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Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 14 Jul 1938

Vol. 72 No. 8

Committee on Finance. - Presidential Establishment Bill, 1938—Second Stage.

Question proposed: "That the Bill be now read the Second time."

The main objects of this Bill are to implement Section 11 of Article 12 of the Constitution, which provides that the President shall have an official residence in or near the City of Dublin; that he shall receive such emoluments or allowances as may be determined by law, and that the emoluments shall not be diminished during his term of office. The Bill is intended to make provision for the maintenance of the official residence, and for the expenses of the office of secretary to the President, certain other facilities and services, and, finally, to make provision for the granting of pensions to persons who have held the office of President. Section 1 (1) has been drafted to show separately the amount represented by the personal remuneration of the President which will be included in the total of the emoluments and allowances payable in pursuance of the Article in the Constitution to which I have referred. The balance of the amount to be provided under sub-section (1) of Section I will represent the allowance to the President in respect of the general expenses of his establishment, his household staff and the maintenance and running of a motor car or cars.

In determining the amount of the emoluments and allowances to be paid to the President, the Government have been guided by the recommendations of the majority of the Committee of Inquiry into Ministerial and Other Salaries and Allowances. The following are the relevant extracts from the report of that committee:

"We are aware," the report states, "that the holder of the office of the Presidency will be the first citizen of the land; that high and responsible functions are vested in him under the Constitution, and that he will be debarred from holding any other office of profit or emolument. Consequently the remuneration for the office should be such as to place him in a position of complete independence financially, and to enable him to maintain with dignity the high position of head of the State.

"Under the terms of the Constitution," the report goes on to say, "the Uachtaran will have an official residence in or near the City of Dublin. We have assumed that the expenditure involved in the provision of the residence, of furniture and equipment and of the maintenance and upkeep of the house and any grounds attached thereto, including wages of the labouring and gardening staff, will be defrayed directly by the State. Such arrangements, however, though to some extent they may be regarded as part of the emoluments or perquisites attaching to the office of Uachtaran and should therefore not be left out of consideration in assessing the total provision that might properly be made for that office, also impose upon the holder an obligation to maintain himself and his private establishment upon a commensurate scale. Due note must be taken of this factor in determining the personal salary of the Uachtaran."

"We have also assumed," the report states in paragraph 85, "that the Uachtaran will, from the remuneration or allowances provided for him, be obliged to defray the cost of the domestic staff necessary for his residence and of all other charges involved in the maintenance of his private establishment on a considerable scale."

"We are of opinion," the report states in another paragraph, "that the emoluments and allowances of the Uachtaran might properly be divided into three parts—personal remuneration, allowances towards entertainment and towards the cost of his official establishment, and the provision and maintenance of his official residence.

"Bearing in mind that the expenditure by the State on the office of the Uachtaran should neither be altogether disproportionate to the provision which we have recommended might suitably be made for ministerial salaries, nor be too great a burden on the public purse, we think that it would be proper for us to recommend that the total cost to the State of providing for the residence, establishment and expenses of the office of Uachtaran na h-Eireann should not exceed £15,000 a year approximately, of which £5,000 a year would be payable to the holder of the post as personal salary, fully subject to taxation. Some of our number, however, were inclined to the view that on the basis mentioned the limit of total annual cost might be £20,000 and the salary £7,500."

In relation to the particular question of the personal salary of the President I think the House will no doubt have in mind the fact that the salary of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court has been fixed at £4,000 and no suggestion has been made at any time that that figure is excessive. It is felt that the personal salary of the President, as Head of the State, should be markedly greater than that of any officer of the State. The committee's recommendation that the salary should be £5,000 is a very reasonable one and that figure has, accordingly, been adopted and, as I have already pointed out, is stated in sub-section (1) of Section 1 of the Bill.

With regard to the amount to be allotted as allowance towards the expense of the maintenance of the Presidential household, it has been decided, in view of the constitutional bar against reduction during an individual term of office, that at the outset the amount should not be higher than the minimum which it is felt will permit the Presidential establishment to be maintained and all the functions, social and otherwise, of the Presidency to be fulfilled unostentatiously but, nevertheless, as befits that high office. After close examination, the conclusion has been arrived at that it would not be reasonable to allow less than £5,000 per annum for this purpose and that figure has, accordingly, been inserted in the Bill.

