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Dáil Éireann debate -
Friday, 10 Jul 1942

Vol. 88 No. 4

Central Bank Bill, 1942—Recommittal ( Resumed—Section 58).

On the section: at times, when we hear people talking very learnedly about something, we find a phrase stuck in quite unexpectedly which shows that he does not understand the fundamentals of what he is talking about. I get something of that feeling when I see in this Central Bank Bill a section with regard to hire purchase. We have a Bill here which did not originally, and now only after discussion, make provision for examination of some of the most important aspects of financial life. The board is now being given power to collect statistics and information without which really its work could not go on. Provision for that was not made in the Bill originally, but we find provision here for examining into the hire-purchase position in the country. There are undoubtedly abuses such as Deputy Norton spoke about last night, but to suggest that those inquiries should be carried out by the new central bank machinery gives a kind of huckstering suggestion to the central bank. One would imagine, in present circumstances, particularly, and in its initial days, that the machinery of the central bank would have a lot of more important things to look after than a kind of review of the situation with regard to hire purchasing—aspects of it which are rather analogous to the difficulties and to the abuses that we have in the moneylending system.

I do not think there is any central bank in the world that accepts in any way responsibility for looking after the position with regard to hire purchase. On page 77 of his book, An Outline of Money, Geoffrey Crowther, after discussing the growth of central banking, simply turns to a general look at the money market, and then he says:—

"It will be as well, before concluding this chapter, to give a brief description of the part played by those institutions which cling to the fringe of the banking system and are known as the money market. There is no necessity here to mention most of the many different varieties of financial institution which are to be found in great centres such as London and New York—insurance companies, finance companies, investment trusts, hire-purchase finance companies, and so forth."

The hire-purchase companies come last in the list of important things mentioned there, and for none of the three previous ones has the central bank any responsibility. There are very serious complaints of the way in which certain classes of people are being dealt with by the new Irish assurance company. There is no provision that the central bank should look after the difficulties and complaints people have with regard to the operation of an assurance company like that. It has been pointed out that there is no provision for looking after the operations of moneylenders or investment trusts here. From the remarks in the report of the recent Banking Commission, it is quite clear that the central bank will have no power to do anything in connection with the hire-purchase system. If, after an investigation by the Department of Justice, of some of the abuses that are occurring under the hire-purchase system, certain aspects of the review suggested that the central bank might have a useful function in the situation, it would be understandable, but here it seems to be a little bit out of perspective and it seems almost to reflect upon the type of institution the central bank is intended to be.

I should not like the House to take it for granted that the hire-purchase system is in itself disreputable. It is not. Hire purchase, decently conducted, simply affords to young persons of modest means who desire to get married and set up a home an opportunity of starting with the same standard of comfort that more prosperous people would regard as indispensable for embarking upon married life. It is all very well for people who are comparatively well-off to be telling the less well-to-do that they ought not to contemplate marriage until they are in a position to furnish a house from roof to cellar and have saved up sufficient money to pay for doing so. If they have to wait until that stage arrives, while receiving a wage of 32/- per week, they will wait a long time. I can see no prospect of this country providing everybody in the country with a wage sufficient to enable young people to furnish their houses out of current earnings while unmarried. What we are reasonably and prudently bound to do is to provide that a system which, in itself, may be good, is protected from those who would seek to abuse it. Anybody who has lived in America recognises the universal character of the hire-purchase system. In America, I think you can buy almost anything on the hire-purchase system, but people in America are beginning to ask themselves whether that is a wise situation or not or whether there ought not to be a restriction on the classes of goods which may be sold on the hire-purchase system. There, the view is, I think, gradually gaining strength that only durable goods should be sold on the hire-purchase system and that costly clothes, wireless sets, and a number of other luxury articles should not be made the subject of hire purchase. This tendency to restrict the class of articles which may properly be purchased by hire purchase is guided rather by a desire to protect inexperienced young people who might be tempted into extravagant expenditure than by reluctance to create credit. The odd thing is that the moment people begin to examine hire purchase on this side of the Atlantic they approach the subject with suspicion. They say: "Here is something designed to create credit, and to create credit is, ipso facto bad, dangerous and most undesirable.” That is all antideluvian “cod”.

May I indicate to the Deputy and to the Committee that this section does not propose an inquiry into the social aspects of the hire-purchase system, nor does it suggest a remedy for the evils of instalment purchase. It simply seeks to empower the central bank to inquire into the monetary and financial aspect of hire purchase. That limitation has been realised by six previous speakers whose aggregate interventions occupied only 30 minutes.

If those six speakers did not realise what this section does, it is time I told them.

The Chair does realise what the section aims at.

I shall make the submission that, perhaps, the Chair does not realise what the meaning of this section is. The meaning of it is that the central bank is to come in as an authority over hire purchase and make such recommendations as it may think suitable, from time to time, for its reform and control. That is the purpose of this section.

The section merely authorises the central bank to make inquiry into one aspect, to wit, the financial aspect.

That is all very well when you read the words of the section in a certain way. I read them in the knowledge of the way they are going to be used. Do you imagine that the Taoiseach or the Minister for Finance put in these words to provide a little mental exercise for the board of the central bank? They put them in so that they could come in here from time to time with a Bill designed to control hire purchase and say: "This Bill has been recommended by the board of the central bank."

This is a Central Bank Bill.

The purpose is to come in here with recommendations from the board——

Perhaps the Deputy would indicate to me what part of the section propose to achieve what the Deputy contends.

The section directs the bank to make these inquiries.

Quite, but——

The Minister says that he hopes the bank will be his guide, philosopher and friend in all matters relating to the economic life of the country. The purpose of these inquiries is to furnish the Government with material for any such legislation which they may desire.

And such legislation must come before the Oireachtas.

Yes, and, if the Chair will be patient with me, I shall argue that, if you contemplate future legislation, an essential preliminary is that the information on which that legislation is to be based should be collected by the right people and not by persons who approach a problem of this kind with the preconceived notion that anything tending to create credit is suspect and bad. That antediluvian notion is very prevalent in banking circles in this country and, indeed, in all circles that regard themselves as orthodox. I regard the hire-purchase system as not being a thing which, in itself, requires continuous supervision.

The purpose of this section is to empower the bank to make inquiries for monetary reasons. The Deputy should direct his remarks to that purpose. The evils of the system would arise if a remedy were offered for alleged evils, but this Bill does not purport to find such a remedy.

I do not regard the hire-purchase system as something which requires continued review and examination as though it were some criminal occupation. It is not. It is, in itself, a harmless and indeed salutary occupation, but it is open to abuses. Instead, then, of treating this in many ways desirable form of business as a suspect organisation which requires continued supervision by the central bank, I would suggest to the Minister that steps should be taken to secure the regulation of this business of hire purchase by the one authority in this country competent to regulate it, and that is Oireachtas Eireann.

In Great Britain, when the case was made that the hire-purchase system had become of evil character, Parliament very properly instituted inquiries into its operations, and laid down such rules and regulations as were requisite to ensure that it would not assume a questionable character in future and would not so conduct itself as to require further review. I suggest to the Minister that we should pursue a similar course here. If the Minister is in any way apprehensive —and I think he has reasonable grounds for assuming that certain individuals are attempting to abuse hire purchase in this country at the present time—I invite him to set up a Parliamentary Committee of this House and the Seanad, to recommend the legislation necessary to provide safeguards against abuses of the kind at present current or of the kind that might be anticipated in the future.

I want to subscribe to the views expressed by the Opposition yesterday, when they said they found it difficult to understand why the central bank should be directed to keep under review the activities of hire-purchase financiers and retailers, and yet might not be required to take any cognisance of the activities of moneylenders. The object of the review here contemplated in Section 58 is to ensure that there will be no exploitation of the ordinary citizen of the State, and this at a time when we know that moneylenders are ruining men every week. When you raise that matter in this House you are told: "Ah, there is nothing we can do about it." Surely, if there is to be any supervision of anyone for the protection of the public, it should be something like that.

The Chair is not prepared to hear the Deputy on the evils of moneylending or on the measures that should be taken to deal with them.

Moneylenders were discussed at length last night.

If six speeches in 30 minutes amount to a lengthy review, I am much surprised, in view of experience of many lengthy reviews on former occasions.

The time taken in speeches is not the question. That is not a concern of mine.

It is the concern of the Chair to decide that this section does not refer to moneylending.

