Dáil Éireann debate -
Friday, 19 Jun 1936

Vol. 62 No. 19

Committee on Finance. - Vote 68—League of Nations (Resumed).

Debate resumed on the motion:—

"That the Estimate be referred back for reconsideration"—(Deputy McGilligan).

Minister for External Affairs (the President)

I do not know that I can usefully add much to what I stated in the two speeches I made on this question yesterday. I should like to say that with a great deal of matter in the speeches delivered from the opposite benches I agree. I should naturally like to see a world in which peace was guaranteed by observance of law and behind the law some power that could enforce it but I fear very much that we are a good distance from that yet. Whilst I think the aim of everybody should be to move in some direction like that, we have, as people with definite responsibilities, to look at matters as we find them. The experience of the last year or so in Geneva has been particularly valuable in pointing out exactly where the weaknesses of the League lay. That there were such weaknesses is, I think, now evident to everybody. A number of those who had the responsibility of Government in the past and who had to picture themselves in a position in which their countries would have to carry out the obligations which they were undertaking in the League were able to see these weaknesses ahead. You had in Europe amongst the nations that would have to bear the principal burden of enforcing the obligations of the League two divergent lines of thought. There was the line which favoured the intensification of the measures of coercion in case there was any breach of the law and there was the line which favoured the idea of trying to get co-operation by goodwill, without these coercion measures.

I can frankly admit that my mind, until comparatively recently, ran in the direction in which apparently the minds of a number of Deputies who spoke on the opposite benches are running now, and that is, the logical direction of making coercive measures strong and certain. If I have changed it is because I have got a fuller realisation than I had before of the difficulties, when moving along that line, of any chance of real success. Let us dwell for a few moments upon the problem as it presented itself to those who are dealing with the question in Geneva. We hear a lot about following this lead or that lead. As a matter of fact we were, and it is generally recognised that we were, the most single-minded of any State in Europe in approaching that matter.

Mr. MacDermot

Hear, hear!

The President

We had nothing to gain except the general interest in which, of course, our common ultimate interest in peace was involved; but we certainly were not being led in any direction by the influence of any other State. We took our line because it was quite clear to us that we had but one line to take. There was no difficulty about it. It was not a question as to which one had anxious doubts as to which line one would take. It is quite definite and clear. We had entered into certain obligations to do certain things in a certain event. The event happened. It was quite clear it happened, and our obligations on that happening were equally clear. Our action was taken not because one Power took this line or the other. It was taken because it was made clear to us that it was due to what was a proper sense of our obligations. We took our line, and if we may talk a little bit more fully of the factors that determined that, I would say that the only anxiety in my mind was as to whether a stage might develop from that which would involve us in doing something which I was perfectly certain our people were not prepared to do, would not agree to do and would not sanction.

The question was whether military sanctions, the taking of military action was involved in the obligation of Article XVI. My advice was that military sanctions were not involved. It was quite clear that a very delicate situation indeed would arise if hostilities began as a result of the sanctions, and that other States were of opinion that their obligations led them to contribute military forces to the common effort—if we had then, apparently, to hold back. That was the problem, and I put it to the Deputies here in the House that if that situation arose there were going to be very violent differences of opinion in this country as to what was to be done. Some would say: "You have entered into obligations which lead to this step and the other step and, consequently, in the end you ought to continue to work in co-operation with those with whom you have begun."

On the other hand, you would have a large section of our people saying that nobody was likely to take action of that sort in our interest; that action was primarily determined by the attitude of the big Powers, and it would have been said that some of the big Powers, at least, were themselves vitally interested in Abyssinia, and that it was in consequence of being vitally interested themselves and not because of any obligation they felt they had taken under the Covenant but for the advancement each of its own separate State that they were prepared to take military action. We would have naturally another section of our people who would have said "It is all very well for States that have clearly their independence to guarantee the independence of others in the hope that their independence also might be guaranteed; but it is quite a different thing in the case of a State which has not the independence the majority of its people desire, for that State to commit itself to military action in favour of supporting independence elsewhere, when its own complete independence has yet to be won." That was our position and I certainly would not, under these circumstances have, as Minister for External Affairs, advised the Government, nor would I as President here have favoured an action that would have involved sending out military forces. Our people simply would not stand it and any view I might have personally would not count in the matter. Our people would not stand it, and I do not think any Government here any more than ours would take the responsibility for doing it.

