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Dáil Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 19 May 1937

Vol. 67 No. 6

Committee on Finance. - Vote 67—External Affairs.

I move:—

Go ndeontar suim ná raghaidh thar £46,002 chun slánuithe na suime is gá chun íoctha an Mhuirir a thiocfaidh chun bheith iníoctha i rith na bliana dar críoch an 31adh lá de Mhárta, 1938, chun Tuarastail agus Costaisí Oifig an Aire Gnóthaí Coigríche agus Seirbhísí áirithe atá fé riaradh na hOifige sin (Uimh. 16 de 1924).

That a sum not exceeding £46,002 be granted to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1938, for the Salaries and Expenses of the Office of the Minister for External Affairs, and of certain Services administered by that Office (No. 16 of 1924).

The total provision for External Affairs for 1937-38 amounts to £76,502, as compared with £81,458 for 1936-37. The receipts for this Service are estimated at about £20,200, leaving the net expenditure at £56,302. The reduction is mainly due to more favourable rates of exchange in France, Italy and Switzerland, owing to the de-valuation of the currencies of these countries. There is nothing in the Estimates for the current year requiring particular notice. The provision, one might say, is normal. Since the financial year 1932-1933 the amount received from American estates in which the Consulates have been concerned is approximately £175,000. I am just reading a short note on the work that is being done in connection with estate work by our representatives, particularly in the United States. These figures do not represent the total amount of money accruing to Irish persons each year from American estates nor the extent of the Department's work in regard to estate moneys. The Consuls give advice and guidance in regard to the best legal advice and help in tracing next-of-kin. The Department's activities in the matter of estates are not confined to the United States. Inquiries have been received and advice given in respect of estates in Canada, Argentine, Columbia, South Africa, New Zealand and Australia, and the total number of estates handled in the past six years approximate to 4,000, or about two a day, involving sums varying from £10 to £20,000, and, in a few cases, the estates were for much higher sums.

Speaking on my own Vote, I dealt with a most important aspect of our External Affairs, namely, our relations with Great Britain. If it had not been so, most of my statement would have been taken up with regard to these relations. However, having just spoken on that matter, it is not necessary to go over this again. I am glad to be able to announce that the Italian Government has appointed a Minister to Dublin. This appointment adds another of the Great Powers of the world to those which have Legations in our capital, and I cordially welcome the friendly gesture. As is the normal usage, this gesture will be reciprocated in due course by the appointment of a Minister to the Quirinal.

With regard to the European situation generally, there is little that I can add to what Deputies already know from the Press. Our attitude with regard, in particular, to the Spanish Civil War has been motived by our desire for peace, generally, and to prevent, as far as possible, the conflict in that country giving rise to a general European conflict. On previous occasions I have defended our attitude here with regard to non-intervention, and I do not think it is necessary to go back on that now or to explain our position in regard to it. With regard to the position in Europe generally, as I have said, it is one concerning which nobody can foresee the end. It may be, as is thought fairly generally, that there is less tension at the present time than there was some months ago. However, it would be very unwise to make any prophecy in that regard. With that, then, Sir, I shall leave the motion to the House.

There is an element of humour, Sir, in that introduction. We want this information, not about the future—although I have no doubt that that information would be quite as trustworthy as anything that the President could give us about the past—but we want this information about the immediate past. We want something more than a vague expression—I do not know whether it was the expression of an opinion or the expression of a hope, because I do not think anybody could make out what the President meant it as—namely, that the tension was not quite as great in Europe at the present moment as it has been for some time past, and that, so far as the future is concerned, it might be worse or it might be better, and he would be a wise man who would venture to say, and if he were a wise man he would say nothing. For a statement on general European affairs I think that that would be hard to beat. However, at the very beginning of the President's statement on international affairs generally he dropped one or two interesting sentences. I gathered from him—I am not quoting him, but I am giving what I gathered from the tone of his speech—that the only international relation that is worth anything, so far as we are concerned, or that was worth spending any time discussing, is our relation with Great Britain, and that because he had finished the last Vote by the speech that he meant to make on international affairs and so discussed our relations with Great Britain, he did not intend to say very much now. Well, coming from the President, and having regard to the high and mighty attitude that the Fianna Fáil Party have taken up as regards our immediate neighbour, that is certainly a contribution to the debate, but it was about the only contribution that the President made.

Here is a matter in connection with which the people are entitled to look for a certain amount of enlightenment from the Minister on Government policy, and, indeed, on more than Government policy. The ordinary man is not in a position to know from the Press what is the position in Europe at present, and especially what is the position so far as it affects our interests or what our attitude is towards it. That is the reason why I asked the President that question yesterday. I said that I understood quite well why he might not make a statement on his own Estimate, since anything might arise on that and he might well make the plea that he would wait in order to see what questions would be raised, but that we did expect him to break from his usual practice and give us some kind of a résumé on the European situation that we could follow. However, I am glad to see that his conscience was bad enough to trouble him on certain matters, and although nobody can say that he threw any light on these matters, he at least mentioned them. I should say it is quite clear from his statement that he regards the Ministry of External Affairs to a certain extent as a joke, as a thing of no importance: that the only reason why he is here at all now is that he happens to be President and also happens to be Minister for External Affairs and, therefore, is called upon to defend this Vote. Beyond a few book-keeping accounts he refuses to give us any information. That is why I asked him yesterday in opening the discussion on his own Vote to be prepared to do so. He ought to know that the ordinary member of the House, the ordinary person in the street, is not in a position without such preliminary statement to discuss this Vote with a reasonable chance of a fruitful discussion—this more than any other Vote.

At the present moment, there are a certain number of items in this Vote that will give us an opportunity of discussing certain matters. First of all, there is the Vote for the Minister himself. Secondly, there is provision for the various representatives abroad. Two, especially, will give rise to discussion. I understand what has really happened is this: I am now taking the President's own statement that what he meant as the preliminary statement on this External Affairs Vote, he gave instead as the concluding statement on the previous Vote. Let us take realities instead of mere form. We may take it, therefore, that his concluding statement on the previous Vote can be regarded as the introductory statement to this Vote. There are, therefore, two provisions in this Estimate that especially fall for consideration. There is the cost of our representative in Britain and the matter I want particularly to be discussed—not the amount but the question of our representative to Spain or, let us be quite accurate, to President Azana.

I thought it was Caballero.

Again, let us be quite clear. The President knows, though it may not be clear in the Constitution or other things that he brings in here, that diplomatic representatives are accredited to the heads of States.

It is very much better that that should be said from your side. We did not get so much before.

Azana is the head of that State. It is to him our Minister is accredited.

That is quite accurate. It is the first time we have heard that accurate statement from that side.

Perhaps the President would show us the inaccuracy in substance and not in theory? What does Azana represent in Spain? Which side? Is there any difficulty in understanding that he represents the side that, up to the present, was known as the Caballero side? Does the President deny that? Is this one of the usual pettifogging distinctions by which he tries to get over the real facts? Our representative is accredited to President Azana, to the Red Government in Spain, and now for the first time we have that acknowledged by the President. Before this he tried to ride off by stating that our representative was accredited to Spain, and now he quibbles on the question as to whether it was to Azana or his Premier the accrediting took place. Now, we have at last a clear acknowledgment of the statement that it is to President Azana our representative is accredited and not to Spain, not to the geographical unit of Spain. Let that be quite clear.

I object, and we have always objected, to that man being kept there accredited to that particular Government or that so-called head of the State. Our objection is as strong now as it was months ago. We can only look, in the light of all the events that have taken place and in the light of what has taken place recently, to this Vote as an expression of solidarity on the part of the Government with that particular cause. We have an opportunity here of deliberately challenging this particular matter, and we do so. Again and again we asked the President to show some tangible evidence of at least real neutrality in this matter by withdrawing that representative to the Red Government, to the Valencia Government, to President Azana, who is head of that State, and the President has always, continuously, deliberately and consistently refused, not merely to meet our wishes, but what I believe to be the wishes of the majority of the people of this country. I wonder does he deny that these are the wishes of the majority. Still he keeps him on there. As I say, I can only read that consistency on his part—a consistency so very rare coming from that quarter —as a determination to flout the wishes of the people and to show his sympathy with that particular Government.

To whom is the Vatican representative accredited?

You can answer that.

Can the Deputy?

Excuse me, the Vatican has made its views quite clear. The President has never done so. Again and again he says: "My views are well known; my sympathies are well known," but he has never gone beyond that, nor has any Minister gone beyond that in public or in private, not even the Minister for Industry and Commerce. He will shelter behind the Vatican, not taking into account the peculiar position of the Vatican State, which is a very different State from a secular State like ours.

I admire the Deputy's loyalty to his red herring.

It is not as bad as the Government's loyalty to the Red Government. That is what I object to so far as the Government is concerned.

A Deputy

Laugh that off.

That is what I expected him to say.

Furthermore, we have aligned ourselves and put ourselves behind this propaganda that is going on that this is a struggle between Fascism and democracy and the ready use that is being made in various countries of the Fascist scare. We have put ourselves as far as we can behind that particular piece of propaganda and helped it on.

There is another question which arises on this Vote. Our views on this matter are perfectly clear. I regard this as one of the most important issues that could have been raised. I regard the conduct of the Government as peculiarly reprehensible in this particular matter. There are issues involved which, I am convinced, are much greater than any of the issues we have discussed in this House. Unfortunately, we have no lead in the right direction from the Government. Any lead, in so far as there was a lead at all, any indication of a lead, has been in the opposite direction, in the wrong direction. In pursuance of our policy of so-called neutrality, which is certainly very favourable to one side so far as our gestures go, and not to the other, we entered into certain arrangements with other powers in Europe. When the President was making that eloquent introductory statement of his, he might have availed of the opportunity to point out to us what was the result of the measures that were taken, and how far those measures have been effective. He contented himself with repeating that we passed certain measures, and took a certain line of conduct, in the hope that that would save a European conflagration. He was in favour of strict non-intervention, neutrality. I am speaking now of neutrality in so far as interference or material help is concerned. We have given the other kind of help already, in so far as our official attitude is concerned. I am confining myself now to material help. We are a party, with other nations, to a certain convention on this particular matter. Is the President in a position to inform us how far and to what extent that has been observed? What steps has he taken, what steps has the Government taken, to enlighten themselves on what is happening? Have the various parties to that agreement observed it, not merely in the letter but in the spirit? The only thing we are thrown back upon is the papers. The President invited us to go to the papers for information. Do you want to know what is happening in Europe? Do you want to know what our attitude is towards what is happening? Go to the papers.

I gather that there is by no means unanimity, by no means agreement, as to the extent to which the policy of non-intervention has been effectively carried out. Is it a fact that help has gone in to the one side in Spain, to the Red Government in Spain, under cover of foodstuffs? The charge has been made. Has the Government made any attempt to see whether or not there was any foundation for this charge, or are we still relying on the goodwill not merely of the Governments of the different countries, but on the good faith of the different merchants of the different countries so far as those things are concerned? How far have the commitments into which we were persuaded to enter really been carried out? Surely that was a matter on which the President might have enlightened us, once he had mentioned Spain. Furthermore, the question has been raised—here again we are parties to this particular agreement, and that is the reason I raise the point—as to what constitutes a blockade. The President is Minister for External Affairs. So far as this House is concerned he is our authority on that international law. Perhaps he will tell us what the modern international law on blockade is, and how far that international law has or has not been violated. Has the President, in his capacity as Minister for External Affairs, made any inquiries on those particular matters, or is he still taking up the line that I gather he took up to the moment we passed these measures, and that was so clearly and definitely outlined by the Minister for Education speaking from those benches on this particular matter—that it would be absurd to think that we or our representatives at an international conference could raise our voices on any of these matters?

Whatever may have been our position as yes-men before we entered into certain commitments, before we passed certain laws enforcing certain agreements, and passed them on the foot of those agreements, our position now is a more serious one. We undertook certain obligations then. We undertook them not merely for ourselves, but by implication we undertook also to see, as far as we could, that other people observed those obligations. Are we in a position to say that that has been done, or is it one of those matters on which we shall be told: "Oh, well, we are a poor, small nation off the coast of Europe. In reality we have no interest in any other country except Great Britain, and consequently we know nothing about any other country except Great Britain"? That, undoubtedly was the attitude taken up by the President in his opening statement. He had already finished with Great Britain in the last Vote, as he said— he had started with Great Britain in the last Vote and devoted all his energy to Great Britain—and there was nothing more to be said on foreign affairs. Has he no interest in what our colleagues in this agreement are doing? The real basis of complaint is that despite the obvious and clear will of the Irish people, in spite of the life and death character in regard to our civilisation, of the struggle that is going on there, the President still insists on having our representative accredited to President Azana, the head of the Red State in Spain. That is the position.

That this House, after several months' discussion and consideration, should be asked to pass a Vote of this kind is nothing less than an outrage. That particular portion should have been deleted before it came before the House, and steps should have been taken in the course of the last couple of months to withdraw our representative. What good is he doing? Is he giving us information as to what is occurring? The Minister himself, in his introduction, stated that one of the matters which was engaging his attention—or, apparently, it was engaging his attention because he mentioned it —was Spain. He was asked previously on several occasions by means of questions in this House, had he any information from our representative there. Surely he had an opportunity now to put before this House such information as he had from that representative. Why did he not do it? What other means has the House of knowing what that representative was doing? Has he given any information on what is occurring there? As usual, the President leaves the House in ignorance of those matters, and is determined to do it, for the simple reason that the President has no respect for parliamentary institutions.

