I understand that the position taken up is somewhat as follows—I do not want to exaggerate it: that the League has been tested in a very critical case and the League and its machinery have been found wanting. That is the conclusion not merely here but I think generally—when I say generally I mean in other countries as well, e.g. in Great Britain, and in some countries particularly in Northern Europe. It is a rather hasty tendency to draw from that the practical conclusion that the League as a machine for enforcing its opinions ought to be scrapped. I think that to adopt any such conclusion would be altogether too hasty. I do not think it would be a contribution to the preservation —I shall say nothing about the development—of our European civilisation. I would ask the President, the Government and the House to consider this. If a similar line of argument was used about the national government in any country, that line of argument would have been a thousand times and on a thousand occasions fatal to the existence of government. The President knows perfectly well that it has taken centuries of long effort to get the idea of the rule of law accepted even within the frontiers of any country. That effort, pursued for centuries, seemed to break down, and hopelessly break down again and again. Surely, everybody will agree that on the occasion of any of these apparent bankruptcies of the attempt at government it would be a wrong conclusion to draw: "We had better throw in our hands, give in and not continue the attempt."
It has been an extremely difficult thing, as the President knows, even within the frontiers of any country, to get not merely physical acceptance of the power of government, but to get the ethos so into the souls of the people to respect the law. That has not been accomplished without a tremendous amount of effort and without many tears. I would ask the President, before he casts the vote of this country in favour of scrapping the League or even weakening the League, to bear that in mind. Europe is engaged, the world is engaged—I speak principally of Europe, because two of the great nations outside Europe are unfortunately not in the League, and that is undoubtedly a capital weakness; I refer to the United States of America and Japan—Europe then has been engaged since the close of the last disastrous war in an attempt to do something for the world in general and for international relations; to do something such as has been accomplished in the course of centuries by the different nations in their own countries. Need we be surprised that in the short space of half a generation the League has not perfected its machinery and has not been able to count on absolute obedience to its decrees when we have had the apparently much simpler task of the acceptance of the rule of law in each country taking centuries?
I admit that many people are gravely disappointed at the outcome of the recent action of the League. They can point, and point scornfully if you like, at the failure of the League to protect one of its members against what the League considered aggressive action on the part of another. Quite so! But I know not a Government—certainly before the nineteenth century what I say would be much truer—at which the same finger of scorn might not have been pointed for the failure to carry out the primary duty of protecting the citizens. Why should we expect the nations of Europe excited and exacerbated, as a result of the titanic struggle that took place between 1914 and 1918, so successfully to overcome their national antagonisms as already to have reached the stage of ready acceptance of the rule of law? I suggest that it is too much to expect, and the fact that the machinery of the League, if I put it no higher, was found wanting on this occasion, is no reason why Europe should scrap the League. I think that would be a distinct step backward. I do not know what can take its place.
There were two things that were necessary in the building up of ordinary civilised life within the individual States, the growing development of the machinery of government on the one hand, and the growth of sound, healthy, public opinion on the other hand. Each of these things took centuries. You will require something analogous in the case of individual States in Europe. You must have, on the one hand, the growth of a better opinion, a more friendly opinion between the nations, a growing realisation on their part not merely that it is wrong, though it is exceedingly important that that ethical consideration should also grow, but that it will not pay to resort to arbitrament of war when other means are ready for the settlement of disputes. You must have the growth of that type of opinion. I may say with regard to the President's idea of the League as a body meeting together, there is that much to be said for it. I think it will, to some extent, contribute to the growth of a feeling of that kind. I think, even if the League cannot be made an effective body, the growth of opinion can be accelerated and helped on, the growth of sound opinion between the nations.
I am not saying that the meeting of the powers of the world together in Geneva, or in any other centre, is not useful. My own experience is that it is extremely useful. I think it does, in cases that are never heard of, prevent problems reaching the stage which brings countries close to war. I think it promotes a better feeling between nations or, shall I put it this way, I think that if it were not there the feeling between nations would be worse. But I do not think that alone is enough, and we ought not to rest satisfied merely with that. I would ask the President to consider whether we have not been asking the League to be in a position to do too much in the short period of its existence.
