I understand that Deputy Dockrell agrees that amendments Nos. 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76 and 77 are met by and might be discussed on amendment No. 79, and that they will not be moved. A different point arises in amendment No. 78.
Trade Union Bill, 1941—Committee Stage (Resumed).
SECTION 23.
Amendment No. 68 put.
The Committee divided: Tá, 39; Níl, 14.
Tá
- Bartley, Gerald.
- Beegan, Patrick.
- Boland, Gerald.
- Bourke Dan.
- Brady, Brian.
- Breathnach Cormac
- Brennan, Martin.
- Briscoe, Robert.
- Crowley, Tadhg.
- Derrig, Thomas.
- De Valera, Eamon.
- Dockrell, Henry M.
- Flynn, Stephen.
- Fogarty, Andrew.
- Fogarty, Patrick J.
- Gorry, Patrick J.
- Keane, John J.
- Kennedy, Michael J.
- Kissane, Eamon.
- Lemass, Seán F.
- Little, Patrick J.
- McCann, John.
- McDevitt, Henry A.
- MacEntee, Seán.
- Meaney, Cornelius.
- Morrissey, Michael.
- Mullen, Thomas.
- O Ceallaigh, Seán T.
- O'Grady, Seán.
- Ruttledge, Patrick J.
- Ryan, Martin.
- Ryan, Robert.
- Sheridan, Michael.
- Smith, Patrick.
- Traynor, Oscar.
- Victory, James.
- Walsh, Laurence J.
- Walsh, Richard.
- Ward, Conn.
Níl
- Bennett, George C.
- Byrne, Alfred.
- Byrne, Alfred (Junior).
- Cosgrave, William T.
- Doyle, Peadar S.
- Hickey, James.
- Keating, John.
- Keyes, Michael.
- Lynch, Finian.
- McMenamin, Daniel.
- Mulcahy, Richard.
- Nally, Martin.
- Pattison, James P.
- Redmond, Bridget M.
Tellers: Tá: Deputies Smith and Kennedy. Níl: Deputies Keyes and Hickey.
Amendment declared carried.
Amendments Nos. 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77 not moved.
I move amendment No. 78:
Before sub-section (5) to insert two new sub-sections as follows:—
(5) Where a determination is granted under this Part of this Act that one trade union alone shall have the right to organise masters of any particular class for the purpose of carrying on negotiations for the fixing of wages or other conditions of employment such union must admit to membership any eligible applicant for membership who complies with the conditions of entry into membership.
(6) Where a determination is granted under this Part of this Act that one trade union alone shall have the right to organise workmen of any particular class for the purpose of carrying on negotiations for the fixing of wages or other conditions of employment such union must admit to membership any eligible applicant for membership who complies with the conditions of entry into membership.
In that amendment I have treated masters and workers alike. I feel that, when this Bill passes, a situation might arise in which, if a man or a master were denied admission to the proper union, he might practically be left to starve. I do not wish to have a position in which, because a person would not be taken into a union, he could not earn his living.
I am prepared to accept the amendment in principle. It may be necessary to bring in some machinery to permit an appeal on either side against a decision to refuse, or compulsion to accept, and on the Report Stage I shall bring in an amendment to meet the point.
I want to oppose the amendment. I consider that the functions of the tribunal and the machinery being set up under this Bill are really much too wide and too ample. Now, we are having something additional, and they are to take on a function normally performed by the courts. At present, if any man has a wrong done to him, he has means of redress. If any man is wrongfully excluded from membership of a union that would be a protection to him in the pursuit of his trade or calling, he has the ordinary channels by which to get redress. But now we want to impose a further condition penalising a union if, for any reason, it does not accept into membership some particular individual. This is going to be a Pooh Bah kind of court with no end to its ramifications. I think the Minister ought to realise that he has meddled with and poked his nose sufficiently far into matters of which he has no knowledge and with which he is not competent to deal, and if he accepts this amendment he will be going a step further in the direction leading to chaos and disorder. I think this is an unnecessary amendment, because there is sufficient protection already provided for the individuals by the ordinary law. Whether the Deputy has in mind that there might be some question of the exclusion of a master from the masters' class I do not know, but I suggest to him and to the Minister that they would be very unwise to give this additional power in respect of workers. The workers have their own means of settling such differences and, if any hardship is inflicted, they have the right of access to the courts. Therefore, I suggest it would be unwise to insert this amendment in an already very objectionable Bill.
I should like to point out the misapprehensions under which the Deputy appears to labour. I think there is a great deal to be said for the amendment, because it realises that where a determination has been granted to a trade union in respect to any particular class, there should be nothing to prevent a person in that class from becoming a member of the union. I do not think, however, that this is a matter that should go to the tribunal. I think that the question to be decided would generally be one of fact, first of all as to whether there are valid reasons, on grounds of character or otherwise, why a person should not be accepted as a member of the union. That is a question of fact which I think could be decided by a court of summary jurisdiction. Perhaps the lawyers might suggest that that was taking too simple a view of it. It is for that reason that I accept the amendment in principle, but I am not prepared to embody it in its present form in the Bill. I think the Deputy might disabuse his mind of the idea that it is proposed that the tribunal should sit to adjudicate upon this matter.
I am satisfied if the Minister accepts the principle of the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I move amendment No. 79:
In sub-section (5), page 11, to add at the end of the sub-section a word and paragraph as follows:—
"or
(c) operate to prevent any trade union which does not carry on negotiations for fixing wages or other conditions of employment from accepting any person as a new member."
This is an amendment which covers the points raised by Deputy Dockrell in his amendments Nos. 69 to 74 and 76-77. This amendment is intended to protect those trade unions which do not negotiate for the fixing of wages or conditions of employment. As we know, there are trade unions—registered trade unions as distinct from authorised trade unions—which do not concern themselves with affairs of this sort. We have the Tobacconists' Association, for instance, which is concerned mainly with the fixing of prices and the general order, discipline and control of the trade. There are other associations which are largely provident societies, and we do not wish that any determination should interfere with the normal activities of bodies of that sort. This amendment deals with the points with which Deputy Dockrell endeavoured to deal in the series of amendments which he put down.
What would be the effect on a union which is not successful in getting a negotiation licence, but which does not cease to be a trade union? It lives on in the hope of being able at some time to get a determination in its favour. Does this prevent such a union from taking any new members? If I read this amendment correctly in conjunction with sub-section (5), it will operate to prevent any trade union, which does not carry on negotiations, from accepting any person as a new member.
It does not prevent them from accepting new members.
It does not prevent them, except in one circumstance, which is, if they enter into negotiations for the fixing of wages or the determination of conditions of employment, unless they happen to be an excepted body. There are, for instance, professional organisations the main part of whose functions are concerned with provident and benevolent schemes. These bodies would be entitled to be considered under Section 6 as excepted bodies. They can discuss questions, wages and conditions of employment with local authorities and others but they are under the disability under Section 10 that they would not get the protection of the Trade Disputes Act. They would be entitled without being authorised trade unions or registered trade unions to carry on the provident side of their activities.
The point I wanted to make is this. I visualise the case of a union that has got a negotiation licence and has got a determination in respect of some industry or industries. For some reason or other, it may lose its determination in the case of one industry, but it does not cease to function as a union as it has a determination in respect of other industries. If it loses its determination in the case of one particular industry, and that determination is given to another union, I suggest that it should still have the right to recruit members from that industry into the union in the hope of being able some day to secure a determination again to organise that industry after a certain period has expired. If it is not able to build up a membership it will not have any hope of doing that.
This is a rather difficult question because there are so many gradations of character in relation to the registered trade unions. As I have said, you may have a body registered as a trade union which does not deal even in the remotest way with the fixing of wages and conditions of employment. Then you have a large number of professional associations until you come along to the associations which cater for active workers, general manual workers. In relation to a trade union, as it is understood in labour circles which construe the term in a rather more limited way than the law does—what might be described as a labour union—any trade union which seeks to fix wages and conditions of employment, will not be able to do that if the tribunal has granted a monopoly right to another or other trade unions to organise that particular class of workmen. However, workers who are members of a trade union which has been excluded by the determination of the tribunal from organising that particular class of worker, will have to elect which of the one or more other unions to whom a determination has been granted they are going to join. If they do join one or other of these bodies which have secured a determination, the union which they left does not necessarily die. It may continue to operate to organise other classes of workers for the fixing of wages and conditions of employment; that is, for classes in regard to which the tribunal has not made any determination. If it decides it has no functions in relation to other classes of workers, and it has substantial benefit funds, it can continue to carry on as a trade union administering benefit schemes. It can recruit members for the purpose of participating in these benefit schemes, but it cannot recruit these members for the specific purpose of negotiating on their behalf for the fixing of wages or conditions of employment.
I quite understand the Minister's point, but I do not think that what he has in mind is properly conveyed in the amendment. I have in mind a union which can still function in relation to some other industries, though it might be put out of action from the point of view of being granted a determination in connection with a particular industry. There may be one or two unions connected with a particular branch of industry and they may be granted a determination. Then, again, it is possible for members to fall away from one or other of the unions; they may lapse into obscurity and non-membership. Why should it not be possible for them to join a union which has provident benefits and which functions in respect of other industries and which may hope, owing to the unsatisfactory working of the union catering for the industry, successfully to seek a determination under the Act? I suggest that if those men want to resign from the unions they are in, they should be free to do so and to enter into unions of their choice and in that way build up a case for the union of their choice so that a claim may be made and a determination granted. I quite understand what the Minister has tried to convey, but I do not think the amendment covers it. This precludes them accepting any person as a new member for any purpose.
I think that Deputy Keyes and the Minister are slightly at cross-purposes. The Minister has explained the various positions that unions may be in, unions that negotiate for the purpose of fixing wages. Quite obviously there would be several classes of unions under that category. There would be the type of union which has quite obviously got a negotiation licence, but has not got or has let lapse the right to organise that trade or class either alone or in combination with others. I suggest these unions are all on the one side. My amendment and the Minister's amendment deal with the type of union that, quite frankly, does not want to negotiate for the purpose of fixing wages. The point about this amendment is that a union that does not negotiate for the fixing of wages is not to be tied down to accept new members.
Not to be prevented.
Yes, not to be prevented from accepting new members. It was to make that position quite clear that this was suggested. I should like to suggest to Deputy Keyes that this deals with that type of union alone, and it does not interfere in any way with the other type of union which negotiates for the fixing of wages and, quite irrespective of whether they are allowed to organise that class or numerous classes, have got a determination. Whether they have not got a determination or have lost their determination—that is all untouched by this amendment.