The presence in the South of France of the Irish Free State Minister to Spain may be a foolish extravagance. I, at any rate, have not got sufficient information to enable me to judge as to whether he is performing any duty there that is worth while. I am inclined to suspect that he is not, and that the President of the Executive Council and Minister for External Affairs would be doing a sensible thing if he recalled him, especially in view of the fact that there is no Minister from Spain in this country, but I feel obliged to protest once again against the suggestion that this is a matter of fundamental importance. To me it seems a trivial matter. The presence of a Minister, even in the country itself, let alone outside the border of the country, accredited to a particular Government, is no sort of certificate of merit for that Government, or no indication of solidarity with that Government. If the Opposition are going to accuse our Government here of solidarity with the Reds in Spain, they will also have to accuse, if not the Vatican—they seem to make a special case for the Vatican——

Is there not one?

Perhaps there is.

Are they completely equal in your view?

No; I do not say they are completely equal. I can conceive a special case being made for the Vatican, although, mind you, it is not true, as suggested by Deputy O'Sullivan, that the Vatican have spoken out more definitely about their sympathies in the actual civil war than our own President of the Executive Council has. You may impugn President de Valera's sincerity if you will, but he has, at any rate, said quite openly on more than one occasion that his sympathies, and the sympathies of the Government, and the sympathies of the Irish people, are with General Franco. If you are going to accuse our Government of solidarity with the Red Government in Spain, you must similarly accuse the Belgian Government, the Polish Government, the Governments of the Republics of South America, and every other Government that has a representative accredited to Spain. It seems to be considered that, over and above being a sort of certificate of merit and a sign of solidarity, it is in some way a help to the Red cause to have Ministers outside Spain accredited to the Red Government. I do not believe that that is at all the feeling of the Reds themselves. I have read statements made some time ago—statements over a considerable period—indicating the resentment of the Red Government in S p a i n at foreign representatives accredited to them living outside the borders of Spain. To such an extent did they resent that, that at one period —I do not know if it is still so—they refused to receive any communications from foreign Minister living outside the borders of Spain. They regarded it as an insult to them that these Ministers should not be at Madrid, in the first instance, and then at Valencia. I take it that those foreign representatives accredited to President Azana who are on the borders of Spain are there for their own purposes and because it is considered in the interests of their countries to be there. I do not think that there is a spark of sense in suggesting that any one of the countries which have representatives at St. Jean de Luz or at Hendaye is thereby indicating sympathy or solidarity with the cause of President Azana and the Red Government.

I think that practically everybody in this House sympathises on the whole with the Franco side in Spain, though when a Deputy complains that it is a falsification to say that there is any question of Fascism involved in the struggle, he is not facing facts. Since we last discussed this subject in the House, General Franco has declared quite frankly for a Fascist system of Government. He has suppressed all parties in his area except the Fascist Party and, when he wins —as I still believe he will win—there is no doubt that a Fascist system of government will be established in Spain. There is not the slightest doubt either that the Government then established will be greatly under the influence of Italy and Germany. Certain dangers to European peace arise from that state of things. The balance of power in the Mediterranean will be changed—and dangerously changed so far as the British Commonwealth is concerned. That is the reason why the bulk of those classes in Great Britain who would be temperamentally pro-Franco and who are constantly attacked by the Opposition in Great Britain for being pro-Franco are getting more and more divided in their sympathies because, while they detest the destruction of religious institutions, the destruction of property, the destruction of art treasures, the destruction of churches and the murder and pillage that have been associated with the doings of the Red side in Spain, they are also extremely frightened as to what may happen if and when a Fascist Government is established there strongly under the influence of Italy and Germany. However, that is really a side issue. I mentioned that only because it was suggested just now by Deputy O'Sullivan that it was an outrage to talk of the question of Fascism being involved in the Spanish struggle at all. It is involved, but there are other issues which, with us here in Ireland, outweigh that particular issue. It remains true that we, here, are overwhelmingly in sympathy with the Franco side as against the other side. I repeat that the presence at St. Jean de Luz or Hendaye of a representative accredited to President Azana may be a foolish extravagance but it is fantastic to represent it as any sign whatever of sympathy or solidarity with the Red cause.

I desire to say a few words about the relations which the President has described as the most important of our foreign relations—the relations with the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. I do not propose to travel over the ground I travelled last night in speaking on the Estimate for the President's own Department. The President has indicated that, in his view, satisfactory relations with the Government of Great Britain and with Northern Ireland depend upon the abolition of the boundary and upon the unconditional surrender of the British Government in the financial dispute between themselves and us. The long speech which the President made to-day on these subjects may have been, in his view, and in the view of his supporters a dialectical triumph, but never can dialectic have been more barren.

The speech produced in me a feeling of profound depression, because it is not by wrangling over the rights and wrongs of doings in the past we are going to arrive at a satisfactory settlement of our differences with Great Britain. The President started off by saying that some Deputies, such as myself, were in the habit of making a case for Partition. I deeply resent that statement and I think I could stigmatise it in very offensive terms if I desired to be offensive. I have had, I fancy, more political experience of one particular kind than the President himself has had—that is, the experience that consists in going as a missionary to try to convert hostile audiences. I have frequently spoken on Partition and, indeed, on other subjects connected with the doing of justice to this country, to English audiences and to North of Ireland audiences both in recent times and in times far past. One thing, at any rate, I have learned, that if you are going to do any good at all you must make an attempt to see the other man's point of view. You must not be content with repeating over and over again your own case and shutting your mind altogether to a consideration of the other man's case.

I have often asserted that the British have a very great responsibility for Partition—that, historically, they have the main responsibility for Partition. But what interests me is not the past but the present. I maintain that, in the present, the maintenance of Partition is due to the state of feeling in Northern Ireland. If relations with Great Britain cannot be made satisfactory except by the abandonment and desertion by the British of their kith and kin in Northern Ireland, then I venture to predict that relations never will become satisfactory. The only fruitful line on which to proceed in this matter of Partition is to realise that our nation is composed of the Northern Unionists as well as of us down here and that, even down here, there is a minority—a small minority, it is true, but still an important minority—who share the traditions, the loyalties and the reactions that are experienced by the people in the North. The true statesman is he who, in moulding his policy, takes into consideration all the various elements of which our nation is composed and seeks to build up something in which it would be possible for them all to co-operate.

The British are in a very difficult position about this question of Partition. I do not deny that they can be of some help to us. They can give us some moral assistance. They can cease to be quite as enthusiastic about the Ulsterman's peculiar form of loyalty as they are apt to be, and they can cease to pat them on the back and to praise them for a course of conduct which, in fact, is putting a barrier between ourselves and Great Britain; but more than that is not to be expected of them. No British Government would stay in office, no Socialist Government even, who are, of course, criticising the policy of the present Government on Irish matters, as on other matters, could afford to force, or allow to be forced, the Unionists of Northern Ireland into our State against their will. You may deplore that. You may say that it is unreasonable, and you may say that it is, in your view, the duty of the British to force the Northerners in against their will, or to allow them to be forced in against their will, but whether you think it their duty or not, it is something there is no hope of their doing.

The logical conclusion of the sort of attitude of mind that the President exhibits in this matter is that the British indeed might be brought some day to allow the Nationalist areas in the North, the areas the President mentioned as being predominantly Nationalist, to be united with ourselves, but then what would be the result? Simply that the remaining predominantly Unionist parts, possibly being unable to maintain their existence with a separate Parliament, would be re-absorbed into the United Kingdom Parliament and would cease to be a part of Ireland at all except upon the map. That is the logical conclusion of the line of thought to which the President adheres so firmly, the line of thought which forbids him to look into the other man's mind and to make any concessions to the other man's point of view.

The same sort of barren results must follow from the President's attitude in regard to the financial dispute. I have always thought that the President had a case and I have always said that the President had a case with regard to the land annuities and the other moneys in dispute, but we must not conceal from ourselves that the British have a case, too. Sometimes difficulties are created, not by a conflict between manifest right and manifest wrong, but by a conflict between apparent right on both sides. I dislike being forced into the position of expressing the British point of view here, but it is really necessary that it should be done when our leaders close their minds so completely to that point of view. The British, after all, did sign an agreement. The President alleges that that agreement was a secret one. That is a matter into which I do not propose to enter, but, secret or not secret, the British had no desire that it should be so. The British requested that it should be published. The British made that agreement with a Government which was not thrown out of office immediately after it had made it, but a Government which was twice reelected after that agreement was made and after the results of the agreement, even if not the full terms of the agreement, were perfectly well known to the Irish people. Surely from the British point of view it is asking a great deal that they should throw over that agreement as worth nothing at all?

There would be much more hope of achieving something on the other line the President took, of the difficulty this country might have in paying such large sums; but there again, there is a good deal to be said for the British point of view which has not been said. We are, in fact, paying those sums now. The President says we are being robbed of them. Let him have his way. Let us call it that, but, at any rate, they are being paid. Are we being ruined by that payment? Perhaps the Opposition say "Yes," but do the Government say "Yes"? Did the Minister for Finance in his Budget speech not maintain that, owing to the excellence of his financial policy, even if we were paying the £5,000,000 a year in tariffs, it was evident that the country was well able to bear that strain?

Can we really compare this payment truthfully with the war debt to America? I suggest that that comparison is extremely misleading. First, it is misleading because the war debt of Great Britain to America was bound up with the question of a number of other war debts. In their correspondence with America, Great Britain did not deal with that as an isolated debt from herself to the United States unconnected with the other war debts. As a matter of fact, it would have suited Great Britain extremely well if all war debts had been paid. She would have been very much the gainer, and she lost much more by the repudiation of war debts than she gained by the repudiation of her debt to America. Then you have to consider that the various countries that owed moneys to America had to act together, to a greater or lesser extent. The payments that were required from European countries as a whole to the United States could no longer be made. It was a sheer impossibility. They could not be made in gold because there was not enough gold in the world to do it, and they could not be made in goods because of United States tariffs, and there was no other way to make them.

Now, these difficulties did not apply in our case. There were no tariffs against us in Great Britain. The presence of the British market made it possible for us without any technical difficulties, and indeed without any unbearable burden on this country, to make those payments. After all, the British could argue that if it is impossible for this country to make such payments, the whole scheme of the Wyndham Land Act should never have been accepted by this country, as it was accepted. I am not saying that, as against all these things, there is not a great deal to be said on the Irish side: there is. The President has said some of it. He has, I think, strained some of the arguments more than they could bear to be strained, but whether that is so or not, one thing is certain—he never shows the slightest indication of seeing that the British have a case, too.

He is asking a great deal of them. He is asking them, in the case of Northern Ireland, to do something that the whole instinct of every Englishman would revolt against. My experience is that there is practically no Englishman, except somebody connected with the diehard Ulsterman, and getting his ideas from that source, who would not be delighted to see Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State come together, but that is very different from expecting them to force the North in or to abandon the North. You might apply that well-known and hackneyed quotation from Tennyson to the situation: "Their honour rooted in dishonour stands and faith unfaithful keeps them falsely true." It may have been wrong and unjust on the part of the British to create the situation in Ulster, but now that it has been created, and now that those people are there, they cannot hand them over against their will just as if they were cattle, so far at least as the more or less homogeneous districts of Northern Ireland are concerned.

It is perfectly obvious, when you come to consider what the feelings of the Unionists in Northern Ireland must be, that they attach supreme importance to two things, and they never have had any indication from the present Government that anything would be done to secure them in these matters. The first is that trade—their agricultural products, their linen trade, and their ship-building—should be safe against tariffs imposed by Great Britain. The other is that they want the King as an integral part of any Constitution they come into. There has never been the slightest indication that the President is prepared to make any concessions to them in that regard.

Another matter that the President has referred to as standing in the way of good relations is the presence of British naval maintenance parties in certain of our ports and the claim that the British have, under the Treaty, to occupy such ports in case of war. Of course, I frankly admit that my point of view about the British Navy differs fundamentally from the President's. I regard the navy as our navy. There are plenty of Irishmen in it; there have been plenty of Irishmen in it; there are Irishmen going into it at present. The Royal Navy, in my view, is ours, just as I regard the King as King of Ireland, and not as an external authority. So that there is that difference in theory between us. Apart from that, I have always been inclined to consider, speaking as one pretty ignorant in these matters, that the value of these maintenance parties in Irish ports was probably over-rated and I should be glad to see them withdrawn for that reason if it assuaged any hard feelings some people may have over there. But, actually, would that settle any problem? Is not that something that is mixed up with the problem of Partition, too? If the British withdrew all claims on Berehaven, Cobh and Lough Swilly, would not the President still have to say: "What about your troops in Northern Ireland? What about the whole gross injustice and injury of Partition? How can you expect that we would co-operate with you in time of war so long as that injustice continues? Supposing we see an opportunity of Great Britain being defeated in war, can you expect that if the Power which may defeat Great Britain promises to give us an united Ireland we shall not assist that Power"?

