Ministers and Secretaries (Amendment) Bill, 1939.—Second Stage.

The Tánaiste

I move that the Bill be now read a Second Time. As the long title indicates, this Bill is directed to the establishment of a Department of Supplies and to effecting certain amendments in the Ministers and Secretaries Acts, 1924 and 1928. The 8th September, 1939, is the date upon which the appointment of a Minister for Supplies was made by the Government. While the establishment of a new Department has been due to conditions created by the present emergency, the Government have been advised that from the legal standpoint it would be desirable, if not necessary, that the Minister for Supplies should be formally incorporated with a seal and with the capacity to sue and be sued in the like manner as the Ministers under the Ministers and Secretaries Act, 1924. The Government have been advised also that it is doubtful if this could be carried out by an Emergency Order. It is possible that later the Minister may find it necessary to enter into contracts and to appear as plaintiff and defendant in the courts. In the absence of incorporation there would be some obscurity as to the Minister's capacity in legal proceedings. He would not be a competent plaintiff and probably would only be liable as a defendant in his personal capacity, and the Government are satisfied that it would be invidious to allow such a state of affairs to arise.

It will be noted that the Bill does not suggest that the new Department will be of a temporary nature. It is understood that the establishment as a corporation sole of a purely temporary body would be open to objection on legal grounds, and it is contemplated accordingly that the Department would be wound up when necessary by specific amending legislation. The Bill indicates in a general way what the function of the Department of Supplies will be, and provides for the transfer to it of functions in relation to essential supplies and services previously exercised by other Departments as and when found necessary. It will be appreciated that in existing circumstances and in the circumstances which are likely to obtain it would be difficult to state in any more precise form the functions which it may be found to be expedient to allocate to the new Department, and that the maximum degree of elasticity as between Departments concerned in one way or another in the provision and maintenance of essential supplies and services should be provided for. Advantage has been taken of the necessity for introducing this Bill to propose certain other amendments of the earlier Ministers and Secretaries Acts which experience has shown to be desirable. The Bill creates formally the office of Minister without portfolio, and empowers the Government to assign to such Minister a specific style or title which shall be judicially and officially noticed.

It may perhaps be mentioned that the considerations already referred to as indicating the desirability on legal grounds of providing for the incorporation of the Minister for Supplies would not, it is thought, apply to every Minisster without portfolio unless his functions were of such a kind that their effective discharge would be facilitated by incorporation. The Bill accordingly does not include a general provision for the incorporation of such Ministers.

Clause 5 of the Bill makes provision for the transfer of Departments of State to and from Ministers. It has been deemed desirable to make specific statutory provision for transfers of the kind and to vest the power of reassignment in the Taoiseach, in whom the power of original allocation of Departments is vested by Section 3 of the principal Act, as adapted by the Constitution (Consequential Provisions) Act, 1937. As the reallocation of certain Departments carried out on the 8th September last was effected by Government Order and not by the Taoiseach it has been necessary to insert a sub-section bringing the action taken into conformity with the general legislative intention.

It is proposed to repeal Section 12 of the 1924 Act and Section 4 of the 1928 Act, which deal with various powers of the Government in relation to Departments of State and to provide afresh for these in a more comprehensive and precise form. For example, it has hitherto been possible to alter the titles of Ministers or Departments of State only where a redistribution of public services amongst Ministers or Departments has taken place, but it is considered desirable that the power to alter titles should not be so restricted. The other provisions of Clause 6 of the Bill represent, as indicated, a more precise provision for the powers and duties mentioned in the clause than the corresponding provision in the earlier Acts.

Clause 7 of the Bill, which covers the temporary inability of Ministers, deals much more precisely with the arrangements to be made for the discharge of their duties than Section 11 of the principal Act which the Bill proposes to repeal. In particular, the new clause provides that the acting Minister shall be for all purposes the Minister having charge of the Department of which he is in temporary control. Hitherto, the acting Minister has been merely an agent and final responsibility has rested with the permanent Minister. Clause 8 of the Bill proposes to confer upon Parliamentary Secretaries the right to attend and be heard in either House of the Oireachtas. An arrangement of this kind is clearly desirable, as, for example, in the event of sudden illness of a Minister, or where matters arising out of the discharge by a Parliamentary Secretary of duties delegated to him, fall to be discussed in the House of which he is not a member.

The Bill contemplates that the power of delegation of duties to Parliamentary Secretaries provided for in Section 7(7) of the Act of 1924 shall be extended to include statutory powers and duties. It has been found, in practice, that in order to comply with the requirements of a particular statute, a Minister is from time to time required to discharge in person duties which, in fact, are largely of a formal or routine nature and, in some cases, the discharge of such duties occupies an altogether undue proportion of his time. The Government are satisfied that there is a reasonable case for taking power to delegate statutory powers and duties of the kind, where considered desirable in the interests of administration, to Parliamentary Secretaries. It will be seen that the conditions under which it is proposed that delegation should be effected are circumscribed, and that, in particular, delegation would not operate to relieve a Minister, whose power or powers have been delegated, of his responsibility for their due exercise or performance.

The power of delegation to a Parliamentary Secretary of Ministerial powers and duties of a statutory kind is, of course, provided for in the recent Emergency Powers Act, but that Act has been framed to meet circumstances of an exceptional kind and is purely temporary, and the power of delegation conferred by it is not subject to all the express conditions proposed in the present Bill. Clause 10 of the Bill is directed merely to giving covering statutory authority to the changes in the Irish names of certain Ministers and Departments which were adopted following on the coming into operation of the Constitution.