Amendment agreed to.
Amendments Nos. 80 and 81 not moved.
Question proposed: "That Section 23, as amended, stand part of the Bill."
Mr. Byrne
I desire to oppose the section which prevents a worker having a choice of union, if there are two or more unions catering for his class of work. I see in this clause that, by depriving a member of a choice of union, the Minister is asking the House to become the organisers of one big union. The clause contains a type of dictation by the Minister and the House to members of the various crafts as to what type of union they should join. Take dockers, for instance, and those engaged in other work along the quayside, where there are two or three unions——
There are four.
Mr. Byrne
——catering for the one type of workman. If one of these unions gets the approval of the tribunal, the other union is crushed out, because of the fact that it is deprived of the right to negotiate on wages or conditions generally, and the Minister in that way is smashing one union that is catering for one type of worker on the Dublin docks. I do not think this clause should be adopted without some explanation whether the Minister wants all dockers and carters to join one particular union of the Minister's choice, or the tribunal's choice. It certainly would seem that they are giving the big union the determination and the concession to negotiate for wages and better conditions.
I would like to draw the Deputy's attention to Section 21 (1) (c), in which that point was debated.
Mr. Byrne
But Section 23 (3) sets out that where a determination is granted, one trade union alone shall have the right to organise workmen of any particular class and no other trade union shall accept as a new member any workman of that class. Those are the words I am complaining of. I know there are two or three unions catering for the dockers and carters and others of that type.
There are four.
Mr. Byrne
I am definitely sure of two. This clause is asking the House to become the organisers for whichever is the big union in that area. I oppose the clause because it deprives a worker of his right of choice in relation to what trade union he should join.
Deputy Byrne stated that if a union got the right to organise, other unions could not negotiate for wages. My understanding was that, in their wisdom or their folly, the tribunal might grant to one or more unions the right to organise, but that once a union was properly accredited, it was allowed to become an authorised trade union and then they got a negotiation licence for wages. I should like the Minister to clear up that point.
The Deputy is quite right. The tribunal might decide to grant no determination and to leave the organisation of any particular class of workers open to any union which might care to go into the field, or might reserve the right to one or more unions, or go further and reserve the right to only one. These rights would only be conferred on authorised trade unions. A number of trade unions operate around the docks, and I think if one trade union made an application to secure the sole right to organise dock workers, the tribunal, in view of the fact that there are three fairly substantial unions, would naturally hesitate before it would decide to grant the sole right to one union to organise dockers. The fact that the tribunal is there would make the unions adopt a more helpful attitude towards each other than they are at present inclined to adopt, because if the tribunal had before it facts to show that one union was continually paralysing the port, and would not co-operate with the other unions in securing stable conditions at the port, then that would be a very strong argument against that union. For that reason I believe that this tribunal is going to prevent a great deal of the dislocation of industry which has arisen at the docks and elsewhere because of this inter-union rivalry.
Is it not a fact that if four trade unions succeed in getting negotiation licences and the tribunal grants to one the sole right to negotiate, the negotiation licences are of no use to the other three and lapse?
That is so. But if they have no other activity they get back their deposits.
But they can no longer, for purposes of negotiation, accept additional members?
I do not think we are justified in assuming that a tribunal constituted of responsible people would act in that arbitrary way. Having considered all the circumstances the tribunal would grant the sole right if satisfied that the public interest required it. Surely, if there is one thing public interest requires, not only in present circumstances, but in the world we may have to face after this war, it is that whatever may happen, Irish industry is not going to be dislocated, disturbed and disrupted simply because two or more unions care to indulge in a civil war against each other.
Irish industry will not only require organisation directed towards securing reasonable conditions of wages and conditions of employment but will also require to be supported by a very strong development of craft spirit inside the organised ranks of skilled workers. My objection to the section is that I do not agree that we are entirely free from the danger of the tribunal taking arbitrary action with regard to one union against another, because there is nothing directive or philosophic in the Minister's exposition of the Bill. With the amount of money that has to be lodged by trade unions under the terms of the Bill, craft unions as such are going to find themselves in this position, either that they cannot get negotiation licences or that if they do get them their position may be prejudiced by reason of the smallness of their numbers when some union applies to be regarded as the sole union covering ground in a certain number of analogous classes. We are going to have the position that a smaller union which may have got a negotiation licence and which caters for a technical class may find itself squeezed out by the application of larger unions. It may be forbidden to negotiate by the decision of the tribunal. It will not be able to get additional members except members attracted to the organisation because of its technical efficiency and craftsmanship. The very fact that we are approaching this measure by the amount of money that has to be deposited is one blemish, and also the smallness of numbers in highly technical classes will prejudice these classes. In the opening stages of the tribunal's work I do not think, because a union does not get placed by the tribunal as a body that might have a monopoly to negotiate, that it should be excluded from building up membership. Under the section which eliminated 12 months and inserted five years before there could be any negotiation, the smaller craft unions are denied the privilege of using a negotiation licence because the tribunal gave judgment in favour of another union, and they will find themselves in the position that they can take no new members for five years. What is the use of having another examination at the end of five years if during the preceding five years they were not able to accept new members?
Mr. Byrne
Do I understand from the Minister that if there are four unions catering for workers at the docks, if the tribunal favours one of the big unions with any of the privileges that are to be conferred, the other three unions must go out?
No.
Mr. Byrne
Will the other three unions have no right to negotiate for better wages or conditions?
No. The other three cannot accept dockers as new members.
Mr. Byrne
They cannot accept new members to build up a new claim to go before the tribunal?
They cannot negotiate for wages.
Yes, they can.
Of course they can.
They will not be allowed to recruit.
In that particular field.
Mr. Byrne
They will not be allowed to build up new members to avail of the conditions in the Bill for five years? They are being crushed out.
They will not be allowed to poach for new members during that period.
Mr. Byrne
There are 10,000 young people going into industry each year. Have they to go into the only union favoured by the tribunal? These will be newcomers into the labour movement, just after leaving school. Are they to be told that they must join the one big union?
I do not know what is the Deputy's purpose in misrepresenting the objects of this Bill. I have already told him that the tribunal will be constituted of responsible men, and they are not going to give a decision arbitrarily, or to confer a monopoly on one union, two unions, or three unions, unless they are satisfied that the public interest requires that that should be done. If so, then I am sure they will do it. Accordingly, any person newly entering the particular class in respect of which such determination has been given would have to join the one union or the other unions to whom this tribunal has granted a determination. But that is not to say—as Deputy Byrne has stated here—that 10,000 new people coming into the industry every year would have to allocate themselves among a limited number of unions, because I do not think the tribunal is going to say, "If you are going to be a carpenter you must join this union and this union only, or if you are going to follow some other trade you must join this union and this union only." What the tribunal is there for is to see that there is no such multiplicity of unions existing in this country that they are all going to be, as they have been for the past 20 years, at each other's throats, one trying to down the other, and that we are going to get some finality to this inter-union quarrelling and rivalry in this country. Accordingly, as I have said, once the tribunal has made up its mind that the only way to deal with this situation is to grant one or other unions a monopoly in certain fields of activity, then those who want to adopt the occupations in which these unions have got that right will have to join the union or unions which the tribunal determines which can deal with the situation best.
Mr. Byrne
I am right, then. The Minister has really made my case. Out of three or four unions that are catering for workers at the docks one of them will be favoured by the tribunal, and new yound men wanting to go to work at the docks will have to join that union. In other words, the Minister is becoming an organiser for the one big union idea at the North Wall and the docks. By the action of this House we are forcing the younger men going to business to join the one union favoured by the tribunal. Because of the fact that the other unions are prevented from taking new members, they are going to fade out. The other three unions are unions that helped to build up that kind of rivalry the Minister now condemns, but which was a kind of rivalry that got wages to the peak they are at the moment. Even rivalry in trade unions had a good effect. I do not favour this big number of unions, but I think when two unions are catering for the one type of craftsmen or worker, unskilled or skilled, that kind of friendly rivalry between the two helps to bring up wages and get better conditions for those who are engaged in that type of industry. The Minister has admitted that the three unions at the docks may go out, that they must go out, because they cannot accept new members. The Minister is building up the idea at the docks and amongst the dockers that there is one big union only to cater for their wants, and he is forcing them to join that one big union, and by the mere fact that he will not allow the other three to accept new members he is going to crush out rivalry, and is going to have the idea of the one big union. The Minister has made my case.
I think it is an absurd exaggeration for the Minister to say that in the past 20 years trade unions have been at one another's throats. There has been relative calm in the past 20 years in the trade union movement and the number of strikes which have been attributed to inter-union rivalry is negligible. The Minister was asked on a previous occasion, I think on the Second Reading of this Bill, to give us some instances of the extent to which inter-union rivalry had caused trade disputes and the Minister, of course, hopelessly failed to produce any evidence on the subject. The Minister says now he hopes the operations of the tribunal will reduce the number of unions, that he personally does not want to see the present multiplicity of unions continued. If the Minister read the section he would know that the tribunal has no power to reduce the number of unions. What happens is, if there are four organisations in an industry, one, which claims to represent the majority of the workers in that industry, may go to the tribunal and may get from the tribunal an authorisation——
No, a determination.
Determination is the same. I do not see the difference between them. The union may get authority from the tribunal that it and it alone shall organise the workers in that particular industry. When that application was made to the tribunal, there were, say, four unions in the industry. The tribunal gives one union the right to organise exclusively the workers engaged in that industry. What then happens? The union that gets that authorisation proceeds to organise all the workers engaged in that industry. The others may not recruit any new members in that industry but they still exist. The three other organisations still exist and continue to function. They may very well take on a new orientation and, in fact, spread themselves out into another industry and decide they are going to organise workers in another industry as well as retaining in membership the workers who are members at the date of the authorisation to another organisation solely to recruit new employees in that industry. The tribunal, therefore, has no power whatever to reduce the number of unions. It may try to create a set of circumstances in which by stemming the inflow to certain unions, in the course of time, it will weaken them. That is going to be a very long time. Very few of us in this House will be alive at the time when that type of slow extermination will, in fact, cause any of these organisations to cease to exist.