Once again it seems to me that the difficulty of Partition is the fundamental thing. It is the fundamental thing; it is at the bottom of everything else. Until you can cure Partition, you cannot have satisfactory relations with Great Britain. It is we who have got to cure Partition. The British cannot do it; they can give a little help—not much. The King, if we were to make him an integral part of our Constitution, could give us a great deal of help. But the main task has to be done by ourselves and is not going to be done by Party dialectics. It can only be done by looking into the other man's mind and making such adjustment of your point of view as will make it possible to satisfy, to some extent, his point of view.

The President accuses me of making a case for Partition. Why it is he who makes a case for Partition; in every speech he makes, he makes a case for Partition. I venture to say with confidence that if I went to-morrow to address an Ulster Unionist audience with a speech on Partition, I would come away having made some impression, having converted a few, having shaken others, having gained a certain amount of sympathy from nearly all. I venture to say with equal confidence that if the President went to address an Ulster Unionist audience he would come away having hardened the hearts of every one of them against a united Ireland.

After the very laconic and extremely halting observations of the President in introducing this Estimate, I think the taxpayer would be justified in asking himself why he is taxed to the extent of £76,502 for a Department of External Affairs in this country. He would be justified in asking himself, as was publicly asked during the beginning of the history of this State, in the early stages of the development of the State, what was the necessity for a Department of External Affairs? So far as the President, in his capacity as Minister for External Affairs, is concerned, he has not this year, nor any year since he took that office, given any indication that he knows the slightest thing about the work of this Department or has the smallest interest in its activities.

I think there is no Parliament in the world in which matters of foreign affairs are dealt with so casually as in this Parliament here. There is no people to whom such little information is given in reference to their external relations as the people of the Irish Free State. If it is that the President is too busy to conduct the affairs of this Department, then I think he ought to get somebody who can devote the time and who will have the necessary interest in the activities of the Department. It is perfectly obvious to me that the President has no interest whatsoever, good, bad or indifferent, in matters of foreign policy. On every occasion when Estimates for the Department of External Affairs have been introduced here since 1933 I have protested against this policy of introducing these Estimates for the Department with a few words and a wave of the hand and, perhaps, a request to ask questions.

In striking contradistinction of the way in which matters of foreign policy are dealt with in this Parliament and, say, the Canadian Parliament, I should like to direct the attention of Deputies to the fact that in each year the permanent head of the Department of External Affairs for Canada presents to the political head, the Minister of External Affairs, a complete and detailed report of the activities of the Department for the preceding year. Each of the activities is dealt with, and, subsequently, the matter is discussed in the Canadian Legislature in complete detail. We used to have a practice here some years ago of giving to the Dáil, and publishing to the public, a report of the activities of our representative at the League of Nations. We have not had any such report since the present Government took office. So far from having a report even of our activities at the League of Nations, we never get in this House any proper information or details as to the activities of our representatives abroad, or of our civil servants at headquarters, in reference to matters of foreign policy or external affairs.

In this report presented by the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to his Minister each year in Canada, there is a complete and detailed account given of the activities of the Department. We find here that the activities of the Department of External Affairs in connection with their work abroad are set forth in detail. The work of the Canadian Legation at Washington is dealt with and a summary of its activities at Washington is given. We do not know what our representative in Washington is doing or, so far as we have been told by the Government, if he is doing anything. We have the greatest confidence in our representative at Washington, and I am sure he is not wasting his time. But so far as the ordinary taxpayer in this country is concerned the slightest information is not given as to what our representative is doing at Washington or whether he would not be better employed at home in some other capacity. We find in this report of the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs at Ottawa a full account of the activities of the Legation at Washington. They keep in close touch with the legislation passed by the United States Congress. Reports as to these activities and matters of that kind are set forth in this detailed summary for the year 1936. You will find there a full statement of the Legation's activities. I quote from this now for the purpose of getting the President, in his capacity as Minister for External Affairs, to do something of the same kind in connection with his Department and so give information to the Dáil and to the people of this country as to what our Legations abroad are doing. In this report I find this paragraph:—

"During the year, the Legation has kept the Department at Ottawa informed on the attitude of the United States on the major questions of foreign relations, with particular reference to neutrality policy and legislation, international commercial policy and the Inter-American Peace Conference. Attention was also given the monetary, financial and fiscal policies of the United States, and the agricultural situation was closely followed."

I give that information for the purpose of indicating to the President something of the work done by the Canadian Legation at Washington. What is being done by our Legation at Washington? Is our Legation there doing anything? Is our representative there doing anything? So far as the President has told us our representative at Washington is doing nothing. Personally, I am perfectly sure he is very active. But the President has not sufficient knowledge of his activities to tell the House and country what these activities are. The activities of the Canadian Legation in Paris are set forth in the same way. From this report we find that that Legation takes a very deep interest in the internal situation in France and its impact upon the European situation. Their Legation in Paris advises the Canadian Government of the European situation which is viewed in the light of the information acquired by that Legation. What is our Legation in Paris doing? Have we got anybody there in Paris who is looking after our interests or who is competent to look after our interests? If so, we hear nothing about it from the Government. As long as the President is endeavouring to carry on the dual position as President and Minister for External Affairs we will be in that position. I referred on another occasion to this Department of External Affairs as the Cinderella of the Departments. I am afraid under the present arrangements it will continue to be so. Again, the activities of the Canadian Legation at Tokyo are dealt with and, in other respects, a complete summary of the Department of External Affairs and the activities of their Legations abroad are furnished to the Canadian people and the Canadian Legislature. We were told something about the work of this Department on Irish estate work. This Department is costing the country £76,502 for the purpose of enabling the next of kin here to be found in the case of Irish people domiciled in Canada or in the United States. In other words, for the purpose of putting money into the pockets of American attorneys. I agree that the Department of External Affairs can do something to prevent citizens of this country being exploited by American attorneys. It is quite true that some American attorneys specialise in finding lost heirs and charge immense sums for doing so. But it comes as a complete surprise to me to hear that that work is of such paramount importance that it is the only item that occupied more than two or three sentences in the President's opening statement on this Estimate.

I left the most important part of this report till the last. It is placed in the position of first importance in that report. It has to do with the trade relations between Canada and the United Kingdom of Great Britain. In this report there is a paragraph which I propose to read for the purpose of bringing home to Deputies here the importance of the work of the Department of External Affairs and how, if properly directed, very great advantage could be obtained for this country. The most important activity of the Department of External Affairs in Canada was, according to this report, their activities in connection with the preparations for the revision of the Ottawa agreements made in 1932. Here is the paragraph to which I refer:—

"The activities of the Office of the High Commissioner during 1936 have ranged over the whole field of relations between His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom and in Canada. Special reference, however, should be made to one or two fields of activity which might be considered as of more than ordinary importance at the present time. In the first place, a considerable part of the work of the High Commissioner's Office has been concerned with economic and trade relations between the two Governments. Special negotiations between the two Governments have taken place with a view to placing the trade relations on a satisfactory basis on the expiry of the Ottawa agreements in 1937. For this purpose the Ministers of Finance, Trade and Commerce, and Agriculture, with other officials, spent some weeks in London during the summer, and following the meeting of the League Assembly at Geneva, the Prime Minister made a visit to London in this connection when the discussions between the two Governments were carried a step further. Special reference must be made in the second place to Canadian publicity activities during the year. A Publicity Committee was established under the chairmanship of the High Commissioner and consisted of members of the staff and representatives of the Departments of Trade and Commerce and National Revenue at Canada House to co-ordinate and supervise Canadian publicity activities in the United Kingdom. It has been realised that by centralising and controlling the working out of a definite plan, the results achieved so far have been entirely satisfactory. In this connection no occasion has been missed by the High Commissioner to speak before the various Chambers of Commerce in London, Birmingham, Cardiff, Manchester, Edinborough, Glasgow and other cities."

There is a summary of the activities of the Canadian High Commissioner with special reference to the problems that will be presented to Canada and the United Kingdom when the Ottawa agreements come up for revision. It is felt to be of such paramount importance to the trade relations between Canada and Great Britain that no less than three Ministers and the Prime Minister visited Great Britain in connection with the preliminary discussion in reference to the meeting this year when the Ottawa agreements come to be revised. The reason is obvious why Canada attaches such importance to the relations between themselves and Great Britain. What is our High Commissioner doing? We see in the papers how our High Commissioner flies over here to Ireland and back again to England occasionally. He goes by rail, by boat and by every possible mode of locomotion. What is he doing flying back to the Coronation? Did he represent this country at the Coronation? What has his activity been during the last twelve months? It is well known that he is a man of great industry, great energy, but we have not been told a single word about what he is doing.

Are we going to let slip again this year the opportunity that was let slip in 1932 at Ottawa to get beneficial trade agreements for this country? Let us look at what the results have been for Canada and this country during the last four or five years when the Ottawa agreements were in operation. In 1930 Canada exported to Great Britain goods to the value of £38,000,000, and the imports from Great Britain during that year were £29,000,000, leaving a trade balance in Canada's favour of £9,000,000 approximately. What was our position during that year, before the present Government came into power? In 1930 we sent to Great Britain £43,000,000 worth of goods and we imported from Great Britain, in domestic commodities alone, £34,500,000. There was a trade balance then in our favour to the extent of £8,500,000. In 1936 Canada's exports to Great Britain had risen, as a result of the Ottawa agreements, to £75,000,000, nearly double the 1930 figure, and the imports from Great Britain into Canada in that year came to £23,000,000, so that as the result of the Ottawa agreements the favourable trade balance of £9,000,000 in 1930 had risen in 1936 to £41,000,000.

On the occasion of the Ottawa Conference we were too proud to make any agreement that would be beneficial to this country, and in 1936 what was the tragic story here? We had, as I have already stated, a favourable trade balance in 1930 of £8,500,000 in our trade with Great Britain. In 1936 we exported £20,400,000 worth of goods and imported £21,000,000 worth, so that the favourable balance in our favour in 1930 had been converted into an adverse trade balance of £600,000 last year.

Remember, the Ottawa agreements come up for revision this year. What is our High Commissioner going to do about it, acting on the instructions of the Government? What has he been doing in the last 12 months? How has he been earning the salary the taxpayers pay him and which we are asked to vote to-day? So far as the President is concerned, he talked about the work of the Department in connection with the finding of heirs. If he had any conception of his responsibility would he have devoted most of his speech to the work of finding lost heirs and putting money into the pockets of the American attorneys? Other members of the Commonwealth of Nations have for months been making preparations in advance for the revision of the Ottawa agreements. Why was our country not doing something towards securing beneficial trade agreements?

The President said we went to Ottawa, not because we wanted to consort with the representatives of the Dominions or Great Britain, but because we were invited there by a friendly Government. Is he going to make any distinction between the Ottawa Conference and the Conference that may be held in London? The Ottawa Conference was held perhaps for the sake of convenience in Canada, or perhaps it was for the purpose of making it clear what Canada's status was in this matter. I think that was the real reason why the Ottawa conference was held in Canada and not in Great Britain.

Is the President going to make any distinction between the Conference in Ottawa and the Economic Conference that will be probably held this year or sometime afterwards to revise the Ottawa agreements, if it is held in England? Is he not going to bow his crested head and go to England, when our representatives went to Canada in 1932 for an Economic Conference? Is he going to make an excuse of Partition, or that he is being treated with injustice by Great Britain, or that he does not want to put his hands as deeply into the pockets of our ancient enemy as he possibly can? I would have thought that one of the most patriotic acts would be to go to Canada, to South Africa, to New Zealand or London and put his hands as deeply as he possibly could into the pockets of John Bull and extract as much British gold as he could extract.

Apparently, we are not going to have anything to do with the Conference this year, but it is as well that the taxpayer who is asked to pay the salary and expenses of the High Commissioner's Office should know that the President, in his capacity as Minister for External Affairs, declines to give any information as to what the activities of the High Commissioner have been or will be, or as to what are the prospects of our getting any benefit from the revision of the Ottawa agreements this year.

The President spoke casually about Spain. He said: "There is no necessity for me to deal with the matter of our policy of non-intervention or to defend it," and he left it at that. There is no question of the policy of the President on non-intervention in Spain. The policy of non-intervention has been adopted practically unanimously here. The President is not called upon to defend that policy. We on this side were the first to plead for the policy of non-intervention in connection with Spain, and for the President to waft aside one of the principal items occupying public attention at present—our relations with Spain—merely by saying that as he has already defended his policy, there is no necessity to refer further to Spain, is rather an insult to the Deputies and to the people. The people want to know, first of all, can the President, from the information his officers ought to have at headquarters, or through our diplomatic representatives abroad, or through the information supplied by the British Foreign Office to the President in his capacity of Minister for External Affairs, give the people any clear information as to what the position in Spain is?

