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Dáil Éireann debate -
Friday, 29 Apr 1938

Vol. 71 No. 3

Agreements between the Government of Ireland and the Government of the United Kingdom—Motion of Approval.

Debate resumed on the following Motion:
That Dáil Eireann approves of the Agreements between the Government of Ireland and the Government of the United Kingdom, signed in London on the 25th day of April, 1938, copies of which were laid on the Table of Dáil Eireann on the 27th day of April, -1938, and recommends the Government to take the necessary steps to give effect to the provisions of the said Agreements.— An Taoiseach.

I stated last night that I welcomed this Agreement and that I regretted sincerely the tone that the debate took here yesterday. However, I suppose these things will happen. It must be remembered that apparently the last attempt to settle the financial difficulties existing between the two countries was made in 1930-31, the price of our agricultural produce in the English market having fallen by over 50 per cent. during the previous four years. From 1938 onwards, the price of cattle and of agricultural produce had steadily fallen in the English market. At that time the President of the day, Deputy Cosgrave, went over and endeavoured to get some relief from the financial burden which was imposed under the secret Agreement.

I am sorry to have to interrupt the Deputy but, as a matter of fact, I did not go over.

It was all the same, anyway. He tried it. It did not matter whether he went over himself or whether he sent the boys. The fact remains that, realising the financial position of the country at the time, and realising that the people could no longer bear the burden which was falling on the agricultural community and which was a very serious burden indeed, an attempt to obtain some relief was made. The burden was so heavy in 1929, long before there was any economic war, that the Cumann na nGaedheal representative for my constituency in this House had to move that the Minister for Lands be requested not to collect any further annuities from the farmers because they could not pay them. He moved that resolution and had it carried unanimously at the Midleton Urban Council. That was the position in 1929 and in 1930-31 when this appeal was made to the British Government—not to wipe out the annuities but only for remission of a small portion, a moratorium on £250,000 of them, which was refused. That was the atmosphere and the position at the period when we took over office here.

We took over office with a mandate from the Irish people to refuse to pay these annuities to the British Government, and we refused to pay them. We were told then that we had not a majority verdict, and in 1933, with the penal tariffs of 40 per cent. on our cattle, there was a general election at which the Irish people repeated their mandate to hold the annuities. One would think after two general elections, at which the mandate was repeated, that the representatives of the Irish people would stand behind that mandate. What happened? As far back as June, 1932, before there were any tariffs at all put on, we had a demand from the opposite benches that the annuities should not be collected from the farmers, because the unfortunate people wore already suffering from the effects of the economic war. That kind of thing continued gradaally until the famous Ottawa Agreement, which was mentioned by Deputy Gorey yesterday, when the Minister for Agriculture told us that the reply he got from Mr. Thomas at Ottawa was plain and straight.

Is it not time to stop these fairy tales and get on with the business?

The statement was that de Valera happened to be in office but would not be there long; that there was a great White Army forming and that it happened the colour of their shirts was blue. Every effort that could be made was made by a large section not to support the mandate that had been given by the Irish people, but to give every succour and aid to those who were endeavouring to collect the annuities from them by force. That situation continued, so that we had to fight not alone enemies abroad but enemies here. That campaign was carried on here, and I leave it to any Deputy to say to the contrary. I have heard statements made that this dispute could have been settled five or six years ago.

Fifteen years ago if you were behind the Irish people.

Deputy Cosgrave told us that in 1921 but we see what has happened since.

And in 1921.

I was there in 1921.

And in 1924.

Yes. I am not sorry for anything I did.

Except for running.

Not a bit.

Deputy Gorey was very glad to go with the National Army then to save his bacon.

When I got into the National Army, you ran.

You got into this House then by a bare, majority, and they even kicked you out since then.

Having regard to the position that we had to face, that is the reason no agreement or settlement could be made. I say that this settlement, or something like it, could have been got at the end of 1932 or 1933 if the position was not such as it was in this country. If one had a quarrel with a neighbour, and if that neighbour's family and relatives supported him in the fight, that would be one story, but if, on the other hand, his family and relatives shouted out for a settlement and if that did not succeed they went and helped the other side against him, what kind of settlement could be hoped for? Having regard to the position that existed here down to 1934, what kind of a settlement could be expected? When I think of that position, I cannot blame those across the water saying: "Oh, there will be a general election soon; the Blueshirt army will be mobilised, and they will wipe these fellows out of existence and a new dictator will come in." I say that the British Government, in view of statements made by Deputies on the Opposition Benches in regard to what was going to happen, believed that there would be a general election and that Deputy Cosgrave would be back in office, when they could tell him, as they told him in 1931, that there was nothing doing, and that he had better go home and pay up. At that time I appealed to Deputies opposite to say nothing concerning this matter for three months, as there was a chance of settling it. They would not agree to that. Now they come and tell us that we have accepted the Fine Gael policy or something of that description. We have not moved a single inch from the position we took up at the start of the dispute.

It is not worth while interrupting the Deputy.

I advise Deputy Keating not to open his lips during this debate.

Thank God, I will not take your advice.

Take your chance and do not upset the apple cart. That is a condition of affairs that did prevail, and, as I have stated, we have carried out the same policy all along. What is the position to-day? There were other financial demands besides the land annuities, the yearly payment of which was agreed to under this Agreement of the l2th February, and under another famous agreement. I know that as soon as I sit down Deputy McMenamin will be up, to tell us that this is the greatest betrayal since Adam. The Deputy is famous in that respect. As a matter of fact, I have here before me a copy of a speech delivered by Deputy McMenamin in Ballybofey during the general election held in June, 1927, in which he stated "that the 1925 Agreement was the blackest document in Irish history, and the greatest betrayal since the Act of Union." That is what he said about the last Agreement, and God knows what he is going to say about this one.

I will soon tell the Deputy.

This is the green, white and yellow one.

We have been told about the slaughter of calves and all the cattle that are gone. That statement has been made by every Deputy on the opposite side. We have also been told by them that we will have to re-stock the land for the farmers. It is a pity, I think, that Deputies would not take the trouble and spend a little time in the Library, in getting authentic information, before they rise to speak here. The actual position in regard to cattle is as follows: that the total number of cattle in this country in June, 1931— that was before there was any economic war and when, as we have been told by the people opposite, everything was flourishing—was 4,029,084, while according to the census taken in 1937 the number was 3,955,185.

The difference being?

1,000,000 short.

The Deputy ought to be able to calculate it himself. The number of milch cows in the country at the present time is about 100,000 more than in June, 1931.

I thought Deputy Brennan said they were all gone. Will Deputy Brennan tell us why?

That is not the way to answer a question.

I am not alluding to a particular period now because the Deputy might say that they were held up on account of the Agreement. The period that I am alluding to is June, 1937.

Neither am I, and there is a good reason.

There is a very good reason, and a sound one, too. The number of yearlings in the country was 994,000 in 1931 and the number now is 998,000, 4,000 more yearlings even though Deputies opposite tell us all the calves have been slaughtered.

Will the Deputy give us the number of three-year-olds?

Certainly. The figures are 230,000 in 1931, and 160,000 to-day. Deputy keating is a cattle dealer.

That has nothing to do with the debate.

He is a man who has a knowledge of the cattle trade, and he knows this much, that the taste in beef has completely changed. He knows that the cattle that are fetching a price to-day are two-year-old cattle; that you can get a better price for a good two-year-old than you can for a three-year-old.

In the market that is gone for ever, thank God.

Anywhere. I have dealt with a number of the statements that were made from the benches opposite yesterday. We listened patiently to them all day, and I suppose we will have the same thing to-day. I have given the figures. I have taken them from the official publications, which I am prepared to hand over to the Deputies.

Will you give the pig population?

I will give the Deputy any thing he likes. All these can be got in the Library.

The Deputy should not invite interruptions.

I am quoting from the agricultural statistics for the period 1927 to 1933, and from the agricultural statistics for 1937, and I am prepared to make a present of them to any Deputy opposite. They give the facts. The Deputies opposite have told us that the country was cleared out of cattle, but here are the facts.

Tell us about the slaughter of calves.

This fire of interruptions must cease. Otherwise the Chair will be constrained to take action.

You were all glad to get the 10/- for the skins of the calves that were killed. As the Minister for Agriculture pointed out last night, this Agreement that is wiping out all the tariffs is not going, in a great many cases, to benefit the farmers at all. Yesterday the Minister gave the price of butter in that English market that is now going to be free and open, but when Deputies opened their papers this morning they saw that the Minister has had to come to the assistance of the dairy farmers of the country in order that they will get the cost of production for their milk. We know that during a period of the economic war butter was as low as 70/- a cwt., and that the difference between this 70/-, the price on the free, open English market, and an economic price for the farmers producing the milk, had to be made up out of the Exchequer, out of taxes and out of the consumer. That position will have to continue. I would like to warn farmers generally that within the next three years they may have to slaughter calves again. The slaughter of the calves did one good job anyway: it compelled the English buyer to pay some of the tariffs, and he has been doing that for a considerable time now. It will all be made clear to Deputies when they take their cattle over to England and when the arrangements under this Agreement are completed.

I will be watching the prices carefully, and we will then see who will be getting the 4 a head that the Deputies opposite have been talking about for the past six years here. We will see how much of it the farmer will get when he sells his cattle there. It will be very interesting to watch that. That is one of the reasons why I welcome the Agreement. Deputy O'Leary last night alluded to derating and the halving of the annuities. I am one of those who advocated a reduction of the annuities by 50 per cent. rather than anything in the way of derating. I advocated it for one reason alone, that I wanted whatever benefits were coming to come to all the small farmers, and not to have the position of affairs which existed under the first relief in rates of £750,000 that was given here. At that period I found that a greater portion of that relief went to ranchers who were paying no annuity, who had freehold land, and who were in a better position as far as farming was concerned than their neighbour with a small holding who had to pay an annuity. That is why I would prefer any relief given to the farmers to go directly in relief of annuities rather than in relief of rates. There is no doubt that the condition of affairs which existed for eight or nine years before this Government took office, the neglect of housing——

The Deputy must come down to the Agreement. Regarding derating and short term loans for farmers, Deputies will appreciate that they arise only incidentally here, and that there will be a further opportunity of discussing those matters.

Should not the Deputy be invited to come up to the Agreement instead of down to it?

Will there be an opportunity——

I am afraid Columcille's prophecies were all wrong this time. This Agreement had to be carried out in very difficult circumstances. It could not be carried out until the English Government were definitely certain that there was no hope of getting anybody else to bargain with except the man they were bargaining with. That is the sole reason it was not made earlier. We have been accused of some backsliding in regard to our policy.

Not at all!

What is the position? Our objective has been the absolute freedom and independence of this country as a republic. That is still our objective. I welcome this Agreement particularly because it has gone another step along that road; because it has cleared the position of our ports. That is my principal welcome to this Agreement—that the British are now cleared, bag and baggage, out of the Twenty-Six Counties at any rate, and that is a good job. We will probably be told : "Oh, yes, but there is something behind that." I can quite understand a suspicion of that kind in the mind of individuals who have been accustomed to the letters that were read out here in this House previously in regard to former agreements, letters demanding that the portion of that secret agreement connected with the annuities should be pasted over for political reasons before the agreement was published. I can quite understand that type of individual being sufficiently suspicious to say that there must be something behind this Agreement also. I can quite understand the man or the Government who allowed that condition of affairs to prevail being suspicious in regard to later agreements made by other Governments. of course that Government handed over the annuities without any demand whatsoever, or any agreement whatsoever in counection with their working. If another Government were elected here—I will not say a Labour Government because I know they would not do it—and they decided that this country, which had regained its freedom after enormous sacrifices of blood, was not worth defending, that it was not worth while spending anything on keeping nut either the British invader or any other invader, I can quite understand a Government of that type starting off by wiping out the Army, and then sitting down to wait for the first invader to pick us up. There is nothing in this Agreement which would prevent any new Government from doing that in the morning. A Government in this country might decide: "We cannot afford the expense of an army. We are not going to be bothered defending this country at all. The first invader who comes along can take it." If a new Government elected in the morning had that for a policy, they could take the old cannons and melt them down, and clear away the embankments. Under the Agreement there is nothing on God's earth to stop them. That is the position. I know Deputy McGilligan is getting uneasy.

Yes—at that policy.

I am against that policy, too.

I thought it was the Deputy's policy.

I am against it, too.

I am no longer uneasy.

I am absolutely against that policy. I believe that this country, which has made so many sacrifices in order to clear out its enemies, is worth defending. I believe it is worth while building up here a defence force which will be strong enough for other purposes, because we may have very different views as to how we are going to complete the independence of this nation of 32 counties. We may have very widely divergent views as to how it is going to be done. I personally am in favour of storing up sufficient poison gas, so that when you get the wind in the right direction you an start at the Border and let it travel, and folIow it.

This poison gas is not relevant to the debate.

I am speaking of the ways and means by which we can finish the job which we set our hands to in 1916.

The question does not arise.

There has been a fair amount of poison gas during the last half hour.

We had any God's amount of it yesterday.

It is a gas bag we have now.

Deputy Gorey has——

Deputy Corry should not provoke interruptions.

This is, as I stated, a definite follow-up of policy. Those ports which were in the hands of the British, well as everything which was in British occupation here in the Twenty-Six Counties, are now in the hands of the Irish people, and whatever Government the Irish people care to elect. The only thing I regret in this Agreement is that there is still a portion of this nation left to be brought in. There are still six counties of those 32 counties which I sincerely regret do not appear in this Agreement. The only regret I have in regard to the whole issue is that we have not got a 32-county Ireland instead of 26 counties —but God is good.

I firmly believe that, if Deputies opposite realise that their policy for the past four or five years has been a very foolish policy, that this thing of helping the enemy is a very foolish game and that it only put suffering and cost and sacrifice on their own people—extra suffering, extra cost and extra sacrifice—and that, having realised all that, they will now be prepared tv come in behind whatever Government is elected here in order to help towards fiuishing the job— whether it bo the present Government or any other Government that comes in there to finish the job that has cost centuries of sacrifice even to get it as far as it has been got—the job will be finished. I welcome this Agreement. I do not wish to delay the House further. I see Deputies over there who are anxious to speak and I would not like to stand in their way for a moment.

Thanks very much.

The only man I can see here who backed a winner is Deputy Keating. For the last three months or so, he has been on a sure winner.

The speech we have just heard, is one of the most scandalous speeches we ever listened to in this House.

Not as bad as the Deputy made.

Having heard that speech, I hope that one of the Ministers will get up at the first opportunity and entirely disown the Deputy. Some of the statements in that speech are a crime against this country. Irrespective of any consideration, it is a crime for any man, who wishes to see the unity of this country established, to make such statements. How can the Taoiseach go to London, after a speech of that kind, and ask for the unity of this country, or how can any other person go and ask for the unity of this country when speeches of that kind are on the records of this House? It makes me sad that such a speech should be made, irrespective of who made it.

I want to say this on behalf of Ulstermen, and I am one of them myself, that we have no terror of the Deputy's poison gas, and I would not like to think that my Protestant fellow-countrymen would submit to such an insult as that, and the Deputy may take it that they will not submit to such an insult. That is not the way to take Ulster and Irish unity will never be achieved on that basis. It must be taken on a broader outlook and on a basis of goodwill and common citizenship and common heritage of an Irish nation. There must be no poison gas about it, and if there were, I, personally, would ask my Protestant fellow-countrymen of Ulster to resist it to the last man.

We have a lot of talk here about everything except what is in this Agreement. Why? They are deliberately avoiding it. Deputy Corry speaks of a speech that I delivered in Ballybofey in 1925. Does he not yet, and do others not yet, conceive what was implied in that statement? I then foresaw what has since occurred and what has brought us and is keeping us here to-day, what has reduced this country to the state of going to London when this country was down on its back; and, foreseeing that, I made that statement. In the statement I made then, I foresaw that some unscrupulous person would launch a campaign in this country with regard to the land annuities—a campaign that would ultimately destroy the peasantry of this country—the finest peasantry in Europe. A few months after I made that statement a campaign was started in Donegal by a certain gentleman known to the members of this House, in the person of Peadar O'Donnell. Fianna Fáil had not even then been able to conceive this nefarious nonpayment plan, and it was Peadar O'Donnell who went down to Donegal.

The Deputy should not mention men who have no opportunity of defending themselves.

It is not the sort of thing, Sir, that the gentleman in question would ask for any defence on.

That is not for the Chair to decide.

Let this House remember, however, that within twelve months a campaign was launched in West Donegal; and the force of the law was used against these poor peasants; and a poor old farmer of 70 years of age was sent to jail, but Peadar O'Donnell went hack to Dublin and left these poor people there to suffer. Deputy Corry says that he does not stand for derating. Dr. Ryan, the Minister for Agriculture, told us yesterday that if he had £1,000,000 he would rather use it in some other way than for the purpose of derating. Deputy Corry says that they got two mandates, in two general elections, not to pay the annuities. How did they get the mandate? Has the Deputy a Leader? Does he recognise him? Here is the manifesto on which the votes of the electors were got in those two elections. It is signed by Eamon de Valera and is dated the 9th Fabruary, 1932. It reads as follows:

"(2) To retain the land annuities in the State Treasury. There is no contractual obligation binding us to I hand these annuities over to Britain. The British Government is neither legally nor justly entitled to receive them. That is the signed and published opinion of several prominent lawyers. With £2,000,000 to £3,000,000 involved, the farmers can be relieved completely of the rates on their holdings. Another £1,000,000 is available for the relief of taxaion, or for such purposes as the Dáil may determine."

Irrespective of anything that has happened since or will happen in the future with the contents of th Agreement, it can be seen plainly now that mandate was got in 1932 and 1933—by an appeal to the cupidity of the people and the implication that the Government that had been collecting these moneys from the people and paying the interest and the sinking fund and so on were doing a national wrong and committing a national crime. This is not partisan with me at all. Let the historian look at this. He will examine it. Is not th at the reason why you got your mandate in 1932 and 1933? Is it not a fact that you got your mandate by that appeal to the cupidity of the people—that they were being cheated and robbed—although you knew perfectly well that the money was due legally and morally, and that our fathers had signed their contracts to pay that money? Now, you have gone and acknowledged that by this present financial agreement, and you have broken, as I said, the finest peasantry in Europe and made them so helpless that they are not able to pay anybody—a peasantry that, all through its history, during all the tyranny that Britain could impose upon this country, struggled in the bogs of this country, maintained their nationality and paid and discharged the last penny of their obligations and claimed no Statute of Limitations, whether to the shopkeeper, the landlord, or anybody else.

There are Deputies in this House— and I am one of them—born of peasant parents, whose peasant ancestry, driven to the bogs of this country, reared large families and, in doing so, accumulated enormous debts while these children were being reared, for ten, and 20, and 30 years. When these children were able to go out and earn the money, the last penny of their obligations to their creditors was discharged, and no Statute of Limitations was claimed by them. Through this appeal to cupidity we are here to-day being asked to consent to this document. What is in the document? What are we asked? The Taoiseach told this House, in opening, that this Agreement or this settlement could not have been made sooner than now. Let this House and this country definitely under stand that that is not the reason why the Taoiseach did not settle in the past. So far as he is concerned, he told us, it was because these moneys were neither legally nor morally due, nor justly payable, as written under his hand in a document signed in February, 1932. That is the reason why there was no settlement—because the President wanted some base appeal that would appeal to the cupidity of the people, in order that the flags would be waved and he would be a great national hero, for defending the peasantry of the country from the exactions of the Government that went before this. That is the reason why this settlement was not made for the last six years. It was done now because the peasantry are ruined. It will take years to repair the damage done. But they are a manly people. They were crushed before, hut they rose from the ashes. I am not without confidence that they will have the power and vitality to do what their fathers did and, on the ashes on which this Agreement was made, that they will yet build up a happy. prosperous and united Ireland.

What is in this Agreement? I will not make any comment upon it—just simply refer to it. In my opinion, even in connection with the 1925 agreement, when England was after winning the Great War, and was then the most powerful nation in the world, one of the greatest nations the world has ever seen, it was a desperately mean think of her that she did not then wipe out the £5,000,000 and the other payments. She had had 150 years approximately of over-taxation from this country, and also a complete monopoly of the business of this country. Would you not think that a great nation like that could for once be generous to weak people like us? But no, not even in 1938, when we were led to believe that England was in imminent danger of being crushed.

Our Government had the misfortune to go to London when the British Prime Minister was in the strongest position of any British Prime Minister in history—certainly in the last two centuries. He had just brought about a position in which he was ready to gobble up the whole of Europe. He was pulling the head of one State after another into the British net. Mussolini, who was to cut the British Empire in two by closing the Mediterranear, was gobbled up in a few days. We dropped in next. Hitler is to be the third. Yet they could not afford to be generous even in regard to a sum of £10,000,000. Why were they not? What is the spirit behind it? What is £10,000,000 to the greatest nation that history has ever known? I loath to say it, but nothing could be meaner than paragraph 2 of Clause 3: "The payment of £250,000 a year by the Government of Eire to the Government of the United kingdom in respect of damage to property under the Agreement of the 3rd December, 1925." Think of poor England insisting on the payment of a quarter of a million while she is throwing thousands of millions away on armaments that will be scrahhed in a few years. The President and his colleagues went to Downing Street and were ladled out a lunch by Mrs. Chamberlain. Our Ministers were put on a par with these gentlemen and statesmen of a nation of similar standing to them. But when Mrs. Chamherlain had ladled out the black coffee they were asked to go to an adjoining room.

The Deputy should pass over these social affairs.

We have swallowed many bitter cups from England.

Their coffee is not bitter.

I think this is the bitterest cup. We are all involved in this. The dignity and independence of this country are involved in this. Our Ministers were asked to step into an adjoining room to sign—what? A document to pay a quarter of a million pounds in interest and sinking fund for damage to property done by the Sinn Féin organisation in this country. I do not know where the Taoiseach was sitting at the table, but I take it that it was to the right of Mrs. Chamberlain. I am not an enemy of anybody. I have pleaded- all my life for friendship and good will between this country and England, and I hope I have done something to bring about that friendship.

Ordinary courtesies of social life should not be made the subject of debate.

There are no social courtesies about this.

They were not omitted from previous debates on certain matters. I am not saying that they should be used now.

I agree with the Deputy, but that does not make them relevant or proper.

I have no object except to point out the treatment that was meted out to us. S o far as I am concerned, they are not going to deceive me. It might as well have been any of us. At one moment they were treated as gentlemen, and then brought into another room and treated as bandits and told: "You destroyed this property and we are going to make you pay for it." That is supposed to be a settlement that is going to put an end to a feud of centuries. I want to put on record how they behaved about that miserable sum, how they treated representatives of our nation. I am not going to take silently such treatment of a Minister of any Government that represents me anywhere.

We have got control of the ports. You have come home to shout about that. What have we got? Does this House appreciate what we have got? Does this House appreciate that during the entire last war not a single shot was fired by the forts on Lough Swilly? This Agreement, of course, involves the sovereignty and independence of this country- £10,000,000 in lieu of £100,000,000 that is due, and that sum of £14,000,000, in my opinion, as I said before this matter arose, as I said in 1933, the night I was elected in 1933, would be the amount payable in settlement of this dispute. The war lords might fight. I knew they would, until the coffers were empty; and I knew when the coffers were empty and there would have to be a settlement that it would not be the war lords who would have to pay. I remember, when I said that, there were boohs and shouts of "John Bull." That did not intimidate me in the least. I then proceeded to examine on what basis this dispute could be settled, and I said this dispute must be settled on the basis of a lump sum here and now or whatever time it was made. I asked the question what would that lump sum be. What can it be? What is its maximum?

When I made that speech when I was declared elected in 1933, I said in my opinion it was £10,000,000, that the last penny that could be extracted out of us as a lump sum was £10,000,000. Why? Because that amount depended upon the amount that any Government in office here could raise in a single loan. There it is in 1938. I went further and I pleaded then, as I did before, and I do now for a generous gesture on the part of the British Government towards this country, to lay down the sure foundation of real peace between the two countries. That is by generosity, generous treatment to us. I thought that England then would accept the sum of £5,000,000. To-day she demands £10,000,000, the maximum sum she could get, in my opinion, in 1933, and she asks along with that the sum of £250,000 for damage to property. Yes, she demands £250,000 from us. What did she demand at the same time in the contemporaneous negotiations with Mussolini? Sir, I am afraid I am tramping on your corns. Sir, England has always filled up the cup for us. I have pleaded for generosity on her part. I hope here and now—when this Agreement was made I was confident that she would at least make a generous gesture to this country and lay the foundations of real peace. Is it contained in that document? I am not saying, Sir, that if I was in the position that the Government delegates were in that I would not have to swallow the pill, the country being reduced to the position she is in. What I am pleading is that England all through her history has made us drink the last dregs out of the cup. You will appreciate how galling it is to me, and anything I have said or done with regard to England during my life was to bring about reconciliation and peace between the two people. Naturally, there we are, twin sisters. Geography has placed us there. No amount of ranting or flag-waving or anything else can destroy that geographical fact. For that reason every patriotic man should take the long view, in deciding the welfare of both people. It is too narrow to talk otherwise, and I have never done it and will not do it now. In this document I was hoping, I was confident, that they would do a generous thing towards the President and his colleagues in London. Instead of that, they come down and make them drink the last dregs of paying £250,000—an infinitesimal sum, less than a penny to me. Why did they do that? What is behind it? Was it a final act of humiliation to this country, not to the Government of this country, but to us? Then we are asked to gloat over that. Sir, I want to put it on the records of this House that I do not gloat over it. It is done out of sheer necessity. I am glad that it is done, to put an end to the suffering and torturing of the hearts of my people and the sufferings of the last five years.

We have a record of your speech in Ballybofey in 1925.

I have dealt with that and explained it. Does the Deputy even to-day understand the implications of my speech? No, he does not. I welcomed the Agreement as laying the foundations to put an I end to the sufferings of our people. The whole thing is tragic. The whole thing was a misfortune. It was a tragedy for the poor people, the law abiding people, men and women, boys and girls, who for the last few years saw the last few pounds they had put by for a rainy day being drained away. So fan as they are concerned, so far as they stand to-day when this dgreement is made law it is not worth that to them unless the Government goes further. We will deal with that on some other occasion. Let us not gloat over it. That document is a national humiliation and let not outsiders or let not the people of England think that I am deceived by it. In a few weeks this country will not be deceived by it. I hope, Sir, that these agreements contained in this doeument will be law at the first available opportunity so as to give to the people of this country an opportunity to start afresh. They have a difficult and a long road before them but, as I have said, they are sprung from a people who have known adversity and surmounted it. I am confident, nay, I am sure, that given a few years—with reasonable prospects they will repair the damage that was done. It is a regrettable chapter . I am glad it is closed. So far as that is concerned I congratulate everybody that is associated with it. The only regret I have is that it was not done in 1933 and it should have been done and it could have been done then, on no worse conditions than it is to-day. In my opinion there can be no dispute about that. It could have been done in 1933 and saved tho wreck and ruin that this country is faced with to-day.