It was suggested yesterday that a number of individuals would go. Yes, a number of individuals would go, I have no doubt whatever. Quite a large number of people would be prepared to go and fight for the cause of freedom elsewhere. It is an appeal that always met with response from the hearts of Irishmen. I did not take the same side as others from 1914 to 1918, but I do recognise that a large number of the people, in fact, all those who had not already committed themselves by their previous obligations, did go out in the belief that they were contributing to the general welfare of mankind and to the establishing of freedom for small nations by going on an expeditionary force to the Continent. I am perfectly certain, therefore, that sentiments of that sort would induce a large number of our people to go to the aid of a victim of aggression. But that is quite a different thing from a Government taking upon itself the responsibility of sending such a force. When we enter into commitments we must as a Government be in a position to carry them out to the full. If there is one maxim I should like to see acted upon always by any Government here, it is not to enter into any obligations except those they are prepared fully to carry out.

If the League were to be reformed in the sense of making sanctions more certain, with the possibility of economic sanctions developing into military sanctions, I certainly could not advise our people, in the present conditions, to be a party to that League, because I am certain that when the time came to fulfil our obligations they would not, in fact, be fulfilled, as ultimately Governments must depend upon the public opinion of their country in order to carry out properly the commitments into which they enter. That is our position, and I am quite frank about it, and I do not wish to press other people to do something which I know our own people would not do.

Let us take the position of some of the great Powers. Take the position of Great Britain, for instance. I want to say this. I see a great deal of blame being laid by opponents of the present British Government on the shoulders of that Government, and particularly on the Foreign Secretary. I was in Geneva, and of this I am certain, so far as I have been able to get facts to make me certain, that it was not the fault of the British Foreign Secretary that successful measures were not taken. I want to say that quite frankly. It is all very well for people in opposition, without responsibility, to talk. But picture the situation there for Great Britain; picture the situation there for France. The French people already had experience of what a great European war was— bitter experience of it. Was the Government of France going to take action that they felt might involve their people in a catastrophe something similar to that of the war which they passed through from 1914 to 1918? Had they not every reason to hesitate about actions that would possibly mean war?

I want to say also that if failure was there, if there was one element of failure which one would have liked to see eliminated it was the fact that it was evident to everybody at Geneva that there was not going to be the co-operation from France which would have been necessary to stop the war or to prevent the war. There was obvious hesitation on the part of the French Government. I am not blaming them. I quite understand that others must have the same consideration with regard to their interests that we have for ours, and I do not blame the Government that hesitated to take action which they thought might ultimately end in war.

There were a number of other reasons why the French Government should have hesitated in the circumstances. But if one thing rather than another prevented effective action being taken, I would say it was the obvious hesitation on the part of the French Government. The British Government had every reason, both from the point of view of their own immediate private interests and any wider interests they might have at heart, to try and preserve the League. I do not think that anybody can say that they reasonably failed to take any action they could have taken, unless there are people who would say that, notwithstanding the immediate threat of war, they should have gone on in the direction in which they were going; that they should have taken the measures which I indicated yesterday, that they should have applied the oil sanctions and, in addition to that, if they were in earnest, that they should have seen that ships of war would not be allowed to pass through an area which they were able to command.

Mr. MacDermot

The President will remember that Mr. Eden did indicate the willingness of the British Government to join in oil sanctions.

The President

The fact, however, is that a nation which was prepared to face war intimidated the nations who shirked the possibility of war. That is the position, and that will always be the position. You will have to face the possibility of war to end war. We have had one already, and people might naturally ask themselves: "Will another war end war?" Possibly, it will be said in future, if a new European war should break out, that it would have been far better to have that war on the question of maintaining the Covenant of the League than to have war in other circumstances. But, naturally, one wants to keep off an evil, such as war, as long as possible, in the hope that it is not inevitable that it should occur.