This was discussed last night, and I am entitled, in respectful submission, to say that, if this Bill contemplates the supervision of the hire-purchase system, something that is designed to exploit an additional class to a much greater extent should come under supervision.

On the Second Stage, possibly. The Deputy might resume his seat for the moment. It is a long-established procedure that discussion is confined to terms of the section. Otherwise, discussion would be interminable.

That is what I am doing —discussing this section. Accordingly, Sir, I would be glad to know from the Government if they are prepared to allege in this House any specific misconduct on the part of those concerned in hire purchase, and if they are prepared to state that there are a great many merchants operating the hire-purchase system perfectly honourably, and that there should be, and justly can be, no aspersion put upon the general conduct of their business. If there are any abuses—I believe there are—in connection with hire purchase, why do we not proceed, as the legislative authority in this country, to deal with them? Why are we "passing the buck" to the central bank? What is the reason for that? Is it that we are afraid of this task? Before this section could pass, I think we are entitled to that information from the Minister and, so far as I can find out, we have not got it yet.

I, too, fail to see why this section is put in here, at a time when the Government are closing their eyes to the abuses which are very prevalent in the hire-purchase system. I take Deputy Dillon's word for it that there are many merchants operating the system honourably; but, at the same time, I know that the few who are not, are bringing the system into discredit. They are responsible for very grave injustices to the working classes. You, Sir, have ruled that an extensive debate on the evils of the system would be out of order, and I will not follow that matter up.

The Deputy, I am sure, appreciates that the limitations of this section do not offer a remedy for social evils.

I quite appreciate that. I will not, though I could, give very many instances of grave hardships suffered under the system. I will leave that for another time. At the same time, I find it very hard to understand why the Government—as Deputy Dillon and probably other Deputies have pointed out—refuse to act in a positive manner and introduce remedial legislation which is very essential.

I feel about this section that either it goes too far or it does not go far enough. I do not want to go into the details of hire purchase, but I want to make some passing references. First of all, in objecting to this section, this side of the House must not be taken as being antagonistic to the Labour Deputies who talk about the abuses of the hire-purchase system. Speaking as an individual, I may say it is not that I object to any investigation into the hire-purchase system or control of it, but I object to it in this form. An examination of the system falls under two heads. Firstly, there is the inflationary effect on the whole country of a universal acceptance of it for almost everything.

As Deputy Cosgrave showed last night, if this system is pursued indefinitely, there will come a time when enough purchasers cannot be found and there will be a flop——

——as there was in America.

Why does the Deputy say "Oh"?

Because it is quite a mistaken view.

That the crisis in America was caused by a flagging of the hire-purchase system?

The Deputy realises that he is raising a very controversial issue.

Whether or not an inquiry should be made is the actual question at issue.

I want to put these points under their proper heads.

The collapse of the United States was caused by tariffs.

I merely want to get this thing under its proper heads. There is the inflationary aspect of hire purchase. We could all say that hire purchase was like the curate's egg— good in spots and very good up to a point, but very bad beyond that point. I shall leave the inflationary aspect at that. The Minister last night spoke about the Federal Bank in America being empowered to make an inquiry into hire purchase. Without knowing the details, I feel perfectly certain that it was the broader aspect of the inflationary tendency which was inquired into by that bank, and whether that ought to be inquired into by a bank or by the Government is a matter which I shall leave for the moment. On the other side of the hire-purchase system, there are the creditable and discreditable details. Deputy Norton last night referred to Mrs. Murphy who bought £10 worth of goods, paid £8 and then got another £10 worth and then found that her £20 worth of goods were mortgaged for a debt of £12.

£20 worth of goods.

Plus the £8 paid.

Pursuing that transaction to the end of the road, if Mrs. Murphy pays the remaining £12, the transaction is all right. The trouble arises when Mr. Murphy loses his job, when the payments fall into arrears and the goods are collected and sold for £4 or £5.

Or probably hired to somebody else.

Yes, but, in the first instance, they are sold. That is an extension of it. These are details, however, into which I do not propose to go further.

Not to pursue them to the end of the road, as the Deputy said.

I merely went a certain distance further along the same road as Deputy Norton to show that there were points which in certain instances might lead to very grave abuse, and I am content to leave it at that. In the hire-purchase system, there are abuses and hardships. I do not see how some of them could be done away with, but others of them call quite legitimately for Government interference. Before parting with Deputy Norton's Mrs. Murphy, I want to point out that the transaction could have been given quite a different turn by these hire-purchase people saying: "This transaction has some peculiar aspects and we will introduce you to Mr. X, who will lend you the money to pay us." You could then quite easily find that hire purchase, money lending, pawnbroking and various other activities were inextricably mixed.

The Deputy seems to be making an inquiry into the hire-purchase system rather than discussing whether or not the central bank should be empowered to collect statistical information.

I entirely sympathise with your point of view and I agree with it. I have, however, touched only on the heads——

The Deputy is still pursuing Mrs. Murphy's case.

I think I can leave her case now. I wanted to touch on these points to show that there are many sides to this hire-purchase system. Now, we come down to the central bank and hire-purchase. This proposal is another instance of the extraordinary system which has grown up under the present Government of getting somebody to do somebody else's job.

"Passing the buck".

Deputy Dillon, in his eloquent way, has described it as "passing the buck". Perhaps it is, but there is a whole herd of bucks being passed, in my opinion. I touched on the point last night, but it seems that it made no impression on the Government, that I did not think a body of directors of the central bank would be qualified to inquire into all the ramifications of the system. They may, apparently, under this section, send letters to people asking them for information, but can they bring up witnesses and examine them on oath? That might be very necessary. You might even have to bring back Mr. and Mrs. Murphy and examine them at the inquiry.

The point I want to make is that somebody will have to stand the expense of conducting this inquiry which, if it is to be held, would in my opinion be far better conducted by some Government Department. It would be co-related with other inquiries and other activities in respect of which the central bank might find itself baulked, as you pointed out, Sir, possibly when looking for information about hire purchase, baulked in respect of inquiring into moneylending, pawnbroking or the activities of the people who furnish the funds to enable the hire-purchase system to operate. What I object to is that the central bank will some day have to maintain a staff who will make an inquiry into an aspect of our public life which it is much better and much more desirable should be inquired into by some Government Department or some body appointed by the Government. We have innumerable instances where at the present time a good deal of expense is heaped upon the manufacturer or retailer, or whatever you like to call him, but that expense ultimately reaches the plain people, as costs are driven up and swollen by hidden services, which are undertaken, possibly only at long periods, by people not as qualified as somebody who is continually at that kind of work. I think this is outside the scope of the work of the central bank and that it should not be asked to undertake it. I do not think the central bank should undertake it without taking on a specialised staff which would, probably, have to be kept on after the inquiries had ceased or, in the alternative, be always kept there, even if there was nothing to be done. This section is an extraordinary innovation along the lines of what Deputy Dillon called "passing the buck".

I do not think that I am called on to add much to what I said last night. I entirely agree with Deputy Dillon as to the system of hire purchase not being in itself disreputable. I stated last night that, in my opinion, it was a legitimate form of extending credit, and whatever disrepute may have in some cases become attached to it, is due to its operation by people who did not follow the best established business methods. I cannot agree with Deputy Mulcahy, Deputy Dockrell or even with Deputy Dillon, when they find it so difficult to understand why we should in this section empower the central bank board to get information. The majority report of the Banking Commission, having investigated this matter of hire purchase, recommended that the central bank should be empowered to make this type of investigation, which is purely a monetary investigation, strictly confined to the financial aspects of the hire-purchase system. As Deputy Dockrell properly said, it might lead to inflation. It is inflation in itself and, if developed to a certain extent, might have very considerable influence in an inflationary way. It had that effect elsewhere. It had that effect in the United States of America, to such an extent that last year the Federal Reserve Bank, a very important body, was authorised by law to investigate the system in its inflationary aspect, and to endeavour to control it, so that that inflation should not develop beyond the point it had then reached. If a very big and important body like the Federal Reserve Bank, one of the biggest of its kind in the world, considered that the board of the bank could usefully and helpfully give time to an investigation of that kind in the interests of the State, and in the interests of the finance of the State, I do not see anything derogatory in the board of the central bank here being asked to make a similar investigation. I am not very intimate with the hire-purchase system but, as far as I am aware, we have not reached any dangerous state of inflation here arising out of the hire-purchase system.

Inflation has half the population unemployed.