A Chinn Chomhairle, I rise to express my approval and support of the Agreement that has been come to and when we realise that this Agreement has been brought about by the plenipotentiaries from a small and a poor country who have been carrying on a war with a powerful and a rich country I think that we are justified in according our approval to what has been carried out. It was the best that could be got in all probability and I am confident that those who went over did their best to get the biggest measure of value out of the negotiations.

Like Deputy McMenamin, I am not at all impressed by the amounts that have been given by Great Britain. They could easily have been more generous. They could easily, having regard to what the people of this country have gone through, and the necessity for maintaining friendly relations with us, they could very easily have been more generous in what they gave away. They have fought and they have driven a hard bargain enough. I listened with a certain amount of interest to an astute and successful businessman expressing his perturbation of mind with regard to the possibilities of what representatives of certain trades could do if they came into any discussions with the Prices Commission. Although he accepted assurances that those trades and interests were adequately protected, I have no doubt that when a powerful nation wants to get a certain thing done, it will use every possible effort to make its opponents bend to its will, and it is quite open to the representatives of Great Britain again to use certain measures which would nullify any possible economic arrangements we might make, and can tell us: "If you do not give us certain things, we will adopt certain other economic measures to make you do so." There is no question that they have the power to do it, if they want to, and I have no doubt, from previous experience of the measures they are able to take, that we must try to meet them half-way, if we can.

I am glad this has been settled. The position of businessmen throughout the country is one of—I will not say bankruptcy—very nearly bankruptcy, simply because they have been unable to get in debts due to them by the agricultural community over a fairly long number of years. That positian has become acute of recent years, simply because they could not get from their debtors the money necessary to carry on their business, and I say definitely that shopkeepers in country districts are exceedingly badly off by reason of that state of affairs. It has been brought about solely through the operations of the economic war, which. in turn, were brought about by those who professed to tell us that the farmers were never better off, although the position in country districts gives. the lie to that assertion. I am perfectly aware that the standard of living amongst the agricultural community has reached a seriously low ebb. It has reached a point at which they have to wear shoddy clothes, to do with inferior food and to put up with every possible shortage known to those in poor circumstances. They are not able to provide their families with the education they at one time provided; they are not able to provide them with the means of a living; and the only alternative for the younger people is the emigrant ship. That is the position which farmers' sons and daughters have had to endure, and the same applies just as strongly to the agricultural labourer who was dependent on the farmer for something approaching a, reaonahle living.

An endeavour has been made to convince us that the penal tariffs now being taken off were not deducted from the agricultural community in respect of exports of live stock and agricultural produce from this country. We know very well that is not correct. We know very well that they fell directly upon those men who were exporting cattle, pigs, and the various products of agricultural entenprise in every direction. Those men have had to bear the brunt of it. It has been alleged that they were patient in that situation. I say they were not, but five or six years of intense poverty is enough to break the spirit of the stoutest heart, and the men who were able to fight for their privileges, to fight for the land which they now are supposed to enjoy, have gone down under the operations of the infamous economic war. The allegation has also been made that cattle prices will not rise very much with the removal of the penal tariffs. That may be so. Markets are very tricky things, but it is a principle of commerce that if you once take off a duty which has been deducted from the price of the article, the producer will get the benefit. I am thankful for the new position, and it is a course we have been urging on the Government for the past five years. The sum of £10,000,000 has been accepted as the balance to be paid to Great Britain, after they have collected during the last five years, something like £5,000,000, making in all £35,000,000. That 10,000,000 is a capital sum representing a half per cent. of a sinking fund which repaid the loans to the stockholder, and adding 2¾ per cent. interest, it represents a very much larger sum than at first appears.

Although it has been alleged that we could not have got such a bargain five years ago, we heard over and over again that a small sum would have settled the matter, because it would have represented an immediate payment of a cash advance, and, divested of interest attached to the land annuity, would have meant a very much larger sum and would have meant an immediate taking up of stock by the British. We all know that if a farmer wanted to redeem his land annuity, the redemption price could be paid by the farmer going on the market a few years ago, buying 100 land stock at somewhere about 56, and handing that to the Land Commission, which would accept it at its face value of £100. The British will hand this £10,000,000 back and redeem so much of the land stock. They will pay it back to the bondholders, and it certainly will represent to them a very much larger sum than it appears at first sight. What is the Gonernment going to do for the men who have paid back £25,000,000 to the British while, at the same time, they paid the revised land annuities to the Land commission? I ask them what are they going to do for those men who have borne the brunt of that imposition at a most critical time, when the slump had taken place and had depressed prices far below their natural level on the then market? What are they going to get? What are the agriculural community going to get for the losses, the sorrow and the perturbation of mind which they must have suffered when they found themselves unable to carry on even an ordinary method of living, and when the flying squad went amongst them and took every beast they had from their farms? Are you going to do anything for those men who have been in the first-line trenches, who have borne all those losses and who have paid back to the British the best portion of the sum which you have compounded and who will have to pay their share of this £10,000,000?

Derating and restocking loans at low rates of interest have been suggested. I am not going to say what method should be adopted. That is a matter for the Government and a matter for future discussion in this House, but I say emphatically that there is an obligation on the Government to repay those men who have lost their all. They are entitled to restitution, and restitution is the proper word to use, for the losses they have sustained. They will not be content to see that sum of £10,000,000 go elsewhere. They will not be content to go on as they are with understocked farms, shabby clothes and undernourished children. They will demand from the Government in the future something more than they had patiently to endure during the operation of the economic war. I shall say nothing about the £250,000 which has to be paid. That was an agreement which could not be avoided, and the wisest thing is to go on paying that in the hope that, on some future occasion, negotiations may be possible to avoid further payments. Once you choose the right time, there is the possibility that that sum will be got rid of. Do not take from the credit of the men who, in 1921, effected a marvellous settlement. It was, perhaps, a settlement made by untried and inexperienced men. They braved an angry and powerful Government when they went across to Britain to negotiate with them at that time, and do not take from them the credit of having done their best to help you to obtain this settlement. You have been successful in bringing back this settlement, but do not say that you won the war. I know very well that colleagues of mine will go down the country and say that they won the war.

The Deputy might argue that down the country.

I shall, and I assure you that I have not said the last word on it. I have risen to support this measure, but let not Deputies on the opposite side adopt the vainglorious attitude of heroes who have come back triumphant. With all their laudation of England, I do not regard England as having been generous in this matter. They probably drove a hard bargain. They are a business nation. They intended to get the last penny and, if they did not, it was probably because you could not pay any more and it would not be good business to press you. If they exacted the last penny, they might, deprive the farmers of all purchasing power so that their traders could not do business with them. It was, therefore, good business for them not to exact the last farthing. The people have been reduced to bankruptcy by their action in compulsorily collecting the land annuities on the stock exported from this country.

It was only a section of the farming community who were paying in that way—the section who were exporting stock and various commodities. We had to pay the annuities whether we liked it or not. Perhaps what we paid the Government here should not be called land annuities. They were really a special fund. Britain was collecting the land annuities and paying herself. Do not forget that the farmers were paying this money directly. The British were collecting the annuities from them directly while you were collecting a special fund which the farmers were utterly unable to pay. The rates are advancing rapidly year by year. That is a direction in which you can afford some relief to the farmers who have been suffering this dreadful scourge. You can renew the promise I heard my colleagues on the opposite side make in 1932—that they would derate agricultural land. That would be a direct form of relief—one the forms of relief which would best help people who cannot now help themselves.

We have had some talk about the ports. I am not perturbed about them. They have been given over, and you will have the pleasure of keeping them up because keep them up you must. Those forts will cost you half a million annually. Britain is not sighing after them. There will be less spending-power locally because the soldiers will not be coming into Cobh from Carlisle and Camden forts and Spike Island. They spent a good deal of money, and the local people also suffered through the departure of the British, who had a very large number of men there. If these forts are not to be white elephants they will have to be maintained, and anybody who is powerful enough to come in and take them over in time of war can make use of them. I ask the Government to lie generous towards those who have suffered, and in particular to be generous to the men who carried on good government in this country. I maintain that, if they had been in office in 1932, they would have made a good bargain—perhaps a better bargain than the combined sum of £25,000,000 and £10,000,000 which Britain collected from the farmers.

I rise with feelings of gratitude on this occasion—gratitude to a merciful Providence that has at last, shown light to the Government of this country. I think that some of the speakers from, the Government Benches have shown the height of ingratitude in endeavouring to hide the facts of the sittiation. This development was not unexpected. Is there any person who has studied the history of Fianna Fáil who did not expect this development? You have run absolutely true to form. I do not want to go back on the history of the last 17 or 18 years, but let any Deputy do that for himself. What does he find? Exactly what has happened now. We would not accept the Treaty; we would not accept the authority of this House for five years. Then the light began to dawn on us. We came into this House and, after five years more, we proclaimed that expenditure should be cut down by at least £2,000,000, that judges' salaries and Ministers' salaries should be reduced. Did Deputies opposite do that? Not at all. We said there should be no Seanad. We abolished the Seanad, and then we put it back again. Are not Deputies opposite running absolutely true to form? I thank God— and thank him sincerely—that this has happened.

There is no use in pretending, as a kind of cover-up, that you have done the right thing all along. Do you not know very well that you have not? What I say does not matter: history will record the facts and the people who come after us will be the judges. Let us wait and see. There are sensible people in this House, such as the Minister for Industry and Commerce, who realise that this is a very important matter. The Minister realised, when he spoke yesterday, that a very big thing had been done for this country. But we had the Minister for Agriculture coming along to tell us that the whole thing was not worth tuppence to anybody. Deputy Corry told us the same thing in effect. From what they say, apparently, we are going to have no benefits. Let there be some kind of consistency. It does not matter how the Fianna Fáil Party try to cover it up, history will record this: that they were guilty of more political heresy and more agricultural heresy than any Government that ever existed in this world. Look at their whole record calmly and see where they have got us. Thank God, they have got sense at last Let us be grateful for it and let us hope that the future will give us an opportunity of going ahead peacefully. As Deputy Gorey said last night, one of the best features of the settlement is that it has killed the buzzards, as he called them, the parasites who made money on the backs of the people during the period of the economic war, That is quite true. Another good feature of the settlement is that it has debunked all the sheer nonsense there was about self-sufficiency and burning everything British except her coal. Mind you, we had that from the Fianna Fáil Benches not two months ago. We have a lot to be grateful for. We should be grateful that we have seen this day, when the people who have the history and the background of Fianna Fáil have come to realise what is the true state of affairs. It is quite a lot to be thankful for.

When he was speaking here yesterday evening, the Minister for Agriculture told us quite a lot of things. As a matter of fact, he endeavoured to minimise whatever good might accrue from the settlement by telling us that the increase in the price of cattle would not be very marked; that it would be very small; in fact, that it would not be there at all. I must say, in passing, that I did not think his speech added lustre either to himself or to this House. After all, agriculture is a very important matter and it ought to be treated in a very serious way. If the Taoiseach and those who want across with him to London did not think it was important to make this settlement, they would not have made it, and I do not think it is good policy for the Minister for Agriculture to endeavour to minimise and try to make a joke of it, as if were. There is no use in the Minister for Agriculture endeavouring to paint the picture that the prices for cattle next week or next month, as distinct from the prices obtaining since the negotiations were undertaken, will not be very marked. That is not a fair comparison at all. Will the Minister for Agriculture, or any other member of the House, take his mind back to 1934 and 1935, when the people of the country could not get even the price of a pair of boots for the cattle they brought out to the fair and were obliged to bring home again? They could not sell them at any price then, owing to the economic war and nothing else. The Minister for Agriculture said that some members of the Opposition, if not the whole of them, had declared that the annuities were legally and morally due. If the delegation that went to London have not proved that they were convinced of it, I do not know what construction to put on what has happened.

Not even one penny.

Not even one penny, says Deputy Victory. Notwithstauding all that, the Taniseach admits that they were collected, with more hardship in the last six years than ever before, and he has to admit that there were close on £27,000,000 collected by the British by way of penal tariffs, and irrespective of all that, he has agreed to give another £10,000,000.

Yes, off the £20,000,000, not off the £78,000,000.

And yet the Deputy says not one penny. Remember, the principle is there. Is that in the Agreement—that £78,000,000? Is there any mention of it? There is mention of £10,000,000, and we have nothing to relate it to. The facts are there, in any case, and I do not want to make any capital out of it. Were it not that the Minister for Agriculture and Deputy Corry tried to make capital out of the matter, I would not now be troubling the House by referring to it We have paid to Britain, by way of penal tariffs, a sum of £26,000,000.

Deputy Brooke Brasier has said £35,000,000.

It does not matter.

There it must be a mistake?

It might have arisen in this way. The Minister for Industry and Commerce might have been responsible for it from the statement he made yesterday. I am going to confess to a complete ignorance as to the amount collected by Britain by way of protective dnties, as distinct from penal duties. I understand, however, that from penal duties Britain collected £26,000,000 on the head of the disputed moneys. The Minister for Industry and Commerce said that, in addition, there were protective duties, so possibly Deputy Brasier and myself are both right and maybe it is £35,000,000. I do say definitely that they collected £26,000,000 by way of penal duties, according to the British accounts.

In addition to that, we are handing them another £10,000,000. I am not saying it is not a good settlement. What I am saying is that it is an admission that the sums were due. After the promotion that has been given to the legal advisers of the Government for giving the advice that they were not due, we have this admission that those people were wrong. The Minister for Agriculture referred to the fact that the people on this side of the House even went to the trouble and expense of getting legal advice to show that the moneys were legally and morally due. Would you not think the Minister for Agriculture would have the good sense not to mention that? At least I would. The people who advised the Government were promoted to the benches of this country, and the highest offices they could hold, for their advice, and now it is admitted the advice was wrong, and we have to pay. Is that not the situation?

Are they giving us all the rest of the claims—are they conceding all the rest of the claims?

The claim that the Minister made has not been acknowledged at all—the number of millions mentioned yesterday, £140,000.000 or £340,000,000.

£400,000,000, under one head.

Yes, £400,000,000.

The other sums fade into insignificance before the Minister's clam. There is one good thing that this settlement has done, it has debunked all that nonsense, debunked the whole lot of it; we are finished with that, and the people know what value to place upon that kind of codology. When Deputy Dowdall was speaking yesterday, he expressed fears over certain matters, with regard to trade and manufactures, and incidentally he said that it was perfectly well known that we could not, and no country could, exercise complete rights in tariffs, put them sky-high, if you like. He said that everybody knew we are living in an age in which there should be exchange, and so on.

Fianna Fáil did not know that until now. Not at all. We were living in an age of self-sufficiency in which the Taoiseach wanted a situation here such as one might imagine would exist were there a big wall built around a country and the people all lived inside that wall. The Taoiseach was aiming at that type of economy. He expressed that view more than once. It was a great pity that Deputy Dowdall, who is a manufacturer did not try to educate the Government on this important matter. I do not think this trade Agreement is a good one. I do not know how it is to operate. I do not know a thing about that, but if people from this side of the House went across to England and brought home a settlement like that, I do know what would be said of them by the people who are now sitting on the Government Benches.

And Deputy Brennan is going to say it now.

No, I am not. Deputy Davin yesterday feared the fact that the Prices Commission will have full authority to declare what the tariffs ought to be. He said whatever the Tariff Commission fixes was afterwards to be implemented by this House. He added that British manufacturera ought not to have a right to appear before the Prices Commission. I am afraid that if we go into the implications of the whole thing and study carefully what is in the Trade Agreement it will be found to be a lot worse than that. The Minister for Agriculture last night told us about Articles 3 and 9. One is a counterpart of the other. The one is relating to and in favour of Britain. The other is relating to and in favour of this country. I asked him why the difference in the wording and he could not tell me. I now invite the House to study that. The difference is there. It appears to me that that Trade Agreement will put us in this position —that we have undertaken to have all our tariffs reviewed by the Prices commission. We have undertaken that we will take them in whatever order Britain dictates. We have also undertaken that Britain will have the right to come here and sit at the Prices Commission and we have undertaken that wc will put into operation Whatever the findings of the Commission are. But remember Article 3 gives us no authority whatever over the British regulating their own market quantitatively, but Article 9 does give the British authority as regards the quantitative arrangement of our markets. I have no hesitation in saying that if people on this side of the House brought back that arrangement, we would have been told, possibly wrongly, that we had sold the fiscal freedom of this country and that we had sold our economic freedom body and soul . I do not think we have paid that but the Article does not read well.

I do not think the Minister for Industry and Commerce in speaking in the House yesterday gave us afair analysis of the reasons why the Irish negotiators had accepted these conditions. I do not think he did so at all. For instance, I thought him very contradictory when he told us first that our proximity to Britain entailed that our Trade Agreements with Britain would have to be on a different basis from their trade agreements with such countries as Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In the next breath he told us that our Agreements with Britain were so worded because they were the same agreements as those which Britain had made with Canada, Australia and New Zealand. That is what I gathered from the Minister's speech. But the Minister cannot have it both ways. We are in a very different position certainly in regard to Britain from the position occupied by those other countries. As far as trade and the ordinary manufactured commodity is concerned, I agree we are in a very different position. But we cannot say that the justification for that Trade Agreement is because it is the same as the agreement made with the other countries. I want to know if we are to benefit from the fact that we are in quite a distinct position as regards Britain from the position that those other countries occupy.

The Taoiseach told us that these Agreements could not have been made any time up to the present. He said there were Constitutional difficulties in tho way and various other things but particularly the Constitutional matters. It seems pretty extraordinary to me that if those Constitutional matters were, as the President says, obstacles in the way of a settlement, yet when these Constitutional matters were being amended in this House there was no murmur and no objection from Britain. Why does the Taoiseach now think that if he brought in this settlement six years ago these Constitutional points would have been raised? What evidence has he of that? Apparently the British were satisfied that these Constitutional matters should go. The point he raises now is that the British would know they were at the back of the Taoiseach's mind. When the Taoiseach took office here in 1932 he panted to know what would be the reactions from the British if he then declared a republic for the Twenty-Six Counties. Of course the President has gone away from that position. That is because it was not a realistic position to occupy. In addition to the benefits it conveys, there is one thing that the present Agreement has done. I am sure there are people of the Fianna Fáil Party, possibly men on the Front Benches, who realise to-day how big the men were who in 1921 negotiated the Treaty. They signed that Treaty after the British had shot us up and burned us out. In the face of that they were able to go over and make an agreement in that very unfavourable atmosphere. They were able to come back to this House and say: "Yes, we were able to make a bargain." That is something that can be appreciated to-day more than it has ever previously been appreciated. For goodness sake, let not the Fianna Fáil Party try now to defend the political antics they pursued in the past. We have arrived at a stage and let us thank God we have arrived at it. Let us go ahead and continue removing these things from tho sphere of practical politics. We know the disturbance these things have caused. We know the losses they have caused in the country. We are aware of the amount of propaganda that was made over these things. I hope that every Party in the country will now have the good sense not to raise any more of this sort of propaganda.

Deputy Dowdall made a good point here yesterday. The point was made from those benches in 1932 by Deputy Hogan. It is a pity that it was not then acted on. That point was that at one time Fianna Fáil represented the wild element in this country, and that Britain would be glad and anxious to get their good will. That point was made by Paddy Hogan six years ago. It was an important point; in every respect it was perfectly true. It is only to-day that Deputy Dowdall has come to recognise it. But now that the Fianna Fáil Party at last are beginning to realise that, I hope, with the blessing of God, they will continue to act on it. Let us go ahead along these lines. I do hope there will be no reason and no necessity in future to debunk the men who saw the wisdom of acting on these lines when in 1921 they signed and voted for the Treaty.

From the other side of the House we have got an indication of what is going to happen. We have had very reasonable speeches from the Taoiseach and from the Minister for Industry and Commerce. These were speeches of the sort that one would expect to be made here in this House. But at the same time we have got an indication from Deputy Corry of the way in which this thing will be dealt with down the country. It is perfectly obvious that, while the Fianna Fáil Government would not admit that they were wrong in the past, they had at least to admit the fact that Griffith and Collins were right in 1921 when they signed the Treaty. Yet Deputy Corry must get up and say: "We are still on the straight road, and we are going to achieve our object, even if we have to use gas." He will even talk about marching across the Border, as the Tanaiste did some years ago when he said that he would probably lead the people over it.

Even though the situation has been debunked, we had better make up our minds that, once these people get out of the House, the bunk will be revived, the drams will rattle, the bonfires will burn, the flags will wave, and we shall be told that this is another step towards the national goat —a 32-county Republic in our time. They will tell us this is one of the greatest historic events this country has ever seen. If one even looks at the Government official organ one will see that it has referred to the signing of this Agreement and to the economic war, about which we have been arguing on both sides of this House for the past five years, by saying that it was ended in a historic ceremony. It was a historic ceremony, according to the official organ of the Government a week ago.

The greatest national advance that Fianna Fáil succeeded in getting since they came into power was made in Downing Street when Eamon de Valera got his field-glasses back, but it has not taken us very near a 32-county Republic or a 32-county Ireland of any sort. Since the l9th January we have heard from members of the opposite side of the House, and from Fianna Fáil sources all over the country, that there would be no settlement without a settlement of the Partition question, that there would be no settlement until the unnatural Border was got rid of. We had the Fianna Fáil clubs shrieking in holy horror even at the very idea of a settlement without the removal of the Border. But to-day we see what a Northern Nationalist Senator thinks of all that talk. He says: "I am now satisfied more than ever that Mr. de Valera has no policy about the North, and that he was only using it for his own purposes."

It is very easy to say that with this Trade Agreement we are getting back our ports, and that Partition was not considered, but I am perfectly satisfied, and the country is satisfied, about what happened as regards the Partition question at this conference. The Taoiseach went over to London, and he got up and said his Party piece for the papers about Partition. He rattled it out, as you would expect him, and then Mr. Chamberlain got up and said his party piece about Partition, and when both had said their Party pieces, which they knew would get into the papers, they said: "Now let us get on to business, and let us forget Partition." But something could have been done about Partition. All over Europe, all over the world one might say, minority questions are causing considerable trouble to-day. There was a minority question in Austria, a minority question in Czecho-Slovakia, and minorities are making themselves very vocal and active in these countries. I say, whether it was possible or not to remove the unnatural Boundary during the present negotiations, the Taoiseach, if he was any way sincere on the question of Partition at all, could have extracted at least some promise from the British Government with which he is so much in love and which, through the blessing of God and coincidence of time, has such a marvellous leader in his view. He could have got something out of that wonderful gentleman, Mr. Chamberlain, who again by the blessing of God and the coincidence of time, happened to be at the head of the British Parliament when Eamon de Valera was the head of the Irish Parliament. He could have got some guarantees from Mr. Chamberlain that would prevent this puppet Parliament in the North from gerrymandering, that would prevent them from victimising and treating the Nationalist minority in the North as they have been treated for the last 16 or 17 years and as they are still being treated to-day.

Sure we gerrymandered ourselves.

We are then presented in the first part of the Agreement with this great national advance, this handing over of the ports. The Taoiseach uses a very clever phrase when he tells us that he has abrogated Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty, wiped them out completely. That is a very nice way of putting it. I would prefer to say that it was Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty which put the Taoiseach into the position of being able to take over those ports, that Articles 6 and 7 gave the Taoiseach the right to get these ports. If the Taoiseach thinks that that represents a great national advance he is welcome to the thought. I should like to get from the Taoiseach or some member of the Government some little idea of what the maintenance of these ports is going to cost. Do they mean to spend money on equipping these ports as naval or landing ports? I remember a time when if one single penny were asked for equipping an Irish Army Fianna Fáil Deputies would shout in holy horror all over the country. The reason for the change of attitude is obvious now. They will equip the ports and they will recruit men to man them for one reason—that in that way they, hope to bring down the unemployment figures.

Deputy Corry and others like him will go down the country and say that by taking over these ports we have taken one step nearer the ultimate goal, but it is obvious to everybody now that it was the Treaty of 1921, and the efforts of Griffith and Collins which put them into the position of being able to take over these ports to-day. We can say one thing anyway, when people say that this Agreement could have been made five years ago. Deputy corry says that if we were behind the Government which then got a mandate from the people, many things could have been done. I say now, and history will prove it, that if the people on the opposite benches were behind the Irish Government when that Government got a mandate from the people in 1922, it is not this settlement we would lie talking about to-day, because this country would have gone on to much better things in our generation, if the Government at that time had the support of Deputies opposite.

History alone can judge what we might have achieved at that time had Deputies opposite given their support to the efforts of the Government then in office. There is very little use in saying to-day that we are making a great national advance, remembering what could have been done during the ten years Deputies opposite stayed out of this House, when every member of the then Government and even every private Deputy who came into the House, was, according to them, a person guilty of treason, murder and rapine of the Irish people. It was the Treaty of 1921, the people who stood up for it, the ordinary people of this country who stood behind the Government at that time who put the Taoiseach into the position of being able to clap himself on the back now that he has got this settlement and that he has been able to get it by the lucky coincidence of a Conservative Government and a decent Prime Minister in England.

On the question of the Finance Agreement, it is quite apparent that there is holy horror amongst the Fianna Fáil back benchers about this £10,000,000.

What is it being paid for? Deputy Victory said a short time ago that not a penny was being paid. That was a beautiful phrase at one time. In the Six Counties the cry is "Not an inch," and in the Twenty-Six Counties it is "Not a penny." The Agreement says:

(1) The Government of Eire agree to pay to the Government of the United Kingdom on or before the 30th of November, 1938, the sum of £10,000,000 sterling.

(2) Subject to the provisions of Article 3 of this Agreement, payment of the sum specified in Article I shall constitute a final settlement of all financial claims of either of he two Governments against the Other...

Were the land annuities considered a financial claim on the British Government? Whether it was admitted that the money was due or not, it was still a claim. No matter what Deputy Victory thinks, I am afraid the Taoiseach admitted it. In his opening statement to the House, the Taoiseach used very peculiar words which I think absolutely proves that he admits it is not part of the settlement or whatever you like to call it. The words were:

"You may, if you like, regard it as ransom money."

