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Dáil Éireann debate -
Tuesday, 26 May 1942

Vol. 87 No. 1

Central Bank Bill, 1942—Committee (Resumed).

Question again proposed:—
In page 5, lines 16 to 25, to delete all words after the word "addition" in line 16 to the end of the section, and substitute the following words:—"to the functions, powers, and duties vested, conferred or imposed on the Bank the Bank shall have the general function and duty of taking such steps as the Minister may from time to time deem appropriate and advisable towards safeguarding the integrity of the currency and ensuring that, currency and credit shall be issued in correct equation to the economic needs of full production and full employment."—(Deputy Norton).
Question:—"That the words proposed to be deleted stand part of the Bill"—put and declared carried.
Amendment No. 11 not moved.

I move amendment No. 12:—

To delete all words from the word "within" in line 20 down to the word "law" in line 21 including the brackets.

The Section as it stands, in the words "and without prejudice", and in the words "within the limit of the powers for the time being vested in it by law," very definitely restrains the operations of the bank to the powers that are vested in it by law. I think it is very necessary, in the discussion on this measure and in the subsequent working of the bank, that we should all be absolutely clear not only as to what the position is but as to what is the purpose of the things that we are doing. I move to delete those words "within the limit of the powers for the time being vested in it by law," for the purpose of clearing the situation. I do not yet know whether or not I really want to remove those words, but I do want to be clear as regards the situation.

Let us first take the position of the bank when it has to work within the limits of the powers vested in it by law. It has been pointed out that the 1927 Act establishes parity with sterling as the law. Now, under this particular Bill here, we are proceeding with parity with sterling as the law of the land. The importance of that has been somewhat glossed over by reason of the number of statements reiterated by the Taoiseach and the Minister for Finance that we can change the law here whenever we like. I think we might say that with regard to any particular law, but, under the words I am indicating here, are we not restricting the bank to a position under which parity with sterling is the law? I think we ought to get perfectly clear that that is the intention of the present legislation, and that with the present legislation we are binding the bank to the position that existed in the past. I do not want to make that clear simply for the purpose either of assailing the principle that is there or disagreeing with it in any way, or of assailing the people who are continuing to insist that that will be the law of the land, because as far as I can see at the present moment it is the right thing, and should not in any way prevent our having all the necessary volume of credit that we require, and having it at a reasonable rate of interest. As far as I can see at the present moment, parity with sterling is the right thing to have.

The Deputy might get his point clear on amendment No. 66 which deals with the question of parity. The benefits or disadvantages of that parity should not be discussed now.

I just want to get in on the parity question, and have it established here that that is definitely the position, in order that, when we discuss the results of parity and everything that will flow from it, we will be arguing against a very definite state of things and not arguing against a position about which it can be said: "That can be changed by law at any time we like." I think we ought not to restrict the bank to its powers, functions and duties according to this law and that law, without being quite clear as to what binding it to those laws involves. I just raised the matter on that particular point on the question of parity— that this is settling parity with sterling as the law of the land.

The intention is that this section shall read and be construed by the board of the central bank, if and when set up, as meaning that it shall act strictly within the law as it stands in relation to currency and credit or any other matter, and shall restrict itself to administering the law as it stands or as it may be amended by the passing of this Bill. The intention is that the board shall not have power to go outside the law in carrying out the intentions of this particular section where it says that the bank shall have the general function and duty of taking such steps as the board may from time to time deem appropriate. The intention is that it shall be restricted to the law, that the central bank board may not take any action it wishes or that may be suggested to it for the purpose of fulfilling these general functions, but that, in so far as it desires to carry out the functions which will be attributed to it, it will act strictly within the law as it appears in this Bill or as it may appear in the Bill when amended.

Can the Minister expressly say that parity with sterling is the law and will be the law?

As I understand, it is the law at present.

The explanatory notes issued with the Bill state in relation to Section 7:

By virtue of the powers (2) to (4) the central bank will be able to supply funds against domestic or other assets to banks and other credit institutions to assist in maintaining the liquidity of the credit system and also to influence credit conditions and interest rates.

Will the Minister say if, under the Currency Act, 1927, the Currency Commission has such power and that, therefore, under that Act the bank would have power to influence credit conditions and interest rates?

The banks will have that power.

At the present time, has the Currency Commission that power and would the bank have that power under the 1927 Act?

The bank will have powers, even beyond those of Section 7, when this Bill is passed.

Has the Currency Commission any such power under the 1927 Act and, if so, under what section?

There is no such power in the law, as I understand it, at present. The Currency Commission might have power to influence credit by discussion with the banks but, under the 1927 Act, I do not think that the commission has power to influence or control credit.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I move amendment No. 13:—

In page 5, lines 23 and 24, to delete the words "and ensuring that in all that pertains to the control of credit" and substitute the words "creating and controlling credit and ensuring that in these matters".

Section 6 sets out that, in addition to such functions, powers and duties as are specifically conferred on the bank by this Bill, the bank shall have the general function and duty of taking (within the limit of the powers for the time being vested in it by law) such steps as the board may, from time to time, deem appropriate and advisable towards safeguarding the safety of the currency and ensuring that, in what pertains to the control of credit, the constant and predominant aim shall be the welfare of the people as a whole. I desire, by my amendment, to make that read: "...such steps as the board may, from time to time, deem appropriate and advisable towards safeguarding the integrity of the currency, creating and controlling credit and ensuring that, in these matters, the constant and predominant aim shall be the welfare of the people as a whole." I leave in the piety of the intention but I want to have the phraseology changed so that, as part of the law, the board will be given the specific power to create and control credit.

I am advised that the phrase in the section as it stands covers the creation of credit and that, as it is a wider term than that proposed by the Deputy, it is more advisable that it should be used. It covers what the Deputy has in mind.

Will the Minister say in what way the board will, under his plan, create and control credit?

I do not think that, by inserting the words the Deputy suggests, the powers would be rendered wider or stronger or that the section would be rendered more workable. The expression used in the section gives the necessary power. How that power will be used, will be a matter for the board. I hope it will be practicable to use the power to the advantage of the community but it will be for the board to determine how far, and under what conditions, the power can be operated.

The implication of the Minister's statement is that the phrase in the Bill gives better powers——

Wider powers.

The Minister would help me to accept his statement, somewhat against my judgment, if he would explain how, under the section as it stands, the bank will create credit.

The Deputy should not take Section 6 alone because it is merely a statement of functions and duties. It has to be read with other sections, including Section 7.

We are dealing with Section 6, which has the bracketed description "general function and duty of the bank." We are told that it will have certain functions and duties, which will be carried out within the limits of the law, and that it will have the general function and duty of taking appropriate steps towards safeguarding the safety of the currency and ensuring that, in what pertains to the control of credit, the constant and predominant aim shall be the welfare of the people as a whole. I want to have that changed so that it will expressly have the general function and duty of creating and controlling credit. The Minister says that the powers he would give are much wider than the powers I would give. My judgment is not able to digest that, and I am asking the Minister how, under his plan, the bank will create credit.

The Deputy seems to be approaching this from some strange angle and I find it difficult to follow him. The whole position with regard to the direct creation of credit has been discussed and explained here over a long period, as well as the difficulties that exist for the bank in itself attempting to cause an expansion or contraction of credit. As I understand it, what is intended in the Bill is that certain functions or powers are directly and expressly given to the bank; but, over and above those powers, a directive is given. That directive is that, if any steps are taken in any direction whatever at any time which would have an influence on the control of credit, the bank should be concerned with the public aspect of that in relation to the common good and that they should consider it from that angle and that angle only. For instance, if an expansion of credit was taking place which was obviously designed by the banks for their own profit and if it did not tend towards the general welfare, it would be the central bank's duty in accordance with this directive to try to influence it, not in the direction in which the banks were going but in the direction of the common good.

In any question of the functions which it exercises, and which in any way could be regarded as having a bearing upon the question of credit, the public aspect of that and its effect upon the community as a whole should be the prime concern of the bank. In other words, they are to direct it for the public interest, and not for any private or particular interest. This is a general directive, such as the directives given in the Constitution. Whilst assigning to them this duty — I would say it is more a duty than a power — the section is careful to point out that that duty cannot be interpreted as enabling them to override the specific powers stated in the Bill. This is purely a directive, imposing a duty in the public interest rather than giving a power.

It is not so easy to see in what respect it is open either to the bank as such or with the machinery at its disposal, in the first place to pronounce judgment and in the second place to carry out the judgment. We are invited to believe that the three civil servants or ex-civil servants, the three nominees of the Minister, and the three bankers selected by the Minister, know more than the commercial banks about the expansion of credit and its effects upon the community, the danger it may cause to the community, and the possible effect of the profits it might give to the banks; and that those nine persons would be able to effect a corrective on that line of policy. On its face, it does not appear clear where they may effect that, in the measure as it stands. The maximum sum of money which the bank is likely to have at its disposal is approximately £23,000,000. There is something like £18,000,000 in currency now at the peak point, some £5,000,000 in consolidated bank notes and some £80,000 of the old notes: it is not £24,000,000 in all. The banks have over eight times that amount of money. What is to be done by a directorate of nine persons having no power that one can see, in connection with any clause in this Bill, to effect a corrective — to direct what those banks are going to do with eight times the amount of money that the central bank has at its disposal?

The weakness that I see in this measure is that it seems to be all the time taking power against somebody that is in business and taking no cooperative steps to deal with the State policy at the moment. However, that will arise on a later amendment. In what pertains to the control of credit, I do not know whether the aim is in one direction and the target in another; but, from all that we have been able to learn from every source, there is no restriction of credit here. Apparently, there is sufficient credit, there is money available for any purpose requiring it. The really important thing is at what rate money is available. There are strong views held upon that. We have heard the views put up by the Labour Party, and at one time even sponsored by the members of the present Government, or by some of them, that power should be given to issue credit, that is, to issue bank notes without any backing at all. That is put forward as a means of easing the situation here.

In the course of the discussion on various sections of this measure mention has been made of the effect of the policy pursued in Portugal for some years past. I have been looking up the interest rates paid there: they have varied from 6¾ per cent. to 3½ per cent. at present. In that country — under what is regarded as a totalitarian Government, an autocracy — it has not been thought advisable to pump out credit, as has been tried already in a few countries, with colossal failures. We have all those lessons before us, we have our own position — which is sometimes referred to by Ministers as unfortunate in this respect, that we do not need the stimulus which has had to be provided in other countries by a central bank, and that all the credit that we need is available. From what can be read in the Banking Commission Report, it would appear as if it had been provided here at as low a price as it has been in other countries.

I do not know in what direction this particular section of the Bill leads: it is not clear on its face. It says:—

"the principal duty of the bank is towards safeguarding the integrity of the currency."

That is a matter already attended to by the eight banks. If they had not the experience and resources which they had over the last 100 years, no central bank could regulate it, unless it could regulate our balance of payments in such a way that it could be managed. It says:—

"and ensuring, in what pertains to the control of credit."

I do not know the meaning of those words at all. Is it intended that we are to have a body, over and above the present commercial banks, limiting them in the exercise of their discretion as to what credit is to be made available in this country? I think it was a bad day's business if that were the intention in setting up the central bank—that they should have that power and should exercise it.

It is quite clear that the Deputy has not bothered about the question of central banks or their powers and duties. If, as he has just said, the ordinary commercial banks were looking after the currency and safeguarding its integrity, there was no need for the Currency Commission — any more than there is for the central bank. The banks' business is not to look after the general public interest, except in so far as it would help their own business. The banks are looking for private business; they are private. Their concern is, in the main, to look after the shareholders and their business and, of course, dealing as they are in deposits, naturally safeguarding the immediate interests of their customers is one of their prime considerations. They are private concerns and they are not directly interested in the public welfare. Central banks are interested in the public welfare. They are constituted in the public interest to look after questions such as the integrity of the currency and the amount of credit available, and they are generally able to influence the rates.

The first point I want to make in reply to the Deputy is that these other banks are private concerns and the central bank is not a private concern; it is a public concern with the public interest as its chief function. That is why we have it here that one of its functions shall be to safeguard all that pertains to the control of credit, wherever that aspect comes in, and, if they are able to exercise influence, that that influence should be in the direction of serving the public interest. In other countries the banks have served their customers, and the community generally, fairly well, but it has been found that the public interests require a direction over and above the direction they would take in looking after private interests. It is for that reason that you have central banks operating in practically every country in the world. Our difficulty is that some of the methods by which central banks in other countries are able to influence the expansion and contraction of credit are not available for us. Here we have to rely upon what is found in other countries to be of extremely great value, and that is general leadership in the direction of expansion and contraction of credit. This particular section tells the bank board that any leadership they are giving in regard to the expansion or contraction of credit should be in the direction of the common good. It seems to me to be an easy section to understand.

If we are to take the measure of the weight of responsibility that rests upon them, that weight is entirely in favour of the commercial banks as such. They have more friends, a bigger business and a greater responsibility. It is idle to say they are not concerned with the public welfare and that nine persons selected by the Minister for Finance are marked out by some occult influence to be the only persons concerned in that direction. We must refuse to accept that and, so far as any question of controlling or restricting credit is concerned, it is from the Minister that we heard to-day for the first time that it is to be controlled.

The fact is that a central bank is not required in order to protect the integrity of the currency. It is idle to say that there was no necessity for setting up the Currency Commission. It was set up in order to issue currency notes and consolidated notes. There was no legal tender except the notes that had been in circulation prior to December, 1921. That was their function. What is important for us is not to control the price of credit. So far as this measure is concerned, it is increasing the price of credit. It is giving no faculty for having a credit available either in bulk or at a price. The bulk is there already. No action that the central bank can possibly take, for the next ten years at any rate, will affect the quantity of credit available in this country. The effect on the price of money is what is really important. It is idle to talk about the control of credit when reports from any banking commissions that have considered the matter tell us that we have plenty of it in this country and, being a creditor country, it stands to reason there should be plenty of it.

I do not want to get the points I raised originally buried by some of the subsequent arguments. I moved this amendment in order to give the bank power to create and control credit. Now the Taoiseach reminds me that it has been said or implied already that the central bank will not create credit. Can we put it out of our discussions, can we take it that none of us has any doubt about the matter, that, in fact, the central bank cannot possibly create credit?

I would not say that.

The Taoiseach then suggests it can?

Then I will ask the Minister for Finance, in order that we may decide, whether, for a body which it is alleged can create credit, the framework of his wording in Section 6, or my wording in amendment No. 13, is the more appropriate framework for putting these powers into the law. I am asking, in order that I may come to a decision, how is it intended that the central bank will give credit?

There are certain powers given here which would have the effect of causing an expansion of credit. If these powers were sufficiently big to be able to have a complete influence on the subject, then I would be in favour of the Deputy's approach, but I think that if you were to put in the words the Deputy suggests it would mean that you believed that the central bank, despite any counteraction that might be taken, any action taken in an opposite direction, would be able to expand and contract credit. I do not think that would be the actual situation and, consequently, they will be to a large extent sitting in judgment, watching what is happening, seeing certain things happening, and they are helping to move the banks in a certain direction. The idea in the section is that if this movement is towards expansion or contraction of credit, the purpose they will have in mind is the public good. But it is true to say that they can cause an expansion or contraction of credit and it is also true that, if the banks wish to counteract, having a larger volume at their disposal, they could possibly do so. I think, therefore, that the words in the section are very much better than what the Deputy is suggesting.

If it is contended that the central bank will have power to create credit, could the Taoiseach indicate to me the particular sub-section or section under which the bank will have power to do so?

Every time, for instance, that the bank discounts bills. Suppose the central bank were to re-discount bills for a commercial bank it would thereby be putting at the disposal of the commercial bank increased bank balances, and, if they were to use anything like the fixed ratio such as the 10 to 1, they would have a basis from which to expand their own credit. They would have a basis for the expansion of credit.

That is a case in which the bank takes the initiative to create credit and is only assisted by the central bank.

In the rediscounting of bills.

But it cannot do so for local authorities.

I do not think the open market operations in our case would be of such an extent that it would make a great deal of difference. It has the power, of course, of going out and buying bills which would mean that it would be making what is equivalent to cash available, which would ultimately come back to the banks and in that way would swell the advances.

Is it a fact, as the Minister for Finance has already stated, that they cannot rediscount bills for local authorities?

That is another matter altogether.

What business has been done in the last ten years?

Not a big lot, and that is why, as I said before the Deputy came in, the power that the central bank will have in that direction should be so great that the action it would take would have the effect which it would naturally be designed to have or that might be expected to follow from it, and not, as seems to be the case, that the banks could, by their own action, counteract the action of the central bank. For instance, if the central bank was, let us say, rediscounting bills and therefore making more cash available, and therefore increasing credit, and if the banks went in the opposite direction, they could diminish it. Their power of acting, in our circumstances, appears to be such that by their action they could counteract the action taken by the central bank, and that is again why I say we have in this case to depend very largely on the leadership of the bank.

I asked how could the central bank create credit and I am told it can and I am told that it can create it under Section 7 (e), that is, it can rediscount bills of exchange. But the central bank could not re-discount bills of exchange except some bank took the initiative in asking to have its bills re-discounted.

In other words, they cannot compel the bank to come along. The other way is that it can go out and, if it can get bills, re-discount them. Bills might be given to it, I daresay at a price. It could go on the open market and re-discount bills in the open market.

I must say that we are getting very little information.

The information the Deputy seeks is in Section 7.

There are a lot of ideas in Section 7.

I am asking a simple question: how can the bank create credit, and when the Taoiseach gives me a sample he says it is very hard to expect the central bank to do it because the banks can prevent it succeeding and yet, when he takes a sample as to how the bank can do it the sample that he takes is a case where a bank takes the initiative.

And he offers as a sample the way in which the bank may take the initiative, a way in which it would probably be more expensive for the bank to do it than the normal way and, therefore, the bank would not do it.

We are getting away a good deal from Section 6.

On a point of order, you, Sir, prevented me from discussing in anticipation. In previous discussions, you prevented me by a very definite ruling from going on to a section we were not discussing.

May I say in reply to that, for Deputy Davin's information, that we are discussing the question of the bank creating credit under its general functions, under Section 6, and the Minister has one set of words in it which talks about ensuring that in what pertains to the control of credit the bank will take into consideration the welfare of the people. I want to have the bank given the express power of creating and controlling credit.

So do I.

We are told that the Minister's words are wider and give more power than the words in my amendment, and, in order that we may make up our minds as to which of the two groups of words we would prefer as giving the necessary power, I am asking the Minister to say in what way, under the scheme as it is there, the bank can create credit. That is how we ran into the discussion of it.