The element of inflation and the foundation of inflation could be laid, perhaps, at such a time with greater danger of development than on some other occasions when the industrial life of the country might be in a more prosperous condition. All we ask here is to give power to the central bank board to investigate this business in its financial aspect. The other matter of abuses that are connected with the system is a subject for inquiry, I suggest, by some other body— the Department of Justice or the Department of Industry and Commerce. If there are abuses in the system in its social aspect, that could be done. The same applies to moneylending and pawnbroking. Moneylending has already been the subject of legislation in this House and is, to a certain extent, controlled by such legislation. If necessary, that legislation could be further extended and greater powers given to the Department of Justice. That is a matter that Deputies will, I am sure, bring before the House at a suitable opportunity. I do not see anything improper, dangerous or outside the scope of the work of the central bank if it is given the power that we seek to give it here. The hire purchase and sale of goods on deferred payments involves a locking up of working capital for a long time until the instalments are completed, and that in many cases may be a lengthy period. That is its effect eventually, if developed considerably, on the financial system. These companies and business concerns interested in hire purchase have not unlimited capital, but have to go to financial corporations or to banks for advances of cash or credit, and that has its reactions on the whole financial system. I am satisfied that no dangerous situation has yet been reached here from the purely financial aspect. There may be other dangers, but not from the purely monetary or financial aspects. We want to have information, and we want to see that the development of this system may not reach such a stage that it would become a danger and, for that purpose, it is very proper that the central bank, which will have a staff sufficient to make the necessary financial investigations, should be given this power.

We have it now that the purpose that everyone thought was going to be served by Section 58 is not going to be served by it at all. Did the House not believe that Section 58 was designed so that the banks would detect the abuses of the hire-purchase system with a view to protecting the people?

To protect Mrs. Murphy.

Yes, but now it appears that they do not give a damn about Mrs. Murphy, and that the only idea is whether an inflationary spiral is going to be started in this country by the hire-purchase system, when 100,000 men are unemployed and as many more have fled to England in order to get employment. God knows, intelligent men would break their hearts laughing if they imagined that Oireachtas Eireann had spent this morning on a discussion about providing the central bank with powers to ensure that the operations of the fellow selling furniture on the hire-purchase system would or would not create an inflationary spiral which would react on our finances. Did you ever hear such grotesque "cod"? How can we carry on with such absurdity with perfectly serious countenances? Inflationary spiral! Upon my word, it astonishes me—the things I hear said in this House. Just imagine saying that the financial collapse in the United States of America, in 1929, was facilitated by the collapse of the hire-purchase system! Tariffs had nothing to do with it! Restrictions on international trade had nothing to do with it!

Mr. Cordell Hull or Mr. Stimson, or anybody else, know nothing about these matters—none of us knows anything about it! It was all due to the sale of veneered furniture and washing machines under the hire-purchase system. And now we are told that in this country the hideous menace of the sale of veneered furniture and washing machines under the hire-purchase system must be kept under constant review by the central bank, but that the gross abuses whereunder individuals are being exploited as a result of that system are to be put on the long finger and, doubtless—perhaps, some time when we can get around to it—the appropriate Department may consider making such inquiries as would facilitate the necessary steps that might be requisite in order to provide a remedy for these abuses.

There is only one question in regard to hire purchase in this country that need worry anyone, and that is, the high-pressure salesmanship which induces people to go in unduly for the buying of goods under the hire-purchase system by the carrying of chattel mortgages from one transaction to another, which is a perfect nuisance. I know what I am talking about, because I was in the hire-purchase business for a long time and I know the abuses that take place in connection with it, but none of these, apparently, is to be touched at all.

The Chair stated at the outset for the guidance of Deputies that this section does not propose an inquiry into the social side of the hire-purchase system, nor adumbrate a remedy for its defects. It is a question of whether the central bank should be empowered to inquire into the financial or monetary aspects of the hire-purchase system and, therefore, the other matter does not arise.

But the whole House, Sir, is under this delusion. Deputy Norton was concerned about the case of Mrs. Murphy.

On a point of order, Sir, may I withdraw Mrs. Murphy?

The whole progress of the discussion on this section has been on the assumption that something was going to be done by the central bank which would operate to abate the abuses of the hire-purchase system. Now, however, the Minister for Finance gets up and says: "Nothing is further from my mind; all I want to do is to ensure that the central bank will prevent the sale of veneered furniture and washing machines on the hire-purchase system being conducted to such an extent as would be calculated to overthrow the whole economic foundations of this country." Now, that is a "cod", and we all know that it is a "cod", but what I am afraid of is that certain Deputies will accept Section 58, as a guarantee that abuses under the hire-purchase system are going to be done away with. I want to make it clear that that is not the case. Now, the Minister says that he apprehends inflation from the operation of the hire-purchase system. I am not going to fall back because these kinds of pontifical declarations, made in this House, are made as if they were truths thrown from the Bible. They are imbecile "cod". So long as you have thousands and tens of thousands of men standing unemployed in the country, the fact that hundreds of people want goods on the hire-purchase system cannot create inflation. The Minister for Finance gets up here quite blandly and innocently, and apparently without any desire to mislead and says that the Federal Reserve Bank of America was instructed by the American Government to investigate hire purchase in order to check it and so as to stop the inflationary spiral. Nothing could be further from the truth. Whoever told the Minister that, was pulling his leg. The Federal Reserve Bank there was told to take effective measures to control hire purchase, not with a view to preventing inflation, but in order to prevent the use of factories in America for the production of consumer goods when those factories and their operatives were required for the production of arms and ammunition for the prosecution of the war. The question of inflation never arose.

The Taoiseach seems to be astonished. Is this the fact, or is it not? The Government there wanted the factories, that had heretofore been used for the production of washing machines and other such things, for the production of arms and ammunition. There was no other place where they could get the personnel to produce these things, or the buildings and machinery that could be adapted to the needs of war production, and, accordingly, hire purchase was cut down there, not for the purpose of preventing inflation, but to release these factories and their personnel for the production of other goods. It is perfectly true that if you had a state of full employment, you might then have the danger of an inflationary spiral, if, on that system, you had imposed a new system of hire purchase, but to be talking of the danger of an inflationary spiral being initiated by hire purchase in this country is just pure "cod", and everybody knows it to be so. If that is the purpose of Section 58, then Section 58 is a shameful fraud. Did anybody in this House assume, did anybody on the Opposition Benches or on the Labour Benches assume that a central bank, in investigating the circumstances envisaged in Section 58, was to be exclusively confined to the possibility of inflation in this country? I do not believe it, and I want this assurance from the Minister: if he thinks it is right to put Section 58 in this Bill, does he not think it his duty to see that the abuses of the hire-purchase system will be dealt with at the same time? Is he only interested in the economic aspects of the problem, and if this problem has been brought to his attention in connection with this matter, will he take effective measures to put an end to the gross abuses that do obtain, and to ensure that anybody who does operate hire purchase in this country will operate it along decent lines?

Question put and declared carried.

You are disposing of Section 58?

Yes, Section 58 and amendment No. 61, both in Committee, after which the Report Stage will be entered on.

I move amendment No. 61:—

In Part I of the First Schedule on page 31, opposite the reference to Section 47 in the first column, to delete all words in the second column and substitute the words "the whole section" and in the third column to delete all the words and substitute the words" the passing of this Act".

The object of this amendment is to repeal, in toto, Section 47 of the Currency Act of 1927. Section 47 of that Act provides that legal tender notes must be issued under, approximately, three conditions. It says that they must be issued for 100 ounces of gold bullion at the one time. While gold may be in the Rand, the possibility of getting 100 ounces of gold bullion deposited with our central bank is not really a live proposition to-day. It also says that legal tender notes must be issued for an unlimited amount of gold coin. Again, in present circumstances, that is not a problem with which we need concern ourselves to-day. The section further provides that our legal tender notes must be issued in exchange for British £1 notes. That is the only portion of the section with which we need concern ourselves in present circumstances. The effect, therefore, of Section 47 is that at any time anybody desires to present the central bank—the Currency Commission at present—with £1 of British money that person must get £1 of our money in exchange for it.

To put the matter in another way: suppose a British bank, or a British financial house, decides to take over here £10,000,000 of British money and deposit it with the Currency Commission, or with the central bank when this Bill is passed, then that British bank or British financial house must get £10,000,000 of our legal tender currency. The Taoiseach, at one stage of our discussions on this Bill, did not appear to realise that was the position, but I am sure he now realises that if anybody in Whitechapel or Soho comes over here with £10,000,000 of British money and deposits it with the Currency Commission, or with the central bank, he can get £10,000,000 of our money in exchange for it. That cannot be disputed. That is the situation to-day.

