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Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 29 Jan 1942

Vol. 85 No. 11

Emergency Powers (No. 139) Order, 1941—Motion to Annul.

Debate resumed on the following motion:—
That the Emergency Powers (No. 139) Order, 1941, made by the Government on the 30th day of December, 1941, be and is hereby annulled. —(Deputies Norton, Hannigan and Davin).

Sir, last night I was forced by the rules of this House to use a phrase which is somewhat ironical in the context of this debate: I moved to report progress. I had been dealing with the fact that early in the period of Constitution making and in the second stage of Constitution making in this country we had at least adhered to what had been the common view of the nations of the world with regard to judicial process. The people here were presented with an image of a free Constitution that seemed to have been preserved with decent reverence, and the people were given a Constitution which seemed to guarantee rights and which would seem to have the two fortifications, that those rights could not be taken away by easy constitutional amendment and that, saving that, there could be no encroachment on the people's rights until after those who seek to encroach upon those rights had passed the barrier of an independent judiciary. It was found that the Constitution did not mean exactly what was on its face. Recent applications before the courts in connection with constitutional matters have only succeeded in tightening the net of the Constitution around the citizens. We have had with increasing pace development going on which is away from the courts and away from the independent judiciary and tending to put all power into the hands of the Government of the time. The courts discovered that under the Constitution it was possible that this House could pass a law and, no matter how much that law might encroach upon the spirit of the Constitution, if they found it was properly passed, when one made application to the courts, then the courts would declare that they had no right to interfere.

In any event, for peace times we did preserve the appearances of a resort to the courts and for quite a number of matters it has been the wish of the Government, so far, that such ordinary matters as civil processes should be left to the play of the independent judiciary. There has been an entirely different story when we approach the area of criminal matters. There is no necessity for me to go in detail over what was said last night. People here will have in their recollection and will know from the laws we have passed here that even in peace time it is possible for the Government to schedule any number of offences that they like and for people who are charged with those offences to be brought before what are called Special Criminal Courts. Special Criminal Courts, as constituted at the moment, consist of military officers. The list of scheduled offences may be added to from time to time and, whether or not the list be added to, on a particular occasion, it lies with the Attorney-General, who, under the Constitution, is a servant of the Government, dismissible by them at any moment, to declare to the courts that he thinks that in the interests of peace and order a particular individual or individuals charged with a particular offence, not being a scheduled offence, should also be brought before the Special Criminal Court and, under a later section of that Act which was brought under review in the courts, which had to be amended and now appears as a special Act of the year 1940, it is possible for the Minister for Justice, by simply writing in a person's name on a particular form of detention order, to cause people to be detained, and to be detained for unspecified periods.

But still there was kept some sort of tenuous attachment to the courts. As far as the people who are charged with scheduled offences, or in fact those who are charged before the Special Criminal Courts either for scheduled offences or at the behest of the Attorney-General, are concerned there is always a right of appeal to the courts of the land. When it comes to the detention at the will of the Minister for Justice there is an appeal to a special commission on which there is at the moment one judge. That special commission has terms of reference with regard to freedom heavily biassed in favour of the Government. A man will not be released by such commission unless that commission is satisfied that there are no reasonable grounds—not legal grounds—no reasonable grounds for the man's detention.

These were the peace time activities of the Government. They are things that may be done completely outside such emergency as invasion or state of war or time of war. It has to be noted that, however much speeches from the Government side last night seemed to indicate that they were dissatisfied with the laws of evidence and with the procedure adopted by the courts up to date in certain matters, they are disposed to leave the courts to deal with such ordinary things as will suits and rights of property and claims for damages when people have been knocked down on the roads. They left all those to be dealt with by these rather out-of-date rules of evidence and by the procedure which apparently they do not like; but when it comes to doing such an irrevocable act as killing a person for any of the offences in the schedule to the Military Court Order, the Government are not satisfied with the rules of evidence which they would still allow to be applicable to ordinary suits and are not satisfied with the ordinary rules of procedure.

We have not reached the stage of invasion yet in which the Government may do anything they please, nor have we reached the stage of actual war in which the Government may establish the ordinary courts martial and send people to be tried by what have been described in the text-books as committees of officers—simply repelling force by force. That is a right which every State claims for itself in a period of turmoil, a period of actual war, or in the somewhat indeterminate region of "a time of war." Being in that time of war, the Government got the authority of this House to deal with the emergency that exists and they were given general powers—such a generality of powers that the courts have even questioned that the limitations which this House, under the Emergency Powers Act, set upon the generality of that Act, are not ultra vires the Constitution as to some degree weakening the full comprehensiveness of the powers the Constitution gives to the Government in such a time. However, without any knowledge of what we were doing—certainly without any full appreciation of the repercussions of what we were doing—this House passed the legislation necessary to bring a time of emergency about, and in that time the Government are free.

It has been stated here, and claimed, that they have legal justification for this order which is now being criticised. So they have, but I assert—I asserted it yesterday and I do so again —that they got the permission and the sanction of the courts for it on false pretences. The arguments used in the courts were based entirely on this, that what the Government were now doing was in their minds necessary in order to counter something which was in some way attached to the emergency in which we found ourselves, a state of war which prevails outside the bounds of this country but which has repercussions inside this country. I waited to hear the case made on that, and one phrase which fell from the Minister for Justice, meagre and all as it was, was some attempt at justification, but that phrase was immediately withdrawn by the Taoiseach, that is, the phrase about organisations in this country which had endeavoured to bring in external persons to embroil us in a particular way. That is now out of it; it is not for that reason that sanction is sought for this order. I want to know what it is then for.

Certain reasons have been given by the Minister for Justice, and these I can deal with in a moment, but in any event I think it would be admitted by all that the situation as put to this country in 1937 when the Constitution was passed was that we were going to resort ordinarily to the courts and we decided that the courts ought to be fortified in the ordinary way. We get people with legal training and experience and we prevent them being imposed upon—no suasion, no pressure, no threat. They were to be free and independent, and, established in that way in the Constitution, they were to judge cases. Now we have moved somewhat, and, on the statements made here yesterday, not because of anything connected with the present war. So far as the Taoiseach's speech is concerned, it was a speech for amendment of the law of evidence in regard to a murder trial held before the war started, or to be held when the war has finished, and in no way attached to the emergency. But what have we done? I have stated already that, in regard to the Offences Against the State Act, we at least kept the link with the courts but that we had done something which removed these cases from the control of an independent judiciary. The first hearing was not to be by judges. We did definitely go away from trial by jury, but we did keep the resort to judges, so far as ordinary offences under the Offences Against the State Act were concerned, to the ordinary courts of criminal appeal, so far as internment was concerned, to a commission biassed in its terms of reference in favour of the Government, but still having on it one person of legal attainments.

I might as well keep the Deputy up to date. That has been dropped now, too.

We have progressed further than I thought. Now we take a further step. We are now going to have men tried before a court of officers only. If that court of officers finds a charge proved, it can pass only one sentence, that is, death, and, having passed the death sentence, on facts presented to them, there is no appeal to anybody.

That might seem to satisfy even the person most fervent in his enthusiasm for strengthening the Executive, but we go a step further. Up to this point, we have at least said that both these courts, the military court and the Special Criminal Court, are masters of their own procedure, and we have laid it down with regard to the Special Criminal Courts that they are to be governed by rules of evidence and the procedure that operates in the ordinary criminal courts of the State. Now we say to them: "The rules of evidence do not count so far as you are concerned," and we say to them, in particular, that "If statements are taken"—in one phrase, we say "If they are taken voluntarily"; in a second phrase, we say "If they are got under any enactment"; and in a third phrase, we say "If they are got anyhow—we, the Government, or we, the Dáil, order you to hear such statements," and in Section 5 of that order, we have indicated that we do not expect them to regard, and do not bind them to regard, any rule of evidence whatever.

It is not the order itself which is under examination at the moment, but by another order we have also told this court to try certain people together. Up to this point, it was the habit to leave the courts to decide for themselves what was the fair and just thing to do with regard to trials, but to a particular court we have said: "Try four men together." Let us take that analogy. We may hereafter say of these people, just as we say about evidence: "We do not think that any ordinary rule of procedure ought to bind them," and the Government may add to that order some day by amendment not merely that statements ought to be received, but that evidence of a hearsay type, evidence which is clearly hearsay, ought to be received. They may go on—there is no necessity for them to go on because Section 5 will cover it all—and say: "If you get proof that evidence has been beaten out of a man, take it."

The whole revolution has now pretty nearly been accomplished. We start off with our appeal to courts of independent judges, under a procedure which has established itself in the minds of thinking people all the world over, and triable by evidence which has established itself to the satisfaction of most people in this country, and which, when reported on in England recently, brought no change, and we are substituting for those courts of independent people and that particular type of procedure and evidence under which they operate—this. We are to have three officers, and I want to stop here for a moment to ask people to refrain in future from pretending to believe in the phrase used about these officers. There is no necessity for anybody at this stage to rise to the heights of vituperation risen to when these men were put in power before, but, having an appreciation of them in their own particular status, one can say that it is not often you find the people to whom you have given the education and training of an officer suddenly disclosing the qualities of a judge. We are told that these people, because they have tried innumerable cases already, are now almost on a par with the judges of the land. I suppose in some future Courts of Justice Act we shall find the qualifications for a judicial officer enlarged by the inclusion of a period of service as an officer on the Special Criminal Court.

We are asked to take these three officers, and what is our fortification instead of the fortification which is regarded as sound the whole world over—the independent status of the people, the code of law sanctioned by many years, and the mental outlook of the people who are appointed? We are asked to take three officers. The Minister for Justice says, can we not believe that they will be fair. Of course they will, according to their lights. But is that sufficient? The Minister says that there is the Attorney-General in the background in his office. Of course there is, and at the top there is a review by the Government. That is the full wheel of revolution.

The situation now is that we get the Government to review after three people, who hold their status and their position entirely at the will of the Government, have tried the accused before them on the case presented by the Attorney-General who, under the Constitution, is a servant of the Government dismissible at a moment's notice. As if that was not enough, we tell all this group of people, entirely and completely surrounded by Government influence, that they are to disavow all and any of the rules of evidence if they think they hamper them in coming to a decision. We go a step further and indicate that this Dáil, through the Government, will intervene and say to these three men: we will not even leave you free to decide your own procedure: you will try the four men together whether you like it or not, and whether you think that is a fair and just way to have these four men treated. Is is any wonder that counsel for the State claim that this was trial by the Dáil, or that the Chief Justice should say that most of the arguments advanced against that sort of system in court had better be directed here.

Those who regarded the courts, in connection with the liberty of the subject, as a sort of Maginot Line must now remember that the line is down, or at least is very badly broached. The people who were established to be the resolute defenders of certain rights can now turn around and look gloomily over an area that they cannot control and ask who did it? The Dáil did it. They can say that we gave the Executive of the day these powers and put them out of commission. There is very little difference between the attitude that has been adopted here and closing the courts down for the time being. The Supreme Court is open, but the courts have not much to tell to those who resort to them. They can simply tell them that they have no power, and can do nothing against the orders passed here.

To come back again to the fundamental point. What does all this mean? I have laboured what seemed to me to be obvious only because the Minister for Justice said that no one could call what we are doing in this drastic: that it was only a very ordinary change that might be expected at any time: that we were only dealing with certain trifling laws of evidence. He did not care where they came from or got their sanction. The Taoiseach does not believe that. He thinks this is something of a fundamental change. Why is it looked for? The Minister used a phrase which was discarded by the Taoiseach. The Minister referred to the explosion at Dublin Castle, to the man who was left for dead on the roadside and who recovered, and to the leaflet from the I.R.A. These were the only three things he brought into question. The Minister, I think, by way of an interruption did not pretend that, if the order had been in operation at the time of the explosion, he would have been able to make any one amenable to justice for the explosion. He hinted, I think, that if he had the order he might have got the attackers of the man left for dead on the roadside. I do not know whether he holds that, under it, he is going to get identification and conviction of those put forth for the leaflet.

The Taoiseach, in the course of an interruption, did speak of an organised campaign of murder, and when asked for evidence of that he said there was one murder inside the last 12 months. I do not think there has been one of the type we are referring to. The Minister's phrase was that if people here get away with this sort of thing there will be more murders. In fact, the murder that is in everybody's mind happened well over a year ago. There was, at least, a 12 months' period between the disappearance of a particular man and of the finding of his body on the mountains. In that period, when apparently the police were baffled and when no one was being brought to justice for that murder, there was no outburst of murder. I agree that it is not wise to wait until murders take place, and that it is much better to prevent them. According to counsel for the State these men are on trial by the Dáil. Has this House got anything that would lead it to believe that there was an organised campaign of murder? There are four men whose fate, to a certain extent, depends on what we do here. Certainly, their fate will, to a very great degree, be interfered with, and the processes of law will, to a certain extent, be warped in their application to these men if this House passes this particular order with regard to the evidence.

I came into this House eager with curiosity over one matter. I had these four men specially in mind. I know that before Christmas they were put on trial before the Special Criminal Court, and that it was agreed that it was a fair and proper thing to do to have them tried separately. Then there was a breakdown in the trial, and suddenly we find these people grabbed under an Article of the Constitution which entirely hangs upon a state of emergency and on something connected with the war. These men are grabbed under that and sent before, no longer the Special Criminal Court, but before a military court, and this House, through the Government, gives a direction to try them together. Now we are going to warp the law of evidence against them. What amazing change took place between, say, December and four or five weeks later which brought about that change in procedure? The crime with which these men were charged had nothing to say to the war situation or to the state of emergency. Why were they not put before the military court first?

On a point of order, is the House entitled to discuss that under this order?

That case is sub judice.

It was decided yesterday that merely Order No. 139 might be discussed. The committal of these four men to the Special Military Court was made under another order.

I am not prejudicing these men's case in anything I say. I do not want to prejudice their case and there will be no complaint put up on that score.

How can the Deputy be answered without discussing their case?

Remember that, according to the courts, this is trial by the Dáil. We know that four men are going to be tried.

We are not trying the case.

We are, according to the courts. I am sorry. I should not have said according to the courts but according to the statement of State counsel.

That is different.

The courts did not say that, but State counsel did. Trial by the Dáil! May I put the thing hypothetically, although it will be quite clear I have the four men at the back of my mind? Surely an explanation would be demanded of the Government in the circumstances I have spoken of. When any criminal, any man charged with criminality, is brought before one court and a certain procedure is adopted with regard to him, and then, within four weeks, he is put before a different court——

Is he put before a different court by this order?

He is not, Sir, but this order will apply.

In its application to that case the Deputy would be in order, not otherwise.

There has to be an explanation given here tying this order to a time of war, to a state of emergency. None has been given. The thoughts I have given voice to here may be ascribed to the fact that I have, for some years past, walked the courts and I have got the sort of feelings bred by close association with people of a professional type who do not like to see all the procedure and the practice that they are accustomed to swept aside. I am quite prepared to admit that particular type of feeling may be in some people. I ask you to believe it is not very strong in me, for the reason that I had some experience as a member of the Executive before I got any experience in the other sphere. Notwithstanding all I have said against these orders, I would be prepared to give the Government all these powers if they made a case to me and could give me some evidence, here or secretly, that there is an organised campaign and that that organised campaign is so widespread and has such terroristic aids that the forces of the law are powerless against it.

I will ask for one other safeguard. I had the humiliation of being in this House and having to discuss what I considered an abuse by the Government of certain powers we granted to them. I have listened to the argument that I never objected to the generality of these powers when they were first promoted. I have learned a lesson since then. We gave the Government exceptional powers on many occasions, and without very much of an exceptional case being made, and those powers were scandalously abused. It is a funny thing that in this year we should have decided that the laws of evidence are not good enough and the procedure of the ordinary courts is not good enough, yet one remembers that, at a time when the Special Criminal Courts were established, those who were charged with a very foul murder, the murder of young More O'Ferrall, were brought before the ordinary courts and the ordinary rules of evidence was the only strength relied on against them, while Deputy Belton and others were charged before a special military court for refusal to pay rates. We know well how the powers of the Military Tribunal were used against the Blueshirts when crimes that certainly in the public mind were ascribed to the I.R.A. were taken no notice of and, when complaint was made about them, we were told the Executive was powerless in certain matters. There was no resort then to changing the law of evidence and there was no application of the Special Criminal Court to these people.

We remember another matter. At a time when crime of a political type was being committed, a certain group of farmers was brought before a Special Criminal Court although the ordinary courts of the land were open and district justices all over the country were sitting to take informations and the preliminaries in these proceedings against them. We know well how in this House we were persuaded to pass a censorship measure on the promise that all that would be censored would be news, not views, and we know how scandalously that has been abused.

The Deputy might now relate those matters to this order.

I will, in this way. Having been fooled so often by that group, I have some hesitation in giving this vast accumulation of powers to the people who abused those other powers in such a way—and that is the most relevant remark I have made on this matter. Why should they ask for our confidence? Supposing we say we will start all over again, that we will start at the point where we will forget any abuse that has occurred. We will not accept the Minister's view that this is a light change; we think it is a big change. Three people here have said:

"Make a case here and now and we can forget all about abuses and about the misuse of powers. We can recognise that we are giving a very big extension of powers, making a fundamental change in the courts, but we will still say that we will give you these powers if you give us any case. But remember, you are asking us to set aside the courts of the country and replace these people by three officers controlled by the Government, with the case promoted by the Attorney-General also controlled by the Government and the only appeal to be to the Government itself."

We are not merely asked to do that, but we are asked to pass a special law. That is what this order means.

We are changing the law of evidence to this extent: get a statement from a man and prove—I do not know how that proof is going to be given—that it is voluntary. The ordinary way to deal with that would be to show that the statement was involuntary, that the person had been threatened and abused or that the statement was induced. Under this order the man giving the statement need not be brought before the court. It is open to the Guard to say that he got the statement, that it was acknowledged and made voluntarily. Apart from that if the statement has been taken under any enactment, then it may be produced. Remember what that means. Under the Offences Against the State Act it lies with any member of the Civic Guard—not an officer—to stop, question and detain a member of the public if that Guard suspects that that member of the public has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offence. What are the offences? A number are put down in special terms, but the last phrase comes to this: that a person is seeking to attain some legal objective by illegal means.

If an ordinary Guard thinks about an ordinary citizen that that citizen is about to attempt to attain some legal objective by illegal means, then he can stop him, interrogate him and eventually detain him. Once that man is detained he can be asked to give a record of his movements and state all he knows that would involve any other person and, if he does not make such statement, he has committed an offence. If you get a statement under these conditions, then it is a statement got under an enactment. You can get a statement of the so-called voluntary type or a statement made under the compulsion of the criminal law and a man will commit an offence for which he may be jailed if he does not answer. If that is not wide enough the last paragraph says in effect: "Get a statement anyhow, beat it out of a fellow and produce it as one beaten out of a man." I am asked to believe that the police will not take them, that the Attorney-General cannot put them before a court and that the court will not receive them. There is one case that we cannot mention here openly. Surely there should be some precautions taken with regard to that type of statement? The man who makes such a statement should be produced, unless there is good reason given to the court to explain his absence. It ought to be made certain that the statement is not an induced one; that the statement is a voluntary one, that it has not been beaten out of a man and that it is something in the nature of evidence.

We are asked to do that and we have done it, and, if we do not take some further steps to remove this also, we have ordered the way in which certain men's trials are to be conducted. Now, this may be the first step along a certain path. The whole course of the procedure here has been a swerve away from the ordinary courts and a swerve over to a group of people, all of whom are under the control of the Government, and we have shown two other steps in an impressive way outside that. We have deprived these people, first of all, of the power of establishing their own procedure of trial, and we have ordained a procedure of trial, or some part of it, and have told them: "Although you are under the control of the Government, and of a fair-minded Attorney-General, with, as a background, a corps of fair-minded police, we tell you nevertheless that there is a statement which, in the ordinary course, the Attorney-General would not put in"—and which, I imagine, the police, in view of their attachment to the courts, would not be very easily persuaded to put in—and we say to that court: "You are to take that statement and use it in evidence against these people."

The Minister for Justice, and the Taoiseach, speaking afterwards, talked yesterday about the revulsion of popular feeling that there was against the old-time trials, and said that that was why this matter was tightened up, and the Minister for Justice talked about some matters that happened two centuries ago. I suggest that that is what we are getting back to now—just about two centuries ago—in connection with this matter of the laws of evidence. The Taoiseach says that he has not had time to examine the history of the growth of the laws of evidence, but if he does find time to do so he will find that he is not in the beginning of the 20th century in this matter but back in the Seventeen hundreds—back in the days when people were being charged with being witches and where they were burned as a method of proof: if they survived the burning, then they were witches and, therefore, could be properly dealt with; and if they did not survive the burning, then it was just too bad but they had had a just trial. You are back to the time also when they used to put babies, whose parentage was somewhat in doubt or who were supposed to be under the influence of evil spirits, on red-hot griddles in order to see whether that particular method of purgation would not clear their character, and thus many of these innocent children lost their lives in order to prove something which the people of those days thought was proper.

We have not gone the full pace back to two centuries ago, but we have gone a little bit back, and if it can be shown that the powers now demanded are necessary, the Government will get the help of the people here. Let it be shown by the Government that these powers, drastic as they are, are necessary and demanded by the circumstances of the time, and the Government will be treated handsomely by the people on this side of the House; but we do not want this drift back across the centuries, nor are we impressed by the very foolish type of case made by the Minister for Justice yesterday, or the academic case, with regard to the laws of evidence, which was made later on by the Taoiseach. I have quoted very often in this House and elsewhere the statement about legal procedure that was made by one of the great men of history, a great American, where he said that:

"It has long been a grave question whether any Government, not too strong for the liberties of the people, can be strong enough to maintain its existence in a time of great emergency."

That was the phrase of a great man, Lincoln, who was trained to the law, but who, while he was a great executive, found himself obsessed by the thought of danger, surrounded by dangers, and who knew that he had to balance between whether the Government could be so tyrannical or so despotic as to be too strong for the liberties of the people, or whether it could be too strong to sustain its liberties in a time of emergency, and he acted strongly and against the law of that time, and has got the decision of history, because everybody recognises that the circumstances of his time demanded drastic handling.