Section 2 of the Bill is intended to make provision for the expenses of the office of the Secretary to the President, including allowance to aide-de-camp, for the equipment and maintenance of the official residence and for such incidentals as official travelling, postage, telegrams, telephones and stationery. These expenses from their nature will fluctuate from time to time and, for this reason, apart from other considerations, their inclusion in the irreducible amount of emoluments and allowances would not be practicable. Section 2, therefore, is intended to allow expenses of this nature to be provided out of moneys voted annually by the Oireachtas and the necessary Vote in fact for that purpose has already been passed by the House.

In addition, expenditure will be incurred on the Votes for Public Works and Buildings, on stationery and printing, on the upkeep of the residence and gardens and on sundry supplies. As in the case of the expenses of the Secretariat, no firm estimate can be attempted at the moment as to the annual amount of this expenditure. I may mention, however, that the annual charge under the head of maintenance and upkeep of the Presidential residence and grounds, even when, as during more recent years, the residence itself has been unoccupied, has been of the order of £3,000. The additional expenditure necessitated by the occupation of the building will not, it is felt, be unreasonably in excess of this. As the House is no doubt aware, there are very fine gardens attached to the official residence, the fruit of long years of labour and a great deal of expenditure, and these gardens have to be maintained irrespective of whether the Presidential residence was occupied or not.

The pension provisions for the President are incorporated in Section 3 of the Bill, and in this connection it may be relevant to read the following extract from paragraph 88 of the report of the Committee of Inquiry to which I have already referred:—

"We feel," the report states, "however, that it is imperative on the State to provide against the contingency that a person on relinquishing office as Uachtaran might be obliged to live in circumstances which would be undesirable in the case of one who had previously occupied a position of such distinction in the community. In consideration of this matter we have assumed that a person who has held the office of Uachtaran will, in the normal course, be precluded from returning to business or professional pursuits and that it is most unlikely that he will take an active part in politics with consequent possibility of ministerial or other parliamentary office. It will probably be found that even in retirement a former Uachtaran would be obliged by circumstances over which he has no control to maintain his domestic establishment on a fairly considerable scale. If these assumptions are correct, it seems clear that there is an obligation on the State to provide a pension of reasonable amount."

As to what the amount of the pension should be, the majority of the committee agreed to recommend that after holding office for seven years the Uachtaran should be eligible to receive a pension of £1,200 a year.

The committee's recommendation as to the amount of the pension has been accepted, but it has been felt that it would be unwise and inequitable to restrict the grant of pension to persons who serve for seven years or over in the Presidential office. If this restriction were applied it would not be possible to grant a pension to a person who was obliged prematurely to relinquish the office of President on the grounds of permanent incapacity within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Neither could a pension be granted to a President who, having served for less than seven years, found himself obliged, say, on some ground of high principle to resign and who was not re-elected at the ensuing election. It appears most desirable that the provision to be made for the grant of pension in such a case should be such as would secure, as far as possible, the President's freedom from personal financial considerations in the exercise of his functions.

Conceding, then, that provision should be made for the granting of a pension without condition as to length of service in cases of the type stated, it was thought unnecessary to make any reference in the Bill to a service qualification. A President can cease to hold office only by completion of a seven-year period of office, by retirement on incapacity, by resignation, by death or by impeachment under Article 12 of the Constitution. The Bill provides for the grant of the specified pension to the President as of right, no matter what his length of service in each of the circumstances above mentioned, except where the cessation of his office is brought about by death or impeachment.

Sub-section (2) of Section 3 provides that a second term of the Presidential office will not enable the holder to qualify for a second Presidential pension. Where a President in receipt of a pension is re-elected President, the provision for abatement of pension on account of other remuneration out of public funds, set out in sub-section (3) of Section 5, will operate to prevent payment of the pension during his second term of office.

Section 5 of the Bill deals with the general provisions in respect of pensions granted under the Act. As to the first of these, it is considered that on the grounds of public policy it is undesirable that the President should look forward to taking up or renewing a political career on the termination of his office and, accordingly, notwith standing the provisions of the Payment of Members (Amendment) Act, of 1925, it is provided in sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Bill that the pension should be abated in the case of an ex-President who becomes a member of the Dáil or Seanad and receives an allowance as such. Sub-sections (3) and (4) of that section provide for the suspension in whole or part of the pension in the event of an ex-President's re-employment, and remuneration out of public funds or the funds of local authorities, or from any other sources, such as, for instance, the Currency Commission, the Electricity Supply Board, the Turf Board, or University funds which the Government may deem to be a public fund for the purpose of this section.