Let those who say that more severe sanctions should have been taken ask themselves: were they prepared for the alternative of war? If they were not prepared, then let them not blame those who were stopped by precisely these considerations, and, as far as I know, no other. Is it reasonable to hope that in any short time we will be able to get the whole world, and, mind you, that is what is aimed at, the whole world with all its diversity of interests, into a league to obey a common law, and to pledge themselves that if any one should break that law all will join together in preventing it from having its way?

Take, for instance, our own position. Suppose that Britain was deemed an aggressor. As a member of the League of Nations it would be our duty not to give Britain any of the things that were forbidden: any of the things that help her. I imagine, for instance, that one of the things that would be of greatest use to Britain under such circumstances would be our agricultural produce. Are our people prepared to enter into a league which would commit them to that in time of war, if Britain should be declared an aggressor, they are not to have any trade with Britain? I want to bring this home, not because it is a likely thing but because it illustrates the position of certain small nations in Europe. There are small nations in Europe that are economically tied up with their neighbours almost as much as we are with Britain. Will you get the peoples of these small nations to refuse to give to their neighbours the things that they have to sell if their economic life is to continue?

General Mulcahy

We have already called it here a blessing in disguise.

The President

The Deputy's speech yesterday was not much of a blessing, whether in disguise or otherwise. The position, therefore, is this: that if we were going to have an effective League of Nations we would have to have people in every country who would be prepared to do things such as I have indicated should be done in our case. Are the people prepared for it? Can they do it? Are they prepared to impose upon themselves conditions which would bring about on the civil community the hardships which they most dread in war? Are they prepared for that? Suppose that Britain, because we would not give to them our beef or our agricultural produce, chose to regard that as an act of aggression. They would, of course, say, as other countries in similar circumstances say, that they were wrongly adjudged an aggressor; that they had nothing but the best motives in whatever act they committed—that it was for the benefit— I do not want to take a real example —of the people of Mars whom they wanted to civilise and so on. By propaganda and so on their people would have been got to feel like that. They would say we were taking sides unjustly against them, and if they felt strong enough to put themselves in the position in which they could take the produce that they wanted they would do it. Therefore, we would have all the suffering that would be caused by refusing to sell that which we could not dispose of. If we did not sell our cattle we would simply have to destroy them. If we are not prepared to do that, and are not prepared to take the further step, namely, the risk of the possibility of military attack upon us, in the case of Great Britain, let us remember that there are other States in precisely the same or in a somewhat analogous position with regard to other countries, and that they, by taking these sanctions in the Covenant, would be risking the same dangers. Let us realise then that the taking of these sanctions and these commitments involve very real sacrifices. I do not think that we are prepared to make these sacrifices for a thing that appears distant and indefinite. We see immediately the sacrifices that are to be made. The advantages seem dim and distant.

Now, the big Powers know that they will have to bear the brunt in the main of any military action that is to be taken as a result of sanctions, and they naturally are slow to move. It is only the countries that have felt immediately what war means to them, and that feel themselves in immediate and pressing danger, that are prepared to enter into covenants with obligations stern and severe such as Deputies would like to have in the League of Nations as reconstituted. I think that you will not make much progress along that road, and I think the best line to take is not to think of a world League of Nations in that sense. I believe that some form of organisation such as exists at present should be there. I do not think it would be merely a debating society at all, but I think that you must move along other lines than these if you are going to get general co-operation. Europe is the danger, and if you could get something like a Commonwealth of Europe—and, mind you, a Commonwealth of Europe is not nearly as difficult a thing as this League of Nations that Deputies speak about—I think it would be much better.