We in this House are the representatives of the people. We are the people to whom, as Deputy Costello said, the courts "have thrown back the ball" in this matter, and whom the courts have told in effect: "You are now the only people who stand between the superfluous abundance of despotic power put into the hands of the Government and the liberties of the people, and it is for you to take care of the liberties of the people." This is the last place where that case can be made, and, so far as I am concerned, it is not too late. I am prepared to let the executive part of my experience triumph over the legal part of my experience, and to give these powers if I get any glimmering from the Government that they recognise that these are very drastic powers that are asked for, and if the Government will make a case equal to the occasion and give us reasons that will enable us to justify ourselves before the people for the giving of these powers. The people have trusted us, and before we give such powers we must be given some sort of case equal to the extremity of the powers that are asked for, and if that case is not made, I shall vote for the Labour resolution.

In opening the discussion here yesterday on this motion, the Taoiseach said that he welcomed the opportunity of coming before the House and making the Government, case in favour of the drastic powers sought in this order. I would have preferred that the Government, on their own initiative, should, before this order was made, have come to this House, as their predecessors did in 1931, and made the case in favour of the order before it was made, and produce evidence to the representatives of the people that there was justification for seeking such very drastic and revolutionary powers. If the Government still believe that the members of this House, irrespective of their own Party, with its clear majority, have any right or authority here to challenge or criticise, even constructively, the policy of the Government, I think that in this case, without waiting for the motion put down by Deputy Norton, they should have taken that opportunity and made the case under these circumstances.

With one exception, I know of no murder, which can be styled an organised murder, that has taken place in this country since the emergency arose. That murder, which, I am personally satisfied, was an organised murder, took place as far back as September, 1940. Now, the Minister for Justice was asked here last night, when speaking, not alone about one organisation but organisations—unnamed organisations—to furnish a list of the crimes that were committed in recent times and which, in his opinion, would justify the powers sought for in this order. He talked about organisations, and the Taoiseach, speaking later in the debate, said, amongst other things, as reported in the Irish Press to-day—and I am sure he would not be reported wrongly there:—

"There are organisations which have to be closely watched from the external point of view in order that our neutrality and the peace of the country may be preserved. On the fringe of one of them was a group toying—while keeping constitutional —with the question of other people being brought into the country. When definite evidence was obtained they would be put on trial for treason."

Now, I think it is in the interests of the good government of this country and the preservation of the peace of the country that the organisations should be named here in this House so that both the young and the old in this country may have the names of the organisations which are regarded as illegal and dangerous and so that they will keep, if they are good citizens, far away from these bodies. Now, therefore, I request any subsequent speaker for the Government to name the organisations, illegal or semi-constitutional, that in the opinion of the Government are regarded as dangerous. If evidence can be produced, either now or in the future, to prove that any persons associated with those organisations, or even individuals, can be connected with the agents of any foreign Power for the purpose of bringing outsiders into this country, I for one—and I think all my colleagues too—will give every support possible to the Government in dealing with such treasonable activities. I refuse to admit that any patriotic Irishman, whether he is in any of the organisations which the Government spokesmen have in their minds or whether he is not, would consciously be a party to bringing into this country any outsiders to interfere with the authority given by the Irish people to an Irish Government to rule the Irish people.

I remember—I think I can get some of my colleagues in this House to confirm this—listening to a statement made by a Minister less than six months ago to the effect that a certain illegal organisation, the I.R.A., had been disorganised and broken up. I know of nothing that has happened since I listened to that statement which would make me believe that any change has taken place, or that that organisation has any real power of a dangerous character at the present moment. I know as much about what is going on in my constituency as any member of the Government. I certainly would not suggest that I know as much about the activities of that organisation or any other organisation outside my own constituency, but I am firmly convinced that this organisation called the I.R.A.—not named by the Minister or by An Taoiseach so far in this debate—is not a greater danger to-day to the peace of this country than it was five or ten years ago. At any rate, is there any murder that can be styled an organised murder on the criminal records of the Department of Justice other than the one I suspect was committed in an organised way in September, 1940? If so, we are entitled to the information, and as far as possible to the evidence, that such a murder was an organised murder of a political or semi-political kind. An organised murder can be committed by two or three or less than six persons.

I want to say—I was tempted to say it before, but I cannot let this occasion pass—that I deprecate very strongly the attitude of Deputy Dillon in coming into this House, and, not for the first time in public, giving his impressions or versions of discussions that have taken place at meetings elsewhere, meetings of a body of which he is a member and whose business is supposed to be regarded as confidential or of a semi-secret or secret nature. I object to any member of that body coming in here and giving his version of what transpired there for the purpose of propping up an argument suitable to his own point of view in a debate of this kind.

Does the Deputy assert that such statement was made in the course of this debate?

Yes. He asserted here twice during his speech that I was furnished elsewhere with evidence by somebody—he did not name him—to prove that there was collusion between the Irish Republican Army and agents of the Nazi Government. I assure members of this House that I never saw such evidence, and I invite any Ministers who may feel it their duty to do so to say if I was, either privately or anywhere, furnished with such evidence. I say it is a rotten state of affairs that any prominent member of this House should come in here and point a finger at me, as he did last night, stating that I was in possession of such evidence.

The Deputy is taking him too seriously.

I say that Deputy Dillon would be quite right in coming to his own Party meeting and making such statements, and even though he would not be correct I would not have the same objection to Deputy Dillon making that assertion there as I have to his making the statement here in public, and having it handed out over the British Broadcasting Corporation in the midnight news last night and at 8 o'clock this morning. I know from experience that Deputy Dillon is capable of believing any story told to him by anybody so long as the type of story serves his own purpose, but he is not going to make a "cod" out of me here in this House, and I object to his making "cods" of any of us for the purpose of propping up arguments in a debate of this kind. I am sure the Minister for Defence or any other Minister will not welcome the kind of argument he used to support them in steamrolling this order through the House. I have no evidence, privately or in any other way or no information of a reliable nature, to lead me to believe that there has been any such conspiracy, but if the Government has evidence or reliable information I will not discourage them from dealing with the people whom they believe to be responsible, and putting them before the proper court for trial and punishment. Deputy Dillon says he has evidence and that I am supposed to have been given evidence on this matter. Deputy Dillon has evidence and information, as we all have information if we want to argue from the other angle, that there are thousands of British-born citizens here in this country who are using their eloquence and their powerful influence from day to day to try to convert our people to a point of view which would involve us in the war, and I suggest that he is one of their ablest spokes men inside and outside this House.

The Deputy should have come to the Order by now.

The members of this Party will give greater support to the Government, inside and outside this House, for the purpose of helping them to maintain the national policy of neutrality, than any Deputy, particularly a Deputy who advocates our entrance into this war on a particular side. I cannot understand the attitude of people who use their eloquence and their influence to drag us into the war on a particular side, and I do not care which side it is—young men who have not the courage to go and put the uniform of the country they are supporting on their backs, and go out and take their chance where the war is going on. I know many young men who are advocating our entry into the war on one particular side, who were not born in this country, but are living comfortably in this country at the present time, and who have not the courage to go and put on a uniform and risk their lives in favour of the policy they are advocating. I am forced to say those things because of the impertinence of Deputy Dillon in making insinuations here that we are the dupes of the I.R.A., and that we have evidence that the I.R.A. is in collusion with agents of the Nazi Government. I hope it is the last time Deputy Dillon will use words of that kind inside this House. If he uses them outside, we will give him an opportunity of proving the allegations he has been making here under cover of privilege. From day to day I come up against people who hold the view that if you do not publicly express your opinion in favour of the British point of view you are automatically pro-German. Deputy Dillon is one of that type. That is not the correct way of supporting the national policy of neutrality, or giving a proper lead in that direction to those who are responsible for implementing it.

One of the striking things in connection with the discussion on this motion was the conflicting points of view expressed in this House by the Taoiseach and by the Minister for Justice in connection with the reasons for the bringing in of those drastic powers. The Taoiseach, for instance, said in the concluding portion of his speech that he was willing to bring this order back to the House after six months' trial and leave it to the judgment of Deputies to say whether it should be altered and, if so, in what way it should be altered. The Minister for Justice, speaking earlier in the debate, said that it was possible that he would have to come to the House again in the near future and look for stronger powers to deal with the situation that he sees through his glasses from the Department of Justice. The Taoiseach said that he was looking for the powers contained in this order to deal with an external situation; with the danger that he sees of this country being dragged into trouble with an outside Power; whereas the Minister for Justice said that he wanted the powers sought for in this order to deal with matters of a purely internal nature. The Minister for Justice and the Taoiseach must not have been talking very long together before they spoke in this House in support of this particular order or of the drastic powers sought in this order.

Plainly and bluntly, what we are asked to do here is this. In the first place, we are asked to trust the Government, to trust the servants of the Government who are responsible for the operations of the military court and the powers that are sought to help the State servants to make their case before the military court. We are also asked to rely upon the sense of justice and the ability, as the Taoiseach said, of the members of the military court. I respect the members of the military court so far as they are competent officers of our National Army. The Minister for Justice, to my surprise, made a case in support of these men, because he asserted— I hope I am not misrepresenting him when I say so—that they had carried out their duties efficiently since they were appointed in 1931. Personally I would have less objection to the composition of this court if it had with one or two of its members a man of legal knowledge and experience. I understand that even as far back as the civil war days those sitting on courts martial had the assistance of a judge advocate-general. I am not sure that I am correctly informed. But, if a court consisting of laymen had even the assistance or guidance of a person with the experience of a judge advocate-general there would be probably less ground for objection than there is to a court consisting altogether of laymen without any legal knowledge or training of any kind.

The view I take of a court of this kind is that, no matter even if they have had previous experience of dealing with cases where serious charges were brought before them, these officers of this particular military court are bound, under the conditions laid down in this order at any rate, to follow the advice or the direction of the State counsel who appears before the court on behalf of the Attorney-General. Is there any Minister or member of the Government Party who will say that the officers of a court trying cases which are likely to be referred to them will act contrary to the directions or advice given by the State counsel, especially on a question of procedure? I certainly would not dream of suggesting that officers would act in a way that would be contrary to the instructions or advice given by the State counsel, wherever and whenever submitted, when challenged by defending counsel on a question of procedure. I would imagine, for instance, that with the powers contained in this order the court would take the advice of the State counsel as to when unsigned statements might be submitted against a prisoner who was being tried.

Now we are asked to trust the Government in the first instance in giving drastic powers of this kind. The members of this Party, in the light of the experience of the working of the Emergency Powers Act, cannot agree to trust the Government because we believe—and Deputy Norton has cited cases to prove it—that the Government have abused the powers given to them under the Emergency Powers Act and made use of that Act for the purpose of getting certain things done in this country which should have been done by legislation or after open discussion in this House. We are asked to trust the servants of the State who will be responsible for helping the Government to carry out the terms of this drastic order.

The Minister for Justice I am sure will admit that very serious cases have arisen, even in recent times, where as a result of wrong information and bad evidence people have been sent to prison in the wrong. I daresay he will not deny that servants of the State have been dismissed for being inefficient; servants of the State who in the ordinary course of events would be responsible or held liable for the operation of an order of this kind. I will quote one case—the Quinn case—where a man was brought before a court on information and evidence supplied by the Gárda, found guilty on bad evidence and sentenced to penal servitude. The man concerned was subsequently released as a result of information which came into the possession of the Minister for Justice and the Government and a big sum was paid in compensation for the wrongful imprisonment of that particular individual.

That is an argument against trying anybody at all.

I say that a person charged with any crime must have all the safeguards it is possible to give him so that he may get a fair trial. If that man was brought before a military court, assuming a military court would be qualified to try him, I take it he would have been sentenced to death, if the death sentence was the proper sentence to give him for the crime with which he was charged. If he were shot, there would be no question of bringing him back to life. The fact that he was imprisoned wrongly was admitted. I daresay that this was all done by somebody who took an irresponsible view of his duties as a servant of the State.

Mr. Boland

I should like to remind the Deputy, as I am sure he should like to know exactly what happened, that a jury tried that particular case. The man was identified by bank officials, so that there was really no blame attaching to the court or anybody else. There was a miscarriage of justice, but it certainly was done in a bona fide manner. Bank officials gave evidence of identification and the jury found the man guilty.

I am aware that it was a jury case, because I know a man who was a member of the jury. The case was brought forward by the State. It was a State prosecution and State servants were responsible for producing the evidence. I only cite that case. I could cite others to prove that mistakes can be made by servants of the State in charging citizens with crimes of which it was afterwards discovered they were not guilty. One of the most serious things I see in the order is that an unsigned statement can be produced in this military court at any stage of the trial and put forward as evidence, unsupported evidence, against the prisoner. Is it possible, for instance, that an unsigned statement can be submitted to the court before sentence is passed on the prisoner? The order says it can be put forward at any stage of the trial. Am I to assume that a statement of this kind can be brought forward without giving the defending counsel a copy of the statement, or the name of the person responsible for the making of it? In other words, will it be possible for defending counsel to get copies of the statements that are being submitted?

Mr. Boland

Certainly.

Will it therefore be in the power of the defending counsel to subpæna a person before the court for the purpose of proving that he was the person responsible for making the statement?

Mr. Boland

It will.

And to give all the supporting evidence he can against the prisoner or for the prisoner, as the case may be? If these unsigned statements are to be put forward at the last moment, without previous advice to defending counsel, there is no justification whatever for having a defence at all in a court of this kind. Is the Minister making that clear?

Mr. Boland

I am making it clear that, as far as the defence is concerned, the laws of evidence have not been interfered with. Any right they had in regard to cross-examination is still there.

How can they cross-examine if the person will not attend the court?

Mr. Boland

I made it clear last night that this order is to provide for an absent or a dead witness. It is in case he may be either abducted or shot. I am satisfied—and every Deputy here can be satisfied—that the court will insist on knowing why the witness is not produced. We are not dealing in the abstract with this situation: we are dealing with what we know are likely things to happen. The witness may be either abducted or shot. I produced some evidence that there is a possibility that that may happen, and that is what is being provided for here.

Suppose he attends and will not give evidence?

Mr. Boland

Then the court can make up its own mind. We are not asking the court to do anything but consider these statements and hear any evidence. If the witness is in court and will not give evidence, we are not telling the court what they are to do about it. That is a matter for the court to decide.

How can defending counsel subpæna a witness to appear before that court unless he is given the names of the witnesses for the prosecution beforehand and copies of the unsigned statements submitted and which are to be used against the prisoner?

Mr. Boland

That is so.

The meaning of the order is quite clear, that unsigned statements can be produced at any stage of the trial and used against the prisoner, and if defending counsel is not made aware of the statements beforehand and the names of the witnesses, how can he make a case for bringing the witness before him?

Mr. Boland

He can get the name of the person who makes the statement and a summary of the evidence, and can subpoena if the witness can be produced; but we are providing for the case in which he cannot be produced.

That is a case of a person who dies.

Mr. Boland

Or is murdered or kidnapped. These are cases we are providing for.

The Minister has cleared up some points, at any rate, that certainly were not clear from the wording of the order.

Mr. Boland

I am very glad that the Deputy is asking me questions in this way, and I am very glad to get the opportunity to clear up these matters. There has been a lot of misrepresentation—not deliberate, maybe—and certain debate in the abstract instead of in the times in which we are living.

I have had the opportunity to talk to people who can interpret these things better than I can. I said to myself, at any rate, that this is a terrible state of affairs, as it deprives counsel on behalf of the prisoner of the right to cross-examine a person who made a statement against the prisoner. Cross-examination of a prosecuting witness very often brings out information not previously brought out——

Mr. Boland

Quite so.

——in any other way to any other person, and which may help to get the prisoner released.

Mr. Boland

It may, and he has that right still.

Of course, he could not have that right if defending counsel did not get a copy of the statements and the names of the witnesses who gave them.

Mr. Boland

Yes.

And the defence in court will have the right to cross-examine witnesses for the prosecution?

Mr. Boland

Certainly. Of course, if witnesses will not give evidence, that is another matter. If the witness will not give evidence, no one can cross-examine him.

They could try it by correspondence.

Mr. Boland

The court has to settle that question.

It is my opinion that a court consisting of officers without legal knowledge or training will, in cases of this kind, feel themselves bound, as servants of the State, to follow the advice or direction of the Attorney-General, and that is a weakness I see in the constitution of the court.

Mr. Boland

Will the Deputy let me make that clear? They are bound to do no such thing as follow the advice or direction of the Attorney-General's representative. It is a matter for them. They may do and often do, but they may take the other view. They are not bound.

I would have more faith in a statement of that kind if I knew that some member of the court was a man with legal training and experience.

Mr. Boland

The registrar is, of course.

He is not a member of the court.

Mr. Boland

He is the legal adviser.

He advises them on points of law.

He is the same as the court clerk in a country court or a circuit court. He has to sit down and stand up when he is told, and he has no right to decide the issues put before the court. I am glad, at any rate, that the Minister for Justice has cleared up one or two points. When we are asked to give these extraordinary powers to the Government in existing circumstances, knowing as we do that they have already abused the powers given by this House very freely in September, 1939, under the Emergency Powers Act, we suspect—and I think we have good reason to suspect from previous experience—that the Government will use these powers for the purpose of dealing with other issues and other types of cases.

I myself suspect—and it has been suggested to me—that the Government, if given these powers, would not hesitate to use them against trade union leaders who may be held responsible for encouraging strikes for increased wages in contravention or opposition to the powers contained in Emergency Powers Order No. 83. I can imagine a citizen of this State—perhaps the wife of some man on strike—coming along and making a statement to the Government or to the Minister for Industry and Commerce, and getting that Minister to arrest a trade union leader, put him before this court, and intern him for the period of operation of Emergency Powers Order No. 83. Would the Minister for Justice say if there is any possibility of this order, or the powers contained in it, being used for that kind of thing? I am asking the Minister for Justice because I know he is a very straightforward man.

Mr. Boland

I would like to make it clear that there is no intention of doing any such thing, and that the only cases coming before this court are cases set out in the Schedule, and in those cases they must be considered by the Government before they come before the court, and they are subject to review again. There is no case of sending a man there unless the Government first consider it. I can assure the Deputy that.

When the Emergency Powers Act was under discussion in the early period of the emergency, we asked the responsible Minister at the time for an assurance—and the Taoiseach gave us an assurance—that the Act would not be used to deal with industrial matters; but we find that it has been used, in the case of the infamous Order No. 83, to prevent the workers of this country getting increased wages, while the bankers, with their safes bulging with money, were given increased charges. Then we have the Minister for Local Government and Public Health quite recently making use of it in order to prevent schoolchildren getting mid-day meals.

I knew Deputy Norton was ignorant, but I did not think that Deputy Davin shared that ignorance. Better look it up and see what that order purports to do.

We have listened to the Minister's sanctimonious piffle and hypocrisy before.

The Chair desires to hear Deputy Davin, who is in possession.

I am very glad to have on the records of the debate an assurance from the Minister for Justice on the point I have mentioned. It is not necessary to say this; it would hardly be necessary for any Deputy to say it: we are prepared to give the Government all the powers and support they reasonably need in order to maintain the national policy of neutrality in this country; but we are of the opinion that the very drastic powers sought for in Order No. 139 are not justified either by the wording of the order or by the speeches which have been made in support of it by the Taoiseach, the Minister for Justice, and any other member of the Government who has spoken on the matter up to the present time.

We are not dupes of the I.R.A. in matters of this kind, as suggested by Deputy Dillon, nor are we the dupes of anybody else. We have the right, on behalf of the people we represent, to endeavour to preserve the liberties of every citizen under the Constitution. It was for that purpose, and for no other purpose, that we put down this motion, challenging the right of the Government to equip themselves with drastic powers of this kind without coming to the House and making a case for them. We can all thank God, as sensible citizens of this State, that we have lived in comparative peace since the emergency arose. I can remember no period of equal length since the State was established in which there was less crime, political or otherwise. One of the greatest consolations I have had in going around the country since the emergency arose has been to see Irishmen who differed so strongly in the years from 1922 to 1938 coming together in the ranks of the National Defence Forces —the L.D.F., the L.S.F., the Red Cross and other organisations—forgetting their differences and lining up, as they never lined up before, in support of the national policy declared by the representatives of the people in this House.

If times and circumstances were normal, it would be difficult to justify this order to the ordinary man and I, for one, should not attempt to do so. The times and circumstances—notwithstanding that some of the speeches to which we listened in this House yesterday and to-day would lead one to believe otherwise—are not normal. I think that that was what Deputy Costello had in mind when he said that, though all his education, training, and experience of 27 years as a lawyer, urged him to vote against this order, he would, in present circumstances, vote for it if a coercive case could be made. I do not know whether it would be possible to make a case which would be absolutely coercive on Deputy Costello, Deputy McGilligan, or any of the other lawyer Deputies who have criticised this order, to the extent that they would vote for it, because, naturally, that would depend upon the amount of detail as to the true situation in the country which they would require to have divulged. The Government knows that the situation requires this order, that it is a grave and menacing situation. But there are limits to the revelations which the Government may make without damaging the public interest or, I might almost say, without endangering the public safety. Furthermore, in making the case for this order, the Government is hampered in a way in which the critics of the order are not, for we, on these benches, must confine ourselves to those matters which are within the public knowledge. Even here, we must restrict ourselves so as not to appear to reflect upon cases which are already sub judice or which in the near future may so be. Therefore, as I say, I do not think that any person would attempt to carry conviction to every critic of this order. But I do think that we can carry conviction to the mind of the ordinary citizen who is concerned with the safety of himself, his neighbours and the State in which he lives.

Reference has been made in a number of speeches to the statement made by the Chief Justice in delivering judgment in the Supreme Court upon the motions of which this order has been the subject when he alluded to the fact that certain of the arguments which had been adduced in that court might more properly have been adduced here in the Dáil. I think that the true intent of the statement made by the Chief Justice has not been apprehended by those who have referred to it. What he said was that the Oireachtas had declared a state of emergency to exist and that, in recognition of the fact that a state of emergency did exist, it was prepared to entrust wide powers to the Government. Therefore, the only question which would appear to arise for consideration is whether, in fact, that state of emergency, acknowledged to exist, is of such a nature that we are entitled to get all the powers we feel to be essential if we are to protect the institutions of the State and the citizens of the State themselves. I do not think that it can be contested that there is a national emergency. I cannot conceive that, in the whole of its history, this nation was ever confronted with a graver peril than it is confronted with at present. After centuries of struggle, we have enjoyed 20 brief years of freedom, and, to-day, we find ourselves with war all around us, closing in on us from every side and our geographical position and strategical importance an ever-increasing temptation to those who are locked in this life-and-death struggle. In the midst of this we stand, a little State of less than 3,000,000 people, passionately and, I might say, fanatically determined to remain at peace. Some of us wish to be at peace for one reason, some for another, but, so far as I can ascertain the minds of the ordinary plain man and woman, there is a deep-seated instinct telling them that this nation, whose population contains so few young and adolescent elements, cannot endure the blood sacrifice of war and continue to survive. They feel deeply and instinctively that the preservation of our neutrality is a matter of life and death for our race. For that reason, no matter what other instinctive claims of blood, of gratitude and self-interest demand, they are resolved, under Divine Providence, to remain at peace. We may not all agree with them in that resolve. There are some Deputies who disagree, and because this is a free country, and this free Assembly, as far as I am concerned, they are entitled to express their views. But in any event, whether individually we agree with that resolve or not, the Oireachtas and the Government have hitherto acted upon it so that the maintenance of peace is the paramount policy of the State. Any conspiracy which, without the consent of the people, is designed to embroil them in war is a menace to this State, and the gravest menace of all is the conspiracy which not only seeks to embroil them in war but challenges at the same time the very foundations of our Government and our State. That is the kind of conspiracy which we are now facing. It is in this situation that there exists a national emergency of the gravest character. The assertion, that there exists a national emergency of the gravest character, is challenged, at least by implication in this motion, by the movers of this motion, and by the critics of the order.

