The Minister stated, in the course of the Second Reading Stage, I think, or certainly on the Committee Stage, that the terminating company would not undertake any new business; that they would carry on the business which had been collected from the four participating companies, but would not do any new business. Am I right in that?
Insurance (Amendment) Bill, 1938—Committee. - (Resumed—Section 3).
Quite right.
I do not find it in the articles of association or in the memorandum of association. They appear to be precisely the same in connection with the permanent company as they are with regard to the terminating company. Therefore, I take it that the terminating company can give birth to the permanent company, and the permanent company can then acquire the terminating company. The Minister told us, I think, that the terminating company would continue until the last policy had been discharged or, at any rate, that it could do that. Article No. 7 (b) (iii) says:—
"The memorandum of association of the permanent company shall, inter alia, provide: The acquisition from the terminating company of the life assurance business and industrial assurance business and sinking fund or capital redemption business and goodwills of the terminating company.”
Is the position this, that a terminating company is formed in the first instance; that it marks time; that it simply keeps the accounts of the funds in respect of which liabilities are going to arise, and takes the premiums regularly of the life and industrial business which comes to it, but it does no other business? At a given time or at any time the permanent company is started. The permanent company, having been started, can do new business and can subsequently acquire the terminating company. Will the Minister explain what is the reason for these two bodies? Apparently there will be two sets of directors and double expense in connection with the management. Why is it the permanent company does not acquire the terminating company and finish up the business?
Because of the deficiency.
Is not the deficiency to be made good by the Minister?
That is part of the scheme for dealing with that deficiency, namely, that this terminating company is to be established and will operate a closed fund. It will take over the liabilities of the amalgamating companies and their assets, plus the amount to be provided by the Minister for Finance, and operate that business and that business only. It will, of course, have assets merely sufficient to cover its liabilities and in due course these liabilities will disappear. The new company will be operating new business. It will be operating that on a much better basis than the industrial business was carried on in the past. It will be operating in accordance with the provisions of the 1936 Act, which, as the Deputy is aware, are much more onerous in regard to the circumstances under which policies will be issued, the conditions of policies and so forth, than have prevailed heretofore and will actively engage in canvassing for new business. The permanent company will operate without any State assistance, without any subsidy or guarantee as to its assets from the State, and will seek to make its business good as an ordinary commercial company would. It will not be saddled at the beginning by any suggestion of a deficiency in its funds or by any obligation in respect to the policies issued by the amalgamating companies which are being transferred, as I said, to the terminating company.
Other schemes for dealing with this insurance situation might have been devised. This one offered many attractions and was considered the best both by the amalgamating companies and by ourselves for many reasons. The Deputy has the impression that there will be some duplication of expense by reason of the fact that we will have two companies. It will be only to a slight extent, because the actual business of the terminating company will be done by the permanent company on an agency basis; in other words, the collection of the premiums, dealing with the actual policy-holders, and all activities of that kind will be done by the permanent company, who will have a staff and organisation capable of doing the work, because it will be doing its own business with its own clients, but will also be doing that work on behalf of the terminating company. The arrangement contemplates that the staff of the terminating company will be the staff of the permanent company also. Its organisation, therefore, while offering the transactions to which I have referred does not, in fact, involve any substantial additional expense. Whatever expenses are involved in the actual conduct of the business of the terminating company will be charged against the funds of that company.
I still fail to see any reason for the existence of two companies. There will certainly be double expenditure. One company is to do the work and the other is to look after the funds. Why should not the permanent company look after the funds? I suppose the Minister has committed himself to that, but it appears to me to be an unwieldy proposition. It may be that it is hoped to secure more in that way than by the single company. Might I direct the Minister's attention to the paragraph dealing with profits —Article 4, sub-section (10) which states:—
"The directors of the terminating company shall at triennial or such shorter intervals as the directors may decide make a valuation of the terminating companies life assurance business and industrial assurance business...."
And so on, for the purpose of discovering what profit there has been and of distributing it. Might I make a suggestion to the Minister in that connection—that no distribution of profits should be made until an actuarial valuation has been made? A valuation by the directors, I am sure, has been made in connection with the four participating companies during the last 15 or 20 years. Some of them I believe paid dividends. Obviously there were no profits there at particular times, at any rate, to discharge these dividends.
Perhaps the most successful Irish insurance company we had paid no dividend for the first five years of its existence, possibly longer, and accumulated funds sufficient to ensure from those funds a 5 per cent. dividend which they proceeded to pay, and paid it, I believe, with very few interruptions, and at times even paid a larger dividend. But the funds of that company are now far in excess, in fact, they are something like three or four times the original capital. I suggest in connection with this company that no dividend whatever should be paid until an actuarial valuation has been made. That is done every five years. It will not interfere with the revenue of any person who has shares in it and the Minister for Finance had better be satisfied with getting no dividend for five years and then, if necessary, getting five years' dividends at once. He can make the appropriate arrangement in connection with any income-tax charges which may arise, allowing each person to be assessed in respect of one-fifth of that period over a period of five years. It would ensure, at any rate, that the funds would be kept intact. The directors would be fully aware of the entire assets they have got and the policy-holders would have the further assurance that no dividend distribution would take place until there was an actuarial investigation, thus ensuring that their part of the property was kept intact.
The policy-holders in this case should be regarded much in the same way as the depositors in a bank with prior rights over the shareholders. Until the depositors can be met obviously if the shareholders are getting a dividend they are getting it at the depositors' expense. I think, so far as that particular clause is concerned, having regard to our experience of insurance and having regard to the 1936 Act, we should take the cold and calculating accountancy point of view rather than the optimistic political speeches of the Minister. We have heard during the last 20 years that every day the business was getting better and that the premiums were increasing. Nobody ever pointed out that when the premiums were increasing the liabilities were also increasing. In this case it is due to us that if we are making good a certain deficiency steps should also be taken to ensure that such a thing should not occur any more.
The Deputy may be assured that there will be no payment of dividends unless bona fide profits have been earned.
Does not the Minister know that statements such as that have been made by every chairman of every company that ever went into liquidation and which paid a dividend? One of the outstanding examples in the last few years was that of the Royal Mail Company which had paid dividends. Can the Minister give us any information upon that?
I can assure the Deputy that it is my intention, so far as I can secure it, that the policy of the company will be based on the most conservative principles.
I suppose the only security we have got for that is the directors.
The whole scheme is designed for that purpose.
It will depend on the people in charge. Will the Minister admit that three of the directors he has appointed recently are men who are ill, or have been ill, and that two of them advised the last Government in connection with trade loans and that most of the money was lost?
Is it not so that the leader of the Opposition has asked for a guarantee that the valuation set out in paragraph 10 shall be an actuarial valuation?
The 1936 Act provides for an actuarial valuation.
Am I correct in saying that a valuation in accordance with the provisions of the Insurance Acts, 1909 and 1936, requires that it shall be an actuarial valuation?
The Act of 1936 provides for that.
Would it not be simpler to say here that the valuation envisaged under paragraph 10 is an actuarial valuation and that the profits to be paid can only be paid out of an actuarially ascertained surplus as on that date?
These will be bona fide profits. I should like to say this. I have administered Trade Loan Guarantee Acts for a number of years. I have a number of advisory committees dealing with these Acts. They give me advice, but the responsibility for any decision is mine, and I do not try to shift the responsibility to those who give me that advice.
I do not know what the Minister means by those irrelevant remarks. He says that he has advisory committees but that he does not want to throw the responsibility on them. If they advise a loan in certain cases, does he say: "I will not grant it"?
Very frequently.
That where an advisory committee has recommended a loan he has not granted it?
Yes.
I should say from information within the possession of every Deputy in this House that some of these advisory committees should be locked up.
The responsibility is on me and on my predecessors.
But the Minister told us that he would not accept any responsibility for these appointees once they were appointed.
We are dealing now with advisory committees.
If the Minister introduces irrelevancies we will simply nail him down to them. In this case he refused to accept responsibility for these appointees, but our money is being invested in this scheme to the extent of £500,000. Would the Minister tell us how it is going to distribute a profit on these two shilling shares, assuming that it is only a proportion of the two shilling shares to which they are entitled?
Some of the companies may be continuing in existence as insurance companies and there will be other forms of insurance business. They will have these shares as part of their assets.
These companies are being wound up so far as the life insurance business is concerned, but they still remain as companies for whatever other business they can get?
That is a possible course of action for them.