We can do the same. We can take over £10,000,000 of our money.

That is a great thrill, seeing that we cannot buy a bunch of bananas or a coconut for the £300,000,000 that we have already invested over there.

That is not true.

If we cannot buy bananas or a coconut, we can buy other things.

For instance?

We have bought other things.

For instance?

We are getting things every day. Look at our imports.

That is what I am worried about. Is not the fact of the situation this, that we are exporting more to Britain than Britain is sending to us, and that Britain is chalking up a credit balance against us. The Minister's nominee at the meeting of Albert Phillips the other day said: "Are these assets going to be any good after the war?" He is a very learned student of economics and he is the Minister's nominee on the Industrial Credit Corporation. He was reported in the Irish Press the other day, the bible of journalistic accuracy, to have said that. He asked why should we invest this money in British War Loan, a thing which the company had just done, and he then asked if it would be a good asset after the war.

What did the Deputy say the name was?

The Minister can look up the Irish Press. At least, he ought to honour the paper by reading it.

To get away for a moment from parity and deal with exports and imports, we have been sending to Britain £3,000,000 worth of goods for the £2,000,000 worth which she has been sending to us, and she has been chalking up a credit balance against us in Britain. But there is no certainty at all that, after the war, we can cash the I.O.U.'s we are getting from Britain. That is my view. That is the view also, expressed less emphatically, of the Minister's nominee on the Industrial Credit Corporation. The position at all events is this, and the Minister cannot dispute it, that any British bank or any British financial house can take £10,000,000 of British money in here, put it into the Currency Commission and in return for it must get £10,000,000 of our money.

That is the position. But they could have done that on any day since 1927.

Quite, but Britain has not been at war since 1927. There were times since 1927 when Britain was on the gold standard, and times when British credit stood higher than it stands to-day. At any rate, since that is the position, that a British bank, or a British financial house, can do that, is it not perfectly clear that we have no control whatever over the volume of currency issued in this country?

That does not follow.

We will hear the Minister on that. I am suggesting to him that, so long as that can be done, it is the British bank, or the British financial house, that determines the volume of currency issued in this country, and that we have no control over it. I am sure the Taoiseach now realises that we are anchored to a scheme by which we are obliged to cash every British pound that is tendered to our Currency Commission or to the central bank when it is established.

May I correct the Deputy? Since the war started, taking total imports versus total exports, there has been an excess of imports over exports to Britain.

For the whole period?

Since the war started.

What has the position been since June of last year?

Take the month of May, the excess of imports was £1,000,000.

Why? If the Minister will get permission for me from the Minister for Industry and Commerce to quote in this House from the confidential trade statistics which I get as a member of the House, I will explain to him why there has been an excess of imports, but my lips are sealed on that. The Minister will know what the explanation is if he looks up the statistics.

I am sorry for interrupting the Deputy, but he is exaggerating the case and I do not want him to get away with that. It is not true to say that we cannot buy a coconut or a banana or that our money cannot purchase anything at present. That is not correct seeing that we are getting imports every month to the value of millions and are exporting goods worth millions.

We are getting certain imports from Britain, but we are sending to Britain more than we are getting.

Surely the Minister does not deny that we are sending more to Britain than we are getting.

What period?

In the last 12 months have we not sent more to Britain than we have got from Britain? Is that denied?

I cannot be certain. Will the Deputy take the calendar year?

I am taking the last 12 months. I read the statistics every other day, and that cannot be denied. We get the statistics under the seal of confidence, but they have no meaning if the Minister denies the accuracy of them.

I do not deny their accuracy, but if the Deputy has a good case he should not spoil it by overstating it.

I have an excellent case, I think.

Then the Deputy should try to stick to his case and not overstate it. He is overstating it when he says that our money cannot purchase anything.

I have said to the Minister, and this cannot be denied, that we have approximately £300,000,000 invested in Britain. Does the Minister deny that this £300,000,000 is, in fact, frozen?

We can get millions of pounds worth of goods.

We are sending to Great Britain much more than we get from Great Britain. The current exports to Great Britain are paying much more than we need pay Great Britain for the imports we get from Great Britain. The original £300,000,000 is surely frozen. The net position in respect of our financial relations with Great Britain is that every time somebody presents a British £ to the Currency Commission or the new central bank he must get an Irish £ in return.

I have the figures of imports and exports here now in the Currency Commission Bulletin for April, 1942.

Will the Minister look at the trade statistics issued by the Department of Industry and Commerce for the month of May this year? Will he go back and look at the figures for the previous 12 months?

I have them for the calendar year here. I understood the Deputy was talking of calendar years.

If the Minister will take a permit from me to quote the confidential statistics I will discuss them.

I cannot quote the confidential statistics.

The Minister produces a document of that kind——

I am producing the Currency Commission's Bulletin for April, 1942, with the statistics for the calendar years 1932 to 1941.

Surely there is nothing confidential about the monthly summary of our trade?

I mean the monthly trade statistics indicating the type of goods that come in. One has not to be very intelligent to discover why they are coming in. The Minister will not deny that we sent more to Great Britain than we got from Great Britain in the last 12 months.

In the month of May this year we had an excess of £1,000,000 worth of imports over exports. It varies from month to month.

If the Minister will look up the drapery side of the statistics he will discover why. If he looks up the statistics for any month he will discover that, although we have an electrical factory in this country, we are importing some hundreds of thousands of electric bulbs. Would the Minister look at that?

They vary from month to month.

That is what I say. A monthly return is not a reliable return. My case is that for the last 12 months we exported to Great Britain more than Great Britain sent to us.

I have here the statistics in the Currency Commission Bulletin for the last calendar year. In 1941, the total of imports was £29,537,000 and the total of exports £31,836,000.

What does the Minister deduce from that?

I want to give the figures to the Deputy. I do not want to prove anything except that the Deputy ought not to say that we cannot buy coconuts and bananas. There are things that we cannot buy at present. He wants to show that we can buy nothing for the millions that we are exporting. That is not right. We are buying millions of pounds worth. We are finding it difficult to get them. In 1940, the total imports amounted to £46,790,000 and the exports to £32,969,000. In the year before that the imports were £43,415,000 and the exports £26,892,000.

Surely the Minister realises that my statement was that the £300,000,000 invested in Great Britain was virtually frozen. The Minister quoted figures for 1941 to show that we imported £29,000,000 worth and exported £31,000,000. I say that that does not at all disturb the fact that our £300,000,000 is not a liquid asset in Great Britain in present circumstances. The £29,000,000 worth that we imported was paid for by the £31,000,000 worth which we exported. It leaves the basic problem still there of not being able to cash our £300,000,000.

In 1939 we had to pay £16,523,000 for the cost of the excess imports over exports. That had to be paid for out of something. The same thing occurred in 1940, when there was £13,822,000 worth of excess imports over exports.

My case is based on the last 12 months or 18 months. I was saying that if we used the £300,000,000 to import goods which we could have bought in Great Britain at the time things might be very different in this country to-day. That is an entirely different argument from the one I want to make on this. I say to the Minister—and this is incontrovertible —that anyone who presents a British pound or £10,000,000 British pounds to our new central bank must get £1 or £10,000,000, as the case may be, in return. So long as that is the position, quite clearly we have no real control over the volume of currency issued in this country. It may be that the Minister does not want any control over the volume of currency issued in this country. The Taoiseach appeared to be startled by that fact.

I satisfied myself that it would not occur.

The Taoiseach knows that he has got no armour plate against the possibility of its occurring.

We can return the compliment.

I do not think the Minister will shake anybody by saying that. There will be no flutter caused in the Dublin Exchange by the Minister's interjection. The real position is that anybody who presents a British pound note to our Currency Commission must get an Irish pound note in return. The Minister may say that that is a link with sterling; that it is desirable to maintain the link with sterling in existing circumstances. I suggest that it is not a link with sterling; that it is really anchoring our currency permanently to sterling. Sensible people do not anchor themselves to drifting objects. What we are doing by the incorporation of Section 47 of the 1927 Currency Act in this Bill is that we are anchoring ourselves to a drifting object and the drifting object is the value of the British pound note during this war and after this war. The Minister can console himself that it is a link. It is not a link. It is a whole chain wrapped round our notes. We are not merely linking ourselves with sterling, but we are handcuffed to sterling under Section 47 of the 1927 Currency Act.