We do not ask the President to divulge any secrets contrary to national peace or contrary to the public interest, but we are entitled to get some information of the state of affairs in Spain and in Europe as a whole. Every foreign Minister in every Parliament in Europe gives, in one of the principal debates in the year's legislative programme, an account of the foreign policy of the country and the general situation externally. We are not to be told anything, except about the finding of lost heirs and other matters that we can find out for ourselves in the newspapers. We do not pay £76,502 for the purpose of being told by the Minister for External Affairs, to whom that sum is voted, that we can find out all our information by buying the newspapers. The House is entitled to have a little more information from the Minister on matters of external affairs, particularly in regard to the European situation, than can be discovered from even a very intelligent and close perusal of the newspapers.

To return to Spain, Deputy O'Sullivan has dealt with our attitude on that and our grievances against the President in connection with the Estimate he moves to-day. We want to know, and we are entitled to know, something about the political situation in Spain or the war situation in Spain. At least we are entitled to know what is our Minister doing there.

The President, in his capacity as Minister for External Affairs, must be aware that the general public in this country, irrespective of politics, are taking a very keen interest in matters in Spain. They are taking a very keen interest in our attitude in connection with Spain. I have no intention of going over the ground that has been already gone over as to whether or not we ought to withdraw our representative from the present Government or from the present President of the Spanish people, whichever way one likes to put it. I am not going over that ground at all, but I think that the President, when he was introducing this Estimate, knowing as he ought to have known, unless he has been so immersed in his Draft Constitution for the last 12 months that he is not cognisant of the state of public feeling, that the people are expecting to know at least what our Minister is doing at St. Jean de Luz, or wherever he is at the present moment. What has he done since he was sent there, and how long is it intended to keep him there? In the debate on the Bill relating to this which took place here some months ago, it was suggested that that was only a temporary measure, and that, instead of being at Valencia, he was at St. Jean de Luz merely for the purpose of giving assistance to Irish people who wanted to come back. At least, we are entitled to be told, without trenching upon the vexed question, and it is a vexed question, as to whether our representative should be accredited to the Red Government or to the Franco Government or to neither of them, what is that man doing in France purporting to represent this country to Spain? What has he done to help any of our nationals in any difficulties they may have had on one side or the other in Spain?

The real issue in this matter is not whether Franco is right, or whether his opponent is right, in Spain. I think that we have not sufficient information before us really to form a proper or an adequate view of the political situation in Spain at all. The one thing that does outstand in connection with the Spanish situation is this, that whatever Franco may stand for—whether, as Deputy MacDermot suggests, he stands for Fascism and whether somebody else may stand for anti-Communism—the one thing that is quite clear and outstanding is that the so-called Government in Spain stands for Communism. Our case is not that we should not have a representative either to Franco or his opponent, but that we should not, by our action in sending a representative to either one or the other, give grounds for anybody to say that we have the slightest sympathy with the Communist fight that is going on in Spain. When it is quite clear that the so-called Government forces in Spain are fighting the cause of Communism, then we ought not to have our Minister accredited to that kind of Government or to the State of which that is the Government at the moment. That is our attitude. It is not a question of non-intervention; it is not even a question of sending our representative to Franco. It is not a question of our having sympathy with Franco, but it is a question of our not having sympathy with Communism. That is the sum total of our attitude and policy in connection with Spain.

There are many matters in connection with this Vote that I would like to speak on. I have on frequent occasions on this Vote pleaded for the setting-up of a committee of foreign relations, or external affairs, which would be representative of all sections of the House. I have stated that it was my firm conviction that foreign policy, leaving aside for the moment our relations with Great Britain, was a matter on which we could have in this House a common policy. We had an opportunity, during the course of the last financial year, to put that into practice. That opportunity was not availed of. I have got tired of protesting against the way in which this Estimate is being treated. My own inclination was to let it pass without speaking on it, but I felt it would not be right that we should let it pass without some protest. I have always taken the view that the Department of External Affairs is one of the most important Departments of the State. I have been desirous from the time that I have had any connection with the Government of this country, that this Department should be put on a proper basis, with proper staff, with proper dignity in the service of the State, and with a proper place in the Government of the State. But it has been treated for years as the Cinderella among the Departments, and the President has further put it back into the kitchen.

We may talk about our status. We may put down platitudes, nonsensical platitudes I call them, in this Draft Constitution about Éire affirming its adherence to the ideals of international co-operation and peace. But what are we doing to give effect to that? We have in this Draft Constitution highfalutin phrases about Éire affirming its adherence to the principle of international peace and international co-operation, but we may test the sincerity of these utterances by looking at what has been done by the President in the past in connection with his duties as Minister for External Affairs. So far as we know, he has not given the slightest thought or work or any attention whatever to the cause of international peace. Last year he gave utterance to the pious expression of his desire to do anything he could for international peace, but, of course, he could do nothing. Well, if he can do nothing, at least let him not pretend that he can by putting it in that Constitution. So far as we know, nothing has been done by the Department of External Affairs to further the cause of international peace. We could be a force in international politics, and we could uphold the dignity and advance the prestige of this State through our representatives abroad, and through activities properly directed by a proper Department of External Affairs. In many respects the present Government have been failures, but in no respect has the President certainly been a greater failure than in his capacity as Minister for External Affairs.

The discussion on the Vote for External Affairs can, as has been properly stated, be divided into two main topics or two main groupings of sub-heads: (1) Our relations with Great Britain and the Commonwealth, and (2) our relations with all the world other than these. But there is one subject which, with all respect to Deputy MacDermot, I do consider for this people, whether or not for the world as a whole, is a matter of fundamental importance, and that, of course, is the question of Spain.

I did not say that that was not a question of fundamental importance.

Our representative at Spain is a smaller point. I still do assert that the question of whether we have a representative in any way connected with anybody who also is connected—I put it at that remove— with the Government until recently presided over by Caballero is a matter of fundamental importance for the people of this country, possibly not for people outside of it. But the more a man is thinking in terms of the Irish people, I think the more he will become conscious of the fact that it is of fundamental importance. A man who has less thought and is less at home amongst the Irish people will have a different viewpoint.

I am glad to find that in any discussion on the Spanish situation anybody who, even in a half-hearted way, becomes an apologist for the Government is driven to work back to the argument about the Vatican. It is the last trench. I wish we could have this matter about the Vatican cleared up. There is an assumption in this House that the Vatican has taken no steps more than, say, Britain has, with regard to the recognition of the Franco Government. There is also an assumption in this House that in international matters the Vatican, either because of its position or because of its Treaty situation is in exactly the same position, or that there is no different situation, from that of Great Britain. Are these three assumptions correct? I have seen it stated—I have not very recent information, but I have seen it stated—that the representative of what used to be called the Government of Spain, to the Vatican, has in fact departed from the Vatican, and that the representative who used to be accredited from the Vatican to what, I suppose, we ought still to call the Government in Spain—that is, the people recently presided over by Caballero—has also gone, and that there are at least junior diplomatic representatives exchanged as between the Burgos Government and the Vatican. Whether that is so or not, I cannot say with accuracy, but the statement has been made, and has been made with authority. Now, the President must know what the situation there is, and I say that it would be a good thing for us to be given some information as to the actual position by one who has access to official documents and who must be aware of the actual state of affairs, so far as they are revealed in such documents. Are the old-time representatives, who used to be exchanged between the Caballero Government and the Vatican, still at their posts, or have they been withdrawn? If they have been withdrawn, have they been replaced, or are there mere empty buildings there? Are there any exchanges between the Burgos Government and the Vatican? These are points that, I am sure, could easily be cleared up by the President, and when these points are cleared up—and I suggest that they can be easily cleared up—we can advance to another argument.

I do not know whether the President is going to avail himself, in the same way as his Ministers have previously availed themselves, of the argument of the Vatican, but will the President inform us whether or not there is anything in the Lateran Treaty which prevents the Vatican having the fullest liberty in connection with international matters that any government has, or is there not a clause there which says that in the matter of intervention in ordinary international affairs the Vatican is not to intervene unless invited to do so by both parties or by all parties to a conflict? If that is so, is there any reason why this State, or anybody in this State, should seek to make an equation between the question of whether the Vatican has not recognised the Franco Government and this country has refused to do so? Apart from these matters, which can be cleared up without any great conflict of argument, I suggest that it is clearly a fact that, no matter what self-denying ordinance the Vatican accepted with regard to intervention in international matters in the ordinary way, the Vatican has clearly the right—the right was not, indeed, given, but merely recognised in the Lateran Treaty—to exert its moral influence to the fullest extent, while it might not intervene through diplomatic usage in the ordinary way. What has the Vatican done? Is there any suggestion that the language used by the Vatican has been lacking in clarity so far as this trouble is concerned? Can anybody have any doubt as to where the Vatican stands in regard to the conflict? Has not the language used by the Vatican been extremely clear? Can any comparison be made between the language used by the Vatican and the fumbling utterances, through the President's own Press, and by himself and his Deputies and Ministers here and elsewhere, in regard to this whole struggle?

The Vatican might easily have withheld even from observation on the matter, because, despite what Deputy MacDermot originally indicated he believed, and what the President, apparently, believes up to this moment, nobody at all can fail to make the distinction between the position of the Vatican in regard to the Catholic world and the position of this secular State. If the Vatican were as completely free as Great Britain or this country to intervene in the ordinary way, internationally, the Vatican also has a responsibility towards the Catholics of Spain, and the repercussion from Vatican action at this moment on the Catholic community in Spain might be a very serious thing. It might be exactly what would retard Vatican action. Yet, notwithstanding that, it has not retarded Vatican comment. Over and over again, here in debate, an attempt has been made to get a proper viewpoint on this country's relations with the parties in Spain. On the 26th of August of last year a reason was given, in an official communication sent to the Press, as to why the Government in this country was not breaking off diplomatic relations with Spain. We had addressed a note to the French Minister in Dublin accepting the principle of non-intervention, and towards the end of the statement there was the following paragraph:

"To those public bodies, however, and to others who have requested the Government to sever diplomatic relations with the Spanish Government, the Government of Saorstát Eireann would point out that diplomatic relations are primarily between States rather than between Governments and that the severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries would serve no useful purpose at the present time."

That, certainly, was mealy-mouthed, to say the least of it. The only comment that was added to it—and I gather that it was not part of the communication to the French Minister —was this:—

"The Government of Saorstát Eireann, in common with the whole Irish people and the Christian world, are profoundly shocked by the tragic events that have been taking place in Spain and by the excesses by which these events are reported to be accompanied. Their sympathy goes out to the great Spanish people in their terrible suffering."

That is a very neutral type of statement. We have a condemnation of excesses but no indication, so far as there was a Government mind at all in this matter, as to on which side it was alleged these excesses had taken place. A month earlier than this, at a time when one of the organs of the Press in this country had definitely taken up a position and indicated that, in their view, this fight was a fight between Communism and the combined forces of the Right, for control in Spain, the President's Party organ indicated their viewpoint in this way:—

"That country is now divided into two camps in which the most unrestrained passions and the most intense hatreds prevail."

They speak of two camps. That was in July; but in August, as far as the Government were concerned, they deplored the excesses by which the events were reported to be accompanied. A little later, we had statements that were queried here in the House—notably one from Deputy Hugo Flinn. The President, it will be remembered, tried to explain away Deputy Flinn's statement afterwards; but evidently Deputy Flinn himself was not satisfied and decided to cut the Gordian knot by writing to the newspapers to say that he never made the statement. That was after the President had explained the statement. That is what I call fumbling. Whether it was deliberate, or whether it was due to a characteristic inability to take up a position and adopt a viewpoint, I do not know. At any rate, I was making this comparison. I assert that this country is free to take any standpoint it likes in this international matter. This country, knowing that its viewpoint would certainly be of importance to the people in the country and was not going to have any serious reactions on the Catholic community in Spain, on one side or the other, was, I suggest, in a different position from the Vatican State. As far as this Government is concerned, they talked about the two camps in Spain and deplored the excesses that were taking place in that country. His Holiness the Pope, speaking of the grave peril of Communism threatening the whole world in reference to the Spanish conflict, referred to it as "this rising tide of ferocity which is sweeping away churches, priests and worshippers"; and the Osservatore Romano, the organ of the Holy See, dealing with the outrages perpetrated by “the Spanish barbarians”—that is their phrase— says: “It is time to drop the mask and show to the world the naked face of these destroyers of Christian civilisation.”

The Pope later received a group of refugees from Spain and declared that "the highest members of the sacred clergy, bishops and priests, consecrated virgins, the laity of every class and condition, venerable grey hairs and the flower of youth, sacred and solemn tombs have been assaulted, violated, destroyed in the most ruthless and barbarous ways in an unbridled, unparalleled confusion of forces, so savage and so cruel as to have been thought utterly impossible for human dignity, let alone for human nature, even the most debased." That comes from a country with which an attempt is made here to put us on a footing. Our attitude in relation to the Spanish conflict is defended by a comparison with the Vatican. There could be any number of quotations given indicating that whatever may be the situation in international politics of the Vatican, certainly, in so far as the Vatican was always free and had in no way submitted to any limitation on its right to exert its moral and spiritual authority in regard to conflicts, nobody could say that there was the slightest doubt about what the viewpoint of the Vatican was and the side which it would like to see prevailing.

