Perhaps in introducting this measure, I might give the House a brief history of the problem with which it deals. Prior to March, 1932, the salaries of Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries were at the rates contemplated by the Ministers and Secretaries Act, 1924, that is to say, £2,500 for the office of President of the Executive Council; £1,700 for the other Ministers, and £1,100 for Parliamentary Secretaries, of which the equivalent of the Oireachtas allowance was free from taxation in each case. The Attorney-General was paid £2,500; the Ceann-Comhairle, £1,700; the Leas-Cheann Comhairle, £1,000; the Cathaoirleach of the Seanad, £1,200, and the Leas-Chathaoirleach, £1,000. As from the 9th March, 1932, by administrative action, the salaries which the House was asked to vote were reduced and the following salaries were paid free of tax:—The President of the Executive Council, £1,500; other Ministers, £1,000; Parliamentary Secretaries, £900; the Attorney-General, £1,500; the Ceann Comhairle, £1,000; the Leas-Cheann Comhairle, £700. The salaries of the Cathaoirleach and the Leas-Cathaoirleach were not altered and these rates remained in force until 21st July of last year.
It is necessary that I should refer to the salaries which were paid during the period from March, 1932, until July of last year, because I want to emphasise that those salaries have been found to be quite insufficient to permit a Minister to meet the demands which are made upon him. In February, 1937, the Executive Council decided that in view of the approaching general election it was necessary to make the normal provision for ministerial salaries and this was accordingly done in the Estimates for 1937-38. On the 25th February, 1937, the President of the Executive Council made a statement to the Dáil calling specific attention to this, and he added:—
"This does not mean that the Ministers and others affected will, during the period of office still to expire, accept the statutory scales. They will accept the same net sums as heretofore. A general election, however, is due to take place during the coming financial year and I am convinced that it is in the public interest that before the election, and before the new Constitution is put into operation, the question of the position and remuneration of the whole-time public representatives should be fully examined. At some stage, therefore, when the new Constitution is under discussion, I shall propose the setting up of an independent commission to inquire into the matter of the remuneration of Ministers and other such officers as will function under the new Constitution. The Dáil will then, on receipt of the report, be asked to take a decision on the matter."
This statement was received with approval in all quarters of the House. Some delay took place in securing the necessary personnel for the Committee of Inquiry, but it was appointed on the 4th June, 1937. The Dáil was dissolved on the 14th June and a general election took place on 1st July.
The Committee, in the course of its inquiry, heard evidence from the then President of the Executive Council, the then Minister for Finance, the former President of the Executive Council, Deputy Cosgrave, and Mr. J. J. McElligott, the secretary of my Department. Confidential information furnished on request was received from the then Attorney-General and from the three former holders of that office. On the 24th November, 1937, the majority report of that Committee was signed by 12 of the 14 members; one member presented a minority report and another member signed neither report. The report of this Committee is a very closely-reasoned document of the first public importance relating, as it does, to some of the highest and most important offices of the State. It will repay careful study by all who believe in representative democracy, as it touches one of the problems which that system has to face, that of securing good and clean government.
The main objects of the present Bill are, first, to implement these recommendations of the Committee of Inquiry which the Government have decided to accept and, secondly, to make the statutory provision required by the Constitution and for the remuneration of the Attorney-General and the Chairmen and Deputy-Chairmen of the two Houses of the Oireachtas.
The salaries recommended in the majority report of the Committee of Inquiry were: for the Taoiseach, £3,000; the Tanaiste, £2,500; other members of the Government, £2,250; for the Parliamentary Secretaries, £1,400; for the Attorney-General, £2,250; for the Ceann Comhairle, £2,250; for the Leas-Cheann Comhairle, £1,100; for the Cathaoirleach, £1,200, and for the Leas-Chathaoirleach, £750, all fully subject to taxation.
The Government, after careful consideration of the Committee's report, has felt unable, in present circumstances, to accept the recommendations where they would involve increases in salaries. The rates in the Bill now before the House are, accordingly, in all cases those which were paid before March, 1932, and which have been restored since July, 1937. Although no change is being made in the maximum salaries payable to Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries, it has been decided to provide for those salaries in this Bill and repeal the relative provision in the Ministers and Secretaries Act of 1924. This Bill, when enacted, will thus contain all the legislation relating to the remuneration of the holders of the offices in question, with the exception of the provision which is contained in the Oireachtas (Allowances to Members) Bill, which was introduced simultaneously with this Bill and the Second Stage of which, presumably, the House will concern itself with this evening.
