I think I can fairly summarise most of the speeches made during the past two days in the debate on the Estimate for the Department of Supplies as expressing the view of Deputies that all our supply difficulties are due to that Department. That was the easy course for Deputies who are concerned more with Party interests than national interests to take. It appeared to excuse them from any obligation to think and even to excuse them from their duty to speak here on public problems in a constructive way. I suggest, however, to those Deputies who took that easy course that, in doing so, they failed in their duty as public representatives. I do not think that any Deputy in the House believes that it would have been possible for us to avoid shortages in overseas supplies and the economic and social consequences of such shortages, situated as we are, an island nation in the middle of the vast battlefield of the European war—not even if the Archangel Michael, instead of Deputy Lemass, occupied the post.
There is no other country in Europe which has avoided these difficulties. Some of them, neutral as well as belligerent, have had to contend with these difficulties in a much more acute form than we have experienced them. I can say that there is no country in the world, even those geographically far removed from the battle area, which has not been experiencing supply difficulties because of the war. It is because the Government knew that these supply difficulties were inevitable and that administrative measures of considerable scope and magnitude would be necessary to cope with them that a separate Department of Supplies was set up. That Department was given the function of organising the getting of supplies, if possible and where possible, the conserving of stocks and the regulation of distribution. It was charged also with the responsibility of endeavouring to cope with price and other problems which would inevitably result from scarcity.
I have been told that because of my administration as Minister for Supplies I have lost whatever popularity I had in the country. I am not very much concerned about that. I knew better than most Deputies who spoke here yesterday what exactly was involved when I was asked by the Taoiseach to take the post as Minister for Supplies. I knew that in this Department there were going to be very few victories and many difficulties, that it would be my job to direct a losing battle, one in which the odds were entirely against us, where the most we could hope to do was to make our retreat as brief and as least costly as possible. I knew that it would be my job to make plans in all the uncertainty of a war situation, knowing that almost inevitably the circumstances which we foresaw would not arise in the form which we foresaw them, that there would be developments that we could not foresee at all, and circumstances against which we could not provide. I knew, further, that I would have to face here, after the event, the criticism of those who by then knew precisely what did happen, and who could pretend that they knew all the time what was going to happen and that they could have made precise plans that would meet the exact circumstances that did arise.
It is now a commonplace for Deputies opposite to pretend that they knew all the time that the war was going to start and the course it was going to follow. I do not believe that. I do not think they believe it themselves. I feel certain there is nobody in the world who knew what these Deputies now pretend to have known, not even Herr Hitler.
It is true that we foresaw the possibility of war and planned against it. We did not know when, or how or between whom, that war would develop, but we knew it might affect us and we tried in all that atmosphere of uncertainty to make the best plans we could to deal with the situation that might develop from it. At the time we were making these plans, everybody in Europe who could claim to speak as an expert appeared to think that the war when it came would develop with exceptional rapidity. Everybody thought it was going to take the form of a blitzkrieg, a lightning stroke in which the central European Powers would employ all their strength in an endeavour to crush their enemies as quickly as possible and procure a speedy decision. Deputies opposite pretend that they knew that it was not going to take that form but, before the war actually started, that was the general impression. It did not, however, happen in that way. The war developed slowly and leisurely. Not for some eight or nine months after it began, did it take the very serious form which is affecting us so considerably. We did not anticipate, and I am sure there are very few Deputies who anticipated, the rapid collapse of France. Herr Hitler has said in public that he did not expect it. He did not know, apparently, as much as Deputy Dillon or some of the leading lights of the Fine Gael Party. We did not know for a certainty that Norway would be involved, that Greece would be involved, that these neutral States, who desired to remain neutral and on whose mercantile fleets we were depending for our supplies, were going to be engulfed in the vortex.
I am sure it puzzles people to read in the Press speeches of Deputies opposite claiming that they knew all these things were going to happen, asserting that the Government should have known as Deputy Cosgrave said yesterday, apparently believing that we have a secret service at our disposal which beats the combined British and German secret service to a frazzle. It is, I submit, a facetious way of approaching the problems with which this Dáil has to deal to make that pretence now of knowing all the time what was going to develop and trying to get people to think that if only they, with their knowledge and their wisdom, had been in charge of affairs here, the plans necessary to obviate hardship for our people would, of course, have been made.
Deputy Norton said here yesterday that he and his Party had been urging us to buy ships. Deputy Hickey said the same thing and the whole Labour Party, in this House and at their annual congress outside the House, have been trying to create in the public mind the idea that they were pressing all the time on the Government to buy ships knowing that ships were eventually going to be our greatest need. I have had the records of the House examined from the date on which the war started to the end of 1940 and not once during that whole period did a single member of the Labour Party mention the word "ship" in this House much less urge on the Government any course of action in relation to ships.