There is a provision in paragraph 10 which entitles any shareholder to remonstrate if he is of opinion that the distribution of dividends arising out of the triennial valuation is unjustified. The Minister then has power to restrain the board of the amalgamated company from distributing any dividend at all. I cannot foresee any danger for the policy-holders in this winding-up company, because it is a winding-up simply to run off the fund, and no danger that I can foresee would arise for the policy-holders in that, but I think the Minister might consider the question in view of the matters raised by the leader of the Opposition as to whether the rights given to shareholders in this paragraph 10 might not with advantage be also made available to policy-holders. That is to say, that if the board of the amalgamated company declared it their intention to distribute a dividend out of the ascertained surplus at the end of a triennial period, it would be done, but if a policy-holder within 30 days wrote to the Minister that the surplus of profit had not been correctly ascertained or was of such a character as would not have justified the distribution of a dividend at that stage, thereupon the Minister would make inquiry and, if satisfied that the shareholders' representations were reasonable, prohibit the board from making a distribution. Naturally one is reluctant to give powers of that kind to such a large body of persons as the policy-holders, but it has to be remembered that the occasion for this representation would only arise once every three years. The Minister may receive 10,000 representations, but he would only have to make one examination of the situation to declare that he was satisfied that the dividend might be distributed or might not be distributed. With one investigation he would dispose of all applications for his intervention. I have not given sufficient thought to the possibility of extending this power, which is given to the shareholder, to the policy-holder as well, but I think it is a matter which the Minister might consider in view of the representations made by the leader of the Opposition.
These companies are life insurance companies and whatever power the 1936 Act gave to the Minister in connection with life insurance business, he can exercise in respect of these companies. The 1936 Act gave fairly wide powers in that respect.
Is there any objection in view of the fact that the Minister has deemed it necessary to insert the proviso in regard to the shareholders, to extending that privilege to policy-holders?
The Deputy has got to remember the constitution of the company. There is provided, in the fact that the Minister for Finance is the only shareholder—I mean the only shareholder with voting powers—a safeguard against any abuse of the powers of the company. He in fact has that effective control over the directors of the company.
Precisely, but the Minister has given power to any person holding more than 5 per cent. of the shares to take certain action in the event of his not being satisfied with the distribution of the profits. He has done that to compensate the holders of A shares for surrendering their voting power. The Minister holds the B shares. The leader of the Opposition points out that the persons primarily interested in the solvency of the winding-up company are the policy-holders. The Minister has protected the rights of the shareholders.
In a sense, we have guaranteed the policy-holders also.
I agree; but if there is any uneasiness in the minds of responsible persons that the policy-holders are not afforded an opportunity of protecting their own interests by invoking the Minister for Industry and Commerce, does the Minister think it would give rise to any special difficulties if such power were given to the policy-holders of making representation to the Minister if they disagree with the distribution of the profits?
My answer to that is that there is nothing to prevent the policy-holders making representations to the Minister, and, in fact, the Minister has the most effective power of all for dealing with those representations, if he thinks there are good grounds for them, in so far as he controls the company through his shareholding.
Could we have some information from the Minister with regard to Article 15 of the Agreement as to the formula? Is that a formula that has been recommended by insurance experts?
It is.
As regards No. 18, the Minister said last night that some of the assets, having regard to the drop in the value of securities, might not be as valuable now as they were when purchased. I see in this Article, Section 1, that "the interest rate to be used shall be 3½ per cent. both for industrial assurance business and for life assurance business." Presumably, if these securities have diminished in market value there has been a corresponding rise with regard to the interest-bearing value of them. Is the company to get it in the neck, so to speak, both ways, assuming that they have got X£ in War Loan or some other security, and that it has gone down £3 or £4 per cent.? Are they not to get the advantage on the other hand of any improvement in revenue that would arise in consequence of the drop?
That is a matter on which there can be, obviously, different opinions. The question here is not what £100 will earn now, but what, with reasonable certainty, you think it is going to continue to earn over a long period of years. The practice has always been to assume a conservative figure. There are many big life assurance companies that take a much more conservative basis than 3½ per cent. We are assuming a 3½ per cent. basis here. There may be people who think a 4 per cent. basis reasonable. Some of the Labour Deputies will remember the discussions concerning the preparation of a pensions scheme for railway men: that these turned on the question whether it could reasonably be assumed that the funds invested could earn 3½ per cent. or 4 per cent. over a long period of years. The expert advice was that it was unwise to assume earning power in excess of 3½ per cent., and that even this might prove to be entirely wrong. These are things on which you have got to make assumptions based upon the experience of the past and reasonable anticipations for the future, generally taking care to err, if you err at all, on the conservative side.
I think it is true to say that a 3½ per cent. basis for industrial funds is regarded in the strictest insurance circles as a highly conservative basis of calculation.
I know that some companies have a much more conservative basis, and take 2½ per cent.
Companies such as the Prudential and the Metropolitan of New York can afford to cut down their valuation to 2¾ and 2½ per cent., but taking the average industrial insurance company, 3½ per cent. is, I think, regarded as a very conservative basis for valuation, a much more conservative basis perhaps than has been the normal practice in Irish insurance circles for the last 20 years.
Yes.
With regard to the amendment tabled to this section, the Chair has informed the Deputy in whose name it appears that it is out of order. The Committee of the House is bound by the terms of the Money Resolution. The Deputy who has tabled this amendment tabled to the Money Resolution a similar amendment which was defeated. The House is now bound by the terms of the Money Resolution as passed. The proposals in this amendment are at variance with the terms of the Money Resolution. Therefore, the amendment is out of order.
On the section, when Deputy Norton was discussing the amendment to the Money Resolution it appeared from what he said that he was under the impression that the companies involved in this amalgamation were getting very liberal treatment at the hands of the Treasury. Far from that being the case, the Department of Finance are getting in exchange for the money which they propose to put into this amalgamation not only an allotment of shares calculated on the basis of the money that they are actually putting in but they are getting by blackmail 100,000 shares free, gratis and for nothing.
Blackmail is a criminal offence.
I used it in a figurative sense.
The Chair did not hear any qualification.
I do not say that they were committing any crime except a crime against justice and equity and, in every sense, public decency, but against the criminal law, no. In so far as it carries that meaning, I withdraw the word. They did simply say at one stage when they had succeeded in passing their Insurance Act and in involving those companies deeply in the labour of giving effect to the law, that they wanted 100,000 shares. When asked on what claim in equity, or on any other grounds, they wanted 100,000 shares they said that their invaluable co-operation in facilitating the agreement entitled them to this allotment. But why they should ask for them, or who put it into their heads to ask for them, nobody has ever discovered.
I would be glad to hear from the Minister on what basis of equity he claims these 100,000 shares. Observe what the facts are. A number of companies were coming together for the purpose of making an amalgamation. It is suggested in some quarters that some of those companies are not now at this moment actuarially sound. It is admitted that certain of those companies are actuarially solvent. It is maintained by all the companies that, given time, and in the ordinary development of their business, they will all become actuarially solvent. The Minister intervenes in the middle of the amalgamation between the companies, some of which are admittedly solvent, and claims as a free grant 100,000 shares as his share in the equity of the amalgamated company. He may say that he is entitled to that in respect of so much of the State's money as is poured into the insolvent companies to make them solvent. He is getting that share of the equity not only from the companies into whose business he has poured money, but he is also getting it from the companies whose business is now solvent and who did not require any of his money at all.
Now insurance affairs and the substance of this agreement are extremely complex, but I think the Minister will admit that if any one or two of the insurance companies concerned in this amalgamation are solvent he is, through the medium of these 100,000 shares which he gets for no consideration, taking from those companies part of their equity for no reason—good, bad or indifferent—except that he facilitated them by the passage of the Insurance Act of 1936 and the amalgamation which is now going through.
Inasmuch as none of the companies wanted amalgamation, inasmuch as all the companies thought they could do much better by standing on their own, if allowed to go on, it seems to be a hard thing to force a solvent company into amalgamation, and then to find £25,000 or whatever contribution of the equity that will represent, under the terms of legislation of this House. I can assure Deputy Norton that the Government are simply grabbing from them the share of the equity to which they have a title in justice. The only claim they can make upon it is to say to any insurance company that elected to stand out, rather than submit to that kind of intimidation: "Very well, stand out and try to force the pass." They have been forced by what appears to me to be common plunder on the part of the Government which in the amalgamation is looking for 100,000 shares for the help it gave, and for the worry it suffered. Devil much worry the Minister had in this transaction. Whatever it was he is mighty well out of it by getting 100,000 shares.
The answer to that is that the Minister is not getting 100,000 shares. The Minister is getting them as trustee for the taxpayers, and the taxpayers are getting them for facilitating the amalgamation. The Deputy's colleagues, and the speeches of Labour Deputies, indicated that these 100,000 shares are some compensation to the taxpayers for the worry, and for this large sum of money to facilitate amalgamation. There are other considerations. It is not quite correct for the Deputy to suggest that a number of the companies did not want to amalgamate, but decided to come under Government control because the Act of 1936 required them. It is quite true that it is the Government brought about amalgamation, and that it was Government policy to get to the position when there will be only one industrial insurance company doing business. That is our policy. The Act of 1936 set out to give effect to that policy. It gave facilities for amalgamation, and did more by giving the Minister for Industry and Commerce powers to go to any company, and to apply a test on a conservative basis of valuation, to discover whether it was solvent or not, and, if found to be insolvent, to take measures to find that out. That was the only power the Minister had to force a company to come into amalgamation, plus the fact that the circumstances under which industrial insurance business could be carried on, under the terms of the 1936 Act, were substantially different to those which previously prevailed, much more onerous on the companies, and much more difficult for them to carry on successfully in competition. These circumstances undoubtedly produced this amalgamation. We have sought only to facilitate this amalgamation, to make it possible, and to save some of these companies from the alternative of being liquidated. The shareholders are getting an asset in consideration of the passing of the business, even insolvent business. Even in the case of an insolvent company the shareholders are getting an asset. If they took the alternative some day of allowing themselves to be wound up, there would be no assets for the shareholders. Whatever assets were there would be for the policy-holders only. I do not think it is at all inequitable for the State to require, in addition to the shares in the equity of the companies actually subscribed in cash, this additional 100,000.