In fact and in essence, Section 47 of the 1927 Currency Act subordinates our currency absolutely and completely to British currency. Members of the Government and members of the Government Party may try to blink the facts as they like, but every financier in this country knows that Section 47 of the 1927 Currency Act, which was at one stage denounced by the Government when in opposition, definitely and irretrievably anchors our currency to British sterling, and the effect of anchoring our currency to British sterling is that this country is deprived of an independent self-acting monetary system.

Anchorage to British sterling means that the price of every article which we sell or buy abroad is not determined by our standards of currency, is not determined by our needs, is not determined by our financial prudence, but solely by the value of the British pound in the market abroad in which we are compelled to buy. Section 47 of the 1927 Currency Act in fact maintains an artificial parity with sterling and only an artificial parity, because there is no other parity with sterling existing to-day so far as our legal tender notes are concerned. What we have really done in respect of Section 47 of the 1927 Currency Act is that we have completely abandoned any pretence of financial independence in this country. We may have a Currency Commission; we may have a central bank; we may discuss currency and financial matters generally in this House, but let nobody in this country or on the Government Benches imagine that we have the slightest control in present circumstances over our currency.

Will the Deputy tell us how we can get that control?

I shall come to that. The fact of the matter is—and every member of the Government Party has to recognise it whether he likes it or not, whether it is palatable or unpalatable—that it is the Bank of England that determines the volume of money which is capable of being issued in this country and it is the Bank of England which manages our currencies for us. That cannot be denied. When the City of London decides to embark on a policy of deflation, as it did in 1923, in 1926 and in 1929, we must do the same, if we are going to maintain parity, because you can only maintain parity with Britain on the assumption that you keep in step with Britain.

If Britain decides to embark on a policy of deflation, then what Pa does we all do. If Britain decides to embark on a policy of deflation, you have got to deflate in this country; otherwise there is no parity. If Britain decides during a war, or on any other occasion, to embark on a policy of deflation, then in order to maintain parity we have to embark on a policy of deflation as well.

We have no more control over financial factors in this country than has somebody on a Pacific island. Of course, parity in our circumstances, vis-a-vis a powerful country like Britain, until recently the financial hub of the universe, means that we can have parity so long as we are prepared to do everything Britain wants us to do in financial matters, so long as we are prepared to follow Britain or be dragged after Britain. The Irish pound with the brogue can look the British pound in the face only so long as the Irish pound with the brogue does what the British pound does. The Irish pound could never dream of doing anything in conflict with the British pound, nor could it afford to quarrel with the tendency of the British pound or the direction in which it wanted to travel. If you want to maintain parity with sterling you have to put up with whatever the British pound does, and you have no control over the consequences.

If Britain wants to extend her credit or the volume of her currency, or wants to provide new credit facilities, we have to follow in her wake. If Britain wants to deflate, we have to do the same, because parity with sterling ties us to an acceptance of that position. Britain, in fact, sets the pace, and if we are not prepared to follow step by step, the British pound will ensure that we will be dragged after it. Of course, the Taoiseach will say that we are really not anchored to the British pound at all, that under this Bill we are perfectly free to alter the whole thing.

And so we are.

What is the type of freedom open to us?

If it is in the interests of the country, the Oireachtas here and now can, with a short Bill, make the alteration.

I give the Taoiseach credit for this, that his effort to defend Section 47 of the 1927 Act is the most subtle piece of reasoning he has yet submitted. There is not a legislative tight rope on which the Taoiseach would not say he had plenty of room when nobody else could even hold on. He tells now we are free to make an alteration.

If I happened to have the same sort of tie as the Deputy, have I no freedom to change it?

It depends on how tight the tie is around the Taoiseach's neck. I am making the case that he should have reasonable freedom in the tie.

So I have.

I do not want the tie to be unduly tight around his neck, and the purpose of my amendment is to give the Taoiseach freedom from whatever menacing things may be associated with having the tie around his neck. The Taoiseach says the Dáil is free to alter Section 47 of the 1927 Act. We have been free since 1927, at all events.

There must be some reason.

Let us get the reason. The fact is that the Dáil has not altered its anchorage to sterling since 1927. Some time ago I quoted a speech made by the present Minister for Local Government when he was formerly Minister for Finance. In that speech he told us what anchorage to sterling meant. It was the famous speech he made in 1931. I quoted it on the Second Reading.

Would the Deputy quote it again?

Paper is so scarce now, I do not think I will take that risk. Then we had the speech of the Minister for Industry and Commerce at Collooney. Addressing the boys down there he said that anchorage to sterling was really the explanation why we were so depressed economically. He told them that the Cosgrave Government was under the control of the British banks and that when Fianna Fáil would come into office anchorage to all these economically subjugating influences would end, and that by breaking that anchorage to sterling there was going to be a new El Dorado in this country; the only danger in which the ordinary citizen would stand was the possibility of being drowned in a deluge of milk and honey. These were the promises of 1931, but I do not wish at this stage to pursue them.

Although the Dáil appears to have the power to alter the anchorage to sterling, it has not done so. It will not do so until it recognises the serious disabilities which are inherent in our permanent statutory anchorage to sterling. We refuse to take powers to break that anchorage although most other countries much more closely associated with Britain than we are have long since abandoned the same type of parity anchorage which we have to-day. I think this is probably the only free country which voluntarily anchors itself to the currency of another country. I know of no other free country which voluntarily and by statute anchors itself to the currency of another country. In the 1927 Act, and again in this Bill, we are permanently anchoring ourselves statutorily to British sterling and we are doing that at a time when very few people in the world are prepared to say that British sterling will be as valuable after this war as in pre-war days.

The purpose of my amendment is to give the Government freedom to move and I want to try to release the Government from the financial strait-jacket into which it is getting itself by Section 47 of the 1927 Act. The British Government is not tied statutorily to an anchorage to our currency. Oh no. We are tied statutorily to an anchorage to British currency. But the British Government can to-night decide, as they decided in 1929, that they are going to alter their currency. When they did so in 1929, nobody in the whole world knew it until they read the papers the following morning announcing that Britain had abandoned the gold standard.

So could we, if we wanted to do it.

Let us see the process.

Let the Deputy tell us all about it.

At 10 o'clock at night, in 1929, the British decided to go off the gold standard. People woke up the following morning to learn that Britain had gone off the gold standard. There was no fuss, no excitement, no public agitation. Simply Britain had abandoned the gold standard and that was all about it.

Cannot we abandon the sterling standard at 12 o'clock this morning, if we want to?

What is to prevent us —common sense, and nothing else.

If you incorporate Section 47 of the 1927 Currency Act in this new Central Bank Bill then, before you can abandon the parity anchorage to sterling, in normal times, you must come to this House with the First Reading of a Bill, the Second Reading of a Bill, the Committee Stage, Report Stage and Fifth Stage to delete Section 47, and then you have got to take it to the Seanad and get it through four stages there.

It could be done by an Emergency Powers Order.

Deputy Dillon says it could be done by an Emergency Powers Order but Deputy Dillon knows Emergency Powers Orders only last for the duration of the emergency. This is not emergency legislation. This is permanent legislation. If the war ends this year, the Emergency Powers Orders cease to have effect six months after the end of the war.

This is permanent legislation and you must compare permanent legislation with our permanent powers to repeal permanent legislation. Nobody can deny that, in normal times, if we are going to repeal Section 47 and abandon the parity anchorage with sterling, we must bring a Bill to this House in five different stages and we must then take it through the Seanad in four stages. Would anybody at this stage be inquisitive as to the possibility that in that event, there might well be public panic in the country, there might well be agitation in the country and there might well be created in the country a feeling which could possibly damage, to a very serious extent, our credit, our economic stability and our desire to make a perfectly peaceful transition from a parity anchorage to sterling to some kind of link with sterling calculated better to serve our interests? It may be, of course, that the Government has a very good case for the maintenance of parity with sterling, and I am not going to question their right to have a view on the maintenance of anchorage with sterling. I do not agree with it myself, but I can see that a Government is quite entitled to say: "In present circumstances it suits us to have an anchorage to sterling." but I want to put on the Government the responsibility and, at the same time, to give it the freedom to alter its anchorage over night if the Government decides that an abandonment of our present parity link with sterling is best calculated to suit the economic and other interests of this country.