I have said that there exists a conspiracy which seeks to embroil us in war. I think, of that fact there cannot be any denial. The history of this conspiracy in latter years should be within the recollection of us all. As the Taoiseach informed the House yesterday, the heads of it issued an ultimatum declaring war on another State with which we were, and are, and desire to remain at peace. In pursuance of that ultimatum this organisation carried on a campaign of outrages designed, in my belief, at any rate— others may not take the same view— to provoke an attack upon us, to embitter the relations between us and our neighbours, and to bring about what that organisation desired, an actual state of war between this country and Great Britain.

What is the date of the proclamation?

The date was late in 1938 or early in 1939. This, then is the avowed aim of the organisation with which this Government has to deal. Would those who have attacked and criticised this order, and who spoke as if we were back again in 1931, or back again at the beginning of, say, 1938, ask themselves what would have been the position in this country, and in this House, if this unlawful organisation had succeeded in its objective, and we had found ourselves faced with a threat or a reprisal from Great Britain? What would be the position, perhaps to-morrow, if they brought about what I believe they are striving to do? But it is not only external war this organisation aims at. It claims to be waging war against this State. Let us not talk here as if we were dealing with some partly innocent victim of hard circumstances. Let us realise what we are up against. This organisation is anxious not merely to bring about war between this country and another, but it actually claims to be waging war against us. Civil war they would call it, perhaps, but armed rebellion we are entitled to describe it here in this State. In pursuance of that rebellion it has raided our magazines, attacked our forces, murdered our police, terrorised our citizens, and claimed the right to exercise the power of life and death over all our people. In the minds of those who are behind this conspiracy this Legislature, and the Government responsible to it, is a usurpation. Remember, too, it has no qualms about courts or rules of evidence. It governs by martial law and drumhead courtmartial. As the Minister for Justice indicated yesterday, it arrogates to itself a competent military authority, to whom the forces of State, upon which we rely to protect our territory, to defend our liberties, and to safeguard our lives, are "enemy forces."

Let us know where we stand. While the Taoiseach, members of the Government, and members of the Defence Forces are going around begging, imploring and urging our young men to flock into the Army, into the L.D.F. and into the L.S.F., remember, when they do that, they are asking those boys to put themselves in peril of their lives at the hands of this competent military authority, which regards them as "enemy forces." This organisation goes further, and warns all citizens, who are bound by the laws of God and man to render obedience and assistance to the law, that any one of them who fulfils these solemn obligations will be shot, if this competent military authority so determines.

What this organisation has been guilty of in the past few years should be well known to us all, but lest we forget, because I think some of us have forgotten, let me remind the House of some of the things that have happened within the past few years. Deputy Davin seems to attach some importance to the date of the ultimatum aimed at overthrowing the authority of this House, as if that mattered so long as the policy of the organisation is to-day what it was then. But, if that point is going to be made, that these things were done before war became imminent all around us, let us remember what has been done since the actual outbreak of the war. We had, as I have already reminded the House, the raid on the national Magazine, the primary reserve of the Defence Forces of this State, a raid which admittedly was planned and carried out by this organisation and about which, perhaps, the country may hear, and the House may hear, something more in the near future. Then we had the attack on the police officers at Holles' Street, the men who were carrying State despatches. Let us all throw our minds back to that morning when we heard of that cowardly attack, when these two men, armed merely with revolvers, were set on and ambushed by men armed with machine-guns who were prepared to shoot them down in order that they might secure the despatches which these officers, as servants of the State, were carrying. Let us contrast the atmosphere in which and the freedom of expression with which we have been debating this order for the past two days with our feelings that morning when we heard of that attack and realised that there were men who were prepared to stick at nothing, not even murder, if they could only secure their aims or ends, whatever they may be.

Then within a short period we had the bomb outrage at Dublin Castle. I heard Deputy McGilligan talk of that as if were a mere fiddle-faddle. Of course Deputy McGilligan did not happen to be one of the 14 detective officers, servants of the State, whose duty it was to enforce the laws passed by this House, laws which represent not only the policies of those on the Government Benches but decisions of the House as a whole—for whether Deputies vote against these laws or not they represent their corporate acts, and every Deputy here is bound to stand behind the servants of the State in their efforts to enforce them to the last drop of his blood. Here were 14 men sleeping innocently within this building and here was this deadly machine planted there by the agents of a conspiracy. To-day, as I have said, listening to Deputy McGilligan one would have thought it was a child who had let off fireworks on Guy Fawkes' Day for all the significance he attached to that outrage.

Then we had the murder of the police officers at Rathgar following shortly afterwards. It seems to be forgotten now, but remember that a short time previously, when the memory of these incidents was fresh in the minds of this House, this House amended the Emergency Powers Act to enable the Government to make an order under which were set up the special courts to which the Emergency Powers Order No. 139 refers. When the Government made that order setting up that court, the day after these police officers were murdered at Rathgar, we had not anybody coming here telling us that, after all, the five officers from whom that court was to be drawn, were men who had no legal training or legal experience. They were not then sneered and flouted at as Deputy McGilligan sneered, flouted and jibed at them to-day. No, there was not a word then, because everybody realised, with the fate of these police officers in front of them, that there was in fact a dangerous conspiracy and that the danger of that conspiracy is not to be measured and gauged by the fact that a murder took place this year or last year but that the danger and the menace are to be gauged by the fact that the conspiracy exists and that it is still under the control of the same desperate men.

Are not they all locked up?

The Deputy did not do anything to apprehend them, whether they are locked up or not. Following this we had the attacks and the armed raids on the banks and the post offices. Of course, we have this jibing and jeering from the Deputy as to their all being locked up. Well, if the present order had been before this House some time, say, early in 1941 and I was making the same argument we would have the same interruption from Deputy Davin: "Are they not all locked up?" Perhaps he thought they were all locked up. But we were not such fools as not to know that some of them were at large and the difficulty was to apprehend those that were at large. If anyone thought that these desperadoes "were all locked up," the outbreak of armed outrages, of armed robberies of banks and post offices and the murder of some of the servants of the State must have awakened him from that dream. We had this menace growing to such an extent that we had to make it one of the offences triable by the court. We had to make the act of engaging in robbery under arms one of the offences triable by the court and punishable by death. Following this outbreak of outrages, when the net of the law had closed round one of the men who had been responsible for some of them, and when we tried to apprehend him we had an Army officer, and I think a Gárda also, wounded, but in any event he and his associates did not scruple to turn their guns upon the officers of the law and put them in peril of their lives. That was followed afterwards by the attempted murder at Dundalk. Of whom? Of a man who had become innocently involved in one of the operations of this conspiracy and who, when he was arrested, just simply said, "I was engaged by so-and-so. My lorry was engaged by so-and-so to come and remove goods— I did not know what they were—I was engaged only to transport them from this place to that." Because he gave that evidence in court, in order to exculpate himself, he, one night, after having made a journey, when he was coming home to his wife and family, was stopped in the darkness on the road by a man who appeared to be a fellow-motorist seeking his help and succour because the car had broken down and when he, like any other ordinary decent citizen, pulled up his vehicle and got down to help the men who seemed to be in difficulty he was asked was he so-and-so, and when he answered, "yes", was immediately fired on, wounded in three places and left for dead on the ground. All this occurred within the space of the last two years. Then we had the attempted bomb outrage at the Gárda headquarters in Cork. We have not heard a great deal about these things because, for one thing, newspaper space is limited and, for another, we do not think that the activities of this organisation or any other organisation of the sort, should secure any undue advertisement.

Hear-hear.

"Hear-hear," says the Deputy but all the time the Deputy and other people who would say "Hear-hear" with him have been asking us and taunting us to make a case for this order. We had hoped that it would not be necessary to say too much about these things but since we are told that no case has been made we have to refresh the memory of Deputies as to what has actually happened and what ought to be within their own knowledge. I was saying about the outrage at Cork. Then we had the kidnapping, imprisonment, torture and projected murder of the one-time head of this unlawful organisation. That is surely fresh within the minds of all the Deputies. Deputy Norton, in fact, referred to a certain statement which has already appeared in the Press in connection with these proceedings.

He was requested not to pursue it further.

I am simply referring to the fact that it is now public knowledge that a man was charged and convicted of having kept prisoner this person who, by our laws, is a citizen of the State—albeit he may be in rebellion or in revolt against the State and, therefore, amenable to the laws of the State. But, in any event, he was a man who, being under the law a citizen of the State, was unlawfully imprisoned and put in peril of his life by the members of this organisation. I could go on and I could say some other things because this does not complete the list. There are other matters known to the Minister for Justice, known also to the Government which, for one reason and another, it is not in the public interest to refer to at this stage.

I was thunderstruck last night when I heard the former Minister for Justice, Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney, in all honesty, asking us to justify the making of this order by asking us when was the last murder. We have had that question repeated here to-day in this House. Surely to goodness we are not going to judge the merits or demerits of this order by the fact as to when the last murder took place or as to how many murders took place. Have we not enough evidence to show us that this organisation exists, that it claims to have power over the lives and over the properties of our citizens and that it is prepared to stop at nothing to enforce its ordinances upon them?

May I ask the Minister a question?

I do not wish to be interrupted.

The Minister is not prepared to give way.

It is just like him.

No member is obliged to give way except on a point of order.

I understand that.

The Minister surely ought to change his mind about that and answer the question.

If the Deputy will put the question.

Deputy Hannigan may ask the question.

I was going to ask the Minister if it was a fact that in a number of the crimes he has outlined, arrests and convictions were made by the State before the issuing of the Emergency Order which the Minister is endeavouring now to support?

In some of them only. But I think I have said enough to show that, so far as this organisation can secure it, we are fighting what they would call a civil war or what we can only describe and regard as rebellion and, I regret to say that, when we describe that as a state of grave emergency, we are told by Deputy McGilligan that we have secured the powers that we have got, the powers which the Dáil has given us, under false pretences. It would be a great mistake if the people of this country were led by anything which has been said here, particularly by remarks of that sort, to underestimate the harm and the havoc and the damage which this organisation might do to this State and to its people.

We have been asked also as to the extent of this conspiracy. It has been suggested that it is of no importance, that it is dying, decaying, and that it will ultimately vanish of its own accord. I do not believe that. I do not believe that this conspiracy is going to die of inanition. I had hoped over the past ten years that with each succeeding year the tendency for it to exist would disappear, but I am not certain now that there is not a vested interest in the continuance of that organisation and, therefore, I do not believe that if we treat the members of it with clemency and with mercy, it is likely, as I said, to die in the ordinary and natural course of things, because there has grown up around that organisation a set of vested interests which are fed, for one reason or another, from sources which we cannot particularise and which we can only guess at. But if you ask me, as we have been asked, what is the extent of this rebellious conspiracy, we cannot give you precise details. We believe that the numbers actually enrolled may not be very great. They may not, for instance, run into many thousands, but we do not know because we are dealing with a secret organisation upon the members of which secrecy is enforced by the sanction of death. We believe, however, that those who control the organisation are desperate, unscrupulous and blood-hardened men who will stop at nothing to enforce their decisions on their associates. We have proof of that fact in the cases which were recently tried before the special military courts. We have proof of that fact in the men who have been taken from their homes, even since 1931, and who have been murdered at the order of the heads of this organisation. Until recently, this organisation also was well supplied with funds. Upon some of those who have been arrested at one time or another considerable sums of money were found. That has not been so common recently. Instead there was, as I have already told the House, an outbreak of bank robberies and armed raids upon post offices and other places where considerable sums of money might be expected to be found.

In those raids arms were used, and when it was subsequently sought to apprehend those responsible for the armed robberies, they turned their arms, as I have told the House, and as the House well knows, against the servants of the State, wounded them and generally imperilled their lives. This is the sort of conspiracy controlled by desperate men against which we are fighting. We do not know, as I have said, how many are actually enrolled in it, but I, for one, believe that it has many hangers-on, many on the fringe, many ostensibly law-abiding persons just waiting to see how the cat is going to jump, and I do believe that every time that conspiracy scores a success against the State, it finds from this fringe new recruits, and I do think that recently the inflow from this fringe into the organisation has been increased by recent happenings.

In the course of this debate, I have been astonished at the emphasis which was laid upon the interests of the prisoner. I, for one, certainly contend that every opportunity should be given to the prisoner to prove his innocence and that he should be treated with fairness and equity, but let us not forget this: that the courts of the land, and particularly this special military court, were not established to protect the criminal but to protect the law-abiding citizen. That is why we have established these courts—to ascertain whether a man has been guilty of a crime, and, if he has been guilty of a crime, to assess his punishment. That is their primary office. They are there to give a fair trial, but their primary function is to secure the due and proper enforcement of the law, and, in doing that, to protect the citizen.

We have been told by Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney that he was not going to vote for this order because he thought it was contrary to the natural law. What is the fundamental Divine and natural law in this matter? It is stated very succinctly in the Fifth Commandment: "Thou shalt not kill," and the fact that the State exists to see that that Divine ordinance will be obeyed is one of the primary justifications for its existence. What right have we to exercise any authority over any individual born within the four shores of Ireland, if it does not spring from the fact that authority is exercised in his interest, to ensure that he will live his life peaceably, that his life will not be imperilled by the unlawful act of any other man, and the primary obligation that rests upon us here is to secure the general acceptance of that Commandment. All the other things are super-added; they are subsidiary. If rules are made, they are made to ensure that the law will be obeyed. They are made to ensure, of course, that no person will be wrongfully condemned, but—and let us be clear upon this—these rules of evidence were not framed to ensure that the wrongdoer would escape, and the moment they are deliberately availed of, as part of an organised conspiracy, to secure the escape of the wrongdoer, at that moment the State in discharge of the duty which rests upon it—the primary duty not merely of preventing crime, but of punishing crime—must begin to review the procedure under which the escape of the wrongdoer may be facilitated.

Now what is our position? We find that, owing to the terror which this organisation can strike in the breasts of honest citizens, the criminal is escaping and the honest citizen who tries to do his duty by the State is being punished, not by us, but by the agents of this organisation. The choice, therefore, which we are facing is whether we are going to allow this hand that strikes in the dark to paralyse the courts of justice in this country or whether we are going to amend the procedure so as to ensure that no technicality, designed to protect the innocent man, will be generally availed of to allow the criminal to escape. We have come to this pass that, as was said in the courts recently, the conspiracy has invaded the very courts of justice themselves, so that the criminal goes free and the man who is prepared to help the State is put in peril of his life. If that state of affairs were to be permitted to prevail, then I think that all justification for this House, for the forces of the State to apprehend and prevent crime, and for the courts to try criminals and to sentence them, disappears, for all this paraphernalia of the law and the sovereignty of the people would become, to adapt the title of the poem to which Deputy Norton referred yesterday, just a mask for anarchy.

This is the situation which confronts us and, I should say, confronts not merely the Government but this House. This is the situation which has coerced the Government to make Emergency Powers Order No. 139. We believe that that order will help us to deal with this situation. The order can be criticised, and it has been severely criticised, but what would the critics of the order, and of the Government in regard to the order, propose to put in its place? They are as responsible as we are for the enforcement of the law. We are the executive of this House. You finally determine and decide policy. As the executive charged with the enforcement of the law, we tell this House that Emergency Powers Order No. 139 will, if approved by this House, help us to deal with this conspiracy.

We are not denying for one moment that it can be criticised. In normal times and circumstances, I would be bitterly opposed to it, but these times and these circumstances are not normal, and let those who criticise us, and those who propose to annul it, tell us, in face of what they know and what I have brought again to their memory, what powers they should give us instead. It is not sufficient to come in here and slander, as they have been slandered in some of the speeches made here, the officers of the court. It is not sufficient to come in here and tell us that they are in the pockets of the Government. You can lavish and bespatter them with as much filth as you care, but let us remember that there have been men taken from their own homes and murdered in this country, that whole countrysides have been terrorised to prevent evidence of such crimes being given, and let us all realise that it is our job, the job of this House, to deal with that situation, and then let those who criticise us tell us what arms they are going to put in our hands in substitution for Emergency Powers Order No. 139.

Now, there has been one suggestion made, that we should make membership of this organisation punishable by death. But surely that is only begging the question. The whole problem here is the question of proof. If we did, as has been suggested by Deputy O'Higgins and by others, make it a capital offence to be a member of this organisation, and still allowed the courts to be hampered by rules of evidence conceived to deal with an entirely different situation, and based upon assumptions which do not exist in regard to this conspiracy, what use or service would it be to any Executive, dealing with this situation, to make mere membership of the conspiracy a capital offence? Would you not have the same difficulty in regard to the production of your witnesses? Would they not still appear to give testimony—if they appeared at all—under the shadow of death? Would they not still be liable to intimidation? Would they not still be liable to midnight murder, and would they not still be the prospective prey of the assassin if we were to adopt Deputy O'Higgins' proposal; and would we not, at the end as at the beginning, find that that measure was only futile and valueless?

That was not Deputy O'Higgins' contention.

His suggestion.

I was listening to him.

That was not his suggestion. I can tell you in a sentence what the suggestion was.

It does not matter. He made another suggestion that we should deal with it by Executive action.

He did not make that one.

He said he would prefer——

He said he would give you that order if you made membership a capital offence.

Mr. Boland

He did not say that. He spoke about the breaking up of furniture to get at a rat.

The suggestion has been made, and if I have wrongly ascribed it to Deputy O'Higgins, without the reservations which he made with regard to it, I am sorry.

It was not a reservation. It was an addition.

Let us consider the basis upon which the rules of evidence rest. They rest upon one assumption: that the state of the Commonwealth is such that every law-abiding person who knows any material fact in relation to a crime which will assist in the criminal being apprehended and punished for that crime will disclose it to the lawful authorities. That is the whole assumption upon which the rules of evidence have been built up. Provided that the assumed conditions do actually exist, I think there is no greater safeguard to the State than the rules of evidence, but the moment that that assumption disappears you take away the foundation from under the whole edifice. If the condition of the Commonwealth is not such that people will give all the help they can to the lawful authorities in enforcing the law: if, on the contrary, the Commonwealth is infested with a conspiracy which is so powerful, so widespread and so desperate that the ordinary common people of the country are terrorised, or can only give evidence at the peril of their lives, then you have got to choose new weapons and to adopt new methods, and that is what we are up against now: that we find we cannot bring the crime home to the criminal once the conspiracy has invaded the law courts.

Let us turn to the order itself. One would think that this order introduces a completely new principle into legal procedure. What does it do? Under Clauses 3 and 4 it proposes, under certain conditions and in certain circumstances, to draw the attention of the court to an inanimate object. That is what a written statement is: it is a piece of paper upon which there are certain writings containing certain particulars, and all that Parts 3 and 4 of the order do, as I have said, is to draw the attention of the court to these statements. One would think that that was a completely revolutionary departure. One would think that the court, in murder trials, had never had to study inanimate objects before; one would think that a blood-stained piece of rag, whose origin may be much less certain than any one of these attested pieces of paper, had never been put before a court and adduced as evidence against a man in peril of his life.

Does the Minister say they have been?

I say that blood-stained pieces of rags have been brought into court and that persons have been asked to testify as to them.

Connected with a case by living witnesses.

Who could only say this: that they found that rag in such and such a place: that this was a piece of cloth found near the body of the murdered person. One witness might say that it appeared to fit a hole torn in the coat of the accused person. Another witness, maybe the scientist who is assisting the prosecution, may tell the court that the stains on the rag are blood stains and that this piece of cloth will fit that tear in the accused person's coat. That is what is adduced in regard to the piece of rag. What does the order here allow except a written statement which will be produced to the court and to which the court can pay exactly the same attention as it might pay to that piece of rag? It will hear the case which the prosecution founds upon that statement, or endeavours to support by that statement—I am not going to say that the case will be founded upon the statement. They will listen to the case which the prosecution endeavours to support by that statement, and they will hear the statement controverted and criticised by the counsel for the defence in exactly the same way as they will hear the evidence of the expert witness challenged by the counsel for the defence and as they will hear the authenticity even of the piece of rag challenged by the counsel for the defence. The statement and the piece of rag are on all fours and there is nothing in this order which compels the court to pay more attention to a statement than it might pay to a blood-stained piece of rag.

So, notwithstanding all the things we have heard here this evening, this order is not at all as revolutionary as its critics would try to make out. Think of the circumstances under which this written statement has to be produced. It is not just simply a statement taken, as some people here would want the House to believe, by the counsel for the prosecution out of his brief bag without any warning and thrust on the attention of the court. Not at all. If a statement is to be put in by the prosecution it has to be proved that it is a statement relevant to the offence, that it has been made by an accused person or a person who may be an accessory or accomplice, or a person who is neither an accessory nor an accomplice but an innocent spectator of the crime.

Or mere gossip.

If it is mere gossip, let us assume that the members of the court, no matter by whom it is appointed, no matter who they are or what training they have, will be at least as anxious to see justice done as the Deputy or I would be. If the statement represents mere gossip, I am certain the court will take the gossip for what it is worth and no more. It has to be shown that the statement is relevant to the crime and that it was made voluntarily or was lawfully taken under any enactment, that it was taken down in writing and was acknowledged by the person who made it. Every one of these matters under the order is made subject to proof. Somebody has got to go into the witness box and on oath swear to the truth, swear that these conditions have been fulfilled, and the moment that person goes into the witness box and puts himself on oath he leaves himself open, not merely to examination by the prosecution, but also cross-examination by the counsel for the defence; so that all this talk we have heard to-day and yesterday about a person not being examined, about a statement being extorted under torture or third-degree methods, falls to the ground. The moment there is any hint or whimper that such methods had been employed to enforce a statement of that kind, that moment the counsel for the defence would be put in possession of certain facts and he could use them to upset the whole case for the prosecution. That is the position in regard to Clause 3 and Clause 4.