Not £100,000—shares.
I do not think it is at all unfair that the taxpayers should be given them over and above the cash subscriptions.
Having regard to the capital changes, it is more than 25 per cent.
Whichever is the lesser.
Taken on the basis of £9,000, it is a very big sum.
The Minister set out under the powers of the 1936 Act to enforce amalgamation. It is chopping logic on his part and he knows it, to say that he took powers under the Act to apply a criterion to the companies at this stage of their development which, if it had been applied to any of the great industrial insurance companies in Great Britain, at a similar stage of their development, would have bankrupt them all. Every great insurance company in England was insolvent at a similar stage of its career to that at which the Irish companies are in now. They were only actuarially unsound. But, by being given time, they became, not only actuarially solvent, but immense industrial undertakings, and are now amongst very wealthy corporations. It is idle to say that the Minister took no power to force amalgamation. He did. He took power to wind up companies not actuarially solvent on any given day. He knows that there is power to go to the Irish companies and to wind them up forthwith, and that that was his declared purpose.
Remember the Minister had not the power to wind them up.
He had power to go and put in trustees.
To go to the High Courts.
The Minister made it clear that if there was not amalgamation he would put trustees into the companies, under the powers of the 1936 Act and force amalgamation through his own agents. He made that perfectly clear and, in this House, warned the companies that unless they took steps immediately to give effect to Government policy, he would wind them up or take such other steps as would commend themselves to him to give effect to that policy. I do not want to go back into a discussion of the merits of the Insurance Act of 1936 at this stage, but it was in the light of that legislation that these insurance companies came together, and made up their minds that there was no use "bucking" the law, that while they were entitled to make a fight, once it had become the law the best thing was to go in and make the thing work. That is why the four companies came together. The House should remember the companies wanted nothing from the State except to be left alone. If the State obtruded itself upon them there is no use holding them up to odium, because they are doing what Dáil Eireann required them to do.
They do not want this money then?
Not if you repeal the Act of 1936. These companies were prepared to go on. If you want the Act of 1936 at this stage, the Irish industrial insurance companies are prepared to co-operate with the Oireachtas.
And they want the money?
How do you mean?
The Deputy stated that if the 1936 Act was repealed they did not want this money.
No. They must have this money because by the 1936 Act we have introduced standards which never obtained in Great Britain. The Act requires from industrial insurance companies in Ireland a thing which was never required in Great Britain. If these standards were introduced in Great Britain at the same stage as they have been introduced here, the Prudential Insurance Company, the Pearl, the Britannic or any of the great financial institutions there would have been wiped out. Let us be clear on that. It is because the House chose to do what was done that these companies are adopting this course. It is because of what this House did by the 1936 Act that this contribution of public money is necessary. It is not, I believe, a dead loss to the Exchequer. I think the Exchequer will get the bulk of the money back. It is not at the request of the insurance companies that the Treasury are taking this risk. It is at the instance of Oireachtas Eireann. So do not, having produced this baby, hand the baby over to the insurance companies and tell them that it is their fault.
I wish the baby could talk because we are very hazy about it.
From what obscurity is the Deputy suffering? What doubt has the Deputy? What difficulty is the Deputy in? What I resent is this, that people make the hazy kind of observations that there is something dark and concealed in this business and that they do not understand something but, when you ask them, "What is it you do not understand," they do not know. Nobody can explain something to a Deputy if he does not himself know what is puzzling him. All I want to make perfectly clear is that so far as the insurance companies are concerned they want none of it. If Dáil Eireann wants it it must take the steps to bring to a logical conclusion what it has set on foot, against the advice of the insurance companies, but do not blame the insurance companies or do not hold them up as beggars for public funds when in fact what they are doing is no more than to conform to the law of the land as enacted, in the teeth of their opposition, by this Oireachtas.
Would the Minister explain "to sell all or any of such shares"? It is a very bald statement as it stands.
It is in the common form in legislation of this kind. And I think the common form should be maintained.
We have had no other legislation of this kind, have we?
It is the common form of all similar Acts which authorised the Minister for Finance to acquire or hold shares and I do not think we should change the common form which existed. It is not intended that the Minister should in fact sell the shares but we do not want to tie up all future Governments in that regard.
I move amendment No. 2:—
In sub-section (2) (a), page 6, line 13, to delete the words "and policy-holders"; and, in line 14, after the word "Company", to add the words "and all persons interested in or in respect of policies issued by that Company."
This is a drafting amendment to make clear that the intention is that the transfer should be binding not only on the actual holders of policies but on all persons having any interest in the policies.
I move amendment No. 3:—
In sub-section (2), paragraph (b), page 6, line 19, to delete the word "either", and to delete line 20.
This is also a drafting amendment. It is proposed to delete words which are unnecessary here since the cases affected are fully covered by paragraph (e) of the same sub-section.
In regard to Section 9, amendment No. 4 is out of order. The Deputy has been so informed and is satisfied on the point.
Yes.
I move amendment No. 5:—
In paragraph (d), page 9, line 25, after the word "persons" to insert the words "to whom compensation is paid in pursuance of the Scheduled Agreement,".
I suggest that this amendment be taken as covering amendment No. 6.
Yes, it is the same. This amendment is required to bring the paragraph into line with the scheduled agreement, article 27, paragraph (iii). It is intended that the paragraph should apply only to persons who take compensation.
On Section 9 this particular clause is not part of the agreement, this clause that the Minister is putting in. Much would depend on the compensation which would be paid. Obviously if the person is to be superannuated, to be compensated by gratuity or anything of that sort, it is in respect of loss of employment and it terminates his equitable case in respect of the interruption occasioned by that loss of employment. That settles that. But it does appear to impose penal terms that, in addition to that, he is not to be entitled to get employment for a period of 12 months unless with the terminating company or the permanent company. Obviously these persons here had experience with industrial insurance or life insurance. That is the sort of occupation to which they are accustomed, and for 12 months they must do nothing. Could the Minister give us a reason for that? Unless I am wrong, whatever terms they are to get under the agreement settles merely the interruption of service, compensates them in respect of that. What is the Minister's reason for going outside that and saying that for 12 months they must take up no employment with any other person engaged in this assurance business?
I am not sure whether the Deputy said that the scheduled agreement does not provide for that limitation on the right of persons who get compensation. The agreement does provide it. We are merely bringing this section of the Bill into conformity with the agreement. The agreement provides on page 33, subparagraph (v)
that no person to whom compensation is paid in pursuance of this agreement shall, during the period of 12 calendar months immediately following the transfer date, be employed by or serve in any assurance company other than the permanent company and/or the terminating company in relation to life assurance and/or industrial assurance business.
In this section we are merely giving effect to that provision of the agreement. I think if the Deputy examines that matter he will see there must be some such provision there if the interest of these companies is to be protected. So far as the great bulk of the employees are concerned, leaving out of account those who are less than two years in insurance business or whose earnings are very small, or who have passed 60 years of age, the provision of the scheduled agreement concerning them is that they can at their own choice get employment with the permanent company or compensation. It is obviously undesirable that you should put the agents of some of the participating companies into the position that they could take compensation in lieu of employment from the amalgamated company and then proceed to go out and work actually against it, transferring to some other company whatever business they can influence in their locality and so forth. I think the amalgamated company is entitled to protect its interest in that regard, and to say to these persons, "If you want to remain in insurance business you can do so." We are not proposing that these people must be compulsorily idle for the 12 months' period. They can take employment at their existing remuneration in the amalgamated company, but if they do not take that employment, if they elect to take compensation instead, then I think it is not unfair that they should not be at liberty to go to some competing concern and use their influence with the policy-holders of the amalgamated company in the locality, to get them to transfer not to this company but to transfer their policies to some other company. If the Deputy is concerned with the possibility of a person now working at a salary being given compensation and told not to work for 12 months that is not the position, because these people can at their own choice get work with the permanent company. The permanent company has no right under the terms of the agreement to refuse them employment.
There are two classes of persons, one of which would be the collectors. Obviously, they are not going to be dismissed. If they are, they will be compensated, I presume?
Yes.
Assuming that the compensation is satisfactory—and I have very grave doubts that it will be —in that case the man must remain idle for 12 months as far as the insurance business is concerned.
He is not compelled to take compensation; he is offered employment at his average salary.
He had the right, before this agreement, of severing his connection with any one of the companies and going to another company.
But he would not get compensation.
He might get a better job, but in this case he cannot. It is in respect of the interruption of his work that he is getting the compensation. The penalty in this case seems to me to be too great. That is not in the agreement.
But he does not have to take that course.