People outside will be puzzled with talk about figures ranging from £78,000,000 to £120,000,000, that Ireland has been relieved of by a settlement for £10,000,000. It is not very long ago, in fact within the first three or four years of Fianna Fáil political life, when they were talking of the financial settlement that could be made some day when England would be made disgorge the robbery that took place since 1803, and made pay back over-taxation that had gone on for 120 years. I should like to ask any of the Ministers if it is not a fact that the actual claim against the British Government placed on record by the Fianna Fáil Government in 1922 amounted to £400,000,000 as being due to this country. Of course, that is forgotten. Everything is forgotten.

It is not forgotten.

Quite possibly the Minister does not forget it.

The Deputy knows it is not.

Surely the Minister is not going to re-open that claim in view of the terms of the Agreement. Does he intend to re-open the claim for over-taxation against the British Government?

No. In regard to that document, I am in the same position as Deputy Cosgrave with regard to the 1923 Agreement and the Ultimate Financial Setlement.

Would the Minister repeat that?

In regard to that question I am in the same position as the Deputy is in connection with the documents he signed.

Will you explain?

I will not re-open the claim.

Does the Minister mean to say that there was a secret Agreement?

The Minister did not say that and the Deputy knows it.

Let Deputy Linehan proceed.

I do not mind giving way to the Minister.

But we would never get anywhere if that went on.

We have not got anyWhere with the Agreement.

We have heard four hundred million words.

I wonder who spoke too soon about the £400,000,000.

Apart from the financial aspect, there is another aspect to be considered in connection with the cost of the economic war to the taxpayers. Ministers are very fond of producing statistics here, particularly about the number of cattle in the country. Coming from an area where there are no big farmers and no ranchers, where they are all small mixed farmers, I say there is a definite falling off in the cattle population there.

They are small farmers that depended for a livelihood mainly on three or four cattle which they would rear and sell in the Autumn. That trade has been dead for four years. With all due respect I am beginning to doubt the accuracy of figures compiled concerning live stock, and wondering if the agricultural statistics compiled for one year are not put down for other years so that the 14 cattle that one John Murphy might have had last year are put down for this year. In the South of Ireland, and particularly in Kerry, there is a big falling off in the cattle population. There are three big fairs within a short distance from where I live, at Castleisland, Knocknagree and Kanturk, and if the cattle were in the country they would be going to these fairs since prices rose. They are not going to the fairs because they are not there. That has been the cost of the economic war in that part of the country. Even if the statement of the Minister for Agriculture is wrong, and that the price of cattle goes up the people will not be able to take advantage of the rise, because they Will not be able to buy cattle, and they have no stock coming along to sell. As we are on this subject, there is another item that might be looked into, as I think Deputies now realise that other people suffered from the effects of the economic war as well as the farming community. It would be well worth Ministers' while to go and live in a small country town with a population of about 1,000 for about three weeks. I say that Ministers could play golf up and down the streets of such towns seven day's in the week without being in the slightest danger of hitting anyone. Country shopkeepers and small traders have felt the brunt of the economic war as much as the farming community for this reason, that up to the start of the economic war people tried to pay their way. For the last six years credit could not be given, so that in most cases people were not even able to pay debts that had accumulated before that period. Ministers may smile and may believe that to be an untrue story, but as I live in a country town I know that small traders could not meet the demands of wholesale firms, because they could not get money from people who had not got it. If Ministers lived in any of these towns they would know what the economic war has cost.

In conclusion. I have to admit that I amglad that this Agreement has been come to. I do not see anything at all in it to brag about, beyond the fact that the Government has done something that should have been done long ago. I hope this is going to end the type of polities we have had here for the last 15 years. I hope now that we have effected a practical settlement, let it be good, bad or indifferent; that we are going to have practical politics, and that Deputy Corry and others will follow the straight road, or the road back, or the road forward, and remember there is not a bit of good in trying to drive the people off their heads again, or to believe that the only hope of remaining in power is to try to get the young people to think that the Taoiseach is the saviour of the country and the only man to carry on the national fight. Let us forget that, because the people are sick and tired of that kind of politics. It is because the Government knows that, that we have got this Agreement. Naturally, I will vote for it, for this reason: that it will give me great pleasure, whatever length of time I am in this House, at least once to go into the Lobby with this Government to do something that I am delighted to see them doing now. I will feel, where marching into the Lobby with Eamon de Valera, that I see him vindicating Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith.

As Deputy Cosgrave is in the House, I should like to know whether he could give the approximate date on which the ports were offered to a Minister, when his Party was in office. Could the Deputy give even the approximate date on which the offer was made?

The Minister might have given me notice of that question, when I would be able to find out the approximate date. It was between 1929 and 1931.

Between 1929 and 1931. That is sufficient for my purpose. The Deputy the other day pooh-poohed this Agreement, and said it was quite a simple matter. He indicated that at any time he could have got one quite as good, at any rate in regard to the ports.

I do not think that I said "at any time."

The Taoiseach referred to the taking over of the ports in his speech introducing the motion, and stressed the importance that we placed upon that portion of the Agreement. The Deputy, when he rose to speak immediately afterwards, said that he did not grudge the Taoiseach whatever pleasure he got from the taking over of the ports: that he could have got the same himself, or words to that effect. I think it is within the recollection of all the members who were here at the time that that is what the Deputy said. Now, I am particularly interested in these ports, and I think that everybody who remembers the time of the Treaty and the disastrous division that was caused here in our people over it, will also have a very keen recollection of Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty, which related to coastal defence and the ports, and to the facilities that the British claimed in time of war or of strained relations. I think there is yet an interesting portion of history to be written about these two clauses.

There were three principal objections at the time of the Treaty. One was the clause giving allegiance to the British King, the other was the Partition clause, and the third was these two Articles 6 and 7, which gave the British sovereignty over our ports, and gave them the legal right to claim whatever facilities they desired in time of war or of strained relations. The history of the clause regarding the Oath has been written. Everybody knows all about it. The Treaty was put over—was swallowed by a number of people who thought that the Oath was not obligatory: that the acceptance of the Treaty did not mean that the Oath of Allegiance would be in the Constitution. That was finally settled when the late Kevin O'Higgins, introducing certain clauses in the Constitution, said that they were obligatory, and that the Dáil at the time had no right whatsoever to reject them.

Excuse me. I happened to be in the House at that particular time—on the occasion of the introduction and the passage into law of the Constitution, and the late Minister for Justice made no such statement as has been uttered by the Minister for Defence. He stated to the House: "This is the Constitution which this Government is proposing to the House. The Dáil has a perfect right to reject or to amend any and every clause of this Constitution. This Government is standing over certain clauses in this Constitution which are regarded as obligatory in the Constitution by the British Government. The Dáil can change these if it so desires, but it will have the responsibility of electing a Government to carry on the business of the country."

The Deputy has borne out my point.

But not your statement.

He states that at that time the British Government regarded the clauses in the Constitution relating to the king as obligatory. At that time a number of people voted for the Treaty in the belief that that clause was not obligatory.

A number of others——

The Deputy is not going to get off on that.

The statement should not be made when challenged.

A number of others voted for it in the belief that the boundary clause meant that a boundary commission would be set up which would go into the territories under the Belfast Government and the Free State Government and re-allocate them on the basis of the opinions of the population. That myth lasted somewhat longer than the myth about the nonobligatory aspect of the Oath. It was about six years before the people found out that the clausc relating to Partition was a fraudulent clause. The other two clauses in the Treaty regarding the ports were accepted by a number of people on the understanding that at the end of five years the review that would take place would result in the handing over of these ports to the Irish Free State. The five years passed and the public got no information as to what was happening. Deputy Cosgrave says now that he could have got them sometime between 1929 and 1931.

He says they were offered at that time. They could have been got earlier.

At the Conference that was held in accordance with the Treaty.

When was that?

Five years after.

Could the Deputy give the approximate date?

Does the Minister know the date of the Treaty?

That was the Conference held in 1927. I want to stress this, that a number of people in this country, those who were thinking of its defence and what its relationship would be to a major war in Europe, were greatly perturbed about those two clauses in the Treaty and were particularly perturbed about the sovereignty of our ports and the fact that they Hers in the hands of another Power. Not alone were the public perturbed about that, but officials were perturbed and some of the most thumbed files in my Department are those relating to coastal defence and the question of these ports.

Deputy Cosgrave treated this as a very minor subject the other day, but here are a few of the files—Deputies can see for themselves-on that subject. They are the biggest files in the place, because those who have had to think about the defence problems of this country over the last 15 years have been distressed about the position of our ports and the position of this country if the British at any time claimed the rights given under Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty. Deputy Cosgrave the other day pooh-poohed the business, and said he could have got the ports, indicating that he could mave got them on the same condition as we got them. Deputy Cosgrave, according to himself nor any of the Ministers serving under him for ten years never told an untruth.

Would the Minister quote exactly what I said?

As reported at column 49 of the Official Debates of 27th April, 1938, the Deputy said: "I am making a speech here now, knowing what I say to be true. I have had in this country 20 years' experience of public life. During the ten years while I was in the Government, not one Minister of mine uttered an untruth that I know of, inside or outside my Government."

The Deputy is doing me a lot of honour now.

I am never so suspicious of Deputy Cosgrave as when he gets sanctimonious, ana the more sanctimonious he becomes the more suspicious I become. I am quite prepared to think that Deputy Cosgrave believed that to be the truth.

The sanctity is that of my Ministers. I did not claim it for myself.

I am quite prepared to believe that he believed he could have got those ports six or seven years ago on the same terms as we got them. Deputy Cosgrave sometimes reminds me of the clown in the circus who, when he sees a man standing on his head or juggling plates, says: "Oh, that it quite simple; I could do that myself." But when he tries to do it . he generally breaks the plates or the eggs or half-breaks his neck an trying to do the trick o' the loop. In this particular instance, however, I believe he might have been convinced that he could have gone further between 1929 and 1931, and could in fact have got those ports. I stress the importance of Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty in the minds of those who are thinking of defence questions in this country. One of the first files I asked for in the Department of Defence was the file relating to the ports, because it was in my mind then that, apart from Partition, those two Articles were going to cause us the most trouble internally in this country; that, if the British held on to the ports, or if in time of war or strained relations they attempted to claim the facilities which it was in their legal power to claim, not alone would it cause international difficulties for us in a world or European war, but that it would cause internal difficulties; that if the Government here wanted to maintain its neutrality, and if the British insisted on claiming further territories around the ports, or even on remaining in the ports, we would have to shed Irish blood in defence of the British soldiers who were in our territory. I saw one civil war, and I do not want to see another for any reason whatsoever. The first files, therefore, that I called for in my Department were the files relating to the ports. I wanted to see what happened in regard to the five years portion of Clauses 6 and 7. I want to say this, that nowhere in those files did I discover anything which would support Deluty Cosgrave's statement of the other day.

Deputy Cosgrave the other day said that his Ministers never told an untruth. It is sometimes very embarrassing if people tell lies. They say a lie is the deliberate telling of an untruth to a person who has a right to know the truth. If there is anything that a Government here has the right to know it is the truth in relation to the extent of the State commitments in international affairs, and what has happened in the past in regard to certain big international questions. I think that the last Government should have had on its files, available for the incoming Government, information of the important character which Deputy Cosgrave alluded to the other day—that away back in 1929 or 1931 he could have obtained those ports on the same basis as we obtained them; or back in 1927 as Deputy McGilligan now claims they could have been obtained. It was a most important piece of information, and the last Government should have transferred that information to us. I think it should be generally recognised that Governments, if they have such important information relating to the international relations of this country, should pass it on to the next Government. I believe that that is the duty of this Government, and the duty of any following Government. All I want to say about it is that we had a right to know the truth about those ports, and if Deputy Cosgrave and Deputy McGilligan are telling the truth about them, those files lie. I searched for the information from those files and from everybody who had anything to do with the negotiations regarding those ports—the negotiations which Deputy McGilligan said took place back in 1927, and the report of which is there.

The Minister might as well be correct in his date. It was not 1927.

The Deputy will not give the date.

Surely people are able to add. It was five years from the date of the signing of the Treaty. When was that? If you do not know it, look at your own Agreement. It was December, 1921.

Then the date was December, 1926.

Now you have got it at last.

Why did not the Deputy give it?

I did not think it was necessary to explain that.

I want to say again that if Deputy McGilligan is telling the truth—that they could have got those ports on the conditions on which we got them—then the official files are lying.

Why? Do the files say we could not? Surely not.

The files——

Are silent.

The files are not silent.

Do they say we could not have got them?

The files disclose a particular fact, that for months reams were written about the importance of those ports, and finally a conference took place in London consisting of a few of the British and about six important people from this side. They were told that they could not get the ports.

What is the date of that conference?

April, 1927. That is as far as the files go. If the files are wrong, we should know that they are wrong; we should have had the information which the Deputy says he had. That is the only moral that I want to point. I believe that Deputy Cosgrave thinks he could have got them, but certainly the files do not disclose that, and I greatly doubt whether Deputy Cosgrave's belief in the matter is correct. It certainly would have been a piece of joyous information, not alone to this Government when they came in, but to the members of the last Government Party, to think that they could have got those ports on the terms on which we got them; that that big portion of the difficulties into which we were forced was gone by the board; that certain of the national and international obligations which followed as a direct consequence of those two Articles were gone. I think that would have been worth any sum of money. Deputy Cosgrave in the past believed that settlements which I think were very much less in importance than the getting over of the ports were worth a very big sum of money indeed, and I think if he had announced to his Government then that he could have got those ports it would have conveyed great joy to them.

One thing is this: that I think that, if Deputy Cosgrave could have got the ports on those terms, he should have at least consulted his colleagues about it, that there should have been a Cabinet decision or a Government decision about it. It was important enough. It is not the kind of an offer that is made every day in the week, and do not think he should have turned it. down on his own initiative or on the initiative of the Minister who was in London. It is not every day that people are handed back portion of their territory, and I think it was important-enough to have a Cabinet decision about it. Whether it was or not, and whatever relation Deputy Cosgrave had to his Cabinet—whether or not he was prepared to take a decision like that on his own initiative—it was certainly important enough to put down on the files and, anyway, to transmit to the Government. That is all I want to say on the matter.

With regard to the speech we have just heard, Sir, I have only one comment to make. The Minister has instituted a comparison between Deputy Cosgrave and a clown. Well at least, there is one difference between the Minister and a clown—the Minister can stand on his head, and has been standing on it for six years past.

I do not think the Minister referred to Deputy Cosgrave as a clown. I certainly would not have allowed it to pass, if he had done so. The Minister said that Deputy Cosgrave reminded him of a clown in a circus attempting to do things and failing.

The Minister made the comparison between Daputy Cosgrave and a clown in a cirous attempting to stand on his head and breaking eggs and plates and saucers. I say that the Minister has been standing on his head for the last six years, breaking eggs, and plates and saucers, and pledges—and pledges, and one of them I am going to refer to; and if we have got him back on his feet again, I am not sure whether or not we will find that it is better, in the long run, to have him back in his Alice in Wonderland position, in which we are told the Red knight used to think better when he was standing with his head in a ditch. I am afraid we will have to wait a few years to compare the Minister's new position with his former position before we shall see whether we will get anything better from him after he has allowed the blood to depart from his head to the other end of his anatomy.

I must say that I had the utmost forebodings as to what would be contained in these agreements when I saw that a deliberate attempt was being made to postpone the settlement over hallowed Easter Week. I knew that it was deliberate, and I wondered what it meant. Now I know. Of the various speakers, so far, only one man has slipped into the old verbiage in the course of this debate. We thought we had done a great bit of work when we made the British give up the phrase "British Empire" and adopt the phrase "British Commonwealth of Nations," and I must say that they had better sense than we thought and did not seem to mind if we used the term "Irish Republic" so long as the substance of the British Commonwealth of Nations was there. Deputy Corry, however, last night, was the first man to use the phrase "the Republic." I thought that the Taoiseach might easily have started a speech here to-day with the ordinary Broadcaster's announcement — t h e S.O.S. — asking that all members of the Republican Party, who were last seen confined to brackets at the end of the Fianna Fáil organisation, would hurry immediately to their clubs where their followers were dangerously ill. I wonder would the Taoiseach take this test: Would he like now to deliver the ordinary Easter Week oration, below the plaque of Cuchulainn in the Post Office, and bring in his hand the Abdication Act, the Constitution and this Agreement, and get Deputy Corry to stand in the crowd there and throw bouquets at him for What he would say about the Republic.

The Taoiseach told us that circumstances had to wait—although circumstances were tending badly for our people—until matters became propitious for a settlement; and the whole propitious circumstances that he spoke of was the advent to power of an Englishman of a particular type and a particular calibre. Of course, the events had to wait for a more propitious turn. It was not so much that British Ministers had to be got to have a new outlook on the situation here, but the Taoiseach himself had to be got to have a new outlook. I have often wondered at the lot that Fate has dealt to this country. Nothing was more wonderful than the fact that, if an Abdication crisis had to arise in England, it arose as late as it did, and not, say, in 1933. The Minister, standing on his head even for that period, had not long enough to break some of his pledges. It would seem that if the Abdication crisis had occurred in 1933, this country would have taken the opportunity then presented to it to allow itself to drift into a republic, but the Taoiseach had to wait long enough to be able to say of his own free will and without duress or aggression, or even a hint of aggression, that he could put on the Statutes of this country an Act that named the British king. That was one of the terms. The education of the Taoiseach was a slow process. In 1933, when the then Dominions Secretary in England had made a statement, the Taoiseach issued a reply, and he issued a challenge. He asked, at that date, if the British Government would say that the form of government, republic or monarchy, was a matter exclusively for the Irish people to decide. He said:

"We will not ask to have it both ways. We will recognise that, if we vote for a republic, we cannot be a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations and enjoy its privileges and advantages";

and he said, in a supplementary matter issued at that time, that he knew what way the Irish people would vote if one thing were assured to them. What was the one thing? It was that the exercise of the fundamental right of declaring for a republic would not be regarded by the British in such a way that they would take active aggression against us, but that if it was only a question, of living inside the British Commonwealth or outside the British Commonwealth, in 1933, the Taoiseach knew, that, if he put that to a vote of the people, they would go for the republic.

Now, he got his chance in 1936, and it was the easiest possible thing just simply to sit tight here, to let the Abdication crisis pass in England, or, better still, to accept the proposal that came from the other side: that here, we, too, abdicate the king, and we do nothing more. Then we were outside. Then we might cease to have the advantages of membership of the British Commonwealth of Nations, but then we were outside and we took the thing that happened miraculously. There was no action on our part that could possibly have called for aggression on the part , of the British. Fate had moved and swung matters our way, and there was nothing more to do except the simple performance of accepting what the British wanted, that we would abdicate the outgoing King and do nothing more, and this country had slipped as smoothly and as quietly as possible into the haven of the republic. We did not accept that. We decided to bring in the king. We brought in the King for a reason that was declared by the Taoiseach through the mouth of a, Minister of his, Deputy Boland. "We believe it to be in the best interests of this country to stay inside the Commonwealth." Three years almost to a month since the date upon which the Taoiseach declared he knew the people of the country would opt for a republic and they would not want to have it both ways and bo both inside and outside But we did by our own free vote, by meaaures passed in this House, measures that are not coloured or befogged by any taint of insecurity, duress or threat, decide then that the time had come in which we would opt to remain in the British Commonwealth of Nations and when, by deliberate act of the House, we would bring in a named British King. What was the start of the propitious circumstances.

I have asked whether the Taoiseach would consider that the presentation of the Abdication Act, of the Constitution, and of this Agreement would be a welcome offering to the plaque of Cuchulainn in front of the Post Office. I will give him another test. Many years ago, in one of the towns in the Middle West of America, an amateur theatrical society put up a shockingly bad performance of the play of "Hamlet." The editor of one of the papers in that area had found it part of his duty to sit wearily through the performance, and on the next day he had this comment: "For years there has been a dispute as to who wrote the plays—Shakespeare or Bacon. That point can now be settled. Let the graves of the two men be opened after last night's performance, and the one who has turned will be known to have been the author." I believe there has been some doubt expressed from time to time as to whether the people who are carefully segregated in what is known as the Republican Plot really were true-hearted Republicans. The same test is applicable now. Take up the Constitution and this Agreement and see who has turned below.

We may rejoice at this Agreement; we may try to disguse with phrases just the fundamental change which has occurred; but the change has occurred and it is well to have it stressed. It may be that in years hereafter the happiest act the Taoiseach has performed will be phrased to be that which he took at the time of the Abdication crisis. It is certain that he would not regard it as the happiest act at the moment, and that the gloom which appears to have settled on his followers over the Agreement is the gloom which springs from the realisation that they were swung into power in this country, not in the way that one political Party succeeds another in the ordinary play of affairs, but because their advent to power marked a new revolution which was to have its outcome in an independent republic of thirty-two counties. Some of the unfortunate dupes who left this country under the stress of economic affairs in the last four or five years thronged into the approach to Downing Street when the Ministers were over there, and one of the banners they bore— what a shocking memory it must have brought to the Taoiseach, if he saw it— was: "Nothing less than a republic for the Thirty-two Counties."

The phrase is attributed to Disraeli that at the time of the passing of one of the Corn Laws he said about his opporient; Sir Robert Peel, that he had appeared in the police court the next day charged with bigamy, having intermarried with free trade while his first wife, agriculture, was still alive. Can it be said of the Taoiseach that the same sort of political bigamy has been committed, that he has intermarried with the Commonwealth while at least his first love, if not his wife, the republic, is still alive? If the phrase is put so, he has a defence—not the old defence put forward so outrageously on one occasion that he knew the first woman was not alive because he had throttled her. Although the Taoiseach might not say that of the republic, he can use a better defence—that for seven years he, who had the best right to hear from and of the said first wife, had not heard a word about her.

I think it was a propitious circumstance that wthe six years rolled so smoothly and that even in six years the educative process brought the Prime Minister from the point where he had been as a stalwart republican writing these challenges in 1932 to Mr. Thomas through the period of 1936, when he accepted the Commonwealth, through his own Constitution, where he faced up to the realities of the situation and had a double-headed State for this country, and brought him eventually to the point where he could bring home the Agreement which amounts to the acceptance of the Treaty, first of all, the burying of all hatchets as between ourselves and Great Britain, financial, economic and political, except one, bringing in British influence as the standard by which hereafter our industrial policy is to be judged, even although at a cartain remove. But that is a big advance. Whether some people may call that retrogression, or others, advance, the fact is that the distance which has been passed is one that we should comment upon.

The Taoiseach yesterday was aggrieved when challenged on the one point that he says is still the only point standing between the two countries—the question of the Six Counties. He was aggrieved at the phrase used by Deputy Dillon, that he misled the Catholics in the North since the start of the negotiations into the belief that their fate was bound up with these negotiations, and that there would not be any agreement unless their fate was somewhere implied, somewhere tied up with the agreement itself. We are told that is not so. I agree with Deputy Dillon that the Northern Catholics believed that that was so. They may have been deluded. I agree with Deputy Dillon that quite a number of people in this part of the country felt that it was so, but they, too, may have been deluded.

The Prime Minister, at any rate, has to answer this. How did it come that the Press organ of which he is managing director also was deluded into the same belief? The Irish Independent wrote during the course of the negotiations that there were disquieting rumours that partition had been shelved or was about to be shelved, and that some bargain or agreement on questions of economics and defence was to be made. They trusted there was no truth in these stories. That was described the next day by the Irish Press as a scandalous allegation and an insidious and scandalous attack on the Taoiseach and the Irish delegation generally. They need not emphasise the gravity of the charge. They described it in plain words to be a charge of the cold-blooded, callous betrayal of the Six-County people, and that they had nothing in prospect except the apathy and resignation of despair. Paraphrasing it like that, it was described as an atrocious charge, and that it was only a malevolent invention. I can give the quotations on which definitely the Irish Press could justify its defence of the Traoiseach on these grounds. But the fact that the Irish Press did make that statement about the Irish Independent for its hinting at the shelving of Partition, the fact that they made that defence, characterised that statement as such a falsehood and such an atrocious and scandalous allegation, puts it beyond the necessity of going through the detailed quotations to show whence Nationalists in Ulster had been misled. During the course of the negotiations the, Ulster Nationalists met, and towards the end of February they issued a statement, and, later, one of them issued a statement on his own: “However strong we have been behind Mr. de Valera in the North in the past, we would regard it as a betrayal if he were to ignore the problem of Partition by getting trade and defence agreements only, although we think he has no intention of doing such a thing.” And, as Deputy Linehan pointed out to-day, one of the Senators there comes wisely to the inevitable conclusion that Mr. de Valera has not now any policy on Partition, and that he never had. When the full extent of this is realised, it may at least have this distinct advantage that the Nationalists in Ulster will realise that they cannot—and cannot even legitimately—ask the, people in this part of the country to sacrifice what is required for the good of this part of the country because the situation that we all deplore cannot be immediately rectified.

But, after being misled during the , course of these negotiations, after undoubtedly being deluded into the belief that the question of Partition was going to be one of the pivotal points and that a breakdown of the whole negotiations was to be looked to if the undoing of Partition was not accomplished, I wonder will they feel that the matter has been even regarded as of importance when they read the passing references that were made by the Prime Minister introducing this resolution un the 27th April:—

"I am confident having got to that point in regard to the Six Counties that it is only a matter of time, and I hope and believe a short time, before somebody speaking from this bench will be able to announce to the whole Irish race that at last the British people have been wise and the British Government has been wise and that our people in Ireland of all sections have been wise and that Ireland is a completely independent sovereign State"—

With those platitudes Partition is put out of the way—

"I am confident it is only a matter of time and I hope and believe a short time."

Surely people in the North who may have been wrongly deluded but who were undoubtedly deluded in the belief that there was some plan and that some plan was being urged, surely they deserve in any event to have a statement here before this debate concludes as to what, if any, plan there is and what are the details of it. Was it proposed? Was it spoken of? What arguments were used against it, and how, finally, did the question come to be disposed of? When you do get people to the point that the Government organ can say it is a scandalous allegation to say that Partition is going to be shelved, that it is a charge of cold-blooded, callous betrayal of the Nationalists if such a statement were true, when you get to that point can you possibly believe that you have satisfied all the expectations that have been aroused by simply saying that "we hope and are confident that it is only a matter of time and we hope it is a short time until the question will be solved"? If that as all the Prime Minister has got to offer to those in the Six Counties, would it not be better to drop all this pretence? Would it not be better to say: "We realise that that matter is outside our control and we will not from time to time raise your hopes and disappoint you by putting at down on a conference agenda and spending casual morning discussing the matter and letting it in any event disappear from the final text of the Agreement."