On the point raised by Deputy Davin, the references to Section 7 were allowed to clear up a point in dispute between the Minister and Deputy Mulcahy, but not for the purpose of discussing Section 7.

There was a doubt as between Sections 5 and 6 also.

The discussion was relevant; to clear up a point that has arisen on an amendment.

Credit can be expanded, or created—if Deputy Mulcahy likes that word better—by a variety of ways set out in Section 7. I do not think I need read them for the Deputy. There are limits to that, admittedly. There are limits to the ways of creating credit. The first way is by making rediscounts and advances. The joint stock banks could use their power, the power of money, to limit the central bank. The banks need not come to the central bank, as Deputy Mulcahy points out, to initiate. There are other ways. Under sub-section (e) the bank has power to rediscount bills of exchange and so on. Under sub-section (h) it has power to make loans or advances to banks and other credit institutions. There are several ways that it can expand credit, within limits, admittedly, and there are counter steps that can be taken in certain directions by the joint stock banks.

There is one way it cannot do it.

What is that?

It cannot rediscount bills for local authorities — the Minister said so.

We will come to that later. We will probably have a long discussion on that. There is an amendment down.

Amendment No. 16.

We will come to that. Deputy Mulcahy proposes his amendment but he does not give any reasons why his wording would be more effective. In matters of legal phraseology I am not an authority and, when considering Deputy Mulcahy's amendment, I asked the advice of the best technicians that we have at our service. I am told that my phrasing in the section has a wider power and that it includes the power that Deputy Mulcahy seeks to put in. That is what I am told: that it is wider and includes the power. I do not want to exclude the power. I am told it is wider and includes the power and therefore I stand over it.

With regard to Deputy Cosgrave's criticism on this, I frankly find it difficult to reconcile the attitude of Deputy Cosgrave and that of Deputy Mulcahy. I do not think it is possible even in this section. We are anxious to get help to make this measure, which Deputy Cosgrave thinks a useless instrument, of some use. We believe it will be of some value, though not of considerable value. Deputy Cosgrave suggests that any power that is necessary for credit in this country already exists. So did the machinery of credit exist in England and in the United States before the present idea of a central bank came into existence or was operating. Take Deputy Cosgrave's point of view. He says that there is no necessity for this institution to be set up at all here, because the existing banks have fulfilled all these functions and that "they will have more money to give credit than the central bank will have in its first ten years or maybe ever". The same thing applies in England where you have what are called the Big Five or the Big Six — I forget exactly how many there are. They have all more resources than the Bank of England; still they find in England that there is a great utility in a central bank. It helps the community and it is of great national value.

The same thing also applies in the United States. They did not have, until a very short time ago, anything like a central bank. There they call them federal reserve banks, but they decided to set them up. There are in the United States banks which are vastly richer in resources than any of the federal reserve banks. Still the United States found it necessary to set up such an institution in the interest of the State and in the interest of the community as a whole. As far as the banks here are concerned, I do not want to say anything against them. I do not want to say that they have done anything against the general interest, but they have acted primarily in their own interest and not in the general interest. We think that the time has come when it would be better in the national interest to set up a central bank here. Again there is the question of the creation of credit. There are certain limits to the power of any central bank that is likely to be set up here in our situation. Taking our situation, it is one that limits the powers of a central bank as long as present conditions continue.

It is just because of that situation to which the Minister has referred that I regard some of the amendments as valuable.

As practicable?

And as valuable. The Minister suggested that the present situation did not allow certain things to happen. Very good. Does the Minister think that these circumstances may ever change? Does he think it is right to provide for such a change, and, if they should change, why tie this bank in such bonds as are here provided for? On the last occasion when we were discussing this matter the Minister for Finance was asked whether the legal tender note was not going to be tied up with British money. He said "No", that we had an Irish £ that was free from any tie of that kind, and he talked about the consolidated bank notes. Apparently he forgot that Part IV of this Bill provides for doing away with consolidated bank notes. Part IV of this Bill is headed: "Extinction of Consolidated Bank Notes". The consolidated bank issue was the elastic part of the Currency Commission's fabric. The framework was so moulded that it had a certain elasticity about it. That has been taken away and, for the future, we will be in the position that we shall have only legal tender notes.

I said on the last day we discussed this matter that to my mind the whole thing was rather rigidly and rigorously associated with British money. I had an objection to that from the Taoiseach but that objection was later on withdrawn. I think it is common ground that, in so far as this country wants to have control of credit to itself, it fails. That may be a situation we cannot get over as present events go. The situation is that, if we wanted to expand credit here, and the Bank of England had the opposite tendency, then all we can do towards the expansion of credit will fail because we have opted here for the fullest and freest convertibility of our notes as against British money. We are asked to consider the possibility that the central bank can create and can expand credit. I do not know that it can do that at all but I do know that, if the Bank of England decides to create credit, we cannot withstand that expansion, and, if the Bank of England decides to restrict credit, we cannot withstand that restrictive tendency. In so far as you have wiped out the consolidated bank note issue, you are removing one corrective to that tendency. The Minister for Finance speaking on the Currency Act of 1927 said that the consolidated note issue was based on the credit requirements of the people. Now that consolidated bank note issue is being wiped out over a certain period of years.

Was it not also to be wiped out under the Currency Act?

No, the consolidated bank note issue was an innovation in that Act.

They are to be wiped out at the rate of £1,500,000 over certain periods. When that is gone we shall have in this country only legal tender notes. The position regarding legal tender notes is set out in Sections 47 and 49 of the Currency Act. Section 47 states that —

"If and whenever any person on or after the appointed day applies to the commission, at the place in Dublin appointed for the purpose by the commission, for legal tender notes and delivers to the commission at such place and in accordance with the regulations... not less at any one time than 100 ounces of gold bullion"

—a person could not do that—

"old gold coins (in this section called Saorstát gold coins)"

—a person could not do that—

"... or money (in this section called British money) in any form which is for the time being legal tender in Great Britain for unlimited amounts, the commission shall issue to such person legal tender notes of an amount equal to ... the nominal amount of the British money so delivered."

So that, whatever issue there is in England, we get the force of the expansion here. Similarly, in Section 49, we find that "every legal tender note shall be payable by the commission on presentation at the London agency and shall be so payable in money in any form which is for the time being legal tender in Great Britain for unlimited amounts". Is it not quite clear that we have an acceptance of the situation that, if there is a big issue on the other side, whatever part of that flows over here in the ordinary way, or is pushed over here artificially, our central bank must issue legal tender notes against whatever notes are presented here? Similarly, when people present our legal tender notes and call for British money, we must pay in British money and, to that extent, there is restriction or expansion. There is that situation. We are tied as much as any of the joint stock banks in England is to the Bank of England. Whatever the Governor or directors of the Bank of England decide on for political purposes, we are to follow suit.

Is not that the law as it stands?

To this extent; so far as legal tender notes are concerned, but not as regards consolidated bank notes.

It will be only in the direction of an increase.

Remember what the consolidated bank note was built on — liquid sound advances — and if there was a restrictive tendency created on the other side and there were liquid sound advances of the type referred to here to enable consolidated bank notes to be issued, so far as the techniques of banking are concerned, you could withstand that. You wipe out the consolidated bank note now and leave yourself entirely with these legal tender notes.

They were not lasting.

Of course, they were lasting. They were tied to the £6,000,000 based on liquid sound advances and there was a provision in the Act for having the £6,000,000 increased.

Will not that power still exist?

No; it will go with the consolidated bank notes. Am I asked to believe that the section which allowed an expansion of consolidated bank notes beyond the £6,000,000 will remain, although these notes are to be extinguished? We are to be tied hereafter to legal tender notes and they are tied to British money.

Legal tender notes could be issued.

I would like to hear how it is to be done, with the proposal in the Currency Act of 1930.

As proposed to be amended.

The consolidated bank notes will disappear over a period of years. The possibility of increasing the issue based on liquid sound advances is gone too. We are forced back to the legal tender note which is definitely tied, as far as expansion or restriction is concerned, to British money, with whatever may be the possibility of enlargement by amendment of the Currency Act of 1930. Meanwhile, I am told to concern myself with Section 7, and with the possibility of enlarging credit. I am not going to read all Section 7, because, as far as the expansion of credit is concerned, I think the greater part of the section is irrelevant. It has nothing to do with credit. I turn to the Banking Commission Report, page 517, in which Mr. Jacobsson used the phrase, "In view of the virtual disappearance of commercial bills." We are going to expand our credit on what Mr. Jacobsson said had virtually disappeared. We have a great prospect in front of the country with expansion of that kind.

We suggest, in opposition to this, an amendment to take out certain words in brackets. At the moment, Section 6 is a bit of hypocrisy. It brings in a phrase from the Constitution that bankers are to have as a constant and predominant aim the welfare of the people. They are to have that as their aim within the powers given by the Act, which, I say, are far too restricted and narrow. If you take out the words in brackets, you have general directions given to the directors of the central bank apart from the legal restrictions here. Supposing something happened requiring action by the bank, if these words are left in, the bank cannot act in such an emergency, and a new Bill would be called for. There is an amazing amount of currency in being in England in circulation to-day far beyond anything they had pre-war. The expansion over there is a great many times greater than any similar expansion we have here. Supposing that is allowed into circulation, it would swamp the central bank and there is no way in which the central bank could meet it, inside the terms of the Act. They must come and ask for legislation to be brought in. If you take these words out, the central bank has power which it may use in an emergency.

Let there be general directions to operate what is laid down in the Act, but do not give two contradictory terms. As they stand, it can do nothing with regard to the restriction or expansion of credit.

I ask that this amendment should be considered, and then there might be some reality in this direction to the bank to look after the welfare of the people. If you leave these words there, it is tied up and can do nothing.

Is it not clear that if what the Deputy suggested is done, there might as well be no Act? Would you not immediately have a question of a dispute arising? Supposing there was any question as to their powers which would cover anything they do, Parliament would decide. They could say: "We are the judges. We took that action because we believed it was in the common good and in the general interest, and therefore anything done was for the supreme purpose, even though it was contradictory, and you are going against something against which it is provided that you should not go." On the other hand, one wishes that the two ideas could be got in and that over and above these powers, there could be general power. You cannot limit yourself. This section is drawn up with the idea of saying: "Look here, Parliament has given these powers and imposed these duties upon you. In any action you take within these powers, you will always keep as your main object the public interest." I am afraid if you do anything more than that, you will have contradiction in which the bank will say: "We are arbiters of all that and we are opposed to anything else; everything we do will be on that basis."

Who is to safeguard the public interest on the board?

The whole body. They will be put on the board for that purpose. They must have no interest but the public interest.

Including the three banking directors?

I pointed out that the three from the banks will be put on ultimately, not as representatives of the banks, but as people chosen because of their particular knowledge of the business. They will be expected, once they get on, to consider the public interest and not the private interest of the banks. They will have knowledge of the working of banks. The fact that they are put on the board means that they are put there to safeguard the public interest in regard to these matters.

Going back to some other points the Deputy made, I think he laid too much stress on the currency side. In every country the amount of currency in circulation is a very small part of the whole. The Deputy dealt with legal tender, but that is only one very narrow section — an important section, but a very narrow one. With regard to consolidated bank notes I do not think the section was ever used. They have never been based on liquid sound advances. There was no need for them to do it. They were always able to get the backing for the currency issued in the form of sterling assets, and, from every point of view, they considered that that arrangement was more convenient for them.

With regard to expansion of credit in Britain, it is not, I think, through the medium of the currency issued in Britain that the expansion will occur here. It will occur here as a result of increased prices and so on, which, on account of the trading relations between the two countries, will have a direct and immediate effect. The purchasing power of our £ on the legal tender side will immediately change, no doubt, but there would be an effect on prices, independent of that, which would carry with it depreciation of the monetary unit, so that, again, if we want to safeguard ourselves against the repercussions of monetary policy in Britain, we should have to do something very much more than merely looking after the question of parity. The question of parity would not settle it, nor would even the question of any tie, the question of the relationship to the British pound. The dangers that might result in this respect will have to be constantly before the minds of the board. It will be one of their most important duties in time of crisis to watch, and, if there are repercussions which are damaging to our community, to try to safeguard the community, if they are able.

How could they do it?

If they can do it. The circumstances may be, as the Deputy has several times said, that it will not be possible. It might be difficult for a small boat to save itself from the wash of a larger ship moving by, but that is the position.

With regard to this particular section, I do not think that we can, without getting into an impossible position, do what the Deputy suggests and leave out the words "within the limits of the powers given by law."

The Minister for Finance, in speaking of the manner in which we over here have dealt with this measure, seeks to mark a difference between what Deputy Mulcahy says with regard to the measure and what Deputy McGilligan says and what I say. There is a very marked reluctance on the part of the people behind the Minister to give expression to views of any sort or kind. The Minister says I am hostile to the measure and that I am doing nothing to help him with regard to it.

I am not complaining about that.

His own amendment seeking to make more easy the issue of currency arises out of my criticism. I have more amendments down to the measure than the Minister and it would not seem from that as if we were not trying to improve it. I am opposed, and strongly opposed, to this measure in respect of three different headings. In the first place, it is increasing the cost of the currency in this country. Secondly, it is taking more money from the currency for the Exchequer and giving nothing whatever in return and, finally, it is basing whatever currency we have exclusively on foreign backing. I am opposed to that.

That is not correct.

It would be correct were it not for my criticism and the amendment the Minister has brought in. It was said—I was not here on the last occasion when the Minister said it —that the legal tender and consolidated notes have both been issued, since their inception, on the basis of foreign backing. That fact was not brought to my attention during my term of office. If it had, and if an objection had been raised by any of the bankers, I would have dealt with it. There is no boast in that, and I would explain it to the Minister, as he does not understand it.

He does not believe it.

He does not understand it, and I shall explain it to him. The legal tender here and, in fact, any tender we shall have in the future, will be based upon British backing — British securities, British money, British credits. That is the whole basis of whatever currency we shall have in the future. On occasion, we shall have an opportunity of doing something else, if the Minister's amendment passes. In other words, we are pledged now, so far as any currency we have or are likely to have in the future is concerned, to taking the British word for payment.

This Ministry — the Minister for Finance and the other Minister backing the Bill — is satisfied with that situation. What exactly is the British treatment of the Irish banks in respect of currency at present? What is the backing of whatever notes are issued in Northern Ireland at present by any of the Irish banks? It is their own liquid sound advances and nothing else. I am not playing politics at all; I am simply stating the facts. If the Minister is prepared to take the British interpretation of credit and is backing the issue of currency in this country upon it. What is the objection to accepting what the British Government takes as representing credit in Northern Ireland in respect of note issue there, from the Bank of Ireland, the Provincial Bank, the Ulster Bank and the Belfast Banking Company? Is it that the British civil servants are more farseeing than ours, or that the Bank of England is better prepared to accept the word of a banker in Ireland than the chairman or members of the Currency Commission here are? That is what I wanted to explain to the Minister when I said I was not boasting. I was simply stating what the fact was.

We are concerned with credit. What is there that affects credit? Surely cost is the most important item. What do the British charge these Irish banks for the note issue which is in circulation in Northern Ireland? They charge 7/- per cent. What do we charge here? The Currency Commission was charging 30/- per cent. To that was added another 30/- in the Government's first Budget, and, in 1937, 10/- was taken off, and the price now is £2 10s. Od. per cent. The price in future, based upon British currency, if it is war loan, is 3½ per cent. and we expect our industrialists, our commercial people and our agriculturists to compete on that basis. If the Minister wants some suggestions as to how to make this Bill more useful and more likely to contribute towards those matters which appertain to the control, the issue and the advantage of credit, let him reduce those items. They are doing it in the North and I do not see why we should not have the advantage of it here.

Deputy Cosgrave makes it quite clear that he is opposed not alone to this section but to the whole Bill, because, as he has said, he believes that there is sufficient credit for every praiseworthy purpose for which money may be required here. I ask him, as a Deputy who was the head of a Government, why, if there is a sufficient amount of credit available, it was not used for the development of the resources of the country during the period he was in power? Why is it that our mineral resources are not fully developed, if all the money that we were told about, both by the Minister for Finance and Deputy Cosgrave, is available and has been available? If any proof were needed of the fact that there has been no real development of our national resources because of the lack of credit and of money at a reasonable price, it is to be found in the fact that our country has not been developed and that our own people have not been given employment. However, Deputy Cosgrave seems to believe that the joint stock banks that have been functioning in this country since our own Parliament was established can do that work for our people, and that they are the people who are to be judges of the welfare of the community. I should like to accept the version that the Taoiseach has just now given as to the manner in which this bank can function — that it can control the issue of credit and the expansion or contraction of credit.

Has he shown that?

I admit that he has not shown it in a positive way.

I think he has not shown it at all.

Will the Minister for Finance tell us why, under the Bill as it stands, there is no power to rediscount the bills of exchange of local authorities?

The Committee is not dealing with that matter now.

I submit, Sir, that you allowed the Minister for Finance to refer to the powers contained in Section 7, and I am sure you will give me the right of briefly referring to them.

As already stated, I allowed reference to Section 7 because such reference was decidedly relevant to Deputy Mulcahy's amendment. I do not see how that amendment tabled by Deputy Hickey — amendment No. 16 — has any bearing on the amendment before us.

If there is no power in this section or any other section to give authority to this bank to rediscount bills issued by local authorities, surely it is a matter for discussion in a Bill of this kind?

The Deputy will have an opportunity of putting that view on amendment No. 16.

Yes, Sir, I realise that, but I wish to point out, with great respect, that it has been referred to already in this discussion.

The Chair has not heard it.

The Minister for Finance referred to Section 7 in order to answer Deputy Mulcahy, and he was allowed to do so by you, Sir.

Indirect comments or challenge of the Chair's rulings are themselves unruly. Deputy Mulcahy and the Minister were allowed to refer to Section 7 because it was relevant to the discussion.

I would willingly accept the statement made by the Taoiseach in regard to the powers of central banks generally, and of this bank also, if there were any representative on the board of the central bank to see that the welfare of the community was looked after. If, however, the board of the central bank do not take the view that the Taoiseach has given of their powers and authority, under this very section, who is there on the board of the central bank — the governor or anybody else — to insist that they should do so or to point out that they are not doing so? On the day that this Bill becomes law, the members of the Government or the members of this House will have no power to interfere in any way with the board or the governors of this bank. I think that it could be regarded as the duty of the three joint stock bank directors, who will be put on this board, to look after the interests of the banks that are responsible for putting them there. A limited selection will be given to the Minister for Finance so far as the individuals are concerned. I presume that what they call the Joint Stock Banks Standing Committee will nominate the panel of six, and that the Minister for Finance——

These matters were discussed on amendments Nos. 2, 3 and 4, and were agreed to by the House.