We have got a representative in Southern France. What is he doing? The question which I asked the President on that matter drew from him a series of replies. It is quite clear that this man has no staff worth while. He is not there with any intent to do any serious business. It was not even pretended that he had headquarters at St. Jean de Luz and agents throughout Spain, at least that is not what was told to us. As far as the President's reply was concerned, it would indicate that he has been kept there as a mark of the President's stubbornness, that that man was not going to be withdrawn as the accredited representative of this country to Spain. Even although he can do nothing, he is kept there in flat defiance of every expectation of the people. Of course, we have got to take everything in proportion. A representative of this country in Spain, in the course of a great war, cannot do very much and we do know that this representative, or rather his office, did this in any event: they got such of our people, as were found in Spain, out. They got them out through an agency, and the agency was the British Office and the British Fleet, and the President thanked the British Fleet for their efforts. If the President would tell us that that is the only type of agency that is of any force or effect in that country, and that it is for that reason he cleaves still to the British Government, because of the aid they are able to give our people, whether they take a different viewpoint or not, then there is an arguable case for that, but that has not been put up as the case on which we stand.

In other respects, this situation with regard to Spain has been allowed to develop in a peculiar way. There is great complaint made in Great Britain of the fact that the broadcasting of any event from Spain is, in the minds of the majority of the listeners—at least those of them who take trouble to write to the newspapers—tinged with sympathy for the Caballero forces. This country does not go in so much for broadcasting in that matter, but in any event in regard to a recent episode in the Spanish war, the British broadcasting authorities did see fit, not exactly to mend their hand on a particular broadcast, but at least to admit, or to recognise, that another viewpoint had been put forward, and that viewpoint had been very authoritatively stated and was allowed to be stated through the columns of the English Times. An attempt was made to raise hysteria in England over the bombing of Guernica. For days afterwards the columns of most of the English newspapers were filled with the stories current about that incident, and the English Times gave a column to a completely different version under the heading of “The Other Side.” That version has been referred to in at least two debates in the British House of Commons, but this country never noticed that there was another viewpoint. There had been not a very lengthy announcement with regard to that particular bombing from the Station here. There was something done, but there was never a hint that there was another viewpoint and that that viewpoint was published in the columns of the English Times, as from a man who had visited that area. If that particular individual's story is anything like correct, it revealed for the first time——

How is the President, as Minister for External Affairs, responsible for the broadcasting of any announcement?

He controls the use of the broadcasting station as Minister for External Affairs, in so far as announcements on foreign affairs are concerned.

It is not the Minister for External Affairs who controls broadcasting.

I suggest that if the broadcast had to be changed on a particular matter affecting foreign affairs, it would be changed only on the intervention of the Minister for External Affairs.

I think the Deputy should have raised that matter on another Estimate, the Estimate for Broadcasting.

If I had raised it on the Broadcasting Estimate, I would be told that in international matters the source of authority was the President, as Minister for External Affairs, and that any line taken in international matters would be from the President as Minister for External Affairs. I suggest that it is in order to refer to the matter here. Whether we relate it to broadcasting or not, the President might think that it might be possible to clear up the errors that have been promulgated through the foreign Press or that have crept into this country. It certainly does appear to be a fact that the main places attacked in what was described as that outrage were three buildings given over to the manufacture of small arms. As far as this country is concerned, it has hardly heard of that. As far as Government intervention of the use of wireless is concerned, no hint of that has ever been given.

Similarly, too, this country has played some part with regard to non-intervention. Just exactly what that part is, it is hard to say. The view held by a member of the Government in regard to the non-intervention matter was given here by the Minister for Education, speaking on the 19th February of this year, as reported in Volume 65, No. 5, column 753. The Minister was annoyed at the thought that anybody should complain that our representative on the Non-Intervention Committee should have discovered what was on foot before that committee; and should have taken care to get the matter explained, or should have a point of view. Answering an interruption as to what his previous statement had to do with Spain, the Minister said:

"It has got to do with the statement of Deputy McGilligan that our representative at the Non-Intervention Committee should have got up there in front of the representatives of Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, England, and the 20 other nations represented, and asked questions, demanded that certain things be done, and, presumably, be satisfied in the name of the Irish Free State Government before he gave his consent to the proposals submitted."

Now I suggest that what the Minister for Education was there pouring scorn upon was the attitude that one would expect the representative of any country to take on a matter affecting the policy of his Government. I cannot conceive it to be the Government view that a representative of this country on any committee should go there in such a shrinking and cowardly way that he would expect openly to be defended in these words, pouring scorn on the view that our representative "should have got up there in front of the representatives of Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, England and the 20 other nations represented, and asked questions, demanded that certain things be done, and, presumably"—this is the crescendo of scorn, the height of the scornful utterance—"be satisfied in the name of the Irish Free State Government before he gave his consent to the proposals submitted." Surely he should? It is not for our representative to go there blatantly to make trouble, but how can a Minister here use this sarcasm about the Irish Free State representative presumably being satisfied before he gave his consent to the proposals submitted?

It may be that that is the viewpoint taken—that there is a definite recognition of the fact that this country does not count a whole lot in international matters, and particularly does not count at all in international matters when it comes to a display of sea power. But that might have been broken to the people a little more gently than by this crude utterance of the Minister for Education in this debate. It certainly must be a shock to the people in the country, when they are paying to have an odd representative go here and there to an odd international gathering, to find that the view taken of him was that he was really going to be something in the nature of a nuisance to the Government that sent him there if he decided to get an intelligent grasp of what was on foot, and, as far as his limitations allowed, to be satisfied with whatever proposal was put up before he agreed to it.

It may be, however, that things which we do not have a great deal of power in regard to may work out strange international doctrines, and that consenting to a matter, even in a big crisis like this, without recording a point of view, may be disclosing a weakness and may further be preparing for a downfall when the matter becomes one of importance to this country in other circumstances.

I cannot understand what is the view of this country with regard to the blockade that was said to be in force— or at least that an attempt has been made to enforce—around Bilbao at the moment. The British have certainly taken up the line that while they will not have their boats used in an attempt to get men or munitions into any quarter of Spain, once it comes to food it is a different matter. It is not so long ago since this country, quite properly and in conjunction with the majority of the nations of the world, tried to impose sanctions against Italy. We had a Bill here. It is on the Statute Book at the moment. We definitely prohibited, under certain penalties, the export of food to Italy. Have we a viewpoint on these matters? Why is there a change? Has our representative a view as to whether the British viewpoint—largely based on the fact that she will not grant belligerent rights to either of the parties in Spain —is correct in regard to the blockade? Does the President think that it is of any importance to this country that General Franco has been insisting —and insisting in accord with old Spanish pronouncements and views— that the limit of territorial waters around Spain is not the three-mile limit, which Britain is so keen on having, but a six-mile limit? Has our representative any view on that, or, even if he has accepted in some sort of tacit way the view with regard to the three-mile limit around Spain, has it been declared that that does not prevent another viewpoint being taken later? I thought I noticed a sign of assent from the President here to-day when Deputy MacDermot said that General Franco recently had shown himself to be a Fascist. I should like to have a reference from Deputy MacDermot or the President to the evidence which demonstrates that.

I do not think the President indicated any view.

I hope the President will indicate a viewpoint on it sooner or later. I take it that he does not, at any rate, want to be bound by an assent to Deputy MacDermot's view for the moment. That statement has been made. I myself felt that there was something of that tendency in the announcement that was made of a certain reorganisation of political forces behind General Franco as declared to the people of this country from our broadcasting station recently. If those matters are going to be broadcast, surely there ought to be some care taken to find out what the exact situation is. Unless there is a clear-cut statement by a man himself adopting a particular point of view, the evidence should be given upon which the statement is made that he has adopted that viewpoint. Is it not an outrageous thing to have a statement, even tinged with a tendency of that type, broadcast to the people of this country when General Franco himself at the moment of this re-forming of his political forces definitely announced that he was going to have no Fascist State in Spain, in so far as he could guard the event? That is the Spanish matter.

As far as I am concerned I think I can corroborate every word which Deputy Costello has said with regard to the general viewpoint on this side of the House. Nobody need have any doubt about the policy of non-intervention, and there would be no doubt in the country if that matter had not been confused in some way in order to try and confuse the issue, which was a straight one between this side of the House and the Government on the question of the withdrawing of our Minister. I have tackled that from only one point of view to-day, because I believe now that the matter has come to a point where it can hardly be confused any longer. The big point of difference between us is not the question of non-intervention. Even those other matters affecting the blockade and other things could be passed over. The matter upon which this country should, through its Government, declare itself in the one way that counts —not through fumbling statements— would be the definite withdrawal of a man who is certainly doing no good where he is. He probably may not be able to do any good on either side, but with his presence in St. Jean de Luz and the attachment that he has with the Government until recently presided over by Caballero there is the international position that it is Caballero we recognise at the moment. As long as that situation exists there will be a conflict between the two Parties, and there is no doubt where the sympathies of the people lie. The only thing to have explained away is this confusing item brought in with regard to the Vatican. I am leaving it where it is.

As far as the rest of our international affairs are concerned, there is in the first place our situation vis-a-vis Great Britain and the Commonwealth. After that, there is our situation vis-a-vis everybody else. There are two points I should like to raise with regard to everybody except the Commonwealth. In Geneva recently there was instituted an inquiry. It was popularly known as the Inquiry in Raw Materials. There was an inquiry which was started after the speech made by the then Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain about two years before. This is a committee which was set up in order to try and see if there was any peaceful way of resolving the conflict likely to arise between Germany, in the main, and other countries on this question of colonies—colonies regarded only as areas from which raw materials were drawn. The committee was appointed by the League Council. It was set up on the initiative of the British Government.

There had been a preliminary discussion, and somewhere about the early days of March the memorandum was under discussion. It then appeared that that memorandum—I am quoting from the London Times of March 9—“had lumped together Great Britain, the Dominions and the Crown Colonies under one head as the producing unit of the British Empire.” It is strange that objection was taken to that by two persons—Sir Frederick Leith Ross and, next morning, Sir Henry Strakosch—on behalf of the British Government. They were at pains to point out the autonomy of the Crown Colonies and the completely independent position of the Dominions. It was rather objected that the memorandum was of no value, produced in the way in which it was, and that there should be a new division of the areas of the world, recognising the political and international status of the people whose countries were being inquired into. I do not find anywhere that any objection was raised by any representative of ours to that, as it is described, “lumping together” of Great Britain, the Dominions and the Crown Colonies as one unit for productive purposes. I should like to know if that was done, and, if not, why some statement was not made by a representative of ours in regard to that matter.

The second point—it is a familiar one —occurred during certain of the debates in the British House of Commons in regard to the Spanish blockade. A point was raised before Christmas as to what were called "British ships" carrying munitions in defiance of the international agreement. There was a question, first of all, as to whether protection would be given to such Dominion ships or British ships when carrying munitions, and, secondly, whether any penalties would be imposed on so-called "British ships" acting in defiance of the non-intervention agreement. That matter was canvassed to some extent in a debate before Christmas, but, quite recently, when the non-intervention matter had advanced still further, it was amazing to find—in the year 1937 —that British legislation carried the phrase "British ships other than the ships of the Irish Free State". I do not know if the use of that term has been noticed.

It is a term that used occasionally to creep into treaties, memoranda and documents proceeding from the British at conferences at which we met them. Every time it did appear, attention was called to it and, although it was difficult to get, from the angle of the terminology they find it necessary to use, a suitable phrase, in nearly every case it was found possible to get some way by which distinction was made between ships or nationals, as the case might be, of this country and those of Britain. I do not know whether the President saw that phrase or not or whether his attention was called to it or whether any letter or representation has been addressed to anybody on the other side about it.

It seems to me that these two things are straws which show the way the wind is blowing at the moment. International matters, so far as this country is concerned, used to be divided into two parts. It was almost an easy matter to decide just what part was under discussion or the subject of thought at a particular moment by finding out what was the venue, so to speak, of the discussion. If it was in London, we were dealing with internal affairs and the reaction of these internal affairs on the British Commonwealth. If it was taking place in, or if the memoranda were addressed to or from Geneva, it was pretty certain that the question had to do with this country vis-a-vis countries other than members of the British Commonwealth. Recently, it seems to me that this country has been so preoccupied in trying to get political advantage out of what had in previous years been done on what I might call the London front that the Geneva situation has been entirely neglected. Certainly, no memoranda proceeding from the secretariat there and falling into the error of dealing with the British Empire, the Dominions and the Crown Colonies as one unit, would have passed without comment. I have the feeling that, so far as international matters are concerned, everything has been let go. Very little attention is paid to the relationships of this country except in regard to the one matter of our relationship with Great Britain. Even our relationship with members of the Commonwealth other than Great Britain has been somewhat neglected. That position I cannot understand when I think of the position we have got into with the British in our external relations.

In December of last year, this House was hurriedly summoned to pass certain legislation. One of the pieces of legislation we did pass recognised the King. That was legislation which admitted an act of abdication and forbore to let the situation develop which would have resulted from that abdication, which took place without any drive from this country. This Parliament was asked to meet to patch up the differences. We had to fill a particular gap and, boldly, we stepped into the gap and, by legislation which nobody can call coercive legislation or legislation under duress—certainly no such statement was made about it at the time—we recognised the King for certain purposes. As if that were not sufficient, one of the most defiant of the old-time Republicans associated with the President was sent down a few days later to the town of Boyle to indicate what the new situation was. Here are his words, as reported in the Press of 14th December:—

"We deliberately kept a connecting link between the different parts of the Commonwealth of Nations because we believed it is in the best interests of the country to do so and for no other reason."