I get more suspicious of this question of the Six Counties when I hear the appeals that are made so frequently from that side of the House that now we should all join together to achieve the only objective that is now left—the finishing of Partition. Every time that phrase is used, that appeal for concentration on this issue, that invocation that we should all join together to try and end that matter— every time I hear that the more it is borne in on me that you people there have no answer to the problem. You used to say you had. We had gone through this before you. We knew the difficulties of the situation. We had ceased deluding the people of the Six Counties. It may not help them much but in any event we did not raise false hopes only to have them dashed. I would ask, if there is a gleam of light in the darkness about the Six Counties, even if it is not politic to disclose the whole of any magnificent plan there may be, let us be told there is a plan, that something has been said upon which the slightest foothold may be got by those who are endeavouring to get that question fixed. And if there has not been, if there has been nothing about it but the silence of the Agreement, let us not then just simply say to the North, in the words of tho Irish Press, that “you have got to resign yourselves to the apathy and to hand yourselves over to the apathy and resignation of despair.” It may be that when the difficulties are recognised that that will be the first time at which any approach to meeting them can be made. It has been a deluding process for years back. The North was cajoled into the belief that that Government of all Governments was the one that was going to release them.

Quote please?

I was just going to get the quotation. On the eve of the General Election of 1933, The Traoiseach made a speech and the Irish Press summary was—in 1933 mark yon —January—“The re-establishment of Fianna Fáil is also a message to the Six Counties that the day of Irish deliverance has dawned.”

Is that a quotation from a speech of Mr. De Valera?

Why did you represent it as such?

You did.

I said the editorial. I said the Taoiseach made a speech on which the newspaper editorial is: "The re-establishment of Fianna Fáil is a message to the Six Counties that the day of their deliverance has dawned." And, in 1938, the Taoiseach says: "I am confident that it is only a matter of time, and I hope and believe a short time, before somebody speaking from this bench will be able to do this, that and the other." We have heard of the longest night of suffering but that has been a very long day seeing that their deliverance had dawned in January of 1933. I do not object to our recognition of the difficulties but I do object to this deluding process that is going on for five or six years. I think it would have been far more manly to say that it is a situation, the end of which we do not foresee. Party capital Had to be made of it; support had to be got; enough baits were required to encourage the Border to speak for Fianna Fáil candidates. In order to get that, of course, this carrot had to be waved before the noses of these unfortunate people, and I doubt if there is any man sitting on the opposite benches who, looking over the five years, can say that at any time he saw any plan, even for the amelioration of the Six-County position, let alone for its termination.

The Minister for Finance surely had.

He has not said so, and I do not think he will say so now. In any event, we have got it, in a timeless sort of way, a recognition of this as a problem, and we have the confidence, again without time limit. that the problem is going to be solved, and that is the end of the Agreement so far as the Six County area is concerned. That, I think, is also part of the propitious circumstances which were certainly around the making of this Agreement, even though the Prime Minister might not so regard it. I have said that the constitutional position brought about here is another of the propitious circumstances, and so it is. We go to a great deal of trouble these days to elect a President and we get a Constitution indicating his position and his power. It requires only the practised eye of anybody versed in constitutional matters to go through it to have the farce of the head of the state position revealed.

Any man glancing through the Constitution and coming to the paragraphs that deal with the head of the State knows what he ought to expect when he comes to them. The omissions are the striking things when one surveys the Constitution of this country. The head of the State has his place mainly when he turns outwards and looks towards other international persons, and the President whom we are going to instal one of these days has no functions in that way whatever; but the eye that marks these omissions will also note that the several Articles in relation to the powers of the head of the State are enlarged by adding in unusual powers, all with internal application. We have a double-headed sort of monster here operating as head of State. There is the familiar barometric construction known to most people with the two little figures, one of which comes out when there is going to be rain and the other of which comes out when it is going to be fine. Remember that is the position we have in this country, so far as the head of State is concerned—the Uachtaran and the King back to back, and when the King looks out, the Uachtaran looks in. That is the constitutional position freely accepted—no question now of duressby the people of this country, and that the section of the people represented by the Party opposite had been brought to accept that as normal was part of the propitious circumstances that led to the signing of this Agreement.

The forts have been referred to, and I want to state my knowledge of those things in the most precise way. If there was one Article in the Treaty and one part of the Treaty which we regarded as onerous, it was the section which dealt with our assuming responsibility for coastal defence. In the Treaty, it is put in a mandatory fashion. It is not that we would be enabled to do this, that or the other thing, but that we should do something. It could be alleged against us that the part of the Treaty which we had definitely neglected was that part about the forts. There was imposed upon us under that Treaty an obligation to have a conference at the expiration of five years from the date of signature. That conference was held, and there never was a more perfunctory conference in connection with all the Treaty matters than that one. I think our representative barely allowed the conference to assemble before he brought it to a finish.

And the date?

Five years after the event of the signing of the Treaty. He brought it to a conclusion hurriedly. We did not want any responsibility for coastal defence in those days. We had two problems to face with regard to coastal defence. One was expense, and the other was a political problem which the present Government must now face and which, I think, they have faced in this Agreement, but it is not yet understood just how boldly and clearly they have faced it. Remember that we, too, had happier circumstances for avoiding any decision in relation to this. Take the year 1926, and the later period of which Deputy Cosgrave has spoken, somewhere after 1927.

Our attention from the angle of external policy was directed, not towards ports and forts and battleships, but towards the League of Nations There was not an impending war and there was no threat of it; there was no question as to what was going to be an embarrassment arising out of the Treaty position if any war occurred, and the British demanded certain rights guaranteed to them under the Treaty. We had two problem to avoid, and we did avoid them, and we avoided them deliberately. They were avoided so well at the conference imposed on us under the Article of the Treaty that the later episode took place. We did fulfil our obligations in a most scandalously meagre way, so far as that conference was concerned. It was held just so far as to enable it to be said that the conference had taken place and that the Article had not been allowed to lapse. The attitude of the British Government was one of amazement at this, with the result that the opportunity was taken on a later occasion, when Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald was in London, to refer to it. There was a certain amount of amazement at the fact that we had not asked for these forts and the evasion that was used to get around the difficulty created by that expression of amazement was that we would enter the matter on the agenda of a forthcoming conference, when we thought it suitable.

One of these days there will be a realisation in this country of the expense entailed by the taking over of these forts, and, very soon, another thing will be realised, that is, that having forts without a navy is like having a needle without a thread or a hook without an eye. The two go together. Is this country going to have a navy? Is it going to be its own navy Is it going to act in unison with any other navy? Will the situation be that we will modernise these forts, and when something of a dangerous type happens we will have the position of an S.O.S. being radioed out from the Irish forts: "Calling all fleets," and saying that something has happened, and asking somebody to steam up and take charge; or will we have something more orderly in the way of a defence plan? Will there be any arrangement for or any question of the protection of convoys? Whose convoys will they be? Will they be convoys we shall be sending across the ocean, and what will they be carrying? One of these days the political implications of the taking over of these forts will be realised, and it may be that the time has come for people to be frank and clear.

It may be that a propitious circumstance is also at hand, because remember that, in 1936, when questioned on this matter of defence, the Prime Minister said that there were too many States interested in seeing that we would not be attacked to permit of our being attacked, and when I asked why he put them in the plural, he said that, if I liked to have it, there was one nation so interested in our defence that she would not allow us to be attacked. We take over the forts, and if there is any sense about the taking over of the forts there must have been a realisation, on the one hand, of expense, or on the other hand, that the forts will be discovered to be an empty mockery, unless there is some liaison with vessels operating at sea, and there will be some clarity soon on the subject of what vessels they are and under whose control they will officiate.

It may be regarded as a dereliction of national duty. It may be that we weighed finance in the balance against propagandist effect. It may be even that we were afraid of propaganda arising from the transfer of these ports but, in any event, we could have taken them over and we did not. You can have all the kudos you like from the acceptance now, with its responsibilities both in the political and financial line, of these places. I have spoken about propaganda. We know what was said before. We know what was even written in these formal dispatches which went to the British Government. When the Treaty came about, we were told that a phrase of Lord Birkenhead's aptly described the situation—that this country was going to be held for the British with an economy of English lives. Suppose, in 1926, or in later years these forts had come into our possession, was there not every chance that we would be told again that coastal defence was going to be carried out with an economy of English lives and English money? Of course, that phrase may still be used and can still be used by those who will not see and will not become realists in regard to this matter, but it will not be used by anybody on this side although it would have been used by all the people on the other side had we come into possession of these forts in the years in which they were offered to us. These are the three matters of political importance in this Agreement. There is the adoption of the Treaty in the early part in the reference to two articles of the Articles of Agreement for a Treaty, of December 1921. We have taken over these forts and we have nothing to say about Partition. That is the political side of this Agreement.

There is, then, the financial side started with a statement of all the moneys that the British owed us and, in the end, we say "We will pay you £10,000,000." That is the simplest way in which this matter can be expressed. I am sure the Minister knows the old pantomime wheeze of the two villains of the piece who decide they will teach the Simple Simon of the pantomime a new trick. They come along with a toy pistol and they hold up a fellow who comes appropriately on the stage. They say "Hands up; give us 2/6." Simple Simon thinks it is a good trick and he, in turn, comes along to another fellow and, mixing his words, says "Hands up; I will give you 2/6." We start off by saying to the British "You owe us any amount of money" and the Simple Simons go across and come back and say, "We will pay you £10,000,000 sterling." Deputy O'Higgins, last night, introduced this question of the £400,000,000. So far as I understand, he introduced it in a way which caused some confusion in the House because the House was left under the impression that that £400,000,000 was the tot of all our claims against the British. That would be to underestimate the ability of the Minister for Finance to find claims against the British, and I should not like to do him that injustice, particularly as we get the measure of his ingenuity in this Agreement.

Of his ability to press home the claims.

We have £400,000,000 under one heading. It is hard to express this under headings because some of them contain six subhends. But take the big headings. There are 14 heads of claim. One of them only is a claim for the overtaxation of this country from 1803, based upon the report of the Childers Commission and the Primrose Report. That amounts to £400.000,000. The Minister was not done with the British there. The Minister's first Budget will be memorable to must people who heard it for the amazing accuracy of the figures he gave with regard to gold and gold ounces. Our investment income, according to him, at the end of March, 1931, was £9,750,000,' representing a capital value of £177,000,000. That was turned into gold ounces, which I am leaving out for the moment. In 1932, at the same date, the capital value of these investments of ours had decreased by the simple fact that the British, without consulting us, had gone off gold. That depreciated our investments, and the Minister's calculation, made on the 11th May, 1932, was that this country had lost a net capital sum of 11,717,000 gold ounces or, in terms of sterling at that date, £63,900,000.

£77,000,000 now.

£64,000,000 is a good enough bit to go on with. One cannot expect the British to listen in to what is said in Dáil Eireann. There are published papers relating to a conference between representatives of the Irish Free State and of the United Kingdom on the 15th October, 1932. This is a Parliamentary production, No. 824. There we set out that we claim compensation in respect of the loss sustained by Irish Free State interests in consequence of the attitude of the British Government in September in suspending gold payments. The British replied to that and we replied again. That claim for £63,900,000—whatever variation it may, have undergone since is one of the Minister's claims. It is only part his claim and he has told us of his ability in getting his claims through. That was one claim for £400,000,000— and there are 12 others. Naturally, when the tot was drawn and the balance struck between these things, there was a considerable balance in our favour. At the end of it all, we say "We agree to pay the sum of £10,000,000 sterling." That is to constitute a final settlement of all financial claims of either of the two Governments against the other arising out of matters occurring before the date of this agreement. Again, I think that the £63,900,000, when it was dismissed in these words in the document, was properly dismissed and that it got more even than its value it nothing more was said about the claim than the four lines in which it was introduced and the eight lines in which it was repeated. That was all it was worth, although it was presented here as one of the flashing items of the Minister's first Budget.

The £400,00O,000 claim was a substantial claim. It can be based on records and not on a flight of the Minister's imagination. Presumably, sober-minded, intelligent people brought out statistics and estimates on which the claim was made. I am not sure that we have sufficient information before us to warn us in throwing it overboard. We have no chance of getting that sum at the moment. We have no chance of getting even a fraction of it at the moment. It might even be left in abeyance. One does not know how this Agreement is going to work out economically between the two countries. This country may find itself harassed and hampered in finding finance hereafter. It might be a good thing to have such a claim in reserve. I am not sure that the claim would ever be pressed the way the annuities claim was pressed. I should think one effort in that way would be sufficient for all time for this country. But there are ways of pressing claims, and remember that that was a claim which was heard of long before the Minister was heard of. It was based upon solid, statistical facts. It does represent a definite charge by this country against the material results of misgovernment in the past. Without any explanation as to why, we simply say that we are glad to get relief from the present burden of the annuities, that we will pay the amount of £10,000,000 and we will close down for ever all financial squabbles with England. Not merely do we say that the £10,000,000 settles the payments immediately in dispute, but we say it wipes out for ever all claims that have arisen prior to the date of this Agreement. If that had not been put into that pamphlet, it might be said that the claim had not arisen so as to present itself to the minds of those who signed the Agreement. The position now is that nobody can say hereafter that that has not been clearly and definitely signed away.

It may be, again, a proper thing to do; it may be that the country is so glad to get rid, not merely of a dispute, but of all prospects of disputes, so heavy has been the burden of this one, that they do not want to stop to calculate it but are content to wipe it out. But there is a claim made by people earlier than any government was instituted in this country. It was carried forward; it has been introduced into arguments; it has been made a balancing factor in arguments. But for the first time, and without any pretence of duress, without being told that this is something we would not do if we were freer than we are at the moment, without any suggestion of an excuse, we now say that all financial claims between the two Governments disappear. It may be good business, but it is net presented in such a way as to make any one believe that it is good business. If, in this light-hearted way, we are prepared to wipe out all these claims, then these documents cannot otherwise be regarded than as complete and entire nonsense. It may be that the Minister realised that there was nothing in these claims. It may be that he thought there was nothing in them even though he put them on paper and made a great to-do about them, both here and at public meetings. We were told about the payments that would be made here if and when Fianna Fáil came in.

Would the Deputy be good enough to give some corroboration, some proof of that statement?

Is not this document corroboration?

The Deputy said that the statement was made outside, on Fianna Fáil platforms, before Fianna Fáil came in here.

Is not this document here corroboration?

Not that document.

Then, this claim was not meant?

I am asking the Deputy for proof of the statement he has just made.

In any event, we had £400,000,000 in one sub-head, £64,000,000 in another, and the land annuities in dispute against us; we say that we owe Britain no money, and then we go and ask the people to say in the end: "We will pay you £10,000,000." That is presented to us as a good financial agreement, an agreement that was characterised by the President with such words as that, if justice and equity were to prevail, we would not be paying anything, but we would be getting something. What does that mean? Does it mean that the Prime Minister is dissatisfied with what has been got? Does it mean that he has been subject to duress? Does it mean he still believes in this fantastic claim, and that something should come to us? If so, why are we giving moneys away?

He does not want to bankrupt the British Empire.

We are giving them away because, as everybody knows, this Agreement has been forced on us under much greater duress than was ever paraphrased about the previous Agreement. Everybody knows that there was one thing lurking in the background of Ministers' consciences when they went over to London. There is a Banking Commission which has to report soon. The town is thick with rumours of what that report contains. The rumours are so bad that they will probably even drive the Government to publication before they desire to do so. But, apart from what the Banking Commission is likely to report, everybody knew that the farming community was on its knees and that there was at least coming to the minds of Ministers this consciousness, that unless the farmers were saved or given some chance to succeed, the country could not last. Ministers may tell us that they waited until a good Prime Minister came into control in England, and that they waited for a favourable opportunity to get the negotiations through. That may be all right, but the goad from behind was the Banking Commission Report, and the fear of it and this Agreement has been grabbed at, and possibly has to be grabbed at, because of the immediate relief that is likely to come to the country through the operation of the agricultural side of it.

There has been an acceptance of the Commonwealth, an acceptance of a particular position by the Politicians and by the political head of the Government. There has been an acceptance of a certain financial position by the Minister for Finance. Thegreatest conversion of the whole lot was that of the Minister for Agriculture, as outlined in his speech here. For years we were told that this country had been built upon ranches. We were told at one time that we were going to have, possibly, surplus agricultural products which could be easily disposed of elsewhere. We were told we were going to have such a change in our agricultural economy that we would grow only for consumption at home and there would be no necessity to rely upon Britain as a purchaser for our goods. The Minister for Agriculture got handed to him a very carefully prepared agricultural economy, one that had been moulded by the passage of years, one that had been adopted by the farming community because it best suited their needs and gave them the best profit from the land. Then, like a child with a valuable watch, the Minister took that apart, pulled out the springs, broke the case, and what he could not prize out he shook out, and, like a, child, he cried with glee when he had all the parts of that carefully arranged mechanism in ruins around him. Then he was forced to alternatives and substitutes, and we have the sorry picture of him through the six years backing his way through all the agricultural production of the country.

Despite his efforts there was an exportable surplus of agricultural goods. Despite his promises there was no place to lodge these except in England. Despite the promises of his whole group of Ministers, those goods could not be got into England without paying taxes, and the Minister was forced to the most absurd devices to try to get over that difficulty. First of all, we sold, and sold to our loss, in Belgium and Germany, what we could not sell to England. Then we decided we would give away free to those whom we had made hungry the beef that was still coming in such a wealth of production that it could not be got rid of, and eventually the killing process started. The Minister paid for the calves that were slaughtered, and, finally, he was driven to the sorriest of all positions that was revealed here when we discussed the Roscrea factory. He tried his best to destroy agricultural production. When it flooded in on him despite his efforts, the first plan he devised was to give away, the second was to kill at the source, and the third was to give away not merely the beef but himself into the hands of those who started the Roscrea factory . When this matter was exposed here the Minister's phrase was that it was big business, business with a capital B, and the capital B was Deputy Briscoe. That was his first effort to get over that trouble that he himself had caused.

There was political effect given to all this. We were told at that time that it was only a Government that was lost to all National outlook that would allow that type of agriculture to continue. There was going to be a change, and that change was going to raise the people from being serfs on the land to becoming people of wealth and standing. After six years we now reach the point that use are glad to get entry into Great Britain, the entry that at the beginning of 1932 we had free. The Government said that they had an industrial policy, and while they said that-this has to be weighed with it-while this scheme was being pursued, that policy meant high tariff walls around every class of commodity coming into the country. The Minister for Industry and Commerce in an endeavour to bring about more propitious circumstances for the signing of this Agreement, made clear that he too, had changed. His speech indicated that he had begun to think that the helter-skelter progress that was being made did not amount to anything. He began to talk about profiteering and the necessity for lowering tariffs at the appropriate time. That was because he had in mind the need for signing this Agreement. The details of these things can be gone into when we come to deal with the matter later.

In these Agreements it is clear there is a balance struck between the entry of agricultural produce into England and the exports of manufactured goods from that country. The position has to be compared with the situation that did exist in 1932. There our goods went freely into the British market. We were, in addition, protected there against foreign countries by a 10 per cent. preference. On the other hand, British goods came in here at any tariff that the Dáil wished to impose. There was no binding agreement as to the limits of that tariff, and there was no condition upon which free entry of our goods would be permitted into England, while there was a tax imposed on British goods coming in here. Now we are dealing with this Agreement which is being held up by the Government Party as the great triumph of 1938. We are back in the position we were in 1932 with this difference that in 1932 we had free entry for our goods into the British market unhampered by any conditions. We were not hampered by a document like this Agreement, the full extent of which has not yet been interpreted.

The Minister for Agriculture, when speaking yesterday, referred to the terms that were got by the Dominions at Ottawa. But the Minister was very careful to put before the House the terms of the Trade Agreements of only two of the Dominions. There was an important distinction to be made as to agreements that were made at Ottawa between Great Britain and the various Dominions. That was that some of these Dominions sold far more to Great Britain than they bought from her, while others bought more from Britain than they sold to her. The harder terms were naturally imposed upon those with whom England had an unfavourable balance. It was the agreements made with the countries with whom England had an uufavourable balance that were picked out by the Minister as models. Remember, these countries sold more to Britain than they bought from her.

Now an important matter in connection with this Agreement is this-that there is one item of our exports to Englaud that would never have been considered and never weighed in the balance in the matter of the trade of the two countries. We were the greatest exporters of live stock to England. England wanted our cattle. There was no question of imposing a tax upon them. But we meet now here in 1938 when the situation is completely changed and when our cattle are going into Britain subject to a heavy tax. We did not expect from Great Britain in this matter of cattle the harsh terms that she imposed upon the Dominions with whom in 1932 she had an unfavourable balance. We will go into the terms of these agreements at a later stage.

This again must be recognised, that in 1932 whatever taxes were imposed by us on British goods coming an here, were taxes imposed at the sole behest of the Dáil. There was nothing to stand between the imposition of these tariffs and the judgment of the Dáil. There were no terms of reference as to what the Dáil should consider. We had nothing to consider except whatever in the opinion of the Dáil was insufficient to give protection to Irish indnstries. For the future there are terms of reference here. The tariffs have got to be reviewed at the end of three years with the possibility of having quotas replaced by tariffs. The tariffs are to be built up only to such a height as will allow full opportunity for reasonable competition to British manufacturers. That may work all right, and it may not, but it is not as advantageous a situation as we had in 1332. Then the Dáil could pass its judgment freely on whatever tariffs we wished to impose. There was no outside body to call that judgment in question and to recommend a change.

The Minister for Industry and Commerce, who started off by being a Republican Minister, has got to hear the burden of that imposition. The House in future is going to be ruled in its judgment by the operations of the Prices Commission. These are the terms of reference. There are reservations of importance but the thing that sticks out is this, that the tariffs must be moulded so as to allow a full opportunity for reasonable competition to United kingdom manufacturers. The United kingdom manufacturers are to be allowed to make their appearance before the Prices Commission and to make their case there. Not merely that, but the British Government has a right to regulate the order in which these cases will be taken by the Prices Commission.

It may be that the Minister for Industry and Commerce had to be disciplined to the point that he would permit what he would himself have described, when in Opposition, as British interference. Again we are going to accept this Agreement without the slightest hint of duress and no suggestion of the forces behind it. We are going for the future to accept the position that Irish industries are to be moulded not in the way the Irish people think they should be moulded. They are under this Agreement to be moulded in such a way as will allow the full opportunity for reasonable competition from the British manufacturers. The details of the Agreement on the industrial side are so complicated that they can only be dealt with at a later stage. I do not think there has been any realisation yet as to what the full effect of this Agreement may be. Until we hear what the industrialists, when they have studied these documents, will say about them, we are not in a position to say much more except that there is that obligation that I have pointed out.

Will the Deputy vote against the Agreement for that reason?

I will not. I could not do so. The farmers of this country are at their wits' end to live. The man who would cause one avoidable day's delay in holding up the passage of this Agreement into law would be, a criminal.

Even though the Deputy would not allow the debate to conclude last night.

Like the Minister on a recent occasion.

It is not the first time Deputy Heron played ball with Cumann na nGaedheal.

The Minister occupied one and a-half hours in addressing the House recently.

Am I to be criticised for holding up the debate? Apparently I am.

The settlement.

Apparently I am.

Then what was meant by the Minister's phrase?

Nothing. I am just merely pointing to the consistency of the Deputy's attitude.

Will the Minister say that this Agreement would become effective one hour sooner if this debate had concluded last night, than if it were carried on until Tuesday?

I shall answer the Deputy later.

When the Minister rises, it will be answered.

I shall answer on both points.

I shall certainly vote for this Agreement. Even if I thought it much worse than I believe it is, I would still vote for it. It is hardly possible to conceive a situation that is not better than that which was in existence on January 19th, when our Ministers first entered into negotintions. I do not think anything could be worse. That does not mean that we have got to accept every part of the Agreement as good. It is a great thing, however, to see as Deputy O'Higgins stated last night, that sanity rules again, that a very big number of shibboleths have been cast away, and that there is some appreciation of the difficulties in the country. I do not know even that, on the industrial side, it is going to work badly. I have apprehensions about it, but I should like to be advised on them by industrialists who have studied the impact of the provisions on their industries. I should have thought that Ministers might have even taken the opportunity of consulting these people before they signed.

Even as to the backroom factories?

Even on them.

And the child labour?

Even on the child labour.

And on the constant play made by the Deputy during the past five years on factory conditions?

All I said over the past five years was that if they were being inefficiently run, it was because there was no stimulus to efficiency and that there was a great deal of child labour and for that I had statistics from Deputy Coburn.

Was it true?

Mr. Kelly

It was not true.

It was true.

Would you mind having that fight between yourselves ?

Mr. Kelly

This is the first time I opened my mouth to-day.

Looking back upon it, would it not have been better if the Deputy maintained complete silence?

Mr. Kelly

It would not.

Surely the point made by Deputy Lawlor is an important one, that people were induced to put money into enterprises that could not last in this country under ordinary conditions. A lot of these people are now concerned as to how they are going to get their money back. Similarly, a lot of people were induced to take up employment on promises that that employment was going to be continuous, and they may now find themselves thrown out on the streets. I think that even in respect to these back-room factories which it might have been better never to have established, it would be well worth while to take the advice of industrialists as to the effects of this Agreement. The negotiations have been spread over a long period, and there was plenty of opportunity to get consultation with them. However, these are questions upon which I shall have to ask the advice of people connected with these industries and who are in a position to express an opinion as to the effect of this Agreement upon the industries.

Apart from that, the Minister knows that there is extreme urgency in the situation. The farmers of the country are near destruction, and if you want to save them and to get some little spirit of hope revived in the country, this Agreement has to be rushed into operation even if it means accepting some of the bad things discovered in it and possibly some worse things still to be discovered which might have to be amended at a later stage.

The farmers did not discover that they were near destruction last July.

Did they not?

Be careful about Wicklow.

I think one of the effective causes of bringing about this Agreement was the result of the last general election.

They voted against the Constitution in Wicklow.

lf there had been no change in the vote given for Fianna Fáil that Agreement would not be presented to this country. There were two things which impelled the Government to enter into negotiations. One was the knowledge and the consciousness that they were losing support even in gerrymandered electoral areas—that and the fear of the report which one of these days will have to be published.

That is a prophecy?

If you are speaking of the report, that is a matter on which I can be confounded by the immediate publication of the report.

The Deputy is speaking now with private knowledge of its contents?

I am speaking from my own observations and I am discounting a number of the rumours which have been circulating in the city recently. I say that these rumours if they are ill-founded can be dissipated by the immediate publication of the report.

The Deputy knows as well as I do that the contents of such reports are not known until they are printed and considered.

That is the pivotal point. How long are they going to be considered?

As long as is necessary for their proper examination.