There is a point in connection with this section I would like to raise, that is, the question of the determinations of the tribunal. This tribunal is empowered to make a determination the effect of which may be that one organisation or two organisations or three organisations, and they alone, have the right to organise workers in a particular industry. In so far as it gives the right to three, perhaps, the thing is not so important, but in so far as it gives the right to one organisation to organise workers in an industry it may by that very fact be jeopardising the future existence of another organisation which is already in existence in that industry. This tribunal is to consist of three people. One is to be a practising barrister or a solicitor. The two others we do not know. In the hands of these three people we are placing the power ultimately to exterminate an organisation, but they will have the power immediately to seriously impair the existence of an organisation which may have been in existence for a very long time. I object to giving this tribunal these wide powers with no appeal whatever against its decision, and I want to urge the Minister that if a tribunal of that type is going to function there should not be given to it these very wide powers to cause ultimate destruction to an organisation and, possibly, to cause an organisation very serious immediate injury. We ought not to give into the hands of these unknown people, about whose qualifications we have no information, the power to damage trade unions in that way. At the same time, in a case of this kind there ought to be provision whereby any aggrieved organisation could appeal to the courts against a determination of the tribunal. That provision for an appeal to the courts has been embodied in other legislation, and there is no reason why this tribunal should be given the very wide powers which it has under this Bill, while no provision whatever is made for an appeal to the courts against any erratic determination of the tribunal.
Before we leave that point, I have already indicated to Deputy Norton that I am considering the question of an appeal from the type of decision which he has indicated, and hope to bring in on Report Stage an amendment which will deal with that matter.
I want to put just a few points to the Minister. When no trade union can accept new workmen of any class that trade union must gradually die out. Now, that trade union has at any rate a deposit of £2,000 as security in the High Court. When it dies out, what becomes of its funds? It would seem to me at first sight that all that money will remain there until the trade union has become a one-man union, and then the one man can draw out the £2,000, use it as he likes, and will also have the other funds of the society such as they are. Let me take, for example, not quite similar corporations. When the old Serjeants' Inn was wound up and there were no more Serjeants, the surviving Serjeants sold the property and received very substantial sums of money themselves.
In the same way, if a social club is wound up the surviving members take the funds of the club such as they are. I myself was once a member of a social club. We found we could not carry on, and sold its premises. We received very substantial dividends out of the proceeds. Will the same thing happen in the case of a trade union: will the last survivor be able to collar the entire funds of the union? No doubt, if a trade union, that cannot take any further members in, happens to be an English-run trade union, the question will not arise, because it would carry on in the other country, but suppose some question arises, and it goes before the tribunal, if they decide that the English-managed trade union is to be the only trade union in this country, that it has got a majority of members, and is to be the only trade union, then the Irish-managed trade unions will gradually fade away bit by bit, and, accordingly, the gentleman who will be lucky enough to be the survivor of them will become a very wealthy man by the time everything is finished up.
I should like, first of all, to point out to the Deputy that an amendment will be moved on Report Stage which will debar the tribunal from making a determination which would grant to one or more unions, having their headquarters outside this country, the exclusive right to organise Irish workers in this country.
I was speaking of the section as it stands.
We can assume, at any rate, that my statement stands for the purposes of the discussion. With regard to the main point, I think that I have met very fully the danger which the Deputy suggests would exist if it could arise in a practical way. We are asked to assume, first of all, a very peculiar case, a case where, by reason of a series of determinations— and it must be by reason of a series of determinations by the tribunal—a trade union can no longer accept members of any sort. That was the fact which the Deputy argued. Accordingly, it must, by reason of a decline in its membership, by reason of death or other cesser, eventually peter out. I think that before that position arose the members of a trade union would certainly take serious stock of their position, and, if they had substantial funds, would elect, I think, to amalgamate with another trade union, carrying their funds with them. There would, at any rate, be a section of them which would seek that amalgamation: those who saw that they were not getting any very great benefits out of the fact that they belonged to this union and who did visualise the day when the union would have to be broken up and its funds distributed among its members. Naturally, they would want one of two things: either that the union should amalgamate and that its funds should be transferred to another union, and that they should get, as a result of the amalgamation, all the benefits and all the rights inside the other union which they were entitled to in their own, or, else, they would look forward to the position which the Deputy has envisaged where the union would break up. I think that the majority would desire, if that position were going to happen and that the funds were going to be divided, that they would all share in the division, and, naturally, they would be most reluctant to allow the union, as the Deputy suggested, slowly to disappear, and all the funds to fall, ultimately, into a very limited number of hands. Therefore, I do not think that the situation which the Deputy has put to us as a hypothetical one, is ever likely to arise.
Apart from that, I think that when the tribunal is granting these determinations it would advert to the possibility which the Deputy has mentioned, as I think it is bound to do under sub-section (2) of Section 21, which states:—
"Before granting under this section a determination that a particular trade union shall alone have the right to organise workmen of a particular class, the tribunal may, if it thinks proper, require such trade union to satisfy the tribunal that the grant of such determination will not affect adversely any rights or claims to benefits enjoyed for the time being by any of such workmen as members of a trade union."
If people continue over the period of their natural lives to be members of a trade union and receive, during the course of that membership, all the benefits which were covenanted to them when they joined the union and continued to be members, I do not think they have any very great grievance if they elect to take that course and allow the union to go on gradually to disappear by reason of a decline in its membership. I do not think that the majority of people would elect to take that course. I think that they would press either, as I have stated, for an amalgamation which would ensure a continuance of their rights within another body, or press for the winding up of the union and for the distribution and sale of the property among the members of the union. Again, I would like to emphasise that the Deputy based his case upon a union which found itself, by reason of a determination, no longer in a position to accept any member. Now, I think it is unlikely that that position will arise. Again we have got to remember that those who organise, control and guide trade unions are practical men.
This, after a fortnight's abuse!
We shall not go into that. As I was saying, we have got to remember that those who organise, direct and guide trade unions are practical men, who will not resign themselves to slow extinction in that way, but will find other fields of endeavour which will enable the union to carry on. I can scarcely visualise a position arising in which, by reason of a series of determinations, because that is what it would have to be, a union would find itself in a position in which it could not accept any new member.
"No trade union shall accept as a new member any worker of that class." Suppose the membership dwindles to 40 or 50 and they begin to think they are not sufficiently strong to carry on. They can divide all the proceeds between themselves, according to the Minister, and join another union.
The Minister concedes that because of the impossibility of this union which has not got a determination to recruit new members, it will tend to dwindle and die. Deputy Norton is inclined to think that that will take a rather long time and be a slow process. I am not inclined to agree with him, and I think it would be much more speedy than it would appear to be at the outset, because there are going to be different causes of disintegration. The union inside, which is carrying on and which has got a determination, knows that its rival outside cannot recruit new members. The incentive to activity and energy on behalf of its members which would be ever present to their minds because of active competition—such as was spoken of by Deputy Byrne in his recent speech —is absent, and if, for any reason, lethargy and apathy set in in that union and disaffection creeps in among the members, personnel is not necessary for them to carry on. Seven people can constitute a trade union under the laws we have at present, and, so long as there are seven people at the head of affairs in that union holding a determination, they can purport to carry on organisation on behalf of the workers in that industry. Other members cannot be recruited by the union outside which may be hoping to prove itself more efficient when the time comes for making an application. What is obviously going to happen is disorganisation. The members will fall away from the union, if what I have suggested occurs. They have no place to go, except into the ranks of non-unionism, or into the house union which may very conveniently spring up then on the invitation of the "boss" or the master. Some of his staff officers may become officials of the union to safeguard him from the wiles and wickedness of the bold, bad orthodox trade unionists.
That is the real menace of this section, which unquestionably exists because the outside union has not got the right to recruit new members. It is going to affect them, but it will, or may, affect the union inside and that is something we should guard against, because if that apathy sets in in a union which has a determination, and is confident of carrying on with its licence, its members will never be coerced into working in a union they do not like, and all the laws you make will not coerce the members to accept any union but the union of their choice. If they are not satisfied with the method of conducting business in their own union, they will fade away. Being prevented from going into an alternative union, they will become non-unionists as a protest. Speaking as a trade unionist—and my views on the Bill may be biassed, because I have a very strong leaning towards the effectiveness of trade unionism as an element in the country's life—anything which militates against or weakens that effectiveness is not good for the country, apart from trade unionists.
Whatever may have been the intention originally in framing the Bill, I believe that the Bill and this section are not going to achieve the object sought to be achieved. It will work in the reverse direction, and, in fact, is going to have very disastrous consequences for the trade union movement. I believe that these reflect themselves in the industries with which the unions are concerned. Many people denounce them. They are dubbed as usurers and graspers, as self seekers, with no interest in people outside, and catering only for sheltered classes, but I suggest that the work of the trade union movement represents a very definite national contribution, and anybody who interferes with it or risks wrecking it is undertaking a serious responsibility. I am afraid this section bores another hole through which these members will leak out, and I think it is going to be equally as disastrous as the previous section, and that instead of making for harmony and solidarity is going to have the opposite effect.
I think there is a misprint in the sub-section where the word "thereafter" is used. It is not made clear, at least to a layman like myself, that the effect of amendment No. 68 which we have passed is definitely to revoke the determinations where these determinations are granted to one union, and it may be necessary on the Report Stage to clarify the point. I should like to point out to Deputy Keyes that he is arguing again from a false premise. It is assumed that these determinations are granted in perpetuity, but there is nothing in the Bill which warants that assumption. A determination will be granted to two or more unions for a period of five years. If they manage to continue to hold their negotiation licence, that is the period. In the case of a determination granted to two or more of a group of unions, I intend that the determination shall stand for a period of three years. At the end of that time, if the situation he indicated has arisen, in which people have become dissatisfied with the union which has secured the determination and another union which has been in the field is anxious to resume in the field, it can make a fresh application and the balance of the members of the stagnant union will determine whether they want to go to the more active union or not.
It is somewhat difficult to get a line on the Minister's view of the section. Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney spoke of what would happen in the case of an organisation which was not entitled to continue to recruit members of a particular class in industry because a determination had been made in favour of another union that it, and it alone, had the right to organise new workers in that industry. He quoted the case of the organisation, from which was withdrawn the right to continue to recruit members, dwindling in membership to a pretty small figure, an organisation which had reached a stage at which there were only a few members left, but at which it still had a negotiation licence and still had a substantial sum of money to its credit. He pertinently asked what was to happen to the funds of such an organisation. From what the Minister says, I take it that he agrees that, in such a situation, it is possible for the surviving members to say: "There are a dozen of us left and there is a sum of £10,000 available," and to divide the £10,000 between those members. That is possible under the section, according to the Minister, and the Minister does not see anything wrong in the possibility of that happening.
I say that it is a most unlikely situation.
It is by no means unlikely.
It could happen now, but it does not happen.