Yes, but it has been possible in the past, and I hope it is still possible, to change the view of the Government.

On the Report Stage, but not on the same stage of the Bill.

The Taoiseach himself made a confession, on the last day, of being in error on a matter of vital concern in regard to this whole Bill, and if his view is now right I think it would be desirable that the whole Bill should be taken back and redrafted. However, the point I wanted to make is this. The Taoiseach tells us that the operations of the board — whoever they will be — appointed to administer this Bill, will depend upon the leadership of the bank. I am quoting words used by the Taoiseach here this evening.

Would the Deputy mind repeating the words?

"Depend on the leadership of the bank."

What will depend?

The activities of the board in connection with the creation, expansion or contraction of credit. I think the Taoiseach's words were also used by Deputy McGilligan. My point, however, is that there is nobody on the board to represent the public interest, nobody to see that they will carry on their duties in accordance with the viewpoint of the community, or the viewpoint of the Government, if you so desire.

That is a different matter, but it is definitely set out that they are to have regard to the public interest.

Well, it is a matter of opinion as to whether they are likely to do so or not. I sincerely hope that the Bill will be operated in the way the Taoiseach has stated, and that there is power to see that their functions will be used to implement a vital Article of the Constitution.

On that point, I do not want to be misunderstood. They have a power of doing certain things, but the results which will follow from their actions may be counteracted by actions taken by the banks. For instance, if I am moving, let us say, towards the stern of a ship, and if the ship is moving forward at the same time, I might be absolutely at a standstill, relatively, in regard to the surface of the water. In other words, one thing counteracts the other.

Accordingly, action taken by the central bank which might naturally tend to contract or expand credit may be counteracted completely and nullified by the action of the other banks. I want it to be understood, therefore, that I know that powers are given here to the bank which might mean a contraction or expansion of credit, but that these powers are not sufficiently great, or that the results of the action that can be taken under them are not sufficiently great to make it certain that the results they want can be achieved—in other words, that they can be nullified.

I hope we have not confused the Minister for Finance into thinking that Deputy McGilligan and myself are on slightly different legs in this matter.

I do not find such a great difference, generally, in the views expressed by Deputies McGilligan and Mulcahy, but I do find a fundamental difference between their views and those of Deputy Cosgrave.

Well, I hope the Minister appreciates what Deputy Cosgrave said almost at the end of his speech: that it is the price of money which counts; and I hope the Minister realises that Deputy Cosgrave and myself are very much on the one word with regard to that.

The price of money and the volume are not the same thing, generally.

I hope the Minister realises that Deputy Cosgrave and myself are very much at one on that matter, and that the first thing in my mind, at any rate, is the price of money, because I do not see anything particularly wrong with the volume— at any rate, anything that is wrong with the volume can be easily corrected. I withdrew my amendment— to delete the words "within the limit of the powers for the time being vested in it by law"— because as we go along on this measure I am perfectly satisfied that we know where we stand and that we are going now to be bound by law, and I am asking that the law shall read — I am cutting out the irrelevant matter — that as regards the general functions and duties of the bank, the bank shall have the function and duty of taking "such steps as the board may from time to time deem appropriate and advisable towards safeguarding the integrity of the currency and creating and controlling credit."

With regard to the board, I want the position to be that under the law one of its general functions shall be to have the power of creating credit. There is not a word in Section 6 about creating or expanding credit. I am trying to get clear the way in which the bank is going to have the power to do that. The suggestion has been dragged in that, even if the proposed law did read like that, the banks might have the power to oppose Government schemes by acting in such a way as to reduce the volume of credit. If we do not expressly say that the bank shall have the power and the duty to create credit, then, I suggest, we are only going to invite confusion of that sort. We have been referring in Section 7 to certain ways in which the bank can create credit. In my amendment to paragraph (g) of that section, I am proposing that the bank shall have the power to buy and hold securities of the State or securities guaranteed by the State.

In reply to a Parliamentary question asked by Deputy Morrissey on the 21st May last, particulars were given of the amounts of the overdrafts obtained by county councils from the banks up to the 31st December, 1941, for the purpose of getting on with turf production schemes. The total amount of the overdraft so obtained was £930,147. The rate of interest charged on all that money was 4 per cent. The overdraft, in the case of Donegal, was £132,791, and of Galway, £110,903. I think it absurd that Donegal should have to pay an interest charge of £5,200 a year on that overdraft in order to push ahead a turf production scheme, and that Galway should have to pay £4,000 odd a year. Surely, there ought to be some way in which, in special circumstances, it would be possible for the bank to create credit for a turf production scheme. Unless the central bank is going to have some kind of power to create money for an ad hoc purpose like that, then you are not going to get done some of the very essential work that Deputy Davin has said should be carried out in the country, or else you are going to have unnecessary money spent on work left undone. I want to see the power of enabling the bank to create credit expressly set out in Section 6.

It may be that as we go on we may find that the best schemes that can be formulated for the purpose may not be very successful, but, at any rate, let us go ahead step by step with a clear knowledge of the facts as to what we want to do, so that when we come up against objectionable facts we will do so with very clear intentions. In regard to what the Minister for Finance has said, the phrase in the amendment in relation to the creation of credit is certainly wider than the pious expression in the Bill. I would like to know why, if it is thought desirable that the central bank should have the power to create credit, it is not set down expressly. If it were, we might then be able to relate some of the proposals that are supposed to enable the bank to create credit to the intentions behind the Bill, as well as to the difficulties that the bank might meet with.

When the Deputy speaks of creating credit, does he mean making money available to the Government for specific purposes, free of interest?

I am trying to find out what the Deputy is after when he talks about the creation of credit in the way that he has been doing. When talking on these subjects it is hard to avoid confusion in one way or another. There is the creation of credit and the action that will be taken by the banks for a specific purpose. In particular instances, the action taken would naturally tend to create credit. My objection to the putting in of creating credit is that the action would be taken but might not have the actual result looked for. If a boat off the coast of Wicklow is capable of doing 20 knots and I have put upon me the duty of moving, on the boat, in the direction of the Irish shore at three to six miles an hour, if the boat happens to go in the opposite direction, the fact is that no matter how fast I may go, that boat is going to sweep me in the contrary direction, despite myself. The Deputy and myself may not be talking about the same thing. I took it that he was talking about expanding the volume of credit — that the bank should, in specific cases, be able to make credit available for some general public purpose. If the Deputy's idea be that the bank should make money available to the Government for such purposes, then I want to say that that idea is being rejected in this Bill. The attitude we have taken is that if the Government want money for a particular purpose they can get that money from the savings of the community. The Deputy suggested on a previous occasion that we ought to be able to borrow at a lower rate. Well, let us try that. You can go to the public and get it at the lowest rate possible. That is what the Government are trying to do.

Are the county councils borrowing from the public?

I am not talking about the county councils; I am talking about the Central Government. If we are to pursue the other matter we shall have to take it separately. I did not refer to local government bodies at all. I am talking about the Central Government. If the Government are to get money otherwise than by trying to get it from those who have savings at the lowest possible rate, then we have a new situation, because there is the question whether people will save at all unless they have some use to make of the money and they must get some return for the money they have saved if they are to hand it over to other people. By their money, I mean their claims on wealth of one kind or another. If they are to hand those claims over to somebody else, they naturally expect to get from that person as much as they could get by using that money otherwise. If you do not give them an inducement by giving them a reasonable return, you will not have savings in that particular way at all. There is no provision in this Bill which will enable the Government to go to the bank and ask for money. If the Government want money for any purpose whatever, they have to get that from the public, using the commercial banks as well, and they have to get that money from savings. I know Deputy Dillon will say: "But the banks will be able to hand it over without getting it from any of the existing savings." We had that question out before and I do not want to deal with it. But there is no provision by which the central bank will do that and I do not think it would be advisable.

Is it not astonishing that the Taoiseach does not want to have that question out again? He comes here and says that he must offer the people who will subscribe to his loans an inducement in the form of substantial interest or he cannot expect them to lend him their savings which can be otherwise profitably employed. That is a defence of usury which I find distinctly stimulating to hear in a professedly Christian State. Leaving that aspect aside, this matter goes to the very root of the question. When the Taoiseach receives subscriptions to a national loan from a bank, my submission is that it is not the depositors' money they lend at all. They lend money which they themselves create. On that they are paid probably what the Taoiseach believes is an equitable rate of interest in order to induce people to create savings. They are not savings at all. The banks are simply making an entry in their books. The Taoiseach says that in order to induce them to make that entry he must give them that satisfactory rate of interest.

Six per cent.

I think 3½ per cent. is what the State is paying at present.

3¼ per cent.

I do not know what the Government are paying for Treasury bills or Ways-and-Means-advances, or whether there are any ways and means advances in this country. They have had Treasury bills.

Nearly 3 per cent. is being paid.

What is being paid on Treasury bills?

2¾ per cent.

We are paying to the banks 2¾ per cent. on Treasury bills which, in fact, operate to open an overdraft in the Bank of Ireland for the Government of our country. Is not that so?

We are not paying anything at present.

Because you have not got them. But you had them.

Sometimes we paid more.

We, the people, paid a joint stock bank in this country from 2¾ to 3 per cent. for the privilege of issuing our own money. Surely that is fantastic. Does it not sound fantastic to anybody in this House? If that is the best way of working credit in this country and you have to employ the banks to administer it, you have to pay some administrative charges, I admit at once. It may be that the most efficient way to operate credit in this country is to operate it through the joint stock banks. Then let us ascertain equitably, fairly and justly what the legitimate charge for expenses is and, if we want to keep the joint stock banks in business, let us give them a fair profit on the entire turn-over of their business in so far as that business is transacted with us, the people. But let us not treat a joint stock bank which is dealing in credit money the same as we would treat a widow woman who had £100 saved in a stocking. The Taoiseach says that she is entitled to a return in usury on that money.

Call it interest.

It is a return in usury. I am not so sure that this business of interest might not be better got rid of and a distinct difference drawn between the employment of money in enterprise with its just reward, as was the old plan, and the lending of money on interest. But, without going into the merits of that question of usury, let us at least distinguish between the person who has invested accumulated savings and the bank that is simply making an entry in its books. Surely the Taoiseach accepts that difference. Surely it is not fair to argue that you are bound to give an equitable return for savings and by that argument to justify giving the banks 3 per cent. for credit money charged on our Treasury bills or ways and means advances when the money is in fact our own? Surely there is a fundamental difference there? Surely that is vital to the matter which the Taoiseach is discussing?

I was perhaps unfortunate in referring to Deputy Dillon, who dealt with this matter on a previous occasion in another way. The Deputy has admitted one thing which he should pursue a little further. First of all, he assumed that this would be credit created by the banks. How does he know that? It might very well be that the banks wished to invest the deposits which they have got in that particular way instead of otherwise. So that to start with we have the question: how does he know that it is created money? Suppose it is; suppose the fact is that the banks have invested all the deposits they have got; that they leave their present investments untouched, and that the Government go to the banks for a loan of, say, £8,000,000; it just gives them a book credit for £8,000,000. The Deputy has admitted anyhow that there are administration charges. I suggest that there is a good deal more in it, that it cannot just stop there.

For instance, the moment that that went out it would immediately change the ratio between the deposits and the cash. Is not that so? They will have to write off 10 per cent. of it again. They will have to provide £800,000, one-tenth of £8,000,000, and put that aside as a cash backing to meet the expansion. A sum of £800,000 will have to be taken out of the existing investments in order to have the cash backing, so they will be losing whatever interest they were getting on that £800,000. Again, that much money put out on the community is bound to give rise to a larger demand for currency. That is one thing, but we need not worry about that; that does not affect it immediately. A lot of the money will come in as deposits, and they will have to pay interest on those deposits. It may not merely be put into current accounts. People do not want to keep large sums of money on current account. It will come in as deposits, and the bank will have to pay the deposit rate—an uncertain amount. Over and above the administration charges they will have to set off a further item of £800,000, which will have to be drawn to make the cash ratio right, and there will also be a sum which will come in from depositors and upon which interest will have to be paid, so it is not all free money, so to speak. I am perfectly certain that if the examination which I have just carried out on the spur of the moment were pursued a bit further, it would be found that it is very different from free money as far as the banks are concerned. I do not know what the rate would be; I cannot say. I do agree with the general principle that if the State is getting money from the banks it is reasonable to expect that that would be given to the State at a lower rate than they would be able to get on ordinary loans, but the distance you go is another matter which I should like to see more thoroughly examined. The position anyway in regard to it is that we do not know exactly how far you would go, and my belief is that the more you examine it the more you will find that the rate which it is reasonable to give to the banks will go up. I said at the very beginning of this debate—it is one of the things that every Government will try to do — that we will try to get this accommodation at the lowest possible rate, at the rates that obtain in ordinary business, because although this is a larger amount it is of the same nature as an overdraft to a private individual; it is a public overdraft, so to speak. That is what it really amounts to. The rates at which they will advance money to a private individual are determined, I take it, by a lot of considerations. They are anxious to do business; they want to get the highest rate they can get, and the highest rate they can get will depend on a lot of things, the availability of money otherwise, and so on. The Government has only one test at present of the rate the bank should get, and that is to go out to the public and try to get the money as cheaply as we can. I am told that in the last loan practically all the money came from the savings of the community — from the public rather than from the banks.

The Taoiseach says, taking the figure of £8,000,000 as the amount of the public overdraft, that the bank would have to sterilise £800,000 cash in order to create that credit. We are not talking in terms of the Midland Bank of London which habitually trades on a 10 per cent. basis. It is common knowledge that the Irish joint stock banks have never traded on a 10 per cent. basis; it is 22 per cent. They have immense surplus funds which are never employed, and of course that strengthens our banks. The fact that they trade on this very wide margin means that our banks are in fact more solvent than any of the English banks. It is ridiculous for the Taoiseach to tell me that they will have to reserve £800,000 upon which they would otherwise be earning a profit.

If they do not change their ratio they will want much more.

Why should they not change their ratio?

You want them to change their ratio?

Why not?

That is a business for the banks, and for us, too.

Surely if it is established banking practice that that procedure is safe and prudent, it is ridiculous to tell me that because the banks say: "We have not done it heretofore," the State must pay 2½ per cent. more interest.

Would a small society have to keep a relatively greater ratio than a bigger one?

If the Taoiseach asks the practical bankers of this country why they always maintain a higher ratio of cash, I think he will find that the reason is because they have never found willing borrowers here of such a character that they could properly advance money to them. Otherwise, there is no reason why they should not have gone on a lower ratio. I take it that the Taoiseach was speaking ex tempore and without due reflection. He said that this £8,000,000 which the Government would borrow would come back into the bank as deposits on which the bank would have to pay interest. That is absurd.

Of course it is absurd.

The Deputy should point out why.

If the Taoiseach will hurry home and consult the family pass-book he will find that, whereas his grandfather and my grandfather, being conservative, rural-minded persons, might have habitually put savings into deposit in the bank, we moderns, when we have money, invest it. I have no doubt that every penny which the Taoiseach has made is invested in the promotion of Irish industry and the employment of Irish nationals. He would not do anything so unpatriotic as to leave it lying dormant and stagnant in the banks. If he asks his followers here they will boast that every penny they have is invested in Irish industry, and I might say that if those industries enjoy a sufficiently high tariff they will get a better return on it than they would get from 1 per cent. in the banks. Of course part of that money will be invested by those into whose hands it comes. It may be invested in shares or used for the purpose of consuming goods. It is quite true that some of it, in passing into circulation, may extinguish existing overdrafts, but if you choose to pursue those things as far as that, you are entitled to say that the business activity created by the distribution of that sum of money will create new demands for overdrafts which will compensate the bank for any loss they have sustained as a result of the £8,000,000 lent to the Government.

I note with satisfaction — it is the first time the Taoiseach has come this far to meet me — that the Taoiseach now admits that where the Government is borrowing credit money from the banks it is fair to expect the banks to give the State its overdraft at a lower rate of interest than that at which it might reasonably be asked to lend to a private citizen, but he says that even when we are demanding that lower rate of interest to which the community is entitled we have got to make fair allowance for administration charges, consequential loss, and one thing and another. I agree with the Taoiseach, but so far I have seen no effort on the part of the banks to make that computation or to give that concession. Mind you, the banks would have to give that concession at any time without waiting for the Government to pass the Central Bank Bill. The Taoiseach says that if he wanted to find out what is the nearest he could go to the rate of interest he should expect to pay the banks on the community overdraft the best test is to go into the money market and try to borrow money directly. I deny that that is the test. I say that our credit here is as good as the British credit. What is the British Government paying at present? Nine-sixteenths of 1 per cent.

Does the Deputy realise that he is going a bit far away from the amendment?

I do not think so. The amendment speaks of the control of credit.

And particularly the creation of it.

I have been dealing with that aspect of it and, so far as I can find out, it is the only aspect that matters. I submit to the Taoiseach that that is the just comparison. The equivalent of our State overdraft is the British Treasury bill or ways-and-means advance. That is the floating debt which it is ultimately intended to extinguish even though it is not extinguished.

It is expected to be extinguished.

It is almost interminable.

One issue of Treasury bills extinguishes the one that went before.

You do not get expansion in that way.

Let us not start drawing red herrings across each other's tracks. The Taoiseach took, as his test, in the first place, the rate at which he could borrow directly from the community by way of national loan——

I meant that as the upper limit.

It would be more reasonable, I suggest, to compare our rate with the rate of interest charged by the London money market on Treasury bills, which was nine-sixteenths of 1 per cent. at a time when the British bank rate was 2 per cent. Why should not we get from the banks, within the limits of solvent banking practice, accommodation for the community at a rate of interest that will approximate to that? Is there anything outrageous about that proposition?

I want to secure that we get money as cheaply as possible.

Constant dripping wears away a stone. Slowly and reluctantly, I am hauling the Taoiseach along to the same view that I have myself, although I am doing so in very heavy water. When is the Taoiseach going to get up and say: "I am expecting the joint stock banks, out of the surplus credit money available to them, to make so much as the Government may reasonably ask available at a rate of interest far less than that charged to the ordinary borrower and bearing a very much closer relationship to the Treasury bill rate on the London money market than it has ever borne before"? When the Taoiseach goes that distance with me, the difference between us will be very narrow. I cannot help reminding the House that, when I first adumbrated this view, the Taoiseach described it as "fantastic nonsense". There is not the difference of a hair's breadth between us now, and I do not think that I have moved very far from the position I then occupied.