The fundamental idea in granting a pension to an ex-President is to provide against the possibility of a person who has held the office of President being unable to maintain the dignity of the position through lack of means. But if an ex-President is able and willing to get another public appointment with remuneration equal to or exceeding the amount granted to him as a pension, then the need for the payment of the pension disappears, at least during the occupancy of that fresh appointment. In view of the adequacy of the amount of the pension which it is proposed to grant, the necessity for allowing the pensioner to supplement it to some extent by earning from public funds does not exist, and for this reason the net of suspension is being cast in a wide form and the maximum total receipts, which may include any pension, have been fixed at the amount of pension payable. If an ex-President earns £1,200 or upwards from public funds no pension will be payable.

Section 4 of the Bill provides for the grant of a pension of £500 to the widow of a President or an ex-President who is entitled to a pension. It is intended by the grant of a pension to an ex-President to ensure that he should be able to maintain the dignity attaching to him by virtue of his former office. It appears essential and desirable that the widow of an ex-President should be provided for proportionately. It will be observed, however, that the widow's right to the specified pension of £500 per annum is dependent upon her making a personal application for it, and her pension is subject to suspension and abatement in like manner and for the same reason as in the case of the President.

Section 6 of the Bill, which creates the post of Secretary to the President, provides, amongst other things, that the secretaryship will be a permanent post in the Civil Service of the State, and thus extends to the holder the benefits of the Civil Service Superannuation Acts. The provision in sub-section (4) of this section brings the post of secretary into line with all other Civil Service posts in regard to tenure and the determination of remuneration and terms and conditions of service.

Section 7 of the Bill makes the necessary provision for clerical assistance in the office of Secretary to the President, and power to make such appointments as may be required is conferred by that section. To make sure that no doubts will arise as to the method of making these appointments, it is proposed that they will be subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Regulation Act and every Act extending or amending those Acts.

I rarely find myself in the position of supporting Government measures, particularly when it is a case of expenditure in connection with salaries. On this particular occasion I find myself in full agreement with the Bill introduced by the Minister. It will be within the recollection of the House that some 12 months ago a rather representative commission was established in order to inquire fully into certain matters put before them, including the salary, etc., suitable for the office of President. That committee, consisting of 16 persons, was representative of all Parties in this House. It included representatives of the industrial life, the labour world and the farming community outside.

It is true to say that for those associated with politics there is always a very big temptation to make political capital out of matters such as this. There is always a big temptation to oppose in order to make political capital. It is also true to say of every member of that commission that that bait, no matter how tempting, was rejected, and every member of that commission sat down to do the work in a spirit detached from, divorced from politics, conscious only of the big responsibility that was on them to make recommendations in accordance with the dignity of the State and, in this particular item, conscious that we were dealing with a new office higher than any other office in the State. The recommendations made unanimously, with certain minor reservations, are the recommendations substantially contained in this Bill. It at least has this much to recommend it, that every member of that commission no matter from what Party or from what class, was unanimous in thinking that the cost of the office outlined in this Bill was reasonable from the taxpayers' point of view and at about the minimum that would be necessary, considering the importance of the office and the dignity of the position of Head of the State.

The recommendations with regard to pension, both for the holder of the office, and, if it should arise, for the widow of the holder of the office, were based on the common sense point of view that it should be possible for even the poorest member of the community to attain to that high office if he got sufficient support from the public and that it would be unfair to the poorer classes if a leader of the poorer sections of the people, a poor man himself, found himself in that very high office and after his seven years were up had got to return to conditions of comparative poverty. The recommendations with regard to pension were not prompted by the idea of giving a pension to any comparatively wealthy man. They were rather prompted from the point of view that our ideal in this State is the ideal of democracy, that every office inside this State should be available to the poor, should be open to the poorest man as well as to the wealthiest, and we realised that it is impossible for any man to occupy a very high office in this or any other country for a considerable number of years and then return to the comparative obscurity of the humble state of life which he previously occupied. Every high office carries high obligations and high commitments and one does not shed those obligations or commitments entirely when leaving office. The recommendation for a pension for the holder of the office was based on considerations such as those. The recommendation for a pension in the case of the widow was based on similar consideration.