Mr. Costello

This Bill has as its ostensible reason the necessity for legalising, or putting upon a statutory basis, the new Department of Supplies, but the Bill does something, I think, far more radical than giving legal effect to what might possibly be a situation of some juristic ambiguity because the Bill introduces some new principles into our existing Governmental machinery. We have introduced into this Bill provisions for Ministers without portfolio. We have extensive powers of delegation by Ministers of their functions to Parliamentary Secretaries. We have, as a third principle, the right of Parliamentary Secretaries to be heard in the Dáil, if they happen to be Senators, and to be heard in the Seanad, if they happen to be members of the Dáil. It will, therefore, be obvious that this Bill is wider in its scope than was originally anticipated when the Bill was introduced as a Bill merely to give legal effect to the position of the Department of Supplies. I think that probably the Minister was wise in bringing in a Bill to make the position of the Department of Supplies legally sound. That is an aspect of the matter on which I do not intend to pass any observations.

I am particularly interested, however, in this new proposal to create Ministers without portfolio. That is, I think, a rather radical proposal. It is a proposal which emerges for the first time in the history of this State. The position of a Minister without portfolio under the Bill, as I understand it, is that he is a member of the Government but is not in charge of any Department of State. I was reminded of the position of a Minister without portfolio recently when I attended a play at the Abbey Theatre, produced for the first time during the past few weeks, one of George Shiel's comedies. "Give Him a House" was the title of it. One of the principal characters was a lorry driver who was out of a job and somebody asked him what he was. He said: "At the moment I am a lorry driver without portfolio." It appeared to me as if the author of that play had envisaged the situation created under this Bill for a Minister without portfolio because, in fact, the position created under the Bill for a Minister without portfolio is that of a Minister without a job. In the case of the lorry driver in the play, however, he would not have been paid while he was without a job but in this particular instance the Minister without portfolio is being paid at the expense of the taxpayer for doing no job.

The Minister touched very lightly on the introduction of this radical new principle in the Bill. In his introductory remarks, he actually did not give any indication to the House as to what was the necessity for the introduction of this new principle, or why it was necessary to provide for the establishment of Ministers without portfolio. It is a new constitutional principle in our governmental machinery, as I have said already, and I think that the House would have expected that this principle would be dealt with more adequately by the Minister in his introductory speech. His speech really was anything but a Second Reading speech on a Bill of this importance, introducing, at least, two or three new principles. It was more in the nature of a Committee speech. It dealt very lightly, indeed, with the underlying principles of the Bill. The really important principle in the Bill, in my view, is not the establishment of the Department of Supplies but this creation of new Ministers without portfolio. I have said that I can see no reason in existing circumstances why there should be any Ministers without portfolio. At least one of the Ministers, at the moment, has three portfolios. I think the Taoiseach himself is carrying three portfolios and why it should be necessary in that state of facts, where the head of the Government has charge of at least three Departments, to create Ministers who have no Department to administer, is not quite apparent.

There is a further very important point to which I should like to direct the Minister's specific attention. That is the rather serious problem as to whether the establishment of Ministers without portfolio is really not unconstitutional. I am not raising that point for the purpose of creating difficulties in the Minister's way, if he can make a case for the establishment of such functions as Ministers without portfolio. It would appear to me that the provisions of the Constitution dealing with the Government envisaged that each member of the Government should be in charge of a Department of State. They certainly do not envisage specifically that there should be members of the Government who have no Departments of State to administer. Looking at Clause 4 and Clause 12 of Article 28 of the Constitution, there would appear to me to be abundant arguments on which to ground the contention that the establishment of Ministers without portfolio is unconstitutional. I presume that the Minister has considered this aspect of the matter. It is one on which I certainly should like to have the benefit of his reasons as to why he considers this particular type of governmental machinery is within the provisions of the Constitution.

Article 28, paragraph 4(2), of the Constitution provides that

the Government shall meet and act as a collective authority and shall be collectively responsible for the Departments of State administered by the members of the Government.

It would appear to me to be the reasonable, natural, and ordinary interpretation of that clause of Article 28 of the Constitution that the Government, which is to act as a collective authority with collective responsibility, should have as its members only such people as are, in fact, in charge of Departments of State, because the Government, under that particular clause, is responsible for the Departments of State administered by the members of the Government. If there are members of the Government who are not administering any Department of State, then it would appear as if the Government's collective responsibility would not cover such members which, of course, would be a ridiculous constitutional situation. Clause 12 of the Article provides for a number of matters which are to be regulated by ordinary law. Amongst the matters which the clause says shall be regulated by ordinary law are: The organisation of, and distribution of business amongst Departments of State, the designation of members of the Government to be the Ministers in charge of the said Departments, the discharge of the functions of the office of a member of the Government during his temporary absence or incapacity, and the remuneration of the members of the Government.

Now if you find in an Article of the Constitution a specific enumeration of a number of topics which are to be regulated by ordinary legislation, the ordinary presumption, in accordance with a well-known canon of construction, is that nothing except what is specifically enumerated is within the scope of the Article. There is a Latin tag which summarises that rule of construction as expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Those matters that I have referred to give sufficient force, at all events, to the contention that there is a good deal to be said for the argument that the establishment of Ministers without portfolio is not within the scope or contemplation of the Governmental machinery set up by the Constitution, and may, indeed, be regarded as unconstitutional. The Minister, I think, should direct his attention, in his concluding speech, not merely to justifying from a practical point of view the necessity for the setting up of Ministers without fortfolio who will have nothing apparently to do except to be members of the Government, but he should also justify the bringing within the ambit of the constitutional provisions to which I have adverted very briefly these proposals for the establishment of Ministers without portfolio.