Let us assume that a man is six months out and he gets an offer of an engagement. It may not be there for him six months later. It seems to be very hard lines on him that he cannot take it. I have in mind now a collector or a canvasser. I quite see that, although it may not be a remunerative or an important position, there may be the point in it that the man could take some business away with him that a company might otherwise get. What about a person on the executive or the staff side? He cannot either, I presume. Take one of the chief clerks. Does it mean that he cannot go to any other company, that if a vacancy arises he cannot take it.
He cannot take that and compensation at the same time. If he wants to work with another insurance company he can go, but he cannot take compensation.
He cannot do any insurance or assurance work for 12 months; he must remain idle. A position offers and he would suit it, but he cannot take it.
Not if he is electing to take compensation. That limitation applies only to persons who take the compensation. It is open to such a person to say "I will take this other job instead of taking compensation."
How much will the average compensation be in the one case and in the other? Is it not five years' maximum in one case?
According to the duration of the service, it is a week's salary for every three months' service.
Then if he is four years in the service he gets 16 weeks and for the 16 weeks that he gets he cannot take a job for 12 months.
But he may be offered at once a job with this company.
I submit that he has no option. He goes out. He sees that circumstances are going to be different and he goes off with his 16 weeks' pay in his pocket. In the 17th week there is a job open and he cannot take it.
He has two choices at the beginning. He can say to himself: "I can go into this company and I am guaranteed employment there at the same salary as I am getting now, taking the average of the past two years. I cannot be dismissed for redundancy by that company. I have an alternative. I can take the 16 weeks' salary and if I do I know I cannot take a job with another insurance company for a year." He can take either course. There is even a third course. He can say: "I will not take the compensation or employment, but I will be free to take another post that is offered to me." In any case he makes the choice with his eyes open.
Even if he takes the 16 weeks' compensation and takes a job thereafter, all that can happen is that he would be required by the amalgamated company to surrender the 16 weeks' compensation?
No, it becomes an offence; it is being made an offence.
What are the sanctions?
He can be fined a sum not exceeding £100.
He would want to be 12 years in the employment of the company before he would get sufficient to compensate him.
He gets his job anyhow. We are dealing with the case of a person who deliberately refuses employment and who decides to have the lump sum instead. He knows the condition that attaches to the taking of the lump sum. If he does not like that he can take the guaranteed employment at his present salary.
There is another point that I consider to be important. It is with reference to employees of the participating companies who for one reason or another are dismissed from the employment of the new company in the near future. Under a special scheme, if an employee of an insurance company was dismissed he would be entitled to receive unemployment insurance benefit, the rate allowed being 20/- per week as against the statutory rate of 15/- a week. If any of these people go out of the employment of the insurance societies what will happen in so far as their unemployment insurance is concerned in the future? Will what they have paid in be transferred to the National Health in the ordinary way or what will their position be? Will they still be entitled to the higher rate of benefit? The Minister has made certain agreements with the directors. Has he taken this point into consideration?
If the Deputy would give me notice of that, I will get a report on it.
Is compensation limited to those who have a yearly income of £50?
No.
I understood there was a £50 limit.
Anybody whose earnings average less than 20/- a week has only one choice, and that is compensation. He may be employed by the company, but the company are not bound to employ him. The company are only bound to offer employment to persons who came into the insurance business before the 1936 Act, persons who were earning more than 20/- a week or who are more than 60 years of age. That guarantee of employment is limited to those dependent for their livelihood upon the insurance business. There are part-time agents getting a small weekly salary and we are not guaranteeing them.
Down the country that may be their sole means of livelihood.
And it is quite possible it may be in the interests of the company to continue them in employment.
They will be compensated on generous rates of salary working out less than 20/- a week.
Mr. Byrne
Can these men for whom you are not providing join another company?
Persons not concerned with this offer of employment can. There is no limitation upon anybody unless they elect to take compensation.
But they must take it. The company is not compelled to offer them employment in this case.
No.
If the company does not act there is no choice for the employee. The company simply can say "You can take a few pounds, and that finishes you." As far as the company is concerned, these men are debarred from taking up employment elsewhere.
They can decline to take any compensation.
But if they get that compensation without any offer of work from the company they are debarred from taking up employment elsewhere.
It was not an uncommon thing in the past for men to lose their employment.
Oh, but those were the un-Christian days before the Constitution.
Mr. Byrne
If they remain on with a company that does not give them a decent week's wages at the work they are doing, and if there is an opportunity of their getting better wages, can they accept that offer?
They are at perfect liberty to do so, but they cannot accept compensation in these circumstances.
Mr. Byrne
If they remain on without taking compensation, and they find that their earnings are too small, is there any bar to their going into the employment of another company?
No; unless they take compensation.
But there is a bar if they take compensation, even though no work is offered to them by the company in which they were working?
Yes, for 12 months.
Mr. Byrne
But if the new company write and say "We do not want you," what are these men to do?
Only in respect of two classes. The company must take over everybody who is now employed by the amalgamating companies. The exceptions are persons who have been employed for less than two years in the insurance business with these companies or persons who are earning on an average less than 20/- a week. These people are not covered. Anybody who is earning more than 20/- a week and who has been for two years in the insurance business with these companies must be given employment.
Mr. Byrne
A young man has been, say, nearly two years in the employment of an insurance company and he is trying to build up a reputation at insurance business for himself. The position is that if that young man, after his period of service in this business, takes a month's pay or whatever the compensation is, he is not allowed to follow the business in another company for an entire year.
If he is two years in the insurance business he is offered employment in the existing company. These two years' limitations have been put in to prevent insurance companies, owing to the nature of the agreement, taking people now into their employment merely for the purpose of securing compensation. That is why this restriction has been put in. It is only those who were not employed before the passing of the 1936 Act and those who were earning less than 20/- a week who are eliminated. The latter class are eliminated because their insurance employment earnings are so small that they could not be said to be dependent on them. Anybody who is earning over 20/- a week on an average and who has two years' service cannot be dismissed.
A young man may be earning less than 15/- a week, and in practice he may be dependent on that for his livelihood. Such a man would have no choice, if he is offered small compensation, but to accept it, and if he takes that compensation he cannot get employment in the insurance business for another year.
If they take compensation from this company, they cannot immediately go in and offer their services to a competing company.
Not for 12 months. They must remain idle for 12 months.
Must the company take a man who has over two years' service in their employment and earns over 20/- a week?
Yes.
Mr. Byrne
And any man who gets compensation is not to get employment?
That is not necessarily the case. The company is not bound to offer him employment.
Mr. Byrne
Take the case of a young fellow who has 18 months' service. He is earning 15/- to 18/- a week. He is slowly building up an insurance business. Now if that young fellow takes a few pounds compensation he is not permitted to go into another company though he has 18 months' service in the insurance business. How is he to live? I think the Minister will agree that this is a very hard case. I urge the Minister to say that they should get compensation for the loss of their employment, and at the same time allow them to go elsewhere to get an insurance position if possible.
Deputy Byrne knows better than most people in the House that there is a tremendous turnover in the personnel of persons doing that part-time business. To describe these people as people dependent on that part-time business for their livelihood is an abuse of the words. People who take part in that business on a part-time basis are not the type of persons we are inclined to safeguard. We are inclined to safeguard those persons who went into the business to get a livelihood for themselves. We had to define those people by rule of thumb methods and we are guaranteeing them a continuation of their employment.
It is clearly understood that a man who draws over £1 a week is to be offered a position and if he does not decide to accept that position then he is to get compensation. Can he be discharged without a charge of misconduct being brought against him or what protection has he afterwards?
There is a board of referees to protect him.
It is all very well for the Minister to say that these men are only in part-time employment but remember 15/- or 18/- a week means a certain income into a man's house. If he is deprived of that income he and his family will feel the loss. The compensation given is very small. A man would need to be 12 years in the employment of the insurance company before he would get the same amount he would get if he worked one year for that company. I think the basis of compensation should be something that would cover the time during which a man is prevented from taking up employment with another company. I do not think it is a good enough thing to pay a man compensation when he is discharged from one company and prevent him working for another company.
So far as the participating companies are concerned they are justified. But for this amalgamation these companies would go into liquidation and the persons employed by them would lose their employment.
There is an amendment to Section 10 in the name of Deputy Mulcahy. This amendment is out of order and the Deputy has been so informed. The amendment is outside the scope of the measure.
There is a point in connection with Section 10 that arises out of the agreement. I refer to Section 25 of the agreement and I think it is involved in Section 10. Section 25 of the agreement says:—
"Where the valuation of the net assets to be transferred by any participating company is less than the amount of the liability of such company the difference... shall be made good by the Minister for Finance.... In each case where the Minister for Finance pays the deficiency he shall be entitled to and receive and shall be allotted `A' shares in the terminating company to the number ascertained according to the formula, substituting for the assets in the formula the deficiency paid by the Minister...."
"Substituting" appears to me to be an incorrect word, unless it is intended to deprive the participating company of any share whatever. I should have thought that "adding" the Minister's contribution would have been better than "substituting." I assume that there are some assets belonging to the participating company, however small they may be. That is taken away. Is it intended in this case, where there is a deficiency, to give the company no claim towards an allotment of shares?