Deputy Dillon was not in for the early part of this discussion. If he had been, he would have realised that the practical details of which he has spoken had been almost entirely forgotten. This section is an attempt at an uneasy compromise between two things — this hypocrisy of pretending that the bank is being given rather wide powers and is directed in the exercise of those powers by this glorious phrase from the Constitution about "the welfare of the people as a whole" and on the other side — the realistic side as against the idealistic side — that the bank is tied and limited in its functions and has hardly any of the functions of a central bank in any other country. There is an attempt to gloss over the reality by this idealistic phrase.

The Taoiseach made a comparison and said one could not progress faster towards the shore than the rate at which his boat was moving. Imagine a big boat, such as the Bank of England, and a little dinghy. Recognising that the dinghy is going to be towed along in the direction in which the big vessel goes, the crew of the dinghy is dressed out in some form of nationalistic uniform or, instead of being towed by the stem, it is towed by the stern — which is rather uncomfortable for the people in it — so that there is no progress. Where is the central bank being given any control of credit? I want to be referred to the section. I have been referred to Section 7 (e). That is infinitesimal. Mr. Jacobsson, who is a recognised expert, says that the amount of business done in that way is insignificant, that this type of bill has practically disappeared.

That was not the only reference. I have referred to the leadership of the bank.

The leadership of a gentleman with his head pressed down on a stone wall and trying to get through. Where is the leadership to be, with all the limitations placed upon the bank in this Bill? In so far as credit is going to be created, it is going to be the manufactured matter of the other side and we will follow and will not have any great power of expansion or restriction, apart from what the other side may do. If Deputy Mulcahy's phrase were adopted, the bank would be given some general function in relation to the matter we are discussing. Even if Deputy Mulcahy's phrase were adopted, I am not sure that it would effect much so long as you had the phrase in brackets "within the limits for the time being vested in it by law". When you have those words, I do not see what capacity of movement is given to the bank at all. If I am wrong let me be referred to any section by which, under this Bill or under this Bill in combination with the Currency Acts, the central bank will have any important function to play in either expanding or restricting credit. Can I be referred to sections under which the bank is given any power with regard to interest rates or any power in connection with exchange rates?

I should like to answer two points made by Deputy Mulcahy and Deputy Cosgrave. The Government and I are as interested as Deputy Mulcahy is in trying to get money for public use at the lowest possible rate of interest. I looked up the Currency Commission's returns to see what rates of interest obtained since April, 1922—the earliest date with which the Currency Commission deals. The rates of interest fixed by the banks varied from 5 per cent. in 1922 and 7 per cent. in 1929 to 6½ per cent. in 1931 and 3 per cent. in 1939. The rate of charge for loans by the banks varied very much over the last 20 years. On the whole, in the last ten years it was much lower than in the ten years before that. I am not saying that the Government had anything to do with that — it had not — but the rate paid for loans over the last ten years, on the average, was lower than the rate paid in the previous ten years. In either case, I suppose the Government had to take responsibility for what they paid; but, at best, they could get cheap money and they got it as cheaply as they could. The fact remains that in the previous ten years they paid more for the use of money, because the bank rate was higher.

There has been a tendency in the last few years for the bank rate to fall. It was 6½ in 1931; 6 in February, 1932; 5 on the 10th of March, 1932, and 4½ on the 18th March, 1932. I wonder if it was the fact that they got such a new and such a good Government that gave the banks confidence and enabled them to reduce the rate of interest.

The bank rate in England at that time was £3 Os. Od. per cent.

If you go back to 1932 you will find that the bank rate in England was considerably lower.

That is tradition.

Though there is a tendency in the bank rate to fall, the Government is not — and in the Government's name I am not — claiming any credit for the cost of money falling. The rate fell from 5 and 4½ per cent. in March, 1932, to 4 per cent. in April, 3½ per cent. in May and 3 per cent. in June. That was a constant fall during those months. It was down to 3 per cent. in October, 1939. There was a fall in 1922 also — from 5 per cent. in April, 1922, to 4½ per cent. in June and 4 per cent. in July. It went up to 5 per cent. in 1923.

It makes things much easier for everybody if we get money at a low rate of interest for public purposes. Deputy Dillon talked about the amount that we pay to the banks for our loans. Of the second last loan — and particularly the last loan — not a penny came from the banks. It came through the banks, but it came from the public, and the public is getting 3¼ per cent., which was lower when compared with the rates paid over a long number of years here. I am not saying we would not like to get it at a lower rate — we would — but from the public we got that money and not from the banks. If I recollect rightly, 60 per cent. of it came from the poorer class people, the smaller middle class and, perhaps, the working class, who had saved £300 or £400. Sixty per cent. of it was in under £600 lots.

Did any of it come through the public going into the banks and getting a loan to lend to the State?

That may have happened. Perhaps the Deputy knows, but I do not. I did not examine the case of any person to see where the money came from, so long as I got it and got it at a moderately low rate. Deputy Coburn says we should get money free of interest. I wish he were Minister for Finance. I would like to see him getting it. I do not think it would be fair to expect that the savings of the public be given without some return for it. Deputy Cosgrave compared the position which will arise, if this Bill goes through, with the position in Northern Ireland. He said that in Northern Ireland they could still issue their fiduciary issue at a low rate. That is true, as the central banks were allowed to keep the right to their fiduciary issue after the Currency Act was passed here. They retained the right to issue their currency. Admittedly, the rate was raised considerably, but it was also reduced: it varies and probably it will continue to vary. Admittedly, the banks are paying more dearly now than they paid in 1927 and than Northern Ireland banks are paying for their fiduciary issue.

The Deputy also stated that the balance over their fiduciary issue was based on domestic assets and domestic securities. The total amount of notes in circulation in April, as taken from the Belfast Gazette of April 1942, shows the total amount at £13,273,261. The total circulation authorised by the Bankers (Northern Ireland) Act of 1928 was £4,951,000. The difference is £8,322,000, which amount is backed entirely by Bank of England notes. Here is the certificate of the Registrar of Bank Returns dated 1st April, 1942:—

"I hereby certify that each of the bankers named in the above return who have in circulation an amount of notes beyond that authorised by the Bankers (Northern Ireland) Act of 1928 have held an amount of Bank of England notes and gold and silver coins not less than that which they are required by the Treasury to hold during the period to which this return relates."

It was Bank of England securities that made up that difference between £13,000,000 and £4,000,000 and not domestic Irish assets.

Is the ratio of Bank of England notes to Northern Ireland bank notes, pound for pound, over the fiduciary issue?

Yes. Deputy Cosgrave said that in relation to these liquid sound advances, his attention was never called to the matter. No advances had been made on liquid sound advances. There is a report to the Currency Commission dated July 31st: paragraph 6 on page 2 says:—

"The general liability of a shareholding bank to pay consolidated bank notes in respect of which it is the responsible bank is prescribed by Section 58 of the Currency Act, 1937. In addition, and without prejudice to this general liability, the Commission is empowered by sub-section (4) of Section 52 to take security from a shareholding bank in respect of its consolidated bank notes. The Commission decided, in the course of the year under review, to exercise this power by requiring the transfer by every shareholding bank to the Commission of acceptable securities to an extent adequate for the protection of outstanding consolidated bank notes."

Therefore the Currency Commission decided they could not operate that section of the Currency Act authorising them to advance money on liquid sound advances. In fact, they never did advance a halfpenny on that section of the Currency Act. They never did, in fact, advance a halfpenny on that section of the Currency Act, and they called the attention of everybody, Deputy Cosgrave included, to that fact in that paragraph of the report of July, 1932.

If my recollection is correct, I stated that no banker had drawn my attention to the fact that that was so. It is quite true that the statement may have been made, but I do not remember having read it. I am accepting it as having been issued by the Currency Commission. It does not in the least shake my case, because if a banker, or more than one banker, had drawn my attention to the fact that that was the case with regard to the Currency Commission, I would have had no hesitation in advising the Government to amend the Act so as to compel them to make those issues of consolidated notes on the basis of liquid sound advances. If there were no other reason for it, the fact that the Minister stated that, in the North of Ireland, the fiduciary issue amounts to almost £5,000,000 on the basis of the liquid sound advances they have, would suffice. Why should it not be possible to do it here? It seems, on its face, to be indefensible that if, in the case of a fiduciary issue under the North of Ireland Government or the British Government, as the case may be, they are satisfied with the security of the liquid sound advances and the domestic assets of the banks, that we should require to have something stronger.

What are liquid sound advances? Give me an example of one. There is an issue by the State of a national loan. Suppose a person has £500 to his credit in the bank and he walks into the bank and says: "I have £500 to my credit. I propose to buy £1,000 worth of national loan and I want an advance from the bank of £500 to make the purchase." The bank has security in respect of the advance of £500. You have there the £500 on deposit and then there will be the £500 that that person will get from the bank. That is a liquid sound advance; it has collateral; it has its own security. Surely, on its face, that is as good a security as £500 worth of British war loan? I am not putting it any higher than that. Why should it not be an asset in respect of which currency can be issued in this country?

The other question is equally material, and that is, what is the cost of the currency that is so provided? The cost here is going to be somewhere from 3 to 3½ per cent., unless one issues credits for them in the Bank of England. We are in competition with the whole world in respect of our agricultural produce and it costs us eight or nine times the price that it costs a competitor across the Border, a man competing in the same market. That is the position of the agriculturist in the North and the agriculturist in the South. Surely the competition is sufficiently keen to warrant us looking to that side of the question to see whether any contribution that we make, particularly in a Bill of this sort, will ensure that the credit will be at least as cheap as in other countries?

As regards Deputy Cosgrave saying that no banker called his attention to the matter, the Deputy and his Government appointed a Currency Commission to take charge of currency, fiduciary matters, and to be the advisers of the Government. If the Deputy, as the head of the Government, wanted advice, why did he not go to the Currency Commission? They were appointed for that purpose. I suggest they gave advice which was ignored.

Its advice I would not take, on the basis of what I said that, in my view, and I believe it would be backed by an overwhelming majority of those who have any interest in banking and finance, liquid sound advances in this country are sufficiently strong and sufficiently stable to warrant the issue of a currency on them. When I say my attention was not drawn to the matter, I mean that it was their duty to have told me and to have pointed out that some provision should be made which would enable them to have the consolidated note issue backed by liquid sound advances, domestic assets.

Are they so advanced in the North of Ireland?

Yes, to the extent of £4,900,000.

I should like to see that proved.

The Minister has between this and the next day to ask any one of the banks — and he knows the particular bank he can go to if he wants to find it out.

Deputy Dillon's thesis all the time has been this: it is recognised that banks put into circulation something that is called money and that certainly does not depend upon cash, either their own or their depositors' cash. Deputy Dillon asks, in connection with that well-known ratio of 10 per cent., that some fraction of that should be more or less demanded as occasion warranted by the State, with the statement: "We should not be asked to pay you the prevailing rate of interest because you are not paying it to anybody." In answer to that the Minister for Finance reads us a long list of bank rates and the only comment which aimed at relevance, but which missed the mark, was the comment: "How could you expect the bank to lend the savings of the people without getting something on them?" That entirely misses the point. Deputy Dillon mentioned that we had an Irish pound which had not to be backed by British money, the consolidated bank note. This Bill aims to extinguish the consolidated bank note. The Taoiseach apparently was not aware of the easy convertibility between our issue and British money.

Apparently the Minister for Finance at last realises what Deputy Dillon is at. At the time of the last war people were amazed as to how the money was going to be raised. I have here one statement which, when it was made, was considered fantastic, but it has since been accepted as a mere statement of fact as to what did happen:

"When the war broke out at the beginning of August, 1914, the gold reserve of the Bank of England,"

according to this statement,

"had fallen to about nine millions sterling. When, about two months later, the State proceeded to apply to that bank for £350,000,000, the spectacle was enough to make the gods laugh. There never had been £350,000,000 in the country. The directors said they would make a public issue, knowing that the public had not got it. Subscriptions began to dribble in——"

Finish the quotation — it is good.

"Subscriptions began to dribble in, but although the Press did its best, and suggested that the loan would be subscribed for two or three times over, those inside knew better, and it soon became obvious that the bank, in order to save its face, would be compelled to adopt some new expedient. And this it did. It issued circulars to city firms and business men, which contained a truly remarkable offer. One of these offers came to me. It set out that if I filled in an enclosed form of application for a portion of the war loan, they would lend me the whole of the money (knowing that they had not got it). Had I applied, say, for £20,000 of war loan stock, I should have had to put up no margin, no money and no securities. It would cost me a penny stamp for the covering envelope, and no more. Those who availed themselves of this offer were charged 3 per cent. for the accommodation. The State will ultimately pay them 4 per cent. and the taxpayer is to pay this 4 per cent. to the State — this being the only real part of the transaction."

What is the Deputy quoting from?

It is a pamphlet on war loans and the banks. The name is not appended. I cannot state with certainty who the author was, but I believe he was Mr. Pethick Laurence, afterwards M.P. and a Parliamentary Secretary in the Labour Government and associated with the Treasury Department. There was another loan of £350,000,000. Eventually there came a £600,000,000 war loan. Of course, it was done in the same way. Whose credit was being used for that? It is very carefully worked out here. It was the credit of the public, and the public had to pay on certain British war loan £14,000,000 a year to the book-keepers for issuing, through these book-keepers, the public's own credit. They are not paying as much in this war because that matter is under control, but in the last war they paid fantastically. I give that as the magnified picture of what happened. Deputy Dillon takes that and applies it to our ordinary circumstances. He takes the ordinary way in which bank credit is extended and makes the proposal — and I have not heard any answer to it yet— with regard to credit. You could see the answer immediately if you had the mentality of the Minister for Finance. He believes that every penny the banks lend out is loaned to the banks by somebody else and that these are the people who demand 4 per cent. on it.

I only said that in reference to the last loan.

I did not understand what the rest of the reading was about but that struck me as peculiarly irrelevant. It meets the point Deputy Dillon was making if the Minister for Finance does believe with regard to the money the bank lends that it comes from people's savings and that those people, for their savings, demand and ought to get some 3 or 4 per cent. or whatever is the prevailing rate, that the bank will add on something and we will only get it at 5 or 6 per cent. Supposing the situation is, as I think is accepted in all the books written on credit, that there is a certain mechanism, that the lever which works that mechanism is bank cash but once you get a certain amount of bank cash and lean heavily on that, you get extended credit of a ten to one ratio. If that is the case, and if there is a very big extension of credit, what people are becoming increasingly perturbed about is why the bank should demand on manufactured credit the same percentage of interest they get when they are in fact simply doing the moneylender, taking in your savings and lending them to other people. Why must the country be mulcted in the same interest rates in connection with that extended or manufactured credit as they are on the simple exchange matter; taking in one person's money and lending it? That is the thesis put up by Deputy Dillon in a variety of circumstances. I have not heard any answer to it yet. I come back to the section and I do not think, whatever anybody may do about it, that the central bank is going to make one penny piece of difference to credit extension or restriction in this country. We might as well stay with the Currency Commission. The central bank is going to make no difference to it.

I would like to add just one or two points: first, that the amount of money borrowed by the British Government between the outbreak of war and the 31st March, 1942, was £5,687,000,000 and of that, £2,141,000,000 is floating debt costing about 1 or 1? per cent. About £1,600,000,000 is at 3 per cent. About £1,300,000,000 is at 2½ per cent. and the rest is savings certificates, etc.

I do not think we should discuss rates and borrowing and created money here without keeping in our minds the picture that we get from the other side. I have discussed on other occasions the estimate that was given more than 12 months ago of what the British were going to spend on the war— £10,000,000,000—and they were not going to fight the war on 5½ per cent. money, as in the last war, but were going to fight on 2 per cent. money, that they could look comfortably to the future; that they could pay off that debt under certain circumstances and, having assumed that they controlled the rate of interest and that they did not allow prices to fall beyond, say, 25 per cent. above the pre-war level after the war, that they could pay for the war comfortably, almost at the rate of income-tax that was in operation before the war. That is the mind that they have on it when they are spending not only £6,000,000,000 of borrowed money but an enormous amount of money obtained through taxation.

As Deputies have stated, our credit ought to be as high as the British for our own purposes here, and we ought to be able to get money here at rates comparable, at any rate, with the rates at which the British are getting their money for their war purposes, particularly when we see that so much of our own money here, money that belongs to our people in the balance of trade, is being loaned to the British at, say, 1? per cent. As far as the rates go, therefore, I think we definitely must state our mind that we will not, for Government or public purposes, pay the type of rates we have been accustomed to in the past. I think a decision here and a decision in Government as to what our line is going to be on that is one of the things that will govern the cost of credit to our people generally throughout the country. So much for rates.

With regard to this amendment of mine which is before the House, I want to know when I leave this House to-night whether it is the intention of this House that the bank that is being set up under this Bill will have the power and the function, first of creating credit, second of controlling credit. I want to know that. Deputy McGilligan questions whether, even if the words in my amendment were put into the section, they would be of any use. I rather question it too because, as I see the central bank, it could almost be an additional section to the Institute of Higher Learning.

It is there for consultation and advice and, in my opinion, it might as well be shifted from Foster Place to Merrion Square. Again, I am open-minded as to whether it might not be quite as useful an institution in Merrion Square as in Foster Place. There are so many things that have to be taken into consideration, so obscure is the situation and the future, that I am perfectly open-minded as to whether I would accept this as an addition to the Institute of Higher Learning or as a substitute for the Currency Commission.

I want to know whether this institution is the kind of institution that should go up to Merrion Square or whether it will be an institution that will create and control credit, whatever the circumstances may be. That is the reason I propose the amendment.

There was one point in the Minister's statement which I forgot to mention. He read out the various rates of interest paid during the last 20 years. They are not very illuminative unless we take into account the circumstances of the period. For example, in 1929 the rate went up because of the demands that were made on the Bank of England for foreign payments. In 1931 the situation was pretty bad for much the same reason. Then a policy of cheap money came into operation, largely owing to the conversion of the 5 per cent. war loan to a 3½ per cent. loan. That is a rate that, one might say, has dominated the money market since. Cheap rates have been operating since that time. It so happens that money rates have the peculiar effect that any changes in them are uniformly adopted by people who hold the same economic views. We could not keep a low money rate here if there is a high money rate in England. It will be found that we are affected to that extent much in the same way as the people on the other side are affected.

Before the amendment is put, might I point out to the Leader of the Opposition that the bank rate here went up at the same time as the Bank of England rate went up, and that it came down here at the same time as the Bank of England brought its rate down?

That is what I said.