The second principle that is embodied in this Bill is the right of audience to Parliamentary Secretaries in the Dáil and Seanad. That is a matter upon which people may legitimately have different views. Personally, I agree with the provisions in the Bill giving the right of audience to Parliamentary Secretaries, provided it is not overdone. I do think that the Minister, in introducing this Bill, dealt very cursorily with a rather vital principle contained in Section 8, dealing with the right of audience of Parliamentary Secretaries, and that he ought to have gone into that matter in a little greater detail, giving more justification than he has done for the introduction of that proposal into this Bill.

The next matter that I would like to draw attention to is this right of delegation which is contained in Section 9 of the Bill. That section, as it stands at the moment, contains a very wide list of powers of delegation, and I would like to know whether the Minister has considered the impact of the proposals in this Bill on the existing provisions in sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the Ministers and Secretaries Act of 1924. Now it must be remembered in that connection that sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the 1924 Act is not repealed in this Bill. That sub-section, if I may recall the Minister's recollection to its provisions, provided for what was then known as the Executive Council, the distributing or allocating of particular branches of the public service, or of branches of Departments of Ministers to Parliamentary Secretaries. It would appear to do in short what is being done in very much greater detail in Section 9 of this Bill, and while, apparently, it is not intended to repeal sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the Ministers and Secretaries Act of 1924, I think the Minister should give some consideration as to whether or not considerable legal difficulty may ensue from the two sections being allowed to stand with apparently concurrent legal effect.

There are some matters of detail on this power of delegation that I would like some guidance upon from the Minister when replying. The power of delegation is very wide. The Minister can, apparently, strip himself of all power and vest it in his Parliamentary Secretary. I doubt if that is constitutional, and I doubt if it is proper even if it were constitutional; but then the section proceeds to enact that, even though the Minister does delegate all or some of his powers, he still retains, concurrently with his agent, the same power as the agent has. I do not know how that is going to operate as a practical or legal possibility. If the Minister is delegating certain powers, who is to be sued by a person who wishes to sue? Is it the Minister, or is it the Parliamentary Secretary to whom the powers are being delegated? A well-known example of the powers that may be delegated under this power, when it is passed into law, is the statutory power vested in Ministers to do certain things. If the Minister delegates the right and authority given him by statute to his Parliamentary Secretary, and if something done under that power is the subject matter, or is intended to be the subject matter, of court proceedings, who is to be sued?

In that connection perhaps I may return for a moment to a matter more or less akin arising out of the question of Ministers without portfolio. One of the peculiarities of this proposal to set up Ministers without portfolio that struck a reader of this Bill immediately was the contrast between a Minister without portfolio and the ordinary Minister, a member of the Government. The Minister, in his introductory remarks, referred to the fact that a Minister without portfolio was not being incorporated. I was anxious to know why the provisions which are contained in this Bill and in the Ministers and Secretaries Act of 1924, providing for the incorporation of a Minister, and for his suing and being sued as such, were omitted in the case of Ministers without portfolio. The Minister, when introducing this Bill, went very lightly over the reasons why Ministers without portfolio were not intended to be incorporated. I understand the reasons the Minister gave, of course, but they do not satisfy me. In any event, I think the Minister ought to deal with that in a much more elaborate way in his concluding speech.

There are some smaller matters of detail which might be more appropriately dealt with on the Committee Stage, and which I intend to refer to only in passing. For example, the provisions in Section 6 of the Bill provide that the Government may do a vast variety of rather vital matters by order. They may alter the name of any Department of State in Irish or in English. Arising out of that particular power, the provisions of the Schedule immediately come to one's attention. We find in the Schedule elaborate provisions for the changing of the Irish titles. I can only assume that the provisions in the Schedule represent some sort of change in ministerial policy on the question of the simplified spelling of Irish.

I confess I have a little more sympathy with the unsimplified spelling of Irish than with the simplified spelling. In that I confess I am out of date with the Ministers and with those scholars who think that the simplified spelling of Irish would lead to greater simplicity and greater success in the learning of Irish. The sole purpose of this Schedule would appear to be to put back on its pedestal the old method of spelling and to bring back those letters which are regarded by the advocates of simplified spelling, as being entirely redundant. I do not know whether this does show a change in Ministerial policy on that important problem. At all events the Minister does provide power for his successor —if he differs from the present apparent view of the Government that simplified spelling is a really important method of advancing the Irish language—to introduce a new Schedule, doing away with the present Schedule and other sections provided here for altering the title of Ministers either in Irish or in English. The powers in the existing Ministers and Secretaries Acts were simple in that regard. I think the power to change the title of Departments and Ministers should be very sparingly exercised. It leads to difficulties with the Departments concerned in matters of legal proceedings. Because if in legal proceedings Ministerial titles are changed, the record has to be changed and amended in order to fit the particular title at the time when judgment is given. One absurd example of that recently occurred in a case in which I was involved. The defendant was the Minister for Finance. The action was started before the present Constitution came into force and the title of the proceedings had to be altered. It was a case of A. B. against the Minister for Finance. The amendments that are to be put in would appear to the ordinary person somewhat absurd. If a Government indulges in that sort of easy change of nomenclature of Ministers and their Departments some ridiculous consequences may be produced.