I am going to be a prophet again. I guarantee that that will be a very long time, but the Agreement must be passed. It must be passed even in its present form. It is undoubtedly open to grave objection, and the greatest objection is that if it had been passed after five years of comparative harmony between the two countries we would say that it was the result of reasoned negotiation, that it was not secured amid the clamour of an economic war. Then we could have a proper feeling of security amongst us. We know the conditions under Which this Agreement was brought about. We know that our Ministers were compelled to approach British Ministers, and that they were not in the advantageous position in which they might have approached them in 1932. The British Ministers were dealing with men whom they knew to be broken, men who knew that their own policy had been defeated. Before reaching that point they had to drop a lot of the old shibboleths with which they beguiled the people in the past. If the shibboleths remained there would have been no Agreement.

There was one phrase which the Prime Minister used to use to arouse the spirit of his followers when their spirits began to droop. He used to say: "We are in this fight with the British, and we mean to continue it until we secure victory. If you give in now, you give in for all time. If once you weaken in front of the British they know they have you, and once they have that knowledge no attempt on the part of this country to get from the British what we consider our just rights will have any chance of success." We did not hear anything from the Prime Minister about victory in connection with this Agreement. I did hear him use the word ransom, and he made some reference to justice and equity. He did not use the word victory, nor did he say that if we did not win out in this, the British knew they had us fixed for all time.

How do you apply that to the Agreement? In this way. There is a balanced Agreement, and the British are getting certain things positively and precisely, and we can do certain things. How is the possibility of trouble over the interpretation of that Agreement to be resolved? In this way. The British on their side retain this power that if the ordinary regulation of the marketing of certain things demands it, they can impose taxes, tariffs and quotas all over again, and, on our side, if the proper protection of industry deserves it, we can also impose quantitative restrictions as well as tariffs. There is the way in which, by the absurd mishandling of this document, the two countries might be thrown back again into the struggle of the last six years. If the British do play fair we will start. If we do not through the Prices Commission, give fair play to British producers, they have the whole of the ordinary regulations for marketing, and in the background there is the ominous and ill-omened phrase used by the Prime Minister, that once you entered into a contest with Great Britain in 1932, you were placed in this, position, that unless you went through completely, the British knew where they were with you. Has that bluff been called? Is it believed that this is a win through for Ireland, or is it that this time the British have our measure taken?

If that is the situation then I suggest that these two circumstances, closely balanced as they are, are very ominous, and that they will always have the whip hand, because they can act upon the clause for the ordinary regulation of marketing. We have our-retort, whatever it may be, and whatever its strength or weakness, that we can impose tariffs on their goods. A paper that now supports the Government described their efforts in respect of these tariffs at one time in this. way—"like the efforts of a maddened rabbit against an elephant." Is that the strength we have been displaying, to them? Is that part of the circumstances that surrounded the making of the Agreement? If they are, that explains a good lot.

I think no one will say this of the Agreement—that it is bad. A lot will say with the Irish Press that it is the best that might be made in the circumstances. People looking at it from the agricultural point of view will say that it is really a good Agreement and gets. them out of their difficulty. People looking at it from the industrial point of view may be full of apprehension that it is not as good as they thought might be got. How these apprehensions will work out will have to be left to the test of time. There are good omens about it. There is first the realisation that there is more to be got from a neighbouring country by bargaining in the council chamber than by the fatuous nonsense of an economic war. Even though it took six years and cost many millions of money, maybe it was not time lost, and that the money was well spent, if Ministers were brought to that realisation, and if people who come along will learn the lesson from their sad experience, by trying the method of negotiation before endeavouring to break down an obviously stronger and heavier competitor than they can ever hope to be.

I am not going to delay the House by following the last speaker over the ground which he has traversed. I do not think it would be in the national or the public interest to take that line. I am glad this Agreement, to which my name is attached, has been so well received in all quarters of the House. I think even the Opposition think it a good Agreement, their only regret being, if one might judge by their speeches, that it has not been made by them but has been made by us. I share that regret. I am sorry it was not possible in 1931, when the agricultural depression in this country was particularly serious, for the Administration which was headed by Deputy Cosgrave to sign this financial Agreement which the Taoiseach, my colleagues and myself have signed. It would have been a fortunate day for the country if, say, Deputy Cosgrave, Mr. Blythe, Deputy McGilligan and the late Mr. Hogan had been able to sign an Agreement which for a single payment of £10,000,000 released this country from the obligation of paying over, as was paid in 1931-32, and had been paid every year since the Agreement of 1923 was signed, the annual sum of£5,079,000.

It would indeed have been a very good thing for this country if Deputy Cosgrave's Government had been able to sign an agreement which, as I have said, for a single payment of £10,000,000 relieved our people of the crushing burden which had been imposed upon them by the Agreements of 1923 and 1925. I am sorry indeed that it has had to wait until it has fallen to our lot, and that it has been our good fortune to sign the Agreement relating to Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty. It would have been of great benefit and of great advantage to this country if Deputy Cosgrave when, as he said he was offered the ports, whether in 1926, in 1927 or in 1931 had been able to get these ports and the unchallenged sovereignty over them as our territory upon the same terms and conditions as we have got them. If he had got them without any commitment, without any obligation, and quite unconditionally. and got with them all the naval and military rights over territories of this State which Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty conceded to the British, he would have rendered signal service to the people. As the Opposition regret that it has fallen to our lot to sign the Agreement, I share that regret, because it would have been of inestimatable benefit to the country if they had been able to sign such an agreement years ago. It has been said that all this could have been done six years ago. Why was it not done? If it could have been done by us in 1932 or 1933 why, in God's name, was it not done in 1930 or 1931 by those who had no constitutional difficulties with the British Government? Why did they not do it, and give to the country the advantages, which Deputy McGilligan said he did not wish to deprive them of for one single day? We have been told what this struggle cost the people. Deputy Brasier said that the British had collected £35,000,000 during the last six or seven years.

£25,000,000.

I beg the Deputy's pardon. I thought he mentioned £35,000,000. I agree that £25,000,000 is a more representative figure, and that that sum was collected by the British in what they described as special duties. That caused the farmers of this country untold suffering, and yet we are told the Agreement could have been signed six years ago. I think if it could have been signed seven, eight or nine years ago that much more might have been saved the farmers than even £25,000,000 or £26,000,000 that the British succeeded in collecting by way of special duties, and Irish agriculture might have been much more prosperous in 1929 and 1930 than, in fact, it was during what night be described as the boom years of world trade. I say again I regret that this was not done, but I do not blame our predecessors for the fact that they did not do this in 1930. I recognise, as I am sure the country recognises, that it was not possible in the circumstances of the time to get three such Agreements as we have succeeded in bringing back home here for the approval and ratification of the Dáil. They are not due to any great merit of ours. We think that these Agreements are the fruit, as the Taoiseach said, of the "concurrence of propitious circumtances" which have arisen. We have been able to take advantage of that concurrence, and I am glad that everybody recognises that in the circuLnstances of the time the best has been done for the country lhat could have been done.

Now, I do not wish, in view of some of the statements that have been made from the other side in the course of the debate, to be over-coutroversial. There is no need for me, because I think that these Agreements and the manner in which, on the whole, they have been considered by all Parties in the Dáil have brought a new feeling into political life in this country. I signed the Agreements not merely because I thought that they would end the economic war upon terms which I considered advantageous to our people, not merely because they gave us back our ports and abrogated those clauses of the 1921 Treaty which were full of menace for us and for our future good relations with our neighbours: I signed them not merely because they would lead to a striking, and, from the national point of view, I think, a beneficial improvement in our relations with our neighbours, not merely because I regarded these Agreements as a practical step towards the political reunification of our country: I signed them also in the hope that they would lead to an appeasement of Party bitterness here.

I am only too conscious that, during the past five or six years, in the heat and passion of the circumstances in which this economic war had to be carried on, I said many things which on calmer consideration I do not think I was justified in saying. I would like publicly, as I said these things publicly, to say that I regret them very much, and I hope that they will not stand as a barrier between myself, my colieagues in the Government, and my colleagues in this House on the Opposition and other benches: that they will not stand as a barrier or as an impediment to that co-operation which, I think is essential if we are to secure full benefit and advantage out of these Agreements.

The circumstances of the time have enabled us to sign these agreements. The circumstances of the time, too, let us be quite clear about it, are not altogether propitious from the point of view of the world and possibly of our country. We Irishmen will have to take with these Agreements the responsibility of defending our territory. I do not think that the efficient defence of that territory can be undertaken without the willing co-operation of all Irishmen, no matter how they were born or where they were born: whether they were born in the Six Counties or in the Twenty-Six Counties, whether born Protestant or Catholic, Unionists or Nationalists, Orangemen or Hibernians, Republicans or Monarchists: as I say, the efficient and effective defence of the territory of this country and of this island is going to require the willing co-operation of all her sons when the need for such defence arises —though I earnestly hope it will not.

I believe it is in the recognition of that fact that, ultimately, the political reunification of this country will be brought about, because one of the Agreements reposes responsibility on us for the defence of our territory. We are not going to take over the ports and assert our sovereignty over them without making, at any rate, the necessary exertions to defend those ports and our sovereignty against whosomever may attack them. I believe the fact that the people of this country must face up to the responsibilities of their sovereignty will lead to a better and truer appreciation of the conditions which are necessary in order to bring back the political unification of this country. I think that is going to be one of the great benefits that these Agreements are going to bring: that inevitably, because they have been signed, the political union of this country will be established, and established by agreement and not by coercion.

When we talk of union, we do not think of Ireland merely in terms of territory, we think of it in terms of human beings, of those in the North who differ from us about a great many thing, who hold their views and their ideals just as strongly as we do. We will have here on our side to cultivate an appreciation of the fact that those who hold those ideals are as strong and as tenacious in regard to them, as courageous in upholding them, and as valiant in defending them, as we have shown ourselves to be through the long years of our history. We are not going to bring them in either by threats or by coercion. There is no use talking about what may happen, in what ways we may sweep out the Border. The Border exists, and exists to some extent in the hearts and minds of our own people. We have got to bring those hearts and minds together in a willing co-operation. I am glad to have signed these Agreements, because I think they bring that day of co-operation and that day of sentimental union amongst all Irishmen nearer.

The debate on this motion is one of the most important that has taken place in this House for many years. I am not going to congratulate the Government on anything they have done, but I do want to congratulate the unfortunate farmers who have been taken out of the front-line trenches. The Government are making a great fuss about all that they have done. To my mind they have not done very much at all. They have simply put us back in the position that we occupied in the year 1932, if they have succeeded in doing that much. They signed those Agreements through sheer necessity. They signed them, as Deputy McGilligan said, because of what is contained in the report of the Banking Commission, a report which, I suppose, will be published some time, and when it is the people will be able to read it. Everyone is aware that that is a most alarming report, and shows that bank. ruptcy and destruction were facing the agricultural community if something was not done immediately. I am glad that something has been done, and that these Agreements have been signed, because their operation will bring relief to a large number of people. They will bring relief also to the country as whole. The signing of the Agreements also puts an and to the highfalutin and the tom-foolery that has gone on here for the last five or six years, such as "Break the connection,""Up the Republic,""To hell with John Bull." All that is finished and done with now.

We have still to face the fact that there are large and difficult problems to be solved. We have a horde of unemployed men. We have over 120,000 men looking for work and longing to earn honest wages. We have the men who fled out of this country to Great Britain to try and earn a living longing to come back here to get a livelihood by working on the soil. The farmers of this country are on the verge of bankruptcy. Something must be done immediately to put those men In the position that they can be of use to the country and of use to themselves. We want to float cheap money to enable those men to get on their feet again. We want to see something done to help those farmers out of the debts which they have incurred during the last eight or ten years. Nothing has been done for those men. We see them in the unhappy position of being nothing more than herds on their own farms. We have Jews and Gentiles from Dublin and all over the country coming down into Meath and taking land on the 11 months system. There is certainly something wrong here when Jews are taking grass lands. It was never heard of in the history of Ireland before. I am also glad that this settlement has come because it will put an end to this mad wall of tariffs which has been created here for the last four or five years. The building up of a wall of tariffs is one of the maddest things a country has ever done. We all know that a country cannot always stay at war, and that when peace comes the wall of tariffs will crash. Here, the majority of those so-called factories which were built up in the last five or six years will crash with it. What about the men who got employment in the boot factories, the beet factories and so on? Where do they stand to-day, or where will they stand to-morrow? I suppose they will have to line up at the Labour Exchange as they did before We believe that the welfare of this country should be built up and rooted in the soil, where an agricultural people can live in peace and comfort. This is an agricultural country, and nothing more, and it is time the Taoiseach realised it. Unfortunately, he realised it six or eight years ton late. If there is one man in this country who must be humiliated, and who must have qualms of conscience, it is the great leader of the Fianna Fáil Party, Eamon de Valera. That man went around this country for the last 12 years as the most ardent republican who was ever heard. He said he would never settle with England until every inch of Irish soil belonged to Ireland; until England gave us back the £400,000,000 that she owed us for a great number of years. What did he come back with? He came back with a settlement, a settlement far less than the great Collins and Griffith gave us in the year 1921. What a pity it is that Eamon de Valera had not sense enough at that time to say: "I do not accept this settlement, but at the same time I will go into lawful opposition in an Irish Parliament, and I will fight my way up to power by lawful means." instead, the skidaddled out to the lads in the country, and cajoled them into falling in behind him. He moped around for two or three years, and brought this country into the most deplorable position that any country could occupy. He plunged it into civil war and strife, for what? He has proved to-day that it was for nothing.

To-day, we must face the fact that we are part of Imperial England still, and part of Imperial England by the signature of Eamon de Valera himself. We are part of England for the next European war. We must build up our forces and man our defences, not for poor old Ireland, but for rotten old England about which we heard so much in the past. What of the people here who marched in the ranks of the Republican Army and did it honestly and sincerely, as I did it myself? What has this man done for us? We were marshalled to fight for Ireland and establish an Irish Republic, but we were not told that in 1938 he would sign an Agreement shackling us to Mr. John Bull. He did not tell as those things, because the lads would not follow him if he did. Why is this Agreement signed to-day? It has been signed because the poor old ship was sinking, and when a ship is sinking it is said that the rats skidaddle away out of it. The President found that some of the rats in the clubs all over the country were skidaddling out of them. He realised that something was wrong, and that something had to be done. The only alternative was to jump out of the poor old Irish boat and jump into one of John Bull's battleships.

I suppose we will be told in a few months' time that we have to spend £4,000,000 or £5,000,000 on an Irish navy. We have our ports and our guns, and now we will defend this country. I know that England is longing for the day when Ireland will say "Build a few battleships." We know that England, under the articles of international agreements, cannot build any more battleships than she has built, but we know that Ireland as a member of the Commonwealth of Nations has the power to build a few battleships. In doing so, she will not be building them for Ireland but for dear old England. We know the game behind John Bull when he got poor Eamon de Valera to sign this scribble. We are told that in final settlement we have to pay only £10,000,000, but I will tell you how much has been paid from the year 1921 to the year 1938, and it is not even the full amount. In the years 1921, 1922 and 1923 this country went through a civil war at a cost of over £50,000,000, with the loss of thousands of young lives. In the economic war from 1932 to 1938 there was a loss of £50,000,000. Now, you must add the £10,000,000 which we have to give England as ransom money. That is £110,000,000—for what? To get Eamon de Valera to sign his way into the British Empire. Where are the great marches to Bodenstown? Where is the great "Break the Connection" policy? Where is the grand army that used to march to Bodenstown and the G.P.O. headed by the Taoiseach? Where are those great republicans, Who shuddered at the thought of Collins and Griffith? Ah, poor Wolfe Tone, you can sleep in peace, and thanks be to God you can, because there was a lot of tomfoolery and rot going on for the last 12 years. Instead of a few prayers over the poor patriots' graves, there was nothing but scuffles and fights, and I thank God that we can see the day when they can rest in peace, and that instead of those mock parades and shouts they will get some silent prayers from honest and sincere Irish Christians.

I am glad the day has come when the Fianna Fáil Party, who paraded around this country for the last 20 years with their nonsense and humbug, are beginning to recognise the struggles of Griffith and O'Higgins, those men who were hounded to early graves. I am sure their spirits floating around here to-day are saying: "Well done, Cosgrave, and your gallant band. You have acted constitutionally and lawfully, and to-day you have set the Irish nation on the high road to justice and stability. You have saved the Fianna Fáil Party from the damage which they had done in the last five or six years.""Although we were done to death by the members of the Party on the opposite benches," say Collins and Griffith, "we forgive them, and thank God that they have come back to the true road." I certainly am sorry for the Taoiseach. He must have qualms of conscience, and I do not think he will stay long in political power after this. I think he is fed-up, and sorry, and lonesome, a wounded man. He is only a plain man who has feet of clay. Some said he was something of a divine nature, and others said that he was one of those who would grow horns. I say he is one of those plain, poor men who is full of vanity, but his vanity has vanished and I hope that, along with that vanity, he will go himself.

Discussion of the Taoiseach does not arise on this motion.

I do hope, at any rate, that with the signing of this Agreement all those political catchcrics and all this nonsense will end, and that the power of Fianna Fáil and the power of the Taoiseach will also end and that they will go back to where they came from, the bogs and the highlands, and try to build up our country as they should have been doing for the last 20 years. Evidently it was not good enough that we were to sign ourselves over to England, but a few years ago we had to proclaim a British King as King of Ireland, and now we have openly signed ourselves as part of England. Well, there is one poor man, at least, that we should think of in this connection, and that is the poor old Duke of Windsor. I think we should bring him over and put him in the Viceregal Lodge.

I allowed the Deputy a good deal of latitude in wandering beyond the terms of this motion. The Duke of Windsor does not, by any stretch of imagination, arise in connection with this motion.

Well, Sir, I may have been granted a little latitude, but I think we have all been granted some. However, this has ended a chapter in our history which we are all glad to see ended, and I hope that in the future we will have an Ireland of business and honour and not one of political jugglery such as we had in the past.

In listening to the speeches that have emanated from the other side of the House in regard to this matter, I was struck by the fact that there has been a good deal of concensus of opinion to the effect that this settlement has been a marvellous settlement, and that it has been a considerable advance on anything that has taken place hitherto. In fact the burden of each speech delivered from the other side reminded me of the famous verse in one of Southey's poems:

"But what good came of it at last?" Quoth little Peterkin.

"Oh, that I cannot tell," said he,

"But 'twas a famous victory."

It is in that spirit that it has been attempted to hut this settlement across for consideration by the Irish people. The most emphatic statement of all, in dealing with the matter, was that of the Minister for Industry and Commerce yesterday when he said, deliberately and emphatically: "Whoever started the war, we won it." Well, whenever I hear of the Minister for Industry and Commerce being particularly emphatic about a point, I am at great pains to inquire into the truth of what he says with that emphatic gesture of his. If we have won the war, if victory has been ours, why is it that this country has been called upon to pay a sum of £10,000,000 in settlement? What becomes of the old cry, "Vae victis”? Is it not the loser that always pays? If the Taoiseach had not spoken before the Minister for Industry and Commerce had been so emphatic, one would be led to believe that we did win something or that we had achieved something.

The issue in this matter of the annuities has also been sought to be clouded by various speakers who have tried to support the contention of the Taoiseach that he has made in this House from time to time, that we never, deliberately and of our own accord, would pay one penny of these annuities, and that neither would we compromise on any point, because compromise with regard to the rights of this country, even to the smallest extent, would be, for our people, surrender. In the statement made here by the Taoiseach, in recommending this settlement to us for acceptance, he glosses over this whole question of the payment of the £10,000,000, and he says that, if there was justice— what he conceives to be justice—the demand would not be one way, but would be the other way. Why is it not the other way? It is because the Taoiseach has found it necessary in the end to compromise on this question. He says: "You may, if you like, regard it as ransom money."

Now, that is a very important phrase —ransom money—and I think it should be emphasised that it is ransom money. What is ransom money? It is something claimed by a person who has done some wrong, or by a person who has acquired some property unjustly and who will surrender it only upon payment of ransom money, which is money handed over simply by force. Perhaps it is in this way that the Taoiseach would like to regard it. He goes on further and says that if there are Deputies in the House who think that we must secure what appear to be our rights in justice, well and good: they will have to vote against this Agreement and say that this money should not be paid. In other words, he has recommended to us the acceptance of this Agreement with the fact, the explicit fact, that he knows the Agreement to be unjust and that this money is being unlawfully taken from us. He has recommended to us, in other words, an Agreement which, in right and justice, he cannot recommend to us, but he gives it to us as a bargain which is the best he could achieve. If he were frank on that point, I think we would all be at one with him. Sometimes it is difficult for persons, in international relations or international negotiations, to insist upon all their rights and see that everything is done in strict accordance with the justice of the claim made. But I do believe—and I want it to be emphasised—that this payment of £10,000,000 is going in settlement of the annuities in dispute as well as in settlement of the other moneys in dispute, and it is set out definitely so that there can be no doubt about it that we have accepted, at this last, final hour, the right of England to collect these annuities, and we are making these payments in the full recognition of that right. It does not matter if the money were ten pence or £10,000,000, still this great Government of ours, which declared that these moneys were neither legally nor morally due, have recognised England's right to them. In paragraph 2 of the Financial Agreement, on page 4, it is stated conclusively that this is a settlement of all financial claims of either of the two Governments against the other arising out of matters occurring before the date of this Agreement. In fact, it is interesting to note the attitude of the English papers in this connection, in commenting upon the Agreement. I have one English paper here before me, which deals with this matter. It is the Daily Sketch of last Wednesday. According to it, it would appear that not only have we sold our-selvss commercially and financially on this matter of the annuities, but we have politically sold ourselves to the service of England. There is an important article here, entitled “Irish Patriotism will now serve England.” In the course of that article, it is stated:

"The squabble over the land annuities has been ended by an agreement to settle for a payment by the Free State of £10,000,000. The sum is equivalent to two years' purchase of the annuities. But how much more worth having is the lump sum down than a dribble of yearly payments is import duties which not only hamper the natural trade between the two countries, but advertise our political differences to the world? The most satisfactory part of the new Agreement is that which throws on Ireland the responsibility for her local defence. The coast stations in Ireland now occupied and maintained by the United kingdom are now to be transferred to the Free State Government. I have no doubt that the resultant security will be greater under the new system than it was under the old. Ireland was never so necessary to our defence as it is now, but Ireland, in defending herself, will now, for the first time since the post-war settlement, be making a definite contribution to our security, too. The Imperial Navy will still be responsible for defence of all the sea communications of the Empire; but its bases in the Atlantic will be Irish property and defended as such."

That last is an important point and a great concession to our sentiment—they will be Irish property. Then he goes on to say: "Because this patriotism will also serve England, it will not be the less Irish on that account." Nothing about England's difficulty or Ireland's opportunity.

I lot has been said about this question of the forts, and the Minister for Defence brought in a pile of files and stated they were all lies if Deputy Cosgrave was right. Of course, at no time has it transpired, or has the Minister quoted anything from the files to show us, that we could not have got back the forts or tho defences at the time scheduled in the original Treaty of 1921. In the Treaty it is stated that England was to maintain the defences of Ireland until—remark the word "until"—the Free State Government was prepared to take them over on her own account. It further went on to state that within five years of the signing of the Treaty there was to be a review of the position for the purpose of having the question considered so that the Free State, if it wished, could take them over.

That is what the Deputy thought.

That is what I thought, and what I think still, and what any reasonably-minded person would think on reading that.

I will quote one portion of this for the Deputy.

I am quoting the particular points in the original Treaty. If anything happened afterwards why they were not taken over, I take it it was because, in the first place, political considerations arose, and, in the next place, that the expense of maintaining these forts would be too great. Now that we have got them—and I give you all the credit in the world for having driven the last British soldier off the soil of Ireland—will the Taoiseach tell us what ultimate use they are going to be to this country? He has definitely told us in his speech that he is going not only to maintain them, but to re-arm them and see that they are kept in an efficient condition.

Deputy Dillon said that I did not say such a thing at all

I must say that I do no agree with Deputy Dillon. The Taoiseach did say very definitely in my hearing that he was going to take them over. That is the thing with which I find fault. If we do take them over, I think we ought to get rid of them as defences because they are of no use. These forts are very obsolete at present. The Taoiseach has a sentimental reason for getting the dust of Ireland off the boots of the soldiers of Great Britain. But when he gets these forts, what use are they going to be? If he mans them and puts modern armament into them, who are we going to fight if we become aggressive, which I do not believe? If we are not going to become aggressive, who is going to attack us? I do not think anyone is going to attack us, except someone who is going to attack England. In that case, why should we go to the expense of defending England, when England is very well able to do it herself?

I have always had the feeling in my patriotic soul that it would be a good thing to see the British gone off the land of Ireland. At the same time, if we are now to be friendly with England, why not let the ports be free to the British Navy to come in and out—not to use them, of course, as before as a threat to our sovereignty, but as a courtesy to people to whom the Taoiseach has given the pledge of our people, which I accept, that he will never allow the soil of Ireland to be used as a jumping-off ground for anybody wishing to attack England. I think that was a very important pronouncement. Although the Taoiseach told us that the ports were given over unconditionally, I think it was a sufficient condition for him to have pledged his word to that extent, and I am sure that, as between honourable people, England accepted that statement to the effect that we as a nation, in safeguarding our own rights, which would be the paramount consideration for us, would not permit our shores to be used in any way as a jumping-off ground for an attack on England.

Nothing has been said in this Agreement about the control of other coastal matters. I refer to lighthouses, beacons, buoys, and other things which have hitherto been maintained by Trinity House, or as we call it, the Irish Lights Board. I think that matter ought to be made clear. Personally, I think it is a service that we could not deal with so effectively as it is being dealt with under the present Administration. I do not think that there is very much national sentiment involved, although the Taoiseach, I am sure, would be very annoyed if he went into cobh some morning and found that, although the Union Jack was not floating from the Carlisle aud Camden forts, still the Blue Peter was fluttering in some part of the harbour. That might hurt his patriotic soul but, from the point of view of efficiency and economic administration, I would advise that the maintenance of this service should be left as it is at present.

We were told that this Agreement could not be made five years ago. Of course, it could not. In the first place, the Taniseach had not developed the mentality that has brought him to the present position. We had not until 1936 accepted the King as a person to be used in our foreign relations—as the Minister for Lands described it. We will keep the King for our forsign affairs because it is in the best interests of our country to do so. That is all very good and fine. But I think that if there was a little more frankness it would be very much better, and if the situation as it develops were accepted by each side of the House it would lead to a better feeling. A lot of problems become difficult because they are approached from different angles. One is a sort of pretence that we are approaching these things, as the Taoiseach said, as symbols and symbols are shackles in one way and we are getting off the shackles one by one. We believe that it is better to be frank, and face up to the situation and take it as we find it.