I should say that the Government has found itself unable to accept the recommendation that the salary of the Attorney-General should be reduced, because it feels that it would not be in the public interest to increase, in any degree, the sacrifice which the acceptance of that office may involve for a leading member of the Bar. On the other hand, neither does the Bill implement the Committee's recommendation that the office of the Attorney-General should carry pension rights. Further, a minor departure from the recommendations regarding salaries appears in the Oireachtas (Allowances to Members) Bill to which I have referred. It proposes to continue the exemption originally provided for in Section 1 of the Oireachtas (Payment of Members) (Amendment) Act of 1925, in respect of allowances payable to members of the Oireachtas. All this matter dealing with the salaries of Ministers and other public officers will be found in Part II of the Bill.
Part III of the Bill provides for the payment of allowances for expenses to leaders of the second and third largest Parties in Dáil Eireann, excluding, of course, the Government Party, on the lines of the majority report. I should like to make it clear that this money is being provided not in any sense as a salary either to the leader of the largest Opposition Party or to the leader of the second largest Party in the Dáil, but is payable mainly as a contribution towards the expense of discharging adequately the duties and functions of that office. The desirability of making such an allowance will be clear if we consider the theory upon which parliamentary government rests. In the realm of public affairs there is a function not merely for the initiator, the projector of legislation, so to speak, and for the administrator of the public estate, but for the critic who, to serve the public good, will bring the critical faculty to bear upon all proposals and all actions of the Government of the day. It is obvious that those upon whom, as the result of public election, this task of critical examination devolves, should be as well equipped for it as possible. They should certainly not be called upon to bear in their private capacities the full financial burden of discharging that public duty. It is as a contribution towards the cost of this public work that the allowances set out in this Bill are being provided.
No one who is familiar with the expense involved in maintaining active opposition in Parliament will pretend that the amounts here provided will cover anything like the whole cost. Nevertheless, since the proposals are largely experimental, the Government has not felt justified in enlarging upon the recommendations of the Committee. Provision has been made in the Bill for the solution of difficulties which may arise in determining the Parties to whom the allowances are payable and for ensuring that what may be merely a temporary reduction in the strength of the third Party, due to a casual vacancy, will not result in the suspension of the allowance. As it is not considered desirable that the allowances to the leaders of the second and the third Parties should be subject to review annually on the Estimates for Public Services, provision has been made in the Bill for the payment of the allowances out of the Central Fund.
Part IV of the Bill is concerned with the grant of pensions to former holders of qualifying office, and to the widows of such persons on their death, and the grant of allowances during minority to the orphaned children of such persons. Deputies who have compared the provisions of the Bill with the report of the Committee of Inquiry will have observed that, with one major exception, to which I shall refer later on, the Bill is broadly based upon the Committee's recommendations in regard to all its essential features. The justification for the provision of a pension to an ex-Minister, who has served for a minimum period in office-three years is the period prescribed in the report and in the Bill-is set out in some detail in paragraph 66 of the report of the Committee. There it is pointed out that such provision as is now proposed would help, firstly, to reduce the extent of the financial sacrifice which is involved in taking ministerial or parliamentary office because of the enforced severance of all active connection with the office-holder's original occupation or profession, and because of the impracticability during the years of office of making any provision for the future of himself and his family. The severity of this sacrifice may often only be realised after the cesser of office. Whilst the provisions of this part of the Bill, that is, of Part IV, are mainly intended to cover future contingencies, and admitting that self-government in this country is, comparatively speaking, as yet only in its infancy, there is, unfortunately, already sufficient experience to afford evidence of the need for some means of preventing this consideration from becoming an increasingly powerful deterrent from the acceptance of political office. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Committee of Inquiry recommended the grant of pensions, not merely for the reasons to which I have referred, but as an inducement towards retaining in political life ex-Ministers who have gained, in the responsibilities of office, a special knowledge of public affairs and a firsthand experience of public administration which makes them, when not in office, the most valuable members of the Oireachtas.
Whilst the Government have felt compelled to depart from the Committee's recommendations in regard to remuneration during office, they have decided to accept in principle the views of the Committee as to pensions and allowances payable on application after cesser of office. In fact, they have taken the responsibility in one respect of going further than has been recommended. The general conclusion of the Committee was that Parliamentary Secretaries, who had held office for a period of not less than four years, should be eligible on retirement for the award of a gratuity equivalent to one year's salary. The Government regret that they are unable to accept that recommendation. With the special knowledge which they possess of the services rendered by Parliamentary Secretaries, and of the risks and sacrifices, actual and prospective, which they, equally with Ministers, incur in thus serving the public, and of the disabilities under which they likewise suffer as regards providing for the future of themselves and their families, the Government have in this Bill provided for the grant of pensions to and in respect of Parliamentary Secretaries, but at two-thirds of the rate appertaining to ministerial office. That is an approximate proportion to the differences in their salaries and their responsibilities.
The rates proposed for children's allowances are identical in each case, and I have no doubt that they will meet with the approval of the House.