There is one small matter of detail also in Section 7, to which I would like to call the attention of the Minister. I would like the Minister's views on this particular matter, that is the securing of power that an Acting-Minister will carry on the functions of a Minister who is ill or unable to discharge the functions of his office. There is provision in this section for such person to be called Acting-Minister. I do not know what the impact of that provision is to be on this Bill. If a person wants to sue the Minister while there is an Acting-Minister there, the position is, that he sues the Minister because the statutory obligation never changes though a particular Minister may change. Here you have a provision providing that somebody may call himself Acting-Minister. That introduces a confusion that is wholly unnecessary and leads to some doubt as to what the position is. These are matters of detail which the Minister may possibly clarify. I think the Minister has the duty of justifying such a very vital change in our constitutional position, namely, the introduction of a Minister without portfolio. That change ought to be dealt with by the Minister from two aspects: first, the practical aspect as to what is the necessity for such a Ministerial office under existing circumstances; and second, what is the position under the Constitution?

Professor O'Sullivan

Like Deputy Costello I thought it was strange that the Minister did not, instead of confining himself to what I might call the explanation of each section, give us some justification for the Bill especially in what we consider its most startling provision. I am also struck with the fact that though there is a provision and though there is a reference in the Title of the Bill to the Department of Supplies, the Minister is not sure of the necessity for having any provisions for it here at all. It does appear that there should be formal power to set up this Ministry but from the Minister's reference it is not clear that it is necessary. There is no reference to the creation of the title of Minister without portfolio. There are three things with which this Bill deals: (1) Minister for Supplies; (2) the Minister without portfolio; and (3), roughly speaking, an elaboration of the position of Parliamentary Secretaries. What I should have liked from the Minister was that in his Second Reading speech where he was dealing with the justification for bringing in the Bill, he would have shown us the necessity for the setting up of a separate Department of Supplies. That Department has been set up but has there been any real necessity for doing so? Has our experience of the operations of that particular Department in the last three months been such an experience as to induce us to sanction any longer the continuance of that particular Department? We have had opportunities here during the course of the last few months to deal with the complete failure of that Department as a separate Department to deal with the situation that confronts the country. We are now asked to give formal sanction to that. And not merely that, but retrospectively, to give legal approval to the actions of that particular Department though we were convinced that on every ground we should like to reverse many of its actions. Has that Department of Supplies, as a separate Department, functioned any better—it might be difficult to function any worse —than did the same Department when it was portion of the Department of Industry and Commerce? Has the present crisis involved such new duties on the Minister for Industry and Commerce that he must needs shuffle off the responsibility for supplies?

As I say, what I find about the Minister's statement is that though it explains some of the legal difficulties which the Bill seemed to convey to the ordinary man, it skipped the really important points. There is, as Deputy Costello has pointed out, provision in Section 2 (3) for the incorporation of the Ministry. Might I ask the Minister what is the position, not now with reference to the precise point raised by Deputy Costello? I understand from the provisions of the Bill that the Minister without portfolio may be entrusted with certain administrative functions. He may take over, at the request of the Taoiseach or the Executive Council, certain portions of a Department of State. Is that not so? That, I think, is the intention. The Minister shakes his head. Therefore, the Minister without portfolio cannot be entrusted with the administration of any Department of State or any portion of a Department of State? Perhaps the Minister will clear up that particular point. I understand that the Executive Council could redistribute at its will—the Taoiseach and the Executive Council between them, because sometimes it is the Government does it and sometimes it is the Taoiseach; at any rate, one or other of them, or both combined—could redistribute the work of the Departments of State between the Ministers. I understood that the man who was Minister without portfolio might occasionally be asked to do some work. I gathered, with his eye on the future, that the Tánaiste is anxious to shuffle off all such responsibility. He shakes his head. He is shocked at the idea that the Minister without portfolio should be asked to do some work. It seems to me that under the Bill he may be asked to face that terrible castastrophe. If so, can he be sued? Deliberately, no provision was made for that. I must say I did not understand the defence put forward by the Minister for that particular omission.

We come now to what I might call— again with all deference to the Minister—the royal lounger. I see he likes the title. The royalty appeals to him, I have no doubt. The royal lounger is to get £1,700 a year for the benefit that the wisdom of his grey hairs can bring to the Executive Council. It is not for doing work, not for looking after a Department, not for accepting any responsibility, but for sitting in the Executive Council occasionally and saying: "Look here, are you wise in doing this? I have spent a lot of time in public life, local public life and central public life, and, with my great record of various kinds in the past, I advise you not to do this, or at least to think over it until to-morrow." For that, we are to give him £1,700 a year. There was one very interesting phrase that the Minister used in reference to this royal lounger. He said: "Section 4 formally creates a Minister without portfolio." Formally creates? I gather, therefore—here is a Cabinet secret revealed—that there are members of the Cabinet who, for practical purposes at the moment, are without portfolio, though they may seem to be responsible for Departments. Now we are formally creating the office of Minister without portfolio. I suggested on one occasion to the Minister himself that he partly occupied that office in his capacity of Minister for Finance, and the intrusion of the Taoiseach in the debate the last day rather bears that out. We are asked to agree to the creation of that office at a moment when there seems to be no justification for extra expenditure, whatever may be the abstract advantage of having a man of great European and corporation experience. I forgot that point; I hope that will be forgiven; perhaps that is the reason it is in at the present moment, to get a man of great, widespread, European experience, a man who has lived in different capitals in Europe, and to relieve him of the necessity for responsibility.