Every company will get some shares. There will be some allocation of shares to it. The formula set out in paragraph 15 will be applied, that is, the net assets as ascertained over the net liability as ascertained will be multiplied by the goodwill, which is a year's premium income. It is upon that basis that the allocation of shares to the participating companies will be made. Whatever sum is secured as a result of that calculation will determine the number of shares they will get. If the net assets do not equal the liabilities, there will be a deficiency in the funds of the terminating company. It is that deficiency which will be made good by the Minister for Finance, but the formula could not result in a minus, if that is what the Deputy has in mind.
Will the company get the benefit of what assets there are over the liability, multiplied by the goodwill?
Yes.
I move amendment No. 8:—
In sub-section (1), page 10, line 1, to delete the word "first".
This is a verbal change, the purpose of which is to apply the provisions of the section not only to the first directors of the terminating company but to all the directors.
What is it proposed to pay the directors?
I do not think the figure has been fixed, but it will be a matter of £100 or £200 a year—the usual directors' fees.
I move amendment No. 9:—
In sub-section (2), page 10, line 13, after the word "company" to add the words "or to the permanent company".
This is a drafting amendment.
I move amendment No. 10:—
In sub-section (3), line 14, to delete the word "first" and to insert, after the word "Company", the words "or the Permanent Company", and, in line 15, to delete the words "that Company" and to substitute the words "either of those Companies."
In a sense this is a drafting amendment. Its purpose is to extend to the directors of the permanent company the same protection given by the sub-section to the directors of the terminating company.
What is the general intention in connection with the directors of the participating companies who will receive compensation? Is it intended that any of these may come back as directors of the terminating company or the permanent company? Obviously, we should have more information on that point. The State is going to put up a substantial amount of capital to provide fairly decent compensation for these directors. We want to know whether, at a later date, when compensation has been received, and in a period outside 12 months from the date of receiving it, we will find these people back again as directors in the new company. We ought to know whether we are going to provide compensation and, at a later date, be faced with the position of some of these directors being directors of the terminating company or the permanent company.
That part of the agreement which deals with compensation of directors makes provision for the case of directors who might be offered posts of any kind with the new company. The amount of the compensation provided will be reduced and, in some cases, will disappear altogether, if they are offered that employment. I do not know if the Deputy has in mind somebody in the company being compensated for loss of office and offered a directorship in five or ten years' time. There is no provision against that, and I do not think we can provide against it.
The Minister is going to control the shares in the permanent company and the terminating company, and we ought to have some declaration of the Government's intention. Is it intended to compensate a director of the participating companies and at a later stage, instal him as a director of the terminating company or the permanent company?
I think I can assure the Deputy that nobody will get compensation who, in our opinion, can be more usefully employed by these companies.
That is a very equivocal statement. We are setting out to give a director five times his annual income, and, if he is a chairman, seven times his annual income. That amounts to quite a substantial sum. Are we likely to be confronted with the position in which, after giving him five times his annual income, we may 12 months or two years hence, find that person installed as a director of the permanent company or the terminating company? If we are, it is crazy economics and crazy generosity, and I want to know the intention of the Government which is going to control both the terminating company and the permanent company.
Mr. Byrne
Who will be responsible for the distribution of the compensation to the chairman and directors? Will anyone in the Minister's Department see to it that every member of the company who is going out will get a fair share of compensation, or will it be the company itself which will allocate the compensation?
The company itself.
Mr. Byrne
Has the Minister no power to see that each director will get a fair share? He is now going out through no fault of his own, and there may be some circumstances in which a man who is a chairman of a company will get nothing. There may be a case of a chairman or director who is losing his office for some reason, and his board of directors may think that he is not entitled to compensation. Is the Minister not empowered to see that that individual gets his proper compensation? I have a particular case in mind.
The case the Deputy has in mind relates to a particular company for whom special provision has been inserted. That provision limits the maximum amount that can be paid in compensation to the directors of the company, irrespective of what the calculation may produce for any director. The maximum amount which can be paid to any director is limited, and it is the board of the company will decide how that limited amount is to be distributed between individual members. I could not possibly take the responsibility of making the distribution myself.
Mr. Byrne
Would the Minister not ask the company to make a statement to him as to how the compensation was divided? I have a definite case in mind in which it is possible for a chairman of a company, for some reason or another—I do not think it is a matter of short service—to go out, and rumour has it that he is going out, is losing his appointment, and that he will not get a penny. I should like the Minister to have some power, through his Department, to see that anybody who is now going out will get something in the way of compensation.
I have not that power. I have not been given that power by the agreement which these amalgamated companies have prepared, nor do I think I would accept it even if they did propose to give it to me. With regard to the amount of compensation to be given, that is limited to a certain sum which is set out in the agreement. The members of the board themselves decide how that money is to be distributed between individual members.
Mr. Byrne
I want the Minister to say that the five directors, or the four, three, or two directors, as the case may be, shall get a certain amount of compensation.
I cannot decide that.
Mr. Byrne
Will the Minister make an inquiry into the matter?
I am fully aware of the case the Deputy has in mind, but there is nothing I can do about it, nor do I think I should take upon myself the responsibility of deciding the claims of individual members in the particular circumstances of these cases. They must make the decision themselves, and if they decline to make a decision, or make a foolish decision, that is their affair. I am afraid that I cannot take the responsibility. In the particular case to which Deputy Norton refers, the agreement sets out that if a director accepts office he loses his right to compensation. There is nothing which meets the particular point the Deputy has in mind, namely, that somebody may get compensation now and, in the course of time, be appointed a director. There is nothing in the agreement which prevents it, although I cannot see any responsible Minister for Finance agreeing to do so unless some other question of compensation arose.
Surely, the framers of the Bill must have contemplated, when they were depriving the directors of these companies of their fees, the question of the possibility of these directors coming back. Are these people being given five or seven years' compensation in fees for getting out, or are they being given it for keeping out? There might be some question as to whether or not the sum was sufficient compensation for having to leave a company, but there is the question of the possibility of their coming back again.
According to this, we are going to provide the directors with five years' income, which will normally sustain them, in respect of directors' fees, for a period of five years. What I want to know is this. Is there a possibility that, 18 months after getting compensation, these people will be, or may be, reinstalled in the terminating or the permanent company, getting their scale of fees, whatever it may be then, and being enabled to put the difference into their pockets? I think that we ought to have a very explicit declaration of policy from the Minister in this regard. I think we should not give these people compensation at all if there is a possibility of their coming in again, and we ought to know where the Minister and the Government stand in that regard.
I agree with the Deputy that a person in that position who has already been awarded compensation should not be offered the position of a director in these companies.
Accordingly, the Minister's position is that if these people get compensation, they should stay out?
I do not want to say that they should stay out for all eternity, or for the rest of their lives, but I certainly would say that they should stay out within any reasonable period after the period of compensation.
During the period that their compensation covered, anyway?
Certainly.
Is that provided for in the agreement?
It is not in the Bill.
Nor in the agreement?
No.
Does the person concerned commit a statutory offence in such a case?
Where?
By becoming a director in another company?
No.
But the ordinary worker commits a statutory offence in a similar case, does he not?
There is a lot of these directors, and I hope the competing companies get them. However, if that director takes office he is not entitled to compensation.
But supposing he takes compensation and then takes a directorial position, does he thereby commit a statutory offence?
With another company?
No.
Within 12 months?
No.
But an ordinary employee does?
The Deputy knows as well as I do——
Will the Minister pardon me? Does the ordinary employee commit an offence in such a case?
Yes.
Can the Minister explain the difference?
Yes.
I should like to know whether or not the Minister has power, on the Report Stage, to insert an amendment in accordance with what he thinks, as he has suggested, the situation ought to be. The Minister has said that he agrees that a person who had been a director and who has been compensated should not be brought back as a director during the period of years of compensation. Has the Minister power, between this and the Report Stage, to bring in an amendment the effect of which would be to prevent that being done?
I should like to draw the Minister's attention, in this connection, to Section 9 of the Bill, which says:
"The following provisions shall have effect in relation to all persons who are in the employment, whether as directors, executives, members of the staff or otherwise of a participating company."
Then, paragraph (d) of that section says:
"It shall not be lawful for any of the said persons"
—the said persons being those referred to—
"before the expiration of 12 months from the transfer date, to enter into or be engaged in the employment or service of any assurance company, other than the terminating company and the permanent company."
Yes, but we were talking about directors, not about employees.
Yes, directors.
Who take office, certainly; but that is not Deputy O'Sullivan's point. He was talking about such people becoming directors of another company.
I think that the nett point is that an employee who gets compensation cannot take employment in another insurance company for 12 months and that, if he wants to get employment during that period, he must get it in some outside employment. What I want to know is whether a director who gets compensation on, say, Monday morning, can take a post as director of another insurance company on the following Friday evening?
No, he cannot.
Would the Minister answer the question I put to him?
Does a director, who has received compensation on the Monday morning and who takes a directorate on the following Friday, commit a statutory offence thereby, or is he guilty of an offence?
Yes.
The Minister said: "No" before.
I should like to have an answer to my question.
These directors are appointed by the Minister for Finance, and I suppose it comes to the same thing in the long run.