When I heard some Deputy speak yesterday—at the moment I cannot recall his name—he immediately reminded me of the position of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Do Deputies think that that could hold together for any length of time if there was to be some law imposed by, say, a central group by a majority or other vote upon all the others? If, for instance, there was some central organisation, something that appeared to be a form of government in which each of the States, irrespective of its own immediate interests, was supposed to fall in with the view of the majority, I am perfectly certain it would not last for any length of time. The British Commonwealth of Nations, so far as it is successful, is being worked on quite a different system. It is being worked on the idea that the States in it will realise that they have certain interests in common: that they are to meet to discuss these interests, and if they agree, and only in so far as each State agrees, that it will carry out any general plan that is accepted. But that is voluntary co-operation without any set law to govern it. If the States in Europe that have suffered by war, and that were in danger of suffering by war, could form some central council in which the statesmen of the different countries would meet in order to consider their common problems and get a solution of them in that direction, it would be very much better, in my opinion, than proceeding along the line of increasing their commitments in regard to the sanctions of the League.

I do not want to see anything scrapped except the machinery which has been proved to be useless, the machinery that is worse than useless, that is, in my opinion, positively dangerous. Whatever commitments are entered into, they must be explicit and they must be such as will give confidence by people being able to satisfy themselves that the obligations will be honestly carried out. You have jockeying, obvious jockeying, in a case like that where action would mean military action. There would be no rush for the front-line trenches, I can tell you. Each State would be trying to put the other State into the position of having to bear the main brunt in the belief that it would be weakened, and particularly if there was any rivalry between States otherwise, one would be trying to put the other into that position in the belief that that State which went in and bore the brunt of it would be weakened and those States that kept longest back would be strongest when the contest was over. It is considerations of that kind that have led me to the view that, if we are going to advance along the line of securing peace, we will have to go in the direction that I have indicated rather than in the direction of increasing sanctions. I do not want to say that I have a closed mind on this matter. It does not, as it happens, come up for immediate decision. In regard to things that come up for immediate decision, I think I have indicated our attitude.

With regard to the League of Nations, I can only say that the League, as it is at present constituted, with its Articles, has not fulfilled expectations. Take Article X as an example. Under Article X you are supposed to maintain the integrity of existing boundaries. We objected to Article X at the very start, because we said it was going to guarantee boundaries that were not just boundaries and we did not want to see nations committed to the maintenance of these unjust boundaries.

Yesterday, Deputy Esmonde, I think it was, referred to the action which I personally took in the United States in 1919. I think there is a good deal of misunderstanding about the position that I took at that time, and it might be no harm to refer to it now. I went over from this country as an interested third party to ask the United States that if they were entering the League they would not commit themselves to maintaining the existing British Empire. We had declared our independence, and we wanted to have our independence recognised. We wanted that fact, as an important fact in the situation as it affected us, clearly brought before the American people, and we asked the American people that, in any adhesion they might give to the Covenant, they would make such reservations as would make it clear that that did not imply guaranteeing to Britain the possession of this island as a matter of right.

That compelled me to speak occasionally of the League of Nations. I did not have the impertinence in the United States to try to dictate to the American people what line they should take. My view was that Article X was going to possess a certain influence. I realised that America was not a likely centre of conflict. I do not think that on any occasion I expressed my opinion in public but my view was that when Europe had settled its own differences and had brought about there something like a United States of Europe, then without danger the United States might come along as another group of States and try to secure universal peace. I saw that the United States was not likely to be involved in war, and I thought that there, at any rate, was a large and important portion of the earth free from conflict, and why should it introduce conflict and the horrors of war there by joining itself up to a disturbed centre? That was my view then, and I do not know that my view has changed in that respect very much since. As regards Article X, unless you can say that the boundaries are just, you cannot get a common consent in maintaining these boundaries. Article XVI, with its indefinite obligations, is also an Article which could not stand, and the changing of that Article, in my opinion, cannot take place in the direction that Deputies on the other benches have indicated, namely, that of more intense sanctions.