We are asked to do that at a time when even the Government occasionally professes a desire for economy. The Minister for Finance has appointed a committee to inquire into the possibility of decreasing expenditure; yet the same Minister for Finance, who appoints that committee and asks it in all seriousness to see where savings can be made in the Civil Service, brings in or takes responsibility for a Bill which creates a Minister for the purpose, as I say, of giving the Executive Council the benefit of his wide experience and wisdom, and receiving £1,700 a year. I put it to the members of the Fianna Fáil Party, is the wisdom—the general wisdom, apart from their great administrative ability, of course—of any member of that body worth the salary of a Minister? That is what you are going to vote for. If another Minister should feel rather tired, and say he had done enough in the way of administration, apparently he also can be appointed Minister without portfolio. There is no difficulty, because we have a man in the Cabinet who is apparently willing to take on any number of Ministries, a kind of unconscionable pooh-bah or pluralist. The number of Ministries he can absorb is without limit, and the better apparently to allow that process to continue—the suppression of one real Ministry after another and the creation of Ministries that mean nothing— we have elaborate provisions made for the Parliamentary Secretary. I do not think it is desirable that any man should concentrate a number of Ministries in himself, and that a lot of work should be passed over to Parliamentary Secretaries. For instance, who is responsible to this House? Let us say that a Parliamentary Secretary is appointed for education: we have a Minister for Education. Let us say that a Parliamentary Secretary is appointed for external affairs: we have a Minister for External Affairs. Who is responsible to this House? The Minister? But it is becoming the custom, for instance in the case of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Works, that is, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister himself, to take all the responsibility and to answer for it. Is that the situation towards which we are developing—a number of men in the Executive Council who have no real administrative work, the absorption of Ministry after Ministry and Department after Department by one individual, and the shuffling off of the actual work to Parliamentary Secretaries? Technically, the Minister may still be responsible to the House, but when we look at the somewhat elaborate provisions— elaborate in comparison to the old provisions—it is difficult to know whether it is really the Minister or the Parliamentary Secretary who is fully responsible, or whether both are responsible. It is not clear.

At a time, as I say, when people are crying out for economy, on bringing in a Bill of this kind—calling it a Bill for the creation of a Minister for Supplies, when it really means the creation of a Minister without portfolio—I should like if the Minister had thought it necessary to justify that, but he approached this House apparently without thinking or without seeing that there was any necessity to give a justification for it. We were not told why this provision was introduced. To be told that it merely formally creates a Minister without portfolio is simply refusing to give any explanation of one of the principal features—we believe the principal feature—of the Bill. It may be that the Head of the Government requires a Minister without portfolio in a different sense, to see that the other Ministers are doing some work, to watch them. Beyond that, and the occasional advice to the Executive Council when important topics turned up, and giving them the benefit of his wide experience, what else is he there for?

That is the portion of the Bill that we find it most difficult to support. No justification has been put forward for it. I invite the Minister to give us the justification. Why is it necessary at the present moment to make this provision? What use is intended to be made of it, if any? If there is no reason for it, why then bring it in, when it must have the effect of creating in the minds of the people of the country the idea that the Government are determined to spend £1,700 a year on some member of the Government and that he is undertaking none of the onerous work of looking after a Department?

There are other provisions in the Bill to which one might like to refer. I wish, instead of telling us what is in the Bill—that, to a large extent, we know, and, therefore, the recital of it is quite useless—that the Minister would go into an explanation of some of the legal points. For such an explanation we would be very grateful to the Minister. He ought to explain to us the necessity that exists for many of these steps that are proposed. I am never quite clear, and have not been since the Constitution was passed —and this Bill does not help to clear it up—as to the relative positions of the Taoiseach and the Government. I wonder very often whether the Minister is clear—I gather he is not—as to what the relative position is arising out of the Government's joint responsibility and the Taoiseach. This Bill certainly does develop what the Minister might say was foreshadowed in the Constitution—the replacing of Governmental responsibility by the responsibility of the Taoiseach. I think a development of that kind ought to be thought out before it is encouraged.

I wonder whether the purpose was to throw—I cannot believe it, in the case of such a language authority as the Minister—a certain amount of ridicule on the Irish language? It is very hard to believe that that will not be the effect. If, with every wind that blows as to Irish spelling, there is to be a change, you are turning, not merely the Ministers into objects of ridicule, but you are giving a certain official cachet to the ridicule that is sometimes cast on the language itself. I doubt if what you are gaining is worth that particular risk. You can organise any number of Departments and SubDepartments of the State, and every one of them, whether they are separate Ministries or not, must involve additional expense. You are encouraged by this Bill to do it.

The only other point that I have to deal with already has been adequately dealt with by Deputy Costello. It concerns the position of Section 9 with sub-section (7) of the original Act. The Minister said something about circumscribing the functions of the Parliamentary Secretary, but the general powers still remain under sub-section (7) of the Act of 1924. If the general clause still remains, I do not see that your circumscribing does any good. There is one thing I would like to refer to in connection with Section 8. The Minister, in making a plea for this particular clause, did give a reason—an unusual thing for him, I will admit, to give a reason for any of the sections of this Bill, but he did give it in this case—and it was that the Minister in charge of the Department may be ill and, therefore, it is desirable that his Parliamentary Secretary should come into this House, if he is a member of the Seanad, or should have the right to go into the Seanad if he is a member of this House.