The amendment which I proposed does not contemplate any compulsion on the Government to abandon the link with sterling. It does not even contemplate compelling the Government to abandon the parity anchorage with sterling. We want to give the Government a free hand to make changes in that association with sterling as speedily as the Government desire to make them, as freely as the Government desire to make them and not to encumber the Government by any type of legislative restrictions which are obviously imposed on the Government if it has to come to this House and get a Bill through five stages here and then take it to the Seanad in four stages.

The Deputy wants to transfer all that anxiety which may take place for a few days and make it perpetual or constant. He wants to have it over all this period. The very fact that you could do that would cause the very anxiety the Deputy says would arise if we brought in a Bill.

I say to the Taoiseach that there is no other free country in the world that I know of which statutorily anchors itself to the currency of another country on a parity basis.

Is New Zealand a free country?

I said which anchors itself to the currency of another country on a parity basis.

I do not know any other free country in the world which anchors itself statutorily to the currency of another country on a parity basis.

New Zealand.

Is the Minister still contending that New Zealand is in that position?

It is a question whether you anchor it at parity or at a certain other figure. It is a question of the particular level.

If the Taoiseach will develop the second view, I am on his side. I want to give the Government power to say: "Let us have £ for £ with the British if that suits us but, if it does not suit us, let us alter that relationship."

The only difference then is that the Deputy does not want that done by Act of Parliament. He wants to have it possible to do it at any moment and at any time—quickly. Is that the difference between us?

I want it done speedily and, if the Government have the power to do that freely, I want at a later stage to convince the Government that, in present circumstances, we ought to abandon the parity anchorage to sterling and put our anchorage to sterling on a basis which may adequately serve our interests.

What will that be?

We will come to that. As long as we are exporting to Great Britain and are getting in less from Great Britain than we are sending, quite obviously, anchorage to sterling is a bad proposition from our point of view. It could not be otherwise.

It depends on the remedy, does it not?

It depends on the remedy. So long as we are exporting goods to Great Britain and getting in less from Great Britain, anchorage to sterling, quite obviously, is not a good proposition from our point of view. That cannot be denied.

I deny it loudly and emphatically.

There are visible and invisible exports.

Yes, taking visible and invisible exports.

What do you get?

Hugo Flinn's £3,500,000, to begin with.

I never hope to convince Deputy Dillon that any abandonment of anchorage to anything that has a British origin is really good from the point of view of this country because the Deputy really—and he disturbs his otherwise good logic by his prejudice—will not be convinced of the essential soundness of Irish assets once he sees a British asset in the distance. As I said, I think that disturbs the very sound logic which the Deputy displays in other spheres. But, I wonder whether it ever occurs to the Minister for Finance or to the Taoiseach that there is something rather unusual in the scheme of our financial relations with Britain, a scheme not paralleled in the relations of any other two States, whether tied by trade or racial associations, in our continued affection for backing the note issue of this country, 100 per cent., by the currency of another country, namely, our next-door neighbour. The whole truth of our financial position is that in order that an Irishman may get an Irish pound note into his pocket as a result of a week or a month's toil, he must get a British pound note, deposit it with the Currency Commission in College Green, or the central bank, and then get an Irish pound note.

I have got an odd one and I never got it in that precise way.

Somebody has done it for the Taoiseach. Cicero said that his soul was bought but his tongue was unsullied. The Taoiseach does not bother about these mechanical operations in getting a pound note. He knows that the Currency Commission will do the whole job for him. The net fact is that this amendment has the same object as Ministers who at one time were going to save the Taoiseach from the disedifying task of getting Irish notes by depositing British pound notes or British I O U's for a pound with the Currency Commission.

The most extraordinary thing of all is that every other country in what is described as the British Commonwealth of Nations has abandoned parity with the British pound. Though we claim for ourselves, and rightly claim for ourselves, a standard of independence not enjoyed by any of them, we appear to be the one dutiful child left in the British Commonwealth of Nations. Other countries may associate themselves with Britain——

On a fluctuating ratio.

On fluctuating ratios but not a parity basis.

What is the particular advantage in fluctuation rather than in steadiness? That is one of the things the Deputy might show us. Is it not obvious to everybody that every nation aims at something like steadiness and stability in its currency?

That is the steadiness the British give you.

The Deputy has not showed us an immovable rock to which any State could anchor itself.

The amendment does not purport to deal with the merits of the abandonment of the parity relationship per se. The purpose of the amendment is to give the Government a free hand. If the Government will take a free hand we can discuss the merits of the question on some future occasion.

That is what you are trying to prevent.

You are giving a discretion to the Government but you are withdrawing the discretion from Parliament. You want them to do it and tell us about it afterwards.

Once this central bank is set up, what discretion have we? The discretion of a prisoner in a cell. What discretion have you over a Bill you passed last year or 20 years ago?

Another Bill.

Everybody knows that once the Central Bank Bill, copper-fastened by Section 47 of the Currency Act, is passed, the Dáil has no more discretion. Even if a private Deputy could get a Second Reading for a Bill to delete Section 47, the hope or the illusion that you have a discretion in regard to a Bill that has passed the Dáil already is the most ludicrous nonsense I ever heard.

That is a nice tribute to Parliament.

Are we not setting up a board of nine directors, and can anyone say a single word to them?

What you have to say to them is here and the one thing they will not do, until you have a word to say to them, is to change the relation between two currencies.

The one thing they must not do is to alter the scheme by which you have got to present a British £ to get an Irish £. I want to give them power to do it. That is what Governments do in every other free country. This is the one country in the world which statutorily anchors itself to the currency of another country.

I do not think so.

Can the Taoiseach say how many countries in the British Commonwealth have abandoned parity with sterling?

That is one thing, but to tie it down is another.

Would the Taoiseach not agree with the view that we are anchoring ourselves on a parity basis to sterling much more tightly than any country in the world?

We happen to be in a peculiar position both geographically and from a trade point of view.

A Daniel come to judgment !

I might argue that these factors are not as binding as the Taoiseach believes but even if they are as compelling and as coercive as the Taoiseach thinks——

We have full power here all the time.

After having passed the Emergency Powers Bill yesterday, containing all the wide powers which the Taoiseach sought, I cannot understand this kind of shyness on his part to take power to abandon the anchorage to sterling.

There are a few other powers which the Government might possibly wish to have and which they have not got. There are a few exceptions in the case of the Emergency Powers Act.

In any case, the Taoiseach must keep at least the silhouette of a democrat.

The Deputy flatters me.

I want to give the Taoiseach power in this section to alter our anchorage to sterling if the Government believe that to abandon sterling is in the best interests of the country. It seems to me that the Taoiseach and the Government generally regard British paper as sacrosanct, that British promises are the best promises made in the world. There is something lofty about British promises and British paper that is not associated with Irish paper or Irish promises. Britain has printed £830,000,000 worth of notes that are not covered by anything.

And will shortly have to print more.

Yes, and if somebody gets £30,000,000 worth of these notes and presents them to the Currency Commission he must get £30,000,000 of our money.

When we see anything of that kind happening, we may have to take action.

Anybody can take £30,000,000 worth of these notes amounting to £830,000,000 to the Currency Commission in Dublin and get our money in exchange for it. That cannot be denied. The person who changes £30,000,000 worth of British money into our currency can go back to Holyhead with that £30,000,000 and what are we going to do but to issue new money against the British money we have got in exchange? Having done that, does anybody claim that we have any control over the volume of money in circulation in this country? Nobody believes we have. There is no backing in Great Britain for the money Great Britain is issuing to-day. That may suit Britain, and I do not quarrel with Britain's right to do it. What I am quarrelling with is the right of Britain to pass over that uncovered note issue to this country and get our legal tender notes in return, which means in fact getting a lien on our produce. I do not at all believe that it is necessary, in order to maintain the parity link with sterling, to give Britain under her present inflationary tendency the right to put in British notes in exchange for our notes. It may be that there is a good case for the maintenance of parity with sterling, but parity with sterling surely does not involve cashing inflated British notes for Irish notes, giving the British money changer the right to utilise the notes which he gets from us to buy our produce, to buy our land, to buy up the capital equipment in our industries, or to take the industries entirely? As a matter of fact, there is probably between £5,000,000 and £6,000,000 worth of that uncovered British note issue coming back to this country annually in the form of remittances from people who have gone to Britain to earn the wages which they could not get here.

Does the Deputy regret that?

I regret——

Does he regret that the money is coming back?