If the Dáil approves of this Bill in the same non-political, non-Party spirit as that commission did its work, it will be a very good headline in the creation of new offices. As I said, politically it is tempting to oppose measures such as this. At times, duty and our sense of responsibility dictate that political temptations must be left aside, that the State is greater than Party, and that setting a proper headline and supporting State offices that are divorced from politics is a far more important work than defending Party interests or political causes. It was in that spirit that the work was approached by every individual member of the commission. I think the spirit in which those individuals approached their work deserves a certain amount of approval from the Dáil, and that the best note of approval that the Dáil can contribute is to realise that those people, before there were any vested interests and before they knew to whom this particular allowance would be paid, devoted their time for four or five months to this work and made the recommendations that are incorporated in this Bill. I join my voice to that of the Minister for Finance in asking the Dáil to approve of the recommendations in the Bill.

There are two sections of this Bill to which I should like to devote attention. Deputy O'Higgins has enjoined us to pass the Bill without cavilling at its provisions and, almost, to overlook any obvious blemishes which may appear in the Bill. If only for the sake of paying tribute and obeisance to what he describes as a high office, we ought to temper our considerations of dignity by some reference to common sense and we ought not to be entirely carried away by this idolatrous regard for high office to such an extent as not to remove blemishes where blemishes appear. Deputy O'Higgins told us that this Bill was founded on the report of the committee, and that, therefore, as an appreciation of the work of the committee, we ought to pass this Bill. Of course, Deputy O'Higgins forgot to tell the House that the section in this Bill which provides for the payment of £1,100 a year as a pension to the holder of the Presidential office is widely divergent from the recommendation contained in the report of the committee. The majority of the committee took the view that the holder of the office should only get this pension after he had held office for seven years. A minority of the committee took the view that he ought to serve for 14 years before he could get a pension of £1,200 a year.

A pension of £1,200 a year is a very substantial pension in the circumstances of this country. If we are going to award pensions of £1,200 a year, we ought to award them only for lengthy service and for meritorious service. In Section 3 of this Bill we are not concerned with the duration of that service the committee recommended that a pensior of £1,200 should be paid after seven years. The majority of the committee, at all events, did so, but under Section 3 of this Bill it is possible for a person to be elected President on a Monday, to have a row with the Government on Tuesday, to resign on Wednesday, and to apply for a pension of £1,200 on Thursday. I may be told, of course, that that is not likely to happen, but if that situation does come about, there is legal authority to pay a pension to a man who has been three days in office. He can go to the courts, as Deputy Costello will tell Deputy O'Higgins, and compel the State to pay him that pension.

He cannot compel them to pay it.

Deputy Costello knows perfectly well that, although the State might be strictly within its right in refusing to pay, he has been very successful in extracting payment from the State in similar circumstances.

Might I interrupt the Deputy for a moment? I think if a man gave up £5,000 a year so as to get £1,200 a year he would be removed from office as a lunatic.

Deputy O'Higgins is apparently satisfied that the kind of person we are going to get in the Presidential office in this country is a person who will be only concerned with one type of appeal, that no matter what he is being asked to do by the Government, no matter how much he is being coerced or abused by the Government, all the time he will hold office because £5,000 a year is better than £1,200. I prefer to think that we shall get as President a person who is not so much concerned with the attraction of that £5,000, and if he felt it necessary to resign because of a disagreement with the Government that he would do so even at the price of sacrificing £5,000 a year. Deputy O'Higgins, by his interjection, apparently imagines that you will get mercenary-minded folk who, in the discharge of their duties as President, will trample on every principle and allow themselves to be rolled into any shape a Government likes because £5,000 is more than £1,200.