That raises two difficulties in my mind. Generally speaking, the Parliamentary Secretary is responsible for only a small portion of the work of the Department that comes under the control of the Minister. Certain functions are delegated to him, but not the whole business. Therefore, if the Minister in charge of any Department is ill, I do not see what the great advantage is in giving certain powers to the Parliamentary Secretary. That is the one justification given by the Minister. I have no objection to the clause itself, but if the Minister is ill I do not see how the Parliamentary Secretary can deputise for him in so far as his main work is concerned. Am I to understand that that is the only case in which the Parliamentary Secretary will deputise? At present, when the affairs of the Board of Works are being discussed, the Minister for Finance is generally not here, and the whole thing falls on the shoulders of the Parliamentary Secretary. Is the same thing to happen with one Department of State after another, so that the man who is nominally Minister is, so far as this House is concerned, unclothed of all his responsibility? That is very much like what we are facing.

I must say that the main difficulty we have on this side of the House as regards this Bill is the creation, without any reasons being given, of this Minister without portfolio. I leave aside the constitutional question, whether it is or is not in accordance with the Constitution. I certainly could not give any opinion on that point. But, in relation to the man who really sits there in state, it is rather high that this State should be asked to pay £1,700 a year, so that the Executive Council should have the benefit of his majestic presence. It is rather a lot to ask the House to consent to.

Mr. Esmonde

There are two matters that I would like to mention in connection with this Bill. As the Minister mentioned in his opening statement, the Government have been advised that it was necessary to introduce a Bill of this character in order to legalise the new Department and the activities of the new Department. Section 12 deems this Bill to have come into force on the 8th September. If we are asked to pass this Bill in its present form, and for the reasons stated, it is perfectly obvious we are inferentially accepting the position that there is very grave doubt as to whether the Department of Supplies is acting in accordance with law at the present moment, and whether certain of its activities would not be subject to impeachment in a court of law. Has the Minister considered the advisability of putting in, in addition to Section 12, a section indemnifying the Minister and his officials for anything he or they may have done during the period from the 8th September until this Bill becomes law, and in any event in respect of any act done during that period which may be held not to be covered by the retrospective character of the section?

The second matter to which I would like to refer concerns the position of the Parliamentary Secretary. I quite agree it is very advisable that the Parliamentary Secretary should have a right of audience in either House, but the difficulty is, have the Government considered whether there is any power in this Assembly to delegate to the Parliamentary Secretary the right to appear in a House of which he is not a member? Have they, in that connection, taken advice on the position under the Constitution? So far as I can see, it is open to argument, if it is not an absolute certainty, that the Parliamentary Secretary is, under the Constitution, deprived of any such right of audience.

The Constitution saw fit to deal with the question of the right of audience of members of the Government before either House, and I think it follows as a matter of course from that, that if that were so, and if the Constitution lays down the right of a member of the Government as such to an audience in a House of which he is not a member that that must, as a matter of course, exclude anyone else who is not mentioned in the particular section of the Article in question. I refer the Minister on that point to Article 28 of the Constitution, sub-paragraph 8:—

"Every member of the Government shall have the right to attend and be heard in each House of the Oireachtas."

That would seem to me to contemplate that the people when they were enacting this Constitution had the right to state what persons outside an elected member of a particular Assembly ought to appear before it, and having given that right to certain individuals it is not within the power of this House to enlarge that right so as to include any other party, meaning the Parliamentary Secretary.

Mr. F. Lynch

May I say first of all that in regard to the Schedule I think the suggested change of names is a retrograde step. I think that the changes are, on the whole, for the worse. I cannot see any point at all in changing from the ordinary simple common expression "Aire Airgid" to "Aire Airgeadais". There is no point in it. The word "airgead" and its genitive case "airgid" is the ordinary word in common general use amongst Irish-speaking people, and I cannot understand why the coined word "airgeadas" is brought in here. Then as to the spelling in the case of "dlí" I do not know why a whole lot of letters are being added there to make the word "dlighidh". They make absolutely no change in the sound. There is only one change with which I would agree and in which I think there is an improvement. I think the existing spelling of "Talmhaiochta" is awful. There is a combination of three vowels there—"aio"—that creates an absurdity. There is an improvement in that case and in that one only. I prefer the suggested spelling "Talmhaidheachta". There is a change from "Gnóthaí Coigríche" to Gnóthaí Eachtracha" which is not quite clear. "Coigríche" is the ordinary well-known and well-used word for "foreign" or "external" amongst Irish-speakers. It is a nicer sounding word, at any rate in my ear, than the word "Eachtracha", and I do not know what is the reason for the suggested change.

Apart from that, one thing strikes me about the Bill: there is no reference whatever to one Minister whom we have had since September—the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures. There is provision for the Minister for Supplies and regularising his position. Why is there no reference whatever to regularising the position of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures or is it, by any chance, that he is the person in contemplation when provision is made for the Minister without portfolio? If that is the case, I think it is wrong to do it in that way. Instead of creating or establishing the principle of having Ministers without portfolio, in order to cover the case of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures, I think it would be much better to regularise the position as it stands. Apart from anything else, I am perfectly certain that every Deputy in the House would be glad to know what the functions of that Minister are. By adopting this ruse or this method of covering him up by a provision for Ministers without portfolio, the House is deprived of hearing what exactly are the functions that the Minister is at present fulfilling.