That is so clear a statement that it is hardly possible it came from the President. The negative and the positive of it must be regarded. There was no question of duress, force or anything else. It was, according to this statement, a free choice—a free choice in the best interests of this country. That marked a change because about three years earlier—almost to the month— the President went forth to declare a viewpoint against a statement made by the then Dominions Secretary. As reported in the Press of November 15th, 1933, under the heading of "A Challenge," the President said:—

"Will the British Government say their form of Government,

that is, the Irish Free State form—

republic or monarchy, is a matter exclusively for the Irish people to decide, that the British Government will not quarrel with them over their choice whatever it may be? The Irish people will understand, however, that if they choose a republic, they cannot be a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations or enjoy its privileges or advantages."

The report proceeds:—

"The President went on to say that he had no doubt what the choice of the Irish people would be if an issue based on such a statement was put before them."

The previous part of this statement, which was alleged to be a challenge, ran along the lines of "we do not care about aggressive action of an economic type."

The Deputy knows that the only matter under review is the administration of the past 12 months.

I do, distinctly, but I cannot wipe out history and I am not going to consider the President as if he started last year, and no rule of debate can make me do it.

The rules of debate are that the only matters that come up for review are what happened during the last 12 months and the administration of the last 12 months. I have given the Deputy some latitude in respect of some of the quotations he made, but there must be a limit.

I should like a ruling on this immediately, because if I am not allowed to continue with this, the heart is cut out of the debate and I do not want to speak further. If the President's attitude, declared by the President in 1933 and carried forward into the early part of last year, is not to be criticised with what he sent his Minister for Lands to Boyle to say, I do not want to speak further in this debate.

I have allowed the Deputy to make certain quotations which I think, if I were to interpret Standing Orders strictly, I should not have allowed him to make, but what is under review at present is the administration of the Department during the past 12 months. There is no amendment to refer back which would widen the basis of discussion, and therefore I must ask the Deputy to confine himself to the 12 months under review.

In the last 12 months, up to a date in December, 1936, the President had not indicated any departure from the viewpoint which was clearly set out by him in his challenge to Mr. Thomas in 1933. If the President will tell me now, in aid of the Chair, that he did so waver, I will leave this discussion, but I am putting it to the President that his attitude was clear up to the time that statement was made.

The Chair is not seeking the aid of the President, or anybody else, in its ruling. The Chair is endeavouring to understand and interpret Standing Orders for the Deputies, and that is my interpretation of Standing Orders for Deputy McGilligan.

The viewpoint I take the President to have had up to the time of this swerve, made for him by the Minister for Lands at Boyle after this Act was passed, was that stated by him in 1933, and the statement then was distinctly and clearly: "So long as you threaten us with aggressive military action, this country is opting, if it can be called opting, for a particular form of Government under duress. Tell us we can do what we like, that the form of Government, republic or monarchy, is a matter for ourselves, even though it means that we leave the privileges and rights of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and I know the way the people will opt." The hint there was: "Even offer us the British Commonwealth of Nations, with all its rights and privileges, on the one side, and a republic on the other, and we will have the Republic." I say there is a distinct swerve from that in this statement made by the Minister for Lands after this Bill was passed. On 12th December we opted to have a King, and on the 14th, the Minister for Lands is sent to Boyle to say: "We did; we opted for him because we believe it is in the best interests of the country to do so," and, he might have added, "it was to get rid of all that nonsense of three years before and for no other reason." There was no question of aggressive military action by the British. The President, faced in December, 1936, not even with taking a step provocatively and on his own initiative which would have put this country out of the British Commonwealth of Nations, but rather than let a situation develop which would have ended by our being out, decides in the best interests of the people of this country that he is going to keep the link with the Commonwealth. That being the situation, and it has not been denied that that is the situation, the question naturally arises, when the people with whom we thought it to be in the best interests of this country to keep in association are meeting in London, in order to develop the whole association, to get the best out of it: Why do we swerve again from our viewpoint of December? We have accepted what the President in 1933 thought was the test. It was the awful test. It was then brought forward in 1936, without any hint of military aggression behind it. In 1936 there was no such reason operating so far as the Minister for Lands is concerned, speaking for his President, and there was only one thing operating on the mentality of the Government—the interests of the people of this country —and they drove us to make our choice of staying within the Commonwealth.

Where did the interests of the country demand that we should be at this moment? There is no longer the political nonsense to be talked; there is no longer the hint to be made that we are in this association because Britain would attack us with her war forces; and there is not even the hint that what was operating on our mind was anything in the nature of aggressive economic designs upon us. There was the statement that we would at one time have been prepared to take a republic, with the recognition that, being a republic, we could not be in the Commonwealth and we should lose certain rights and privileges attaching to being in it, but there is no question of hostile action to be taken against us, in the way of penal tariffs or anything like that. We clearly made our choice in December of last year, and, having made our choice in December of last year, and sent, as I say, the most defiant of all the Republicans down to Boyle to proclaim that it was in the interests of the country and for no other reason, we now have to take a new swerve.

The thing, however, is being narrowed down. I remember the time when it was proclaimed to be treachery to all the ideals of the people of this country for anybody to have thought in terms of the monarchy. The monarchy was not a symbol of organisation, or association, or co-operation; it was the symbol of all the wrongs done to this country, and it was around that symbol, and the acceptance of it, that the whole break over the Treaty occurred. The President is now in the position that he has accepted that, but he will not go to London, even although he said to-day there are matters being discussed there in which we are interested. In my part of the country, at this time of the year, one hears the Orange bands practising. They are getting ready for the 12th July, and they work up to a crescendo of music about the 12th. After that, when some one of the bands, feeling lonely for the earlier performance, takes out one flute and plays a few notes on it, the populace gets excited. They do not know what has happened. It is almost the beat of the tom-tom sounding through the village. We had dropped the practice. Our 12th July, so to speak, had come and gone on 12th December of last year. Why is not the President having a bang at the drum or just a tootle on a single little flute at this moment? Is it because of the election? The President to-night admits that matters in which we are interested are being discussed in London, and the President will not take part in that discussion, although in the interests of his country he has kept the association, and for no other reason.

There is on at the moment, of course, a process of piecemeal settlement. The President talked to-night about the annuities. He dragged in Partition and the secret agreement, revealed in these two volumes on the desk in front of us. The President never stops to think that, three years ago, he might have still talked of secret agreements and of paying money to Britain, while he was carefully concealing himself behind the backs of the unfortunate civil servants whom he sent to England to make an agreement whereby the annuities were paid. But remember that he has now done that three times. It is futile to be talking about the enormous harm done to this country, and making these amazing calculations about the debt to America and so on, when three times he has sent across people to make agreements, and it was clear, the moment an agreement was entered upon, that there was one line beyond which the British were not going to move, beyond which apparently he never attempted to get them to move, and that is, their own terms: "Every penny withheld from us through the annuities dispute we are going to get." Year after year for three years he has made his agreements. If there was a secret agreement, it was one agreement. Three times the President has done the same thing.

We have now got, as the last resort, this laboured effort to-day about Partition. The situation apparently now is that no matter what our association with the Commonwealth may be, no matter how well we have got over our old antipathy to the Crown, no matter how distasteful it has been to the President to accept that people had more foresight in 1921 than he had, that they saw a situation which could be developed for the good of the people of this country and did develop, and that it took until the late winter of the year 1936 to get from him a declaration that it was in the interests of the people of this country to remain in a particular association—notwithstanding that he has been brought to that point, he now decides that he has to make the whole matter pivot upon this—as long as there is Partition we are going to sulk. Even although there are matters of importance being discussed over there, we are told that our representation over there in London at this moment might lead to grave misunderstandings, and we are not at the same time prepared to co-operate even in other matters that are of mutual interest.

The President has gone further than that in this inconsistency. I remember years ago there used to be a thing spoken of called the All-Red route between Canada and this country. There was a time when Canada was no longer interested in that, and, Canada being no longer interested, the British Government were no longer interested in it. It was revived recently, and the old All-Red route is now a fact, or rapidly approaching being a fact. People who read the comments of the English Press about their preparations for war got presented to them in a very pictorial way that one of the new matters being contemplated with regard to defence was wireless. You had the statement one time, backed by a little map, that the wireless defence of the British Empire had to consist of certain stations, and they were supposed to be placed in a more or less quadrilateral way. Later, it was recognised that we were going to have a particular base along the Western coast. Some time later we got a hint of an oil refinery here, the economics of which are somewhat suspect. Of course, the practical use, from a war viewpoint, is enormous and is quite clear. It seems to me to be a pity, if this country is obsessed by, or if the mentality of the Government is in any way concentrated upon, the possibility of war, that quite close to where the centre of industrial activity is, through the power-house at the Shannon, there should be placed two other things—we are told now possibly an ammunition factory—all to be a target for aircraft in this country, if we ever get involved in a war. When there is one great point of vulnerability around the city in a particular gas container, that would be tolerated in no other city, the President decides to have another target in the nature of this refinery fairly close to that.

What are these touches that we have with Great Britain? It may not be that our motive in swinging in certain things has been to help the British, but what we do is going to be of enormous help to them. The whole policy, of course, is stated by the President when he said this: "We have definitely stated that we will not permit our territory to be used as a base of attack upon Britain and we will do everything in our power to defend our own territory." Some time after, the Minister for Finance, in a pathetic way, said: "What more could the President be expected to say?" The text of that speech, when it was being impressed on the Minister, was that some touch ought to be got with the British Government of a friendly type, and the Minister referred to that statement and said: "What more could the President be expected to say than to make the declaration that this country was never going to let its shores be used as a base of attack upon Britain." Taking that, and throwing in these things, that we have accepted our association in the political line and it is said we did that principally in the interests of the people of the country and for no other reason— nobody will say it was duress or force; it was a deliberate choice—thinking of all that, and of the various bridges that have been crossed, we arrive at that particular point. Then, at the end of it, when there is a collection of the representatives of that association meeting in London to get the best they mutually can out of the association, we sulk and we will not go there. Is there any reason for it?

The President has very nearly got us into a position that long ago he thought would be the proper situation for this country to adopt. It is a notable thing that in all the last half-dozen books produced about the British Empire, or British Commonwealth, whichever it is called, the stress is always on this—that what used to be called the Dominions are now free and independent communities. They move in their own spheres of influence, independently of any other; no coercion; no one Government speaks for the lot; nobody advises the King, who is the representative of the whole lot, at least for certain purposes. Inside what these books always describe as their home areas, they move freely. But every one of these books takes this peculiar swerve, that the same cannot be said of the Commonwealth as an international person; that when action is required it will be action in an emergency; that whenever action in an emergency comes, there is only one Government close at hand to advise, and that is the British Government. Although these people have certainly been converted—some of them were a very obstructive type of Unionists or Imperialists—but no matter how much they have been converted to the viewpoint of the Dominions as international persons in the limited home field, they certainly all still very tenaciously cling to the idea that, once it comes to facing towards the outer world of international matters, then the Empire has got to be considered as a unit and, in these circumstances, there is only one Government and one source of authority, one real authority.

That may be in accord with the President's view. The President's Party organ seems to be leaning gradually on an ancient professor of constitutional law who was very strong in that point of view, having been converted after many years of effort to a recognition of the internal position. Remember, the President long ago did opt for what he called a Monroe Doctrine for the British Isles. He will remember the interview he gave to the Westminster Gazette in which he made a comparison between this country and Cuba:—

"The United States by the Monroe Doctrine made provision for its security without depriving the Latin Republics of the South of their independence and their life. The United States safeguarded itself from the possible use of the Island of Cuba as a base for an attack by a foreign power by stipulating: ‘That the Government of Cuba shall never enter into any Treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorise or permit any foreign power or powers to obtain, by colonisation, or for military or naval purposes or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any portion of said island.'"

The President was reported to have said this:—

"Why doesn't Britain make a stipulation like this to safeguard herself against foreign attack as the United States did with Cuba? Why doesn't Britain declare a Monroe Doctrine for the two neighbouring islands? The people of Ireland so far from objecting, would co-operate with their whole soul."

Is that what the President really meant, only expressing it differently, when he said that we would never permit our territory to be used as a base of attack upon Great Britain and that we will do everything in our power to defend our own territory? I started off by saying that I thought that in the peculiar concentration upon one very narrow point of our international relations vis-a-vis Great Britain, we seem to have no proper policy or plan with regard to international relations. It may be that there is a plan. The President may be harping back to the Cuban status idea. The President may have given a promise that Ireland would never be used as a base of attack on Great Britain. He may be working on his own plan, because even the President cannot pride himself from his previous record on his consistency. Supposing we have something like Cuban status or something like the Monroe Doctrine declared by ourselves. Supposing we have taken up that position. Was there anything that made us, as we did last December, do what we did except the interests of the people of this country? Keep all these things together and let the President give us some argument in support of his policy. Why did the President in December last year make agreements with the British and have these agreements signed along the dotted lines for the payment of the land annuities? The President could possibly get some basis of agreement on economic matters with the British. It is interesting to hear how his attitude in not endeavouring to do so could be defended. But I suggest now to the President that he has burned his boats or has burned so many of them that the loss of any further little craft does not matter. He might get some advantage for the people of this country so as to enable our folk to live here.