As I have already stated, the main provisions of this part of the Bill are based broadly on the recommendations of the Committee. In the case of widows' pensions and of orphans' allowances during minority, which were recommended in principle, the Committee found difficulty in prescribing a detailed scheme and in specifying definite amounts, but the Government have accepted as pointers the tentative conclusions of the Committee in a certain paragraph of the report that widows' pensions should not exceed £250 a year; that the allowance for each orphan under 18 years of age should be at the rate of £30 a year, and that special provision should be made to meet the case of orphans whose parents were both dead. It will, I think, be generally accepted by this House that the pension for which her deceased husband's service in office would have qualified him, and that the allowance payable to an orphan during minority should be raised from £30 to £50 if deprived by death of the support and guidance of its second parent, and the Bill provides accordingly.
Turning to the definition of ministerial office, it will be seen that it applies both retrospectively and prospectively, and covers all those who have already held Cabinet office under the first, second, or third Dáil Eireann, or who have been members of the Provisional Government or of the Executive Council of Saorstát Eireann, or who held the office of Ceann Comhairle in this House, as well as those who now function or will in future function as members of the Government under the new Constitution or as Ceann Comhairle here. All this is in accordance with the views which the Committee expressed in the report.
I should perhaps make a particular reference to the position of the Attorney-General. As I have said, the Government has felt unable to accept the recommendation to make the post of Attorney-General a pensionable one. Let me say at once that the Government has not reached this conclusion without much hesitation. I know that it may be argued against it that the Attorney-General shares with Ministers under the Constitution the obligation to vacate office on the resignation of the Taoiseach, that as generally recognised head of the Bar he has to maintain a social position higher perhaps than if he were engaged purely in private practice, that whilst theoretically or in fact he does not relinquish the practice of his profession he must at least temporarily relinquish his professional connection —an important sacrifice representing the accumulated results, the goodwill, so to speak, of a long time of effort.
In addition, it may be urged that he has, in common with the Ministers of the Government for which he is acting as legal adviser, to meet the vicissitude of resignation and to try, thereafter, to re-establish his private position at the Bar against the competition, not perhaps of better minds, but certainly of men of fresher and, possibly, younger physique, and that, in an occupation and profession so labourious as the Bar, is admittedly a very heavy handicap. I admit at once the cogency of every one of these considerations. The Government have given them all full value in their examination of the question of pensionability. But there are countervailing circumstances which, on the other hand, we have not found it possible to ignore. To begin with, the Attorney-General, unlike most Ministers, remains, during the period of his office, in touch with his profession, and it is only to be expected that the enhancement of professional status, which results from his occupation of the exalted position of Attorney-General, and the specialised knowledge he thereby obtains of certain branches of the profession, should secure for him, in the event of his leaving office, a place among the leaders of the Bar. These, as I said, are the pros and cons of the problem, and, rightly or wrongly, the Government has come to a conclusion opposite to that arrived at by the Committee of Inquiry, and accordingly no provision is made in this Bill for making pensionable the office of Attorney-General.
I do not propose at this stage to go into other matters of detail, embodied in the Bill, which are either consequential on the conclusions already mentioned, or are of minor importance in the framework of the scheme. Before concluding, however, I should perhaps call attention to sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph (d) of sub-section (4) of Section 13, in the first portion of which double pensionable value is given for services rendered before the 11th July, 1921. As the House is aware there are statutory precedents for this. In the Military Service Pensions Act and similar Acts there are precedents for making special provision for particular services, and I think this House will accept that sub-section without question as being merely what is due to those who bore the brunt of the leadership in that historic period. Most of the surviving Ministers of that day are already qualified for maximum pension under the other provisions of this Bill and would not need the reckoning of that period of service in the manner prescribed but a few former leaders who have gone have left dependants but ill-provided for, dependants who would not otherwise be eligible for awards, and the Government have felt that it would be invidious and entirely contrary to the wishes of this House if a provision of this nature were to be made for those now surviving and the others to be excluded.
In submitting and recommending this Bill for the approval of Dáil Eireann, I welcome the opportunity of paying on behalf of the Government, a tribute to the thoroughness with which the Committee of Inquiry discharged the duties entrusted to them, and to the good sense and careful appreciation of the public interest which they displayed in the recommendations embodied in this report. They have facilitated the preparation of this difficult and, in some of its personal aspects, to this Government, rather invidious measure. In framing the Bill, the Government on their part have done their utmost to emulate the spirit of the Committee and to weigh with equal care what they genuinely and sincerely believe to be the best interests of the country. We have tried to have just and due regard, on the one hand, to the standards on which the State can afford to base the life of its public men, and, on the other, to the financial prospects which those who devote their abilities to the necessary service of their fellow-men in a political career must perforce abandon. We have taken some time to reach the conclusions embodied in this Bill, and much thought has been given to its provisions. We submit it now for the consideration of Dáil Eireann, in the belief that it will contribute materially towards attracting high-minded, competent persons to office in the service of their country, and towards preserving proper and right standards of democratic government here in future.