I move that the Bill be read a Second Time. Seven of the Resolutions which were passed on the 12th May last were given statutory effect under the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act, 1927. That Act, however, provides that the Financial Resolutions to which statutory effect was thus given would cease to have such effect on the Dissolution of the Dáil. On the other hand, the Finance Bill would, in the ordinary course, have given the effect of the force of law to the previous Resolutions subject to any modifications or amendments which the Dáil may insert in this Bill during its progress through the House. It is obvious that if steps were not taken now to clear up the position which has been created at the Dissolution, some confusion and uncertainty would prevail which would affect in relation to income tax on ground rents, etc., not only the Revenue but a number of persons throughout the country. This Bill is designed to clear up that situation and to restore the position which would have existed if the Budget Resolutions continued to have the force of law up to the date of the passing of the Finance Bill. This Bill does nothing more than that. I move, subject to the approval of the House, to take all stages of the Bill to-day.
Committee on Finance. Financial Motions. - Collection of Taxes (Confirmation) Bill, 1938—Second Stage.
A matter on which I have already spoken requires attention on this Bill. Section 3 (1) of the measure before us is in these terms:—
Every of the Financial Resolutions to which this Act applies shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Act of 1927, have and be deemed always to have had statutory effect as if contained in an Act of the Oireachtas, and shall continue to have such statutory effect until such cesser as is provided for by the next following sub-section of this section.
Does that mean from the date of the introduction of the Resolution or from the date of the passing of this Bill? Is it intended to be retrospective? Can the Minister give me that information? Is this Bill giving statutory effect to the Resolutions passed on the 12th May, some of which were given further effect to on the 25th May?
It is.
The situation is that a declaration on financial matters affecting the country is before us. There has been a series of Resolutions passed here. The last one is the one which brings in the Act of 1927. The effect of the Act of 1927 is this — that statutory effect is given to certain Resolutions until they are taken up in certain ways or until they cease. One of the ways in which cesser is brought is by Dissolution. Does it cease to have any effect after the date of the Dissolution? There is a gap between the date of the Dissolution and this. From the date of the Dissolution to this point there is a gap. I do not care what the intention is, but I suggest that without a breach of the Constitution it is not possible to do anything against any man who has erred in that period by anything in the way of a penal attack upon him. Because if you try to do that you are making something an offence which was not an offence at the time it was committed. From the 19th May until this particular date, when these Resolutions were passed, the position was the same as if they had never been there. If you start now to re-establish the law and if the re-establishment of the law imposes the making of anything an offence which was not an offence at the time it was committed you will find that that can only be done by an amendment of the Constitution. Therefore it cannot be proposed to use that machinery. Let the citizens get this into their heads that no matter what threats may be held out to them in regard to the collection of taxes, one thing the Government cannot do and that is to bring them before the courts and to operate against them the machinery of penal legislation. I understand that was in the background all along. If there is any fear that that particular type of machinery will have to be relied upon then the Constitution must be amended. There is a doubtful position there and it ought to be cleared up.
I do not think it will be ever necessary to impose the penal provisions of certain Acts. It is not, therefore, necessary to make provision for that situation until it arises.
I am pointing out that it is not legal to do it.
The Deputy says it is not legal to do it. He has been advocating an amendment of the Constitution, but why advocate an amendment of the Constitution when it is unnecessary? I have already said that there is no reason to anticipate that any penal provision of any Collection of Taxes Acts will be enforced. This Bill does not propose to make anything unlawful which was not in fact unlawful during the particular period that has elapsed.
Surely it does. Surely it was not unlawful to refuse to pay income-tax from the date of the dissolution.
The question of the collection of income-tax is being legalised. That is quite a different thing from making illegal during that period the non-payment of taxes. No person seeks to do that. If a person comes along and pays his taxes voluntarily, this Bill confirms that position. The tax is lawfully collected.
Can the Minister say it is intended to enforce the tax collection during that period?
The necessity will disappear once the Bill comes into operation.
How will it be enforced?
By the usual processes of law. What we are simply doing here as practical business men is to confirm the policy of these Resolutions, and making certain that the collection of the revenue, which is one of the most important functions of the State, goes on.
The question is: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."
Agreed.
I should like to object to the Committee Stage being taken to-day as I cannot speak a second time.
Objection taken to taking the Committee Stage to-day.
I understood that all stages of the Bill would be taken to-day.
Well, I should like to find out whether or not we can get this situation clear. It is not an answer to a constitutional point to say that certain penalties may not have to be availed of. That is no answer. Is the situation this: that there is a code of income-tax law that includes, as part of the enforcing machinery, as I call it, that there is an offence? I suggest that that is being built into the code, and, if that is so, I suggest that it is futile to say that there may be no necessity to enforce what I might call an offence type of coercion. Is this an attempt to establish the law in that period that is not covered from the dissolution of the Dáil to this date? Does that include the offence type of sanction? If so, I suggest that it is open to the President to have doubts about this and to say that, possibly, we are not going on constitutional lines. Is there an effort being made by the Oireachtas to do something which is wrong? It must be remembered that this is not a question which is peculiarly phrased in the Constitution, or one that is covered by a law which says that it is null and void. There is an absolute prohibition to the effect that the Oireachtas shall not pass anything which might constitute an offence. I suggest that there is a serious point to be considered, and that the courts, in considering this whole matter from the point of view of amending the Constitution, should be in a position to say whether or not there are methods of evasion. They would argue as to whether or not there might be the possibility that, on some occasion, this offences machinery, as I have described it, could be used. I suggest that, if so, it is a breach of the Constitution, and that, if not, there should be some amendment. I should like to deal with one portion of the Act of 1927. I do not think the Act of 1927, in its entirety, is dragged into this, or that the whole business of tax enforcement is involved, but there is one portion of that Act with which I should like to deal, and I suggest that there is an attempt here to draw into this what the Constitution says should not be done.
Are we taking the Committee Stage here to-day, Sir? I understood that we were taking all stages.
I understood that the Committee Stage was being taken to-day.
All stages but one.
I would suggest that we take all the stages. However, I should like to reserve what I might have to say in connection with this to the last stage of the Bill, if we want to continue this discussion in Committee.
We want to facilitate the Minister in every possible way with regard to the Bill, and the only point that arises is this constitutional point. Perhaps the Minister would be satisfied if he got the Committee Stage through to-day, and would then give us reasonable opportunity for discussion on the Report Stage to-morrow?
I cannot admit that there is anything in the constitutional point.
As I have said, we wish to facilitate the Minister, but we would like to have an opportunity for a discussion of this point.
Perhaps the Deputy would bear with me for a moment. I say that I am not conceding anything with regard to the constitutional point — I do not think there is anything very much in it — but I should be quite happy if the Opposition would agree to take the Committee Stage and, if possible, the Report Stage to-day, and allow Deputy McGilligan to make his constitutional point more clearly on the final stage to-morrow, when I could deal with his point.
That is, if the Deputy desires it.
But, Sir, I cannot do it on the Fifth Stage.
What we are anxious about is to have the Attorney-General's answer.
I think it only goes to show that even a brilliant Deputy like Deputy McGilligan should not get up here and try to improvise a case.
Would the Minister tell us whether the point concerned has been considered by anybody with even a nodding acquaintance with the law?
It has.
The amendment of the Constitution?
Oh, no — quite different — whether the Bill is contrary to the Constitution.
Is there a difference between what is constitutional or not constitutional and what is contrary to the Constitution?
Not in Section 1, Deputy.