It has been said that economic sanctions have been tested. I do not believe they have been tested in the present case. I will put the thing as clearly and calmly as I can. Economic sanctions are useful at two stages, first as a threat and then, if the threat and the decision of the League are ignored, they may be useful as a weapon brought in to enforce the decision of the League. I think anybody who knows human nature and anybody who knows the relationship between States will acknowledge that of the two methods in which sanctions might be useful the former method is the more important, the threat, the belief that sanctions will be used. I think that condition was absent in the present case. I may be wrong, but my own view is this: I do not believe that Italy, in the summer of 1935, believed for a moment that the nations that in this particular case took the lead in guiding the policy of the League, because there are nations that do that, and inevitably will do that, were serious in regard to sanctions. I do not think Italy believed that things would be pushed to extremes against her. I think it was impossible, in the early summer of 1935, for Italy to believe that. I believe she thought there was a certain amount of talk only on the part of the two countries mainly in question, Great Britain and France. I ask the President how was it possible for Italian statesmen, reading the newpapers of these countries, observing even the attitude of the statesmen of these countries, to believe that they would ever induce the League to advance to the actual application of sanctions. Therefore, in this case I do not believe the sanctions weapon was ever fully used.
It has not been tested. It was put into operation, undoubtedly, and to that extent it may act as a deterrent. I am sure it will act as a deterrent in similar cases in future. Nations will not now be so ready to believe that that weapon was merely something that was used as a kind of bogey man to threaten them. They will now be more ready to accept the possibility and the likelihood of sanctions being used against them if they are guilty of action which the League determines to be a proper case for the application of sanctions. But I think it is a mistake, even in this particular instance, to condemn this machinery of the League because in the present instance it was not able to enforce the decision of the League. I say this even if it is true that Abyssinia might have got off much better, might have escaped better had she never relied on the League—that is purely problematical, but it may be true. However, I am not interested in making debating points of that kind.
But even if there was complete failure there, I suggest that the answer to that is not to throw in our cards or give up the idea, because, candidly, if Europe gives up that idea of the possibility of international co-operation, the gradual, the slow development of international co-operation, I think you may be easily faced with the destruction of European civilisation. I do not mean that you will have another great war—that is almost certain; I do not mean that the next war, from the purely physical and material point of view, may put the last war in the shade—that is also certain; but there will be much more serious issues involved. It is only now that every country in Europe is beginning to reap the moral harvest of the Great War, its effects on the spirits and the minds of the people, and I shrink from thinking what will be the moral effect, a much more serious thing even than the material destruction, of another war. I think before any hasty decision is taken to scrap an institution that at least tries—it may not always succeed —to prevent war, a great deal more consideration ought to be given to it.
We should not, because of failure, throw up our hands in despair. Had that been done in the case of the histories of individual countries you would have no civilisation left, no Governments left; you would have simply chaos instead of Governments. It has taken time to overcome that, and it will take time—I agree there with Deputy MacDermot—it will be a slow growth, but the difficulties in the way of building up a better system of international relations ought not deter us, because the alternative is too horrible to contemplate. We must utilise what we have got, utilise even the experience of the present attempt, and this with reference even to economic sanctions. We can believe that the countries can be convinced, because they must be after the present experience, that economic sanctions can be made a reality to some extent, at all events, that they can be put into effect, that they are not merely a threat, but something which can be used.
In the light of that experience Europe ought to face up to the new problem and if possible get rid of any bitternesses connected with the present difficulties. There is a new situation and a new problem to be faced by Europe—to get the greatest possible consent for the greatest strength of the League. I agree again with Deputy MacDermot in saying that we should not shrink from that, because in certain instances that are possible to think of it might lead to war. If we did that we should scrap our National Army. We should scrap every defence force. A country which keeps up an army and keeps up a navy undoubtedly has constantly before her the fact that a time may come when those things will have to be used—when war will break out. Is that any argument against a peaceful nation having an army or a navy? Surely it is nothing of the kind. I think the possibility of national war is much more likely than the possibility of war developing out of the application of sanctions, because, as I say, the recent experience—with which even the President is dissatisfied—of the application of sanctions is in itself a lesson to the nations of Europe. I admit that the time when we can have perfection is a long way ahead. That is perfectly true, but it is all the more reason for striving for slow and gradual improvement; all the more reason for taking no steps backwards; all the more reason for looking forward and trying to build up machinery. A realisation of the difficulties of building up that machinery ought to impress upon us more firmly the necessity of setting our faces towards its building up.