You would not like to look at Clause 5?

I am just coming to Clause 5. We have heard a great deal about Clause 5 and we have been told it is the kernel of the order. I am not a lawyer, but I have had on occasions to pay some attention, a good deal of attention, to decisions given in the law courts in relation to orders made by myself or my colleagues, or regulations which have been issued by myself or my colleagues, and I have not found that the courts are prepared to construe one part of an order without referring to the other parts.

Very naturally, I would hesitate to put my opinion against Deputy McGilligan's if it were a case of a person taking advice, but I would be prepared to back my own opinion if a case based on this order ever went to the law courts. The moment it went there, if the counsel for the Attorney-General tried to rely on Clause 5 of this order to the exclusion, from the knowledge and construction of the court, of Clauses 3 and 4, he would be scouted out and the judges would say that the Legislature, the Government, could not have put in Clauses 3 and 4 merely as window-dressing; that these clauses were put in very definitely to limit the powers and the rights of the prosecution under this order; that they were there to lay down conditions which the Government would have to fulfil and, if they were to be ousted by Clause 5, then there was no use putting them in at all.

It is important to note in this connection that the Chief Justice has already adverted to the value of this clause because, while we have heard, in the elegant phrase used by some of the lawyers, that the courts have passed the ball in this matter to the Dáil, and while they did refer to the statement of the Chief Justice as to some of the arguments which had been adduced in court, they carefully refrained from quoting this his statement that "while the changes effected by Clause 3 and Clause 4 of the order were entirely in favour of the prosecution and in favour of it for the reasons I have mentioned, the powers contained in Clause 5 might equally well be exercised in favour of the accused persons". That is one of the reasons why Clause 5 has been introduced in this order. The accused person may wish to put in a statement. If he does, the same conditions are not imposed on him as are imposed on the State by Clauses 3 and 4. The State, under Clauses 3 and 4, has to fulfil certain conditions. Those conditions might not, by their very nature, be capable of fulfilment by an accused person. Therefore, the accused person can avail himself of the wide latitude which is given to him and his defence by Clause 5 of the order. He may put anything before the court and the court may waive in his favour any one of the rules of evidence that would appear to keep from the court any material fact.

Now, again, what are the rules of evidence there for?—just to ensure that the material facts will be put fairly before the courts. I do not want to go into the whole history of the rules of evidence but let us remember most of them are very largely judge-made laws, made because very often careless judges, in the past, dealing with prejudiced jurors, allowed the defence to be prejudiced by submitting mere matters of opinion, and not material facts, to go to the jury as material facts, and the superior judges overruled them. That is how the rules of evidence were built up, but at any rate, let us remember that the whole purpose of the rules is to set the material facts before the jury, and, in these circumstances, where the material facts are very often difficult to get but where, by one means or another, the do come into the possession of the State, are we going to prevent them, by any rule that was framed—again, let me emphasise—to meet entirely different circumstances—are we going by that rule to prevent the material facts being laid before the court? That is the reason for Clause 5—two reasons: first of all, to give to the defence even greater privileges than, I think, the courts will accord to the prosecution under Clauses 3 and 4, and secondly——

Does the Minister really mean all that?

Yes, every bit of it.

And is it in the order?

I think it is here.

May I put a question? Is that the intention of Clause 5?

Certainly.

Why not make that clear, that it only applies to the defence and not to the prosecution?

Because we are facing that conspiracy which you cannot kill by hammer taps or heel taps. We are not going to make ourselves ridiculous here by tying our hands against men whose hands are not tied, men who have no regard for your rules of evidence or courts of justice, and who deal summary death to any person who will dare to stand up against them. Now, I am sorry to detain the House, but there is another aspect of this order which was criticised. We were told, with regard to Clauses 3 and 4, that statements would be put before the court and that the men who made these statements would be deliberately withheld from the court. Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney made a statement which, at any rate, conveyed that as his belief to me, and I asked him did he for a moment suggest that the Attorney-General, who is charged with the conduct of the proceedings before this court, charged with the conduct of the prosecution before this court, was deliberately going to withhold from the court any witness whom it was in the power of the State to produce. Unless you are prepared to say that, you cannot for a moment say that statements are going to be taken from witness and that then these witnesses are not going to be produced.

Remember, again, in this connection, that no person goes before this court except on an order made by the Government. If you say to me that, after all your experience, the Government is going to instruct the Attorney-General to keep back a material witness who can be produced, and that the Attorney-General is going to act on that instruction and will not refuse to serve under a Government which would give him such an order, then I can say no more, because we do not meet on the same plane. I do not believe that any Government or that any Attorney-General would do that, but if, as I say, there are people in this House who do believe it, then I do not think it is worth wasting time in discussing the matter in this House with them. But do let us consider what has happened: why it is that it has been necessary to bring in an order of this sort. Hitherto, the moment it has come to the knowledge of this organisation that a statement has been made to the police, that moment the organisation sets out to intimidate the person who has made the statement or, if it finds it cannot intimidate him, then to put him out of the way, as they say, and the consequence has been that people who have made statements have felt, and have been, in peril of their lives. It has always been, therefore, an inducement and a temptation to the organisation concerned, once it has learned that a statement has been made, to murder the person who made it. Now, so long as Clauses 3 and 4 of this order stand, that inducement, to some extent, will be lessened, and that is why that proviso is made there, so that if the information does come properly and legitimately into the hands of the police or the officers of the law it will not avail, or at least will not so greatly avail, the unlawful organisation to try to murder or intimidate a prospective witness.

Does the Minister say that a person can only be brought before the military court on a Government order?

Where is it in the order?

That has been the practice, at any rate.

It can only be done on the order of the Government.

Is that in this order?

Where is it?

It is not in the order.

Anyhow, it has been the practice.

Then the Attorney-General could bring anybody there, and a private prosecutor could also do so?

I do not think so.

Why not? You are making a point on it, and it is wrong.

I do not think it is wrong, because it has been the practice.

Let us have the order.

The practice of the law has always been shaped by precedent, and this has been the practice.

But we are changing the law now.

Anyhow, that has been the practice, but in any event the Attorney-General has hitherto conducted all these prosecutions, and if anybody is going to say that there will be a Government in power here in this country which will at any time deliberately withhold from a special court of this sort evidence which is material to the trial of a case—if you say that there is ever likely to be a Government of that sort put in power here, then I cannot discuss the matter further, except to say that if a Government did that——

——if a Government were to do as has been suggested, and keep back a material witness, then we have still the Dáil to be accountable to.

To try cases?

I am not suggesting that we should try cases here, but I say this: that if it can be shown that the Government keeps back a material witness in any proceedings before this court, there is still the Dáil to be accountable to.

On the day on which the Dáil is asked to deal with that question, it is going to try the case.

Well, then, if chaos comes let chaos come, but until then I do not believe any such thing will happen unless Deputy Cosgrave thinks that the people of this country are going to elect a Government that will not deal equal justice not merely to people charged with crime, but to all the citizens of this State. I do contend this: that we have proof that a state of emergency exists, that we are confronted with a dangerous conspiracy, and that the only and sole purpose of Emergency Powers Order No. 139 is to enable the Government to deal with that conspiracy and break it up. I say that those who propose to disallow the powers which we are now asking for should at least tell us what they are going to put in their place. They have not said that yet.

We have not yet been told what the conspiracy is.

The Deputy was not here.

I have been told that the Minister has worsened the situation.

The Deputy is always looking for an excuse.

We asked for proof.

To take the Minister's last point first, he wants to know what the people who desire to have this order annulled would put in its place. The answer is very simple. There was a time in this country when there was an organised conspiracy to murder jurymen; when officers of the Civic Guard were being shot; when banks and Post Offices were being raided; when there was everything except a raid on the Magazine Fort—and that covers the complete category of crime mentioned by the Minister—but a little Article called Article 2a of the Constitution met the situation in 1931. The powers in Article 2a of the Constitution were nothing like as drastic as the powers which the Government is asking for now; but the protests which came from these benches in those days were ten thousand times more vehement than the protests which are now being made.

Shelley was thrown in, too.

And bloodhounds.

The Minister said he was sorry for delaying the House. I am glad that he did delay it. I have listened to the most interesting legal lecture I have ever listened to. He must have spent some portion of last night trying to find out exactly what were the functions of a criminal court, and exactly what the rules of evidence meant, and he succeeded in learning everything off by heart—absolutely backwards. His interpretation of the functions of a criminal court and the procedure of a criminal court was the most extraordinary thing I ever listened to, even from those benches. He said that the function of a criminal court was to give every opportunity to an accused person to prove his innocence.

I did not say that. I said the function of a criminal court was to enforce the law.

I wrote down the Minister's words: "...every opportunity given to the prisoner to prove his innocence". Mind you, there are countries in this world——

I said: "While every opportunity should be given..."

——where that is the law, but, as far as I know, previous to this it has not been the law here. Mind you, that statement was made yesterday as well. It was made by no less a person than the Taoiseach. He said that the duty of the court was to get after the perpetrator and prove him guilty. In my submission, the duty of any court, the Special Powers Tribunal, the Military Tribunal, the ordinary criminal court or any other type of court, is no such thing. Its function is to listen to the evidence for the prosecution, to listen to the evidence for the defence, and to decide on the guilt or innocence of the prisoner according to the evidence produced to it. It is not the function of the court to hound anybody to his conviction. It is not the function even of a drumhead courtmartial to do that. The real danger behind this order is the mental attitude by which it is approached by members of the Government Party, and the mental attitude by which it is approached by a number of other people in this country. I suggest that, from that attitude is arising a most dangerous situation, where it is immediately assumed in any type of prosecution that every little of evidence given for the prosecution must of necessity be true because it is given for the prosecution, and that every title of evidence adduced for the defence must of necessity be false because it is given for the defence. That is the type of attitude behind an order like this. We know certain facts. We believe a certain person to be guilty of a certain crime. We cannot prove that that person is guilty, so we make an order which will allow us to adduce certain facts which could not be adduced in any court of law in the world. Having satisfied our own minds that the person is guilty, we create a court, surrounded by a special set of circumstances, which will be coerced into deciding the guilt of that person.

I cannot understand why anybody like the Minister for Local Government or anybody else should get up in this House and lecture on the functions of courts and the development of the rules of evidence. The rules of evidence were developed because the natural instinct of the judges, the natural instinct of legislatures, and the natural instinct of a developed humanity was that no person should be put on trial except in a fair manner before a jury of his peers; that a prisoner should not be put on his peril in this State until the prosecution had proved their case beyond yea or nay; that if there was any reasonable doubt in the minds of the judge or jury the prisoner should get the benefit of that doubt, and that no man should be asked to prove his innocence until the State had at least shown a prima facie case of his guilt. If we are to go away from that completely, the quicker we are told so the better. The Minister has no right to gloss over this order by talking about a conspiracy. He was indignant because the Government had been asked for facts. He suggested that the Minister for Justice and the Taoiseach had given sufficient facts last night to enable the House to make up their minds as to the seriousness of the situation. He mentioned that the situation was grave and menacing, and he gave a list of crimes, grave crimes, serious crimes, but crimes which would possibly have justified the bringing in of this order 12 or 18 months ago but do not seem to justify bringing it in now. He mentioned some cases which, to my own knowledge, should not have been mentioned, because they did not justify the bringing in of this order, arrest and convictions having been secured in those cases. I will mention one of the cases. He referred to an attempted bomb explosion outside the headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department in Cork City. That is one of the outrages to which he referred. Now, nine people were charged with that offence; nine people were arrested and duly convicted, and those nine people are now in prison. It did not require this drastic order to secure their apprehension and conviction.

There may be cases other than those he mentioned where the perpetrators have neither been apprehended nor convicted, but I suggest that the time when this order was necessary, if it was necessary at all, was not on 30th December, 1941, but on the evening of the day he so eloquently referred to when officers of the State were shot down, as he described it, by people with machine-guns in ambush, when those officers were bringing State despatches. Why was this order not necessary then or at the time of the Magazine Fort raid? Unless I am greatly mistaken, I remember that people were apprehended and convicted for taking part in that very selfsame raid. I should like some Government speaker to tell us exactly in how many of the cases mentioned by the Taoiseach and the Minister for Justice and the Minister for Local Government have people been apprehended and convicted, and in how many of the cases have no arrests been made.

There is one very significant fact. A case has been mentioned by the Minister for Local Government, where a man who had a lorry was engaged to carry goods of which he did not know the nature. It turned out that he was taking part in a criminal offence. He gave evidence and people were convicted of that criminal offence. Subsequently, he was shot and wounded. There appeared on the papers recently a report of an application by that man for compensation for criminal injuries before the circuit judge of that county, and he was awarded the sum of £970 damages. According to the reports in the Press, it appeared from his evidence that he stated that shortly after the trial he saw one of the people who had been convicted and sentenced. Whether that is correct or not I have no means of finding out, but I know very well it created a most alarming impression in the country that a man who gave evidence in the case was shot, and that that man, in his subsequent application for criminal injury compensation, gave evidence to the effect that he saw a person, who should have been a prisoner, at large about 18 months before he should have come out of jail. If that sort of thing is happening it is very hard to understand what is the attitude of the Government.

He could only be released by Government orders.

I will carry it no further. I only saw the report. I would be very glad, for the interest of the State and all concerned, if some Minister would deny that it ever happened or show that it never happened. If there is going to be a situation in which people sentenced by any court in this country, whether a special powers court, a military court, or an ordinary court, will be released without any suggestion that they were not guilty or that further facts had come to light which proved their innocence and, if on the other hand, others are to be put in the dock in peril of their lives under an order like this, it is really no wonder that people like the Minister for Local Government can get up and make the ridiculous statement about the ordinary fundamental laws, because if that sort of thing happens there is no law or order or respect for the fundamental law, as he said, not alone the natural or moral law.

It was very lucky for the Government, and they made very good value out of it, that the Chief Justice passed the remark about Article 5—that it might possibly be used in favour of the defence. If the Chief Justice had not made that remark, I wonder how many Ministers would have thought of that point—that it was quite possible to construe something in Article 5 in favour of the defence? In other words, that a court might allow the rules of evidence to be waived in favour of the defence. If I was defending a prisoner before a court like that, I do not think it would be very much advantage to me to have the rules of evidence waived in my favour under Article 5 by the time all those possible things that might happen to my client had happened under Articles 3 and 4, although it might be very pleasant to know that the court was good enough to give him the same opportunity as it gave to counsel for the State.

I want to make it clear that nobody on this side of the House either slandered or jibed or sneered at the three officers who compose the court, or suggested that they were in the pockets of the Government. It was like an echo to hear that. You would imagine it was a voice coming from the past. Certainly there was no suggestion by anybody on this side of the House of slander or jibing or sneering or that these people were in the pockets of the Government. I have had a certain amount of experience before this court and, so far as their conduct and treatment of people representing prisoners are concerned, I could not speak too highly of them. As a matter of fact, for people who had no legal experience or judicial training, they do very well indeed. But what has that to do with it? They may be the decentest men in the world, but they are being put into a position where a prisoner may be placed before them and the State will say: "We intended to call two witnesses, but one of them is missing; we believe he has been kidnapped. Here is his statement." Then the Gárda officer says that he took that statement in writing and that it was acknowledged or signed or something of that kind. If it is a question of a voluntary statement, he can certainly be cross-examined on that by the counsel for the defence. But, if it is a statement taken under an enactment, all the Gárda officer or Gárda need say is that, pursuant to the Offences Against the State Act, he took a statement from so-and-so, reduced it to writing and the person acknowledged it.

That is all right when the person who made the statement is missing. But what happens when the witness is present? The witness goes into the box, takes the oath, and is examined by counsel for the prosecution. He probably gives his name and address, but when he is asked the first relevant question as to the statement, he then denies on oath that he made that statement, or says that the statement was not framed in the way that he intended. Here you have the position that a Gárda officer says that he reduced the statement to writing; that he took it from this person, and that he acknowledged it. That is handed in and may be accepted as evidence. The man who is alleged to have made the statement says on oath that he did not make the statement, or that, if he made the statement, his statement has been misconstrued or has been written down in such a way that it does not show his intentions or the words that he used.

The Minister or nobody else in this House is so simple as to imagine that things like that never happened. I do not claim to have such experience of the courts as Deputy Costello, Deputy McGilligan, or Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney, but I know of cases where that sort of thing happened. Just to give an instance, I can tell the Minister of a case where a young man was prosecuted for an assault on a police officer, and where a witness, who was a very strong supporter of the Minister's own Party, was called by the State. He was asked the usual formal questions, but when it came to the vital point of his statement, which was being read out by the State solicitor, he stated: "I never said that." The question was: "Did you see this assault take place?" The witness said: "I never said that." The State solicitor asked for leave to cross-examine him as a hostile witness. I may point out that all honour was due to that man, who was giving evidence against a very strong political opponent. Even as a hostile witness, the State solicitor could not get any more out of him. I was acting for the defence, and I asked him two questions. The first was: "Did you make a statement?" He answered: "Yes." The next was: "Is that the statement you made?" He answered: "No." Then I asked who made the statement and he said that the Guards knew that the statement was bullied out of him by two people who took him to the barracks to make the statement. But the Gárdaí produced that statement as the statement of that person. That man was honourable enough to admit that he had been induced to give a written statement to the Gárdaí that he had actually seen the other man assault a police officer, when in fact he had not. I should like to know what the feelings of the Special Powers Tribunal would be if something like that happens. If a Gárda says that he reduced a statement to writing and that it was acknowledged, they are entitled to accept it as evidence. Then the man goes into the witness box and says that it is not his evidence, or if it is, portion of his statement has been wrongly written down. What are they going to do about it?

Whose evidence are they going to accept? It will give rise to an extraordinary position. I might point out to the Minister that there is no such thing as a voluntary statement except on very few occasions. The only voluntary statement I know of is the statement made by a person who is in a motor smash and who wants to get in first. So far as criminal offences are concerned, there is very seldom any such thing as a voluntary statement. When reduced to writing, they are not always the original statements of the persons concerned. I remember a district justice, on reading a statement in an infanticide case, stating that it was the first time he had ever seen a statement which looked like a perfectly voluntary statement because it was written down in narrative form and in the type of words you would expect the person to use.

What happens in the case of an ordinary statement? A young boy, say, is being interrogated because he is suspected of having poached salmon with some other boys. The Gárdaí get a statement out of him, but what happens? He is brought to the barracks and told: "We know you were there that night. We have got a statement from Paddy Murphy already, and the quicker you make one to save yourself the better." Of course, the lad immediately makes the statement and signs it. Then they send for Paddy Murphy. He comes in and they say to him: "We know you were there. Johnny Riordan made a statement and you better make one to save your own skin." Then he makes a statement. There is no good in the Minister or anybody else expecting us to be so terribly simple as to believe that things like that never happen. I know from my own experience that they have happened. Anyone who has anything to do with courts knows quite well that they happen. As long as there is any crime or any attempt at running down crime these things will happen. On occasions like that I can imagine that to take a statement in that way would be quite laudable. There is the suggestion of statements made voluntarily. To be voluntary, in my mind, the statement should be one where a person says he wishes to tell something about a particular offence and then reels it off in his own words and the Guard writes it down. It is very seldom that that occurs. It is nearly always question and answer and develops like this. The Guard says: "What time did this happen?" The man making the statement says that it happened about 9.30. The Guard says: "Are you sure?" and the reply is "Well, I am not sure, but it was about 9.30." You will never find "about 9.30" in the formal statement, but it will say: "At 9.30, I was on the banks of the river and was accompanied" and so on. It will not be in the expressions of the person who made it. The statement is taken down and reduced to writing by Civic Guards, and that always reminds me that, in giving evidence, they will never say they saw a person but that they "observed" him, nor will they say they went to a place but that they "proceeded" there.

When different words are being used from the words a person uses in natural language, it is very easy to put down something in writing which will bear an entirely different construction from that which the person intended. What puzzles me more about this order than anything else is that, if I approached it with a completely open mind at 3 o'clock yesterday and said that I was going to vote for or against this motion on the arguments I heard, I would be in a rather peculiar position to-day. The Minister for Justice seems to want the Emergency Order on one little set of grounds and the Taoiseach—while it is not so much that he does not want the order on different grounds—certainly does not want it on the same grounds as the Minister for Justice. The concluding portion of his statement yesterday was: "I am not asking for this order on the basis of the statement of the Minister for Justice about the present situation and the danger from outside." Anybody whose mind was in doubt as to the case for the order had those doubts very rapidly cleared when they heard the speeches of the four Ministers who have spoken already—the Taoiseach, the Minister for Justice, the Minister for Education and the Minister for Local Government and Public Health.

I know there is no case at all for the order. The only case that has been adduced is talk about a conspiracy and suggestions that the conspiracy has something to do with people outside the country, a list by the Minister for Local Government and Public Health of crimes which are well over 12 months old, and a suggestion that there has been organised conspiracy going on for a long time to prevent people giving evidence. In regard to the last point, I would like to know how many cases the Government have failed to bring before any court simply because people have gone back on the evidence or statements already given. As far as I know —and I am entitled to cast my vote on what I know I have been told in this House—I only know of one case so far, where the State could not proceed with the prosecution because the witnesses retracted statements and in that respect I do not think that in itself would be an argument at all.

In cases where three or four people were concerned or suspected of being concerned with an offence, and made statements which implicated themselves and others, it is entirely within their rights, if they are liable to be subject to prosecution themselves, to get up in court and say that they refuse to give evidence on the lines of the statement, on the grounds that if they did give such evidence on oath, they would be giving evidence which would incriminate themselves. That is a fundamental rule of law—that nobody is bound to give evidence to incriminate himself. As far as I recollect, people who were asked to give evidence and had not been charged with the offence were subsequently charged with the offence themselves.

The Taoiseach has spoken a lot of the Government's right to make the order. Nobody denies that right, as the House gave the Government this Emergency Powers Act and took away that right from the House. The Government has the right to make it, and the Emergency Powers Order is based on this new Constitution. There are some people in this House and some outside it, I am quite sure, who would never agree to give the Government the Emergency Powers Act if they thought it would be used for such an order as this, or for other orders, and there are some people in this House who voted for the Constitution who were quite sure that never again in this country would anything be heard of like a Coercion Act.