The Bank of England lost that power of controlling rates when the British Parliament said to Mr. Montagu Norman: "If you do not bring down the rate, we shall make you." That was a new departure for the elected Parliament in Britain in its dealings with the Bank of England. It was a revolutionary change and it was carried further when Mr. Keynes went on the Board of the Bank of England. If you proposed to put Mr. Keynes on the Board of the Bank of England 15 years ago, the whole bank would have fallen into the street. There has been a change there and we want to carry that change into this country.

Deputy McGilligan questioned the desirability of importing this word "creating" into the section. I agree with the Taoiseach that there is a danger in bringing in the word "creating" here, lest "dafties" get it into their heads that this will confer on the central bank power to set up printing presses to print money, but if it is agreed, as it now seems to be agreed, that there is a recognisable distinction between credit money and actual currency, cash, could it not properly be the function of the central bank — and I put it to Deputy McGilligan that it is a practicable function even within the narrow limits of this Bill — to summon the joint stock banks to state to the central bank what is the cash basis credit on any given day and to ascertain then the total volume of permissible credit money that might be created within the four corners the joint stock banking community has established by empiric knowledge over the last 20 years?

If there is a difference between the total permissible volume of credit money, and the total actual volume of advances, of £20,000,000, you could say that within that limit of £20,000,000 the Government shall have access to short-term credits at the prevailing bill rate in the London money market. This would be a sensible creation of credit. It would be an order from the central bank to the joint stock banks to create more money for the accommodation of the Government and an entirely different rate of interest will be charged from that charged for ordinary advances. In a limited sense that would be the creation of credit.

I am not trying to commit Deputy McGilligan to an admission that that course of action would be desirable, but to a recognition that if it were desirable, it would be practicable within the very narrow limits of this Bill. If that course should subsequently appear to be desirable, is it not better specifically to authorise the central bank to do that? I think Deputy Mulcahy's amendments mean a specific authorisation to the central bank to do that — and inasmuch as they do, I shall support them.

It is telling them to do it inside the limits of the Law.

Yes, it gives them power in that limited sense to create credit.

I fear that if I were to reply again to all the points which Deputies have raised, it would involve a good deal of unnecessary repetition.

That is what makes Dáil Eireann such an excellent deliberative Assembly.

I quite agree, but unfortunately there is a limit to the time we can spend on these sections if we are to get this Bill through in a reasonable time. There has been a great deal of repetition at times and if I were to deal with all these points I should have to go back on something previously said. I want to say definitely what I said long before this Bank Bill was introduced — and I was speaking the mind of the Government on the matter — that there is a public aspect of credit.

The proposition that Deputy Dillon mis-stated originally I agree with when stated properly. That is, that if the banks increase the amount of cash available and maintain the same basis as before, they can extend credit. I pointed out that in that there are many limitations, the effect of which can be seen by looking at the banks' profits in normal times. If this easy money were available, and the banks were anxious, as they naturally would be, to make use of it, you would see it reflected in their profits, but you do not see it reflected in their profits. Moreover, the time in which expansion takes place is a time of emergency in which the Government is really the initiating body in creating that expansion, whether in this war or the last war. With regard to the question of the expansion of credit, do not think that it stops when you get that £8,000,000. If you got that from the savings of the people you would not send up prices but by an expansion of credit you are going to have a reaction in the way of increasing prices.

That means that in so far as every individual buys less with the money that is available you are extracting from him a certain contribution towards the cost of your £8,000,000. If the bank get a rate of interest over and above that to which they are legitimately entitled it should be the business of the Government to prevent that and to any extent to which it is possible to reduce the rates at which the Government gets money for different purposes I am in favour of that. The only thing I want to add is that if you are going to insist on certain things we want to be satisfied that they are just on the basis of the interest involved and that it can be done properly.

That is the only difference between us. Deputy Dillon wishes to say that, like him, I turned. It may be like Keynes going to the Bank of England. It is a question as to who changed. I think it will appear that Keynes has changed somewhat. This subject has been intensively studied during the last 20 years, and during that time many things have come to the surface that were hidden earlier. There is a great deal more knowledge of monetary matters and of monetary control now than there was 50 years ago. We agree that that is a line which requires a certain amount of investigation. One reason why I am anxious to see this body set up, with somewhat more extended functions and a wider field than the other is, because I believe the Government will have at hand a body of advisers to whom it can go, which will have as complete knowledge as it is possible to have while devoting themselves to the theoretical and practical side of banking, and all involved in it. We want to have them as expert advisers to the Government, and as expert advisers to the banks, because in the long run — perhaps it is a short view — the welfare of the whole community means the welfare of those who are both customers and shareholders of banks as finance institutions.

With regard to the Government getting money at special rates from the banks, I think that wants to be examined from another aspect, somewhat apart from seeing what it costs the banks, the desirability of getting money, if it can be got by savings rather than the creation of new money. At times it might be better to have the creation of new money. That is one of the things that the board of the bank will have to look to very carefully. You certainly will not have any increase in prices or an inflationary tendency if the money is got by savings. It is really money already in existence and it might be desirable not to increase purchasing power at a particular moment. The aspect you ought to consider is this: Supposing a business firm, a big customer, comes along and asks for a special rate for doing a certain job and for supplying certain materials, the question is, am I entitled to give it to that big customer at cost? I am taking the big and the small. Ordinarily, I would say: "Here is a big customer, I will give him a special rate, but I will not cut it to the bone. I will get a certain amount out of it." I imagine that if I were anxious to progress in my business I would try to take advantage of the particular profit I was making to help to lower the rate at which I was able to give service, in the belief that it was good business. In other words, I would endeavour, out of the business as a whole, to make way for a reduction in costs. I think Keynes had some such idea when he talked of adding to the cost of credit right through.

If you get a specially good customer, and if from the size of the transaction you are able to make more than you would have made, that particular customer ought not to come along and in the interests of business and competition say that you ought to try to lower the costs on everyone else. If banks were to make the same, profits, and only looked for the same profits, they might, as a result of lending money in that way to big customers, be able to reduce the cost to private enterprise. The danger is that if they have to make up their legitimate costs and expenses, through giving big customers something which imposes a heavier burden on them, they might have to put that on to private individuals afterwards. That is only an aspect, but I throw it out as one that might occur as to the extent to which it is possible for the State to demand and to get money which would barely cover costs, and at a low rate. I think it should be examined. I do not think we can do that in this Bill. The only way would be by putting it to the board of expert advisers, with other matters relating to monetary policy. It is for them as advisers to the Government, and as leaders of the banking community, to try to keep them along the direction that will serve the common interests. That is what we expect.

With regard to what it does in the creation of credit. Deputies will have to read the Bill. The ultimate thing will be the proper reading and interpreting of the Bill in the final stage. That is the only way we will know what it can do. What we intend to do is set out. I think the amendment suggested would change the character of the Bill completely, so completely that it would practically mean that you would be setting up this bank as a means of financing the Government, so that it would make money available for the Government. That would give it quite a different character and also functions which are not the functions of central banks at all. If that became predominant it might interfere with other aspects, the integrity of the currency and the value of the monetary unit.

Will the Taoiseach say what steps he is going to take to make the necessary funds available for turf cutting for the emergency, and to see that it is not going to cost 4 per cent., while Great Britain can fight a war to the tune of thousands of millions at the rate of 1? per cent.? Is our credit as good as that of the British, or are we doing less useful work than they are doing with the money they are spending?

That brings us back to the whole fundamental question, why is it not possible for the community to get in peace the same results as in war? That is a natural question to ask. There is a number of things we want. One is to have money available at cheap rates. I say with regard to that, that war is a peculiar situation, in which every individual, whether right or wrong, feels so intensely that he is prepared to hand over to the Government complete power over himself and all he has. That is not a normal but an abnormal situation. The fact is that war is a completely abnormal situation, and you can impose on each individual restrictions, directions and regimentation that you could not impose in normal times. You will either have to make the abnormality of war normal, or you will have to admit that things done in war are things that we pay a big price for, from the point of view of the community. The price you would have to pay would be too big to make it a normality. I do not know all the details of the financing of the turf cutting operations and so on, but I take it that the money was got by way of overdraft. Is that right?

Yes, and they could not get it any other way.

They have got the money by way of overdraft, for which they are charged. We did not fix the terms on which the overdraft was arranged, but I dare say they fought for terms in the same way as the Government fights for its accommodation and tries to get it at the lowest possible rate.

The Minister for Local Government sanctioned the rate of interest and the amount.

He did, and he had to sanction it because he was probably told that it was the lowest rate at which the accommodation was available. If he did not do so, it would have had to be provided otherwise— from some direct fund.

He was told by the banks.

I do not know that the Minister was told anything by the banks, but, if he thought the rate was an improper rate, I am sure the Minister would have tried to find out if there was any way of influencing the banks to give a lower rate, but the initiative did not come from the Minister.

How is it that some of the banks are lending money to the British Government at 2 per cent.?

I am not so sure about that.

It is a fact. It was stated in replies given by the Minister in the House.

I should like to get notice of the question. So far as our banks are concerned, I thought there was comparatively very little given in that way.

Only £27,000,000.

The Deputy has me at a disadvantage in this matter. I presume he has some figures at his disposal, but whether he is interpreting them correctly or not, I do not know.

I got them from the Minister for Finance.

I should have to know the whole question and the whole answer before I could argue on it, because I do not know enough about it at the moment. I think, however, that at one stage I did satisfy myself that the amount invested, or made available, by the Irish banks was not considerable.

Let us not get away from the point I put to the Taoiseach. When he says that to accept my amendment would change the whole character of the Bill, I ask him what he is going to do to secure that our Government, for the work we are doing, are not going to pay 3¼ per cent. when the British Government are paying on the average 2 per cent. for what they are doing, and the Taoiseach says: "Oh, but they are at war, and it is the old story of being able to do for war what you cannot do in peace." I understand that that theory is out of date.

What interpretation then are we to place on the statements of the heads of the churches in Great Britain, when they declare that there are certain things which have to be done for social security and social betterment, like housing? What interpretation are we to place on leading articles in such newspapers as the London Times which says that there are two scourges—war and unemployment—and that one has to be fought with all the weapons with which we fight the other, and that if it had been recognised not only in Great Britain but throughout the world, in 1931, that the unemployment which then existed was a very different phenomenon from the unemployment which existed before the last war, the present war would not have taken place, and that by a fractional expenditure of the moneys and energies now being devoted to the waging of this war, this war would have been avoided and the people could have been provided with amenities, education, employment, and such things in a very definite way. Is that all dreaming? Is that all a matter of people mouthing, simply out of the terrors of the war and out of the feeling that the expenditure now being borne is so terrible that anything in any way less would be tolerable, or is it a fact that the entire financial theories in Great Britain have radically changed since 1931 and that the new clearing of their minds, as a result of the shock of war, has shown them that there are ways in which people can be occupied and provided for, which are not as costly or as wasteful as the ways of war?

If they are prepared to continue afterwards the restrictions in force at present and prepared to make a normality of what are generally regarded as abnormal conditions, they can go about it, but I should like to see it done.

Is the Taoiseach, then, saying that we cannot reduce our rates here, that we are going to continue paying 3¼ per cent. for our Government money, that we are still going to have the bank rates which are charged to those engaged in turf cutting and other people doing emergency work here and still going to have excessive charges for interest compared with charges in Great Britain?

The charges in Britain are the present war charges.

If Deputy Mulcahy feels, and has always felt, so worked up about this question of high interest, why did his Government pay rates of interest much higher than those we are paying?

My dear sir, do you realise that I have learned——

That is all right. We have all learned.

——since the outbreak of this war, and that I am not the only person in this country, or any neighbouring country, who has learned?

We have all learned a lot.

I would not be arguing in this way if we had all learned.

If the Deputy looks up some of the speeches I made from that side, he will find in them many of the things which were said in the Times.

I am not looking for speeches or for words; I am looking for action.

I really wanted action, too.

I am trying to put words into this which will be a kind of prelude to action.

There is where we differ.

Deputy Mulcahy, perhaps unconsciously, misrepresents the situation here when he says that they are getting money in England at the very low rate of 2 per cent. or 1? per cent.

1? per cent. on floating debt. 2½ per cent. is what they are paying now on money they are getting from the people.

But for 90 per cent. of it—I cannot give an accurate figure —they are paying 3 per cent.

For the vast bulk of the money.

I gave the figures.

Is it not a fact that the Minister said in reply to questions here that between September, 1939, and December, 1941, a sum of £27,500,000 was invested by our Irish banks in British Government loans and securities?

Not at 1? per cent.

I am not asking the Deputy behind the Minister. I know he is a financier, but I am asking the Minister.

I cannot remember the figures, but I will look them up. If the Deputy quotes me as giving that information, I am sure I did give it.

At 2 per cent.

Does it say 2 per cent.?

Will the Minister inquire whether or not it is a fact?

For the vast bulk of the money which Britain is borrowing at present to fight her war, she is paying 3 per cent.

Will the Minister listen while I read out the figures?

The vast bulk of the money is not short-term money. For short-term loans, they are paying small rates of interest—rates of interest never known before; but for the large bulk of the money—the tap money, and most of it comes in that way—the interest is 3 per cent. That is my recollection of the figure, but let us say that it is 2 per cent. or 1½ per cent.

I will give the Minister the figures if he wants them.

It is rather striking how the London Times and the Economist have become the Bible of Deputy Mulcahy during the last two or three years.

Read the London Times of last week and see the advertisements of six of our Irish banks appealing to their friends to take money at 3¼ per cent.

Again I say that I have learned—and I think we have all learned—that there are things capable of being done now by banks and financiers which, before this war, none of them would have dreamed possible. That is true. I think it was Deputy Dillon who said that the British Government had taken charge of the situation now. That is true. It is not the Bank of England that is in charge now, but the British Government, which says, "We want your money—your deposits—bring it in, and we will tell you what we will give you for it." But that is due to the war situation. They are taking, not alone the money, but the lives of their people.

You have not taken control of the banks here.

We have not conscripted the people's lives here. We have not said to them: "You must go and work in such-and-such a place for so many hours a day, at such-and-such wages, and we will give you no holidays." We have not done that. We are not in a war situation. If we were, perhaps we would have to conscript our people also, not alone their labour, but their lives. We might have to tell them what hours they would have to work and what wages they would be paid, and so on. That is the situation in England, which Deputy Mulcahy is rubbing into us, and, with all respect, we know as much about it as he does; but we have not conscription here, either of the wealth of our people or of the lives of our people.

They are getting our money.

We have not war here—God keep it from us—but if we had, we might have to go back and take the money from the people and say: "We will pay you nothing for it." In a war situation, where the safety of the nation, of the people, the community and everybody in it—the very lives of the people—were at stake, we might have to be even more ruthless than the Government of Britain have been, not alone towards financiers but towards their own people. There is the situation. There is no use in telling us what is done in England: we know it, we have read it, and it is brought very forcibly to our notice. They are taking the money there—it is probably given willingly, but at any rate, if it is not given, the Government of Britain is prepared to take it, and for short-term money the Government pays very little interest. Interest on Treasury bills, Ways-and-Means bills, and similar short-term loans, is phenomenally low; there has been nothing like it in history before.

The rate for Treasury bills was far lower two years before the war than it is now.

No. The rates vary according to the terms of the bills.

Interest rates on Treasury bills went down to nine-sixteenths of 1 per cent. before the war.

They vary from week to week.

Nevertheless, Deputy Dillon is correct in saying that the rate was very low before the war— as low as it is now.

Yes, but the terms of the bills differ very frequently.

What is the good, then, of saying that it is due to a war situation? It is not.

The rate is fully ¾ per cent. lower, and certainly ½.

There is a war situation in England that has fundamentally altered the financial position there, and that affects the position vis-á-vis the banks.

The bank rate is the same in England as it was five years ago.

What Deputy Mulcahy wants to impress on us—I think we know it without his having to impress it on us—is that money is got at low rates of interest in England to-day—very low rates—for war purposes and for public purposes in general. If there were a war situation here, we would get it at a lower rate, too.

The Minister has said, five times already, that cheap money in England is due to the war situation. It has sweet damn all to do with it. It was appreciating three years before the war began; then the rate was far lower, and the only result of the war has been to increase it slightly.

When did the war begin?

In 1939.

Well, as a matter of fact, for a year previously there were negotiations going on, as everybody felt that a war situation would have to be met at any time, and that also affected the position.

For years before the war the bank rate was 2½ per cent., and the Treasury bill rate was between nine-sixteenths and 1½ per cent.

If we had a war situation here, it would, probably, fundamentally change the situation here, too, and we would have to go to the banks and, perhaps, tell them that we would have to take the money they had, create credit, and do anything that might be necessary to save this State, and we might have to do it without paying any interest.

The Minister talks of conscription. What on earth conscription would you want to have where the county councils have to borrow large sums of money for turf cutting and have to pay 4 per cent. for it?

What would the Deputy himself do about that? Will he give us a picture of what he would do to meet that situation?

Under this clause, which I propose to amend, Section 7 (g), I would require the banks to lend to the local authorities at not more than 2 per cent.—if as much as that— an amount of money that would enable them to carry on, under Government guarantee, for the turf-cutting year.

Would you say that they would have to recoup themselves in any particular way for that?

I would ask them to show that 2 per cent. would not pay them all their necessary expenses in giving that additional turf-cutting overdraft to the local authorities.

Would you say that 2 per cent. would meet all their charges?

I think that 2 per cent. would over-meet all their charges.

I should like to see an analysis of that.

I should like to see examined what it costs any of the banks to make a loan to a county council for such purposes. Take Galway, for instance.

Have they not got Treasury bills in their portfolios at the present moment?

They have. Suppose you take only the loans to the British Government for the quarter, say, from 31st December to 31st March. It might be well to examine whether it would not pay the banks very substantially—even if they had to transfer some of their money to the Currency Commission and get notes in exchange —to lend £100,000 to Galway at 2 per cent. I think it would over-pay them.

There is no reason why they should not give it at the same rate here. I think, however, that the Deputy will find that he is complaining of things that are not of the same character, from the same point of view.

But any money that is available to the Bank of England can be made available to the Currency Commission, changed into Irish notes here and transferred to the local authorities that want it, and I think we must be bankrupt of any kind of ability to handle anything if we cannot learn something from the way in which the British are handling their position, in view of the war situation, and the way in which they are arranging for the future.

If we are going to continue in this helpless kind of way because of the absence of control over the amount of money in circulation, and over the price at which it is circulating, and in consequence are not able to do important emergency work, then we are certainly going to be crying over the future in the way in which some people are crying over the past. The Taoiseach's last line to this proposal of mine was that it would utterly change the Bill, and he is not going to have that.