The Minister may have a Department. I do not know. As far as I know, he has not, and I take it that it must be to cover his position that this principle is introduced of having Ministers without portfolio. Deputy Costello has pointed out and, I think, with considerable substance, that the creation of Ministers without portfolio may be in contravention of Article 28 of the Constitution. There can be no danger of that if the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures is dealt with as the Minister for Supplies is dealt with in this Bill, by name, and with his functions set out before the House.

General MacEoin

There are a few aspects of this Bill which strike me as peculiar and to which I wish to draw the attention of the House. Deputy Costello made a very able speech in which he has pointed out certain legal difficulties. It would not surprise me one bit to find this Government running a coach and four through the Constitution, seeing that it is sacred only in so far as it serves their particular purpose. We have had evidence that they are quite prepared to smash this Constitution in various other ways as well as in this particular way. The only thing I would like to know from them is, when they are doing it do they know what they are doing and are they doing it deliberately, or is it that they have no ability whatever and that they run blindly into situations such as this? They have had some lessons in the past week of which they should take advantage and they should be careful in the future. Personally I do not expect them to be ever very careful in any of these matters at all.

The point that strikes me most of all is that a Party, elected by the people, to have reduced salaries, cheaper administration, administration that was not to cost the people more than the people could bear, has decided to inflate the cost of government in the country at this particular time, when they are reducing expenditure upon unemployment assistance and when they propose to reduce other estimates for social services or essential services. I think that particular aspect of the matter should be brought home to the people. We know perfectly well that the Executive Council that was in existence prior to the 1st September, 1939, were not unduly hard-worked, and, if they were hard-worked, there was fairly substantial remuneration for that work. To add to that remuneration at this particular time shows a lack of regard for the financial position of the country. I appeal positively to the Fianna Fáil back benchers that they should not impose this additional expenditure upon the country at this particular time. The country Deputies in particular know very well the difficulties with which the people in rural areas have to contend. When they see the Government, not only increasing the salaries of themselves and the Deputies of the House, but increasing the cost of government at this particular time, it is going to reflect very gravely upon the institutions of State established here.

It will give a reason or be a cause for people to agitate and say that there is nothing to be expected from this Parliament or from this Government or from this State, and that efforts should be made to alter them. I want to warn the Government that there is a responsibility upon them to set a headline in maintaining the institutions of State established here after such sacrifices and not to do anything that would jeopardise or damage them in any way.

It is a rather peculiar thing that the Department upon which so much money is being spent, namely, the Department for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures, is not mentioned at all in this Bill. There has been no mention of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures. Are we to take it, as Deputy Lynch suggested, that he is to be the new Minister without portfolio? These are questions to which the Minister must give a very positive answer. The Government have asked for the co-operation of all Parties in this House, and of this Party in particular, but they have not made any effort to place us in a position to give that co-operation. They simply propose something, make no attempt to explain it, to give reasons for it, or to make a case as to why it should be so, and expect that we ought to do what the back benchers of Fianna Fáil will do—troop into the Division Lobby after them. That is a thing we will not do. It is not in the interests of the country to do so, and as long as we think it is not, we will not do it. The Constitution and the existing Ministers and Secretaries Act have made ample provision, in my opinion, for all the governmental control that is required and the duties of Government could be fully carried out under them. We know that in the past one Minister has often deputised for another for considerable periods. Therefore, it must not be a whole-time job for any Minister. While I agree that a Minister should get ample time for recreation and should get reasonable holidays from his work, at the same time it is unfair that Ministers should leave their jobs or have so little work to do that they can spend a considerable amount of their time at what you might call social gatherings. I do not want to touch on that very much, because I do not want to adopt any of the tactics adopted by Fianna Fáil against the last Administration when they talked of tall hats, black coats, etc. I just want to pass this comment upon it, that the present Administration have followed the others pretty closely in that respect. There is only one thing, I suppose, that stops them, and that is that they have not the courage of their convictions. But while they can attend these social gatherings, and while there is ample time for them to do the work of Government, I feel that this added expenditure should not be placed on the country at this particular time, and that the Executive provided for in the Ministers and Secretaries Act is ample to carry out the duties of government.

Mr. Benson

Unfortunately I missed the Minister's introductory remarks, but I gathered from subsequent speeches that as usual he was not over-informative. I am anxious to know if he has made or if he can make any case for the establishment of this particular Ministry, as this Bill is ostensibly a Bill to establish a Ministry of Supplies. I should like to know whether he can make any case for that. Since that Ministry has been in existence has it done anything, has it secured any supplies or done anything which could not equally have been done through the ordinary channels of the Department of Industry and Commerce, of which it was originally a section? Has the establishment of that Ministry justified itself in any way? Deputy Lynch and Deputy MacEoin also referred to the Ministry for the Co-ordination of Defensive Services or, if one takes its initials, the Ministry of "Cods", which many will think a more suitable title. It certainly is surprising that no reference was made to it, because whatever case may be made for the Ministry of Supplies, I think none can be made for that Ministry. I hope the Minister will be able to reassure the House that in fact these two Ministries have done something worth while, because I think very few people are inclined to believe that.