It could not so easily happen now. It might very well happen in theory now, but it is by no means unlikely to happen under the Bill. But the Minister then says that folk who are responsible for the administration of trade unions are practical people, and if a determination has been given against them, they are still sufficiently resourceful to be able to continue their organisation. If it is true that they are practical men, that they are resourceful and able to devise ways and means of continuing their organisation, notwithstanding the determination against them by the tribunal, how will this tribunal reduce the number of unions?
According to the Minister you can get a determination from the tribunal against an organisation, but the Minister says, on the other hand, that organisations are still sufficiently resourceful to keep their existence. I believe they are. I believe that it is nonsense for us to put in a provision to the effect that a union will not continue to recruit members. It would be quite impossible for any authority in the State or for the State itself to prevent an organisation from continuing to recruit members. It will continue to do so. It will do it in a surreptitious fashion that will escape detection, and make it quite impossible for the State to prevent a union which has had an unfavourable determination made against it from continuing to recruit members and keep itself in existence. I believe that this whole section and the other sections relating to the establishment of the tribunal, its determinations and its functions are quite impracticable, and cannot in fact be effectively administered. I think this whole piece of machinery is quite unworkable.
Question put.
The Committee divided: Tá, 48; Níl, 17.
Tá
- Aiken, Frank.
- Bartley, Gerald.
- Beegan, Patrick.
- Boland, Gerald.
- Bourke, Dan.
- Brady, Brian.
- Breathnach, Cormac.
- Brennan, Martin.
- Cleary, Mícheál.
- Crowley, Tadhg.
- De Valera, Eamon.
- Dockrell, Henry M.
- Flynn, Stephen.
- Fogarty, Andrew.
- Fogarty, Patrick J.
- Gorry, Patrick J.
- Harris, Thomas.
- Hogan, Daniel.
- Keane, John J.
- Kelly, James P.
- Kelly, Thomas.
- Kennedy, Michael J.
- Killilea, Mark.
- Kissane, Eamon.
- Lemass, Seán F.
- Little, Patrick J.
- McCann, John.
- McDevitt, Henry A
- MacEntee, Seán.
- Meaney, Cornelius.
- Morrissey, Michael.
- Moylan, Seán.
- Mullen, Thomas.
- O Briain, Donnchadh.
- O Ceallaigh, Seán T.
- O'Grady, Seán.
- Rice, Brigid M.
- Ruttledge, Patrick J.
- Ryan, James.
- Ryan, Martin.
- Ryan, Robert.
- Sheridan, Michael.
- Smith, Patrick.
- Traynor, Oscar.
- Victory, James.
- Walsh, Laurence J.
- Walsh, Richard.
- Ward, Conn.
Níl
- Bennett, George C.
- Byrne, Alfred.
- Byrne, Alfred (Junior)
- Cosgrave, William T.
- Fitzgerald-Kenney, James.
- Hannigan, Joseph.
- Hickey, James.
- Keating, John.
- Keyes, Michael.
- Lynch, Finian.
- McGilligan, Patrick.
- Mulcahy, Richard.
- Nally, Martin.
- Norton, William.
- O'Sullivan, John M.
- Pattison, James P.
- Redmond, Bridget M.
Tellers: Tá: Deputies Smith and Kennedy; Níl: Deputies Keyes and Hickey.
Question declared carried.
SECTION 24.
Question proposed: "That Section 24 stand part of the Bill."
This section provides that the Minister may make regulations in relation to such matters as the times and places of the sittings of the tribunal, the persons to whom, and the times and manner in which, notice of the sittings of the tribunal shall be given, the admission or exclusion of the public to and from sittings of the tribunal, and such other matters in relation to the practice and procedure of the tribunal as the Minister may consider necessary in connection with the conduct of the business of the tribunal.
Would the Minister tell us what kind of regulations he proposes to make under Section 24 (d)? It seems to me that Section 24 (d) covers Section 24 (a), (b) and (c), because it is so comprehensive in its terms as to enable the Minister to do (a), (b) and (c) under (d). Will he give us an idea of what he intends to do under (d) that is not done already under (a), (b) and (c)?
Mr. Byrne
I should like to know from the Minister if any provision will be made for the publication of the tribunal's business. Will they report to the Government or report to the House, and will this House have any opportunity of discussing the tribunal's activities? In the case of affected parties who may disagree with the decisions of the tribunal will there be any way of affording an opportunity to these parties to appeal or go before the tribunal, or is there any way by which the dissatisfied party's case can get consideration afterwards, either by the Minister or in some other way? Will this House have any opportunity of criticising the decisions of the tribunal? In general, I want to know whether there will be a report of any kind to come in from the tribunal to the outside public, or will their proceedings be on the lines of certain commissions, dealing with other matters at the moment, who will sit and be asked to report in due course? One of these commissions has been sitting for three years and has never reported yet.
In connection with the regulations which the Minister may make, does he contemplate determining in what manner the tribunal will reach a decision? The tribunal is to be constituted of two laymen and one legal man. It would be of interest to the unions concerned, and to the public generally, to know what will be the precise method of arriving at a determination. Would it be by a majority decision; would the two laymen be able to out-vote the chairman, or would the chairman, exercising his legal lore and authority be able to dominate the two laymen into obedience and silence? Since the tribunal will be one with responsibilities to the House and to the country as a whole, I think the House ought to be told what will be the procedure adopted by the tribunal in arriving at decisions. Perhaps the Minister can say whether that is one of the matters he proposes to arrange under Section 24, and we should like to be told now what is his intention in regard to the manner of arriving at a decision—whether it is to be a majority decision or a unanimous decision.
The point made by Deputy Byrne has been dealt with already on Section 20. As to the character of the regulations which the Minister may make, I think that is clear on the face of the section as it appears here.
Surely, this is the section on which we should hear something about the matter.
The section says that the Minister may make regulations in relation to all or any of the following matters, such as the times and places of the sittings, and so on, and also—
"such other matters in relation to the practice and procedure of the tribunal as the Minister may consider necessary or expedient for the proper conduct of the business of the tribunal."
For instance, one of these matters might be whether a decision of the tribunal should be a majority decision or a unanimous decision. I think that, in order that the tribunal should work effectively, we should allow a decision of the tribunal to be a majority decision, and it would be my intention to give effect to that in making these regulations. It might be necessary also to regulate the manner in which the ballots, which the tribunal is empowered to take under Section 22, shall be taken. These, and matters of that sort, are the other matters that will be dealt with in the regulations.
Mr. Byrne
The Minister has not answered the point I made. Will the sittings be open to the public, or will a report be issued to this House?
Regulations (c) and (d) deal with that.
Mr. Byrne
So it will get further consideration?
Yes.
Is it not an extraordinary procedure for the Minister to take power to make a regulation, prescribing the manner in which the tribunal shall come to a decision, without having it definitely here? The usual procedure in cases of this kind is to put definitely into our legislation that, in considering an application for a determination, the board concerned, by a majority decision, may arrive at a verdict, but here we omit completely the machinery by which the board is to operate in arriving at a decision. The Minister says that he may make a regulation that the board can come to a decision by a majority vote, and we may have the situation arising where the Minister may start off by making a regulation empowering the tribunal to arrive at a decision by a majority vote, and then, after 12 months of that, the Minister may go back and provide that it must arrive at a decision by a unanimous vote. Is it not better to write into the legislation the precise manner in which the tribunal may come to a decision? If it is possible for the Minister to make regulations in connection with that matter, then we may have varying regulations being made, and the tribunal may arrive at different decisions at different times by different methods.
Or you might have something like the situation under the Pigs and Bacon Act, where a decision may be come to by the chairman himself if there is disagreement on the board. In view of what the Minister says, it is all the more remarkable to me that there is no provision in the Bill here by which the regulations will be laid before the House. While the Minister says that he thinks that the majority of the tribunal should decide a determination, nevertheless there are other ways in which a determination might be arrived at other than by a majority. The Minister, however, while keeping the actual terms, upon which a decision will be given, out of the Bill, by reason of the fact that he makes no provision by which the regulations will be placed before the House, cuts the House completely away from having any say, later on, in determining how the tribunal's decision will be given.
I shall meet the Deputy on that point and introduce an amendment to provide for the tabling of the regulations.
In such form that they can be annulled?
Yes, that they can be discussed.
That would give us an opportunity to discuss these matters as each point arises, but surely the Minister could outline his present intentions a little bit more. The times and places of sittings of a tribunal may not be of such importance, but it is important that notice shall be given. There is a procedure, which must be known to the Minister, under the Railway Tribunal, where in general public notice is given by advertisement. I wonder if the Minister has that in mind in regard to this. The next point is this admission or exclusion of the public to or from the sittings. We have this year amended the Constitution in such a way as to provide that the administration of justice—and this would be at least a sub-branch of that —is generally to be held in public, except for points that are mentioned. I imagine that should be done there, although I can understand cases where matters of funds may have to be discussed and where certain trouble might be caused amongst contributors so that the financial strength of one body as against another cannot be too obviously concealed. Except for that, the sittings will be in public?
Exactly.
In the case of the Military Tribunal, it can regulate its own procedure; but this says the Minister may regulate the procedure of this tribunal. There is no doubt about the question of decisions and what the strength is to be. We have varying practice in this matter. The original idea was that a majority verdict held. You did, however, get the point where there may be a chairman and then laymen as assessors. Particularly where these men are in the position of assessors, they have no right to vote at all and the decision rests with the chairman. Then we have the odious example of the Pigs Board, where the Minister's nominee is chairman. If he can secure the disagreement of even one person on the board, the Minister's nominee has the decision entirely in his own hands.
We cannot get away from the fact that all three are to be nominees of the Minister. The situation may arise where the Minister, after the tribunal has given a majority decision, may say that system does not work and may give the chairman entire control of these proceedings in any event, thus reducing the other two members—representing two different sides—to the position of assessors. The Minister has started off at least with the idea of a majority decision, but, nevertheless, has hinted that that might be changed.
I have not.
May I take it that, generally speaking, the Minister's view is that notice would be given publicly by advertisement in the newspapers, that the sittings would be in public, and that, ordinarily speaking, the decisions would be reached by majority verdict?
What is the meaning of the word "public" in paragraph (c)? Does "public" there mean persons who are not members of the two trade unions? For instance, there are two trade unions each of which consists of, say, 5,000 members. Can any of the members of the two trade unions attend the sittings, or is it only the officials? Can any one who likes attend?
That would be my general view. I do not know if Deputy McGilligan is aware that I propose to bring in an amendment to make it incumbent on the Minister to appoint the ordinary members of the tribunal from panels nominated by the authorised trade unions, so that they will not be exactly my nominees, except to the extent that I have limited powers of selection from the panels.
Question put.
The Committee divided: Tá, 47; Níl, 11.
