): Perhaps! But it is the solution that can put an end to the tariff war on which England has just embarked."

When was that interview given?

I should be very glad to have the matter cleared up. I do not know what interview the Deputy is talking about. I know there was some interview referred to on a previous occasion. The interview was supposed to be given in Ottawa, and it was fully dealt with by the Vice-President. My recollection is that he made a statement dealing with that question.

The Vice-President never dealt with that question here.

Well, the Vice-President will be able to deal with it.

That is what we want.

I take it that the Vice-President will intervene on the President's Vote?

I shall bring the matter to the Vice-President's notice.

Arising out of the President's statement, I made a remark which brought forth jeers from certain parts of the House, and to which the President replied that he had made a certain statement for the thousandth time. I want to ask now, is it definitely clear, as far as the economic war is concerned, that the Free State Government would enter into negotiations, on a business basis, with no political background, and is it a fact that the British Government are refusing to enter into negotiations unless they have that political background?

I do not know what the Deputy said previously, but if he will look up the White Paper he will find that there were extended negotiations at one particular period, and that, I think, almost the sole question that was considered was the question of the annuities. I can only tell him that that ended up with the Chancellor of the British Exchequer saying: "If you admit that there is an obligation to pay, then there may be some question of mitigation." That is all I know about it. All the rest of the documents that were exchanged are available for the Deputy.

Might I put another question to the President? I was listening to his speech from beginning to end, as I always do. I pay that respect to the head of the State on all occasions. The President stated that the position was very grave. I feel that everyone recognises that the position is very grave, and for that reason I want to ask the President one question to clarify the position further. Does he agree—I feel he does agree— and believe that a united demand coming from the Twenty-six Counties and the Six Counties would be listened to by Great Britain, that is, if we were one nation, with North and South united? Does the President not consider that the first step to be taken is to endeavour to bring the North in?

If the Deputy would tell us how it is to be done we would be obliged to him.

I should like to ask the President—I think he was less ambiguous to-day than ever before— does he agree, in order to secure the object which apparently he is out to achieve—namely, to get the British out of our ports—that that demand would be greatly strengthened if North and South were united? What steps does he propose to take to bring the North in?

That is a speech, not a question.

Question—"That the Estimate be referred back for reconsideration"— put and declared lost.
Vote put and agreed to.
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