If the Deputy does not mind, I will answer the question in my way. I regret the circumstances which drive our craftsmen, our creators of wealth, to earn in another country the wages which they cannot get here. I would much sooner see them working here creating wealth for the nation, creating assets for the nation, and creating a pool of productivity on which they could draw in the interests of themselves and in the interests of the nation. Of course, in the case of an unemployed man with a wife and children, faced with a choice between starvation at home and wages in Britain, there is no question of argument as to what course he should adopt.

And the Deputy regrets that that man's wages are coming home to his wife and children.

I do not regret that, because wages are still the passport to food, clothing and shelter, but I am sure Deputy Dillon will agree that there is something essentially wrong, nationally and economically, with the system under which we export one of a family of six to create wealth in another country, and to send back to the remaining five title deeds to a lien on the produce of the country in which they live but in which they produce no wealth.

What has the parity link to do with that?

I am answering an interruption. The fact remains, in any case, that we are at present importing into this country approximately £5,000,000 per annum of British money, unbacked British money, and that unbacked British money is apparently as good as our money because it is able to purchase the same food, and clothing and shelter as our money. While we refuse to issue notes ourselves unless backed by British pound notes or I.O.U's., we are prepared to take and cash in this country notes issued by another country which have no backing whatever, and which, after the war, may have no real value whatever, except as souvenirs of a titanic military adventure. The sole purpose of the issue of money here ought to be to maintain production and consumption in the country at the highest possible level. Nobody will pretend to believe that that is the purpose of our currency and credit policy to-day. There might, of course, be a case for the maintenance of our parity with sterling if our price level coincided with the British price level; then you would have a kind of natural parity, but, so long as the price levels are unequal, you can only have the artificial parity which you get by an exchange of our pounds for British pounds. Once we begin to exchange our pounds for British pounds, we are anchored to a kind of financial juggernaut with no power whatever to unhinge ourselves from it. This type of artificial parity which we are maintaining to-day is a parity which is only obtained by the fact that we are subjugating our financial independence to British control. We have no control——

The Deputy has not yet come to the part he promised he would come to—how this thing is to be done.

My amendment is not arguing the merits of abandoning the link with sterling at all. My amendment, as the Taoiseach knows and as I stated at the outset, is to give the Government power to make the alteration whenever they like, without having to pass a Bill through the nine stages in the Oireachtas.

It is a very simple question to deal with, and does not take us into all the arguments the Deputy is advancing.

I was answering a number of interruptions by the Taoiseach and others.

The Taoiseach would like to restrict this discussion to the sovereignty of Parliament, without any reference to the sterling link.

The position simply is that we have no financial independence whatever in this country except such financial independence as the Bank of England permits us to have. We have abandoned political union with Britain.

The Taoiseach wants to break the connection; every year down in Bodenstown he wants to break the British connection, but in Leinster House he wants to maintain the financial connection with Britain——

That is not the point.

——and that is what he is doing in the Central Bank Bill, no matter how he may deceive himself.

As one of those unhappy people that Deputy Norton is determined will have no voice in this matter in future, but that possibly the Taoiseach is anxious may be given a voice in, might I say a few words to the speech of Deputy Norton? I think it was by way of interruption that Deputy Dillon said Parliament is still there, and Deputy Norton tried to get out of that by saying that the private individual has no power to do those things. I should be very sorry if any private individual could carry through his wishes against the opinion of Parliament. Parliament always has power to do those things, and it will have power when we pass this Act. The net issue is a simple one.

Is it advisable or not that Parliament should be left the power to express its views before a most radical step is taken? I suggest that it is a matter of the importance of the issue, and my present inclination is to agree with the Government on that particular point.

As I explained to the House already, I see the danger of precipitate action —the very grave danger. I am not altogether unaware of the danger that we may get left behind through clinging too long to the more conservative methods. To my mind, therefore, it is a question of weighing up the dangers, and at the moment—I was going to say my ideas—shall I say, my feelings are against the danger of precipitate action. If at any period in the future our trade relation with other countries changes so much, or some catastrophic event occurs, say, to the finance of Great Britain, as occurred in certain continental countries after the last war, and the Government finds it necessary to act quickly, does anybody in his senses, knowing Parliament, believe that it would take long to push the necessary Bill through these Houses? It is only in such a crisis that I could see any grounds for the policy referred to by Deputy Norton. In a case like that, I do not think there would be any difficulty in getting the necessary Bill through. I agree with one of the interruptions the Taoiseach made during Deputy Norton's speech. If you put this power in the hands of the Government, so that you may go to bed to-night and find your whole currency altered in the morning, it will cast a pall over the whole financial outlook of the people. It is a question of which is the more advisable method.

My feeling at the moment is altogether on the side of preventing precipitate action of that kind except in a very grave crisis. In that event, action could be taken very quickly, with the consent of both Houses. In a time of crisis that has been done in the history of the last Government and of this Government. I see no grounds for altering the provisions of the Bill in this respect.

There was a good deal in Deputy Norton's speech which seemed to me, if I may say so, to be designed to throw a certain cloud over the whole matter rather than to deal with the net issue. We had all this continual reference to the anchorage—I leave out the question of parity—of our pound to British sterling. It was "British, British," all the time. The Deputy did not indicate in the slightest what he wanted to be put in place of that. To legislate in the vague, to give powers to the Government, without even a vague hint as to what the exercise of these powers may mean, does not seem to me to be dealing with the matter in a spirit of reality. That is merely to attempt to stir up prejudice by the fact that you refer to the "British". Does the Deputy intend to anchor our pound to any other currency? Is that one of his suggestions?

He has not suggested anything.

Precisely. We are asked to place great powers in the hands of the Government without any indication being given as to how the men to whom it is proposed to give these powers shall exercise them. There was a reference to the danger of inflation in Great Britain. I should like to know the country which is not confronted with the danger of inflation. Perhaps Deputy Norton would tell me. If we do cut away from sterling on account of a sudden panic on the part of some Minister—even a Government may get panicky—has he considered the effect which that will have on our trade? If we found it advisable to change our trade in the course of years, and if we could so change it, there might be reason for departing from the connection with sterling. Whether the connection be by way of parity or by way of proportion is, to some extent, in this amendment, a secondary matter.

Unless we can do that, will somebody indicate to me how any Government could deem it advisable to do what is now urged as a possibility? It is not our fault, though it may be our advantage, that we are in a certain relation to Great Britain as regards trade. That is not the Government's fault or achievement either. I do not see how the Government can change it or why they should change it merely because they are twitted with having our currency anchored to the British currency. That is bringing an element of prejudice into a matter which should be considered purely on its merits.

When the bogey of British inflation is held up to me, I cannot see—I admit I am a child in financial matters—how Britain is more threatened with inflation than any other country involved in this war. I am not aware that the financial position of any other country will be sounder than that of Great Britain when the war is over. The sneers poured upon the financial juggernaut of Great Britain would almost indicate the opposite—yet if there is one thing the British do understand in this war, even if it be argued that they do not understand military or diplomatic matters so well —it is that they understand financial matters.

A great contribution to human progress.

That is bringing in a side-issue to this amendment merely to create prejudice. I am discussing one net point—whether or not the British understand finance. Deputy Norton does not deny that they do. He merely sneers at the humanitarianism of people who understand finance; they must be all ruffians of some kind and grinders of the poor. But are they not more likely to emerge from the war in a sounder financial position than those who do not understand finance? That is the only issue I am discussing at the moment.

There is another aspect of this matter which I should like to have considered, though I, myself, cannot pronounce an opinion upon it. Are we to remain deflated if all the other countries are affected by inflation? Where will our trade be then? I happened to be on the continent on the very day that the British went off the gold standard. The feeling in France was very peculiar.

I found that the French people had a certain national satisfaction that, at last, the British were compelled to go off the gold standard. Conflicting with that satisfaction was anxiety that Britain's going off the gold standard would mean that she would be a more serious competitor of theirs in various continental markets. The problem, therefore, is not quite so easy as Deputy Norton supposes. If the Government think it advisable to remain anchored to sterling, it is because of the facts of the situation. Much as I should like to criticise the Government, I cannot believe that it is merely affection for the British that is inducing them to maintain the anchorage with sterling. That is absurd and Deputy Norton must know that it is absurd. His twitting of the Government shows that. Anybody who looks at our position will see that the action of the Government is due to the fact that that position is almost unique as regards Great Britain. No other country is in the same position. It may be said that that is not desirable, but I am not going into that.

What is the economic reflex of that uniqueness?

Deputy Norton, in a portion of his speech, devoted much time to the question whether we are the only country in the world whose Government has not these powers. I do not know whether that is so. I know there was a time when a number of other countries had the same currency and the same system. There was a number of continental countries where the money of one was quite valid in another, as in France, Belgium and Switzerland.