If Coercion Acts and drastic orders like this are necessary, it is entirely the fault of the people who have been telling the young men of this country that, once they got into power themselves, they would produce a Constitution that would do away with all necessity for political activity, and who tried to convince them that, sooner or later, the day would come when nobody would question any political activity. They told them that, as long as certain things were not done it was just, it was right and it was patriotic to assail the institutions of the State. The Government, while in power themselves, just kept those people under their hand on the side, by saying to them: "Take your time and, sooner or later, we will satisfy you and do everything you want." They have not done everything those people wanted and those people have turned on them. It is entirely the Government's own fault.

In this respect I do not agree with the attitude of one member of the Labour Party, Deputy Hickey, who says that were it not for a certain political situation there would be no political crime. I am convinced that the cause of the crime is laxity by the Government in dealing with it. Time and again they said they would try to give these young men another chance to be good boys in the future. When the Offences Against the State Act was going through the House there was a speech from a Deputy on the Government Benches for a little more leniency. I do not approve of anybody like Deputy Hickey suggesting that, but for a certain political situation, there would be no political crime in this country. I am convinced that a person who carries on that type of outrage and that type of crime would not be satisfied if he got the millennium for the Thirty-Two Counties. They will not be satisfied with organised government, as they want anarchy or something like it. I do not believe it is too late, but the Government seem to think that it is, as the Minister for Local Government and Public Health said the situation is a serious menace, that there is a conspiracy to prevent the writ running in the courts of the country. According to the Minister for Justice there is a conspiracy of organised murder and a conspiracy to deal with people outside this country, to take away our national sovereignty. If one were to listen only to the speeches from the Government Benches and add up the terrifying total of all these charges, unsupported by fact except as regards the actual criminal offences, one might give them this order.

I warn the Minister that the most dangerous thing in this House for a long time was the statement last night about this organisation and that organisation and certain organisations which they also have an eye on—people engaged in a peculiar, subversive activity. Surely the people of the country are entitled to know if such organisations exist, and the names of those engaged in subversive activities, so that they may more properly deal with people who are known members of those organisations, and so that there will not be created an atmosphere of suspicion in which people will be whispering to one another: "What is the Minister for Justice talking about when he refers to those organisations? Was it pro-German, or was it pro-this or pro-that?" I think, in fairness to this House and to the people of the country, if there is a known organisation, which has a name and which is engaged in subversive activity, the quicker that information is given to the people the better. The Taoiseach, when speaking on that point in reply to Deputy Davin, said:

"I can only give the information that I have got from the Minister, and that was to the effect that there was a group who, while apparently keeping constitutionally all right, not part of this other organisation, were toying on the verge of it to such a point that, if proof either in their case or in the case of the others could be got, it would be a matter that would come definitely under the heading of treason."

There is an organisation, allegedly constitutional, which has toyed with something in the nature of treason. Do the Government propose to take steps to deal with that organisation, or do they adopt the attitude that they will wait until they can prefer a charge of treason? If these people are toying with subversive activities, why should not the Minister use the powers he has and intern the lot of them before they do any harm? Perhaps it is just another twist of the warped mind of the Government, that instead of preventing crime it is better to wait until the actual commission of the crime and have the satisfaction of convicting the man of a bigger offence. I have heard more silly and ridiculous statements about law and evidence from the Government Benches during the last two days than I ever heard before. If the Government's advisers have been teaching them the law in that way, it is no wonder that, since they came into power, they have failed to uphold the Acts passed by either themselves or the last Government. They are bringing in drastic Acts and are being met by habeas corpus. Then, they mend their hand and are met with another motion. That gives no confidence to the people.

The people would much prefer to see the Government put their cards on the table, say what we are facing in the way of conspiracy, put a name on the people and on the organisations concerned and say that they want certain powers to deal with them. Can the Government imagine what position they would be in at present as regards law were it not that the Emergency Powers Act gives them such wide powers and that it takes the power of the High Court to pronounce as to the constitutionality of any Act or order completely out of its hands? But for that power, the Government would not be out of the High Court any day of any week. I suggest to the Government that because the Emergency Powers Act takes away the functions of the High Court, as the natural guardian of the rights and liberties of citizens, they should not be less careful of the type of order they are introducing. They should have some regard for fundamental rights. Is it the duty of a court under this or any other order to hear evidence for the prosecution and defence and adjudge a prisoner guilty or innocent according to the weight of evidence or is it the duty of a court to make every effort to convict him? I submit that that is not the duty of any court and never will be so long as there is any element of law or order in this country.

It is easy for the Minister for Local Government virtually to joke about Articles 3 and 4 of this order. He said that, of course, when the special court was dealing with Article 5, which entitles it to ignore any rule of statutory or common law, it would take that Article in conjunction with Articles 3 and 4. That is the most utter nonsense which has been spoken about this Article in this debate. This order exists entirely because of Article 5. You could knock out Articles 3 and 4 and you would still give this court all the power it is given in Articles 3 and 4. That is because Article 5 is an omnibus clause and states that if, on any occasion, the court considers it proper that it should not be bound by any rule of evidence, whether statutory or at common law, the court shall not be bound by such rule. That gives the court power to disregard any rule of evidence or bring in any kind of evidence, animate or inanimate. The Minister for Local Government made a glorious point. He said the statement handed in on behalf of the prosecution would be an inanimate object—something like the blood stain on a piece of cloth in a murder exhibit. One great difference between the inanimate blood stain and the inanimate statement is that the statement talks and gives evidence and that the blood stain does not. The blood stain has to be connected by oral evidence with the charge. The statement speaks for itself. I am not satisfied to give these powers to this or any other Government without the gravest reasons. I have no sympathy with those who say that they would give the powers to the present Minister for Justice but would not give them to the Government. The present Minister for Justice, in his easy-going, apologetic way, gets away with far more than he would if he happened to be Attorney-General——

Mr. Boland

I am not in the habit of apologising.

The Minister opened by saying that he was not a legal expert. I would not give these powers to a Minister of my own Party if we were in office, and I would not give them to a Labour Minister or any other Minister unless I were satisfied with the case made. The only case we heard was one of alleged conspiracy to murder, an alleged conspiracy by other organisations dealing with people outside the State and a number of crimes committed more than a year ago. If there was any justification for introducing this order, it should have been introduced at the times these crimes were perpetrated. There is no use in the Minister saying, as he did, that the powers asked for were reasonable powers which an ordinary citizen would not refuse to give. That is neither here nor there. He said, also, that lawyers would crow over getting a man out of a case even though they knew he was guilty. Perhaps we would. Perhaps we would regard it as a great score, but there are servants of this State who would be equally pleased if they convicted a man simply because they had some inkling of his guilt. They would be as glad to get their man convicted, without any great assurance of his guilt, as we might be to get him off. If there are people in the legal profession who laugh when they get people off, there are equally prosecutors who would laugh if they convicted their man.

Let the Government get the idea out of their head—it appears to be firmly fixed in it—that every tittle of evidence is always true because it is for the prosecution, and that every tittle of evidence is a lie because it is for the defence. The courts have not been set up to establish the guilt of a person or to convict him. They were established to try a person according to the weight of evidence and adjudge his innocence or guilt. If there is a reasonable doubt, it must go to the accused, but a person is not put at his peril or asked to prove his innocence until some evidence has been adduced and the onus passes to him. Why should you put a person in peril of death and require him to prove his innocence on a statement alleged to be made by an absent or a dead person? That does not mean necessarily a person who has been murdered. It might, possibly, mean a person already convicted of an offence by that court, sentenced to death and executed. I cannot imagine anything more drastic than putting a man in peril of his life on the statement of a man already convicted, sentenced to death and executed by that same court. The Minister and the Government have failed to make a case for this order.

They have talked about things which have horrified members on this side as much as and, perhaps, even more than themselves, but they have not connected these things with this order. There is a gap, and that gap is too big to be bridged by references to the hoary antiquity of the rules of evidence. They have not connected the organisations and conspiracies of which they speak with the necessity for this order and, until they do, I am going to vote for the motion. I could not conscientiously give these powers to any Government in the present circumstances.

This debate is a very serious one indeed. I intend to cast my vote according to my conscience. It might be suggested that, because one of my occupations is that of lawyer, that would influence me in coming to a decision as to whether these powers should be given to the Government or not. Even if I, as a lawyer with a certain amount of experience in defending and prosecuting criminals in various courts, came to the conclusion conscientiously that it was right and desirable that the Government should have these powers, I would willingly give the Government support.

I have come to the conclusion without any difficulty that it would be very wrong for the House to reject this motion. In reaching that conclusion, I have taken into full consideration everything said in support of the order and I do not think I could be accused of having the slightest sympathy with anybody who would try to do anything outside the ordinary rules of law in support of any political programme. I believe that the way to inculcate respect for our laws, institutions and for our Constitution is to frame our laws justly. When the Chief Justice said that the question of this order was more for the Dáil than for the courts, I think it could be properly interpreted in this way—that, in the opinion of the court, this order was within the letter of the Constitution but that it was a matter for the members of the Dáil to say whether it was within the spirit of the Constitution. I am one of those who voted against the Constitution. I came into the Dáil the first time as a result of the endeavours of people who voted against the Constitution. But I have such a respect for law and order that I wish to see the spirit of that Constitution carried into execution and not interfered with by anything we do here. In 1939, the Oireachtas thought fit to amend the Constitution so as to give a different definition to "time of war". Acts and decrees were passed one after the other, as a result of which we are debating this order. The Government, I admit, have to face a very serious situation, as Governments have had to do for the past 20 years here, but, without any doubt or reservation, I have come to the conclusion that the rights and liberties of the citizens weigh the balance down in favour of this motion. In arriving at that decision, I am not influenced by rules of law or evidence but merely by knowledge of its effect. I am not taking into consideration that it may be used only on a particular occasion. We must not lose sight of the fact that this order is to be enshrined in our legislation and we cannot look on it as designed to meet any particular case that may come before the courts or that may be before the courts. As a famous American Chief Justice said, after the American Civil War, in a case involving the jurisdiction of a certain court, "The fundamental rights of man and the liberties of the subject may have been enshrined in the written American Constitution but they were a God-given birthright which existed before any Constitution was ever written". I am not going back on anything I said when the Emergency Powers Bill No. 2 was before the Dáil, but I believe we have been giving the Government too great power. In this order, I think the powers should be limited. In the interests of peace and order and in the interests of respect for the law and the rights of the citizen, my duty, which I propose to do, is to vote in favour of the motion.

I feel, in connection with this motion, like a number of other Deputies, that I have to make some personal explanation as to why I am supporting this change in the rules of evidence in so far as this military court is concerned. As a firm believer in democracy, I am horrified that we are faced with the necessity for making such a change. Those of us who have any knowledge of the historic conditions which brought about the present rules of evidence in our civil courts are well aware that to alter them in any way offers a most serious precedent. Having regard to the history of the illegal organisations against which this order is directed, I have no doubt in my mind that the measure is necessary. This Government removed all circumstances which made it reasonably possible for such an organisation to exist. They used the most moderate action over a period of years. They exhorted, they pleaded, they used kid-glove methods but all to no avail. When the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed, with a new departure in our history and a new stage set in our progress, with only one problem to be solved so far as our relations with England were concerned, once more the suggestion was made that constitutional methods be tried, that the final problem be solved by constitutional methods and that this illegal organisation should cease to exist. Not four months after the Agreement, in spite of every effort by the Government to avoid it, we had again the most reckless campaign which made every effort by this Government and also by the people at large to bring about a peaceful settlement of that problem impossible. Finally, when we established our own Constitution and when signs of the present world conflict became apparent this organisation still continued to operate. When unity became more necessary than ever, they began to show their hand even more ruthlessly than before. Clearly moderate methods failed to produce discipline. Clearly more drastic methods were required.

I think that one point has been lost sight of in the course of the debate which I should like to mention, largely because of the comment that has been made on the influence of this organisation so far as war is concerned. To my mind, it is not important whether a link has taken place between this organisation and another Power, irrespective of whether that link is a major one or a minor one. To my mind the important thing is the fact that we have, on the evidence of three Ministers, proof that this organisation arrogates to itself the right not only to enter into negotiation with a foreign Power but sees fit, over and above the present Government, to attack any foreign Power it wishes without the consent or authorisation of the present Government. It rather amazes me that certain Deputies have asked for evidence as to the danger of that link.

Those of us who have any personal acquaintance with what we might call the pseudo-constitutional wing of the organisation—and many of us have— are very well aware of the fact that they boast quite openly that they can, far more adequately than the present Government, take action if and when the occasion arises, both in relation to attacking another Power or making a connection with another Power. I have heard a sufficient number of these people, whom one might call pseudo-constitutionalists, and whom I have known from personal contact over a number of years, to be aware that they boast of their power, without the consent of the present Government or any authority of this House to exercise that power, to enter into negotiations with foreign Powers or to commence an attack on a foreign Power at any moment when the emergency becomes more strained.

There is no need for us to exaggerate the seriousness of the position. All members of the House who read the newspapers are aware that certain contacts have been made, but to my mind the important thing is the enormous potential danger that faces us in the future should the emergency become more grave. There are, of course, also people whom one would describe as being on the extreme right, and whom I have heard arrogate to themselves the right to decide that we should make certain connections. These people believe that they can do that better than the present Government. We do know, however, that this organisation is a definite body of persons associated in a common effort, and that they are heavily armed. We have no evidence that such an organisation exists on the right wing. Therefore, we speak of a particular organisation. I wonder whether some of the Deputies who question the value of this order have read or heard accounts that have been frequent in the newspapers as to the checks which have been made by other Powers who are belligerents. For example, in the case of a certain country it has been reported that a certain individual was, by means of aliases, able to enter telephone exchanges, to get to the switch-board of certain power stations, to watch secret processes and to fly an aeroplane into emergency aerodromes—all because he appeared to be a loyal citizen of the State in question. While events of that kind have been taking place in other countries with a strong defence organisation to prevent such activities, which have been found seriously wanting, we question the right of the Government to exercise greater powers in the case of an organisation which is armed, in a country with our difficult history. We question the right of the Government to increase their powers in order to deal with an organisation of that kind.

I submit there is only one alternative to this order, and that is a still greater order to increase the penalties that at present exist for offences under the Offences Against the State Act, to make the penalties far more severe in the case of those persons who can be apprehended, tried and convicted on evidence procured under the old rules. Just as the Minister for Justice said that he might yet have to ask for greater powers, so I feel that this order will perhaps enable us to avoid making the penalties more severe, a thing which I dislike very much. I should like to feel that we can overcome this danger without going still further in the dictatorial direction.

I have one other observation to make and it is that although innocent people may be accused, as a result of this order because of the purely human difficulty which will occur in deciding a case on evidence not attested in the old way, I do think that the order will act somewhat as a deterrent on those people who are on the fringe of the organisation. I would ask the Minister to consider that the people who are on the fringe of the organisation, who support it without taking part in its criminal activities, are just as dangerous as the people who are armed supporters of it. This order will, at least, deter these people from taking part in the activities of the organisation because, to be perfectly frank, I believe that once it is proved that an accused person belongs to this organisation the dice is weighted rather heavily against him. I have no doubt in my mind that it would be almost impossible for the court to avoid either imposing heavier penalties than those justified or occasionally committing injustices if this order were used frequently, because it is extremely difficult for any court to judge evidence unless it is attested by the old method. But at least the people of this country who belong to that organisation will know that. They have been given fair warning. They have been given warning since 1931. Every effort is being made to induce them to take part in the constitutional government of this country and they now know that once they touch this organisation, once they associate with it, it is made very difficult for them to escape and that perhaps they may even be convicted in a manner beyond that which they deserve for any particular offence.

I would like to conclude by saying that I detest the thought that we have to pass this order. I detest the thought that, because of the existence of perhaps 10,000 moral supporters and 2,000 or 3,000 armed conspirators of this organisation, we have to have dictatorship of this kind, reminiscent of dictatorships in other countries; I do think it is well, even in the midst of this discussion, to point out that the vast majority of the people of this country are law-abiding citizens and that we have to have this extraordinary legislation to deal with so few people, and the reason for that is because so few can do such terrible damage to a country in peace time and so much fewer can do such still more terrible damage to a country in war time; and because even 500 resolute men in a time of great emergency, when our country was being attacked by a foreign Power, might make just the difference between our being able to hold our own and having to suffer ignominious defeat.

This discussion has put me in a frightful quandary. Before I came to the House I had my mind unreservedly made up to support the Government in the order they were making. Having heard a number of able men, a number of lawyers, and three or four Ministers, it is very difficult to make up one's mind.

But I have not changed my mind. The subtleties, niceties, or technicalities of evidence in ordinary times do not appeal to me at all in this case. We have had twenty years of peace and I am glad that the people who are in Government have learned a lesson. I am one of the people who should not trust the Ministers on the opposite side but, because of the dangers that exist, I am prepared to accept the word of the Minister for Justice and of the Taoiseach that whatever powers they get will not be used against the ordinary citizen nor against any lawful organisation in this country. I think their word may be accepted. I believe they have learned a lesson and I believe their word can be accepted that they will use these powers only to deal with something extraordinary. It is ill for us that this order should ever have come into this House to be debated because it puts us in the position that this House is made judge and jury of something that is sub judice at the moment and I believe if the Minister had taken ordinary precautions, if the Attorney-General and others had done their duty, we would never have heard of this. However, as things have happened I suppose it was necessary. As Deputy Linehan said—I think the Attorney-General said the same thing in regard to the courts—the conspiracy followed us into the House. Something must be done and I am satisfied to support the Government in this, trusting that, in the circumstances, the powers conferred on them will not be used against any other body of men or any other organisation except those who are trying to upset the whole foundations of the State and of the Government of this country. I hope the Government have learned a sufficient lesson. I am nearly certain they have and I feel that those powers will not be used except when they are necessary for the preservation of the State. Therefore, I am supporting the Government in this matter.

I am very sorry that the Government have occasion to come to the House to ask for these very great powers, especially at such a time. We have had our freedom here for the past 20 years. We had the former Government for close on ten years. They found it necessary to bring in such orders. Up to that time, the present Government, who were then in opposition, were pursuing a very extreme policy in this country. They changed, but some of the adherents of their Party did not change. The present Government came into power by the votes of the people of this country and they pursued a policy of what I would call coaxing along a certain organisation and doing their best to make them come in and adopt a constitutional line. It is deplorable that that organisation should be up in arms against this State. After all, the people of this country are the masters. They have elected representatives and sent them into this House to represent them. We have set up a Government which is the elected Government of the people of this country. The laws that they make and the institutions set up by this House must be upheld by every representative of the people. Having listened to this debate, I feel that it is my duty to support and vote for the Government on this order because I stand for law and order and I believe in my heart that every man and woman that I represent stands for law and order. If there is not law and order in this or in any other country then may God help that country. I say it is deplorable that any Government of this country should have to take such powers, especially at a time when there is a great war raging all around us, when the whole world is caught up in the flames of war and when we are being attacked in every kind of sinister manner from outside so that we will be dragged into this accursed war.

I think this is the time when we should be closing the ranks in this country and I am glad to say that we have an Army of young men—I believe 300,000 or 400,000 or more—and we have an army of the good, young, decent, respectable men and women of the country who are prepared to do the best they can to preserve our neutrality, who are prepared to give their lives if that neutrality is threatened. In view of all that, I think it is deplorable that we, the representatives of the Irish people, are being called upon to make one of the most serious decisions that I have been asked to participate in since I became a member of this House, but I will do my duty, believing that I am doing the right thing as the representative of the people who sent me here.

I have listened to the speeches of eminent lawyers on the technicalities of law and all the rest of it. They surely carry much weight, but, as an ordinary individual, who is not an expert in law and who does not presume to know very much about it, but who is possessed of a little commonsense, I have come to the conclusion that although the eminent lawyers may dislike this order and the powers given by it—and I dislike it myself—I believe that no law-abiding citizen of this State need have any fear of these orders, or of any court in the country. It is only the man who is out to break the laws, and, as the Minister for Local Government said here, to break the Fifth Commandment: Thou shalt not kill, who need fear them. I believe that the Government would be lacking in its duty if it did not protect to the very last the rights and property of the citizens, and, therefore, I have come to the decision that I am doing the right thing in supporting the Government in respect of this order.

As this debate has gone on for two days, my mind has wandered back more than once to the night in this House immediately following the outbreak of war when we were asked for very wide powers for the Government. I was one of a very small minority on that occasion who expressed the view that the Government ought not to get powers of that kind, and every day that has passed has confirmed me in the opinion that that was the right and proper line to take on that occasion. There is very little doubt that the powers given on that occasion for what was stated to be the specific purpose of protecting our neutrality have been used for purposes for which there was no intention in the minds of members of the House to give them, and I can well recall that atmosphere of righteous indignation which the Taoiseach cultivated, and which is always available to him in a situation of the kind, in which he set about smiting what he termed the irresponsible, or less responsible, persons in the House who had the temerity to suggest that the powers then sought might be used for purposes other than those for which they were obtained. The Wage Order and many other things that have since been passed give ample evidence of how far from the main purpose for which the powers were obtained has the exercise of the powers developed.

Two or three phrases which have been allowed to fall in the course of the debate have confirmed my fears that it would be a very unwise thing for me to acquiesce at present in the passage into law of this order which has been promulgated by the Government. The phrase used by the Minister for Justice that the rules of evidence were hoary with antiquity was, I think, very significant. It was a phrase pregnant with meaning, and, in my opinion, the meaning which could be attached to it is a very sinister one indeed. I make no allegations against the Minister, but I think that the interpretation which could properly be put on a phrase of that kind presages very serious possibilities and consequences. I am not one to make any allegations whatever against the military gentlemen who constitute this court at present. I am old enough to remember the very violent attacks made on them in this House. I did not subscribe to that view then, and I do not subscribe to it now, but I cannot forget that they are just human beings, nor can I forget that a situation may arise to-morrow, next week or next year in which they would be replaced by other people who might not have their experience and might not be possessed of many of the qualities they possess. For that reason, I object to giving into their hands by means of this order the power of life and death, to be exercised at their will, without any further right of appeal.

I am one who always respected the police force set up here. I have respected that force since it was formed, and I never subscribed to any campaign to defame them, although I often heard the force defamed and bespattered very generously with that mud of which the Minister for Local Government spoke this evening, but I am not satisfied that every member of that force could be trusted with powers of this kind. I am satisfied that the great bulk of them would act honourably and fairly. I am quite satisfied, too—and I have some reason for saying this—that there might be a very small minority whose zeal might easily outrun their discretion and who would decide that it was good business to get a statement by any means, to get a statement by hook or by crook, and to use that statement for the purpose of presenting a case. In saying that, I want to make it clear, as I think it is fairly clear, that I am casting no reflection whatever on the overwhelming majority of the members of that force, who would act as honourable men and who would not resort to any methods but the methods of fair, open and honourable investigation.