Because it is a problem that will have to be tackled in another way.

I beg the House not to leave this matter without realising that the statement of the Minister for Finance—I do not know what put it into his head—that cheap money in England is associated with the war and the personal conscription of wealth is as fantastic as to say that cheap money is associated with the Shah of Persia's gall-stones. The two things have no connection whatever.

I find from a report here that since 1932, except for two months in 1939, the bank rate has been 2 per cent.

The Minister for Finance got up and said that the explaination of cheap money in England is because there is a war on and the personal conscription of wealth. There is no more foundation for that statement than there would be for the statement that the members of the Cabinet in Éire are women when we all know the contrary to be the fact. It is hard to believe that the Minister for Finance would make such an utterly vague and rambling statement. I want to emphasise and drive home that there is no scintilla of foundation for the association of cheap money in England with the war situation there. Cheap money obtained in England five years before war broke out when the bulk of the English people solemnly believed that there were going to be seven or eight decades of peace.

Does the Deputy believe, with the expansion of money there is in England, that if there was a demand for money in normal times the rate would still be 2 per cent.?

I believe that the rate is being kept down in the war situation, but to say that cheap money in England is associated with the war situation is nonsense, and the Taoiseach, who is a shrewd old campaigner, knows it, too. The Minister for Finance also knows it, and I sympathise with him for having gone a little further than he meant to go. But it is important for the purposes of the record that the error into which he fell should be nailed now before all the members of the Fianna Fáil Party get it into their heads that the Minister spoke advisedly. I beg of them to bear in mind that he did not speak advisedly. If they go down to see him later in his room, and ask him confidentially, he will tell them confidentially that he was talking through his hat. Deputy Mulcahy was challenged by the Taoiseach to give a picture of what he would do to meet this turf problem in which he has crystallised the whole problem. Deputy Mulcahy's reply was: why not ask the banks to advance the money to the local authorities to carry out turf production at as low a rate as they are advancing it to the British Government? The Taoiseach argued that that may be a different type of advance from that at which the banks at the other side take a low rate from the British Government. The very essence of a Treasury bill is that it is repayable by the British Government on a certain date. If you do not want to wait for that date you go into the London money market, sell it there and thus liquify it before its due date. Its easy negotiability is due to the fact that it is redeemed by the British Government at par at an early future date.

At so many days.

Or months. What does the Deputy mean by so many days? Treasury bills may run for three months or for six months.

Ninety days.

A Treasury bill can be issued for any period of time that the London money market will take it. There are different periods of maturity.

The usual period for a Treasury bill is 90 days.

There are on record longer bills. In the case of longer bills it simply means that their negotiability will not be quite as easy as that of a shorter bill. What is to prevent an intelligent Government and the joint stock banks of this country issuing advances to the Galway County Council to enable it to go ahead with turf production, the banks taking Government bills on the turf being purchased by Fuel Importers (Éire), Ltd., Suppose the Exchequer places funds at the disposal of Fuel Importers (Éire), Ltd., to purchase turf; suppose the Galway County Council wants to cut turf, and that the Government says to the joint stock banks to take Treasury bills at nine-sixteenths of 1 per cent. for the cash that the Galway County Council requires, have you not there a perfect example of a Treasury bill?

If you want to put that into the Bill, who is going to determine what class of operations will be carried out?

The Taoiseach challenged Deputy Mulcahy to paint a picture of what he would do. Here is the picture. If the Taoiseach likes the picture and wants us to put a frame on it, we will do that for him, too.

I think the Deputy would have great difficulty in putting a frame on it.

Does the Taoiseach like the picture?

I would like to see money made available at the lowest possible rate of interest at which the Government and public authorities could get it. The question is how to do that.

I thought the Taoiseach would like to get that on record at this stage so that the innocents reading it might not be misled. Is not the operation I have described analogous to the Treasury bill practice in operation in Great Britain? No one is criticising the joint stock banks of this country for not carrying in their portfolios the English Treasury bill practice, excellent though it be, because, as the Taoiseach knows, the Treasury bill practice would not be easy to operate here for the reason that we have not got a money market. But you could have a closely analogous procedure which would finance the operation the Taoiseach challenged Deputy Mulcahy to picture financially. If their credit margin permitted, why should not the joint stock banks of this country create money to finance Irish Treasury bills for a specific limited purpose, repayment to be stipulated on the extinction of the credit being provided for within a limited time?

Could one find a more perfect example of an operation of that kind than this: that you have the turf in the bogs, the labour in the cottages and the demand for the turf in the City of Dublin? These three things exist, but it is impossible to bring them together. The way to do it is to have six months or three months Treasury bills. If that is done the three things come together: the turf out of the bogs, the labour out of the cottages and the hearths in city houses are filled, with the result that the credit disappears and goes back into the void when it came. Is not that a perfect example of the kind sought by the Taoiseach?

Now is not this amendment which Deputy Mulcahy seeks to insert giving the very kind of power which would enable that to be done? Would it not be a proper power to vest in the central bank to enable them to go to the Joint Stock Banks Standing Committee and say to them: "On such-and-such a day there is this surplus of credit money for which you will take Government Treasury bills"—six months bills or three months bills—"at such-and-such a rate of interest, and you will create a credit for that purpose in addition to the existing credit which you are using for the ordinary mercantile purposes of your banks"? When the bills fall due the credit is extinguished and the work has been done. Deputy Mulcahy is not responsible for that answer, but that is my answer to the Taoiseach's challenge to Deputy Mulcahy when he says: "Paint the picture for me of how you will finance the turf operation"— Treasury bills at 1 per cent., or three-quarters of 1 per cent., extinguishable on a due date. Is it not worth while thinking of? If it is worth doing, is it not worth giving the central bank power to do it?

That gives a much more general power.

Then say to General Mulcahy that the power he envisages requires to be more closely examined and accept the principle of the amendment.

It does not fit in.

Do you accept the principle?

It is worth thinking about, not in connection with this Bill, but in connection with other matters.

Question put: "That the words proposed to be deleted stand."
The Committee divided: Tá, 40; Níl, 30.

  • Aiken, Frank.
  • Allen, Denis.
  • Bartley, Gerald.
  • Beegan, Patrick.
  • Childers, Erskine H.
  • Cooney, Eamonn.
  • Derrig, Thomas.
  • De Valera, Eamon.
  • Gorry, Patrick J.
  • Keane, John J.
  • Kelly, James P.
  • Kennedy, Michael J.
  • Lemass, Seán F.
  • Little, Patrick J.
  • Loughman, Francis.
  • Lynch, James B.
  • McCann, John.
  • McDevitt, Henry A.
  • McEllistrim, Thomas.
  • MacEntee, Seán.
  • Boland, Gerald.
  • Brady, Seán.
  • Breathnach, Cormac.
  • Briscoe, Robert.
  • Meaney, Cornelius.
  • Morrissey, Michael.
  • Moylan, Seán.
  • Mullen, Thomas.
  • O Briain, Donnchadh.
  • O Ceallaigh, Seán T.
  • O'Loghlen, Peter J.
  • O'Reilly, Matthew.
  • Rice, Brigid M.
  • Ryan, James.
  • Ryan, Robert.
  • Sheridan, Michael.
  • Smith, Patrick.
  • Traynor, Oscar.
  • Walsh, Richard.
  • Ward, Conn.

Níl

  • Bennett, George C.
  • Brennan, Michael.
  • Browne, Patrick.
  • Byrne, Alfred (Junior).
  • Coburn, James.
  • Cogan, Patrick.
  • Cosgrave, William T.
  • Costello, John A.
  • Davin, William.
  • Dillon, James M.
  • Doyle, Peadar S.
  • Esmonde, John L.
  • Fagan, Charles.
  • Giles, Patrick.
  • Hughes, James.
  • Keating, John.
  • Lynch, Finian.
  • MacEoin, Seán.
  • McGilligan, Patrick.
  • McGovern, Patrick.
  • McMenamin, Daniel.
  • Mulcahy, Richard.
  • Nally, Martin.
  • Norton, William.
  • O'Donovan, Timothy J.
  • O'Higgins, Thomas F.
  • O'Sullivan, John M.
  • Pattison, James P.
  • Redmond, Bridget M.
  • Ryan, Jeremiah.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Smith and S. Brady; Níl: Deputies Doyle and Bennett.
Question declared carried.

I move amendment No. 14:—

In line 25 to add at the end of the section the words:—"and to advise the Minister annually and on such other occasions as the circumstances may require as to the effect of State policy in relation to the safeguarding of the integrity of the currency and of credit and in particular as to the trend of the financial policy operative in the State on trade, commerce and employment."

This amendment is considered to be a strengthening of the measure from many aspects. It is possible that it may be viewed by the Minister as affecting this Ministry. That is not the intention. The intention is that it should be there no matter what changes of Government may take place in this country, and it is one of those clauses which would have been very advisable if there had been any British banking enactment in the period before they went off the gold standard. One of the things which operated in that respect was the fact that there had been for many years a financial policy pursued by the Parliament which was bound to culminate in financial catastrophe of some kind or another. The same might be said with regard to practically every other State which has had to undergo the pangs of currency changes, depreciations or inflations, as the case may be.

Apart from the question of currency altogether, there is the question of how far State policy may possibly affect internal prices. Although the Banking Commission devotes many of its passages to the effects which internal prices would have upon the currency situation, my proposal in this amendment has reference to a different set of circumstances, although they may be parallel to some extent with the currency situation. From practically 1922 up to the start of the present war—the emergency, as we call it here—we have been in competition with countries not only on the Continent of Europe but almost at the ends of the earth, and that competition was very intense. It is likely that at the conclusion of the present war we will be faced with much the same sort of competition, so it is all the more advisable that there should be a body, not subject to political fluctuations, which each year, or as occasion demanded, would consult with the Government generally upon the line of policy that is being pursued. It ought to be an advantage to the Government itself. It certainly should be an advantage to the State and, if the intention behind this clause be carried out, it ought to have a rather good effect upon our trade, and upon that will depend, to a very large extent in the future, not only the prosperity of the country but, what is even more important, continuous and regular employment for those who are engaged in those of our industries that depend largely upon an export trade. It should also have a very good effect upon the industries here which depend entirely upon home trade. One of those matters which have been referred to in almost every page of the Banking Commission Report is the effect upon prices of the policy which is pursued by the State. I put forward the amendment believing that it will improve the measure, that it will be of great benefit to the industry and commerce of the country, and that it should be of advantage also in regard to those other two matters which are mentioned throughout this measure—the integrity of the currency and the maintenance of a sound credit position.

I think it is sincerely to be hoped that there will be the closest co-operation between the central bank and the Government. It is advisable, I believe, that the board of the central bank should keep in close touch with the Government on financial matters. But this matter was considered by the Banking Commission and they suggest in paragraph 364:

"No formal constitution of the monetary authority and no formal relations prescribed between it and the Government can ensure that this function will be adequately performed if the arrangement is not carried on in a spirit of frank co-operation. It is not sufficient to adopt a statutory obligation for consultation; a tradition of regular consultation should be developed, and, on the basis of experience gained, the most suitable forms of consultation must be gradually evolved."

I agree that friendly relations and cordial co-operation between the two bodies ought to be developed, but I wonder if it would be better developed by making it a formal statutory obligation put upon the board of the central bank. I am not certain that putting that obligation on the board of the central bank is the best arrangement. Perhaps it is necessary, but I doubt that it is. Up to the present, there has been close and cordial co-operation between the Government and the board of the Currency Commission. I do not know that, by putting this provision into the statute, we shall make co-operation more intimate or more helpful. I do not see any strong objections to Deputy Cosgrave's amendment but, at the same time, I think that it is possible for the necessary co-operation to develop without placing a statutory obligation on the board of the central bank. I am prepared to look into the matter and see if I can fall in with Deputy Cosgrave's idea. I do not think that I would bring into any provision which I might introduce the last two lines of the Deputy's amendment "and in particular as to the trend of the financial policy operative in the State on trade, commerce and employment". I do not think that I should ask the board of the central bank to advise the Government on matters which are not within its province. Currency and credit is its province and I suggest that the matter referred to in this amendment should not be within the responsibility of the board and that it should not be asked to advise upon it. I doubt that it would be wise to put that responsibility on the board. The rest of the amendment I should be prepared to accept in principle, though the development of co-operation could, I think, be left in safety to the Government and the board of the central bank. I should be prepared to consider the amendment with the limitation I suggest.

The Minister is holding over the matter for consideration?

In that connection, would the Minister refer to paragraph 356 of the Report of the Banking Commission? They say that great care should be taken in the future to examine all policy with more regard to its possible monetary and financial repercussions. In the paragraph in which the recommendations in this connection are mainly comprised— paragraph 364—they say that the exigencies of Government have had a most decisive influence on monetary developments, "an influence that has more often than not been of a highly disturbing character". "In other ways," they say, "as, for instance, by their commercial policies, Governments can cause monetary repercussions." They question whether putting this in the statute will bring about the desired result. In the third paragraph of paragraph 364, they say: "It is not sufficient to adopt a statutory obligation for consultation; a tradition of regular consultation should be developed, and, on the basis of experience gained, the most suitable forms of consultation must be gradually evolved." Apparently, their view was that it would not be sufficient to make it a matter of statutory obligation, that after the relations which might develop on formal lines on account of some such amendment as this, there should be developed a relationship on closer and more intimate lines. This is a statutory body and it will have no functions other than those the statute gives it. If some reference is not made to this matter of advice, it will be possible for a Government to say to the bank: "You have no business doing that; it is no part of your functions."

In principle, I accept the amendment with the limitation I mentioned.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed: "That Section 6 stand part of the Bill."

One would be entitled to assume that Section 6 was an attempt to indicate to the central bank what its public policy was to be. This is the only section in which an effort is made to indicate that the bank is to concern itself in some way with the welfare of the people—that, in fact, their interests are to be its predominant aim. I imagine that Section 6 was drafted by a person who had a mechanised heart, and that he was assisted by somebody who had some tint of affection for high and lofty principles. Section 6 seems to be the metallic-hearted banker providing that the bank shall exercise all the functions which it has as a bank with the high-minded, pious legislator saying, "All right; that may be so, but will you please put in something to give the impression that the bank is also concerned with looking after the welfare of the people when it is not manipulating currency and credit?" The impact of these two outlooks has produced Section 6 in its present form.

Section 6 is just humbug. It has no meaning whatsoever. It is not possible for the bank, under Section 6, to do anything but what banks have been doing since they were first established. If asked to accept what it implied in Section 6 as one of his articles of association, no banker might be worried on the score that he would have to deviate one iota from his normal banking practice. This is rather an effort to fool the people. Even then, it is a very feeble effort. One need not read the section with any great care to realise that it is quite impossible to implement the second portion of Section 6 so long as the first portion of that section stands. The Taoiseach and the Minister for Finance will say that they did not overlook the welfare of the people when drafting the Bill, that they put in a few phrases in Section 6 about them. But they know that the tail-end of Section 6 has no real meaning and is likely to have no effect whatever on normal banking practice in this country. I suspect that, when the directors of the central bank are appointed—and particularly the three banking directors — whatever obligations they will see in the first portion of Section 6, they will see no obligations or impediments to normal banking practice, as understood by past operations, in whatever piece of piety has been injected into the latter end of the section.

In so far as Section 6 is concerned with public policy at all, as distinct from pretending to be concerned with public policy, the vital importance of the section, to me, is that it ought to indicate that it is the purpose of the State to insist that the central bank— so far as it can make any contribution to our financial difficulties—should have imposed upon it functions which would enable it to interfere with the provision of money for State purposes in this country. There is no indication whatever in Section 6, which carries in it all the obligations at present imposed on the Currency Commission under the Act of 1927, that the central bank is likely to have any effect whatever on interest charges in this country, or on the creation or extension of credit facilities. It has been made abundantly clear, in the course of the debate on this Bill, that the public mind is concerned with the necessity for the provision of cheap money for State purposes and with the necessity for the issue of State credits essential to finance schemes of a national character, such as the reorganisation and regeneration of agriculture, the provision of assistance for industrial development and the financing of our social needs. Nowhere in Section 6, or in the Bill as a whole, do we find the slightest indication of any bend or bias being given towards shaping the policy of the new central bank in the direction of supplying cheap money to the State or cheap money to finance worth-while schemes of national and industrial regeneration.

This Bill—as I see it through Section 6; and for the purpose of my remarks I take Section 6 as being the section which is supposed to indicate the public policy of the bank—gives no hope whatever that we are likely to have any economic resurgence as a result of its passage and in particular as a result of the passage of this impossible section. We are not likely to be in the slightest way delivered from our present-day economic difficulties, so long as Section 6 remains as at present in the Bill. Money will be as dear and as scarce as ever, and as long as money is dear and scarce the things that only money can buy and the activities that only money can create under our present currency and financial system will be scarce and considerably restricted.

When this Bill, with Section 6 in it, is passed, we will still have a condition of affairs which is reflected in an underdeveloped agricultural country, an industrial position which is far from wealthy, and we will continue to have the drift from the rural areas to the towns in search of work. We will continue to export large numbers of our people to another country to get there the employment which they find it impossible to obtain here. The industry which is our basic industry and which probably for all time must provide the main source of our wealth, will continue to be starved for want of the necessary credits, or the credits will be made available only on terms which will impose new burdens on the industry.

In the course of a lecture which he delivered at Cork recently, the Minister for Agriculture told us what our post-war agricultural policy is likely to be. He told us we would be in keen competition with every other agricultural country, that the industry could not continue to live on subsidies and bounties, that in respect of our produce which was sold elsewhere it would be sold on the basis of the survival of the fittest. He told us that we could only succeed in maintaining the industry by being able to produce commodities and sell them in what is now our only market—Britain—in competition with countries with a better method of financing agriculture than we have, with resources more extensive than ours and with certain natural and climatic advantages not possessed by our country.

Can anybody visualise the agricultural economy of this people if we have to face the position envisaged by the Minister for Agriculture—a position in which no more bounties or subsidies will be available for agriculture? Does not everybody know that if bounties and subsidies for agriculture were removed to-morrow the industry would not last, that if it had to rely on an export market it would not last 24 hours?

So long as we have to rely on an export market to consume goods which we cannot sell to our own people because they are too impoverished to buy, then we must maintain the scheme of subsidisation for those exports or introduce new methods of agricultural production and new schemes to finance agricultural production. There is no indication in this section that agriculture is to get money more cheaply in the future than in the past; there is no indication of any special facilities to finance agricultural activities and no indication that agriculture will get any special attention to equip it for the type of fitness expected from it in the post war period by the present Minister for Agriculture. Therefore, in so far as this Bill is concerned, neither industry nor agriculture can look forward to any relief from their present pressing problems. They will have to continue to stagger and struggle on as best they can. This Bill gives them no hope that any of their difficulties will be so appreciated by the State that some special assistance will be extended to them.