Tá
- Aiken, Frank.
- Bartley, Gerald.
- Beegan, Patrick.
- Boland, Gerald.
- Bourke, Dan.
- Brady, Brian.
- Breathnach, Cormac.
- Brennan, Martin.
- Briscoe, Robert.
- Crowley, Tadhg.
- Derrig, Thomas.
- De Valera, Eamon.
- Flynn, Stephen.
- Fogarty, Andrew.
- Fogarty, Patrick J.
- Gorry, Patrick J.
- Harris, Thomas.
- Hogan, Daniel.
- Keane, John J.
- Kelly, James P.
- Sheridan, Michael.
- Smith, Patrick.
- Traynor, Oscar.
- Victory, James.
- Kelly, Thomas.
- Kennedy, Michael J.
- Killilea, Mark.
- Lemass, Seán F.
- Little, Patrick J.
- McCann, John.
- McDevitt, Henry A.
- MacEntee, Seán.
- Meaney, Cornelius.
- Morrissey, Michael.
- Moylan, Seán.
- Mullen, Thomas.
- O Briain, Donnchadh.
- O Ceallaigh Seán T.
- O'Grady, Seán.
- Rice, Brigid M.
- Ruttledge, Patrick J.
- Ryan, James.
- Ryan, Martin.
- Ryan, Robert.
- Walsh, Laurence J.
- Walsh, Richard.
- Ward, Conn.
Níl
- Byrne, Alfred.
- Byrne, Alfred (Junior).
- Hannigan, Joseph.
- Hickey, James.
- Keating, John.
- Keyes, Michael.
- Lynch, Finian.
- Nally, Martin.
- Norton, William.
- Pattison, James P.
- Redmond, Bridget M.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Smith and Kennedy; Níl: Deputies Keyes and Hickey.
Question declared carried.
SECTION 25.
Question proposed: "That Section 25 stand part of the Bill."
This section gives the tribunal the powers, rights and privileges for enforcing the attendance of witnesses, examining them on oath, and compelling the production of documents that are vested in the High Court. It provides that a summons signed by one or more members of the tribunal will be equivalent to a formal process issued by the High Court. Sub-section (2) provides that where any person defaults in attendance as a witness, after being duly summoned, or refuses to take an oath or to produce any document in his power or control, legally required by the tribunal, or refuses to answer any question or does anything which, if the tribunal, were a court of justice having power to commit for contempt of court, would be contempt of such court, the tribunal may certify the offence of that person to the High Court and the High Court may, after such inquiry as it may think fit, take steps for the punishment of the person concerned as if he had been guilty of contempt of the High Court. Sub-section (3) provides that witnesses before the tribunal shall be entitled to the same immunities and privileges as if they were witnesses before the High Court.
Other Acts have carried sections of the same type as this. Is this the usual section?
Yes.
It is quite clear that what is intended by sub-section (1) is that the tribunal will summon a person to give evidence, but that the summons may be signed by any one member of the tribunal. A point was raised under a similar section that it, apparently, gave power to a member to summon a witness, whether the tribunal wanted him summoned or not. I take it that the wording here merely provides machinery in the signature of one member and that it is the tribunal which will summon the witnesses.
Yes.
If that is the intention and if it is carried out by the wording, it will be all right. I take it that sub-sections (2) and (3) are, so to speak, to be read together. Would it be possible for a witness to attend before the tribunal and claim privilege, which the tribunal would not grant him, the tribunal then having, more or less, to deal with him, or would the procedure be that, under sub-section (2) the tribunal would report to the High Court.
That is the intention.
Question put.
The Committee divided: Tá, 48; Níl, 11.
Tá
- Aiken, Frank.
- Bartley, Gerald.
- Beegan, Patrick.
- Boland, Gerald.
- Bourke, Dan.
- Brady, Brian.
- Breathnach, Cormac.
- Brennan, Martin.
- Briscoe, Robert.
- Cleary, Mícheál.
- Crowley, Tadhg.
- Derrig, Thomas.
- De Valera, Eamon.
- Flynn, Stephen.
- Fogarty, Andrew.
- Fogarty, Patrick J.
- Gorry, Patrick J.
- Harris, Thomas.
- Hogan, Daniel.
- Keane, John J.
- Kelly, James P.
- Kelly, Thomas.
- Kennedy, Michael J.
- Killilea, Mark.
- Lemass, Seán F.
- Little, Patrick J.
- McCann, John.
- McDevitt, Henry A.
- MacEntee, Seán.
- Meaney, Cornelius.
- Morrissey, Michael.
- Moylan, Seán.
- Mullen, Thomas.
- O Briain, Donnchadh.
- O Ceallaigh, Seán T.
- O'Grady, Seán.
- Rice, Brigid M.
- Ruttledge, Patrick J.
- Ryan, James.
- Ryan, Martin.
- Ryan, Robert.
- Sheridan, Michael.
- Smith, Patrick.
- Traynor, Oscar.
- Victory, James.
- Walsh, Laurence J.
- Walsh, Richard.
- Ward, Conn.
Níl
- Byrne, Alfred.
- Byrne, Alfred (Junior).
- Hannigan, Joseph.
- Hickey, James.
- Keating, John.
- Keyes, Michael.
- Nally, Martin.
- Norton, William.
- Pattison, James P.
- Redmond, Bridget M.
- Rogers, Patrick J.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Smith and Kennedy; Níl: Deputies Keyes and Hickey.
Question declared carried.
SECTION 26.
Question proposed: "That Section 26 stand part of the Bill."
Can the Minister say what fee the tribunal is likely to prescribe as the fee to be paid in respect of applications made to the tribunal? Does the Minister, for instance, intend to prescribe a fee under the powers he has taken in Section 24 or does he intend to allow the tribunal to fix the fee? If he intends to have the power himself to prescribe the fee, will he indicate what fee he has in mind?
That is a matter on which I should like to have some consultation with the lawyers, but I think it ought to be a substantial fee, as we do not want to have vexatious applications coming before the tribunal.
Would not vexatious applications be prevented by the fact that costs before the tribunal could be levied against the parties concerned?
Is it not right that fees are generally the same for everybody and that the levying of costs beats down the vexatious litigation?
Perhaps I did not advert to the fact that in this case a substantial sum would be on deposit. I was about to suggest that perhaps you might get a litigant from whom costs could not be collected. However, I shall bear in mind what Deputy Norton has said, but I do think it ought to be of some reasonable value, like £5 or £10, or something like that.
Question put.
The Committee divided: Tá, 49; Níl, 12.
Tá
- Aiken, Frank.
- Bartley, Gerald.
- Beegan, Patrick.
- Boland, Gerald.
- Bourke, Dan.
- Brady, Brian.
- Breathnach, Cormac.
- Brennan, Martin.
- Briscoe, Robert.
- Cleary, Mícheál.
- Crowley, Tadhg.
- Derrig, Thomas.
- De Valera, Eamon.
- Dockrell, Henry M.
- Flynn, Stephen.
- Fogarty, Andrew.
- Fogarty, Patrick J.
- Gorry, Patrick J.
- Harris, Thomas.
- Hogan, Daniel.
- Keane, John J.
- Kelly, James P.
- Kelly, Thomas.
- Kennedy, Michael J.
- Killilea, Mark.
- Lemass, Seán F.
- Little, Patrick J.
- McCann, John.
- McDevitt, Henry A.
- MacEntee, Seán.
- Meaney, Cornelius.
- Morrissey, Michael.
- Moylan, Seán.
- Mullen, Thomas.
- O Briain, Donnchadh.
- O Ceallaigh, Seán T.
- O'Grady, Seán.
- Rice, Brigid M.
- Ruttledge, Patrick J.
- Ryan, James.
- Ryan, Martin.
- Ryan, Robert.
- Sheridan, Michael.
- Smith, Patrick.
- Traynor, Oscar.
- Victory, James.
- Walsh, Laurence J.
- Walsh, Richard.
- Ward, Conn.
Níl
- Byrne, Alfred.
- Byrne, Alfred (Junior).
- Hannigan, Joseph.
- Hickey, James.
- Keating, John.
- Keyes, Michael.
- Lynch, Finian.
- Nally, Martin.
- Norton, William.
- Pattison, James P.
- Redmond, Bridget M.
- Rogers, Patrick J.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Smith and Kennedy; Níl: Deputies Keyes and Hickey.
Question declared carried.
SECTION 27.
Question proposed: "That Section 27 stand part of the Bill."
This section provides that the tribunal may fix the cost of the parties appearing on any application before them and may direct the manner in which these costs are to be paid. It further provides that the tribunal may themselves tax the amount of any costs awarded or may direct in what manner they are to be taxed. It also provides that costs awarded shall in default of payment be recoverable as a simple contract debt in any court of competent jurisdiction.
Could the Minister give any indication as to the level or standard of costs in which applicants to the tribunal are likely to be involved? I think we should get some indication of the costs in which people who will have the temerity to make an application to this body are likely to be involved. What standard is being taken? Is it to be the High Court scale for witnesses and others who will have to appear before the tribunal? We surely ought to get some idea, having regard to the fact that some of the applicants are likely to be poor unions. It is to be hoped that some of the poor unions will still have sufficient funds to enable them to make application to this body. Are the costs of such unions to be measured on the same scale as the costs of unions who may have millions, or thousands of pounds, at their back? We know that the Minister has certain ideas as to the type of unions that are likely to make application to this tribunal, but as there are also likely to be some of the poorer unions involved, we ought to get some indication as to whether the expenses are to be on a grandiose or moderate scale.
This is a question upon which I could not express an opinion, as it is a matter which lies in the hands of applicants themselves. Where they elect to be represented by lawyers of eminence, the costs will presumably be high, but that will be at their own election. If they elect to be represented by laymen or officials of the union, their costs will be correspondingly lower. Between these two extremes, I cannot give any indication as to what the costs are likely to be. It is a matter which rests largely in the hands of applicants themselves.
Question put.
The Committee divided: Tá, 47; Níl, 12.
Tá
- Aiken, Frank.
- Bartley, Gerald.
- Beegan, Patrick.
- Bourke, Dan.
- Brady, Brian.
- Breathnach, Cormac.
- Brennan, Martin.
- Briscoe, Robert.
- Cleary, Mícheál.
- Crowley, Tadhg.
- Derrig, Thomas.
- De Valera, Eamon.
- Dockrell, Henry M.
- Flynn, Stephen.
- Fogarty, Andrew.
- Fogarty, Patrick J.
- Gorry, Patrick J.
- Harris, Thomas.
- Hogan, Daniel.
- Keane, John J.
- Kelly, James P.