We are being asked to pass a Bill under which it is possible for a person who has served as President for a few days to walk off with £1,200 per year for life. Is there any other citizen in the State who would be treated as generously? Is there any other office in the State where it is possible under legislation to get a pension of £1,200 a year after a few days' or a few hours' service? Yet it is possible under this Bill to get £1,200 a year as pension after having served for that short period. If Deputy O'Higgins wants to honour the committee upon which he served and upon which other persons served, he ought at least to have stood out for the very reasonable recommendation of the committee that a person ought not to get a pension of £1,200 a year unless he has served for seven years. It is not a gift or a gratuity of £1,200, it is a pension of £1,200 per year for life. The capital value of that pension is quite a considerable sum, and we ought not lightly to vote for a pension of that kind without making sure that a person has served a minimum period in the office of President. I am opposed therefore, to the passing in this form of a Bill which makes it possible for a person to get a pension of such substantial dimensions after such a short period of service.

In recommending this section to us, the Minister stated that if a person ceases to hold the office of President he has to adjust himself to private life, and you cannot expect him to go back to whatever occupation, if any, he followed prior to his assumption of the Presidential office. That is reasonable and understandable, and everybody, I think, desires to make provision for a pension for the holder of the office, provided, as I said, he renders service sufficiently long to merit the granting of a pension. The Minister visualised that this person who held the Presidential office might desire to become a private citizen, and in these circumstances we have to make provision for his sustenance in future.

But an entirely different reason was given in asking us to pass Section 5. In recommending Section 5 to us the Minister told us that while the ex-President might desire to lead the life of a private citizen and almost become a recluse, we must at the same time provide for the possibility that he will select politics as a career. So that he can have the choice of either of two courses—to become a private citizen, when his existence in retirement will scarcely be known to anybody—certainly he need not obtrude himself on the public if he does not desire to do so—or, if he does not like that uneventful career, he can shift over to the turbulent and tempestuous career of a politician. Whether he decides to live a quiet or a turbulent life, there is a pension to be provided for him in any case. If he decides to live in quiet retirement, he will get a pension of £1,200 per year. If he prefers the more exciting career of a politician, then he can become a member of the Oireachtas and he can come in here and become the most leisured politician in the House. If he does that, and takes his place again as an ordinary citizen of the country, entitled to no more admiration and no more respect than any other Deputy, he will still be able to carry in here with him a pension of £1,200 a year, less his allowance of £360 as Deputy.

If there is so much respect and admiration for an ex-President as to permit him to have a pension of £1,200 a year, we might reasonably expect him to live in retirement. If he does not desire to do that, and prefers instead to follow the career of a Deputy, then he ought to have no special recognition at all, if, having abandoned his Presidential position, he desires to go back to public life, and into the more stormy aspect of public life, membership of this House. I take the view that if the ex-President desires to become a member of the Dáil he indicates by his action in doing so that he wants to get into the heat and burden of the day, that he wants to be like every other Deputy. If he decides to do that, there is then no case whatever for paying him a pension of £1,200 per year, such as you would pay to him if he decided to lead a quiet, retired life. If the ex-President decides to become a member of the Dáil, I think the pension to him ought to cease entirely.

Taking Sections 3 and 5 together, we may have a situation here where, after having served for a few days as President, a person may have a row with the Government and resign, may make himself the child of a political Party the following week, may fight and win a by-election the week after, and may come into the Dáil again as probably the noisiest politician here, reeking with rancour because of the difficulties he experienced with the Government; and, in our sane senses, we are going to give him a pension of £860 per year in that set of circumstances.

Even worse than you.

Certainly he would not be as bad as the Deputy—there is one little consolation in that. Taking a combination of Sections 3 and 5, I think it is possible for a good deal of abuse to arise under this Bill. Without making any reference to the present holder of the office, because normally we ought to have been dealing with this Bill before he assumed his present position, I think that we are needlessly generous in Section 3 and that we are leaving a loophole which ought to be closed. In respect to Section 5, we ought to say to an ex-President: "If you are going to go back into public life and be a member of the Oireachtas, then there is no case whatever for giving you a pension such as we would be prepared to give if you led a quiet, retired life as a dignified ex-President." I am not opposing the Second Stage of the Bill, because it is essentially a Committee Bill, but I certainly reserve for myself the right to move amendments in the Committee Stage to try to close these two gaps and cure what seems to me two possible abuses under the Bill as it stands.