I should possibly want to be very careful in wording what I am now going to say, lest the President may resort to his ordinary device of abuse when he feels it necessary to answer certain questions. I think Deputy McGilligan has already asked that our Government should recognise a state of belligerency in Spain and give belligerency rights to the contesting parties. Have our Government recognised that Spanish territorial waters extend only three miles out? If our Government recognises that, I would like to know why they do? With regard to our relations with the British, I understand that the President in his statement referred to Partition. I understand he referred several times to the presence of the British in our ports. It is generally recognised in every part of the world that a Government has continuity, and it is by reason of the fact that a Government has continuity that States are able to come to agreements in the form of treaties. Otherwise, if a treaty made by one Government may be overthrown by a popular vote in a few months time, then it is obvious that no Government can forego any of its rights which they are not able to assert in the event of another Government coming into power in another country with which they made agreement.

I remember, just about nine years ago, discussing with the officials of the Department of External Affairs certain matters with regard to the ports in which the British now have care and maintenance parties. These officials at that time made no secret of the fact that the British Government anticipated that these ports would be handed over within the space of ten years' time. Now, I presumed at that time that that would take place automatically at the end of ten years. We know that the reason why the British maintain those care and maintenance parties there is that we are geographically within their lines of defence, within the lines of defence of a country depending upon sea-borne supplies of food which might be interfered with in time of war. Now, presuming that these places would be handed over to us, I naturally recognised that in the handing over to us, the British would require, possibly, to know that these ports would be maintained and in a condition to be of service in preventing interference by hostile craft in our seas in time of war. But when the present Government came into power they said they were not going to be bound by any agreement made by their predecessors unless that agreement had been ratified here in the Dáil even though these agreements were made in terms that did not stipulate about that ratification. That was the origination of the whole ramp about secret agreements. We know that the agreement about the land annuities in 1923 was notified to the Dáil here and the Dáil, having been informed that such agreement had been made, proceeded to vote moneys.

If the Deputy will allow me, there is a point on which I should like the House to be clear. It is not usual or, indeed, permissive in discussing the Estimates to reopen on one Vote a matter already decided on a previous Vote. The House might have taken any one of many subjects for which the Executive Council has joint responsibility on the Vote for the Executive Council. The matter principally discussed was the relations between this State and Great Britain. It would obviously be an abuse of procedure if, when a Minister had concluded on one Vote, the whole matter could be reopened on the following Vote.

Very well, Sir. There is this peculiar overlapping here, but I wonder would I be in order in referring to one or two matters somewhat analogous. I refer to an order, No. 804, which was published by the Government in 1932. It will be remembered that in certain negotiations which took place between our Government and the British, various matters were referred to in some of them. Our Government gave a direct negative to the British vis-a-vis in certain matters. In other matters it was agreed there was a prima facie case. I refer to such matters as the road fund, coinage and currency. Under the head of receipts under certain articles of the Peace Treaties which deal with ex-enemy debts and properties, we have this note: “It is understood that the validity of the agreement of 1925 is not contested, but that a further discussion is desired. To this the United Kingdom representatives would readily agree.” Then under the head of “Dead Notes” it was stated: “When the Irish Free State introduced their own currency notes in 1928 the necessity for legislating afresh on the matter raised the question of notes which had been outstanding so long that they might be regarded as lost and as never likely to be presented. The allocation of the value of these notes, when written off, between the two Governments might well form the subject of further discussion.” There was agreement between the two Governments on the matter of the Post Office dormant accounts. As regards all those points in which it appears we put forward a claim to certain moneys, which was not wholly contested by the British, I do not see how I can discuss them without referring to the fact that ever since that time the British Government have been collecting all, and more than all, the moneys that they claim due.

If the Deputy cannot do so, the fault does not lie with the Chair. The question of this State's relations with Great Britain has been debated to-day. It cannot be reopened now. If there are other matters upon which the Deputy desires to ask questions, the Chair will not rule stringently, but the main question must be taken as closed.

Surely, these are largely matters of a departmental nature and they ought to have been raised on the Vote for the President's Department. I scarcely think that the Vote for the Minister for External Affairs is the appropriate place to raise them. They relate more particularly to the Department of the Minister for Finance and the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs.

Surely the Department of External Affairs is the channel through which all our external business is done. I would assume that, inasmuch as it was proposed in 1932 that certain negotiations between the Government of the Irish Free State and the British Government should take place, this Vote for External Affairs is the appropriate Vote on which to discuss the matter. With regard to the Road Fund, the papers relating to a conference from which I have already quoted state:—

"It is agreed that the Irish Free State are entitled to a share of the Road Fund. The dispute is as to the method of apportionment; the Irish Free State claimed that the past decisions of the Road Board as to allocation of grants had been unfair and should be retrospectively revised, but the Treasury regard this as inadmissible.

"It had already been agreed to submit the question to the arbitration of Sir Henry Strakosch."

I would not have dreamed of raising these points on any other Vote. It is proposed, in connection with these various things, that there should be negotiation and, in one case, arbitration. I want to know what has been done about them since.

I submit they are all aspects of our relations with Great Britain which, as the Chair has ruled, were fully discussed on the previous Vote.

They are certainly connected with our external relations, and if we are not allowed to refer to them on this Vote, I do not see where they can more appropriately be introduced. We have not only the estimate for the Office in Dublin here, but we have also the estimate for our representative in London. The Minister is down, though his salary is not indicated. If we are to be excluded completely from making any reference to possible contingent negotiations between this country and the Government of Great Britain, then we reduce the Department of External Affairs to a mere negligible quantity.

I do not see how we can discuss this matter at all without such reference. For instance, in the Bill passed last December amending the Constitution in respect of external relations, there is a change proposed. It is stated that all our external relations will be done by or on the authority of the Executive Council. That does seem to me to imply certain changes. It would, to my mind, imply a change with regard to passports. It would, presumably, imply a change with regard to the credentials of Ministers Plenipotentiary sent by this Government to other countries, and it would imply also a change in the credentials of the representatives of other countries accredited here. I would like to know if the form of the new credentials has been drafted and decided upon, and I would like the House to be notified as to the form of words now being used.

Incidentally, while I am speaking on that, I am reminded that the last we heard of the policy of our Government was that in strict accord with the Geneva decision we could not recognise the King of Italy as the Emperor of Abyssinia. I have seen it stated in the papers that a new Italian Minister is to come here. Are we going to reverse the policy as it was and accept credentials from his Majesty the King of Italy and the Emperor of Abyssinia? What I got up to deal with, I am afraid, concerns almost exclusively the relations between this country and Great Britain and if that is to be excluded, I cannot continue.

We are accustomed to be asked on each occasion when this Estimate is brought before the House for adoption, to give a lengthy report of world affairs. That is, in effect, what it would amount to, if we are to meet the wishes expressed by Deputies like Deputy Costello. I was listening very carefully to the extracts which Deputy Costello quoted from a Canadian report, which he held up to us as a model. I was just wondering if we brought in a report of that sort and presented it to the Dáil what would be the remarks of Deputies on the opposite benches. I believe they would immediately say to us that we were telling them things they knew full well; that we were telling them of the ordinary routine work that was being done by our representatives in foreign countries.

Of course, our representatives, whether they be in Paris or Berlin or Rome or the United States—wherever they are—must keep us informed of the policy of the State to which they are accredited, and they do that. Would it add very much to the information which Deputies have if I were to tell them in a report that our Minister, say in Washington, kept us informed of the policies of the American Government in regard to world affairs in so far as it was possible for him to find out what their policies were? In fact, the things that would be of most value to us as a Government, and to Deputies if they wanted to get information that would be most valuable, would be just the very things I could not give in a report.

Consequently, in the very nature of things we can hardly say more about our representatives than that they are representing us, and that they are available to be called upon by us at any time to perform services for any of our citizens and for the State as a whole: to initiate conversations with regard to trade where there is a question of trade or with regard to any other matter. They also send us information of the happenings in a country in so far as that information is capable of supplementing and adding to the reports which we get by following the ordinary Press. That is, in fact, the type of summary that I would have to give if I were to follow the example which the Deputy has held up to us, and, frankly, I do not think it would be worth while collating and printing a report of that sort. It would not add to the information which Deputies have. Now, the Department in its information is very much like any other news-gathering centre. Rumours come in first. After that, you get confirmation, or the reverse, of these rumours, and from day to day the situation changes. You try to keep in constant touch with it, but it changes for us in the same way as it changes for the ordinary reader who tries to keep himself informed on world affairs by following the Press. There is very little in general that you can say about it that is going to add to the information which the ordinary person gets. Frankly, I do not think it would be worth while presenting that in the form of a report.

We are also told that in other Parliaments it is usual, on the Vote for External Affairs, to have world affairs discussed. Yes, undoubtedly, world affairs as they impinge immediately upon the particular State in question, but not a roving debate over the whole world situation. It is that situation as it immediately affects the particular State in question. If it is Great Britain, it is the question of her relations with France Germany or some of the nations about which public interest is excited. In our case it is quite clear that if we had to publish and give the House a very long report, the debate here would be concentrated on exactly the same points that it was concentrated on to-day, and these are matters on which we have already spoken to the House on several occasions.

Nobody is going to say in this House that our relations with Great Britain are not well known. I was mocked when I began to speak of the position with regard to Partition. "Who are you telling that to; do we not know all about it?" That was the complaint that was made on one of the things that most affects us, and most affects our relations with Great Britain. I was supposed to be doing a completely unnecessary work when I referred to that, and yet it is fundamental, as far as our relations with Great Britain are concerned. When I spoke on the question of the annuities I was told I was flogging a dead horse, or something of that sort. Yet again it is one of the most important things in regard to our external affairs, a thing that immediately concerns us. The question of our ports and defence was brought up. Is there anyone who will say for a moment that it was necessary for me to give a report on the position with regard to our ports?

The position in Spain was brought up. Was there any necessity for me to deal at length with regard to the position in Spain? We have had several debates on it already, and there was no material change in the situation. A policy of non-intervention is not equivalent to a policy of disinterestedness and carelessness with regard to what might be the results of the conflict in Spain. I am glad to have it explicitly stated from the opposite benches—it was by no means so clear some time ago—that the policy of non-intervention is now accepted by them as the proper national policy, and that they are now prepared to stand by it without hesitation. I think it is the best policy, as I said before, in the interests of Spain. I think it is the best in the interests of world peace, and because we are standing by this policy of non-intervention we do not want to do things on either side. The policy of non-intervention means this, that whatever our sympathies may be on one side or the other, the States of the world should keep their hands off, that they should cease giving munitions to the parties on one side or the other, and should not interfere. As far as I have been able to hear about it, the cry from the Franco side has been: "Let foreigners not come here to Spain and we will settle this matter ourselves." The appeal from the Spanish people has been to get those foreigners out of Spain. They have said that if it were not for those acts of intervention on the one side or the other the thing would have been finished long ago.

Our representative, with the representatives of a number of other countries, is at St. Jean de Luz. He is there able to keep in touch with both sides. From that point of view he is nearer to and has greater facilities for getting into communication with the Franco side than with the other. We have not formally withdrawn him. I did not think that a formal withdrawal of our Minister was going to help conditions in Spain, or was going to help the situation from the world point of view. In so far as our influence has been of any value, our representative has worked consistently for this policy of non-intervention; that it should be, in fact and in truth such a policy and not a mere verbal agreement. So far as Spain is concerned Deputies know perfectly what is happening. They know what our representative is doing and what the representatives of other countries are doing. He is getting for us such information as he can get and is keeping in touch with both sides. As regards minors, there was the question of trying to get minors, who had gone away without the consent of their parents and were engaged in the conflict on one side or the other, out of the area of conflict. We succeeded in the case of those on one side in getting them out to a position behind the fighting lines.

It is very difficult at first sight to say what are all the things that a representative in another country does. If we want to maintain our international status we have to do what other nations do in that regard, and we are only doing what is, so to speak, the minimum that is required.

It is not right to suggest that the Department of External Affairs is the Cinderella Department. I admit that it is not a very big Department as regards numbers and personnel, but it is one of the most important Departments of State. Through it are canalised all our dealings with outside countries. All communications with outside countries are canalised and done through the Department of External Affairs, so that it will not happen that one Department will be going on one line of policy and another Department on another. The work is being co-ordinated, each knowing what the other is doing. It is a most important Department, and I think the fact that the President of the Executive Council has himself taken over that Department—let us forget about the person who is occupying the position at the moment—is an indication of that. The fact that he has taken on the Department of External Affairs— you have the same position in a number of other countries—is proof of the importance of the Department, from the point of view of the estimation of the Government.