- Kelly, Thomas.
- Kennedy, Michael J.
- Killilea, Mark.
- Lemass, Seán F.
- Little, Patrick J.
- McCann, John.
- McDevitt, Henry A.
- MacEntee, Seán.
- Meaney, Cornelius.
- Morrissey, Michael.
- Moylan, Seán.
- Mullen, Thomas.
- O Briain, Donnchadh.
- O'Grady, Seán.
- Rice, Brigid M.
- Ruttledge, Patrick J.
- Ryan, James.
- Ryan, Martin.
- Ryan, Robert.
- Sheridan, Michael.
- Smith, Patrick.
- Traynor, Oscar.
- Victory, James.
- Walsh, Laurence J.
- Walsh, Richard.
- Ward, Conn.
Níl
- Byrne, Alfred.
- Byrne, Alfred (Junior).
- Hannigan, Joseph.
- Hickey, James.
- Keating, John.
- Keyes, Michael.
- Lynch, Finian.
- Nally, Martin.
- Norton, William.
- Pattison, James P.
- Redmond, Bridget M.
- Rogers, Patrick J.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Smith and Kennedy; Níl: Deputies Keyes and Hickey.
Question declared carried.
Amendment 84 not moved.
SECTION 28.
Question proposed: "That Section 28 stand part of the Bill."
This section provides for the appointment of the officers and servants of the tribunal.
What staff will the tribunal have?
That will depend on the number of applications, but I presume the tribunal will have a registrar, or a secretary, at least.
Question put.
The Committee divided: Tá, 45; Níl, 8.
Tá
- Aiken, Frank.
- Bartley, Gerald.
- Beegan, Patrick.
- Bourke, Dan.
- Brady, Brian.
- Derrig, Thomas.
- De Valera, Eamon.
- Dockrell, Henry M.
- Flynn, Stephen.
- Fogarty, Patrick J.
- Gorry, Patrick J.
- Harris, Thomas.
- Hogan, Daniel.
- Keane, John J.
- Kelly, James P.
- Kelly, Thomas.
- Kennedy, Michael J.
- Lemass, Seán F.
- Little, Patrick J.
- McCann, John.
- McDevitt, Henry A.
- MacEntee, Seán.
- Meaney, Cornelius.
- Breathnach, Cormac.
- Brennan, Martin.
- Briscoe, Robert.
- Cleary, Mícheál.
- Crowley, Tadhg.
- Morrissey, Michael.
- Moylan, Seán.
- Mullen, Thomas.
- O Briain, Donnchadh.
- O Ceallaigh, Seán T.
- O'Grady, Seán.
- Rice, Bridget M.
- Ryan, James.
- Ryan, Martin.
- Ryan, Robert.
- Sheridan, Michael.
- Smith, Patrick.
- Traynor, Oscar.
- Victory, James.
- Walsh, Laurence J.
- Walsh, Richard.
- Ward, Conn.
Níl
- Byrne, Alfred.
- Byrne, Alfred (Junior).
- Hannigan, Joseph.
- Hickey, James.
- Keating, John.
- Keyes, Michael.
- Norton, William.
- Pattison, James P.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Smith and Kennedy; Níl: Deputies Keyes and Hickey.
Question declared carried.
SCHEDULE.
DEPOSITS.
1. Where the number of members does not exceed 2,000 the deposit shall be £2,000.
2. Where the number of members exceeds 2,000 but does not exceed 5,000, the deposit shall be £4,000.
3. Where the number of members exceeds 5,000 but does not exceed 10,000, the deposit shall be £6,000.
4. Where the number of members exceeds 10,000 but does not exceed 20,000 the deposit shall be £8,000.
5. Where the number of members exceeds 20,000, the deposit shall be £10,000.
I move amendment No. 84a:
To delete paragraphs 2 to 5 of the Schedule and substitute the following paragraphs:—
2. Where the number of members exceeds 2,000 but does not exceed 5,000, the deposit shall be £2,000 together with £200 for each additional 300 members (or part of 300 members) in excess of 2,000 members.
3. Where the number of members exceeds 5,000 but does not exceed 10,000, the deposit shall be £4,000 together with £200 for each additional 500 members (or part of 500 members) in excess of 5,000 members.
4. Where the number of members exceeds 10,000 but does not exceed 20,000, the deposit shall be £6,000, together with £200 for each additional 1,000 members (or part of 1,000 members) in excess of 10,000 members.
5. Where the number of members exceeds 20,000 the deposit shall be £8,000, together with £200 for each additional 1,000 members (or part of 1,000 members) in excess of 20,000 members, but subject to an overriding maximum of £10,000.
This amendment grants a certain easement in the making of the deposit. As the Schedule originally stood the number of trade unions was slightly in excess of the quota set out, and that would mean they would have to deposit a considerable sum. I have now arranged that the increase in the deposit will take place gradually.
The minimum is £2,000?
Yes.
Will the Minister say how that sum was arrived at? Has he any figures which will show the numerical strength of the trade unions and their funds? Has he any statistics to show how many trade unions in this country will be able to put down £2,000? As I understood on Second Reading the Minister gave a list of trade unions and took them simply according to numerical strength. I think the number was 34 that would have to amalgamate or disappear, taking the basis of strength of membership to equal £1 per head, according to that rate of calculation. There must have been some reason for arriving at the £2,000 minimum. What was the reason?
It was felt that a substantial sum was required, taking into consideration the resources of substantial trade unions. I think the Deputy misunderstood something I said on Second Reading. I was quoting then from Memorandum No. 1, which suggested that there were 34 unions whose membership was under a certain figure. I did not suggest that 34 have to go completely. The determining factor is not the size of the membership but the strength of a union's resources, and naturally a union's ability to cater satisfactorily for its members is proportionate to its financial resources. I do not think the minimum figures we have down here, and the further amelioration made on the Committee Stage, in relation to the unions registered in this country regarding the deposit, is likely to impose any undue burden upon a trade union, which is really in a position to help its members.
I have here the figures the Minister gave at Column 1542 of the debate on the 4th June of this year:—
"Only two unions have a membership exceeding 10,000; four unions have a membership of over 5,000; eight unions have a membership of over 2,000; 12 unions have a membership of over 1,000; four unions have a membership of over 500; while the balance—18 unions— have a membership of less than 500 each."
Taking that basis of numerical strength and relating it to the deposit, that meant there were 34 out of 48 unions who were on and under the 1,000 mark in numbers. The funds a union has would, to some extent, depend on the numbers. I can imagine circumstances that would come in where that would not apply. I can well imagine a small union which had had no great disputes, which had not had its funds wasted by strike pay and matters like that, or certain other matters that might arise, being a comparatively wealthy union and, possibly, being able to put up £2,000. On the other hand, one must understand from the debates on this measure that the object of the measure is to lead to a decrease in the number of trade unions in the country and it was argued right through on the basis that it was the small trade unions who were responsible for what was called the inter-union rivalry that had taken place. If those two things are correct, the aim in the Schedule is to see that some of the smaller unions are wiped out or forced to coalesce with one another or with some of the big unions. There must be some relationship between the strength of membership and the possibility of putting up the deposit. Taking that as a foundation, it is rather a big jump to another conclusion, but the conclusion is something like this: that out of 48 unions, 34 have either to coalesce with one another or to mix with some of the bigger unions. Why then is the £2,000 mark arrived at? The Minister simply says it is a minimum sum and that it does not seem unreasonable. The question of whether it is reasonable or not can only be decided by people who have looked into the financial strength of the unions and who are able to say that the unions which will be hit by this are the unions that have caused the trouble. I would like to know if any investigation in that regard has been made.
It would be quite impossible by this procedure to single out the unions which have been particularly prominent in inter-union disputes. Undoubtedly, there are certain unions which have been perhaps engaged in these inter-union disputes who will have substantial sums and who will be able to make the deposit without any difficulty. On the other hand, we have this very definitely, that one of the causes of the abuses, the admitted cause of abuses, has been the facility with which new unions can be formed. We have also, as I have said, the existence at the present moment of new unions, mushroom unions and unions over-lapping, with practically no resources, who, if they are going to secure appreciable membership must depend upon their ability to create disturbance here and there. There are unions with comparatively small membership who have funds in excess of £2,000 and there are other unions with a much larger membership whose funds are very much below that mark, but we have simply got to take this rough-and-ready sort of decision that, after all, a union's ability to safeguard the interests of its members is, to some extent, proportioned by the resources of the union. If we want, first of all, to weed out unnecessary unions and redundant unions I think we can start off by saying that a trade union, no matter what its membership may be, which has not a substantial general fund to serve the interests of its members, is an ineffective union and, therefore, an unnecessary or a redundant union in so far as there may be other unions dealing with that class of worker whose general financial position is much stronger and much better. I think when we decide that we have to reduce the number of unions in order to get rid of these unnecessary or inefficient elements in the movement that a salutary and very convenient way, at any rate, and I think the only practical way to do it is to require trade unions to make a reasonably substantial deposit. There is no reason to believe that in the case of the unions who are likely to want negotiation licences that deposit will prove onerous in the great majority of cases.
Possibly, there are unions which, by reason of the fact that we require a deposit, will have to seek amalgamation with other unions. I do not believe that, on the whole, these amalgamations are going to prove undesirable or disadvantageous either from the point of view of the trade union movement, or from the point of view of the public interest. I could not say that we have fixed that figure with a view to crushing out one union rather than another. That has not been the idea, because, after all, when we bring in a Bill of this sort to secure reorganisation of the movement, to prevent the formation of unnecessary unions, why should we use these proposals to crush out something that is already in existence? What will happen now is, that these unions will have to take stock of their own position, and, if they can, make arrangements which will enable them to survive, complying all the time with the requirements of the law.
If all the unions at present in existence in the country can find £2,000, the unions will not be reduced by one, and the Bill might as well not be passed. That situation is not likely to arise. Otherwise, we would not have all this confusion that has existed here both in the House and elsewhere for the sake of this academic piece of work. The reality behind it is that the Minister believes that the £2,000 will beat certain unions out of a separate existence. The Minister has used a phrase—I am glad he used it, because I would have applied it myself —that it is a rough-and-ready decision. It is a rough-and-ready calculation. There is no real basis for £2,000 rather than £1,000 or £500. Only, the higher you go, the less likelihood there is of a big number of the small unions surviving.
That is so.