I do not think I can add very much to what I said yesterday on this whole matter. If it were simply a question of desire, of willingness to work, there would be little difficulty. I do not believe I am a cynic; neither am I a pessimist, and so far as I have anything to do with inspiring the action of the Government in any question touching the League of Nations, it will be in the direction of trying to improve the conditions so that we will not have these recurring wars, and that some system by which peace might be maintained could be evolved. That is naturally the direction I would like to work in, but I think that in doing that one had better take full account of all the facts; not to take account of them is to court disaster and disillusionment. That is what has happened in the past.

Look at all the big things that the League of Nations tried to do and failed to do. I am not saying that the League of Nations did not perform useful service—let nobody get that from what I have said. But as regards the big things that the League tried to do, it failed in all of them. They did not want Japan to enter China, to interfere with Chinese territory. They failed in that. They failed also in regard to a similar dispute between Paraguay and Bolivia. They have failed in the case of Ethiopia and, if we take the other cases that did not involve immediate war, there was, for example, the Disarmament Conference and also the Economic Conference. These have failed and the result is that the League of Nations as it stands will not get the public opinion behind it which is absolutely necessary for its success.

Let us then try to do something which will get public opinion behind it. So far as the Government are concerned, at any rate, we shall do everything we, as a small nation, can do. We have a certain amount of moral weight, perhaps, and that will be exercised to the full in so far as it is possible. Any influence that we have here or elsewhere will be exercised to the full to try to bring about an arrangement by which these disputes, which inevitably arise between nations, as they arise between people living in a community, may be peacefully settled by methods of arbitration, and that the ultimate thing on which all will depend, public opinion, may be properly educated along those lines. That is the line we shall take, and I do not think that, in the long run, if we did have that committee that was referred to by Deputy Costello yesterday, there would be very much difference of opinion between the members of that committee on the line that should be taken if we had all the facts equally before us. It is because each one of us does not give the same amount of attention to the matter—it is not our business to do so—to enable us to see it as a whole, that we very often differ.

The matter of defence, of course, is one of very serious moment to us. Deputy McGilligan said that the Volunteers are no defence. Small nations realise that they would not be able successfully to resist a great power which had made up its mind to conquer them by its military forces. They know that, but they do not at the same time want to make themselves defenceless. Very often a small force can hamper an invader so much that valuable time is gained. On one occasion I remember saying that a man, if you are defenceless, may rob you for sixpence. If you have only a blackthorn it may take more than sixpence to induce him to interfere with you. If you are still more strongly armed he will hesitate still more. We have to take the reasonable view that the more we are able to defend ourselves, the less is the probability of attack. At least it will make an intending attacker hesitate more. He will have to have very much better reason for attacking you if you are able to defend yourself than if you are completely defenceless. That is all that can be said for any of the small nations looking after their defences. I have also indicated what, in my opinion, is the attitude of our people generally in this matter. We do not want to be dragged into imperialist wars because we have no imperialist ambitions. I said yesterday that if we were a neutral State, and if we were attacked, other States would have an interest in seeing that the attack was not successful. My thoughts were not confined to Great Britain alone. We are in a very important position in the Atlantic, and I can easily see that it would be of interest to more countries than Great Britain that an enemy of those countries should not attack the position of our country or use it for military purposes.

Mr. MacDermot

They never bothered much about us in the past.

The President

I am not suggesting for one moment that any of those powers would be interested in our welfare. I am sure I have never said that they would take that interest in helping us. The factor in the whole situation that has to be borne in mind is that in their own interest they would be prepared to put their forces in the field, so to speak, to prevent such an attack from being successful.

Mr. MacDermot

They never were in the past.

The President

Who never were?

Mr. MacDermot

No nation ever felt it sufficiently in its own interests to intervene in the past.

The President

The past is not the present. I think we had some discussions here not so long ago in which the position in Napoleon's time was considered, but that is not the situation that I am envisaging. I am talking about the future, in which we are going to have aerial conflicts, and I say again that it is obvious that if this country were neutral there would be countries as anxious to see that our neutrality was not interfered with as there were people anxious to see that Belgian neutrality was not interfered with before.

Mr. MacDermot

I wonder.

The President

Well, I do not.