The provision in the order dealing with the acknowledging of statements is one which needs much more explanation than we have got, and I think it was a very significant and a very strange thing that the Leader of the House yesterday evening, in dealing with this order, appeared to be unaware that unsigned statements could be accepted by the military court, that it was only during the course of the debate that it seemed to appear to him that such was a fact, and that he rose to defend the order without fully realising its significance. One other statement was made which was, I think, a very grave statement, that is, the statement that some such provision as this method of presenting evidence might form a necessary addition to the ordinary law. That is a very serious position indeed, and if this order is to be the forerunner of proposals of that kind, the possibilities for the future are very serious.

I am afraid there was more than a little truth in the suggestion made by Deputy Norton last evening reinforced by the very apt poetic quotation that he introduced in his statement: that we have in this country people who would like to regard the law, and would ultimately work to frame the law, as the echo of their own views. I regard the line of argument used about numbers of dangerous people in this country being associated with certain forces outside the country as being entirely exaggerated. I do not believe it. I do not think any evidence has been given here that the statement has any degree of accuracy. I want to say that as one who believes in law and order, as one who is no recent convert to law and order, which I think is an important thing. I want, before I give my vote, to put on record my view that I feel I would not be acting fairly to my own conscience if I agreed to give powers to a Government that I distrust: to a Government that has shown, in many directions, that it has not fairly used the powers it has already got from this House. I do not think the very extraordinary powers the Government is seeking at the present time, under this order, would be safe in its hands. Certain factors emerged from this debate that go to confirm that view. I make no apology at all for saying that I would be fearful about giving these powers into the hands of the present Government. It would, in my opinion, be exceedingly dangerous to give this Government the power of setting up a system of investigation that might lead to consequences more serious than any we have been asked to deal with up to the present.

I think it is an appalling state of affairs, having regard to the many grave economic and social problems which face this country at the moment, that our national Parliament should be called upon to spend two days discussing a matter which concerns the administration of the law, a matter which should have been settled long ago. The taxpayers are contributing over £2,000,000 a year for the maintenance of law and order through the upkeep of the Department of Justice and the Gárda Síochána and yet, in spite of that, we find that this House is being called upon, almost every other month, to consider revisions and readjustments and changes, very often of a drastic and far-reaching character, in the existing regulations for the enforcement of law and the maintenance of peace. I think that is a state of affairs that should not arise at the present time when everyone responsible for the government of the country should be allowed to concentrate upon our economic and social problems.

This debate has not impressed me to any extent, either as to the gravity of the case made for the order or the motion to annul it. On this motion, as on many others, the House is being called upon to make a choice between two evils. I think it is a rather intolerable state of affairs to find that there is not ability enough on either of the Front Benches to offer any constructive suggestion which would lead us away from being forced to choose between two things which, I know, are wrong and undesirable. If the motion is passed we are going to be forced back to rely upon machinery which has proved ineffective and inefficient. If it be rejected we will have in force an order under the Emergency Powers Act which will be repugnant to the sense of justice and fair play of almost every citizen. During this two days' debate we have not heard a single constructive suggestion as to how the machinery for the enforcement of law may be effectively reformed. Deputy McGilligan made one suggestion, but I do not think the Deputy, or anybody else, would regard it as a constructive one. He suggested that the members of the Government should shoot each other to bits, and that the survivors should commit suicide. That, I think, might fairly be regarded as destructive rather than constructive criticism. I have made up my mind that there is very little to choose between these two evils, and, consequently, I have decided not to vote on the motion.

I would like to offer at least one constructive suggestion to the Government. If the machinery for the enforcement of the law, as contained in the laws of evidence, has been found to be inefficient, why has not some reasonable attempt been made by the Department of Justice or the Government to reform the system, and at the same time preserve the rights of an accused person? I believe that such a reform is possible. I believe that when cases of murder, or other cases of serious crime, occur, a special court of inquiry should be set up immediately after the offence has been committed, so that all persons whom the police consider have any knowledge likely to be of use in clearing up the case and of bringing the offender to justice, could be called before it and allowed to give evidence. If that were done, the statements made before such judicial assembly could be produced afterwards in a higher court without any suggestion that they had been obtained by unlawful or improper means.

At the present time, if a murder is committed, we know what takes place. The police officers question people who are likely to be able to give information. That is the only machinery at present, in addition to what is little more than an empty formality—the holding of a coroner's inquest which has now become almost obsolete. If, instead, all persons who would be considered likely to have any knowledge of the circumstances under which a crime was committed were brought immediately before an examining justice, and all the evidence that they could give taken down in the form of shorthand notes, that, being evidence given in a judicial assembly, would, therefore, be proper evidence to be produced in a court afterwards. That is a solution of the problem, a solution which must eventually be adopted. I understand it is the system which prevails in certain other countries. I do not see any reason why we should rely on the British system of administration of justice in this respect any more than in any other. I do not see why we should slavishly follow the regulations adopted in Great Britain under circumstances which may be altogether different from ours.

I quite sympathise with Deputy Cogan and others like him who think that to-day we might be spending our time in Parliament more usefully than discussing what we are actually discussing. For instance, the agricultural committee of the Fine Gael Party, composed of persons not actually members of the Parliament, intended to-day to discuss certain aspects of the agricultural situation affecting various counties. We were able to carry on the morning, but not the afternoon, discussions. I can sympathise also with those people who feel that we are being asked to give additional powers to a Government to whom we gave very wide powers already, these powers being abused. For instance, while Ministers are going throughout the country urging the necessity for food production, proposals discussed and recommended by the agricultural committee of the Fine Gael Party to-day, issued at 1.30 p.m. for publication in the evening Press, are being withheld by the censor; so that I can sympathise with people who feel like that.

Nevertheless, I am quite certain that there is no decision that we could more usefully take to-day than the decision this motion gives us an opportunity of taking; that is, a decision that the voice of this Parliament, leading the people and directing the people, shall be very clear on three points: firstly, that murderers and people who are working treason against the Government, the democratically-elected Government of this country, shall be fully and completely and unmistakably warned that they are going to be dealt with and that the machinery is there that will enable them to be dealt with; secondly, that murderers and workers of treason who are found guilty will be very definitely and effectively punished; and thirdly, that this Parliament will require of the Executive, through whom we have to work, that the responsibilities that fall on them in these matters will be fully and effectively carried out. If we can take a decision to-day that will make these things perfectly clear, then there is no more useful decision that we could take and we could get on more readily and more effectively with the other work that requires to be done for the country.

Deputy Esmonde spoke about certain aspects of life and order and law. I have no interest in or concern with statutory law, except in so far as it acts as the handmaid of order, that itself acting as the handmaid of life. Law and order ministering to that life have been disturbed in this country because the powers that the Government possess were not effectively used. I am going to support the Government getting the powers that they are asking for. I have nothing to show me that any additional powers in the hands of the Government are going to be used for the purpose for which they have been asked. I have been reduced by the Government and their history to this, that no words of theirs can carry any conviction to my mind, good, bad, or indifferent. They have, in comparatively recent times, protested that they are determined to prevent any revolutionary bodies, by armed rebellion of any kind, threatening the established Government of this country. They have stated they are determined to prevent that, but they have not shown us the slightest sign that they are earnest about it or, if they are earnest, that they are prepared to proceed in any kind of effective way.

Nothing will satisfy me but sustained action on their part, a sustained line of action that is going to carry conviction unmistakeably to the people against whom that action is necessarily addressed, that they are not going to be tolerated in this country; sustained action that is going to carry conviction through the country that the support of our people is wanted by the Government in stamping out organisations of that particular kind and that will carry conviction to this Parliament that in these matters we can rely upon the Executive that the Parliament, by a majority, has set up.

I am prepared to take the protestations of the Government to-day as bona fide that they intend these powers to be used for the purpose of crushing out of existence organisations of any kind using arms against the State or threatening to overthrow the democratically elected Government in an unlawful way. I am prepared to accept their bona fides and I think it would be a very disastrous thing, considering what we have seen, that the Government would be put into such a position that they could say when they come to the end of their tether: “We would have dealt with this only there were powers we said we needed and the Parliament refused them to us,” or “There was such a volume of opposition created that the country did not believe we were going to use these powers faithfully and justly.”

Many people may consider their minds have been obscured with regard to the issues that are at stake here by all the talk and the various points that have been made. I do not think there is any necessity for anybody's mind to be obscured. All the time the Government have been in office we have perfectly and clearly seen certain organisations there, and they are still there. We have perfectly realised that that could not and should not be tolerated, and we have urged the Government in every way to stamp those organisations out of existence. I do not think there was ever a time when any powers would have been refused to the Government if the House was satisfied that it was really intended to use these powers. It would be disastrous, I say, both for the reputation of this House before the people and for this House itself, if it got itself into the position that it, by its criticism, by its lack of faith, by its lack of hope, if you like, interfered with the Government when they had apparently come to a decision to deal with this particular matter. I realise the difficulty that the House is in, but when we have heard the volume of legal criticism that has been made here, and which some people object to, I welcome it, and I welcome it as a guarantee that if these powers were used by the Government in a way that outraged the sense of justice of the people, the Government that so used them unjustly could not continue to hold that weapon in their hands and use it.

I do not think that any scrap of risk is taken if these powers are given to the Government, and given to the Government by a Dáil standing completely behind them. In fact, the more we think, the more we can definitely say: "Yes, this conspiracy has existed and does at the present moment exist; we do want it stamped out; we do not know whether you will do it or not, but we will give you the powers you say you want." I think that, in the first place, by doing that you wither a very large part of any organisation that exists at the present moment and, in the second place, you make it utterly impossible for the Government to stand here, face the Dáil as its Executive, and allow things to happen in the country that showed that they were not standing up to their responsibilities and were not using their powers. I think that this House will lose a unique opportunity of finishing for ever the type of thing that has disturbed the life of this country for so many years if it halts in any way in giving the Government the powers they ask for now. They are powers that the Government could not continue to hold in their hands if they used them in a way that outraged in any way the sense of justice of the people.

I just would like to warn the Government, in supporting them, that these powers alone may not be sufficient. It has been accepted by the Minister for Justice that the experiment that has been carried out for the last ten years in the treatment of this disorder in the country has not been successful. It has not been successful for many reasons: in the first place, because the Government never really faced up to taking the decision that they were going to eradicate it. The organisation was assisted to draw new blood, and young blood too, because a certain attitudinising on the part of the Government enabled these young fellows to accept, as it were, from the Government, a certificate that they were following the road of the highest national endeavour, that their conduct was the conduct of people who had the hall-mark of courage and sincerity. That attitude on the part of the Government enabled the organisation to draw young people to it, and they were enabled to carry on, with more impunity than they ordinarily would, by reason of the fact that the police forces in the country were weakened. They were weakened by two things: that they were restricted by the Government policy in the extent to which they could inquire into the movements, armament and organisation of this particular body, and the police were further restricted, and these people were given greater immunity, by reason of a tinkering with the police force when the Government drafted into that force men who, by reason of their character or their training, were quite unfitted for a police force. Many of these intruders found themselves in positions in the police force where they were in close touch with the most intimate and secret political information. It is only, I suppose, six months since the highest and the most important office, where secret political information was dealt with, was staffed by people who were traitorously disposed to the Government.

So that young people of the country have to be made to understand by the attitude of this Parliament that the cloak of patriotism or sincerity or courage or honour, does not fall naturally around men of their type, and that every person in this House and every person in the country is going to deny their right to boast that they wear that cloak. In the second place, the police have to be made to understand what the intention of the Government is and what the attitude of Parliament is, and to understand that the police have to be cured of the weaknesses that have been introduced into their body by Government action and by Government policy.

Our problem here to-day, or in these times, is not the writing of an exquisite book of laws or the setting up of any special and particularly fine moral code. We have suffered positively in the past by thinking we were doing that. We should not allow ourselves to suffer now by a neglect to deal with this particular problem, by anything connected with the writing of our laws, or by any peculiar, delicate views with regard to political morality. The life of our people is involved in this. It is involved in this, quite apart altogether from any international situation, and I approach this matter entirely without reference to the international situation. I welcome the fact that, due to the state of emergency that has been declared here, the Ministers are armed with powers that they might not otherwise be prepared to ask for. I am glad that they have these powers, but I support them entirely on the merits of the internal situation here. We have an Executive that, we consider, have failed in many ways. They have even encouraged the organisation that is there, to this extent: that they have never, until perhaps comparatively recently, quite made up their minds that they were not, as it were, prepared to tolerate the presence of an organisation like this, so long as it kept within certain limits, both as a factor in maintaining their internal political situation here and as a pawn in their international diplomacy.

The Government have to get right on the principle with regard to this organisation and organisations of its type. I believe they have got right on that. They are asking for powers. Whether we think these powers are necessary or not, the Government are of such a mind that they come before this House and, as you understand from some of their remarks, are either not prepared or are not able to deal with the problem except they are given these powers.

That is the kind of an Executive you have. That Executive has been supported here in solid strength by the majority of this House. This House has no way of dealing with the problem by any kind of executive action except through the Executive you can get here. That is the only Executive that you can get here, and you cannot afford to be fastidious in trying to get them either to take weapons that they do not want or to use weapons that they do not want. Give them the weapons that they ask for. I believe that the responsibility that this Parliament has to its people, apart altogether from any external situation, is to give those powers to the Government that asks for those powers to-day.

People have talked a lot about the injury that may be done to innocent people. Not a year has passed in our history, down to last year, that innocent people have not suffered. On 14th or 15th December, 1922, the commanding officers of the National Army attended at what were then the General Headquarters of the British Army in Ireland, at Parkgate Street, Dublin, to receive over the Headquarters, while the British Army took its departure from our capital. The change-over was to take place at 12 o'clock. It was about three minutes past 12 when the commanding officers of the National Army reached General Headquarters. There was a sergeant-major in charge of the saluting party inside, and I suppose every additional minute's wait was an anxiety to him, no doubt increased very much by the nervous tension of the colonel who was handing over. The sergeant-major who was in charge turned to us and said: "Gentlemen, you are late". Major-General Seán O Muirthuile, the Quarter-Master General at the time, looked at him and said: "Ah, for heaven's sake, you have been here for the last 700 years and another few minutes won't do you any harm." Innocent people have been suffering during the last 20 years under our own administration here. I would refer them to the answer that was given to the sergeant-major by an Irish Army officer. Another few months will not do the innocent people of this country any harm, and there will be many an innocent young man saved, and many a father of a family and many others will be let go about their business, devoting their whole thought to the constructive work that is necessary, or to the real defensive work of to-day, if the Government, taking those powers and seriously facing up to the job that they are being handed by this Parliament, do it, seeing that in their attitude they are not only guides to the people but a warning to wrongdoers and an inspiration to the police force and the other official forces of the country that will have to worm out this conspiracy and to crush it. I would assure Deputy Cogan and other Deputies here that there is no other duty that this Parliament can better do to-day than to do that completely and wholeheartedly.

I would say to those who have spoken in terms of critical legal delicacy on the legal points that the matters they have raised are small compared with the necessity for eradicating this danger and this threat from the country's life, and that, while not denying those powers to the Government even though they fear those powers in the hands of the Government, they have made it perfectly clear, by what they have said and what they have brought out, that no Government in this country misusing those powers will continue to be able to hold the position of Government, or to hold such powers and use them unjustly. I ask, therefore, that the Government be given those powers, even by people who think we are giving them powers which they are going to misuse. The capacity of any Government for injuring the people of this country at the present day is very limited, because the problems that are pressing on them from all directions are much too serious not to make a discriminating people, an active and energetic people. They need not be afraid that any powers which, in good faith, we give to the Government to-day can be used either against the people of this House or any of the people of the country.

I accept at its full face value all that has been said by speakers on these benches who have criticised this order in so far as the dangers that are to be apprehended in connection with a departure from the rules regarding evidence that have prevailed so long in this country are concerned. This order marks a fundamental change in the rules governing the presentation of evidence in the courts. So far, the change is restricted to what is called the military court, and very much more serious than the observations which have fallen from the lips of Ministers in connection with their support of this change is their criticism of the procedure which has marked the business of the courts of this country for so long. That is very much more disquieting even than Order No. 139, which is at present under discussion here. Those are sometimes referred to as British rules. I share with Deputy Professor O'Sullivan the humiliation which every thinking man must feel regarding the state of law and order in this country and the lack of improvement in the acceptance of law and order which has marked these last few years. If we are to have law and order, we are much more likely to have them if there is respect for the law and if there are ordered conditions in our courts than if there is the severity which distinguishes this particular order. To that extent I think that this order does not mark any improvement. It is a retrograde step; it is a step which nobody can view with an easy conscience.

It may be that we were not ready for the present system which has prevailed so long, which has been so successful in the neighbouring country, and which has secured for law and order in that country the respect of almost every citizen. It may be that we have mixed up two things, and that, in our anxiety to push political party programmes, we have not observed the national demoralisation and retrogression which has taken place in this country during the last 20 years. I do not propose in any way to introduce a controversial or Party note into this discussion. The Government have no cause of complaint about the debate since it was opened by Deputy Norton; they have had fair public criticism of this particular order. It is not introducing anything in the nature of controversy when I say that Government policy in connection with law and order in this country has been an absolute failure, and the proof of it is in this particular order that we have here.

Accepting as fully as I do all that has been said in favour of the present rules of evidence, I must admit that those rules can only work if they are accepted by others. Those rules have not been accepted by others. There has been no discrimination on the part of those who went out with guns to take life. We ought to have it as a guiding principle and a guiding rule in this country that there must be law and order, that there must be one fountain of control in this country and that we will tolerate no other. It is in connection with that that I find the real weakness in the Government case for this order. During the last two days we have heard of a conspiracy, of organised violence, and of organised murder. I have looked carefully over the debates for a reference to the name of the organisation in question from the Head of the Government and I have not found it; not once is it mentioned. This is a democratically governed country. We meet here in the Parliament of the people where, if we are to ensure that public confidence will be maintained throughout the land, we must take the public into our confidence.

How many young men in this country during these last 20 years joined this conspiracy whose parents were unaware of the danger of it, who perhaps did not know the name of it, and who have to endure the anguish and the suffering and the degradation that flow from the operations of this organisation? My first criticism of the Government in this connection is that the name of the organisation ought to be mentioned. We ought not to be afraid to name it. It is our duty to tell the parents and the young men throughout the country that it is a national crime to join that organisation. Having given that warning, there is no reason why a date should not be fixed by which any person leaving it would give that information to the local superintendent and it would be accepted. I do not mean that in a case of that sort we should condone any crime which has been committed. A person who has been guilty of a crime should be brought to justice.

Let us make no mistake about it, law making is by no means easy. We are laying it down under this new dispensation that a statement can be produced in court, a statement which is described as voluntary. We are told that this court has exercised jurisdiction for some years past and that we are satisfied with it, that the persons composing the court are qualified to appraise the value of a statement. One is puzzled after having listened to the Minister for Local Government, who perhaps made too much of a debating speech in connection with this matter, although he may perhaps have given a greater number of reasons for approving of this order than any of the other Ministers who have spoken. The court may accept or reject a statement, which is subscribed to voluntarily. Let us be very careful about what is meant by that. If any statement produced in court has been made under terror, no court, High Court, Supreme Court, or any other, has a right to entertain it. Will anybody tell that to the members of this military court?

When we conceive it to be our duty to put down crime and to keep order, we are bound at the same time to conform to justice. If perhaps there has been a little too much stress laid on the fact that, under no circumstances, must an innocent man be found guilty, it has been laid by those who have had long and practical experience of the functioning of courts. It is not without reason. Only within the last 12 months has there been a case of a wrong conviction in our ordinary courts. I mention the fact because the Minister for Local Government stated here this evening that we had murder, wounding, bank robberies, explosions and so on. This young man was convicted in a court on evidence in a fair trial. It was subsequently found that he was innocent. I feel quite sure that every possible precaution was taken in that case before he was found guilty; but remember that it was some six or eight months after he was found guilty that his innocence was established. He may have been at fault. Assuming for a moment that we are to take the Minister for Local Government at his word, and that bank robberies are one of the offences which will come before the military court, is the military court less liable to make a mistake than was one of our ordinary courts?

If we look for and expect to get respect for law and order it is our bounden duty to ensure that there will be a clear and impartial administration of justice in the courts which we establish—whatever names we may give them. One of the things which was most disquieting, as I have already said, was the fact that two, and possibly three, Ministers were critical of the present form of dealing with evidence in court and loud in their praise of this new dispensation that we have under Order No. 139. What is the weakness in that particular case? The weakness in that and in every other case is the source from which the prosecution starts. More precautions must be taken in the future in dealing with any case that will come before this court than have been taken up to this, and very serious responsibility rests on every official in the State so that, under no circumstances, will innocent men be found guilty. If it be the intention now—and it is not clear from any statement that I have heard from the Government Benches— to take off the gloves in connection with organised crime here, then under no circumstances let there be an innocent man found guilty by any court that will function and take this order as its basis for dealing with prosecutions.

So far as the members of this side of the House are concerned, they are at one with all proper steps taken to put down organised violence of any sort or kind. It is not a case of to-day or yesterday.

I would accept—although I was unconvinced—the statement of the Minister for Justice of the necessity for this order, more by what he left unsaid, perhaps, than by what he said, having regard to a long experience in connection with this matter. So far as that is concerned, I find myself unable to vote for the motion to annul this order. To support it is quite another matter. In my view, an order such as this should not be in the hands of any but a national Government—and a national

Government in this country is an impossibility, if for no other reason than the existence of the head of the Government at the present moment. Its use, then, requires very careful consideration. In the first place, it is not clear—it is not stated and it has not been stated by any member of the Government—that this order is to be used only against those who are in an illegal organisation and in a conspiracy, nor is the organisation named. Are we not entitled to get at least that undertaking? Secondly, this should not remain the statute law in this country beyond a certain period: a limit should be put to it. In my view, it should not last over two months or three at the outside? If it be required again, a House which refuses to annul it will again refuse to annul it unless there has been abuse in the meantime.

In the course of the speech of the Minister for Local Government, it was stated that it was the Government which directed cases to be brought before this court. That is unfortunate, in my view: that should be the prerogative of the Attorney-General. Political prosecutions are a thing which I had hoped we had done with when we established our own State here. The Attorney-General ought to be in the confidence of the Government and should be advised in these matters by the police authorities. The Government has a very unusual role in connection with this court. There is but one sentence, there is no appeal court, there is one reviewing body and that body is the Government. If the Government directs a prosecution in these cases and it subsequently is the reviewing body, have we not got a complication which is disturbing, to say the least of it? Do they simply order prosecutions in order to demonstrate their power, or is it afterwards to show that they can exercise the prerogative of mercy? That particular phase of the administration ought to be reviewed.