£2,000 has been chosen and there is no reason whatever why that has been chosen rather than £1,000. The Minister, apparently, has not related this to strength of membership or strength of union funds and, apparently, no calculation has been made by the Department as to the number of unions that will disappear or will have to coalesce. It is a rough-and-ready business. Apart from the Minister's phrase, that emerges from the context of his remarks. There are no calculations in the background. What is going to be the situation then when this comes into operation? The Minister says you are going to stop the small mushroom organisation, the breakaway union. You are going to stop it causing trouble. You also stop something more. You stop new unions, not of a mushroom type. Supposing new conditions arise which call for the development of a separate type of union, some new element of craft which would ordinarily make desirable the grouping of a certain number of people of a working type around it? That is going to be prevented because it is quite clear that a group arising in that way will not have the money to put up £2,000. The Minister might consider that in relation to other bodies. There is quite a number of native insurance societies that have been recently brought under legislation in this House. The Minister must know well that if a £2,000 deposit had been imposed on quite a number of these societies in their early stages, in the first year, say, they could not have started. There is any number of businesses which have every prospect of becoming successful businesses, of giving employment and doing effective work in the country, which could not start if, immediately prior to starting off, they had to have a lodgement of £2,000 to their credit with the accountant of the courts of justice.
The Minister is now putting up a hurdle that may trip up certain people already in existence whom he wants to see foiled in a particular race for power, but it may also operate against new entrants of a desirable type. There is no basis of reality in the background as to what unions are going to be crushed out, or as to how far this £2,000 disability is going to hurt good or bad unions. As the Minister has said, it is simply a rough-and-ready decision.
I appreciate the difficulty of the Minister in coming to a determination about the figure. Some figure had to be taken when it was decided to reduce the number of unions owing to over-lapping. I think, however, it is a wrong thing to make the deposit a governing factor as to whether a union should be allowed to continue to exist or not. Too much over-lapping is not good for the country, but this deposit is going to create a real hardship in the case of the old craft unions. Their one desire is to carry on their craft. They have done so now over a long period of years, and have never caused any dislocation in industry or in any other sphere of activity. The test now to be applied to them is whether they can put down £2,000. If not they will lose their identity. Their long and honourable record will count for nothing, and they will now have to merge themselves in some other type of association. It is absolutely wrong, in my opinion, to use this method of putting these old craft unions out of action. Some other test should be applied in their case.
The Minister says the reason for the deposit is that there must be some evidence of stability. Surely, the withdrawal of £2,000 from the funds of any union and freezing it in courts is not going to make that union more stable. The money cannot be used for the benefit of its members. It will simply be retained in the courts to satisfy any legal claims that may be made against it. The taking of that £2,000 out of the funds of the union may place the union in a very difficult position for some considerable time, especially while it is trying to fill in the gap created by the withdrawal of that amount. It is really immoral to use a weapon of this kind to drive the old craft unions out of existence. All, or almost all of them have small memberships, and no one can prove that they have ever done anything to disturb industry in the country. Some concession ought to be made in respect of unions of that character. It is quite improper to ask them to put up £2,000, and, because of their inability to do so, drive them out of existence.
I understand that this amendment is something in the nature of a concession regarding grading. If the Chair allowed the discussion to range over the Schedule as well as over this amendment, would there be a duplication of debate, or might the amendment be put first and then the Schedule discussed, or is it the desire that the debate should cover both? I take it the debate is to cover both.
I think the Schedule is not vital to the Bill. No union can, under the Bill, negotiate about wages or conditions of employment unless it first secures a negotiation licence. The sum set out in this Schedule can only be looked upon as a penalty. If the Bill had been introduced to protect the funds of trade unions, I could understand some such provision being inserted, but nothing of the kind is intended. Therefore, the Schedule is not, in my opinion, vital to the Bill. I have in mind a number of craft unions with long and honourable records, and a history of peaceful activity so far as the industrial life of the country is concerned. From time to time these unions have had to fight big law cases in order to protect the rights of their members in regard to certain aspects of their work. Now they are going to be asked to deposit £2,000 before they can even go to the tribunal to look for a negotiation licence. I think the Minister should delete the provision dealing with that deposit.
It seems to me that the real point is whether the minimum figure fixed here is so high that it will cause extreme hardship in the case of long established societies with a comparatively small membership. That is a matter on which I would be prepared to meet the views of the House. There is the difficulty that if we make the minimum deposit unduly low and confine it, say, to societies which have a comparatively small membership, it may be suggested to me that we are going to occasion undue hardship to other societies, perhaps equally estimable, whose membership happens to exceed the figure which we would regard as essential. In considering any alteration in the deposit, if I were pressed and were prepared to reduce the minimum to £1,000 in the case of societies whose membership did not exceed 500, the hard case of the society which had 501 members would be immediately trotted out. At the same time, I would be prepared to consider the position of these old established small societies.
I think there is something to be said for the point made by Deputy McGilligan in regard to the formation of new organisations, though I do not think there is just as much in it as he has suggested, because as we know new craft trades are generally based upon a development of an old technique.
Take the recent development in electricity in the country in which that would not apply.
I think there is no reason why, if the views which now prevail in relation to those matters, prevailed at the date the first electricians' union was formed, it might not have been realised that the proper thing for the electricians to do was, perhaps, to join an engineers' society and develop as a group in an existing engineering trade union. A great deal of the trouble about demarcation and overlapping would have been avoided if that had been the trend. It has not been the trend up to the present, though the separate craft unions are tending to amalgamate more and more. It may be more and more the trend in the future. While I do not think there is such a great deal in the point Deputy McGilligan has raised, some importance might be attached to it, and to the extent to which the views expressed here will be met by a proviso that, in the cases of unions whose membership does not exceed 500, the deposit required should be £1,000, I should be prepared to bring in an amendment on Report Stage to deal with it, but I think that beyond that I should not be pressed to go, because, by an extension, we should be back to the situation as it exists at present.
In the course of this discussion, we have had put forward in support of the Bill what is described by the Minister as Irish Memorandum No. 1. The Minister has tried to get what consolation he could out of it in an attempt to justify the Bill, but, of course, the authors of that memorandum in no way suggested the provisions embodied in the Bill, and their viewpoint on the terms of the Bill is already very well known to the Minister, but, even though the Minister, by perverse reason, endeavoured to give the impression that he was implementing in the Bill certain of the suggestions made by the authors of this memorandum——
I never said that. No statement of mine has gone further than this, in regard to Memorandum No. 1, that they realised that a thorough-going reorganisation of the trade union movement was necessary.
And the Minister suggested that the way in which that reorganisation was to be brought about was through the medium of the Bill. If the Minister reads his own speeches on the subject of the memorandum, upon which he relied to a considerable extent to justify the Bill, he will see very clearly what was his suggestion. Whatever consideration was given to this matter of trade union reorganisation by the special conference of the Trade Union Congress, at no time was it suggested by any of the members of that conference, or suggested in any of the memoranda, that there should be a deposit made by any organisation as a condition of its right to live. In that respect, the Minister has entered upon entirely new ground and he is doing in this Bill what I think has never been done in respect of trade union law in any other country. The Minister is now setting out to indicate that the title to existence of a trade union in this country is the fact that it has a substantial bank balance and he is insisting that, if they have not got the bank balance, no matter what constructive thought they represent as a union, no matter how much they may protect the interests of their members, no matter what useful part they want to play in national reconstruction or nation building, they are not to be permitted to exist as a trade union.
I think that is a most unfair title to existence. It is a most unreasonable requirement and most unfair to many of these small organisations that they should be compelled to pay these heavy deposits, which will be permanently frozen so long as they are trade unions and which cannot be used in furtherance of the interests of their members. If this Bill is passed, and if the unions make the deposits provided for, a very substantial sum of trade union money will be placed in the hands of the court, and will no longer be available to the trade unions for any of the normal trade union activities. This Bill, in fact, imposes a very substantial permanent tax on the trade unions. It is being imposed on them in order that they may continue in existence and being imposed in a manner which will weaken their effectiveness, because it will withdraw from availability a substantial sum of money which could otherwise be used on behalf of the members. The Minister, in the course of his arguments on this Bill——
On this Schedule?
No, Sir, on the Bill.
The matter before the House is the Schedule.
And the amendment.
By Section 7, it was decided that there be a deposit. The question now is what should be the amount in the Schedule.
I say that this is a perfectly unfair deposit.
Quite, but I hope the Deputy does not want to get his Memoranda Nos. 1, 2 and 3 redebated on both sides of the House.
The Minister got it in several times.
Not on this amendment.
I do not propose to follow the Minister's bad example in that regard, but, in the course of his arguments on the Bill, he made the case that he was anxious to encourage Irish unions, but the amount of the deposit set out will do nothing to encourage them. Let me take an example —the Association of Engineering and Shipbuilding Draughtsmen. The membership in Ireland of that association on 1st January, 1939, was 470. Suppose the members of that association living in Ireland were anxious to form a new Irish association, catering for engineering and shipbuilding draughtsmen—and they are not the kind of folk who can easily be amalgamated with any organisation because of their peculiar vocational status—the 470 members must pay a deposit of £2,000 before they can get a negotiation licence. If they cannot pay the £2,000 deposit, there are two courses open to them: (1) they must stay in the organisation which has its headquarters across-Channel or (2) they must be prepared to find some body which will take them in and keep them in membership. That may not be a very easy thing. Looking after a relatively small group of 470 members amalgamated with another organisation which caters for members following entirely different vocations may not be a proposal which will commend itself to the larger organisation, but, by reason of the deposit which the Minister suggests, it would be impossible for an organisation of that kind to separate itself from the cross-Channel organisation and to establish an Irish organisation because it could not pay the amount of money demanded as deposit.
I cannot understand how the Minister purported to come to a judgement that a sum of £2,000 was necessary for the purpose of legalising the existence of a trade union. Trade unions have existed in law for the past 115 years, and never once during all that period was it suggested that their title to exist should be the deposit of a minimum of £2,000. Here in this country, for the first time, this Government is insisting upon trade unions paying that ransom as a condition of their existing, and in that respect the Minister is doing what has not been done in Britain, in the Six Counties, or, so far as I know, in any other country in the world. We are doing it here in a spirit of revenge; it is being done here for the purpose— which seems to me to be the sole purpose—of weakening the trade unions, of impairing their efficiency, and one obvious effect of the high deposit will be to wipe out a number of small Irish trade unions, which I want to keep, because they are Irish. I see no reason why they should be put out of existence merely because they are small, if they have an honourable trade union record. Owing to the deposit to be made under this Schedule those organisations will go to the wall in so far as the Minister can accomplish it. The Schedule is the weapon he is using for the purpose of driving them out of existence.
Many members sitting on this side of the House have been informed by some of the Deputies sitting behind the Minister that they were quite unaware, until they received a copy of this Bill, as to what was being done by the Government in connection with this matter.