There is one thing paramount in the whole of the relations between this country and England and that is, that this is an English-speaking country. As an Irish speaker, that is a thing I do not care to admit. I must, however, say that I am afraid the possibility of ever restoring it to anything else than an English-speaking country I seems very remote at present. While that is so, and while we have discovered Lhat our economic existence depends practically altogether upon the value of the English market to us —and this agreement admits it more emphatically than ever before—I say that we ought to be more frank with each other in realising our position and in realising the difficulties that arise and the problems to be solved in connection with the re-arrangement of our relations with Great Britain in that regard.

There were other matter that would have made this impossible four or five years ago. The economic condition of this country was not then in the parlous condition in which it is to-day, nor was the condition of our basic industry, agriculture, so weak. We had thrown the farmers into the front trenches straight off and we kept telling them what brave fellows they were, but we were doing nothing to help them. We kept on fighting the economic war until the farmers practically had fought to the last dead calf. The position has arisen that we have now to do something to save our financial souls. Other financial considerations have pressed the Taoiseach and pressed his Government. He knows that as well as I do. The Banking Commission and various other considerations have financially pressed us and urged us to try and save the financial soul of this country by making some settlement, for God's sake, with England, and that is the reason why at this particular juncture this settlement was made. Now, the Minister for Industry and Commerce told us the war was won and that he won it. The Minister for Finance told us it was won five years ago. Well, there was a frightful lot of misery for the people and the war was not won. As I said, I am not going to deal with the facts that may arise out of consideration of the various schedules and articles of the Trade Pact. They will be discussed in various connections hereafter, but I do think at the moment on the face of them that they seem to take from us a lot of our liberty, and a lot of our fiscal liberty that we like to enjoy in the proper regulation of that industrial development to which the Minister for industry and Commerce has set himself, and of which, I think, in a great measure he has made a great success.

Now, coming on to the last matter of our position towards this Pact, we believe that it is a good Pact. I believe it ought to be accepted by the country; it ought to be accepted for its true worth. We ought not to accept it owing to the fact that Mr. Malcolm MacDonald threw his hat in the air in Piccadilly; we ought to accept it for the way that it benefits ourselves, not so much for what it gives us but for the opportunities that it offers us in dealing with problems of various kinds in the future. And there is one thing I particularly accept it for. We from this side of the House have always been urging upon the Government, the other side, the necessity of getting down to reasonable talk about problems when they arise, and there is no use in shouting here about England; when difficulties arise with England, we ought to take up our beds and walk and go over to the English people. I am glad that they have done it, and they have done it on our advice, and I must congratulate them on their courage to do so because I do think it took a considerable amount of courage on the part of the Taoiseach in trying to live down his past and do what he has done in connection with this Pact. There was a time when it would have been impossible to get the Taoiseach to do this. I do not want to go back to the era of Document No. 2, but I do think if this document is going to be of value that we must receive it in the proper way and consider it in the proper spirit, with regard, not as I said for what actually is in it, but in regard to its future potentialities, and not alone its trading or fiscal potentialities, but to its political potentialities and the opportunities that it may give. As the Minister for Industry and Commerce said yestarday, we here on both sides of the House ought to be able to face problems in a united way and in an Irish way, and considering our own Irish difficulties in connection with those problems. Before we have that beautiful unity which we all desire, I think the Ministers, or some of them, ought to go down penitentially and reverently to a little place called Bealnablath and there they ought to ask forgiveness of the greatest man that lived in our generation, Michael Collins. He was a man who brought back the Treaty, and because he brought back the Treaty he was maligned and subseduently murdered. He had no efficient staff of civil servants as our present Ministry have. He had no High Commissioner in London to help him out. He went over with practically a price on his head and manacles upon his hands. Still he brought ns back something and I do say it was that something that gave us freedom and gave you the power to make this Pact to-day. It is on the same lines as he worked that you work, and it is because he was successful that he has enabled you to be successful. It is a pity that in between there has been frittered away a lot of valuable Irish time and a lot of valuable Irish resources and Irish lives. I mention these matters not so that it may evoke any bitterness, but because I think matters of this kind ought to be related in their proper way in the pages of history, and perhaps even now close the cover on it, it will enable us to start a new volume. We may not be enthusiastic about this document. We may not be able to cry with you enthusiastically a great laudamus, but we may be able to say at all events, sursum corda.

I would be slow to impose on this House if it was not for the fact that it is a momentous occasion. I listened with some care and sympathy to the explanation given by the Taoiseach—a very honest and complete explanation of the matters that occurred in London. I do not think that he had any reservations. I appreciate that because I feel that the man is inherently honest, if sometimes mistaken. I also believe that he has not marred the knowledge that completes his education by treating with men who are less honest than himself. But I do rise here, and I am the only one in this House to make a protest against this Agreement. I think it ought to be examined in a much more detailed way. That is the approach that ought to be made by , the House generally, but there has been one approach to this grave matter—grave and historic matter— that all sides are favaurable to it. I do not desire to intrude upon the mutual admiration society, but I am compelled. I understood there were two great Parties in this Chamber and an Independent Labour Party. I find that the two Parties, the two political Parties, as such, are practically at one, that they admire each other—with the exception of Alderman Tom kelly and Deputy Dillon. We were told, in the choice phraseology of Deputy Dillon, that a marriage of convenience has been arranged and the blushing "bride"—that is, the spokesman of this nation—had put himself in a rather invidious position because he was absorbed. It would be a pleasant thing for humanity that somebody should absorb him. But the marriage of convenience has been arranged. I hope it has not been consummated, but I suggest to the Toiseach that he get a quick and permanent dispensation—in this country called a divorce —because the offspring of that marriage will suffer from scrofular empiris, a very virulent and deadly disease. However, I am not going to deal with the very pleasant and friendly and sympathetic phrases hurled at the benches opposite by Deputy Dillon. His contribution can be weighed up and valued by the word that he rolled over his tongue again and again—"It is all cod." We will finish it at that. This momentous hour in the history of this race and this nation of the matters that took place in London of great importance is "all cod, all codology." So that the soldiers trained by the men in these benches, and the men in those benches, have committed crimes against this nation! I say that it is because of the men who drew the sword on behalf of this nation, few as they were, because of their sacrifice and the blood that was shed, that such as Deputy Dillon is allowed to speak in this House.

And you with a cockney accent.

And an Englishman.

I an Englishman? You are a liar, Sir, as I have had to tell you before.

It is a wise child knows his own father.

The only difference between you and me is that you do not know how many fathers you have. My father's record is to be found in written documents.

A public waster.

Go up to killeavy, county Armagh and trace it. My mother's record can be found in South County Down. As for the Deputy who has just interrupted, certification——

The Deputy should not pursue that line of argument.

I did not interrupt anybody in this House nor did I challenge anybody's pedigree. I am not asking you for protection, Sir, because I can always protect myself, but I do suggest that I might be allowed to approach this question without the hatred which animates these men. I have no hatred for them. The word I would use is "contempt". I am trying to follow this debate. I have not had the privilege of sitting here all the time because I have other duties. I regret that, but I do want to approach this question, as it ought to be approached, from the point of the future of this race and this nation. I, whether they like it or not, am a part, and am accepted as a part, of this nation, and I have given service to this nation. I am not going to eulogise my own services or blow my own trumpet, but my record is to be found in the record of service to this country, and I can get documentary proof of that. However, that is all to no purpose.

This document which we are asked to implement was introduced by the Taoiseach in a kindly and statesmanlike way, in a speech in which he said he welcomed free and open discussion. I wish he had gone a step further and said that not only did he want free and open discussion, but he would take off the Whips and let us have a free vote as to the acceptance or rejection of this Agreement. The question of the machinery to implement this Agreement is a matter of to-morrow and one which can be argued and debated here when approval of the action of the four representatives of this nation has been given. The Minister for Industry and Commerce made a gesture in the course of his speech on this matter yesterday. In explaining certain details of the discussion which took place, the Minister made a laboured statement, but, he closed with a very eloquent peroration. That gesture was received in a most discourteous manner. Although it was a gesture worthy of any man, it was thrown back at him with derision and scorn. In that eloquent and generous peroration, he asked that we should forget what had led up to this quarrel. I wish that we could forget history, but one studies history with a view to getting experience of previous foolishness and faults, so that people may not make the same mistakes and so that we may organise tactics and strategy for the future and may achieve the objectives aimed at. That is the purpose of any man of intelligeince. In this case, the Taoiseach had a difficult task. Whether they were responsible for the dispute that led up to this trip to London, history will tell. Life speaks its answer and no one can deny life its message. You must charge yourself with the answer life gives and anyone who would stand up here, or outside, to suggest in an impudent manner that he would defend certain shortcomings, if charged against a certain Party, on an outside or indoor platform, is presumptuous.

History tells what led up to these heads of Agreement. Men enter your estate or country and destroy all they can destroy. They submit you to slavery and to slavish conditions and, having brought you to a state of bankruptcy, where life itself is insufficiently provided for and death stares you in the face, they come along and say: "In the interests of ourselves, having drawn from you by a process of exploitation certain moneys and values-moneys in the shape of return on goods grown in your country and shipped to ours and life in the form of soldiers and navy men—we must have a source of exploitation and, ergo, we go out in the world and borrow money and set you up in your estate and give you a chance to exist on it. You will be allowed to work on it and to pay us an annual tribute.” It was to get rid of that crime against humanity that we were fighting. The Taoiscach and the Party opposite inherited all the mistakes—mistakes that were grievous —made by this other Party when they had their ten years of Government. They came into power and place supported by the Party that represents officially the working classes and they set about trying to undo ths wrongs that had been perpetrated in the ten years of purgatory through which we passed from 1921 until the advent of this Government. The first thing they did was, although they had to pay under force majeure certain moneys, to agree that they would not pay and that there was not a righteous man in this House, or in the four corners of the earth, who would not say that it was a righteous act on their part to refuse to pay one penny more of tribute to the enemy, external or otherwise. We had loud-mouthed expressions as to its being a legal instrument and that we were liable to pay. Some of them doubted the morality of it, but none questioned the legality of it, from the Leader of the Opposition down to any of his satellites, that heterogeneous conglomeration that sits over there, comprising all kinds of political opinion. They agreed it was a legal document and that it ought to be implemented. This side of the House, and I, and those who sent me to the House whenever I asked their confidence, said: “No, we will not pay it.” So we agreed to tighten things up. The working classes contributed and I am sorry that the Taoiseach did not give them, the landless men, the men on uneconomic holdings, the ordinary proletarians in the towns and provinces, the full meed of praise that is rightly theirs. I hope he will give them credit for having upheld him in every time of tribulation. He, as the spokesman of the Party, declared in emphatic terms: “We will not pay one cent. of that annual tribute.”“We will not nay the annuities,” he said, and rightly so, but because there has been a compromise, I am going to vote against the Agreement. I say, however, with all truth and sincerity, that therc never was a body of men speaking for this country, in all its chequered history, that ever did a greater work or achieved more successfully than the four men who left here only a few months ago under very disadvantageous circumstances.

What was the story while they were away? How were they supported in the street, in the market place and, in the caravans of the city and country? We had Dame Rumour, that lying jade, and all kinds of double statements were made, some vocal and some printed. They said: "The spokesman of this nation"—giving him his name, and they are not very pleasant in doing so—"has now gone over when he would not go over in 1921. He has gone over now, but he invited himself over." I hope he had the courage to do that. Why should pot any sane and businesslike man write to another business man and say: "I want to arrange matters with you"? Why should it be a cowardly and beggarly thing to do? Why should it be suggested that he had begged his way into audience with the spokesmen of England? Why should he not say: "I want to discuss these matters with you"? He went over and he was received at a very unpropitious moment. There was a pause; there was a hiatus. What did our friends say throughout the country? They put it abroad that: "Now Mr. de Valera"— as one of them said in a caravan I was travelling with, one of these briefles barristers out of Henrietta Street—"will get a kick in the pants." We know the kind of asides that go on in the streets and highways. He did not; he was received as the recognised spokesman, not of a race of 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 people in these 32 Counties, but as the spokesman of 20,000,000. He was received with respect, but there was the other dangerous condition of things which is now menacing the entire world civilisation—the cloud over the horizon of civilisation which has its impact on the heart of the Empire. The spokesman of the British Government now in power was amongst those who received him. He will not be long in power, because his own character and policy have been impugned and challenged on the nine occasions upon which they have been submitted to the test of the ordinary people of Great Britain. They have discharged and renounced him and his policy, and I hope that in two days' time, in Lichfield, in the Cathedral City of England, in the centre of an nonindustrial popuiation, they will also reject him, and cast him into the outer darkness from which he or no other of his name ought to have come.

It has nothing to do with this debate.

They were received in that manner. Not very long after they were received, the threat had come to the Empire. Everything was at a standstill, and our men had to come back. Then, again, the rumour got abroad that there was a deadlock, and a little "aside" appeared in all the papers that there was a dissolution about to take place. It was rumoured that the Republican Cabinet—they are still republicans, I hope, and I am sure their objective is a republic; if I had any doubt about that, I should doubt my own sanity—was divided, that the Minister for Industry and Commerce had objected to the arrangement made by the Minister for Agriculture. That was broadcast to the public. Every body knows that. They went back again, and there was some further delay. We do not know what the intimate relations of the delegates were. But they were negotiators; they were not demanding. People do not seem to understand the application or meaning of words. It would appear from some people that we made a demand on the British Government, and that they did not give us all we required. We entered into negotiations with them with our eyes open on certain matters and, on these, we have come to an agreement—an agreement which may have its uses, but whether it will be fruitful in respect of those matters at which we aim, I know not.

They brought back a document to which they ask us to agree without the alteration or addition of a period. I say that that is not the right thing to do—that that document ought to be put before the House and that there should not only be free discussion but that there should be a right of amendment, alteration or rejection. If we cannot do that, we must take the obvious course and vote for or against the Agreement. I hope we will—the Taoiseach has not made this plain-when the machinery emhodied in the proposed Acts comes before us, have the right to amend, and that a certain point made by the leader of the official Labour Party may then be corrected. We have, however to vote yea or nay on this Agreement. What does the Agreement say? Is there any man who says he cannot accept the Agreement, let his views be what they may? I am a republican, both by birth and conviction, and I always will be. I say that there is nothing in this Agreement to stop any man or body of men or women from working out objectively and setting up a republican form of government. I challenge contradiction on that. This particular document was born in time because it was born out of conditions forced upon this country by fraud. That is admitted by all historians and by all intelligent men and women. These conditions were enforced throughout the country by fraud. Now, we have come to an Agreement out of fear. I say candidly, coolly and without any hesitation—I defy contradiction in this —that this document could not have been brought before this House six years ago, five years ago, or even one year ago. At now time in the history of the travail of this country, could you have this document presented, and you could not, have it presented now but for this menace and this fear that has got hold of the Empire and which has it almost paralysed.

We have not got this Agreement because of the love of the Chamberlain family for this country. It was not because of love of this country that the Conservative Party made this Agreement. The epitomised history of England and the Empire might convey to you that the Conservatives gave any measure of comfort which this country received. Any measure of that kind which this country received was due to the men who forced them to do that. Even in this country, we are forgetting the great Liberals, the great majority of the organised working classes who always stood on our side and made themselves heard. In every purgatorial period of the history of this country in the last 100 years, Radical and Liberal opinion was always on our side. Men sacrificed their political future and sacrificed even their personal comfort to stand by us. None of the Conservative Parties did that save one man, who went down to political oblivion— Wyudham. The others gave us only what was extracted from them.

There are one or two points to which I desire to advert. Someone has said that the farmers are at destitution point. I have taken care to inquire as to the admissions to the poor law institutions. I do not find that there were many applications from farmers —even small farmers. I have carefully perused the bankruptcy list because I was on that list myself. I was not a bankrupt for failing to pay my just or honest debts. I was forced into a certain position because of political intrigue. However, that has been adjusted. I have liquidated that and I am standing here with my full rights, as I always did. I have never made any compromise with any man or men.

Deputies here say that the farmers are against the policy of this Government. Let us examine that statement home. I submit that the men on the Government Benches represent more constituencies controlled by the farming class than the men on any other side of the House. I say that the farmers have spoken out authoritatively and that the Government have the support of a majority of the farmers—both small farmers and middle-class farmers. These men cannot, however, speak with the voice of the grazier or the would-be grazier, and I hope they never will, much as I sometimes differ with them. We, here, speak for the landless and unemployed men and women and for the organised workers mainly of the provincial towns and of the metropolis. I say—and I challenge contradiction—that 90 per cent. of the organised workers were behind the Government in their mission to London and that they would have been behind them even if they had to tighten their belts and go out into the fields or public parks and eat grass. I challenge the Taoiseach to say that at any moment he had occasion to pause and consider whether we were behind him in this mission even to the extent of 100 per cent. We were behind him because we challenged the moral right and the legal right of England to extract that tribute. We denied their right to extract it by force, majeure. We challenged the right of the British Government to use a force which is greater than physical force-economic force—to make us pay, whether we liked it or net. A Minister who was particularly active in that campaign was a renegade from the Labour Party and he has gone down to well-deserved oblivion. He was particularly bitter when he had the power. He is now removed from that position, and he has no longer power to exhibit his hatred of this nation.

What is the position? This Agreement has tremendous potentialities. I am not going to argue that. You are compelled to accept the capitalisation and commutation of this particular sum. I was not in the House when the Old Man of the Sea who hangs about the Fianna Fáil Party—a Parliamentary Secretary—said this sum was not a commutation of the annuities. He said it was a sum of money—I do not know how he made it up—which has got to be paid. I say that the leader and the spokesman of the nation said that this was a commutation of a sum of money, that the commutation amounted to £10,000,000, which would sort of liquidate all the liabilities except, and this is what I take issue upon, that we have got to continue to pay £270,000 a year. That is not a large amount of money; that is not a very important thing, but why should we not have commuted that £270,000? Why not capitalise it at two years? When you will have a leaseholder's Bill here in the early stages of your work, I suppose we will be asked to capitalise on a two years' basis. It will be a very pleasant task for you.

We have sold to the British Government a pup, and for the right to pay certain millions, which they themselves borrowed and we are paying interest on, we have sold our right and borrowed off them to the extent of £10,000,000. I think it was a good business arrangement; 1 think it was a good job, and so would any businessman think. Deputy O'Neill, who is a very important businessman in the South, would jump at it. Why did we not buy out the £270,000 tribute? May I suggest to you that the Government of England do not want to buy that commute it? They desired a tribute, because that is a tribute. I suggest you should have a further stage of negotiating and commute the £270,000. Then all the strings would be cut, except some strings that some people on the opposite side have got in their minds, because they are very suspicious people. I think your Document No. 2 is very plain and explicit —at least, it is to me. There was always some doubt about it, but I read it very carefully in the cool cell of a prison. I had time enough to read it, when I was in jail for a political action. I remember reading this document very carefully and in some places there was amibiguity, a lack of clearness of thought. The utterances you make in public seem to me very clear, but, as soon as you get a pen in your hand, you seem to overshadow clear thought by a multiplicity of words.

I do not know what you mean by sheer justice. Justice should be upright and above board and the word "sheer" seems to me to be totally unnecessary. There cannot be justice between man and man and country and country; that is obviously impossible in the existing form of civilisation and in the system under which we live. There is, however, some measure of common justice. Then he went on to speak about the equity. There is no equity in the relations between a powerful and unscrupulous—I am not saying enemy—neighbour and a country like ours, where sometimes we lack the ordinary knowledge of the machinery of carrying on government. It was an unequal bargain but I submit that history will say that these four men did good work. Some of them were scarcely ever out of the country before and one might be inclined to describe them as parish pump politicians, yet they were able to meet these great men of the Empire, who control hundreds of millions, and who have been negotiating with all the countries of the world; they were able to meet them at a round or square table, whatever you like, and they were able to come back with the goods. They delivered the goods and every man, woman and child in this country, every townsman, countryman, field-workar, ordinary labourer and industrialist congratulates them on what they have done. What have we done? We have lowered the Jack and raised the tricolour on every field in Ireland except in the Six Counties.

More important than this question of the tribute of £270,000, more important than whether we can buy boots or cattle, is the question of the Partition of this nation. History will tell you who was responsible for that. However, Partition is there. Certain politicians in the North sent out their propaganda, and they had the right to do it. I have one very important point to make. In the terms of reference that were submitted before these men met in London there was one portion that applied itself to Partition. If so, we ought to be told all about it. Was there any discussion about Partition? I do not think we are entitled at this stage to press that matter. I think we will get the information later. It would be imprudent to ask that question at the present moment. Partition is a fundamental issue and I am deeply concerned about it, yet at this moment I will not touch upon it. To me Partition is the greatest crime conceivable. To me it is more important than my right aim, or my left arm, than the whole of my life and the lives of other men.

It would be foolish to think that you could accomplish that task all at once. There are enemies who would invite you to take up that issue, but you must be careful, because that problem will not be solved in a hurry. It will not be brought to the point of consummation that every man and woman in Ireland and the millions outside so ardently desire until again England's difficulty will be Ireland's opportunity. There is no knowing whether it will be by the drawn sword, by economic laws or by political inpingement that that position will be brought about, but I do know that, as sure as to-morrow's sun will rise, that condition of affairs will be brought about. We will all accept that situation with joy and understanding, we will enter into it with pleasure and that period will mark the progressive march of this nation, the best part of this nation that never compromised and never failed when called upon. I am glad to say that by name and race and blood and service I belong to that section. I say that the problem of Partition could not immediately have been solved and I do not blame those who went to London.

I assure the men of the Six Counties, and I expect they will not fail to understand, that there has been no treachery and no betrayal by the men who went to London. There has been no betrayal by those who are going to associate themselves with the Articles of Agreement. At a given time and hour, any support we can give to them will be given. I think the time is opportune when you might invite them here to sit with us. They will be honoured guests of our contry if they sit with us here, even though they may refuse to carry out the policy enunciated by the men opposite.

We had here a denunciation of self-sufficiency. What is self-sufficiency? Is it not Sinn Fein? That was the policy of the men associated with the Sinn Féin movement. There was a time when those associated with Sinn Féin were described as foolish men. They were told that their policy was a foolish policy, that Sinn Féin was a Hungarian policy, born out of time and created in the mind of a discredited economist. We had it repeated here that self-sufficiency is all wrong, that there is nothing in it. Self-sufficiency, properly organised and supported by all the elements of this nation, by the agricultural and the industrial arm brought together and working in cooperation—that form of self-sufficiency is the only policy, and I speak as an internationalist. You cannot live by yourself. Man is an animal, it is true, but it is also true that man is a social animal and no country can live by itself, but a country can adapt itself and its productions to its own needs. I hope that in the time to come we will not go back to the days of the grazierdom, turning the land into cattle ranches. Some years ago we had the slogan, "The land for the people and the roads for the bullocks." In those days the only use for a man was to give him a goad with which to drive the cattle along the road to the ports for England. If this Agreement is in danger of Ieading to any recurrence of that, then I say let us pause. What is important is the cultivation of the land, not the grazing of the land. The Minister for Agriculture is sometimes not doing what I would wish him to do, but he will not take my advice. This country can only be run in a proper manner by the co-operation of the working classes.

In the years in which I have been associated with public life I have known of no man who has paid more close attention to his public duties than the Minister for Industry and Commerce. I say that man has charged himself with an intimate knowledge of industry. He is a man who tries to do his duty, but it is his advisers who sometimes should be corrected if not removed. I say that Minister has done all he should do. I say that every man now engaged in the manufacture of boots should be given a chance. For years I pleaded for the setting up of that manufactory. Instead of producing, as we did some years ago, £136,000 worth of boots in the year, we are now producing £2,000,000 worth. We are getting to the point of saturation, and we are making a boot equal to any in Europe. I say to the Governrnent be very careful that you do not destroy that trade. I say to the Government be careful that you do not destroy another part of your agronomy, that is wheat production. Continue to produce wheat, because the time will come when you will be able to sell that wheat in England at a very enhanced price. The time will come when, because of war, you will get a high price for your wheat in England. Keep your sugar factories going, and do not give up one thing. Your manufacturers then will be able to give the young men out of the colleges and out of the technical schools of this country a chance of learning something and a chance of adapting themselves so as to be in a position to add to the means of the nation. Do not drive your young men the nation outer parts of the British Empire without a trade or calling or profession and with no knowledge of discipline of mind or body.

I wish now to conclude. Possibly I could treat of these matters for the next ten hours, hut I am not going to abuse the confidence or courtesy of the House. There is one suggestion that I wish to make. There is one phase in connection with these Agreements to which not enough attention has been drawn. That is very vital indeed. Yesterday you could have stood against the world, and you might have here within these four corners of this nation, the four fields of Caitlín Níh Ualacháin, a distinct civilisation. I remember there was a time when to say a word in Irish drew forth the criticism that one was talking gibberish. But Irish has now got an honoured place in the four fields of Caitlín Níh Ualacháin. I am only in a position to speak myself in English, a language that was forced upon my people. I did sit at the knee of a woman who spoke the Irish language, and I sucked the milk from her breast, but I cannot speak the language. I want to live to see the day when every man and woman in this House will have to speak in the old language. I have been leading too active a life to take up the study even of O'Growney. I did say this: that yesterday we could have stood against the world. We could have set up here in this cradle of civilisation a civilisation from which men from all the nations of the world might look for a lead. Perhaps at the exhibition of 1940 we would be able to show something to the nations of the world. We might have done all these things yesterday, but not to-day. Once you accept these ports you aceept responsibility. You are now in the European vortex, but some day your sons and daughters will have to pay the penalty. You are now a part of the comity of nations and part of the European federation, either on one side or the other. You are bound to be. You are taking these ports. Take them, and I agree that every foot of land that we can get we should take, and we should maintain our rights. But having taken up your rights and having these ports, you take upon yourselves certain responsibilities; you invite the armed men of a mighty federation out side this State to cast a rock in upon you. I want to thank you, Sir, for your courtesy and kindness in allowing me to go outside perhaps the ordinary terms of the debate. I will now conclude. I will talk again upon the introduction of the machinery of these Bills in cennection with the Articles of Agreement.

The Taoiseach to conclude.