But everything they do is being done by the power they receive from this House.
No. We are dealing now with something which concerns the Minister for Finance. It is he who has the appointment of these directors.
Would the Minister agree that, once the liability with regard to compensation for these people, and so on, under this agreement, is discharged, it is no infraction of the agreement to make another provision to the effect that such a person as we have in mind cannot get back as a director during the period covered by that period of five or seven years, as the case may be, once he has received compensation?
I think it would be quite reasonable, but it must be remembered that the question of appointment rests with the Minister for Finance.
But this is a Government Bill.
It is not free to the company to appoint or make these people directors. It is only the Minister for Finance who can do it.
Here is a Government measure—not a measure proceeding from the Minister for Industry and Commerce. When we pay compensation to a director, giving him five times his annual income, is it unreasonable to ask that he should not be allowed to come back, at least within that five years? Personally, I would keep him out altogether.
Without repaying the whole or a proportionate part of the compensation.
But there is no provision in the Bill, beyond the assurance of the Minister, which has no restrictive effect at all.
Quite.
As it is a Government measure, surely the Minister ought to bring before the Executive Council the question of submitting an amendment to prevent what would be a gross abuse.
If you got a Minister for Finance who would act in that particular way the provisions of the Bill would not stop him. The Bill could be amended.
The Minister knows what happened in the case of the transport workers. He ought to make sure that the same does not happen here.
Is not the Minister's whole philosophy: "Trust me and trust the Minister for Finance, and you do not need a Bill or an agreement at all?"
That has nothing whatever to do with the agreement.
Exactly. That is my point. When I tried to amend the Bill I was told I could not do so because it would interfere with the agreement. Now, when I want an amendment which does not affect the agreement I will not be allowed to put it in because it has nothing to do with the agreement.
Disallowed by a different authority.
I am not questioning the fairness or the logic of your ruling, Sir. The Minister thinks it is desirable that a director who gets compensation should not be allowed back as a director of the terminating or permanent company. There is nothing in the agreement which makes an amendment of this Bill an infraction of the agreement. Why, therefore, if it is desirable that that should not happen, should he not put in a definite barrier to prevent those persons from coming back within a certain period? It is no infraction of the agreement, and if it is desirable in the Minister's view, surely we ought to enshrine it in this legislation?
I think it is unnecessary.
Why? Trust the Minister for Finance?
A most trustworthy person.
Why have a Bill at all? Why not say: "This agreement shall be given effect to in the wisdom and justice of the Minister for Finance," and not trouble to have a Bill drafted at all. This is making a caricature of Parliament. It is not the first time that has happened.
Hear, hear!
Mr. A. Byrne
I am sure the Minister will forgive me if I press my point again. It is possible that the Minister, in the next stage of the Bill, might be able to introduce an amendment reading something like this: "Every director losing his office because of this Act of Parliament shall receive or must receive his proportionate share of the compensation allotted by the Government for that purpose."
I am afraid I cannot agree to that. The Deputy is trying to do something which is not our concern. The board of an insurance company gets for the payment of compensation to the directors a sum of money—£9,000 or £10,000. In a particular case that board of directors may come together and decide: "We are going to give the whole of this £10,000 to one of our number and take none ourselves." The Deputy wants me to step in and say: "You must not do that." I see no reason why I should not say that people must suffer the effects of their own folly, nor do I consider that it is an obligation which a Minister of State should undertake— to intervene in the affairs of a company of that kind and determine upon some basis or another that one director should get so much and another so much more, if the directors say: "We do not want it. We are prepared to give it to A.B."
May I ask why should the Minister have any hesitancy in producing an amendment on the next stage to implement what he thinks is desirable and necessary? I do not see why the Minister should have any hesitancy about that. We are going to great pains in the Bill to prevent the ordinary worker——
I agree that it is desirable to take a certain course. As to the necessity for amending the Bill, I do not agree.
Would the Minister give us some valid reason why, having declared that a thing is desirable, he will not introduce a provision in this Bill to ensure that what is desirable must be given effect to?
Because it will be given effect to.
It will, if the Minister for Finance thinks it desirable, but if he does not think it desirable it will not be given effect to. Therefore, the House having passed the Bill, may find itself in the position that a director who has been given five times his annual income will come back 18 months afterwards to direct another company. The Minister says that is not desirable, but there is no provision in the Bill to prevent the Minister for Finance from doing that which is an outrage.
Does the Minister mean that it is optional to the Minister for Finance to refuse to sanction the appointment of such a director?
Has not the Minister for Finance the option to do wrong?
He says the Minister for Finance is a most trustworthy person.
That kind of pathetic declaration of faith makes no appeal to me.
I hope the Deputy does not expect us to join him in his declaration of unfaith.
I still want to know why something which the Minister says is desirable is not embodied in the legislation, and why we should give the Minister for Finance the option to do wrong?
There are a whole lot of desirable things which are not embodied in legislation.
I should like to know also how many directors of the terminating company we are protecting?
What does the Deputy mean?
Section 11 deals with the protection of the first directors of the terminating company. I want to know how many directors have been appointed, and who the directors are?
Five directors have been appointed.
Have been appointed?
Have been invited to act.
Would the Minister say who has been invited to act, and how many have accepted? We have had no official declaration on that aspect of the matter.
The names were published in the Press. If the Deputy puts down a parliamentary question I will give them to him.
That is not treating the House fairly.
I think it is treating the House quite fairly.
I ask the Minister for Industry and Commerce, who is piloting this Bill through the House, who are the directors, and he says the names were published in the Press. Surely that is treating Parliament in a very cavalier fashion? Surely we ought to know who the Minister has appointed? Surely we ought to know who is going to spend this half a million of money?
I think the Deputy should let the Bill pass through without regard to personalities at all.
I am not concerned with personalities.
I think that is all the Deputy is concerned with.
I want to know who are the five directors of the terminating company. I think we ought to be able to get that information from the Minister who is charged by this House with the responsibility for insurance legislation, and that we ought not to have to look in the newspapers for it. We ought to be able to get from the Minister information as to who they are, who have been invited to act as directors, who has accepted, and how many of them have accepted. That is a very reasonable question to ask in a House of Parliament.
The names were, in fact, mentioned in the House.
Is there any objection to giving them to the House? The Minister is behaving as if there were an objection.
There is none, except that it has become the practice in this House, when names are mentioned, to make those persons the subject of personal attack. I want to protect business people who accept the Government's invitation to act on a board of this kind from the sort of attack which we have already had here to-day. Speaking from memory, the persons invited to act——
On a point of order, might I ask whether, in your hearing, Sir, any names were mentioned in connection with this terminating company? I did not hear them.
I did not hear the directors' names mentioned to-day, but I have not been in the Chair all through the debate. The Chair should not be drawn into the discussion.
The Minister said they were mentioned.
The names are going to be mentioned now.
The Chair has always been very careful to prevent any such attack.
We are only ruffling the Minister's feelings if we ask for any information on this Bill.
The people who were invited to act are:—Senator J.C. Dowdall, Mr. John O'Neill, Mr. Esmonde O'Brien, Mr. D.J. O'Donoghue and Mr. F.P. Symmons.
Would the Minister say——
I am not going to be cross-examined by Deputy Norton or anyone else.
And I am not going to be muzzled by the Minister.
The Deputy had better proceed by way of speech.
I am going to ask in this House, whether the Minister likes it or not, any question which the Chair permits to be asked in this House and which is within the rules of Parliamentary discussion. I want to know how many of these directors have accepted. I can recognise four of the names. I cannot recognise the fifth name, but I understand the fifth director is an ex-official of the Prudential Insurance Company. I want to know what post does that gentleman occupy and whether it was not possible for the Government to find a citizen of Éire to fill the position which that gentleman will occupy. He is going to handle £500,000 of our money and we ought to have some information about him.
Have you any information that he is not a citizen of Éire?
I submit that this matter is irrelevant to the section.
I merely intervene to make this inquiry: whether we are going to establish in this country the principle that no citizen of Great Britain is to get employment here because, if that principle is to be established, I should like to ask those who propose to establish it what is going to happen to the 75,000 Irish people who left this country and have got jobs in Great Britain during the last three years? If that principle is to be applied to our people all over the world, it is going to create a very awkward precedent for those who wish to establish it in this country.
That is a problem which does not arise on this Bill and which may not be discussed. On the Schedule the Deputy will get an opportunity of asking for the information he desires regarding the directors of the terminating company.
Am I going to get any information from the Minister as to which of the five people invited to act have consented to act?
All of them.
Can I get any information as to whether it was not possible to get a citizen of Éire as the fifth director?
That is a discussion that I do not propose to enter into.
Then I will challenge a division on the section.
Tá
- Allen, Denis.
- Bartley, Gerald.
- Beegan, Patrick.
- Boland, Gerald.
- Bourke, Dan.
- Brady, Brian.
- Brady, Seán.
- Breathnach, Cormac.
- Breen, Daniel.
- Brennan, Martin.
- Breslin, Cormac.
- Byrne, Alfred.
- Byrne, Alfred (Junior).
- Childers, Erskine H.
- Cooney, Eamonn.
- Corry, Martin J.