So it is all nonsense to say that this is the Cinderella Department and that it gets no attention. I will admit, quite frankly, that, obviously, if I am to do other work, I cannot give as much time directly to the Department of External Affairs as I could give if I had that duty solely to perform. That is quite true, and I admit it. The time, and so on, that I spend in connection with other Departments, I would give to that Department if I were dealing with that Department alone. That does not mean, however, that I am not satisfied that everything that should be done in that Department is being done. I am. I was very fortunate to have officials in that Department who have been working there and who have been acquainted with the work of the State since the State was founded. It was an old Republican Department which was carried on, and I am perfectly satisfied that the fact that I cannot attend to a number of details, to which I should attend if I were Minister for that Department alone, is not detrimental to the Department, and I am quite satisfied that the work of that Department is not suffering from the fact that I might not be able to attend to all these details. I get every piece of information that I should get in connection with that Department, and I get every piece of information, particularly, in connection with our relations with Great Britain, inasmuch as the most important part of the work in External Affairs is in connection with Great Britain, in which the Government, as a whole, has an immediate interest, since that is the biggest external relation that we have to deal with. Any information in that regard comes, of necessity, directly and immediately to me.

We are asked what our High Commissioner in London is doing. The Deputies who ask that question know perfectly well what he is doing. He is there, not merely in the capacity of a diplomatic representative, but he also combines in himself, with that, the position, so to speak, of a trade representative. He is the one member of our external representatives who is in direct and immediate touch with some of our Departments, because of the extent of our trade relations with Great Britain. Nobody suggests, I think—certainly no Deputy in the House, and I doubt if there is any person in the country who does not know fully what, in general, is the type of work that our High Commissioner in London is doing—that he should be withdrawn. I do not think the suggestion would come from any quarter that he should be withdrawn or that he was not worth his salary, or that that particular office was not worth the money that is being spent on it.

As I was saying, in a debate like this, if we leave aside the ordinary details of expenditure, once we begin to discuss our external relations, it is inevitable that the whole weight of the debate will be concerned with our relations with Great Britain. Deputy McGilligan tried to make some point as to inconsistency when he said that there were matters of great importance affecting this country being discussed in Great Britain at the present time, and that we are not there. In my statement on my own Vote, as President of the Executive Council, I admitted that we are interested in these things; but we are interested in other things even more than we are interested in the things that are being discussed at present. Trade treaties and so on, are going to be bi-lateral. They are bi-lateral agreements. As far as we and Great Britain are concerned, any of these trade treaties that are made, from time to time, between the several States, are, by their very nature, bi-lateral, and if there is any question of our trade relations with Great Britain, the mutual interests of the two countries will put us in the position of being able to make such trade agreements, and it is not necessary to go to the Imperial Conference in order to have matters of that kind brought forward for discussion. The fact is that the relations between us and Great Britain are such that the other States, besides Great Britain, would hesitate to interfere. They would say: "Keep us out of your difficulties; these are difficulties peculiar to yourselves, and we have no quarrel with either of you. Just keep us out. These are quarrels between two particular units, and we do not want to be brought into them." I must say that I would find it very difficult to resist an appeal of that sort, or to base a claim as to why they should come in. They will probably have this interest— but it is not necessary for us to go and point it out to them—that, as far as they are concerned, and so far as the position of the States of the British Commonwealth in the world as a whole is concerned, the more unity there is and the more definitely all the groups co-operate, the better it is for them. Consequently, for their own interests, and apart from any wishing well as between Great Britain and ourselves— Great Britain being the mother country from which many of their citizens derive—they would probably have an interest in both of our countries from that point of view. Apart from that, however, in their own interest, they would like to see any differences that exist between Great Britain and ourselves fixed up, but what they would say is: "For Heaven's sake, try and fix up your differences yourselves," and they would be very slow, I think, to go farther than that, and either to suggest solutions or to press for a particular type of solution.

There are no deviations as regards the main lines of our policy—the main lines of the policy for which we have been working. As I have said, I think that the central aim of anything I have ever done, in so far as there has been a question between Great Britain and ourselves, was to try to arrive at a foundation on which good relations between the two countries could be permanently founded, but I know, and everybody here must know as well as I do, that it is only on the basis of fair play and justice that you can get those good relations established. Everybody knows the position that we had in this country, and you could not get these good relations between us so long as you had the Oath in the Constitution and the number of other symbols that were in the Constitution. They had to be got rid of, and the clearing away of them was absolutely necessary in order that the site should be cleared before any proper edifice of good relations could be placed upon it. I think, for instance, that this new Constitution, so far as this part of the country is concerned, does clear away a number of the things which would make good relations between the two countries impossible. It does clear away a number of these obstacles to good relations between the two countries, and that is why it is devised.

The people in this country, just as the people in other countries, will differ as to what is the best possible policy, in the interests of their country, for foreign affairs; and what I have been trying to do in this Draft Constitution is to put that thing outside of the machinery of the State and the machinery of Government, so that it could be dealt with and we could differ upon these matters of foreign policy without differing at all upon the institutions, so to speak, of this State. I am perfectly certain that the new Constitution will mean a tremendous advance towards laying the foundations for good relations between the two countries. If we had that situation which is envisaged in that Constitution for the whole of this country—if we had the question of the ports settled —then the question of our relations with Great Britain would be a matter for a difference of opinion amongst our people, just as, for example, the question of whether the United States becomes a member of the League of Nations or not is a matter for a difference of opinion amongst the people of America. It would be no longer the same type of difference. When you examine it, all it means is that we have tried to get down to a basis of justice in which any relationships our people may have with other countries will be relationships into which they will not be forced by threat of military action or anything of that kind, but relationships which they will undertake freely because it is in their interests, the interests of the people generally.

Some statement made by the Minister for Lands has been referred to, and it is suggested that he made that statement on behalf of the Government. Not every Minister who speaks goes out as if he had got a special commission to speak on behalf of the Government. There was no question of that. I have not got his exact words here, but my recollection of what he did say was that what we did was done in the interests of the country and was done for no other reason. A more general statement as the basis of any action could not be made. Should not everything we do as a Government be done in the interests of our people? If we, for instance, make a Coal-Cattle Pact with Britain, in whose interests are we doing it? At the time we made this pact there was a very heavy pressure on our people and it was necessary to that extent, whilst that pressure was there, to make this agreement so that the pressure would not become altogether intolerable. Is there a suggestion that, because we made this agreement, we accept the situation? We do not. Our protest about what is being done by the British in that matter has continued and will continue so long as moneys are being extracted from our people which we think are not due and should not be paid in justice. There is nothing inconsistent in that. No more fundamental reason can be given by anybody for the action taken in that particular case. When we enter into a Coal-Cattle Pact or any other pact, it is because of the fact that the interests of our people demand that the thing should be done, but it does not mean—and we have been careful to point out that it does not mean— that we accept the situation as being a just one or that we have ceased to protest against it. Our present action is also in the form of a protest. Our refusal to go to the conference is also in the form of a protest, so that it would be made clear in the most definite way that we protest against the taking of moneys from our people which are not, in our opinion at any rate, due. The taking of them, in our view, cannot be defended.

I do not know whether there are any special points brought out in the debate that need to be further dealt with. The debate covered such a very wide field that it is very hard to deal with it. I was asked about the position of the Italian Minister. That will be made clear when the formal reception takes place. We are receiving the representative of the other country in the same spirit as the gesture, the friendly gesture, in asking us to accept the Minister, was made. There has been some reference to an explanation by me of a statement which was made by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Finance. Here in a debate somebody quoted, or purported to quote, a statement made by the Parliamentary Secretary. I asked somebody here if he could give me a copy of the statement. I took that statement and I interpreted it, assuming that it had been made, as I thought that ordinarily it should be interpreted, and I said that, even on that statement, the case that was being made by the Opposition was not tenable. Is there any inconsistency between that and the fact of the Parliamentary Secretary's stating afterwards that he never made that statement? I did not say that the Parliamentary Secretary had made it. There was a report, which was alleged to give that statement. I asked to see it, and I interpreted the report as it was given to me. There is no inconsistency in doing that and in his saying afterwards that the statement was not made at all. Some of the old orators made up speeches for delivery which they never made afterwards. If there was a question of the interpretation of a passage from such a speech, that I interpreted it, and that it transpired afterwards that the speech had never been delivered, there would be nothing inconsistent in my having interpreted the speech given to me and the statement afterwards that the speech was never delivered. However, these are very small points indeed, and I do not think it worth while spending the time of the House in going over them further.

With regard to broadcasting, there is a peculiar confusion of thought. The broadcasting station acts independently. It has an independent news-gathering method and it gives out the news it gets, just as a newspaper or any other independent body gives out news. We do not control, in that sense, the news service. It publishes certain governmental communiques when they are sent along but they are always acknowledged and definitely given as governmental communiques. I do not know whether the view of the Opposition is that whenever there is any news statement issued by the broadcasting station, which may not correspond exactly with the information we may have, it is our duty to go out and correct it. These things correct themselves. The news of one day very often corrects the news of the day before, and unless there was some very blatant and dangerous statement broadcast, we would not interfere ordinarily. If my attention were called to some misleading statement issued by the broadcasting station, which I found to be misleading, if it affected our external relations in any way, either by getting our people to believe that things had happened which had not happened or the reverse, and if I thought it of sufficient importance, I agree with Deputy McGilligan it might be advisable to issue a Government communique on the subject. No matter of that kind has so far been brought to my notice. I do not watch these announcements every evening myself. I do not know whether the Department make it their business to watch all the statements issued from the broadcasting station to see if they are accurate in regard to international affairs. I think it would be a rather heavy task and it is only in cases where the matter would be brought to our attention that we would ordinarily take cognisance of what was issued by the broadcasting station. I agree that if it touched external affairs, and if the matter were sufficiently important, we should take cognisance of it and try to correct any wrong impression. It should obviously be a matter of very great importance before we could do that.

I am sorry that I do not remember every point which was made, but I think that the main points were with regard to our relations with Great Britain, and with regard to the question of Spain. In regard to Spain, the Opposition has repeated a point of view which it has expressed before. I would only repeat the point of view which I have expressed before, and there would be no use in doing that. With regard to Britain, I have given a full account in the previous speech. With regard to our Ministers, they are doing what the Ministers of other countries do. With regard to giving a report, I think that, very largely, it would be waste, because the things you would like to know, and that would be some information if you could be given them, are of their nature the sort of things we would not be at liberty to give.

Question put.
The Committee divided: Tá, 54; Níl, 29.

  • Aiken, Frank.
  • Allen, Denis.
  • Bartley, Gerald.
  • Beegan, Patrick.
  • Blaney, Neal.
  • Boland, Gerald.
  • Boland, Patrick.
  • Brady, Seán.
  • Breathnach, Cormac.
  • Breen, Daniel.
  • Briscoe, Robert.
  • Concannon, Helena.
  • Cooney, Eamonn.
  • Corbett, Edmond.
  • Corkery, Daniel.
  • Corry, Martin John.
  • Crowley, Timothy.
  • Derrig, Thomas.
  • De Valera, Eamon.
  • Dowdall, Thomas P.
  • Flynn, Stephen.
  • Goulding, John.
  • Harris, Thomas.
  • Hayes, Seán.
  • Hogan, Patrick (Clare).
  • Keely, Séamus P.
  • Kehoe, Patrick.
  • Kelly, James Patrick.
  • Kelly, Thomas.
  • Killilea, Mark.
  • Kilroy, Michael.
  • Kissane, Eamonn.
  • Lemass, Seán F.
  • Little, Patrick John.
  • Lynch, James B.
  • MacEntee, Seán.
  • Maguire, Ben.
  • Moore, Séamus.
  • Moylan, Seán.
  • Murphy, Patrick Stephen.
  • Neilan, Martin.
  • O Briain, Donnchadh.
  • O'Grady, Seán.
  • O'Reilly, Matthew.
  • Pearse, Margaret Mary.
  • Rice, Edward.
  • Ruttledge, Patrick Joseph.
  • Ryan, James.
  • Sheridan, Michael.
  • Smith, Patrick.
  • Traynor, Oscar.
  • Victory, James.
  • Walsh, Richard.
  • Ward, Francis C.

Níl

  • Anthony, Richard.
  • Beckett, James Walter.
  • Bennett, George Cecil.
  • Bourke, Séamus.
  • Brennan, Michael.
  • Brodrick, Seán.
  • Dolan, James Nicholas.
  • Doyle, Peadar S.
  • Fagan, Charles.
  • Fitzgerald, Desmond.
  • Keating, John.
  • McFadden, Michael Og.
  • McGilligan, Patrick.
  • McGuire, James Ivan.
  • Morrissey, Daniel.
  • Coburn, James.
  • Cosgrave, William T.
  • Costello, John Aloysius.
  • Desmond, William.
  • Dillon, James M.
  • Dockrell, Henry Morgan.
  • Mulcahy, Richard.
  • O'Higgins, Thomas Francis.
  • O'Leary, Daniel.
  • O'Mahony, The.
  • O'Sullivan, Gearóid.
  • O'Sullivan, John Marcus.
  • Redmond, Bridget Mary.
  • Reidy, James.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Little and Smith; Níl: Deputies Doyle and Bennett.
Question declared carried.
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