There was a time when it was believed that it was the privilege of bankers to talk on money matters and interfere in currency and financial questions. That was a domain which they claimed for themselves. The ordinary man in the street, particularly in the last 25 years, has begun to realise that finance is just as important a matter to him and just as important in his daily national life as it is to those who live by selling and circulating money. If there is any one thing which has stood out more pre-eminently than another in respect of currency and financial matters in the past 25 years, it is the interest which the ordinary citizens are taking in these matters. The extent of that interest is shown by the movement in many countries critically to analyse the whole basis of finance and credit, and as a result there has been a rapidly growing disposition to alter methods of currency and finance at one time regarded as sacrosanct. Deputy McGilligan quoted from Pethick Lawrence's book "War Loans and the Banks"—a book that is most revealing and that indicates very clearly that, no matter in what kind of majesty and pomp bankers may endeavour to enshroud themselves, banks have in the past been able to manipulate currency and credit with most bewildering efficiency, as was indicated by the quotation which Deputy McGilligan gave to-day from that book.

One of the most noticeable features of the past 25 years has been a disposition to abandon the rigidity which was formerly associated with the methods of finance and many countries have found to their own advantage that it was desirable to introduce new methods of finance, new conceptions of finance and new uses for finance which were unheard of 50 years ago. To-day there is a growing disposition to recognise the basic truth of the saying that nations live on what they produce, that there is nothing else on which they can live. But the manner in which a nation produces its goods is related to the manner in which its production is financed, and the manner of financing the production of goods in this and every other country in a very large measure determines the standard of the produce and the extent of the production. There is not a farmer in this country but will tell you that if he gets cheap money he can have better land and better productivity and in return, the national wealth will correspondingly increase.

Finance, therefore, has played, and is continuing to play, an ever-increasing part in our agricultural and industrial activity and it is vital to us, if we want to see any industrial or agricultural expansion, if we want to see social problems dealt with comprehensively by the central authority of the State, to ensure that not only is cheap money made available, but that the State, by controlling the issue of credits, the expansion and, if necessary, the restriction of credits, should be able at all times to determine what are the needs of the people in relation to the methods of financing their industrial, agricultural and domestic lives.

My complaint with relation to Section 6 is that, while it makes some effort to pretend it is the purpose of the central bank to be concerned with the welfare of the people, in fact, neither the section nor any one of the other sections gives the slightest indication that there will be any real concern for the welfare of the people. If this Bill is passed every banker will say: "Well, that temporary storm has blown away; we can just carry on in the same way as we have carried on since banking institutions were established," and they will probably feel that because of the passage of the Bill they will be immune from any serious annoyance from the Legislature for a very considerable time to come.

I think Section 6 might have been a good section if it had been given the bend which I sought to give it by my amendment; but it is now a contradictory section, an effort to keep the bank purely as an automatically-run banking institution and, on the other hand, an effort to give to the bank certain pious functions which are impossible of implementation. I do not regard the Central Bank Bill—and the Taoiseach agrees with me—as likely to solve any difficulty we have. He takes the view, and I take the same view, that even when this Bill is passed, every problem we have will still be with us and that the Bill does not in the slightest way point to the road along which we may find a solution of any of our present difficulties. In so far as it might be of use at all, one would imagine that there would be some full-blooded direction given to the directors of the bank in Section 6. Instead of that, they are asked to implement in their public policy a section which is contradictory, a section which, because of the way in which it is drawn, makes it impossible for the banks to do anything but discharge the functions imposed on them by the first portion of the section. If one reads Section 6 in conjunction with the statements of members of the Government, one can only confess complete disappointment that this measure, which has been produced as a result of the labours of the Banking Commission, should be such an anæmic document.

I have been listening to the discussions for a number of days and I do not propose to give my own views, because I have not very strong views upon finance. I have been listening rather as a student, anxious to get some idea of what is proposed or what is the best course to adopt, and I must confess that the more I listened to the debate the more bewildered I became. There were many points of view expressed and no two Deputies seemed to agree; every Deputy and every Minister seemed to be cocksure that he was right and everybody else was wrong. The two who seemed to come closest were the Minister for Finance and Deputy Cosgrave, because nothing seemed to stand between them only the two directors. Then the most extreme opposition seemed to be between Deputy Hickey and Deputy Dillon at one time. Deputy Hickey appeared to place great reliance on producing money out of nothing. Deputy Dillon was very much opposed to that view, but after a certain time the two of them seemed to move so closely together that Deputy McGilligan pronounced them to be divided only by a paper pound.

The whole debate has been very interesting. I listened to the most voluble Deputy in the Dáil, Deputy Norton. He spoke more upon this Bill than half-a-dozen others, yet he never gave us the least inkling of what he meant or what he had in his mind. Nobody knows even at this moment what the Deputy intended to convey. We are growing more and more bewildered. I also listened to the Taoiseach. He took up the attitude which has been the secret of his success all through life—he adopted the course of reconciling all the irreconcilables. He said: "This Bill is the best compromise of the different views to which I have listened". It appears that, good mathematician that he is, his view in these things is to connect all opposites by a straight line and bisect that straight line, and then out of two wrongs he finds a right. I do not know whether that is sound logic or not, but that seems to be the Taoiseach's way. My opinion is that if he founded the Central Bank Bill upon these lines, connecting all opposites, it will be more like a spider's web than a Central Bank Bill.

My advice—and I think this would be the wisest course to follow—is that all Parties should agree to hang up this Bill for three or six months and in the meantime the differing views might be reconciled. Deputies and, Ministers might come closer together and perhaps they could settle on some sound sensible scheme. From all the points of view put forward so far, I think it would not be wise to proceed with this Bill. I have listened to the views of Deputy Dillon with regard to the 10 to 1 ratio. There may be something in that point of view. According to the Deputy, every £100 lodged in the bank would make £1,000 available to borrowers. That is the meaning that I gathered from the Deputy's statement.

That is right.

Then we have another point of view from Professor O'Rahilly—I saw it in The Standard this week. His point of view is that every £100 lodged with the bank is hoarded and taken out of circulation. There is a difference in these two points of view so wide as to be puzzling. There must be something wrong somewhere. Which is wrong or how far are both of them wrong? These are things that would require to be examined. The more I study the different points of view, the more I am bewildered and confused. I think it would be well to leave the matter over and allow time to consider it rather than waste time discussing it here. The discussion so far has done good, but I do not think the Bill should be proceeded with at the present moment.

I disagree with the Deputy. I think the Bill should be proceeded with. I think that it would have been much better for the State if we had gone ahead with this Bill some years ago. I do not think the Bill would be any more effective in achieving the things that Deputy Norton apparently would like a central bank to do if his amendment were adopted. If we merely put the section that he suggested as an amendment to Section 6 into the Bill and left it there, we would not be one step further in the direction towards building the Utopia that Deputy Norton would like to see established here. I do not think the most active and ultra-liberal central bank that could be established would do—I will not say all the things—but many or most of the things that Deputy Norton suggested this bank should be able to achieve. I do not believe it would be able to put agriculture on its feet, that it would be able to stop emigration and the flight from the land or that it could put every man to work. I do not think these things are the job of the central bank. If they are anybody's job, they ought to be that of the Government of the day. They are their responsibility, not the responsibility of the bank. The central bank has the responsibility imposed upon it of safeguarding the narrow financial interests of the currency and credit of the State. The central bank's function would be ignored if it were to issue wholesale credit for any purpose without regard to the effect that wholesale issue of currency and credit might have upon the economic and financial structure of the State.

Nobody suggested it should do that.

To do half the things that Deputy Norton suggested it should do, it would have to make a wholesale issue of credit without regard to the effects of that wholesale issue on other aspects of our economy. Some of the things that Deputy Norton has in mind have been attempted in countries much bigger than we are and vastly more wealthy than we could ever hope to be. After the financial collapse in the United States of America in 1932, when the new President was elected, he started on a campaign of an almost unlimited issue of currency and credit to end unemployment. Was he much better off or nearer to the goal just before the war started or when the talk of the war started than he was in 1932? What had he added to the national debt of the United States of America? That is one case. The central bank alone cannot achieve these ends. It cannot achieve them certainly without regard to other economic questions that are bound up with the State's sound economy. There are other matters of an economic kind that we may try to control but that we cannot completely control, that have to be taken into account by the Government and by the central bank in considering what currency and credit may be issued by any authority in the State for certain objects which may be very excellent in themselves but which have to be done in a measured way in accordance with the resources of the State. No central bank can create a Utopia where there will be no unemployment, no emigration, no flight from the land. A central bank with all the powers in the world might not be able to stop these things unless it could control a whole lot of forces as well, some of which operate inside the State but a great many of which operate outside the State, which the State cannot itself completely control.

What about Article 45 of the Constitution? How can you implement that?

That is a very malodorous red herring that should not be followed. The Constitution has nothing to do with this Bill.

We will have plenty of opportunity of getting on to Section 45, and the Deputy can probably introduce Article 45 then. I do not believe that if Deputy Norton was operating it, the central bank could achieve the things he suggests the central bank ought to be able to do. I do not believe that if he had complete power, the central bank alone, with unlimited powers as a central bank, could do the things he suggests.

I have acknowledged myself in agreement with the Taoiseach—and I am in good company there —that this Bill solves no difficulty.

I am talking of a central bank that Deputy Norton might build up for himself here, that the State might allow him to build up, if he happened to be dictator here. I say that the central bank alone could not achieve the things he suggests. There are other forces that have to be taken into account. In no country can the central bank control all the economic and financial forces that operate in the affairs of a State from outside as well as from inside. I do not attempt to mislead the public in any way by suggesting that this Bill is going to be used for the working out of the economic liberation and salvation of this country. It has very modest powers, but very essential powers, that will be used for the betterment of this country, and I hope it will be able to help, in a modest way perhaps, to solve some of the problems we are faced with.

For the sake of carrying a section which is going to be carried in any event, there is no good in the Minister for Finance sending himself further apart from Deputy Norton or pushing Deputy Norton further apart from him than in reality they are. Deputy Norton founds greater hopes on central bank activities—I do not say this central bank—than I personally would found myself; but I think it is difficult—it is certainly a position I will not take—to be asked to take up the position, merely out of opposition to Deputy Norton, that the Minister for Finance and the Taoiseach have taken up in this House in connection with the central bank.

The Minister says it is not much good a central bank can do anyway and the Taoiseach has told us, with particular application to this country, that in so far as he is aware, from ten years' experience, no reform—I do not say credit-worthy reform — which merely begs the question—no worth-while reform in this country has been held up because of money; that if there was anything held back—developments we would all like to see—it was not because of money. That is not the Minister's statement; that is the Taoiseach.

I do not think the word "reform" was used.

I think it was actually used. Let us not quibble about terms—no worth-while developments. We have it on the Taoiseach's authority that, as far as his experience of ten years goes, no worth-while development was held up because of monetary matters. That is not the view of the world generally. There are people in other countries who go far beyond what Deputy Norton has said, who think that if you had control of the money situation you could regularise or solve most of your difficulties. There is quite a number of people who do not go as far as that, but there are very few people who will take up the view, which now appears to be accepted in this country, that no worth-while development has been held up at all because of the lack of control of the monetary resources of the country. I think there is exaggeration on both sides.

My impression of this is that, as the world has gone whirling round in the last ten years, more and more attention has been given to monetary problems. You have gradually segregated the monetary cranks, but there are monetary reformers too who do believe that the whole banking situation is one that requires a great deal more examination than it has got up to the present, that there is some "slack" to be dealt with in that regard. At the end of the last war, we had quite a number of theories put forward which were regarded as fantastic socialistic theories but which are now accepted by the best people. The reason for that is in the old days before 1914, money was plentiful, wealth was accumulating, national incomes were going up and conditions were being bettered even for the working man. Then the war came along, a considerable amount of property was destroyed, capital assets were allowed to depreciate and the surplus on which people had to work on over the whole world was restricted and narrowed.

The result was that a lot of things that were taken as they ran under the old conditions were definitely examined and they were harnessed more to the public use. Credit has come under the microscope at the moment and it is coming more and more under the microscope because of the black outlook that faces the world. People are beginning to inquire if the old rate of 5 per cent. which we allowed the banks for the handling of credit is necessary and, if not, why should we not turn some part of it to the use of the State. That is a problem that we are going to hear more of as time goes on.

I view Section 6, not by itself. It has to be taken in conjunction with the sections already passed. This House has now set its foot on this path, that we are going to establish a central bank and to appoint a certain number of directors, one of them as governor. He is going to be seven years in office. He can only be removed—he can be disqualified in certain ways which are not likely to arise or he can be permanently incapacitated on account of bad health— by the unanimous vote of the directors. If he is a director himself we have practically the analogy of the League of Nations because that unanimous vote must include his own. I do not think it is intended that it should do so but the section is open to that interpretation. All the other directors are continued in office for five years. There is a bank created, therefore, consisting of certain people, one of whom is appointed for seven years and the others for five years, and as far as this House is concerned it has lost all its grip on all these people for all that period. We are throwing them out at arm's length from this House. We do not retain even the power that we have in the case of the Electricity Supply Board under which the board is required to make a report each year to this House which can be analysed by Deputies.

We have a Minister who is set over the general policy of the Electricity Supply Board. He gets the accounts examined, and sees that a report is brought into this House, a report which can be discussed in the House, if necessary. We avoid interference with the day-to-day activities of the board but we have control over their general policy. Again the Government can at any time by resolution of the House replace the board if they find that the activities of the board are not in accord with the Government's point of view. That is the way we have dealt with the production and distribution of electricity. Why should we not have some such system in regard to public credit? We are going to appoint these directors for a period of from five to seven years under these terms of reference:—(1) you tie up these men in a certain way under this measure; (2) we recognise, and it is stated here that we tie them up in a particular way, because we recognise the force of circumstances. I think that recognition of the circumstances comes to this, that we are definitely agreed that these people cannot do any of three important things that a central bank might do. The bank can do nothing about credit restriction or expansion, nothing in regard to interest rates, or in regard to rates of exchange because we have opted for a different policy. Then, as Deputy Norton says, we have this contradiction. We give these people this advice—it is only really to cheer them on their way by giving them a sort of nationalistic flavour—"In anything you do, your constant and predominant aim shall be the welfare of the people". Of course that is all nonsense. The welfare of the people, shut up as they are in this particular strait-jacket!

We point out that there is a limit.

The limits are as I pointed out, that they expand money when British money is expanded and restrict it when it is restricted. It is not a mere question of exchangeability of notes. Deputy Norton has asked whether this bank is going to have any power with regard to promoting schemes that will reduce unemployment, recondition industry or anything of that kind. Let us take the small point that was brought forward by Deputy Morrissey's question. The amount outstanding by the banks on overdraft for the purpose of turf development up to 31st December, 1941, was something short of £1,000,000. The rate of interest was 4 per cent. in every case.

And that interest would pay the wages of 2,500 turf workers.

For how long?

For the whole turf season.

£40,000 is the tribute paid to the banks. For what? For the banks advancing enough money to pay workers their wages before the turf could be sold. Out of the proceeds of the sale of the turf they will eventually be paid. To keep these men working for a short period we have got to pay the banks £40,000. That is in regard to a matter on which they are taking no risks. If it were a case of taking ordinary commercial risks, that, for instance, some of the turf might be left unsold, or if there was a danger that the banks could not get the money from the county councils and that they had to weigh up their risks, in that way then one could understand the reasons for such a charge, but this was merely the creation of credit. It is not what the Minister for Finance says the banks were doing when they received money from certain people on which they paid 2 per cent. and advanced it to other people to whom they charged 4 per cent. It is the creation of credit.

Is the Deputy sure of that?

We can examine that later. Remember what it is for. It is for a project in respect of which the Government is guaranteeing to people who cut turf that it will be all sold. It is the same as a guarantee that the proceeds are secure, unless the Government goes down, and that the money to pay these people will be got. It may be for hopelessly bad turf, but the money will have to be paid over. There is £40,000 going to be paid out. For what? What is the service? There is one example at this moment. The central bank does not control. The central bank, with the grand declaration about the welfare of the people being the predominant aim, find themselves up against that proposition. It is not going to reduce the interest charged by one shilling. It is not going to do any of the things Deputy Norton mentioned. I agree with him that the money should have been lent. I do not know if any expense would be imposed on the bank in putting up the money. There may be the payment of clerical staff but certainly ½ per cent. would meet that. There is £40,000 for that development, one of the greatest gilt-edged securities ever offered in this country under the conditions, and the Government have not declared, even if there was a collapse of the war or that coal was coming in, that they are not going to see that the people who cut turf would have it sold at rates that would remunerate them. There is 4 per cent. on that. We need not be imaginative about it, or push Deputy Norton along the road that the Minister for Finance tried to push him along. We need not get into high flights of imagination about the State having to do everything. I think this section can only be read in conjunction with the other section regarding control. I take again a very conservative book on banks in which I find this quotation:

"Mention of the Government raises the question how far the central bank can, or should, be independent of the Government. There is much to be said for removing the central bank from the immediate compulsion of political opinions. In the post-war epoch there were so many examples of central banks being dominated by the disastrous financial policies of Governments that the international conferences which discussed the subject made almost a dogma of central bank independence, carrying it as far as advocating the private ownership of central banks. There has been a reaction from these views."

I stress this as being from definitely a conservative source.

"Private ownership of central banks may mean their ownership by, and control in the interests of, rich bankers or industrialists to the exclusion of the interests of the community as a whole. Since this is still a matter of acute political controversy in many countries of the world, it must be enough to say here that, whether or not the State owns the central bank, it must necessarily exercise a considerable measure of control over it. This follows inevitably from the very large and important powers which the central bank possesses. In fact, the modern tendency is for the State to own the central bank but for the actual control to be in the hands of a governor or a board appointed for a period of years, and more or less independent of political domination during that period. The dispute is in any case a somewhat artificial one. The importance of banking policy for the community at large is fully recognised nowadays, and no responsible Government, whatever its political complexion, could afford to surrender so large a portion of the attributes of sovereignty to an autonomous body."

We are surrendering more than is normal at present. I think that bad. I think it is particularly bad that, having done that, we have such restrictive terms. I should like to see this section removed.

Why does the Deputy not put down an amendment?