- Crowley, Tadhg.
- Derrig, Thomas.
- De Valera, Eamon.
- Dowdall, Thomas P.
- Flynn, Stephen.
- Fogarty, Patrick J.
- Friel, John.
- Fuller, Stephen.
- Gorry, Patrick J.
- Harris, Thomas.
- Hogan, Daniel.
- Humphreys, Francis.
- Kelly, James P.
- Kelly, Thomas.
- Kennedy, Michael J.
- Killilea, Mark.
- Kissane, Eamon.
- Lemass, Seán F.
- Loughman, Francis.
- Lynch, Finian.
- Lynch, James B.
- McDevitt, Henry A.
- McEllistrim, Thomas.
- Maguire, Ben.
- Meaney, Cornelius.
- Mullen, Thomas.
- Munnelly, John.
- O'Briain, Donnchadh.
- O Ceallaigh, Seán T.
- O'Grady, Seán.
- O'Loghlen, Peter J.
- O'Reilly, Matthew.
- O'Rourke, Daniel.
- O'Sullivan, Ted.
- Rice, Brigid M.
- Ruttledge, Patrick J.
- Ryan, James.
- Ryan, Robert.
- Sheridan, Michael.
- Smith, Patrick.
- Walsh, Richard.
- Ward, Conn.
Níl
- Corish, Richard.
- Everett, James.
- Hickey, James.
- Hurley, Jeremiah.
- Keating, John.
- Keyes, Michael.
- Norton, William.
- Pattison, James P.
In discussing this matter yesterday evening, the Minister for Industry and Commerce told us that the arrangement provided for in the Schedule presupposed the existence of an arrangement by which the terminating company would take over the business of the participating companies and wind up that business; that coincidentally, or perhaps some time subsequently, a new permanent company would be established, and that that permanent company would write new policies and carry on as a permanent company. I think it came as a surprise to most people to learn that the terminating company has to continue in existence for the purpose of winding up the business of the existing companies. When I put to the Minister a question as to whether this company was likely to continue in being for a period of 30 years, he said that was quite possible. I take it that if there is a policy with a participating company likely to extend over that period, 30 years hence we shall have a situation whereby we may have the terminating company in existence with five directors of that company, and the company handling a premium income of something about £1,000 a year. Is it contemplated that the terminating company shall at a certain period review its position actuarially and transfer its business to the permanent company?
It is.
What is the section dealing with that?
It is provided for in the functions of the terminating company set out in the agreement.
That it may do it or that it shall do it?
It is empowered to do it.
The terminating company may hand over to the permanent company. But the operating company is not empowered to take over from the terminating company.
It is empowered to take over.
The Minister nodded his head to the first question but does he say that the operating company has power to take over?
The terminating company will be subordinate to the permanent company.
Are we likely to have a situation whereby in 1968 we shall still have in existence the permanent company and the terminating company?
In theory, it may happen.
Is it not possible for the Minister to devise a situation whereby we will not have two companies of that kind in existence, one waiting for a kind of actuarial death and the other hoping to reach the full height of insurance manhood? Surely it should be possible to have the terminating company absorbed in the permanent company after some time?
That is the intention.
What is the provision in the scheduled agreement whereby that can be brought about?
There is nothing in the agreement which prevents it.
I know, but the Minister has admitted that in theory it is possible that both companies may be in existence 30 years hence. That is a clumsy arrangement.
Let us discuss that. Why is it a clumsy arrangement? I think it is the best arrangement. If you are going to wind up your existing fund, is it not better to do that without involving the operating company in the winding-up contracts of insurance which it has been necessary to treat in a special way? The whole object of this legislation is to start off insurance in this country on an entirely new basis. Before this, you had a number of companies operating under a different code of law and competing for business in a very restricted area. Under the new arrangement we are going to have one large company operating what is virtually a monopoly and on an entirely different scale. Afterwards we expect it to deal with business which was formerly handled by such large companies as the Prudential and Britannic. Is it not much better to keep the two things apart? Let the existing fund wind itself up and let the new company function exclusively on foot of its own contracts. You must realise that these four companies each had its own variety of policies, all of which have got to be brought together in this one winding-up operation.
It might be that, when you examine all the policies of these four amalgamating companies, you will find that they were in the habit of issuing 40 different kinds of policies. We do not expect that in the new company there will be such a wide diversity of detail. They will have their own standard set of policies and you do not want to be bringing into their valuation, and their daily work, the whole variety of policies which may subsist through the four companies now amalgamated. It may be possible, of course, to standardise the policies but policy-holders may object to that and may say: "We entered into a contract with the City of Dublin Insurance Company in 1927 and that is the contract we wish to stand." They have a right to do that, if they want to, and I do not think we ought to impose upon them a statutory obligation to take some other policy, if they wish to stand by their original contract.
Therefore, apart from condemning as a bad thing the complete segregation of the new position from the old, I think that probably we will find in practice that that is the right thing to do. It would be better let the old fund wind itself up in the ordinary way. Certainly from the point of view of arriving at a truer valuation of the shares which are going to be allocated to the four companies in exchange for their respective equities transferred to the amalgamated company, it would be much easier to revaluate these if the old fund is allowed to run itself out. I would advise the Minister to stand firmly by that. I was surprised to hear him say now that he contemplates the transfer of the bulk of the business of winding up companies to the new operating company, because if that is his plan, it is certainly a departure from what I understood was the best advice that the amalgamating companies had received.
It was always intended that after a period of time when the terminating company had eliminated the unhealthy sections of business which it will have acquired and when the permanent company will have become permanently established that the outstanding business of the terminating company would be transferred to the permanent company. The proper and the most suitable time for that is a question for future decision. The theory is to keep the terminating company until the last policy has been disposed and the last claim made. In practice there will come the stage when it may be a better job to transfer the outstanding business to the permanent company and wind up the terminating company.
That is the point that I am making. Deputy Dillon says it is better to allow the existing policies to be dealt with and finally discharged by the terminating company. In theory that may put you in the position that ultimately you will have a company looking after policies which yield in all a premium income of, say, £1,000 a year. How is that company to continue in existence for that purpose, particularly when for many years it may be only getting in that income and paying out much more in directors' fees? All the companies are likely to undergo an actuarial examination. We know what the relative position of the companies is. You have £500,000 of the State's money going in now to put them right. It should be possible at any period of the valuation to say: "Well, those policies are worth so much and the assets against them are so and so," but some arrangement should be made by which the permanent company could take over those policies and wind up for all time the terminating company.
Deputy Dillon says that the policy-holder might object to an arrangement of this kind. The policy-holder has not been troubled with too many worries so far as this Bill is concerned. Are the policy-holders to stand by and see companies that are insolvent still spending a substantial amount of their insolvent funds in paying compensation to directors on quite a substantial scale. How many individual policy-holders were asked whether they agreed with that or not. The policy-holder has simply had this Bill rolled through the Dáil and told that he must pay. That is what is happening. That is the aspect of the matter to which I object. I think that it would be good business to have the terminating company wound up as soon as possible, and to have the assets and liabilities transferred to the permanent company. It surely would be absurd to have two companies in existence in this country 20 or 30 years hence. The fact that the terminating company can continue in existence for possibly 30 years, in theory, under the Minister's statement, shows how misleading it is to describe it as a terminating company. In 30 years it may be a permanent company.
With regard to Deputy Norton's observations, the policy-holders have no grievance under this Bill. They are being guaranteed absolute security.
Were they consulted?
Whether they were consulted or not they are getting something they had no adequate reason to expect. The only persons who are getting a really good deal under the Bill are the policy-holders. They are riding high and handsome under it, and no matter what happens in the hereafter they have absolute security against any loss. Therefore, it becomes a matter of what business prudence demands. I take the view that it is better to let this fund run out. The Minister takes the view that it is better to let it run a certain distance before trying to transfer it to the terminating company. The directors may take a third view, or the Minister may change his mind. I think Deputy Norton will agree with me that, so far as the statute is concerned, on which there can be a wide difference between two people, the best thing to do is to leave a discretion. I take the view to let the fund run out. Deputy Norton thinks that it would be better to transfer the fund at the earliest possible moment to the operating company. In that situation, it would be better perhaps to leave the matter open, and place the responsibility upon whatever persons are chosen to operate the companies. Let them determine what is in the best interests of the policy-holders, the shareholders and their representatives.
It would be most unfair that the idea should go forth from this House that the terms of any policy entered into between a policy-holder and any of the participating companies have not been honoured to the last letter during the period of their operation, or that they will not be honoured in the future. The Bill provides for the honouring of every policy written by any of the four participating companies. These policies, as I have said, have been honoured to the last letter. On the Second Reading of the Bill, remarks were dropped, I do not know whether accidentally or intentionally, but from them it would be implied that policies were not being honoured. They have been honoured.
Surely the Deputy knows that certain of the companies are insolvent and cannot continue to honour their policies?
I dealt with that on the Second Reading of the Bill.
What is happening is, and it is desirable that it should be made clear, that if you die quickly you get your policy honoured, but if you happen to have the good fortune to live for a long time, there is the risk that you will not be paid. Deputy Kennedy is congratulating the people who die quickly, but he seems to have very little sympathy for the people who are likely to go on living.