Cynical people say: "What can the League do? Every nation is looking out for its own advantage." That is the continual cry which one hears amongst would-be smart cynical people, but that is an argument, too, against the whole code of Christian morality, and, furthermore, it is the greatest argument for the League. The mere fact that that danger exists —that, unfortunately, in the present European situation, national antagonisms are the normal thing and not the abnormal thing—is the very reason why the League is necessary, and why the League should be developed and built up. It is precisely because those national antagonisms are there, and precisely because they are so bitter, so capable of plunging the world into chaos and causing the destruction of our civilisation, that we should make every effort to perfect machinery of the kind I refer to. If there is a European War I do not know whether we can get out of it; it is very hard to see how we can, but leaving that aside, even if we are to stay out of it, the very civilisation in which we are interested will be destroyed. It may take five or ten years after the close of a war of that kind before the effects of it reach this country, but reach this country they will. That is all the more reason, therefore, why we should recognise that the fate of European peace is also the fate of this country.
We cannot cut ourselves off from Europe. Geographically we cannot do it. We cannot do it from the point of view of European civilisation. We are part and parcel of it. I do not see how we are to escape a situation which may bring about a destruction of that civilisation. As I say, two things are necessary. One is the building up of a better international opinion; of a sense of decency in international relations—a duty incumbent, I admit, on every individual State, but an institution of this kind will help the building up of that opinion. The other thing which is necessary is having proper machinery. Neither will work alone. I should not for a moment think of relying on the machinery alone, and that is what I fear occurred on the last occasion. As in home politics, machinery alone will not be sufficient, and coercive powers will not be sufficient if they have not behind them the moral authority and the moral backing of the people. As at home, the strength of the Government is necessary; so in international affairs is the strength of this machinery of which I speak. But in addition to that and side by side with it there will have to grow up a better international feeling. But the two things will grow up together; they are not two separate things. We may discuss them separately, but they are part and parcel of the organism of European life and cannot be separated. The two things must grow up and develop together, and it is on that, and on that alone, so far as mere human institutions are concerned, that we can rely for the future preservation of our civilisation.
Therefore, so far as the present situation is concerned, what I would put to the President is this: Let us realise that a new start has to be made; that every particle of goodwill has to be mobilised in the direction of strengthening the League, realising at the same time that the work is arduous and slow; that it cannot be expected to produce its fruits immediately, and that anything in the nature of such expectation is harmful rather than otherwise. As I said, there is no reason why the nations of Europe, before full disaster comes upon them —if disaster comes upon them I admit it is too late—if they seriously lend their minds to that particular task, should not be able to surmount the many obstacles which stand in the way of the realisation of that ideal. Those are some of the considerations which I should like to put before the House and the Government. We are interested in general security in various ways. Deputy McGilligan developed one side of it, and I do not propose to follow him in that; he developed it fully and adequately. We have, as I said, further interest in general security. We have the interest of our common civilisation, and that is a vital interest for us. I think that, imperfect as may be the League—as is any human institution— it deserves serious consideration, to see whether it cannot be more fully developed. My study has brought me across various countries in which a much more hopeless task faced national governments. Those tasks, as I say, took generations and centuries to solve, but in many cases they were solved. I realise that there are many problems—possibly the results of the late war and the settlements of the late war—which require attention. Everybody will admit that. No matter what happened, I do not see how a satisfactory settlement could have been reached by any human being. Even the most idealistic supporter of the President would not have been able to draw the frontiers in Europe in such a way as not to cause intense dissatisfaction.
There was no solution possible in the sense of giving satisfaction—of being perfect. Members, if they are interested in this question, need only look at a race map or a language map of Europe and they will see immediately the impossibility, from that point of view alone, of any satisfactory drawing of frontiers. When you complicate that with economic and defence considerations, where are you? It must be remembered that these, too, are considerations of great moment. You see that you are dealing with a problem that is not capable of anything like an ideal solution.
Let us realise, therefore, that these settlements may have been unsatisfactory, but let there be in that sphere also a gradual approach to rationalism—to the use of reason not of force. If there is one thing in which the big nations of Europe have recently failed, it is the way in which they have been much more inclined to give way to force rather than to reason, but that, again, is a weakness that nations share with human beings, and the realisation that that is so ought not to prevent us from facing the task of trying to get a proper solution.