The Government has very little cause for complaint at the criticisms which have been expressed in this debate. Unquestionably, those who will appear in court, who will be prosecuted under this new order, will feel that the dice is loaded against them. It may be that they have brought most of their troubles upon themselves, but we must take the long view in connection with this matter and look ahead and see what policy we have in mind for the future, so that whatever misapprehensions may arise in connection with the fact that such an order is in our laws, every man can be sure of a fair trial. I know very well the difficulties that beset this situation. I know that it is the duty of those who are charged with the responsibility of governing to do their duty. I would suggest to them again the desirability of getting back to normal law as early as possible and, above all things, to ensure that, if the courts are to function under this new order, the greatest possible care will be taken to ensure that no innocent person will suffer by reason of this order. I am satisfied that perhaps at no period in our history—taking it over the last 20 years—was there a greater consensus of opinion against organised crime. The Government has an advantage in that respect that its predecessor had not got—and I make no complaint of it, none whatever. We have had to learn; unfortunately, it has been at other people's expense and not at our own. In the ultimate resort, we expect, first, an undertaking that this will not be used except against organised crime; secondly, that there will be a time limit to it; and, thirdly, that still greater precautions will be taken to ensure that justice will be done under it and that persons will not have any cause of complaint of an injustice by reason of the order.

Deputy Cosgrave asserted twice in his speech that the Government had no cause of complaint as to how this matter was handled by the Dáil during the course of the debate yesterday and to-day. Let me say at once that I certainly have no cause of complaint of the way in which Deputy Cosgrave spoke. Far from it. I think we have every cause to be grateful that he handled this subject in such a calm and, apart from one statement, let me say, non-Party manner. Personally, I have very grave cause of complaint against a couple of speakers who took part in this debate; one is Deputy Dillon and another Deputy Norton. After dealing with the points raised by Deputy Cosgrave, I propose to go back to deal with Deputy Norton. Deputy Dillon has already got a reprimand for his particular theory from his own leader, and I propose to leave him at that. Deputy Cosgrave asked three questions with regard to the operation of this order. He wanted to know if everything possible would be done to ensure that accused persons against whom this order was invoked when brought to trial would get a fair trial. The Government have no hesitation in promising that. While everything possible will be done by the Minister for Justice, the Attorney-General, the police force under him, and any State witnesses that are called, everything possible will also be done to ensure that no innocent man will suffer unjustly. At the same time, everything will be done to ensure that those who are guilty will be so adjudged.

Deputy Cosgrave wanted to get back to normal law. His second question was to ask if the Government would give him a guarantee that this order would be invoked only against members of illegal organisations on trial for what is called organised crime. Again, on behalf of the Minister for Justice and the Government, I have no hesitation in giving that promise. This order was drafted in order to deal with crimes committed by organisations. Because they were organised, and somewhat widespread, they could make their trial and conviction under the normal courts of law absolutely impossible. It is because that state of affairs exists to some extent, and in the circumstances in which we are living to a serious extent, that this and other orders have been passed by the Government. I have no hesitation in giving the guarantee that this order will be used only against members of illegal organisations, or organisations banding themselves together to commit organised crime, including, of course, conspiracy, about which Deputy Cosgrave also asked. The next question was the time limit. In the matter of time limit, I want to draw the attention of the House to the fact that this order was made by the Government under an Act passed by the Oireachtas, and that that Act is very much limited in time. The first Act was passed on September 3rd, 1939. According to the debates, the Bill to renew the Act and to give power for another 12 months, was introduced in June, 1941; so that, normally, if no other occasion were found for debate to discuss and condemn, if necessary, the actions of the Government under this order, an occasion would be found if and when the Government had to come forward to renew the Emergency Powers Act. If they do not come forward for a renewal of the Emergency Powers Act, it lapses automatically next September. That is a time limit.

As Deputies are aware, the Government, fully realising what underlies the powers which they took under this order, the powers which were given by the Oireachtas to set up the Military Tribunal, appreciated that they were extraordinary powers which would not be given to this or any Government unless the House accepted the situation that the circumstances in which we found ourselves were impelling. They realised that the Oireachtas thought it to be its duty to give the Government the powers. The Government felt it to be their duty to ask for these powers so that they might govern this country as wisely as the Lord gave them wisdom to do in this time of crisis through which we are passing. I have dealt with the questions put by Deputy Cosgrave.

Let me say, finally, in regard to his questions that the Government will try to ensure a fair trial for all accused persons who come before the Military Court, or any other court, and that they will be only brought before the Military Court, and the powers of this order invoked, in the case of such persons as, in the opinion of the Government and the Attorney-General, are members of illegal organisations engaged in organised crime and in an organised effort to avoid the consequences of their acts. This order will lapse, if not before, at least when the Emergency Powers Act elapses. If it is thought wise to do anything by way of amendment of the laws of evidence in normal times, of course that would have to be done by the Oireachtas under normal procedure by passing legislation. Deputy Norton, first of all, made a most exaggerated case. It is too bad that in times like these, when discussing an order such as this, which is far-reaching and new, and which can quite justifiably be the subject of close examination and scrutiny, Deputy Norton, in such circumstances, should make such wild statements as he made regarding the effect of the order. In the course of his remarks the Deputy said that the Government were acting like Pontius Pilate, that they would take a decision that a man should be found guilty and sentenced to death and then compel the Military Court, by virtue of this order, to find the accused guilty and carry out the execution.

As far as I can see it, the fact of the matter is, that the powers that were made under this order were not necessary, and that an Act of this Oireachtas, of which Deputy Norton approved or never questioned, gave to the Military Court the same powers as were given to it under this order. That is, the power given under the Act of 1940, when we amended the Emergency Powers Act, 1938, giving the Government power to set up and to make provision for trial in "summary manner" by commissioned officers of the Defence Forces of any person alleged to have committed any of the offences specified in such order. In 1940, the Bill passed through the Dáil in three minutes. There was less discussion on it than on many Bills of less importance. So aware were the members of the Dáil of the need for such legislation, and of the need for giving the Government power to set up military courts, which would try in a "summary manner" persons alleged to be guilty of certain crimes, that it passed all stages in less than ten minutes, and neither Deputy Norton nor any member of the Labour Party questioned it. But that was not without Deputy Dillon drawing the attention of the House to the far-reaching powers it was conferring on the Government. He said: "It is with a full appreciation of the magnitude of these powers, and the distance we have been asked to go, that we consent to this Bill." Following the passage of that Bill an order was made under the Act, setting up military courts and detailing the crimes for which accused persons could be tried before them. That order was never questioned by either House of the Oireachtas to this date. Power was given to the military courts to determine their own procedure. Under the other Acts the special criminal courts were bound by the ordinary laws of evidence. Under this order Section 7 (1) says:——

May I interrupt the Minister for a moment, as I know that he does not want to be unfair? Surely the Act to which he refers was the subject of discussion before it was introduced, and it was generally agreed that it was inexpedient to discuss it. Is not that within the Minister's recollection?

If Deputy Dillon will let me make my speech he can put that point forward later.

May I point out that my recollection in regard to what the Minister said, when referring to Deputy Norton, that it passed without criticism, was that it had been the subject of previous discussion, as I remember saying that although it was agreed that we were not going to discuss it in Dáil Eireann, I thought it right to put it on record that we did not lose sight of its significance. I remember speaking and saying that although we had not a long discussion we appreciated the gravity of the measure, and that no one could say that we were slipping it through the House without fully appreciating its nature. It is scarcely fair to say that Deputy Norton let it through without discussion, when it was an agreed measure.

I want to make it plain that under the Act of the Oireachtas passed at that time, and under the order framed in conformity with it, there was a section which said that subject to the provisions of the Article every military court was to determine its own procedure.

If the Government wanted to act as Pontius Pilate and not to take responsibility for the action of the military court if the court saw fit to ignore the rules of evidence regarding statements made by witnesses, the Government could have relied on the good sense of the military court to make their own rules of procedure and to admit such evidence, but in order to make it perfectly clear that the Government were prepared to take responsibility for the acts of the military court, should the court feel it necessary in the interests of justice not to be bound by the rules of procedure of the normal civil courts, the Government specifically issued an order giving the military tribunal the powers outlined in this Order 139. We take full responsibility for doing that. Not only have the Government clearly and specifically given the military court such powers but in every case they take full responsibility for sending a person for trial before that court, and afterwards for executing any prisoner found guilty by that court, if in the opinion of the Government, he should be executed. It is unfair, therefore, to say that the Government, acting like Pontius Pilate, want to wash their hands and disclaim responsibility for any deaths that were or may be the result of trials before the military tribunal.

It is unfair also to say that the gentlemen who accept the very onerous duty of serving on the military tribunal are in the pockets of the Government and are merely penny-boys to carry out the Government's will. No officer can be a member of this court, in my recollection, who is not a senior officer in the Army. If they wished to avoid service on this court I expect they could have avoided it in many instances merely by a request to be excused, but it was found and declared by the Oireachtas to be necessary in the interests of the country that a military court should be established for the purpose of trying certain crimes committed by certain types of organisations and it is an honourable duty for every military officer to step forward and be prepared to carry out that onerous task. It is unfair for Deputy Norton or anybody else to cast aspersions on their character or to pass derogatory remarks about their situation and their position as members of the military court. It is an honourable work which the gentlemen who accepted the office over a period of years carry out in an honourable, open, straightforward and trustworthy manner.

Deputy Norton also said that the fundamental rights of our citizens should be preserved from the ruthless attack which has been made on these rights in the order to which I have referred. The Minister for Justice and the Taoiseach pointed out, and there is no use in my reiterating it, that the ordinary average citizen of this country has fundamental rights, too, as well as the prisoner who is accused before this military tribunal. The ordinary normal father, the ordinary mother and the ordinary wife have a right to be given some assurance that their sons and their husbands are not going to be tried and executed without any semblance of court procedure by a body which has no authority from the Irish people or from God to function as a court or as executioners.

Why did you oppose it in 1931, so?

In 1931 matters were different. We can discuss 1931 if it is so desired. Deputy Mulcahy said that we were largely responsible and had some share of responsibility for incidents of this character, this conduct and this behaviour. That sort of criticism addressed to this Government is a direct incitement to young fellows throughout the country to carry on this organisation. The historical fact, and it cannot be disputed, is, that 18 years ago, an offer was made, known as the "Cease-fire Proposals" which would have put an end, in my opinion, to all this trouble at that time. These proposals are there to be read but I do not propose to raise any controversy about them now.

For the sake of peace and quiet I hope you do not, because if you do you will get plenty of it.

I do not want to go back.

Deputies opposite have gone back already.

It is a long, long trail.

Keep the boys quiet.

Deputy Norton also said that the military court will, under this order, have no discretion whatever to refuse to admit evidence tendered in that way, no matter under what circumstances that statement may have been obtained either from a witness or the accused. Deputy Norton put down a motion in regard to this order and, surely to goodness, he read the order before tabling the motion.

Which was more than the Taoiseach did because he thought the statement should be signed.

The Deputy says there that, "no matter under what circumstances the statement is obtained," the Military Court have no right to refuse to entertain it. Clearly in the order it states: "Where it is proved that such statement either was made voluntarily or was lawfully taken under any enactment." Unless those circumstances are proved the Military Court cannot entertain it.

Either of them.

Look at Article 5.

Wait now a second. Deputy Norton read the thing and there it is as clear as daylight, that in regard to such statements it has to be proved to the satisfaction of the court that either they were made voluntarily or under due process of law. He should not exaggerate.

Does that exclude a threat?

It does exclude a threat. What is "voluntarily"?

A threat of the kind Deputy Linehan referred to this evening?

What is "voluntarily"?

The order says "voluntarily or was ..." not "and was". Read it again yourself.

I will read it again. "Where it is proved that such statement (1) either was made voluntarily or was lawfully taken under any enactment." It must have been done under one or the other.

But must not be both. It must not be both.

There is no common law or law passed by this Oireachtas which gives power to take statements involuntarily.

The Offences Against the State Act makes it a criminal offence to refuse.

You cannot use force— which is the connotation when one says it is made involuntarily.

What is the three months in jail if the person does not make it?

It is a voluntary statement. The person is not beaten physically or no physical violence is used to force him to make the statement and he can voluntarily refrain from doing it.

There is the threat of three months in jail.

There is no threat to his life.

So long as you do not kill him, it is all right.

No, that is not so.

So long as you do not beat him.

So long as you do not dance on him.

The fact of the matter is that the Deputy said that, no matter what the circumstances under which the statement was taken, they could not refuse to entertain it. It is clearly shown there one of the circumstances under which the statement must have been taken, and that is a direct negative to what the Deputy asserted. He should have read the order.

If that is clear to the Minister now, he is about the only one to whom it is clear.

The Deputy referred to anybody who had given consideration to this thing in an abstract way. We are not dealing with abstractions in this year of Our Lord. We have the concrete fact that this world at the moment is going through the greatest war, the most savage war, in its history, that if this small nation is to survive, it must have the greatest unity and the greatest discipline and the best organisation it can form. In such circumstances, crime which disrupts the State, crimes of violence of one citizen against another, crimes of violence committed by groups against the Government, are very much more serious than in normal times and it is because of these abnormal times when we want unity, the greatest possible unity and the greatest possible discipline, that the Government took these powers in order to ensure that those who could not be induced to keep discipline would be forced to do it by the extremities of legal powers. There is no one enamoured of this particular order. We were all perfectly aware when we were taking the decision that it would be open to grave criticism, and all we can say to the people and to the House is this—that the Government have had extraordinary powers over a prolonged period, and I think they have never abused them to the extent that this Dáil has refused to continue them or wanted them annulled. We are fallible. We may have made mistakes in regard to the exercise of some of them, but, by and large, we tried to use them for the purpose for which they were entrusted to us, the purpose for which the Government asked for them, and that was to secure the safety of this nation in the greatest crisis in its history.

We all know that if this nation is to go down in this time it is liable never to come up again and I hope to God that the young men of the country who are being misled into this organisation which arrogates to itself the honourable name of I.R.A., will give up their membership of that organisation. They have seen, as well as we have seen, the depths to which it has deteriorated and the type of weed that can get to the top of it. That is no organisation for any honourable young man who wants to see this country progress to belong to, no matter what name it bears. It has no more right to that name than it has to the name of Swiss Guards. I hope that it will die a natural death not only for the sake of the young men who are in it or who might be misled into it, but for the sake of the country. We have done our utmost over a long period—I will not say how long for fear of getting into controversy—but we have done our utmost for a long period to get a Constitution in this part of the country to which all men could be loyal and within which all citizens could operate for whatever ideals or policies they had at heart. That situation has been achieved and there is no moral excuse or justification that any man can put forward for using violence against the Government elected under that Constitution which the people freely enacted for themselves and the man who uses violence against such a Government is a traitor and committing treason. I trust that they will realise the gravity of the course upon which they are set. There are very few of them left in it, and there are very few decent young fellows left in it, but as to the few that there are I hope and trust in God that they will give up.

I think I have dealt sufficiently with the points made by Deputy Norton. At least, the Minister for Justice dealt with most of the others. I hope and believe that the powers which the Government are giving the Military Court in this particular instance will not be abused. Whether that court is composed of the present officers or of other officers, the men who are chosen for that particular work are men who will not be intimidated by anybody, and men who felt so sure of themselves that they were prepared to take public responsibility for their acts. It is not the type of job a military officer craves, and again I say that they took it only because of a clear sense of duty. The Dáil has a right to be grateful to the men who carried out this unpleasant type of duty over a number of years, and can feel sure that they will not be intimidated either by Deputy Norton or anybody else——

That they will be intimidated by you is my fear.

——into coming to a judgment which is not in accordance with their conscience and in accordance with the evidence put before them.

I think the Minister may have misrepresented some of us. When he speaks of the Act passed establishing the Military Court, he refers to the court as having the right to establish their own procedure. Does he mean to suggest that their right to establish their own procedure is the same thing as the right to take evidence under the new order? What has procedure to do with evidence at all?

They were given the right to make their own procedure, so that they would not be bound by the normal procedure.

Does the Minister know what "procedure" means? Would he look up the Courts of Justice Act, 1924, and see what the meaning of "procedure" is? It is the manner of address and other things.

It is much more than that.

We certainly did not vest them with power to abrogate all the laws of evidence.

It was necessary in the others to give them the right to do it.

We have listened for the past two days to the weakest case ever made by a disorganised and obviously disunited Government in its struggle to make a case for the order which it is now asking the Dáil to endorse. The Minister for Justice opened the case with probably the weakest attempt ever made in this House to justify a measure which so gravely restricts the liberties of our citizens and a measure which is coercive in its application and may be both tyrannous and unjust in its consequences. The Taoiseach then came along with less enthusiasm for it than the Minister for Justice displayed. He said he was sorry to have to ask the House to deal with the matter, but there was not very much in it and he also said he was not asking for the order on the grounds given by the Minister for Justice but on entirely different grounds, so that the Minister for Justice and the Taoiseach could not make up their minds to agree on what precise ground they would ask the Dáil to give them this order. Then we had the Minister for Education who became sulky after a few minutes, because somebody asked a question, and who sat down. That was the best contribution made by any of the Ministers who spoke. Then we had the Minister for Local Government, fresh from his ultimatums to local authorities, painting himself in the best vermilion and almost declaring war on everybody this evening. Then the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures was put up to misrepresent everybody's speeches and to try to explain the order, only to show that he knew as little about it as the Taoiseach who still thought that a statement must be signed before it went to the court, although it was pointed out to the Taoiseach that the order itself did not provide for the subscription of a signature at all.

That is the exhibition we got from the Front Bench yesterday and to-day. The Minister for Justice yesterday coined a phrase to frighten all the old ladies in Rathmines and Ballsbridge about "organised murder". We are going to deal with organised murder, and when asked when the last organised murder took place, the Minister was not at all too clear in giving a date— probably because the Minister said at one time this year that the last organised murder did not take place at all, and that in fact the person who was murdered was not murdered at all, but was somewhere else. The Minister apparently did not want to disclose that inconsistency by giving a date. Do we not know perfectly well that the last organised murder is more than 12 months old? Why then have we an order of this kind to-day? Why had we not the order 12 months ago? If the "organised murder" is to be taken as a reference to the Devereux murder, one of the Minister's high officials testified in court that he knew that that particular man was dead in November, 1940. It is in January, 1942, that we are now asked to deal with an order of this kind. Does the Minister doubt the accuracy of the statement I have made?

Mr. Boland

If anyone did swear that, it is the first time I heard that anybody knew any such thing.

If the Minister will look up the proceedings of the court he will find out.

Mr. Boland

What happened in the court I do not know, but I have been in touch with this case for quite a long time, and I am certain that that fact was not known in November, 1940.

Let the Minister look up the proceedings in the court. Let him get a copy of the transcript of evidence.

Mr. Boland

I am familiar with every phase of that case.

You are not familiar with that phase. That is the last case that has been brought to our notice, and nothing was done for the last 12 months by the Government to equip themselves with the unusual powers it is seeking in this order now. What is the purpose of looking for the powers in this order now? Is it because the Government fear that there is going to be organised murder in the future, or is it because, having been engaged in a shemozzle in the courts for the last few weeks, they now want to use the order in respect of a particular case? But is the order for a particular case? Is it intended to be a direction to the court in a particular case, or is it intended to be a permanent order which will have currency during the emergency situation? We have not been able to get clearly from any of the five members of the Government who spoke, whether this order is intended to apply only to the case at present before the military court, or whether it is intended to apply to organised murder which the Government apparently fear may arise in the future.

We had the Minister for Local Government this evening indulging in a lot of noisy ráiméis and exaggeration in an attempt to justify this order. He quoted a number of cases of outrages which he said were committed during a certain period gone by, but he did not once tell us that if the Government had the powers in Order No. 139, they could have prevented any of these outrages occurring, and he did not once tell us that, except in one possible case the possession of the powers in this order would have enabled them to apprehend and convict any of the people responsible. The Minister quoted a number of cases in which he alleged that outrages took place, but did not once show the relevancy of this order, either to the detection of the crime in those instances or to the apprehension of the persons responsible.

Again, to give an idea of the disorganisation amongst Ministers in this matter, we have the Minister for Local Government this evening in the course of his full-blooded speech telling us that recruiting for the I.R.A. was increasing, while the Minister who has just sat down says there are only a few people left in it.

Mr. Boland

A few decent people.

That is a good correction, but it is not what he said.

Mr. Boland

He did say that, no matter how Deputy Norton may try to misrepresent it—that a few decent young men were left. I am not going to allow that statement to go unchallenged.

I do not care whether the Minister allows it to go unchallenged or not. The Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures clearly gave an impression to the House contrary to that given by the Minister for Local Government when he said that the I.R.A. was a dwindling organisation in this country, whereas the Minister for Local Government said that it was increasing its strength. Who is talking for the Government and who represents the official viewpoint? One Minister says the force is increasing and another says it is dwindling. How is this House going to make up its mind when a difference of that kind is rampant on the Government Front Bench? If one were to believe the Minister for Local Government this evening, this country is like a pineapple republic with chaos and disorder abounding. The Minister for Local Government this evening painted the weirdest picture of disorder and of the imperilment of life and property, of threats to the liberty of innocent people and, generally, gave the House and the country, if it is permitted to read his speech, the impression that nobody was safe in this country: that life and property were quite unsafe here, and that there was a very dangerous and widespread conspiracy afoot, a conspiracy of such a kind as to warrant not merely the adoption of the measures contained in Order No. 139, but almost the making of open overt war on the forces that, apparently, are creating the disorganisation, disorder and lawlessness mentioned by the Minister for Local Government. If cross-channel papers get a hold of the speech made by the Minister for Local Government this evening I imagine we will see more leading articles in them similar to what we have seen in the last few weeks. The one person who endorses all that they have said is the Minister for Local Government, from the Government Benches, in an attempt to justify the possession of powers such as are outlined in this order to put down a widespread and anarchical conspiracy of that kind. If half what the Minister for Local Government said is true, is it not a shocking indictment of the whole Government policy and a shocking indictment even of the State forces? Are we to understand from the Minister for Justice, or from any of the Defence Ministers, that the position in respect to internal disorder to-day is worse than it was in 1931? Is there more internal disorder here to-day than there was in 1931? Does the Minister want to answer that?