Mr. Cosgrave

We did not hear from the Minister any particular reason for this measure in respect of either of these two Ministers, the Minister for Supplies, or the Minister without Portfolio. Presumably the Ministry of Supplies will be for the duration of the war. I do not know whether it is intended to continue it after the war has concluded. We got no information regarding the size of that Department, what it is doing, what it has succeeded in doing, what it hopes to do, or even what it has failed to do, or whether the staff assigned to it has been recruited from other Departments of State, which in consequence of that recruitment will not cost as much as formerly. Generally, we got no information whatever except a sort of Committee Stage explanation of the various sections of the Bill. It was rather shocking to hear the Minister say that advantage was taken of the occasion of providing for a Ministry of Supplies to take power to appoint a Minister without portfolio. There are at present, as far as I can make out, 11 Ministers and five Parliamentary Secretaries. That is a number in excess of the Ministry. No case was put to the House for this particular extension. Each Minister sought to be appointed here in excess of that number and, in fact, the Ministry of Supplies as well, will cost, presumably, about £3,000. There is the Minister's salary and perhaps travelling facilities. He will have a private secretary, probably a typist, and an office, costing about £3,000. The Ministry of Supplies will, I am sure, cost much more than that. Let us take it that this has been managed most efficiently and most economically, and that it will only cost £3,000. A Minister without portfolio will also cost £3,000. I wonder if it has occurred to the Minister for Finance, in connection with this particular proposal, how many poorer citizens having say, six in family and taxed an extra ¾d. per lb. on sugar, it will take to make up a sum which will, probably, run to about £10,000. I have not made it up, but offhand I would say that would be the amount. Are we to go to 10,000 poor citizens, having six in family and say to them: "We are to have two new Ministries, one without portfolio, and you will make up the cost by the ¾d. per lb. extra on sugar." It may be that by reason of the detachment of the Ministers from the people of the country they do not know how they are feeling. I have here a letter that I received from one of these citizens who is a taxpayer, a ratepayer and an industrialist as well. He says:—

"My shattered financial condition is due to national laws, State laws, county laws, city laws, corporation laws, liquor laws, mother-in-laws, brother-in-laws, sister-in-laws, and outlaws.

"Through these laws I am compelled to pay a business tax, amusement tax, head tax, school tax, petrol tax, light tax and excise tax. I am required to get a business licence, car licence, truck licence, not to mention marriage licence and dog licence.

"I am also required to contribute to every society and organisation which the genius of man is capable of bringing to life; women's relief, unemployment relief and the gold-diggers relief. Also to every hospital and charitable institution in the city."

He mentions a number of organisations which, I am sure, it would shock the Minister to hear.

"For my own safety I am required to carry health insurance, life insurance, fire insurance, property insurance, liability insurance, burglar insurance, accident insurance, earthquake insurance, storm insurance, unemployment insurance and old age insurance.

"My business is so governed that it is no easy matter to find out who owns it. I am inspected, expected, suspected, disrespected, rejected, dejected, examined, re-examined, informed, required, summoned, fined, commanded and compelled until I provide an inexhaustible supply of money for every known need, desire and hope of the human race.

"Simply because I refuse to donate something or other, I am boycotted, talked about, lied about, held up and robbed until I am almost ruined.

"I can tell you honestly that but for a miracle that happened I could not enclose this cheque. The wolf that comes to many doors has just had pups in my kitchen; I sold them, and here is the money."

That man does not know he is going to be taxed again in view of this new development.

Mr. MacEntee

He must subscribe to Fine Gael. He must have sent one of the pups to Fine Gael.

Mr. Cosgrave

I think the Minister has got rather touched by reason of this letter.

Mr. Norton

He was touched.

Mr. Cosgrave

Section 17 of the Act of 1924 contains a clause providing for publication:

Prima facie evidence of any order, regulation or other official instrument made or issued by the Executive Council or by any Minister who is the head of a Department of State established by this Act may be given—

(a) by the production of a copy of the Iris Oifigiúil purporting to contain such order, regulation or instrument; or

I am not sure that provision has been made in this Bill for the publication in Iris Oifigiúil of these new regulations, alterations and matters of this sort which are prescribed in the Act. Formerly, when there was a change of Ministry, the House got some information about it. I do not know whether it is intended to give the House any information, other than to say that there has been a disturbance in the Executive Council and, so as to make peace, certain changes have been made of persons occupying certain Departments of State. No information is given as to whether or not it is intended to submit to the House the name of the person to be appointed Minister without portfolio. Is it quite clear from this Bill as drawn whether or not it is a Senator who is to be appointed? Section 2 (2) appears to suffer, from the layman's point of view, from a slight ambiguity. It states that without prejudice to the power conferred on the Government by a former section, this particular matter is to be determined by the Taoiseach. It is obvious that the Minister who is head of the Government has power over and above that of all his Ministers, but this is a new alteration.

I wonder if it is intended, in connection with any differences that might arise in this case, that the Government would validate or implement any such decision. This is, I think, the fourth Act dealing with Ministers and Secretaries—it is certainly the third. It may have been thought well, in connection with matters of this kind, unless this is meant only to be temporary, to codify the law, and if the time of the Executive Council had been taken up to see how they stand with regard to it. As to this measure, while we would have been disposed to agree to a Minister for Supplies, in view of the other matters embodied in the Bill, unless I get a much more satisfactory explanation from the Minister than that given on the Second Reading, I propose to divide the House on it.

Dáil Éireann debate - Tuesday, 5 Dec 1939

Ministers and Secretaries (Amendment) Bill, 1939.—Second Stage.

Tá

Níl

Dáil Éireann debate -
Tuesday, 5 Dec 1939