Deputy Cosgrave put down one proposing to leave out the words in brackets. If that phrase were out we give certain functions at law. It is easy above and beyond that to say: "Take as your consideration anything which has to do with the integrity of the currency, or whatever appertains to the control of credit, while the predominant aim shall be the welfare of the people." There is some meaning in that. If you say: "Have that as your motto, but remember that while we have given you that motto we have pinned you down."

Why not put down an amendment if you think they should have these powers?

The power I want to give them is to let this Bill be there in conjunction with the Currency Act. When the consolidated bank note issue was there you had liquid sound advances. If that was left, and you have these terms of reference operating generally, then the bank would have certain functions. Joined with that, I think in future banking should be better tied to Parliament and to Parliamentary control. I have suggested that it should be tied to the Parliament as the Electricity Supply Board is tied. If Parliament is not satisfied with the general policy, while I do not want the House to interfere with the day-to-day mechanics of banking, it could change, and it would have to do so publicly. It could say to the bank that Parliament had adopted a certain policy, and could ask the House to get rid of them. There was no question of leadership and co-operation as far as these measures are concerned. We appoint people, and could fire them out if we thought right. I think we are running contrary to best practice, and certainly to the common practice of the last decade of years, by entirely divorcing this group from Parliamentary control, and also in not giving them all the powers required, and which we could give them in connection with credit, exchange rates and rates of interest. It is no answer to say that circumstances do not allow these powers to be operated. I am looking forward a little longer than the present. I would rather give the bank some power.

There is no excuse for saying that there is any tying down with regard to any of the powers that any central bank has. We are not tying them down in any way in the section. Within the limits of the law will be within the limits of the law when this Bill becomes an Act. This is only the Committee Stage. If there are any powers that the Deputy thinks they should have, and that they can exercise, let amendments be put down, and I assure him any that come forward that make it possible for the board to influence credit and monetary policy in the interests of the community as a whole will be favourably considered. By that I mean in reason and common sense. Our approach will be to try to meet the Deputy in that connection. The attitude of the Government is not very different from the attitude the Deputy is arguing. In regard to the connection between the Government and the board, we have considered that, and we find there is no half-way house that we could get which will not be objected to on the grounds of dangers that will expose themselves. If we came in here and centred control of the whole credit policy of the country in the bank, we would have objections raised, I feel certain, from every section of the House on the ground that it gave the Government too easy a way of financing itself.

The question of the financing of turf cutting was raised, and I am inclined to agree with the Deputy that the rate charged is too high, just as I am inclined to think that the rate we have to pay for money, considering the rates obtaining elsewhere, is high, but you cannot lower that rate, except by methods of compulsion. We have tried to get a willing response. No doubt the arguments put up by the Deputy were put up to the banks by every local body which was looking for accommodation. These bodies said: "This loan is backed by the rate-making power and backed also by a Government guarantee that the turf will be sold. You cannot lose your money. There is no risk, and therefore you ought to give it at a lower rate than you are charging." Then the question arises: what is the lowest rate you can ask in these cases or can expect to have the money available at?

I think we are running a very big risk in talking about credit money all the time, because you cannot have that credit money for nothing. The tendency will be for credit money to send up prices and to lead to inflation. There is scarcely a doubt that that is the tendency, and, if you keep at it, undoubtedly the tendency will produce its effects, and instead of getting interest, what you will be doing then is extracting from everybody the particle of diminution in value the money taken from them will bring about. You cannot avoid it.

I do believe, however, that there is a certain amount of "slack". It is not easy to determine exactly when a particular creation of credit is inflation and leads to increase in prices. One of the things I said early in this debate was that I believe the rates we had to pay were too high and that anything that will make for a reduction of the rates of interest it should be the Government's aim to try to bring about, provided it could be brought about without damage to the community. This amendment really cannot be implemented without running the other risks. This measure was not brought in to meet a crisis situation, and this will not prevent anybody from meeting any crisis that may come along, but it will fit us to meet such a crisis by having here an expert body of opinion which will be available to advise the Government as to how to meet any particular crisis that might possibly arise out of the war.

What difference is there between it and the Currency Commission in that respect?

The difference between this body and the Currency Commission is that this body has certain added powers. I am quite willing to admit that the added powers, in our particular circumstances— although, in the circumstances of other countries, they would—do not enable the board effectively to bring about expansion or contraction of credit, because they may step in one direction, while the banks, on account of their liquid assets, will step in the other direction and counteract their action. That is a fact outside our immediate control. You cannot settle that by Act of Parliament. The powers, however, are there. They have these powers to exercise to whatever extent they consider desirable and to whatever extent they consider would be effective. We are not tying them.

When we come to the question of parity, if the Deputy takes up the attitude that we should not have the link with sterling—that of parity, or any fixed ratio to it, or a fixed ratio other than parity—let him put down his amendment and say that we should not have it. If the balance of argument is to depart from it, let him put down an amendment that we should not have parity and we can argue it out, but it should not be said at this stage that there is in any of the sections we have passed anything which will be incompatible with a complete and absolute change in the sections of the Bill, or does not leave the way open to any amendments, except those on which we definitely vote, or, if the Chair so decides, the principle of which we discuss and take a vote on and which are voted down. I can say that the effort on the part of the Government was to try to get an expert body to look after this matter of currency and credit in the interests of the nation and to give it all the powers that could be given, without running the risks of other serious dangers. If it be said that we should compel them, that their policy should be dictated to them by the Government, I say that, if that is done, the Government is in control, and, in any of the measures it takes, will be suspected of trying to finance itself in a way which would relieve it of certain political difficulties and of trying to make money available to it for whatever schemes it wants to carry out, instead of going the distasteful way of getting the public to meet the expenses of the State by way of contributions through taxation. We welcome from Deputy McGilligan or anybody else amendments for discussion as to how any further powers can be given and there is no desire at all to tie Deputies, except that having discussed certain methods here we want to let the public know exactly where we stand. We cannot give the board contradictory powers.

I do not agree with the Deputy, either in respect of the Constitution or this section, that these are simply pious expressions. They are intended to be implemented as and when it is possible to implement them. They indicate the direction in which we want to travel. They indicate a public philosophy and a public intention. It may be that for the moment you may not be able to show exactly how you are to do something which some people would consider to be in accordance with it, but I think that having a set objective, the public good, put before this body, it is a headline for them as to the direction in which their duties lie, and that it is good to have it there, so that they may realise that they are to have regard to it in respect of every question which turns up and that the acid test for them as to whether a certain policy should or should not be adopted must be: Does it make for the public good? If it does, they ought to try to work in that direction; if it does not, they ought to oppose it.

While I agree it is good that there should be in this section a direction to the board of the bank as to what their aims should be, I think it wrong that the powers of the bank should be so limited that that direction cannot be carried into effect and wrong that such a direction should be included as would give the impression that they had certain powers. The Bill does not definitely give the board of the central bank power to act for the welfare of the people. Its powers at the moment are altogether too limited. I think the Taoiseach made the point fairly clear when he refused to accept Deputy Mulcahy's amendment giving the bank power, or stating that the bank had power, over the creation and control of credit. He said that if that amendment were included, it would give the impression that the bank had that definite power, whereas the Bill itself does not enable the central bank to create and control credit effectively.

Now, in all the arguments in support of this Bill and against any reform which may be sought to be introduced into it, the Taoiseach has frequently asked, by way of argument: is there anything that we could do under a reformed system of finance that we cannot do under our present financial powers? I think that is a question which should be answered. First of all, we have got to consider what are the things that are desirable to be done from the point of view of public welfare. Mention has been made of the production of turf. Under the present financial system it is not possible to produce turf efficiently and economically, because the production of turf is burdened with an excessive load of interest. I pointed out also, I think, in connection with this Bill, that the erection of houses for our people is excessively burdened, under the present system, with a crushing rate of interest, which makes it impossible for the State and the local authorities to produce the number of houses which are required and to produce them at an economic rent. Therefore, the present system is preventing our people from obtaining an adequate supply of fuel and from obtaining adequate housing accommodation.

What other reforms are urgently needed? Surely, the most urgent need of all is the extension of employment in agriculture and the relieving of unemployment generally. There is no field of activity in which more men can be put into permanent employment than in the sphere of agricultural industry. Anyone who has studied the matter, and particularly any agriculturist who has gone into the matter, will admit that in order to farm the land of this country properly, and get the utmost production out of the land, it is essential that there should be at least one man employed on every ten acres of arable land in the country. The average number of men engaged in our agriculture at the present time, I think, is one to every 20 acres, and then we must remember that in that average number are included people who are over the working age and people in the congested districts who are confined to very small plots of land. As statistics are likely to be misleading, I have gone into the question of a number of people employed on the land in an area with which I am personally familiar and which, I would say, is an average agricultural area, and I have found that the number of men employed on the land in that particular area is one to every 25 acres. Now, nobody can suggest, for one moment, that one man can farm properly 25 acres of land. Accordingly, we find that if we are to provide this employment, if we are to work the soil of the country as it should be worked, employment is available, not for 100,000 men but for several hundreds of thousands of our men.

There we have the solution of the unemployment problem, only waiting to be put into effect, but because we are labouring under an antiquated financial system—and most people are beginning to admit that it is antiquated—we find that it is impossible for the State to put those men on the land. Why is it impossible? Because the limited control of finance in the hand of the State, of the community, or of the Government, makes it impossible for the State to guarantee the remuneration which is absolutely essential if you are to employ a larger number of people on the land.

Now, if you were to put into effect what I have suggested, 100 per cent. increase in the number of people employed on the land, the first essential would be a long-term agricultural policy in which the prices of all tillage products would be guaranteed over a number of years. No Government would dare to do that under the present financial system. Therefore I say that it is that financial system that is blocking the way of economic reform in this country, and I feel that the Government will have to have the courage to face up to the obstacle which is being put in their way by the present system of private control of finance. Just as Governments in countries engaged in war have faced up to that obstacle and overcome it, so a Government not engaged in war must face those problems with the same courage and determination. The Taoiseach has replied to this point on several occasions by saying that war is an abnormal situation and that in time of war people have to submit to many restrictions on their liberties. He should bear in mind, I think, that the British people—all responsible leaders of opinion in Great Britain— are asserting that they will never go back to the pre-war condition of economic affairs in that country. They are declaring that the financial conditions under which they are carrying on the war must be continued during the period after the war, that the high expenditure which is being incurred for the conducting of military operations must be continued after the war for the reconstruction of the country, for all works of national development, and for the establishment of permanent industries for the people.

We must therefore face the fact that the situation which prevails in Great Britain at the present time, the situation in which money is being freely expended and in which there is a very considerable expansion in employment —an expansion which is drawing the young men and women of this country from a peaceful, neutral country into the centre of military activities—we must face the fact that that condition of expenditure, of public development, and of national control of finance, for that is what it really means, will continue indefinitely, and it is no answer to say that the present conditions in Great Britain are different from ours and are due to the war situation.

Deputy McGovern suggested that this Bill should be withdrawn. I admit that there is a great conflict of opinion in this House in regard to the Bill, but I do not agree with Deputy McGovern that the Deputies who have spoken are very cocksure in regard to those matters. I think that if the minds of all the Deputies who have spoken on this question were analysed, it would be found that they represent a number of very distinct question marks. I do not agree, however, that this Bill should be postponed indefinitely, and I think that some reform is urgently needed.

I did not say, indefinitely.

I do not agree that, when individual citizens, and, more particularly, public representatives, are in doubt in regard to a question, they should take the easy and, I would say, the cowardly course of shelving their difficulties—putting the matter on the shelf, so to speak. I think it is the duty of every Deputy to go into this question so that, when this Bill is amended, it will be possible to put into effect the pious words to be found in the section.

There is no use in the Minister asserting, as he has so frequently done, that no worth-while scheme of development has been held up for want of money. If that were true it would be the strongest indictment that could be framed against the Government, because of the fact that they have neglected to do so many things and have left unsolved so many problems. If the position were that they were not held up for want of money it would mean that the Government's failure to carry out essential reforms such, for example, as to provide employment for our people, to provide increased development and production in agriculture and many other things so urgently desirable, was due to criminal negligence on their part. All these reforms have been held up because the control of money is in the hands of private minorities whose main interest must be to secure profits for themselves. It would be a remarkable coincidence if the interest of those minorities coincided with the interest of the people. I believe it does not. I want to say to the Taoiseach that he should try to implement the concluding words in the section. This, in my opinion, is the most opportune time to get complete control of credit so as to secure the welfare of the people—a time of change and of emergency. The complete control of credit must involve a considerable amount of control over the economic affairs of the country. The present is the most opportune time to secure and exercise that control, because it is a time when it will be possible to stabilise prices for the main products of the country. Without that it will be impossible to carry out a true financial reform to secure the welfare of the people.

The successful operation of this measure by the board to be set up will depend entirely, in our opinion, upon the way in which the powers contained in this section will be made use of in the interests of the people. The Taoiseach, in the course of two or three speeches, has explained what it may be possible for the board to do under the powers conferred by this Bill. He must be aware of the operations of central banks in other countries, because I am sure he has made a very careful study of that subject, and must know that in the majority of those countries their operations are subject to Parliamentary influence or control. The Taoiseach invited amendments from Deputy McGilligan and other Deputies. I have before me Section 10 of the New Zealand Reserve Bank (Amendment) Act of 1936, which deals with the general function and duty of the bank. I was wondering whether the Taoiseach would be prepared, provided it was in order, to discuss an amendment of this character on a later stage of the Bill. This section reads:—

"It shall be the general function of the reserve bank within the limits of its powers to give effect as far as may be to the monetary policy of the Government as communicated to it from time to time by the Minister for Finance."

If that type of Parliamentary or Ministerial interference with the operations of our bank could not be tolerated by the Government it would, of course, be useless to put down an amendment on these lines to the Bill. Provided the Chair ruled that such an amendment would be in order, would the Taoiseach say if he thinks this is a type of amendment that could usefully be discussed on a later stage of the Bill?

I have been thinking along these lines, whether it is possible we would go any further. Again, it would be said that it was only a pious opinion—to give the board a direction to have due regard and so on. That is the most you could do— to give a direction. If you were to make it compulsory on the board, then, of course, you would be taking away control from it. You might consider giving a direction to the board to have due regard to any view conveyed to it by the Minister for Finance, but not necessarily making it an obligation on the board to take that view.

The Taoiseach understands the nature of this amendment better than I do. From their experience of the working of the 1934 Act, the Coalition Government in New Zealand found that the board of the bank had not the powers to do what the Parliament of the country desired it to do, and so this amendment was inserted in 1936 after the Labour Government came into power. It does not give a very definite direction. It simply says that, whenever the Minister for Finance thinks fit, he can make representations to the board of the bank, indicating to it what the financial policy of the Government is and that, following that, the board of the bank shall take his representations into consideration.

Is not that amendment practically the same as amendment No. 10 which we have just been discussing?

It is the kind of amendment, I think, that the Taoiseach has invited members of the Opposition Parties to submit for consideration.

I asked Deputy McGilligan, when he was talking about working on some such link as that which exists in the case of the Electricity Supply Board, to put down in black and white what exactly he had in mind so that we might have his point definitely before us. With regard to what Deputy Davin has said, I have not had an opportunity of consulting the Minister for Finance about that matter. There may be objections to it that I do not see at the moment. Speaking for myself, I would be prepared to meet any Deputy who has views on what the attitude of the board should be towards public credit. That might come in under a previous section which says that in everything that pertains to credit the board shall have regard to the public interest. The words "due regard" are not in that section, but you might say that the board would pay due regard to any direction conveyed to it by the Minister for Finance. I do not think you could make it compulsory on the board to follow any direction that might be given by the Minister because if you did that you would be taking away the board's responsibility in the matter of control.

The language of that particular sub-section which I have read is not mandatory. It is fairly well qualified.

It is mandatory.

My recollection does not bring immediately to my mind what was the ultimate effect of these Acts of Parliament in that country which Deputy Davin referred to. If I am not mistaken, shortly after that period it was necessary for the Finance Minister to apply to the London money market for accommodation. It is not a very good example to take. From some of the statements made on this section, one is driven to the conclusion that you want several things at the one time—(1) Government control; (2) cheap money; (3) plenty of it whenever it is required; (4) revenue such as the central bank will not inherit from the Currency Commission; (5) so to manæuvre within the limits laid down by law every single one of those limitations, restrictions, expansions and accommodations as the occasion may require. That is what we want. The difficulty is to get all these things at the one time.

One complaint made here is that 4 per cent. was charged for accommodation in connection with the turf cutting throughout the country. From the reports of the Currency Commission I find that on the 31st December last the banks had approximately £10,000,000 in cash; I may be £100,000 or £200,000 out, but that is the approximate sum. If they have that much money, they are liable to pay to the Currency Commission now and to the central bank later on approximately £270,000 per annum for that money at 3½ per cent. Having paid that much for the cash, they are expected to lend that at 1 per cent. Mind you, they will have to be experts who will do the job that is required of them, if that is the job. In recent years, if one is to follow the accounts published in the Press, bank profits have diminished and the last published aggregate gross distribution by banks in 1936 to shareholders was £1.172 million, or about £1,340,000. The Currency Commission on the 31st December last had in British Government securities £14,600,000, and that money is not earning less than 3 per cent. on an average. That is approximately £420,000. They have, with the deposits, approximately £18,000,000. The commission have an income of more than £400,000, and the charges in respect of that income are nothing approaching those of the banks. Has it suggested itself to anybody to ask why the Currency Commission or the central bank would be unable to lend £1,000,000 at 1 per cent.?

Are we not putting a lot on the new bank by asking them to give way to everything the House wants; to give us plenty of money, to give it at a cheap rate and to increase the revenue that the Government will make out of the currency business in this country? So far as one can judge, not only from the records of the proceedings but the close association between the Ministries and central banks, the evidence is all against the best interests of the country being served by this proposal. The evidence elsewhere favours a measure of independence on the part of the central bank. Right through the Report of the Banking Commission, from one end to the other, it was emphasised that the independence ought to be more pronounced.

What is the contribution of Parliament to the present situation? We complain about bank rates being high and about not having sufficient money. At the present moment there is approximately a sum of £30,000,000 in the banks, which is not invested, in the shape of cash either here or with London agents. Surely that is as much as anybody would require to be employed at any time? But to come back to our own situation, taking Parliament as a whole, in August 1939 we had a price index figure in comparison with that of 1914 of 158; the figure to-day is 209 for food alone. For all items, it was 173 in August, 1939, and it is now 237. We are urging that we should have more control over the monetary system, over the central bank and so on. There is our own record. It does not appear to me to make the other programme attractive.

I move to report progress.

Progress reported; Committee to sit again to-morrow.
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