Before the Taoiseach concludes there is just one question I want to ask. In opening the debate the Taoiseach dealt generally with the Agreement; the Minister for Industry and Commerce dealt with the economic side; the Minister for Agriculture with the agricultural side, and the Minister for Defence with the ports side. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Finance dealt with the financial end of the Agreement. I think the few words that he uttered on that particular portion of the Agreement have led to some discussion here. The Taoiseach stated that the £10,000,000 that are to be paid should be called ransom payment, or a two year's purchase of the land annuities. I think that was the equivalent to what he said. Some time later the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Finance said it was nothing, of the sort, that it was not a payment as mentioned; that it was a payment in settlement of other financial differences which were between the two existing Governments. That statement was made last night. When questioned on the matter later, the Parliamentary Secretary said he had not time to go fully into it, but that it w ould be gone into later. Will the Taoiseach clear up that point now as to whether it was a ransom payment or a payment in consideration of other outstanding differences, and if so what are these?

I have been wondering whether by making another speech now on this matter I can add anything useful to what I said at the start. It was inevitable in a discussion of this sort that we and those on the Opposite Benches should have different views as to what led up to the present situation and what was the cause of the trouble in the past. We have come to the point, at any rate, when an end seems to be in sight. I think from all sections of the House there was only one Deputy, the Deputy who spoke a few minutes ago, who intimated his intention of voting against this motion. Therefore, I suppose we may take it that no matter what your views in the past may have been, no matter what faults you may find with the Agreement here and there, on the whole you approve of it as something that is in the interest of our people. If that is so my work really is done so far as this matter is concerned, because I do not think we are going to do very much by way of either side converting the other as to the real meaning of the past. I have my views to-day. I hold them just as strongly as I did before.

I would not move the acceptance of this Agreement if there was in my mind any feeling that we were sacrificing anything which could reasonably be called a question of principle. We are doing nothing of the sort.

There are, as I said, three Agreements in this document—three parts of it if you wish. The first part deals with the ports. Perhaps I might repeat something that I have already said about it; lest there should be any misunderstanding in that matter. That Agreement wipes out, win the first instance, Articles 6 and 7 of the 1921 Treaty. It is suggested by some of the lawyers on the other side that the very fact that we say that something shall cease to have effect, means that we are recognising it. That was clearly before my mind and if I could get any way by which I could get rid absolutely and completely of the dangers which I saw in these Articles, other than by referring to them and saying that they shall cease to have effect, I would not have these words. I looked through the Treaty to see if there was any Article of it that could be regarded as remaining in existence, any Article, that is, about the interpretation of which these words—"shall cease to have effect"—might be used to try to revive that Treaty in any sense. That Treaty is sped. It is finished, particularly with these dangerous Articles removed. The fact that there is the reference here "shall cease to have effect," is not to be taken by anybody as being a recognition by me now that that Treaty should ever have been in existence.

These negotiations were begun on a message from me. They started on our initiative. That initiative was taken, not because as has been suggested, we had come to the last cow and the last calf. It is quite clear that that is not so. It is well known that our people have suffered during that period. I am not going to deny it. They have suffered. That suffering was necessary in order to secure the position we have got to-day. That the payment was not due legally or morally I hold now, as I have held for a number of years, that that payment should not be continued for an indefinite period of years. It was not because of the pressure on our people by the economic war, or the economic dispute, that we took the initiative. I shall tell Deputies why I took the initiative. I shall refer them to some speeches of mine which were made some years back. Speaking in the Town Hall, B l a c k r o c k , on the 6th June, 1935, I said something like this—this is the report of it in the Press:—

"A free Ireland in times of common risk could be for Great Britain only a friendly Ireland, and would be a surer safeguard to Britain's security than could possibly be an Ireland in subjection, for an Ireland in subjection could only be a hostile Ireland. If that fact has at last penetrated to the consciousness of the Government and the people of Great Britain, then indeed a new era in our relationship is at hand."

The report continues in the third person:—

"In those days of wars and rumours of wars their minds naturally turned to Articlcs 6 and 7 of the Treaty of 1921. He knew of nothing that menaced the possibility of permanent good relations with Britain so much as that Article. Were the English Government to make demands indicated in that Article, no Irish Government could accede to them and hope to retain the confidence of its people. He knew of nothing more urgent than that there should be an understanding between Great Britain and themselves in this matter. The Irish people did not want to be dragged into any European, or other, war but the Irish people would be prepared to strain themselves to the utmost to defend their own territory and to see that no nation suffered because of their freedom. It was to prepare for such an emergency that their Volunteer force was establislied. They were ready to undertake to the full the obligations of their freedom once it was fully secured. He hoped that they would be taken at their word in this matter."

The negotiations were undertaken on the basis of the views which I then expressed. Nothing could be more dangerous in this country to the relations between itself and Great Britain, than that these ports should continue in British occupation or that Britain should have a claim to make, a claim such as the claim she would regard herself as possibly entitled to make under Articles 6 and 7. I say that this Government would certainly not have recognised any such claim and it was clearly impossible for any Government to do its duty by our people here, so long as these Articles remained.

As one who was responsible for seeing that some protection should be afforded our people, and who was prepared to give our people that protection in the circumstances which I could not fail to discover around us, I said: "We must get down to bedrock in this matter and know what are going to be the relations between the two countries, if there is going to be a major European, or other, war." It was necessary to get down to bedrock to know whether we, as a people, were going to organise ourselves to defend our own rights or whether foreign people were to hold a part of our territory which would put them in a position to make further demands upon us far facilities, etc., such as they might make, or consider themselves entitled to make, under these Articles. We had to get down to bedrock We could make no plans for defence. It was humiliating to find that, when the question of protecting our people against possible attack was being considered, it was not the Government could do it; that it was people like the Port and Docks Board or somebody else that could talk about the measures to be taken to defend our people in case of a major conflict. Could we escape? Is it likely that we could escape if there was a major European conflict at the present time? If there is such a condition, will we continue to export cattle and food to Great Britain? Will the export of food be regarded as contraband of war or will it not? If we are going to send food from our ports to Britain, when Britain's enemies, let us say, will be trying to starve her, will our position be respected by other people? Will our ports be free? Will we be immune from attack? I do not know if it was in the House but someone asked: "Could we have the audacity to have our neutrality recognised by foreign Governments? Would any foreign Governments think we were neutral if our ports were occupied by Britain, or if a Government here gave the facilities which might be asked for by Britain under Articles 6 and 7? I suggest that our people would be living in a fool's paradise if they thought anything of the kind.

Hear, hear.

Therefore, we have to try and protect ourselves and we have to try to make plans for defence. We could not make plans for defence while Articles 6 and 7 existed. Now we can do so, at any rate to the extent that the removal of those Articles has made it possible for us to do it. The British are wise, and they would be wiser still if they had the courage to use their influence and see that we had the whole country here. Its manhood would be prepared to defend it. They have not got that wisdom yet.

They will get it.

I believe they will. Let Deputies opposite not taunt me later with raising false hopes. They will have sense. Twenty years ago they had not the sense to make a Treaty or an Agreement like this. This country would now be much stronger than it is, and the stronger and freer it is the better it would be for Britain. There was a time when Britain feared us because our population was very nearly as great as hers or, at least, was very high. That situation is changed. Britain has no need in future to fear an independent and free Ireland, but has every reason to wish for a stronger and bigger Ireland. The British have got, if she was wise, this much wisdom, that they recognise now that we have responsibilities placed upon us and that we cannot have it both ways.

Hear, hear.

We cannot be free and refuse to take up the obligations of freedom. If we want to be free, let us not hope that somehow or other we will "slither" out of anything that might come our way to attack us. We have to face facts. The position in this country is that of every other country. That is the spirit in which I want to have this Agreement accepted, so that we may face fully up to our responsibilities. It is true that it is going to cost us something to maintain these ports. Why do we not let them become derelict? We have the right to do so, if we wish. There is no provision to the contrary, express or implied. We could let them go but, in our own interest, we dare not do so. Why? Because in the first moment of war they are of such tremendous importance, either to Britain or to enemies of Britain, that if we had not some means of keeping out those who might want them in their own interests they would be used by them.

If we want these important positions to be held for the interests of our people, we have to face the expense of doing it. It will be no small expense, as far as I can see. We have a standing army which is very small, and barely sufficient to act as an auxiliary to the police force. We cannot stop at that. I warn you that every 1,000 men added to the standing army will mean an expenditure of £100.000 a year, or something in that neighbourhood. If there is joy, then, on the part of some people at the acceptance of this Agreement, let us not think that we are going to have a new heaven and a new earth. There will be nothing of the kind. We are going to face new responsibilities and these new responsibilities are going to put burdens upon us. We accept these burdens in the same spirit as we would accept the burdens which undoubtedly would be placed upon us if we got in the North. Is anyone here going to suggest that the inclusion of the North with the rest of this country would not impose at this moment very severe burdens upon us? Of course it would. They have 100,000 unemployed in the North, and by adding that number to our own unemployed, we see what a problem that would set. There are other big and heavy problems that we would have to face, and new burdens that we would have to bear if we took in the whole of Ireland. Are we going to grumble because there is a burden to face? We are not. We are, I hope, quite ready to bear the burden. I understand that a number of industrialists down here would be shivering if we had the whole country in now.

That is a remarkable admission.

I have heard that. Nevertheless, although it might make them work much harder, and put bigger burdens upon all of us, because it would mean the restoration of the unity of this country, we would face these burdens willingly. In the same way, any burdens that will flow from the possession and occupation of these ports by ourselves, I, for one, recommend the Irish people to face cheerfully. This House, at any rate, seems determined to face these burdens. Deputy Dillon asked me to be frank with the House, and stated that I did not say if we were going to continue to keep these ports. Apart from the Journals of the House, I got three daily newspapers, in which it was stated in as explicit and as express terms as it was possible to use, that we did take over these ports, and that we meant not only to defend them but to modernise them. Yet a Deputy comes into the House and said that I had been trying to fool the people; that I did not say we were going to defend them.

What was his complaint? His complaint was that I would not go the distance he would go. I say that he would go a foolish distance. He told us what the Commonwealth is, but he did not take the trouble to realise what the position is in matters of defence. I have here the report of the debate that took place in the Canadian House of Commons on Monday, January 25, 1927. If the Deputy reads that report, and reads another debate in February, he will get some enlightenment on the question of defence and the attitude towards it, just as on a previous occasion we had to enlighten another Deputy as to the position regarding common foreign policy. This is the speech made by the Canadian Prime Minister. He said—I am going to read only one paragraph—:

"The question of Canada's participation in war has been discussed many times in this Parliament. Neutrality is just another aspect of the same question. Participation in war is the positive aspect, if I may put it that way, and neutrality is the negative aspect. Over and over again we have laid down the principle that so far as participation in war is concerned it will be for the Parliament of Canada to decide. Having taken that attitude with respect to participation, I think we may well take the same attitude with regard to neutrality. It will be for this Parliament to say in any given situation whether or not Canada shall remain neutral. At any rate, that is the position which the present Administration proposes to take."

Hear, hear.

Very well. If I say on behalf of this Administration that that is our attitude is Deputy Dillon satisfied, or does he want us to do something more? Does he want us to go in contravention of the terms of the Constitution?

I certainly do not want you to contravene the Constitution.

It says that: "War shall not be declared and the State shall not participate in any war save with the assent of Dáil Eireann". That is the constitutional position, and that is the position which must be maintained if the Constitution is to stand. Having taken over these ports, we shall have to come to the House with a defence policy. This is by no means the time to go into our whole defence policy. I can only say that in my belief it is going to impose a considerable burden on our people, but that they will have to face that burden if they want to be free.

May I ask the Prime Minister a question. I do not want to misrepresent him in the least degree, but sincerely want to find out what the situation is. Did I understand him correctly when he told us a few moments ago that if we continued to send foodstuffs to Great Britain in time of war it would be folly to pretend that we could maintain our neutrality? Now, that is one question. The second question is quite simple. I quite agree that he said that he intended to defend the ports taken over from Great Britain. I want to ask him, does he intend to construct defences there in the form of naval bases, or does he merely propose to erect land fortifications to resist invasion at these particular points?

I have already said to the Deputy that I cannot at this moment go into the whole question of national defence. The appropriate time to do that is when the Votes for the purpose come before the House. I said that we undertook these negotiations because it was not possible, in the existing conditions, to have any decent basis for our defences Henceforth we will. We will know what are the immediate and what are the likely problems, and we will have, in my opinion, to consider these defences on a double basis. The first basis would be to defend our territory against attack from any quarter, no matter from where. Secondly, we would have to consider what is the likely quarter, and when we have considered that, if it were, for instance, an attack from a European power, then we would have to ask ourselves: "How are we going to plan our defences so as to be in the best position to resist such an attack?" As I have often said before, any attack on us by a foreign power could not be ignored by Britain, because if this country was taken by a European power—if possession of our harbours and territory was taken—then Britain would be in a very parlous condition indeed. Britain, therefore, could not ignore that, and in her own interests, and not for love of us, any more than anything that we would do would not be for love of Britain but for ourselves —under these conditions Britain would have to do her utmost to prevent such an attack, so that whether she willed it or not, the force of circumstances would make her an ally of ours in our defence.

Therefore, in planning our defences to meet such an occasion, and in order that, in such situation, the greatest possible strength should be behind this nation to defend its rights, the planning should take place on the basis that we wanted to have the combined forces as effective as possible. That is how I face it. I am not a military man, and I am only giving you what a lay man looking at it in that way would consider to be best. As I have said, we can have all that discussed on the appropriate occasion in this House. As far as that problem is concerned, we would approach it on a certain line. We would have to consider whether the attack was going to come from the east or the west.

The west is thousands of miles away and there is nothing to fear there.

Looking at it in that way, our defences would need to be planned to meet attack from the east or the west or from any quarter. When we had that done we would superimpose, if you like, upon that a second plan, namely, to meet the situation in which a foreign Power might possibly covet our territory or our positions here for her own interest and for the detriment of our people. Obviously, to meet such a situation one should plan on the idea that there was one ally that we were bound to have not because of her love for us but for her own sake, and that ally was bound to be Britain, because she dare not allow a foreign Power, as long as she is where she is, to take possession of this country. Therefore, our plans would have to be made on that basis. It was in order that we might get down to bedrock, so that we could reasonably plan for defence and get out of the present parlous and impossible position, that I asked that the whole outstanding questions between Britain and ourselves should be the subject of discussion with the British Government.

Did I understand the Prime Minister correctly when I believed him to have said that if we continued to send foodstuffs to Great Britain in time of war it would be folly to pretend that we could maintain our neutrality?

I fear that it would be so, in fact. The truth is, of course, that in modern war there is not any neutrality. During the War, trade from one neutral country to another was stopped or interfered with by the belligerents on both sides. Food is, I think, conditional contraband, according to the Conventions. But, again, these Conventions are not worth a scrap of paper once war appears. Obviously, to get down to bedrock we had to clear the decks and see what we were about. We had to see what were going to be the relations between the two countries in the event of a major European outbreak. Were we going to have parallel interests or were we going to have interests in the opposite direction? I tried in vain for 20 years —partially succeeding in the present Agreement—to convince the British Government that their interests lie, like our interests, in good relations between the two countries, and I was anxious to get down and sweep away all the outstanding matters in dispute. First and foremost of those matters in dispute was that outrage to which Deputy Larkin referred—the Partition of our country. No Irishman who wanted to establish good relations between Britain and ourselves or between ourselves and Britain could ignore that. Remember that promises between Governments are not the things that matter. Treaties and signed documents are not the things that matter.

What matters most in the relations between countries is the fact that those countries have common interests, and that there are no disputes which prevent those common interests from getting their full attention. No Irishman could hope to establish good relations with Britain, really and fundamentally, as long as that outrage on our nationality and on our people persists. Therefore, if we were, as I was—and my colleagues were with me—anxious to find the basis on which we could establish really good relations between Britain and ourselves, we had to, if we were honest, as I have said, put the ending of Partition in the first place. Nothing else would so help to improve the relations between the two countries. I, therefore, said when I was going over, as I have explained to you here, that one of the matters which were outstanding and which I wanted naturally to discuss was the question of Partition. I did not say it explicitly perhaps, but "outstanding questions," in view of the statements I have made hundreds of times, surely could not have been misunderstood. And it was discussed. It was discussed the very first thing, and it was discussed, I might say, the last thing in our negotiations. It had to be, and to the extent that there is not in this Agreement a reference to Partition, and the ending of it, this Agreement is a bad and poor document.

That is not your fault.

It is not my fault.

I agree.

But I resent deeply the suggestions that were made by Deputy Dillon here, that I tried to fool the people in the North. I did nothing of the sort. I was most careful, and not a single word can be adduced at any point where I said to the North that we would not make an agreement unless Partition was ended.

I put in evidence an article in the Prime Minister's own paper.

Do not talk to me about an article in the Prime Minister's own paper. I could not do, as the Deputy's father apparently found possible to do——

I think the Taoiseach might let the dead rest.

I beg your pardon. I did not mean to be disrespectful; it is the last thing I want to do. I am very sorry. I had every respect for your father——

I quite agree.

——and he was a personal friend of mine at the end. But I want to point out to the Deputy that there were different conditions which enabled that to be done. If I were sitting on the opposite benches and had the freedom and all the rest that goes with it which the Deputies on the opposite benches might have, I might be able to dictate and write leading articles. I cannot do it. I am not responsible for what is in those articles. If it continues for any length of time with a policy which I think is inimical to the Irish people, then I can interfere. I have those powers, and that is all. I cannot interfere from day to day, and any attempt to hold me responsible from day to day for what appears in the paper is unfair to me, because I have more to do than would enable me to do that. I may from time to time give general directions as to the policy that is to be adopted in certain circumstances, but I can only do that in a very general way, and only at rare intervals. I am not responsible for them. I am responsible to the Irish people and to myself for what I myself state.

And for the impression you created on their minds.

I did not create any impressions. It is the Deputies who try to make it appear that I do those things, who create those impressions. It is not I.

Here is the Irish Press saying it is.

We have heard it several times here in this House, and I am sure that in a month's time, if the Deputy thinks it is to his advantage, he will say the same thing, in spite of what I have said to-day. I cannot do it; I have not the time to exercise day to day supervision over the articles that appear in the paper and hold myself responsible for them. I say I made my position with regard to Partition clear. It is in the first place, and it is in the last place, and until I die it will remain with me.

An admirable sentiment.

I have not ever pretended that there was a straight road to the ending of Partition. Time after time I said the reverse. Time after time when the United Ireland Party was founded I have said the same thing, that we are now, as far as that objective is concerned, on the one road and I welcome it. It is one of the things at least that is of advantage, if this goes through, that the whole Irish nation now will be consecrated to try to end that wrong.

And always has been.

I did not fool anybody. I met representatives of the people in the North. I told them that I would do everything that was humanly possible for me to do, and I have fulfilled my promise as far as I can see it. I know nothing that I could do, nothing that I could organise this part of Ireland to do with success, that I have not done and that I would not do in order to end Partition. Representatives from the North came over to meet me in London when the negotiations were on. They came at a time when the things they had got to say were not going to get much prominence in the British Press, because other matters which affected Britain closely happened to be in the papers at the time. But this has been done with regard to Partition: not merely has it been isolated, not merely has its importance in the relations between the two countries been pointed out to the British Government, not merely has the injustice that is being done to a section of our people been pointed out, but the whole British people and the whole Irish people— the 20,000,000 of whom Deputy Larkin spoke—have been acquainted with the position. They know now, if they did not know before—I am referring to the British public in this case—that there is no justification whatever for the inclusion in that territory of minorities that wish to belong here, no matter what basis they work on.

And majorities too.

I quite agree. I have never said at any time that there was a right of a small portion of this country, even though they might have a concentrated majority in a certain place, to cut itself off. I think that this island is a natural unit for self-determination, and I have seen no other unit in this country that seems to have the right to it. But I do know that there was a basis of pretence, namely, that there was in a certain part of this country, in Six-Counties it was said, a local majority in favour of Partition. I say there is not a local majority in favour of Partition in the greater part of the Six-Counties. There is in portion of it, I think. We have gained this, that the importance of Partition in the relations between the two countries is well understood; that it is vital it is understood, and I hope it will be understood by the people in this country and by the people outside it.

Now, I did not at any time deceive the people in that area. I would say that everything that Deputy Dillon said would be only half what should be said if I were guilty of that, because I, for one, do consider that there is nothing meaner than to get the assistance of people and to inspire hopes in them when the person who does it knows that these hopes are vain hopes. I did think that there was a possibility—that having come a certain part of the way on the path of wisdom, we might possibly get the British Government to go the whole way on the path of wisdom; but I recognised that Partition is not solely a British-Irish problem. It is true, quite true, that it was started and was made what it is mainly by British action, that it was the action of British Parties that made it what it is, mainly. I am not such a fool, however, as to think that—to mention the old rhyme, Humpty Dumpty—if you knock the egg off the wall, the fact that you yourself are the person that knocked it off is going to make it any the easier to put it together again; and though I recognise that it would serve British policy very well to-day to have the reunification of this country, I also recognise that they have to proceed slowly about it, and that they have to try to convince the people who are standing out against the unity of this country—that they have to convince them as they are convinced themselves.

Hear, hear! Perfectly right.

One of the first things is that they should be convinced absolutely themselves that it is good policy, and I hope that we have gone some distance in making them see that and in making them see that, as long as they are the supreme Parliament, even though they may not be able to interfere in certain legislation —as long as they are holding themselves as the supreme Parliament in that area, that they have responsibilities towards the minorities in that area, and that they cannot hold the one and shirk the other.

I do not think, then, that in so far as the first objective is concerned, these negotiations have been in vain. As far as the other parts are concerned. I think they have been reasonably satisfactory. I am not going to talk too much about the value of this Agreement. I would rather have heard it criticised a very great deal more than I have heard it criticised—criticised fundamentally— because I could have criticised it and have been criticising it for two or three months, perhaps, and the other members of the delegation have been criticising it as well.

Troth, you could criticise it, and eloquently, if we had brought it back.

I have been criticising it very hard, I can tell the Deputies, and there are many things that, but for our criticism, would be in it, and if it were given to me to write it out, I could write out a very much more satisfactory Agreement for our people, and so could every Deputy.

Hear, hear!

Later on, I will have to talk about trade, and I have a little note in which I have reference to a statement that was made by Deputy O'Higgins with which I fully agree, which was to the effect that there is probably not a single Deputy here who, if he were allowed to write out a trade agreement or a general agreement, could not write out a very much better agreement if he had not to deal with other people.

I quite agree.

Very well. This is not all a one-sided bargain by any means. It is not all advantage for us. I have told you that, in connection with this matter of the ports, there are going to be considerable disadvantages, namely, the burdens they will place upon us. Deputy Cosgrave has told us that he could have got the ports some time ago and that he was sheered off from taking them—well, I am afraid of that word "sheer"— that he refrained from dealing with them on account of the cost. I think that Deputy Cosgrave is mistaken, and anybody else who spoke in that connection. It was my business some time ago, because I was interested in this question, to go carefully into all these matters, and, whether it was the Department of Defence or the Department of External Affairs, I naturally tried to find out what the British had been, at any time, prepared to do. I have no evidence that they were prepared to hand them over. If anybody can refer me to any files or show me any evidence of that, I shall be very glad to have it, but I can say quite definitely that there is no record at any time of the British being prepared to hand over the port defences to us.

I can assure the Taoiseach, on behalf of Deputy Cosgrave, that his Minister for Defence met the appropriate Department in London and was informed that they would be prepared to do so.

Well, then, I will say that both the Minister for Defence and the President of the Executive Council did not act wisely in refraining from putting down a note to that effect because, clearly, it was going to be of great advantage to subsequent Administrations to know that. I can only say that I cannot find it and I can only say that it is denied at the other side.

That is important.

I made it my business to look into that matter and actually, on some occasion or another, I said—of course, this is my recollection and I am not absolutely certain of the exact words—"But you were prepared to hand over these ports. What about it?" That fact was denied, and I should like to get any confirmation whatever that can be given to me by the Leader of the Opposition or his Minister that that was so, because I can find none. I do know this, however; that they would have been very glad to share our coast defences with us, that is, to give us, under what you might call Article 6—the Deputy can see what is contained in Articles 6 and 7—they would be quite willing, I have no doubt whatever, to let us take over the responsibilities for other portions of it as long as we admitted that they had rights under Article 7, certain facilities and so on. Now, Deputies on the other benches know as well as I do that no Irish Government could make an agreement of that sort. We had either to get these ports unconditionally or we would not take them at all because they would be no use to any Irish Government. I have said already that peace between peoples is what is to be made, and not bargains between Governments, and it would have been quite impossible for this Government or any Irish Government to make arrangements of that sort and hope to have them loyally accepted by our people and accepted, principally at the time of crisis. I would not take the ports if the British suggested that we should put our flag upon them and at the same time agree that, at any time the British wanted them, they could have them. I would say: "No; if you take or intend to take the ports, you will have to bear the cost of their upkeep, and if you say that, of necessity, our interests will be parallel with yours in some of the cases in which you apprehend danger, then it would be very much better to work on that basis than to work on scraps of paper." We have got the ports in our own right without conditions, but the policy that I indicated as the policy of this Administration remains the policy of this Administration, and I believe that no succeeding Ministry will change that policy in any time that I can see with the world wagging as it is to-day; but if they should, there is no commitment to prevent it. The State is not committed in any way. Neither are there any commitments upon this Government. The commitments that are given there are the statements we have publicly made because of the policy which we think best for our country, no more and no less.

I hope that every person in the House and in the country understands the position with regard to these ports. I know I will have a hard time when I go to the Minister for Finance. He is going to be a very tough customer to deal with when dealing with his Budget. I know the Labour Party will, very rightly, question every item of defence expenditure as long as the social services have to be met, as long as there is any slackness—I do not blame them at all. I think it is right, and that it is their business as public representatives that that should be done. It is also the business of the Minister for Finance to see to it that all our services get apportioned to them, according to their requirements, the moneys that we can supply from our resources. I know it is so in every country—that when a Government comes to Parliament and asks for the Votes necessary to maintain the defences everybody questions them. Unfortunately, it is one of these insurance items.

There is a vague notion about, which I can never understand, that somehow or other there will be a big war and that we can continue supplying goods to Great Britain and that somehow we will come through that unscathed. It would be a right policy for any Government, if they could see their way to do it. That is what the Canadian Prime Minister clearly indicated they would like to do if they could do it. What they want to do, and what we want to do, is to preserve for the Parliament the sovereign right of determining, in the circumstances of the moment, what action is best in the national interest. That is the freedom we wanted to preserve, and that is the freedom we have preserved. Again, I think that that freedom, though it is freedom for us, does mean necessarily an advantage to Great Britain. They could have that advantage with all my heart now if we had the whole of our country. Until that is there, there will be in the minds of a large number of Irish people, undoubtedly, a big question mark with regard to that. It is precisely because I do not want, at the beginning of a crisis like that, to find our country in turmoil that I want to clear that question away as we have cleared other questions away. However, I think I have said enough on the score of the ports.