What I dislike, and what I think every fair-minded person will dislike in connection with this Bill, is the association of dignity and money. It is assumed by this Bill that there can be no dignity attached to the office of President or to any other office unless there is a certain amount of money attached to that office. I think that the principle upon which this State should be founded, and upon which every democratic State should be founded, is that there should be a certain amount of dignity attached to honest labour. The people who have held the office of President in this State since it was established—Arthur Griffith, Michael Collins, William Cosgrave, and Eamon de Valera—were men who brought dignity to that office.

It was not the dignity of money but the dignity of hard work. They were men who stood out above all others as workers, honest, fearless workers, and whole-time workers. As workers, they brought dignity to this office and to the State. They are recognised, and will always be recognised, as men who stood out not only above their fellow-countrymen, but above the leaders and heads of State in other countries, and I do not think we should depart from that principle.

We have it set out here that it will be a disgrace to this State if an ex-president, or a president, commits the awful crime of digging his garden with a spade: that poverty, in any shape or form, is a disgrace for the highest officer of this State. What I, as a farmer, want to point out is this: we in the country are frequently insulted and upbraided and told that we do not recognise the dignity of honest labour; that we, our children and our friends are leaving the country and coming into the towns and cities to look for higher wages. We are told that somebody should be sent to educate us on the dignity of working on the land, even though we are getting no remuneration whatever for our labour. Yet, in this Bill dealing with the office of the President, we have it clearly stated that there can be no dignity without ample remuneration. That is a principle that, I think, should never have been introduced. I think that the office of the President should carry with it a considerable amount of hard work. I have considered from the very outset that the Presidential office should have been amalgamated, or merged, with the office of Chief Justice, so that you would have at the head of the State a person who was absolutely divorced, not only from politics but from the possibility of ever becoming a politician. In that way you would have got over the difficulty of getting rid of, or disposing of, ex-presidents.

I cannot understand why this principle of creating a new something in the nature of a new aristocracy is being introduced. Seeing that there can be no dignity for the President unless he receives ample remuneration, I presume there can be no dignity associated with those in touch with the Presidential office—with those visiting the President—unless they can do so in state. We are creating a new aristocracy or, rather I should say, a new snobocracy, a thing that is most undesirable in this country where the majority of the people are of humble means. We are a new State, and I think we should be a democratic State, a State founded on the principle that every citizen has got to live, as far as possible, by honest work, and that the differences between the various classes or sections of the community are not very great.

Now, it has been said that the office of the Chief Justice carries with it a salary of £4,000 a year. I think that salary would have been quite ample for the office of the President. As I have said, there is no reason why the two positions should not have been merged, and, as has been pointed out, there is absolutely no excuse whatever for the pension arrangements in this Bill. Deputies know how the average farmer, who is supposed to be a very dignified citizen, is treated when he retires at 70 years of age. He has almost got to go on his knees to a number of officials and, ultimately after having been examined and cross-examined in regard to his means, he is finally awarded a pension of probably 3/- or 4/- a week. I wonder is that a dignified position for those who constitute the most important section of the community, the people who are feeding the entire population and carrying the entire nation on their shoulders. If the President, the head of the State, is entitled to a certain amount of dignity in the form of remuneration, surely a member of the most important section of the community, the farmer, should be entitled to a fair pension when he reaches the retiring age: when he reaches the age when he is no longer able to contribute to the maintenance of the State. I would ask, therefore, that this whole matter be reconsidered, and that at least the pension arrangements be deleted.

The Minister to conclude.

I would like to say how deeply I appreciate the manner in which this Bill has been received in all quarters of the House, even by those who have made some criticisms of its provisions, but particularly by Deputy O'Higgins, who, I think, has put this whole question in its true perspective. I should also like to pay a tribute to those members of the committee, representative of all sections of this House, and, I think, of virtually every class in the community, who examined this question over a long period and embodied in it the recommendations to which we are giving effect almost in their entirety. The office of the Presidency is one, whether for good or for ill, whether we agree with it or not, which has been created by the Constitution, and it is now a formal part of our State. It is not possible to amalgamate it with any other office, and if the Deputy who has just spoken had devoted as much care and attention to this as a great many other people have had to during the past three or four years, he would have realised that the functions of the Chief Justice per se are quite incompatible with the functions of the President, so that it would not be possible to amalgamate the offices in the way he suggests.