Mr. Boland

If the Deputy is merely putting a rhetorical question, I am not going to speak, but if he wants me to deal with that point, I am quite willing to do so. I say the position to-day is infinitely worse than it was in 1931, for the simple reason that we have the state of affairs that the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures pointed out. To-day, when we have the whole world at war, this organisation, the so-called I.R.A., has gone so far as to take sides and to declare war on one of the belligerents. Surely to God that is a situation fraught with the utmost danger? Deputy Norton should know that as well as I do. Deputy Dillon knows it, and I am sure every Deputy knows that it is a most serious situation, far worse than ever it was in 1931 or, to go back further, worse than the situation in 1922, and God knows that was bad. The ultimate fate of this country depends on how we are going to behave in the terrible crisis we are in, due to a world war raging, and a body of men here who do not care what they do to endanger the situation. I am aware that Deputy Norton knows this, because he has been in close touch with me regularly. He knows a lot of what I know about it, and it amazes me that he should, for the sake of getting some sort of ephemeral popularity, jeopardise the whole position and undermine us in our attempt to keep order in this country and to put down this organised crime. He ought to cut this thing out, and face the hard facts of the situation as I have to do. It is no pleasure to me I can assure him.

Are you going to tackle it?

Mr. Boland

I will tackle it. The Deputy gave way to me, and I have taken advantage of the opportunity he gave me.

In any case, the Minister says that, having come into office in 1932, he found in this country what was then regarded by the former Government as a serious I.R.A. position, a very serious position. But the Government started out on a policy of nursing and coaxing them. The present Minister for the Co-Ordination of Defensive Measures was despatched to Arbour Hill in the middle of the night to release them. They were made public heroes of and got the benediction of this Government. They got the approval of this Government and fought elections for this Government subsequent to 1932, and at the end of ten years' nursing them, of ten year's pansying them, you admit that your handling of the whole situation has been so incompetent and so inefficient that you have allowed to grow up in this country in 1942, with most of the world at war, a more serious situation than you found in 1932. If that is the position you ought to resign and let someone else deal with the position because of the incapacity you have displayed in the last ten years.

Mr. Boland

I would not care to leave it to Deputy Norton.

After ten years' handling of the situation the Minister gets up and confesses this evening in irritation——

Mr. Boland

There is no irritation at all.

——that the situation which he has to-day is very much worse than the situation which his Government got ten years ago. If that is true, the Government ought to get out. But I do not believe it is true. I believe that the position in the country to-day is calmer and quieter than it was in 1931, and the fact that we have not had anything like the incidents which occurred in 1931, and earlier, during the past few years, and not on the same scale or with the same frequency, is evidence, in my opinion, that the country has settled down considerably during the last few years, and that it is not as bad, as the Minister for Justice in an attempt to get this order through, represented it to the House this evening. I refuse to believe that the country is as bad as the Minister for Justice says. I think I can say that I am breaking no secret when I say that if that is so we were never told that at the Defence Conference. The Minister for Justice knows it, and my colleague, Deputy Davin, can bear me out.

Mr. Boland

I know no such thing. I know the contrary. We have about 500 men interned at present. That was not the case in 1931. Why are they interned?

I am not talking——

Mr. Boland

We are talking about the situation in the country. These men have been interned without trial.

I want to tell the Minister for Justice that I believe he is misrepresenting the position in the country. If he says that there is here an organisation which is endeavouring to overthrow the State, that it has more strength to-day than it had in 1931, that it is more dangerous to-day than in 1931, and that the general internal position is worse than it was in 1931, I want to say that I refuse to believe it. If it is worse than it was in 1931, and if the position is supposed to be as grave as the Minister has represented it to be, then this is the first time that I have heard that picture painted, notwithstanding the fact that I am a member of the Defence Conference, in the lurid language used by the Minister for Local Government this evening. The Minister knows well that statements have been made at the Defence Conference of an entirely different character, even though it may not be desirable to repeat those statements, because they do not make a good case for this order.

Mr. Boland

As far as I am concerned, the Deputy can repeat anything he likes.

Will the Minister repeat the statements he made?

Mr. Boland

It is very unfortunate for me that I cannot reply to that.

It is very unfortunate that you cannot do everything: that you cannot be a Pooh-bah. Let us come to the Taoiseach's statement. The Taoiseach said it was alleged against the order that things were being done which were not and could not be done, and that very little was being done with regard to the law of evidence at all. Is it denied by any Minister or member of the Government Party that evidence on oath is unnecessary before this Military Court? Is not that a grave departure from the present position? Is it denied that a statement under threat to send a man to jail, if he does not make the statement, can always be submitted to that court? The Minister for the Co-Ordination of Defensive Measures said that he did not know that a statement under threat could be made. The Minister forgot about the Offences Against the State Act under which, if you do not make a statement, that very fact in itself may result in your getting three or six months' imprisonment. If a person is threatened with imprisonment because he will not make a statement, and afterwards makes a statement, is it denied that this statement can be presented to the Military Court? Of course it can, and the statement can be extracted under a threat, and under that threat can be made a valid statement so far as this Military Court is concerned.

Is it denied that the statement can be made by a person and that person need not sign it, may not have the moral courage to sign it, and yet the State counsel can tender that unsigned statement to the court and ask the Military Court to accept it as evidence of the guilt of the person before the court? Is that denied? Is it denied that a person can make a lying statement to a police officer or to anybody else, that that lying statement can be submitted to the court, and the person need not be compelled to testify in support of that lying statement? Is it denied that the prisoner or his counsel may not see the person who makes the accusation and need not be given an opportunity of cross-examining the person who made the accusation, even though the statement is unsigned? Is it denied as well that the State is claiming the right to put in the unverified evidence of an unknown person to the court against the accused person and that that right is solely reserved to the prosecution, and the prisoner has no opportunity of putting in any statement of that character?

What we are really doing in this case with our eyes wide open—and I do not know of any circumstance that justifies us doing it with our eyes open—is that we are making it possible for a military court, the creature of the Government, and nothing more than the creature of the Government, to sentence a dozen men to death on the unsigned, unsworn evidence of an unknown person. The accused in that case has no opportunity whatever of cross-examining the unknown person, of testing the character of that person or of sifting his statement in order to ascertain whether there are malicious motives behind it. We are doing all this, not against a murderer, not against a person guilty of treason, not against a person guilty of any crime, but we are doing it against a man who, up to that stage, is innocent of any crime. We are making sure, at all events, by this order that so far as we can do it, that man will have to go into the court, not to be proved guilty, because he goes into the court with the whole process of law reversed and he will have to prove himself innocent.

Deputy Mulcahy, in the course of a speech in favour of this order, referred to certain persons weaving treason—I think that is what he said. When this House, in 1939, passed the Treason Act the Government then felt it necessary to put in this provision:—"No person shall be convicted of treason on the uncorroborated evidence of one witness." They do not need even one witness now to convict a person of treason; they do not need even a signed statement; just submit an anonymous document in a military court and you can get your verdict there. In circumstances of that kind you have a prisoner, one helpless citizen, against all the power and authority of the State and all the forces of the State. The prisoner stands on one side and ranged against him is the whole power of the Government and the State, armed with the tyrannical powers that the Government possess under this order.

The Taoiseach told us that very little was being done in connection with the ordinary law of evidence; it was merely a change in the method of giving evidence. Then, having confessed that he did not know much about the rules of evidence and had not had time to read that interesting and extensive subject overnight, he indicated that he had a kind of idea that the rules of evidence were, in fact, British rules of evidence which we took over. Somebody forgot to tell him that the Criminal Justice (Evidence) Act of 1924 was passed by this House and it sets out the procedure by which evidence should be taken. That code of legal procedure has governed our legislation since then and still governs it in respect to the ordinary civil courts. In fact, in the recent Constitution we took over that piece of legislation, preserved it and apparently, since we do not intend to amend it, we regard is as quite a good procedure so far as our civil courts are concerned.

It was interesting when the Taoiseach, in his efforts to justify some slight change in the law of evidence under this order, and having referred to the fact that the present rules of evidence were British in conception and application, read for us the report of a British Royal Commission of recent date in which certain recommendations were made for changing the law of evidence and which the Taoiseach lapped up with avidity for the purpose of this order and doctoring the Military Court. It is merely a change in the giving of evidence, we are told, but it is a very vital change so far as the helpless prisoner is concerned, though it might not be a vital change so far as a murderer is concerned. But, we are making that change as against an innocent man, a man who must be regarded as innocent until proved guilty. The change is made in order to weight the scales heavily against such a man.

Another piece of the Taoiseach's philosophy was that we must trust the court. He believed in trusting the court in 1941, but he would not dream of trusting it in 1931. He would not dream of having anything to do with it in 1931, and the whole Fianna Fáil Party was in full fury against the military court in 1931. We remember the speeches made at the time the Constitution was before the country, when Fianna Fáil claimed the credit for having abolished the military court. Now, the philosophy of the Taoiseach is to trust the Military Court.

I will now deal with what the Minister for the Co-Ordination of Defensive Measures said in connection with my opening speech and my reference to the Military Court. It is perfectly true that the question of the establishment of a military court was before the Defence Conference in 1940. I should like to see the statement of the Minister for Justice, in connection with the military court then envisaged, produced, and I should like to see the minutes of the conference also produced. Remember what 1940 was like. France had collapsed; there had been an invasion and an occupation of the Low Countries. Responsible Deputies in this House, and responsible Ministers, too, were beginning to talk in terms of how many hours the invasion was away.

Everybody knows the state of mind which then existed. Parachute troops were then very much in the public mind, very ubiquitous, a form of warfare we might expect to see at any moment, any day. No one could say how many hours we were away from invasion. It was in these circumstances and to guard against the possibility of an invasion that I agreed we might want a military court to deal with whatever might arise. It was in these terms and on that understanding that we understood the military court; we never understood it in the sense in which it has come to be used here for the purpose of trying persons who would be amenable to our law in the same way as people were brought before our courts in the past two years since the special criminal court was established.

It is nothing short of dishonest for the Minister for the Co-Ordination of Defensive Measures to pretend to believe that the military court that was talked of in 1940 was the military court that is in operation to-day. We thought of the military court then as a court set up to preserve this country from invasion and to deal with people who would invade this country and trample on our liberties. That is not the court we are thinking of to-day, and it is grossly dishonest for the Minister for the Co-Ordination of Defensive Measures to pretend to believe that because you got authority then to establish a military court—it was done within a few minutes in this House because each Party told their group the type of court that was wanted— this is the same type of court that you got authority to set up. It is gross misrepresentation to pretend to believe that you got authority to establish a court for the purpose for which you are using it now. Will anybody contend that a most contentious measure of that kind could have been got through the House in three minutes—the Minister could not explain it to his own Party in that time—were it not for the fact that everybody was given the impression that the court was to deal with invaders and the possibility of troops from another country being landed here for the purpose of sabotage or as an advance guard for an invading force? At any rate, I have nailed that lie, and I am quite satisfied to have done it.

Let us come now to the scheme or organisation of the court. I do not want any words of mine to be construed as making any reflection on the persons who constitute the Military Court. I do not think anybody in the country wants to make any reference to the personnel of the court at all as individual officers. I do not know these persons. I have no grievance against them, one way or the other. These men are the victims of a piece of legislative machinery—and victims they are—because the job we are giving them is an extremely distasteful one, and must be so, to any military officer. But my complaint about the court is that we never contemplated the trial of ordinary civil offences, offences punishable by the civil law, by a tribunal consisting solely of military officers, and that military officers of that kind have no adequate legal training to justify their being given the power of life or death over the citizens of this country.

Somebody took objection—I think it was the Minister for the Co-Ordination of Defensive Measures—to the fact that I said that the court was in the pocket of the Government. I repeat that it is in the pocket of the Government, and I repeat that it must be in the pocket of the Government in view of the fact that the Government pay the salaries of these people and, within 24 hours, can secure the resignation of these three or five people, or whatever the number is, by a simple decision taken in Government Buildings. These military officers have no security of tenure. They have not the fixity of tenure of a judge, nor have they the fixity of tenure even of a member of this House. They hold office at the will and pleasure of the Government, and if they do anything which the Government do not like, the Government can get the resignation of all of them in 24 hours.

Of course, it may be said that that would not happen, that a thing like that could not possibly happen. Do not we all know that this Government removed the Secretary of a Department, and removed him in a needlessly brusque way? Do not we all know that the Government also fired the Chief Commissioner of the Gárda Síochána—if they did not, in fact, fire two of them? So to imagine that this Government would worry themselves about firing out three or five military officers because they would not be a rubber stamp for the Government, in face of the fact that they have fired, I think, two Chief Commissioners of the Gárdai and the Secretary of a Department, is giving the Government credit for a tenderness of feeling that I do not give them credit for.

And do not forget what happened to the officer in connection with the raid on the Magazine Fort.

Yes. My complaint is that this Military Court has no independence, that it is paid by the Government and that, therefore, it is in the pocket of the Government. The Minister for the Co-Ordination of Defensive Measures thinks that they are most estimable gentlemen. So they may be, and I have no doubt they are, but the point I am making is that while you control their pay you control their decisions, and that you do that more effectively if, now and again, you remind them of the fact that you fired two Chief Commissioners of the Gárda Síochána. I think it was Cicero who said that although his tongue was bought his soul was unsullied. I think that is the precise position of these people who constitute the Military Tribunal. Once you line their pockets with pay envelopes, then you exercise a threat over these people that you can withdraw that from them, and thereby their independence crashes.

It is because of that fact, and the danger of that fact, that our judges are not remunerated in the same way as Army officers are. I should like to ask the Minister for Justice, does he think it is just because of an affection for things that are hoary with antiquity, if I may, with his permission, borrow that excellent phrase of his, that we prefer trained judges to administer justice in this country rather than Army officers? If there is any affection for judges it is because they are men with proper legal training.

Why should I have to say whether or not I prefer judges to military officers? I did not know that there was any question involved here of putting judges in the military court at all. That court has been there for a number of years, and I never heard that there was an objection to it on that ground. I understood that it was the rules of evidence we were talking about, and not the personnel of the court, and why should I have to say whether I prefer a judge to a military officer?

The Deputy is drawing attention to the constitution of the Military Court, and I presume is relating his argument to that.

I am pointing out that we are giving to a court which has no independence, a court which is in the pocket of the Government, added powers, and that we should not do that: that it is bad enough to have such a court but that it is worse to give that court, so constituted, these powers. When I say that there is something of substance in a preference for highly trained legal men to administer justice, that should not be taken as a mere preference for things which are hoary with antiquity, as the Minister for Justice said. The normal way to deal with people is by means of the trained judge, who ought to have wide powers but powers conditioned by regard for the prisoner's rights. But we would not give an ordinary judge these powers.

I do not think that arises exactly.

Might I point out that both the Taoiseach and the Minister for the Co-Ordination of Defensive Measures spoke at great length on the constitution and personnel of the court, and that the Deputy is replying?

They praised the personnel of the court.

The Deputy is right in referring to the constitution of the court as an argument that his motion should pass, but I think he is going too far with his argument.

I do not think so, Sir; I have not time to go too far. The point I am making, however, is that we would not give an ordinary court the wide powers that are given to this court under Order No. 139, that there would be an outcry if we proposed to give an ordinary court such powers, even with the knowledge that jurors and others would be present there, and that if we would not give these powers to an ordinary court, or even to the Supreme Court, why should we give them to a military court, not versed in law, without the independence that our judges have, and without any training whatever in regard to the sifting of evidence, the admissibility of evidence, and possibly, in times of heat and anger, with not too much regard for the rights of a prisoner, as compared with the way these rights are respected in a civil court?

With regard to any effort that has been made or may be made to represent our position in regard to this order as a case for the I.R.A. or against the I.R.A., I say that that is dishonest, and deliberately dishonest, and anybody who makes that charge knows that it is false, but it is a trick that they think may cause a bit of confusion. Our concern in this matter is not for the I.R.A. at all. Our concern is not for anybody who might attempt to sabotage this country or embroil it in war. Our position in regard to neutrality has been made perfectly plain, and we have made some considerable contribution to the spread of that policy throughout the country.

That fact in any case ought to ensure us against the misrepresentation which has been indulged in by some members of the Government Party. My concern is that the ordinary innocent man who may be brought before this court, the unconvicted man who will be arraigned before the court, is entitled to get a fair trial. I am concerned with ensuring that every man in this country against whom a charge is preferred, and particularly when he is a relatively helpless man fighting a powerful Executive, should get a fair trial. Nobody can deny his right to a fair trial, but he cannot get a fair trial from a military court armed with the powers set out in Order No. 139. That man, up to the present, has had the right to know and see his accuser. He has not the right to know his accuser now, and he has not the right to see his accuser. Any anonymous document by an unknown person, who may in fact not be living, or may not have lived, can now be submitted to the court. The court will be compelled to read that evidence and may take that evidence into consideration against him. Previously, he had the right to cross-examine his accuser, to test the truth of his accuser's statement, and to expose if necessary and if it were possible the bad character of the person who was traducing him before the court. He will not have the right to do that when this order is passed. Those rights are being swept away, and no case whatever, except the disorganised, disjointed muddle we heard from the Front Bench this evening, has been offered to this House in justification for taking those rights away from a prisoner.

My view is that if we are to endow this body with the dignity of the name "court", that title carries an obligation and a heavy responsibility to hold the scales evenly between the prosecutor on the one hand and the defendant on the other. The court cannot do this. The prisoner there, unknown to himself, probably, is playing with the dice heavily loaded against him. He has no chance whatever of getting justice if the Military Court interprets that order in the way in which it is possible for a military court to interpret it. We here to-day have a bigger responsibility than merely to give expression to the views of our constituents on different matters. In an issue of this kind we are the guardians of the people's liberties and the guardians of the people's rights. If there were any violent attack likely to be made on this State or on its institutions, no Party would be more enthusiastic than this Party in giving whatever Government was in office the necessary powers to deal with that situation. We would do it then, realising that perhaps in those circumstances the ordinary liberties of the people might have to be temporarily subjugated in order that we might preserve those liberties permanently. To-day then, we are in the position of guardians of the people's liberties. We are asked to-day by this Government to hand them over the people's liberties, so that they in turn may relay those liberties to the Military Court. I am not prepared to do it on the case I have heard from the Government Benches to-day.

We must make sure that we do not create machinery which will send innocent men to their graves, and I am afraid we are to-day creating a piece of machinery capable of convicting an innocent man speedily, capable of executing an innocent man, and there is no real redress for mistakes of that kind. This order, in my opinion, is capable of great wrong and capable of great evil. No situation, no internal or external situation, has been adduced to us to justify us in endorsing this order, and I hope that this House, which is the repository of the people's liberties, which is the guardian of their rights, will refuse to give the Government those powers on the miserably inadequate case which they have made for them in the past two days.

Before the question is put, I should like to raise one matter by your leave, Sir. The Minister for the Co-Ordination of Defensive Measures in the course of his speech quoted a reference to a speech of mine reported at column 1741, volume 80, in connection with the Emergency Powers (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill, 1940, and said that this House readily passed that measure in a few minutes although fully warned of its significance by the nature of what I said. That was said in order to suggest that the powers contained in the Bill were willingly given without discussion. Am I not correct in stating, as a matter of record, that there was a prior discussion at the Defence Conference about that measure, and that it was consequent upon that discussion that the Labour Party and the Fine Gael Party consented to give it rapid passage through Dáil Eireann in view of the urgent emergency existing at the time?

Mr. Boland

The Deputy is quite right in that.

Thank you.

Question put.
The Dáil divided:—Tá, 20; Níl, 71.

  • Brennan, Michael.
  • Byrne, Alfred.
  • Corish, Richard.
  • Costello, John A.
  • Davin, William.
  • Esmonde, John L.
  • Everett, James.
  • Fitzgerald-Kenney, James.
  • Hannigan, Joseph.
  • Hickey, James.
  • Hurley, Jeremiah.
  • Keating, John.
  • Keyes, Michael.
  • Linehan, Timothy.
  • McGilligan, Patrick.
  • Murphy, Timothy J.
  • Nally, Martin.
  • Norton, William.
  • O'Higgins, Thomas F.
  • Pattison, James P.

Níl

  • Aiken, Frank.
  • Allen, Denis.
  • Bartley, Gerald.
  • Beegan, Patrick.
  • Benson, Ernest E.
  • Boland, Gerald.
  • Bourke, Dan.
  • Breathnach, Cormac.
  • Breslin, Cormac.
  • Buckley, Seán.
  • Carty, Frank.
  • Childers, Erskine H.
  • Coburn, James.
  • Cooney, Eamonn.
  • Corry, Martin J.
  • Cosgrave, William T.
  • Daly, Patrick.
  • Derrig, Thomas.
  • De Valera, Eamon.
  • Dillon, James M.
  • Dockrell, Henry M.
  • Flynn, John.
  • Flynn, Stephen.
  • Fogarty, Patrick J.
  • Friel, John.
  • Fuller, Stephen.
  • Giles, Patrick.
  • Gorry, Patrick J.
  • Harris, Thomas.
  • Hogan, Daniel.
  • Hughes, James.
  • Humphreys, Francis.
  • Keane, John J.
  • Kelly, James P.
  • Kennedy, Michael J.
  • Killilea, Mark.
  • Kissane, Eamon.
  • Lemass, Seán F.
  • Little, Patrick J.
  • Lynch, Finian.
  • Lynch, James B.
  • McCann, John.
  • McDevitt, Henry A.
  • McEllistrim, Thomas.
  • MacEntee, Seán.
  • McFadden, Michael Og.
  • Meaney, Cornelius.
  • Moylan, Seán.
  • Mulcahy, Richard.
  • Mullen, Thomas.
  • O Briain, Donnchadh.
  • O Ceallaigh, Seán T.
  • O'Grady, Seán.
  • O'Loghlen, Peter J.
  • O'Reilly, Matthew.
  • O'Rourke, Daniel.
  • O'Sullivan, John M.
  • Redmond, Bridget M.
  • Rice, Brigid M.
  • Ruttledge, Patrick J.
  • Ryan, James.
  • Ryan, Jeremiah.
  • Ryan, Martin.
  • Ryan, Robert.
  • Sheridan, Michael.
  • Smith, Patrick.
  • Traynor, Oscar.
  • Victory, James.
  • Walsh, Laurence J.
  • Walsh, Richard.
  • Ward, Conn.
Tellers:—Tá, Deputies Keyes and Hickey; Níl: Deputies Smith and Kennedy.
Motion declared negatived.
The Dáil adjourned at 9.40 p.m. until 3 o'clock on Wednesday, February 4th.
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