Now let me come to the question of the £10,000,000 payment. Deputy Norton, I think, asked me if the British had recognised now that the land annuities were not due. The land annuities were, roughly, about £3,000,000 a year, the capitalised value of which they estimated at £78,000,000. Our experts, no matter what Deputy Cosgrave may say, have told me that they had no good fundamental reason for quarrelling with that. I will tell the Deputy as a secret that I did not examine it very closely because I went over determined that not one penny of that £78,000,000 would ever come from Ireland. Did I ask the British to recognise that? No, I did not—I am not such a fool. I am quite content as long as they did not want me to recognise their point of view.

Hear, hear. That is very reasonable as I often told you.

These negotiations have been successful to the point they have been successful for this reason, that neither side tried to get the other side to accept their point of view.

Hear, hear.

If they did, they would not succeed. So we wisely started—if I may reveal some happenings; I am sure I will not be indiscreet —by each saying what they could not do, not what the other fellow should do, which is quite a different thing. There were certain things as to which, I said, "We cannot do them, and if there is a question about doing them, home we go." They retaliated: "There is a certain thing we cannot do, and if you try to force us to do it, knowing we cannot do it, then you can go home." So certain things, although they were never relinquished, had to be recognised fairly early. Although each side tentatively tried at other stages to get the other side to change their attitude, there was no change of attitude. That attitude was preserved to the end. It was because of that the Agreement is of the type it is.

But the moment I saw that Partition was not going to be solved, that there was a danger that it would not be solved—I did not lose hope until the last moment no matter what was said at the beginning—but the moment there was a danger that Partition was not going to be included, I told the people as plainly as I could. I took the first occasion to do it. I told them in their interest and I told them in our interest, because I did not want to deceive them, and I did not want to have to pretend, as Deputy Dillon would like to do now, that I did want to deceive them.

As the Irish Press did.

I can deal with the Irish Press elsewhere perhaps. I cannot deal with the Irish Press here.

We had better send an ambulance down to Burgh Quay then.

I am sensible enough. I do not expect those who have to write leading articles every night—I would not like to have to talk every day; in fact, I keep out of the House a good deal because I do not want to be talking too much and it would be a good thing for other Deputies, perhaps, if they did the same; if you have to talk a lot and you do talk a lot, then you are bound some time or other to make very serious mistakes. The unfortunate thing about a newspaper is that it has to come out before the public every day and so it says something that it has to say or that it thinks right. Second thoughts are not very often possible. Of course it is only possible for other people to interpret things as they see them at the moment. I only asked that I should not be held responsible for it, because really it is a responsibility I could not hold. The man who writes would not, I am sure, hold himself responsible the next day. He could not do it. Neither could any other newspaper hold themselves responsible the next day for every article —that they would not change a line of it.

Look at what the Independent wrote about his father.

It does not matter. What we have to do is to forget or try to forget. However, I hope I have not talked too much about the ports. I talked as frankly to our people and I expressed my mind as fully as I have expressed it to anybody or anywhere. It is the whole truth—no reservation. With regard to the money payments, as I said, I did not, of course, ask the British Government that they should, as Deputy Norton naïvely remarked, recognise that we were right all the time. I could not do it. A simple sum in arithmetic is good enough for me.

There were two main classes of items. There were the land annuities and there were other items. During the years past we withheld all the payments. Why. If anybody cares to go back to the election addresses and manifestoes in 1932, I think it was, they will find the thing set out under two parts. One part was the question of local loans and other things in which the foundation was quite different; the reasons were different from the land annuity reasons and I made it quite clear that I was going to examine these things on their merits. Why did we retain them? Because I believed that the British Government had taken away from us over ten years, on the head of land annuities, some £30,000,000 and that that, even if they were entitled to the rest, was a fair set-off until the dispute was over. I did not go into detail about them. I have not argued them I have not argued them in this House. I have not argued them in the country, but I did argue and until the end of my life, if I have an occasion to do it and think it is worth while, I am going to argue that these land annuities payments were neither legally nor morally due. Deputy Larkin takes a broader view and thinks the other payments should be treated likewise. I have said about the other payments that they were set off much bigger than the sums on which these payments were charged.

Somebody said, I think here, that there was a large sum put up by us as a counterclaim in 1932, and that it has been abandoned. That is quite true. I believe—I cannot get any word to qualify justice, it must be simple justice, I suppose—that justice between the two countries, fair play, or any word you like to express the similar thing, would mean that if there were payments at all to be made by us on the head of these other payments because of the counterclaim that the payment should come in the other direction. And, therefore, I sympathise with anybody who says: "I am not going to vote for this because there is a payment of £10,000,000 to a country to whom we owed nothing, and do owe nothing, and which owes rather to us"! But as I have said, a simple sum in arithmetic satisfied me anyhow. There were two main blocks of items—£78,000,000 and £28,000,000. We pay £10,000,000. I have said I am not going to fight with the British Government if they regard it as spread over the lot. I am satisfied myself that we are not paying a cent. of the money of the land annuities that we said were not due, and that we believe were not due.

Perhaps, as the last farewell to this dispute, I might say this—for six years before we came into office that dispute was argued up and down the country on the basis that we were asking the farmers not to keep their contract with stockholders. That was the basis of the argument. That was the basis on which certain people said we were breaking the Seventh Commandment, and that we were guilty of peculation, highway robbery and all the rest of it. That lasted for six long years. We questioned that basis, pointed out that there was no contract between the farmers and the stockholders, that there was a contract between the farmers and the State. The whole essence of the dispute is not whether the farmer owes the money or whether the stockholders should get their stocks and dividends, but what State—what State—had the right to get the moneys from the farmers.

Do you really say that your own Deputies said that?

The Deputy might allow me to pronounce the funeral oration anyhow.

You dearly love the last word.

I am entitled to it, am I not?

The Taoiseach has now the right to the last word, according to procedure.

I say that the question really was which State—this State or the British State—was entitled to these moneys, and we proved, to our satisfaction, we certainly proved, that the moneys belong to this State, and we said this State and this Exchequer is entitled to hold them. They are being held in the North, and that fact itself was proof that there was no direct contract between the stockholders and the tenant farmers.

That was the basis on which we argued until we got into office, when we held them and asked the British on what basis did they claim them. It was too useful for British propaganda—this thing about the Seventh Commandment and the idea of the Irish farmers not paying their debts and being encouraged by an important Irish Party. It was too good propaganda for them to surrender. They tried to walk on two legs, but when we nailed them down and asked them on what basis did they legally demand these moneys, then we got an answer, and then we had a change altogether in the basis on which the campaign was carried on. Then we were told that there was an agreement signed in 1923.

And discussed in Dáil Eireann.

And ultimately confirmed. We were told, in 1926, that there was an agreement which bound the Irish State to transfer these moneys to Great Britain, and that it was on that agreement they stood. We had then to face a new fight. The Seventh Commandment disappeared from the scene at once, and we had a new question—whether that contract was binding on the nation because of the signatures that were attached to it and the conditions under which the moneys were transmitted. We held that it was not. Deputies yonder held it was, and although they held it was they want the Irish people to believe that they could have gone over years ago and made this settlement. Well, be it so. Some individual perhaps may have come across, without any records left behind, who may have suggested to Deputy Cosgrave on the eve of an election that he could get away and that a settlement would be made with him on some other basis. I have often wondered why that basis was not given to the Irish people, why that confidential statement was being made on the eve of an election.

We have no record of it. At any rate, when we went over in 1932, the answer that was given to us, as I have repeatedly said in this House, was that if we recognised that that debt was due there would be some mitigation of the amount. "Mitigation" is not the usual word to use if there is to be a considerable reduction. However, I cannot prove that the Deputies are wrong in that, any more than I can prove, because there is no record of the statement which Deputy Cosgrave made to-day, that Deputy Cosgrave is wrong. I can only have my belief I can only say there is no record. I have seen no indication at any time that such a settlement could have been made, and I say now, as I said already in this debate, that I believe that that settlement could not be made to-day any more than in my opinion it could have been made six years ago were it not that a number of favourable circumstances have occurred. I am glad for the nation's sake that they have occurred. I did not want to plunge this country into an economic struggle if I could have avoided it, but I saw the matter this way—we were paying £5,000,000 a year and would continue to pay £5,000,000 a year for another generation at least, and most of it for more than one generation—for two—we would have continued to pay that and pay it, in my opinion, when it was not due, and I said we have got to challenge that in the interests of our people. Challenging it means a risk, but it is a risk which I think we have a right to take, because I think in the end that our claim will be recognised and admitted even if we have to fight now for it and stand out for it. We have to thank the tenant farmers of Ireland, and I am willing to do it, and we have to thank the consumers, and particularly the labour section, of the people because they stood out. But we have not to thank the big ranchers —we have not—because at every stage of the struggle, when it was important that we should be firm, they tried to weaken us. I recognise fully that the position of the Opposition in a matter like this is extremely difficult. You can be quiet for three months, and again I want to pay a tribute, as it occurs to me, to the fact that so far as the public Press and public expressions are concerned—I do not know what was happening in the streets, or at the corners, or anywhere else——

Do not spoil the ship for a ha'porth of tar.

I am simply stating the fact. I do not know. Statements have been made about it, but I do know that so far as anything public that I have seen is concerned, there was nothing that I could find that was weakening our hands during the last three months. I admit that, and not merely that. It had a wider field than that, because, in the most marvellous way, we have been supported, not merely by the Press here, but generally by the Press of Great Britain during the past three months, and farther than that, in the United States of America we got support and generous support. I recognise and admit that, holding the views the Opposition hold, and having the point of view regarding the interests of the country which they have, they wanted to make their point of view clear and to press it. I suppose they were hoping that their point of view would prevail——

As it has.

——and that the people would put into power a Government such as themselves, who they thought were able to make a good bargain for them. However, I think the people have been wiser than to give way to that policy. The people across the water have recognised that if they were to try for another six years, they would not have compelled our people to surrender. We had not to tighten our belts yet. We had not to appeal to the people to tighten them so much. The farmers were in the front-line trenches, I told them from the start, and we recognise it; but it is not fair to the rest of the community, wonderful as the work which the farmers have done, to pretend that they did not help them. They did help them, and we do not envy them now the fruit of the struggle which they have had. The fruit of the victory for them is that as long as grass grows and water runs, or at least, as long as annuities have to be paid, they have to pay only one-half of the sum they had to pay before. This time, let nobody pretend, as was pretended in the early stages of the fight, that it is as good to pay the money to Lloyd George as it is to pay it to de Valera. To pay it to your own Exchequer is not the same thing as to pay it across to Britain, because, to the extent to which it is in your own Exchequer, it is going to relieve you of other burdens and other taxation.

We have got that fruit of our struggle, and if there has been a teaching of lessons, perhaps the teaching has not been all in the one direction. Some people across the water may perhaps have thought that by putting on the pressure and by giving another turn to the screw, they would ultimately have got this country to surrender, either its constitutional rights or its other rights. They have been taught that there is a good deal of resisting power in this nation, and that is a very useful lesson to have learned. We have a good resisting power here.

I pass from the second Agreement. I have tried to point out to the House that these two Agreements stand by themselves in a special position, and that it is necessary to take the third Agreement as something which is of a kind apart. The third Agreement is a pure Trade Agreement such as might be made between any two countries in a piping time of peace, without any disputes in the air. Britain, as the Minister for Industry and Commerce told the House, abandoned its free trade policy in 1932. They changed over in that year to a policy of protection, and it protected itself even against States of the British Commonwealth, States that were in every way friendly with them. The complaint made in 1932 was that, because of our dispute with Britain, our farmers were not able to get into the British market on terms comparable with those on which the States of the British Commonwealth could get their produce in. We have made this Agreement, and I have asked that I might have a short note on it to cover some of the points that have been raised and perhaps, instead of speaking on it as I have been, it would be better for me to give it to the House from these notes.

The two main pillars of the Trade Agreement are the provisions under which our products are entitled to free entry into the United Kingdom market, with the exception of products such as beer, spirits, sugar, etc., which are subject to revenue duties, and the provision under which we undertake to arrange for a review of protective duties and import restrictions by the Prices Commission. There are, of course, some other provisions, but they may be regarded as subsidiary and of minor importance. A number of Deputies have raised questions about some of the concessions which we give in return for the right of free entry, and I should like, at this point, to express my appreciation of Deputy O'Higgins's recognition of the fact that there must be two parties to every agreement of this kind, and that neither party can expect to get an agreement in the form in which he would have had it, if he could ignore the point of view of the other party. Any member of the delegation, or any member of this House, could have drawn up a trade agreement which would be more attractive from the point of view of this country than the Agreement which the resolution asks the Dáil to approve. The only difficulty about such an agreement would have been the impossibility of inducing the representatives of the British Government to sign it.

There are, of course, provisions in this Agreement which would have been omitted if we could have got the Agreement without them, and what I must ask Deputies to remember is that the same is true so far as the British Government is concerned. An agreement of this kind must be acceptable as a whole to both parties and both parties must be satisfied that the Agreement as a whole is fair and advantageous to them. The Irish Government are satisfied that the Trade Agreement fulfils that condition. I think that a careful perusal of the actual Articles of the Trade Agreement should satisfy Deputies that there is no real ground for apprehension. Article 8, on which there has been a good deal of comment, provides, it is true, that protective duties and other import restrictions shall be replaced by duties which, the text sets out, "shall not exceed such a level as will give United Kingdom producers and manufacturers full opportunity of reasonable competition." Deputies, however, must not ignore the stipulations in the same Article that the Prices Commission will recommend rates of duty which will afford adequate protection for Irish industries, having regard to the relative cost of economical and efficient production, and that special consideration may be given to the case of industries not fully established. These are their terms of reference. The Government is satisfied that these stipulations provide reasonable safeguards for our native industries and that industries which are economically and efficiently run have nothing to fear.

I think I might interpolate at this stage that I sympathise most fully with the point of view which Deputy Larkin expressed a short time ago with reference to our position here. I think it would be a disaster—a national disaster—if we were to go back simply to grass, and if I thought— though I think on the whole the Agreement is satisfactory and there are things in it I want—that we were going back again to grass, simply going to be a ranch and maintaining only the people a ranch could maintain under world conditions, then I would prefer to scrap that Agreement and that my name never appeared to it.

We never were and never will be a ranch.

However, I and the Government are anxious, and have been right through these negotiations, to secure, and we believe we have secured, safeguards which would be suitable to see that industries which are run reasonably well will succeed and will have a chance of succeeding.

I said some time ago in this talk that our freedom gives us responsibilities, and that we cannot shirk these responsibilities. If we want to be a vigorous, strong nation, we have got to go about it in the way that nations become vigorous and strong. If we want to be strong economically we must try to work for it, but those who work for it are entitled to reward for their hire. They are entitled to the results of their labours. What I do hope is that the people of this nation will gird themselves and try to make use of all our opportunities and resources—that we will act up to our responsibilities and will try to make use of the results of the work we have inherited. Some of our people have died to try to bring about, some time, the realisation of the things we see to-day, and we should be a very poor people, indeed, if, having got these advantages, we were not prepared to take off our coats and work them to the full.

A number of Deputies have criticised the immediate reductions of duty for which provision is made in Article 10 and Schedule 5. The reductions made in accordance with this Article have been carefully considered and it is not thought that they are likely to endanger the position of our native industries which are producing goods of the classes or kinds described in Schedule 5. I should like Deputies to pay particular attention to what I am now about to say because this question was raised a number of times. Goods of the kind described in Part 2 of Schedule 5—goods such as boots, shoes and woollens—will continue to be the subject of quantitative restriction as well as the duties set out in that Schedule until they have been reviewed by the Prices Commission. Then, it will be open to the Prices Commission to recommend higher rates of duty than those set out in Part 2 of that Schedule if the higher rates of duty are required in accordance with the terms of reference.

I should also direct attention to the safeguard inserted in paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the Trade Agreement. If the imports of any class or kind of goods enumerated in Schedule 5 should increase to such an extent as to endanger the prospects of success of the producers or manufacturers of such goods in Ireland and if it should appear that such increase of imports is due to the reduction of Customs duties for which provision is made in Article 10, then the Irish Government are entitled to apply quantitative regulation to the imports of such goods without reference to the Prices Commission. This is obviously an adequate safeguard for the industries in question.

I do not think that it would be desirable to attempt to answer hypothetical questions of the kind asked by Deputy Dockrell. The Prices Commission will take into consideration all relevant factors and I have no doubt that its recommendations will be fair and reasonable. The Commission is is in the nature of a judicial body. It has already been explained that there is nothing new or remarkable about the provision in Article 13, that the United Kingdom producers and manufacturers shall be entitled to full right of audience before the Prices Commission. A number of agreements between the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and other countries contain similar provisions. In any event, it is obvious that, if the Prices Commission is to make a thorough inquiry into the relative costs of production, they must have information as to the cost of production in the United Kingdom. The best way to get this information is to get it from United Kingdom manufacturers and producers. Even if no such provision had been inserted in the Agreement, it is clear that the Prices Commission would wish to hear evidence from British manufacturers and producers of the goods to which a particular inquiry relates.

The Tariff Commission, which was established under the Act of 1926, followed this practice and, in fact, frequently visited factories and plants in the United Kingdom. I should also explain that the Prices Commission was established in accordance with the provisions of the amending Act passed some months ago. That Act had no relation to the Trade Agreement or to the negotiations which led to the Agreement. An amending Bill to give the Commission the necessary powers to enable it to review tariffs and import restrictions at the request of the Minister for Industry and Commerce has been introduced. Before I pass from that, I may say that this Government has always recognised that the policy of protection involved certain dangers. If anybody is interested, they can look up the Fianna Fáil programme so far back as 1926 and 1927. There is there a clear indication that it was our policy that, when our industries had had a reasonable chance of establishing themselves, there should be some tariff commission which would examine impartially the conditions under which these industries were operating and report so that the public would understand whether these conditions were fair, whether the prices charged to the consumers were reasonable and whether or not undue profits were being made. I admit that there is going to be a big difference in future so far as public opinion is concerned in regard to that matter. It would be easy to get a public opinion here to support any awards of the Prices Commission which would be brought in showing that the Irish consumer was being unfairly dealt with and that unfair profits were being made. Public opinion would be so strong that any Government would be easily supported by it. There is a danger in the new set of circumstances that those who would be profiteering or unfairly exploiting the protective position given them would be able to suggest to the Irish public that the action taken was simply designed to benefit some people in another country. I admit that and it appears to me to be a pity because, while I am anxious to see the industrial policy succeed, I do not want to see profiteering at the expense of the consumer or exploitation of any kind— unfair exploitation either in the conditions of labour or in the prices charged to the consumer. I do fear that the strength which a Government would have, with a Prices Commission whose recommendation was being implemented solely for the benefit of our people and on its merits, may be somewhat lessened under the new circumstances.

The action of the Prices Commission should be the same, namely, to consider the conditions under which the goods are produced and say what is a fair price in comparison with prices which would be obtainable if the goods were produced elsewhere. That is going to be the new position. It will be easy to misrepresent it. There is a good deal of this misrepresentation of one kind or another going on. I am not going to say that it is confined to one Party. Unfortunately, there is misrepresentation which has become, and I suppose it is in every country, a really serious evil; misrepresentation of what people say, and it prevents fair argument, it prevents a fair understanding. If we are to have any hope in democracy we can never have that hope if the people who are to be the final sovereigns and final judges are not given fair information on which to base their judgment.

Hear, hear! You never spoke a truer word.

I agree—I have always held that. Unfortunately, we have misrepresentation, and I must say that in my judgment the Deputy acted in that way when he spoke about the North. I do hope that we will all on both sides do our best to stop it. It does not help anybody and it certainly does not help to make democratic institutions more workable. I will ask Deputies to bear with me while I conclude this statement. It has been carefully drawn up to meet the points raised, and it is very important from the public point of view that the information should be given. I should also explain that the Prices Commission was established in accordance with the provisions of the amending Act passed some months ago. That Act had no relation to the trade Agreement or to the negotiations which led to that Agreement. An amending Bill to give the Commission the necessary powers to enable it to review tariffs and import restrictions at the request of the Minister for Industry and Commerce has been introduced.

A complaint has been made that we had not communicated with our manufacturers in connection with the negotiations, whereas the British Government, it is stated, did communicate with their own manufacturers. But the British Government did not, so far as we are aware, communicate with the British Farmers' Union. They did communicate with British manufacturers who wanted concessions. We got all the trade concessions we could possibly get in any circumstances, for we got all the duties removed. Therefore, we did not have to consult our farmers; we had not to consult our farmers on the matter. With regard to our industrialists, if we saw our industrialists, each firm would want to be looking for its own share, and we were satisfied that the Department of Industry and Commerce had at their disposal all the information that was necessary for them in order to see what was going to be the result of any concessions which were made.

I think they were mistaken in that.

That was the basis on which the thing was done. There is no reason to think that the manufacturers here could have given us any assistance. The Minister for Industry and Commerce is, I believe, quite familiar with their views, just as the British Government are, no doubt, well aware what their Farmers' Union would have said if consulted about the concessions we wanted for our agricultural produce. Deputy O'Higgins has raised the question of the duration of the Trade Agreement. Deputies will notice that while the Agreement is expressed to operate, in the first instance, for a period of three years, Article 19 provides that after the expiration of that period it shall remain in force unless six months' notice of termination is given by either Government. I should like to direct the attention of Deputies to the terms of Article 18, which provides for consultation between the two Governments should either of them feel that the objects of the Agreement are not being attained. I have every confidence that any difficulty that may arise will be settled satisfactorily by consultation between the two Governments and that when the period of three years has expired, the two Governments will find it to their mutual advantage to keep the Agreement in force.

I have dealt with the three Agreements. I confidently recommend them to the House. I have always held that the only agreement one should sign is an agreement which you mean to keep and which you think can be kept. I think it is bad policy to sign any other than a document not merely that you think can be kept, but that you mean yourself to keep. So far as these Agreements are concerned, we mean to keep them and we mean to act fairly by them. We mean to see that they are carried out in the letter and in the spirit. I hope the people on the other side will mean the same, and I believe they do. I believe as regards any trade agreements between the two countries, even to the limited extent they existed, and having regard to the difficult circumstances in which they were made, that they have been fairly kept by both sides, and, in the keeping of them, both sides recognised that it was good business, apart from any other consideration, to act fairly and squarely. That is the spirit in which the Agreements made in connection with that matter have been kept. I believe that not merely is this Government, and anybody over whom this Government has influence, going to keep these Agreements in the letter and the spirit, but I believe if we were to pass out and another Administration were to take our place, the Agreements would still be kept, because they are acceptable to our people on the whole. I recommend them to you. I do not know whether there is to be a division or not, and notwithstanding the fact that the North may see differently about the advantages or disadvantages, we are all here prepared to accept the Agreements in general as being an advantage to the country.

There is one thing to which, before I sit down, I should like to refer. I understand there were some irresponsible statements made which have gone out to the Press. I regret that anything which could obviously not have been said seriously was taken as if it were a serious matter, either by Deputies on the other benches or by the newspapers. It was an expression which, I am sure, the Deputy himself could not have meant seriously and which, I am sure, no Deputy in this House on any Party or any side would stand over.

I need hardly say that we entirely confirm what the Taoiseach has said about that statement. There is one other matter which, in courtesy, I should mention. The Taoiseach very courteously said he made all inquiries to find out what were the circumstances under which the offer of the ports was made to President Cosgrave's Government. I am now in a position to tell him that the matter was discussed and the suggestion made that our Government should take over the ports in February, 1928, and I am sending him a note with the names of the two gentlemen who spoke to the Minister of our Government and adumbrated that proposal.

I am very glad to get this information, and I will have proper inquiries made into the matter.

There is no necessity for inquiries. It does not take anything from your action.

I would like to have the Deputy understand my view. I think it is of very great importance, where there are matters in dispute between two Governments like our Government and the British Government, that when anything of that sort is done or said, any offer of that sort, that it should be somehow registered for the benefit of the people who come after, if the Government should go out of office. It should, at least, be made known to the permanent officials.

May I suggest that another lesson is to be derived in this connection—that if our Government would pursue the common practice of all other Governments, and consult the Opposition in matters of foreign policy, the work of both sides would be probably made a great deal easier?

I would like to respond to that suggestion. I made certain offers at one time, but there were difficulties which apparently made it impossible. I did say to a prominent Deputy on the Opposition Benches that I was going to London. I met him casually and I said: "I hope you will understand the seriousness of this position and that nothing will be done by your people to cause unnecessary embarrassment."

And that suggestion was generously met.

It has been, I say that; but I would prefer, instead of meeting a Deputy casually under such circumstances and saying that, to meet a Deputy in a responsible position and say in confidence to him: "This is our position and I want you in confidence to give me your advice and your best knowledge." Unfortunately, the relations between the Parties up to the present—I hope they will improve— have not been such as to make that possible.

We are not conscious of any ill-feeling on our side.

I am not really laying the blame on one side or the other, but that has been the effect. We in this House, if I may say so, have been working under conditions which are not altogether normal in Parliaments. It is easy to understand that. There has been the Civil War, in which people on both sides of the House fought on different sides. These things are not easily forgotten. It is not always possible for human beings to forget these things. They are not over that yet, and things will be shouted by one side or the other that are interfering with the relations between the two Parties. All I can say is that I do hope it will be easier in the future to co-operate in those things that are of as much interest to the Opposition as to the Government, because what is of importance ultimately is the common good—the common good which is as dear to the people on the Opposition side as to the people who for the time being have a majority. As we are talking of these matters, I would like to say this—when the Opposition takes its work seriously and avails of its comparative freedom in properly criticising, it is almost altogether necessary for the proper working of democratic institutions— without it we could not work—that fair criticism, particularly of a constructive character, that comes from the Opposition side should always be welcomed by the Government in office. And when we get from the Opposition constructive suggestions they are welcomed by us. When we do get these constructive suggestions in the future, not only will they be acted upon, but due credit will be given for them.

A very grave matter has been mentioned, dealing with Section 8. Has any discussion taken place as to the right of entry of carcases into the English markets?

Question put. Does Deputy Larkin want to be recorded as dissenting?

I want to put a question to the Taoiseach.

There can be no discussion when the question is put. There must be a decision. The motion is carried. If Deputy Larkin desires to be recorded as dissenting he will be so recorded.

Very well, Sir, but I want to make a personal explanation.

Not now. I declared the question decided, and Deputy Larkin is recorded as dissenting.

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