I cannot agree with Deputy Norton that there is any serious blemish in regard to Section 3. I think there is something in the point which the Deputy made with regard to Section 5; but we must remember that this is the highest office in the State: that we hope the person who will be called upon to fill it will always be a person worthy of the office, a person who will be worthy of the Irish people, and if the Irish people chose an unworthy person —such a person as Deputy Norton has tried to envisage: a person who would hold the office for a day or two, have a row with the Government and, in a moment of pique, resign, secure in the knowledge that he would be able to draw a pension of £1,200 a year for life—then I say that the blame for that would rest, not upon the Oireachtas, not upon the holder of the office, but upon the people themselves who had put an unworthy person into it. We must proceed, in dealing with a matter of this sort where the highest office in the land is concerned, on the assumption that the Irish people fully realise what qualifications that office requires, and will put into it the worthiest citizen in the land. And it is upon that basis of good faith and good judgment on the part of the people, and only upon that basis, that a measure of this sort can be conceived and given effect to.

The Irish people might not be given the opportunity to vote.

The Irish people would, and I would ask the Deputy, or any member of the House who thinks that the position which Deputy Norton has envisaged is a possible one, to remember this: that if ever an abuse of that sort did arise, this Dáil and the Oireachtas of the people would very quickly deal with it. It might happen once. It certainly would not happen twice.

It will be the law then.

It would certainly be considered by the general body of the people as an abuse of the spirit of the Act. Let us see what is the occurrence which Deputy Norton fears. He says it may be possible for a person to be elected to the office of President on one day and, as he put it himself, to resign on the next day and secure a pension of £1,200 a year. We must assume that a person elected to the office is one who seeks that office and who seeks it not because of the emoluments it carries but because of the honour which it bestows and the opportunity to serve the nation which it gives. We have to imagine that he is a person worthy of the office. Is a person who is worthy of the office and qualified for the office by character, capacity and in every other way, likely to resign in a moment of pique because he has, as Deputy Norton says, a row with the Government on a matter of no importance? If he did feel it his duty to resign, he would be, I suggest, coerced into that view only because the matter upon which he felt his resignation was necessary was one of the highest constitutional importance, one which, bearing in mind his position under the Constitution as guardian of the people's rights, he felt should be put to the final court of appeal—that is to the people. In order that this might be done, he might feel bound to relinquish the high office to which the people had called him.

That is the only circumstance in which a man worthy to be our President would dream of resigning. If the President felt that, on a question of high constitutional principle, he must resign and, by resigning, allow the people to decide the issue which had been raised, is that the sort of issue on which we should penalise the President and endeavour to deter him from resigning by the knowledge that, if he resigned in these circumstances, he might be left a beggar for life? That is quite conceivable. Are we to do that or are we to put him in the position in which we do to some extent, though not to the extent herein contemplated, put the members of the Judiciary? They are put in a position in which they can exercise their functions quite independently of any monetary consideration. I am perfectly certain that the Irish people would like to see the President, who is, in the final resort, the guardian of our Constitution, put in a position of independence. The moment you impose a specified period of office as a condition to securing a pension, then, to that extent, you may penalise the President in exercising these constitutional functions by putting him in a position of dependence on the Government of the day. I think that that is not a sound constitutional principle. The more you study this question, the more you will find it undesirable to impose such a thing as a qualifying period of service for the pension and associate it with the presidential office.

The committee recommended it.

They may have, but the committee's recommendations have been searchingly considered and it is because of considerations of the sort I have tried to put before the House that we have felt ourselves coerced, in order to preserve the independence of the President, into discarding this limitation of a qualifying period. That is in regard to Section 3.

With regard to Section 5, I think the Deputy put a very wide gloss on anything I said either in regard to Section 3 or Section 5. I never suggested that the President should become a sort of recluse. Neither I nor the committee felt that that should be the position. What we did feel was that, having been called to the office of President, if a person retired from that office after the expiration of the first or second term, he would not be able to live the life of a recluse. On the contrary, commitments will follow him even into his private life which will prevent him becoming a wholly private personage again.