Mr. Anthony

There is a change of front anyway. We are forgetting the past now. That is one good job. We are forgetting 1916 and 1922.

The President

I do not think I have referred to them so much as others. I think that people on the opposite benches, including Deputy Anthony himself, are much more anxious than I am to bring up all those things when they think there is political advantage to be gained. I have had to spend too much time looking for to-morrow to spend very much time about the past. Suppose we only say there is only one State which would have that interest— I do not think it would be confined to one—but suppose there is only the one which Deputies on the opposite benches seem to suggest I am relying on. I am relying on it only as a factor in a situation which I see clearly. If we were independent, and if we were fighting to maintain that independence against another power, Britain would be as anxious—not in our interests but in her own—to see that we maintained it. Therefore, I say that that being so, as far as any help we were likely to get from Britain was concerned that help would be forthcoming at least as readily if we were an independent nation as it would be if we were held completely by Britain.

Mr. MacDermot

But perhaps less effectively.

The President

Let us come to that. Suppose we had our independence here, with a possible war threatening on the continent, in which it was not unlikely that attempts might be made to utilise some of our territory as a base. What would we do? Is it not obvious that, in dealing with any defence programme—I am assuming now that we have friendly relations with Britain— one of the first things we would do would be to get in contact with them, to see how far the assistance which they would give in their own interests could be best worked in with us, so that the defences would be planned as a whole to meet with such a contingency? Is there anybody so foolish as to think, for one moment, that that would not be done? Of course, it would be done, and the line in which we would build up our defences would be a line which would take cognisance of that as an ultimate situation. Could that be done now? It could not. That could not be done at present, but it could be done under the circumstances I have indicated—if this country were a free country—and it would be done, I am perfectly certain, by any Government which was in a position of responsibility for the defences of the country. You would have, therefore, a planned system—a system that would be planned by each nation in its own interests—but it would be planned in co-operation, in order that in the eventualities I have indicated the total forces would be available for the common defence. So far as we were concerned, and so far as they were concerned it would be a question of common defence. No Government here at the moment can adequately plan defences for this country. In fact, a large section of our people would be careless about the matter. Their attitude would be that which was indicated by Father O'Flanagan in his speech in 1917, or about that period, when somebody was accusing us of being pro-German. He said that if a mouse is being worried by a cat, and a dog comes along, the mouse is likely to be pro-dog for the time being at any rate.

That is the situation, and it is only when a people are independent that they have any reason to co-operate with others for the maintenance of their independence. If they have not independence, however, they are sometimes inclined, wisely or unwisely, to think that a change of masters would be no harm—that that was not the worst thing they could see out of the situation. Naturally, what they would try to do would be to try to use the situation as best they could to get rid of any master, and that would naturally be the line of the majority of our people in any such situation as I have indicated so long as there is any interference whatever with the right to independence of our people here. The situation here, the fundamental thing from the point of view of defence, is to try to get our people here and the people across the water to realise that they have certain common interests and that these common interests can be best served by each nation allowing the other nation to go its own way in peace and, when co-operation is in question, that each should admit the rights of the other and that they should sit down and see how best they could co-operate. That is what I, at any rate, have been working for as long as I can remember. It is the line I have taken since I have come into office. We have taken the same line, and any contacts that there have been with the British Government have been contacts with that aim in view.

There is available here a vast deal of goodwill which can be immediately released if the action which Britain has been taking up against us in the past were changed. I think the people in this country are as ready to bury the hatchet as the people in any country are ready to bury it. It is a misrepresentation of the people, as it was of me, to say, as Deputy Anthony said, that we are always thinking of the past—going back to Cromwell and all the rest of it. That is simply the propaganda of those who try to excuse themselves from dealing with the actual problems which are there. We have shown goodwill, but that goodwill has not been reciprocated to any extent, and, if it is not, then, as far as I can see, the relations between the peoples of these two countries are going to continue in the future as they have been more or less in the past.

Question—"That the Estimate for the League of Nations be referred back for reconsideration"—put and declared lost.

Vote No. 68 (League of Nations) put and agreed to.