On the section, it is provided in sub-section (2), paragraph (c), that "all dividends and other moneys received by the said Minister in respect of such shares, and also the net proceeds of all such shares sold by him shall be paid into the exchequer." I would like the Minister for Industry and Commerce to give us some idea as to what the State expects to get out of this company in the form of dividends, and on what grounds he bases his argument that moneys invested in this company are likely to yield a dividend.
I do not propose to offer any opinion on what the State will get in the form of dividends. I expect dividends will be paid. I see no reason to think that the business of the company will not be carried on properly.
This is a point on which I cannot get any information to convince me that the Minister is right. We have been told that there is a deficit of £500,000 amongst the participating companies. We cannot get any information as to how many of them are responsible for that deficit. The Minister will not give us any information. But the State is going to put in £500,000 in order to enable these companies to meet their liabilities to their policy-holders. In return for that £500,000 the State is to get shares. Shares in what? The £500,000 is mortgaged to meet the liabilities of the participating companies. What has the State got shares in? Normally, when one invests money in a company one expects that the shares subscribed will create assets, and these assets are a guarantee of the payment of future dividends. In this particular case the assets have been dissipated by insolvency. How then does the State hope to get dividends out of money which is being put aside to meet insolvency?
The liabilities of the company are calculated upon certain assumptions. There has to be a calculation as regards the expectation of life for everybody insured by the company. There is an estimate as to the assets of the company, and the pro bable earning capacity of those assets. The earning power of the assets has been fixed at 3½ per cent. under the agreement. If, in fact, the expectation of life should be better than is calculated, then the assets should earn more, and there will be a surplus unless there is an epidemic or a complete collapse of the fund. Having regard to the fact that both the liabilities and the assets are being calculated upon a conservative basis, the most reasonable assumption is that there will be a profit.
I must be very obtuse, but I still cannot see where the assets come in. Let us suppose that the Minister for Industry and Commerce insures Deputy Dillon for £500,000——
A terrible temptation!
The Deputy is full of vigour, but let us assume that the Minister insures Deputy Dillon for £500,000 and is suddenly presented with a claim for £500,000.
That would not be industrial insurance.
The Minister then finds himself in a financial dilemma and when he goes to the Minister for Finance the latter says: "I cannot meet this claim. I want to give him the £500,000 to meet the liability but, what I will do is, I will give him shares." Shares in what? I want to know what the shares are in. We are putting in £500,000 against a deficit and are to get shares, in what?
As to the policy for £500,000 on Deputy Dillon, I would work out the expectation of life. I am sure the Deputy understands that phrase, I would have to determine the sum which, invested at 3½ per cent., would produce £500,000 when Deputy Dillon might be expected to die. It is not a case of dealing with one case but a large number of cases. It is on the average the calculation would work out. If Deputy Dillon was paying premiums longer than anticipated, or if I earned more than 3½ per cent., I would be getting more profit. If the assets did not earn 3½ per cent. there would be a loss.
I will keep off this sepulchral subject, and the expectation of Deputy Dillon's death. Having considered what the Minister said in relation to the four participating companies, taking assets and liabilities, there is a deficit of £500,000, which this State is going to put in, and in return is to get shares. What assets are against these shares?
All the assets and all this fund of money which is required to be invested at 3½ per cent. to yield an amount to be rapid on policies transferred.
Is not this money mortgaged already against the liabilities of the companies?
Yes. I said that if they did not succeed in getting 3½ per cent. there might be a loss.
If we find that the liabilities are greater than the assets, we inject £500,000 to restore financial equilibrium in the four companies, and, in return we are to get shares. When I asked "shares in what," the Minister said shares in the funds that are there.
Shares in the operating company.
Shares in the company are not worth a halfpenny.
Of course, they are.
If that is abundantly clear I should like the Minister to tell us in what way this £500,000 will be used against the liabilities of the companies, because the assets do not cover the liabilities. When we have put in £500,000 to restore the equilibrium, we have done no more than this, that the expectation of a dividend on the £500,000 depends, I take it, on being able to get a yield of more than 3½ per cent. on the value of lives than are more strictly to standard than is normal. Is that the expectation?
If the board of the company wanted to realise profits quickly and unscrupulously they could do as many industrial insurance companies did in the past, by setting out deliberately to make policy-holders lapse policies. That has been done before. It is not usual now as of old, but they could have such a situation that in three or four years there would be no liabilities and no assets.
That is not the point. Is the expectation of dividends, if we spend this £500,000 dependent upon the ability of the new company to get an investment yield of more than 3½ per cent. on the one hand and, on the other hand, that it will not have to pay out so much of the funds by reason of there not being so many deaths as was anticipated? Do the expectations of dividends reside in that?
That is, if the earning power to the assets is lower, but I assume that there will be a profit.
Then we are to invest £500,000 on the chance of a better return on investments and less deaths?
One or the other. On the other hand, as Deputy Dillon said, the calculations are on a conservative basis.
It is the first time that Deputy Dillon was right. I admit it now.
I move amendment No. 12:—
In sub-section (1), paragraph (a), page 13, line 9, to delete all words from the word "and" to the end of the paragraph.
This is really a drafting amendment. The words it is proposed to delete were found to be unnecessary.
I move amendment No. 13:—
In sub-section (2), page 13, to delete paragraph (c).
On the section the four companies entering into this arrangement are described as the participating company. I should like to know from the Minister if there is one other company that has not come in.
Yes.
Can the Minister give any information as to whether that company is likely to come in, if there has been any communication as to its coming in, or any consultation as to policy, or as to whether it will come in at an early date, and the general attitude towards this one company, whose general standing would probably be small in relation to the permanent company carrying on business in the insurance world.
All I can say is that negotiations with the company were conducted and, as a result, it has not yet decided to come into the amalgamation, or decide on negotiations. I hope they do.
Did it intimate that it was standing out?
Yes.
Is there any likelihood of it coming in at a later date?
I cannot answer that.
Assuming that that company continues as a separate company, is it going to be obliged to conform to the same investment standard and mortality tables as the permanent company? If it is not to do that, is it going to be put into a worse position vis-a-vis the permanent company?
There is no question about its right to continue. It is perfectly entitled in law to continue.
If it has got no licence?
It has got a licence.
Surely it requires a renewal of the licence.
There is no question about the right to get it.
No matter how insolvent it may be?
It is only when the question of insolvency arises that any action by the Minister for Industry and Commerce would be taken.
The Minister admits that they must have a licence and must get a licence to renew their insurance business annually. Supposing this business is carried on on a basis which is not yielding on the one hand a 3½ per cent. investment on these mortality tables, the utilisation of the tables set out in this agreement, the OM Table and the English Life No. 8 Males Table, and suppose it is not able to conform to these standards and that it is in an insolvent position judged by these standards, does the Minister contemplate a situation whereby power would be taken to compel them to come into the permanent company?
There is no power to compel them.
What is going to happen to the policy-holder of that company?
I do not know if the Deputy is raising any question as to its solvency now?
No, I am not. What is going to be the position in the future in the case of a big permanent company, backed by the State's assets?
I must assume that the directors of the permanent company expect to continue on a profitable basis.
Assuming they cannot do that in relation to the standard imposed here, what is the position?
The Act of 1936 imposes upon the Minister for Industry and Commerce the obligation of supervising the affairs of insurance companies. If he thinks the company has got into an insolvent condition then he can take action in the High Courts for the purpose of winding up that company. That is the only power, and the question of insolvency has to arise before he can proceed.
Does the Minister contemplate that in the event of insolvency arising they may be required to come into this company?
On the contrary, they cannot be allowed to come into this amalgamation. In no future case will an insolvent company be allowed in. This Bill provides that the only companies that can participate in this amalgamation in future are those who are in a position to transfer in full assets equivalent to their liabilities.
Will the Minister say what other companies, which may be described as cross-Channel companies, are likely to come into this amalgamation in the near future?
Yes.
Which of them?
I have mentioned the Pearl, the Refuge, the Prudential.
Are they likely to come in at an early date?
I hope so.
And is there any prospect of the other Irish company coming in at an early date?
I have no idea.
The Minister is not as sanguine about the Irish company as he is about the cross-Channel companies.
I have no opinion on the subject whatever.
The Minister thought that the English companies would be likely to come in at an early date. Does he think the Irish company would be likely to come in at an early date? I want to get information on that point.
The Deputy cannot get that information.
I want to know where I stand.
The Deputy does not know, and I do not know.
Certain English companies are likely to transfer their business to this new company. We will have the position whereby practically all the companies operating within the country will be within the permanent company and one Irish company standing out.
Yes.
If one company is better than ten companies, one company is still better than two companies. Is there any prospect that the other Irish company will come into this amalgamation?
I cannot answer that question.
When is it proposed to take the Report Stage?
On Wednesday next.
I wonder if the Minister could leave it until Thursday?
I am quite prepared to leave it until Thursday, but I propose that it be put last in the Business Order for Wednesday next.
The Dáil adjourned at 5.35 p.m. until 3 p.m. on Wednesday, the 16th November.