I pointed out to the Deputy two days ago that it is not usual in the House to base debate on what is said outside it by members of the House. I do not think it proper. It is not out of order, but I just want to put it to the Deputy that opinions expressed privately outside should not be debated here.
The language I have used does not disclose any State secret. I have not named and do not intend to name any particular Deputy in connection with this matter. But I was leading up to this point, that the members of every Party in this House, if they know what is going on in regard to Government business, know perfectly well from announcements made in the newspapers that the subject matter of this measure has been under consideration for about 12 months. Deputy Corry came into the House and quoted from the Irish Press a report which was submitted to the newspapers following a discussion between the head of the Department of Industry and Commerce and the Executive of the trade unions in November, 1940.
With reference to the deposit?
I am merely making this statement to refresh the minds of any members who may have read about this matter in the papers at the time, and to prove, if proof is necessary, that this whole business has been under consideration for about 12 months. Why, therefore, should the Minister get up here and say in this discussion that this is a rough-and-ready figure fixed by him and his advisers, or by him on the instructions of his advisers, for the purpose of imposing the death penalty upon Irish as well as amalgamated unions? I can produce the reports of speeches made by the Minister for Industry and Commerce before he became a Minister, and long before he became Minister for Industry and Commerce at any rate, to show that he publicly gave his blessing to the formation of a certain Irish Union. He made no secret of the fact that he was doing so for the purpose of smashing another big amalgamated union which he very much disliked. I believe written evidence of that fact can be produced against the Minister. But now he comes along, and, even in his amendments, deliberately and consciously demands payment of a deposit from this very union, which he knows perfectly well will sentence that union and its membership to death. I have a copy of the last report submitted by that union to the Registrar of Friendly Societies, which shows that not alone have they no money to meet the demand for a deposit but that they are actually in debt. They confess that they are in debt, in the last report which they have submitted to the Registrar of Friendly Societies. Would it not have been possible for the Minister for Industry and Commerce to send for and examine the reports of the unions submitted to the Registrar of Friendly Societies before fixing the prohibitive deposit both in the Bill as originally introduced and in the amendment? If he would even now call for, as he is entitled to call for and get, a copy of the reports submitted by those unions to the Registrar of Friendly Societies, he would see what the prospects are of either the Irish or the British unions being able to meet his demands in this matter.
It is a terrible state of affairs to have to admit that the Minister, who has had this matter under consideration for about 12 months, came to the Dáil on behalf of the Government of this country and confessed his ignorance of the whole measure in the way in which he has confessed it throughout the Committee Stage discussions. He has admitted on more than one occasion during discussions here that some of the sections are ridiculous, although he has had this matter under careful and personal consideration for 12 months. He admits here to-day that this is a rough-and-ready figure, although I believe he has had discussions with the officials of some of the unions concerned, apart from the discussions which he has had with the members of the National Executive of the Trade Union Congress. Did he go into this matter in the discussions which he had with the members of the National Executive of the Trade Union Congress, or did he pay more attention to the advice which was given to him by his officials, and particularly to the advice that we know was given to him by the officials and members of the Dublin Chamber of Commerce?
We know perfectly well that some of the leading employers in this country are extremely anxious to have this Bill put into operation as soon as possible. The Minister has a perfect right to discuss the contents of this measure with the representatives of employers in the country, but when he discussed this Schedule and the proposals in this Bill with the members of the National Executive of the Trade Union Congress last November he did not say that he intended to introduce this figure into the Bill for the purpose of terminating the existence of Irish as well as British unions. He ought to know now, if he did not know before now, that the imposition of this penalty will have a greater effect in bringing about the termination of the existence of Irish unions now affiliated to the Irish Trade Union Congress than it will have on the amalgamated unions. The Minister has read from certain documents here in this House in connection with the annual report of the Irish Trade Union Congress. He has figures and facts at his disposal to show the financial position and membership of the Irish and amalgamated unions affiliated to the Irish Trade Union Congress, and the knows perfectly well, or he ought to know, the effect that this Schedule will have on the future of the Irish as well as the amalgamated unions. I dare say that, no matter what one says in this House, or what figures or arguments one may produce, the Minister will not change his mind. The only hope I can see of getting the Minister to change his mind is to get him to adjourn the further discussion of the Committee Stage of this measure over the weekend, and get him to attend a summer school with Fianna Fáil Deputies somewhere in the country.
The Deputy should keep the debate on general lines.
The only hope I have of getting the Minister to change his mind is that the rank and file of the Fianna Fáil Party should get the Minister somewhere to themselves, where they may be able to explain to him the consequences of this trouble-making measure, and a trouble-making measure it is. If the Minister insists upon bringing this Schedule into operation, it will certainly have the effect of terminating the existence of many Irish trade unions which have performed a wonderful service for their members in this country without, at the same time, informing those members as to what their future position is to be within the trade union movement.
Mr. Byrne
This tendency to test the value of trade unions on their financial standing is a vicious, and, in my opinion, a very unfair one. It will have the effect of crushing out a large number of trade unions which have done very valuable work in this country. The method now adopted to crush them out is unknown, as far as I can see, in any other country, and is causing great uneasiness amongst our workers. I would suggest to the Minister that he should take his colleagues into consultation, and ask them the effect that this Bill is having on the minds of the workers of the City of Dublin especially. I can only speak for the workers of the City of Dublin. Everywhere one goes one hears comment, severe comment, on the unfairness of this Bill, and the workers believe that it is just an effort by the Government, and especially by the Minister, to weaken their strength for some purpose unknown to them. I appeal to the Minister not to create further uneasiness in the minds of the workers and the people generally by the continuance of the methods which he has adopted in carrying through the Bill before the House.
Surely, the Minister's own comment on this particular matter to-day shows the absurdity of the proposal to require a deposit. He originally said that where the number of persons does not exceed 2,000 the deposit shall be £2,000, and then he said, more or less, that he expected to reduce that amount.
I have not said that. I said that if it would meet the point of view expressed here I should be prepared to bring in an amendment. If it does not, I shall not do so. That is all.
The Minister is getting sulky now.
The Minister said that he would be prepared to bring in an amendment to reduce the £2,000 to £1,000: that is, if the House would stop pointing out the absurdity of the proposal completely.
Might I point out to the Deputy that the question of having a deposit was decided on Section 7, and the question now is the amount of the deposit.
In connection with this Schedule, Sir, I approached this matter myself from the point of view of seeing whether there might not be a reduction, and the more I considered what the reduction should be, the more I myself was satisfied that the only thing was to wipe out the proposals altogether.
But the Committee has decided already that there be a deposit.
Well, Sir, I would not be satisfied with anything that would leave the necessity for a deposit there anything but the most nominal figure—£5 for a trade union, or something like that, just as an earnest of their good-will. The Minister, the other day, when we asked him to define certain classes, could go no further in the definition of a class than to mention the Cork bakers and the Dublin bakers, and the implication is that the Cork bakers are a separate trade union at the present time and that the Dublin bakers are a separate trade union at the present time. I do not know whether it is the Minister's intention to operate this deposit provision in such a way as to force the bakers in the various parts of the country to amalgamate into one union.
There is only the one union, as a matter of fact.
I cannot operate the deposit at all; it is a statutory provision.
The Minister can abolish it now.
Oh, I am not going to.
Well, in view of what Deputy Norton says, that there is only one bakers' trade union in the country, then it simply mystifies me more as to what was the Minister's thought in this matter, although when he was speaking on a previous section, he talked about its being obvious to the meanest intelligence.
Not only is there only one bakers' union in the Twenty-Six Counties, but it caters for the 32 Counties also.
And it is a purely Irish union.
However, the argument has been laboured sufficiently already that the fixing of a deposit of this particular size is going to eliminate the smaller unions, and the matter was further stressed by Deputy Davin to-day when he pointed out to the Minister that a trade union in which he was interested is likely to be wiped out as a result of it, but when we find the Minister shifting so easily from £2,000 to £1,000——
We are not shifting now. The Deputy's speech has ended that.
That is the kind of evenhanded justice we may expect, I suppose.
Will the Minister explain——
The Deputy can continue to obstruct the passage of this Bill for another week, if he likes. He is back now where he started, and he can continue his tactics, if he wishes.
I am on this point——
It is now four minutes to two, so the Deputy can save his breath. He can prolong the debate for a further week and bring the Dáil into further contempt if he wishes.
I am trying to get back to where the Minister started when he decided that in order to get a negotiation licence a trade union must have £2,000.
The Deputy is back now on the note on which he started the debate.
I am coming to the point where the Minister now says he is prepared to reduce that amount to £1,000.
I have withdrawn that, since it is obvious that it does not meet the Deputy's views.
I want to know where the Minister stood ten minutes ago, when he said that he was prepared to reduce it.
The Deputy has killed that proposal, and that is all there is to it.
Can I have any protection from the Minister's interruptions, Sir?
Deputy Mulcahy is in possession.
I think that we cannot understand why it is necessary to impose a financial test on trade unions before they can be given a negotiation licence until we understand what the Minister was at when he put down this £2,000, and what he was at, ten minutes ago, when he suggested that it should be £1,000. He has given us what is, to my mind, a rather fantastic explanation as to what can become of these deposits. He said that they could be drawn on after a court decision.
That matter was decided on another issue.
I am trying to find out why the size of this deposit should be £2,000, and in relation to that I want to recall the Minister's suggestion that one of the reasons this deposit is wanted is that there might be cases brought against trade unions for their printing bills or their rents, and I told the Minister that I did not believe that.
That matter was discussed on another section, on which that was mentioned.
We discussed it, Sir, on a section in which provision was made that some of this money could be called on because of a court decision.
Quite.
But we are now discussing why it is necessary to have the deposit at the size at which it is proposed to have it here. The Minister's attitude to the whole matter is even more impossible to understand when he takes up the attitude he now takes with regard to my remarks, because I exercised my right to question the size of this deposit, or whether it should be anything more than nominal, and he withdraws a suggestion which he thought might have been helpful—I do not know what it would have been helpful for—that it should be reduced to £1,000. I want some clearer explanation from the Minister as to why the size of this £2,000 deposit is what it is, before we can discuss the matter.
I addressed myself to the Minister's amendment when I was speaking in the House half an hour ago, but the Minister did not seem to think fit to make any response to what I, at least, consider is a very important point on this amendment of his and on the Schedule. I move to report propress.
Progress reported; Committee to sit again on Tuesday.
The Dáil adjourned at 2 p.m., until 3 p.m. on Tuesday, 8th July.