That is the common experience in other countries, where it has been found that persons who have held office of this sort can and do continue to render very useful public service in a voluntary capacity. I agree with Deputy Norton—I am sure it would be the view of every member of the House —that it would be extremely undesirable that a person who was once President should ever again enter into the hurly-burly of politics. I am not so sure that there is not something to be said for a Constitutional amendment which might deter an ex-President from becoming a member of the Oireachtas. A Constitutional amendment might be necessary to do that. I feel that a person who has held the office of President should be discouraged from again entering the political arena. It is to deprive him of any monetary inducement to embark on politics that we have introduced the provision in Section 5 of the Bill. I am prepared to agree with the Deputy that, possibly, it is not a sufficient deterrent. But other considerations arise. I have said that this matter might require a Con stitutional amendment, but I am not sure. It would, at any rate, require an amendment to one or other of the Electoral Acts. If the Deputy desired to give effect to his views in that regard, I am not sure that this is the Bill on which he should do it. I think it would be much better to go out flatfooted, and say that a person who has once held the Presidential office should never again become a member of the Oireachtas. There is a great deal to be said for that view. It is a matter that might be argued, but I am not sure that this is the Bill upon which it should be argued.

Does this apply to the last Governor-General?

No. It does not apply to Governors-General.

It has nothing to do with them.

I cannot see the difference.

With regard to the speech made by Deputy Cogan, I think the Deputy is wrong. There is no association of money with dignity in this office. As the Deputy said, dignity is attached to honest labour, but the functions of this office and all it signifies would confer a special dignity even upon the most illustrious person, because the occupant speaks and stands for the Irish nation. The fact is that these functions cannot be adequately fulfilled or discharged without the expenditure of a great deal of money. It is not merely that the person called to this office is going to have a very onerous task and, so far as he is personally concerned, a very unenviable existence, because he will have to do many things, at times, which may be inconvenient to him to do from the point of view of his own personal comfort. He will have to go to many places to which, if left to himself, he would prefer not to go. He will have to undergo a great deal of drudgery even in the discharge of the social side of his office. The functions attached to that office are such that they cannot be adequately discharged without the expenditure of a great deal of money. It is only to enable the person whom the Irish people have put in that position to fulfil those functions in a manner which benefits the Irish nation that money is needed and that money is being provided under this Bill. It is not at all a question of creating a new "snobocracy" or anything of that sort. At any function which up to this has been associated with the office of the Presidency, there has not been any element of "snobocracy". People in all walks of life have been invited to these functions, and have met the President, and I hope will continue to do so. It is a great honour to meet the President, because he represents the Irish nation. They cannot, however, be invited to meet him unless we make some provision out of public moneys to enable these functions to be held. They are regarded as an essential part of the public life of any well organised State or well organised community.

I want to know if the Minister has changed his policy during the past fifteen years.

The Deputy must sit down.

Deputy Cogan has talked about the provision made for the maintenance of the President after he has left his office and has asked if that does not indicate that poverty is regarded as a disgrace for an official. I say no. If the official were impoverished, or compelled by force of certain circumstances to live in a condition of poverty, it might be no disgrace to the official. It would depend entirely on whether his condition was due to spendthrift extravagance on his part. It might be a disgrace to him if he had squandered a patrimony which would have enabled him to live in conditions which were not poverty-stricken; but if the person has been lifted up by the consent, either of the whole of the Irish people or the majority of the Irish people, and placed upon a pinnacle as a symbol of the whole people, and if, afterwards, he were to have to live in conditions which would be generally regarded as being impoverished, it would be a disgrace not to the official, but to the Irish people. It is to avoid blemishing the reputation of this people by such a disgrace that these provisions for a pension have been embodied in this Bill because we want to feel that a person who has once been our President will afterwards continue to live in such comfortable circumstances as will enable him to render, I hope, a great deal of voluntary unpaid service to the State and will enable him to move about among the people in a way which is commonly regarded as fitting for everybody in the State, and even for those who have never held or discharged very responsible official functions. It is in order to enable that to be done that the pension provisions have been incorporated in this Bill.

I do not know whether, in view of the statement of Deputy Norton, he reserves to himself the right to move certain amendments on Committee. I was going to ask that the House might take all stages to-night. I appreciate that that is not possible now, but I do think that whatever else this Bill does, it certainly does not associate dignity with money. It merely makes the necessary provision to enable a dignified office to be filled in a fitting manner.

Question put and agreed to.

Is there any objection to taking all the stages and getting rid of it now?

Is there any objection?

Committee Stage ordered for Wednesday, 20th July.
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