And Norway and Sweden.

That was because it suited them to have it so. Unless Deputy Norton can show that we are in the same position as other countries, as regards Great Britain, his argument falls to the ground. It may be desirable that we should be, if we had a new trade system in operation.

Will the Deputy answer this question?

He will not. I am putting my case against the Deputy's amendment. I do not pretend in the slightest to be an expert either in finance or economics, but until Deputy Norton has given at least some indication of what might be put in the place of these things, and some argument in favour of what might be in the place of the present system, he is simply battling with shadows. It is due to his own amendment to be serious and not try to befog a plain issue—as some speakers do—with prejudice, with his particular continual repetition of British, British, British. He is trying to arouse a certain amount of prejudice in a problem that is very serious and that should be considered simply on its merits. Surely he is not going to tell me that the Government is sticking to sterling because it is British, rather than to the dollar, which is American. That would be really absurd. If he wants his amendment taken seriously, I suggest he give his alternative and show us the advantages of it.

I do not know whether we should address ourselves to the narrow or the wide aspect of this question raised by Deputy Norton. If we are to take some of his remarks seriously, all he wants is to have freedom here. This is a narrow amendment on the Committee Stage, and we should keep ourselves to a relatively simple question. That question is whether the bank or the Government should be free or not, without going to Parliament, to change the basis of our currency. Portions of the Deputy's speech show that he wants us to believe that that is all he is seeking—namely, that we should not appear to have tied our currency by Act of Parliament to British sterling.

He talks of the present situation and its dangers, of the changing value of the British £ as reflected in the price of goods, and he apprehends danger for us from that. I suppose there is danger. If we are to deal with that particular danger, it must be done as an emergency measure here—I do not mean by emergency Order—as something arising out of the present crisis.

I said earlier that this Bill was intended to be a central bank measure for normal times, to cover a normal situation. If there is anything arising out of the present emergency which requires special action, that action must be the subject of special legislation, irrespective of this Bill. Taking normal times, then, is it or is it not wise to have the basis of our currency fixed by statute, and to make it impossible for the Executive authority or the bank to change that basis suddenly? In monetary matters we must try to get whatever stability we can. Since gold has proved unsatisfactory, there is nothing that appears to be firm at all. To a large extent, gold was illusory, too, from the point of view of establishing a firm foundation. In dealing with this matter of money, therefore, we are dealing with something which, in its very nature, is relative—we have a relativity problem in regard to it.

I am keeping my remarks to the narrow question—whether it is advisable in normal times to place it outside the power of the Executive authority and of the central bank to change the basis suddenly. If it is in their power, and if there are any changes or indications of change, it will give rise immediately to a great deal of anxiety.

No matter how Deputy Norton may talk about it, money is fundamental in our modern economic and social system. In fact, I doubt if it would be possible to get on at all without money, as it is as old as society in one form or another. Therefore, money is one of the most important things which we must safeguard in the community. If there is any unsteadiness in value, it stops trade and induces speculation, and so on. It is obvious that the more stability which can be introduced the better. One of the ways to do that is to make certain that changes will not take place suddenly and that due notice will be given. I am speaking now of normal times, to which this Bill is intended to apply. Whatever basis we have for our currency, that basis should be as fixed as legislation can fix it; and it should not be possible to change it without legislation. I do not know if the Deputy will agree with me in that —that whatever basis we have should be fixed. If it is not, there is a likelihood of fluctuation, uneasiness, unsteadiness and the disadvantages that that unsteadiness produces.

Surely variation is not unsteadiness.

What else is it? The opposite of being steady is to vary.

Surely unsteadiness is entirely different to variation.

I am sorry to say I do not understand the Deputy in this particular matter. If we have a thing that is changeable or unsteady, it is not fixed.

That was Deputy O'Sullivan's point of view. He overlooked Deputy McGilligan's amendment No. 11.

I am talking of ordinary ideas. I am talking of steady and variable—constant and variable. Those two terms are constantly used.

Is a week unsteady because Tuesday follows Monday?

It is variable, if you are talking about a point of time.

If Tuesday followed Wednesday, it would be unsteady.

Probably the Deputy has put another meaning into the word "unsteady." There is a general synonym for variation and steadiness, or invariable and unsteady. I am not saying that, in all circumstances, they are equivalent. I am talking about fixed foundations, and I say that fixed and variable are contrary terms. In money matters, for a variety of reasons, it is desirable that the basis should be kept as steady and as unvarying as possible. One of the ways in which you try to arrive at that is to make it impossible suddenly to change it. The whole question then in the narrow sense is: is it desirable to have whatever basis we are going to have embodied in the Act? I am arguing that it is desirable, for general steadiness and to prevent variation, to have it in the Act.

The next question then is: what in normal times should be the basis? All countries are trying to get such a basis for their currency that will so far as is possible keep the level of their prices unchanged, and when they are exchanging goods with other countries, will make the exchange in regard to goods as steady as possible, so that when they enter into a contract, they know what they will get: when they are buying something, they know what they will pay, and when selling something, they know exactly in terms of some unit what they will get. That is the purpose of it, and, in the years before this war, there was a variety of international congresses and a good deal of private negotiation between central banks and Governments for the purpose of trying to get over the disadvantages to trade, prosperity and the general well-being of the various countries arising from instability of exchanges and so on.

I think the House will agree, in view of the part money has to pay in the case of exchange that if it were possible to get, in the case of money, something as fixed as we can get in the case of a measure of length, like the metre or the yard, which could be reproduced somewhere else and which would always be the same thing, it would be to the great advantage of the world as a whole.

Various attempts have been made in various countries to evolve such a system. Taking a particular number of fundamental articles and trying to devise some steady basis of value has been considered, but these attempts have all pretty well failed, and all countries try therefore to have, in the first place, something steady for domestic purposes, something steady in value. They try to get some relation between their own and some external currency. There is a reason, I suppose, why we should try to have an external standard of comparison. Internally, the relativity business becomes worse because you are trying to form a basis on part of a variable thing itself, that is, the value of money, internally expressed in the value of the goods produced. If that relation changes, you have no standard by which you can appreciate what these changes mean outside. Consequently, the natural thing to do is to try to get some external thing with which you can compare your own unit at home and which will not be immediately involved in internal changes. That external thing which you would naturally try to get is the most stable, in respect of its value compared with goods, of these external bases.

If we are thinking of an external unit—and I argue that if you can get an external one which seems to be stable, it is the best one—there are two that come to our minds. We think naturally of the British unit and the American unit. If it is agreed that it is well to see that the external purchasing value of our unit is kept right by relating it to something outside, I think our choice would have to be limited to either the dollar or the £.

The most natural way of looking for a solution would be to try to get some external unit and it seems to me that either the pound or the dollar would be the unit with which we would be most likely to link ourselves. As to the relative stability of these two units, there was a time when some people thought the dollar was more stable than the pound, and, at another time, that the pound was the more stable unit, but, looking back, it is doubtful which of the two would be regarded as the more stable. Each of them has changed at various times, but probably you would find the majority to say that, on the whole, the pound was as stable as the dollar, but, leaving that question, on which I do not want to pass any judgment, aside, there was not such a difference between them— there have been changes in the dollar as in the pound—as would inevitably indicate one rather than the other as the unit to which we should be attached, so that it was more or less a "toss-up," from the point of view of external stability, as to which of the two would be the better.

On the basis of our particular situation and the commercial relations between this country and Britain, it should become apparent at once that, if there was not a particular element of stability in the dollar over and above the pound, it was much more natural that we should try to attach ourselves to the pound, because there was a tremendous advantage in having our relationship to the pound fixed rather than to have our relationship to the dollar fixed—not at parity exactly— but in a particular ratio. There was the point that the great bulk of our trade in the way of imports and exports was with Britain and, therefore, assuming that I am right in saying that from the point of view of stability there was little to choose between them, the argument was altogether in favour of using the British pound as the external standard rather than the dollar. That is the question so far as using the external unit of comparison to which you would be attached is concerned, and I think the argument up to this seems to point almost inevitably to the use of the British pound as the standard.

The next matter which you would consider is at what rate should you fix it—at parity or some other rate? Everybody at the moment is anxious that if a change is to be made, it should operate from the moment forward, so to speak. You will not change values arbitrarily, if you can avoid it, because, if you do, it means that you are going to affect immediately the distribution of wealth as between different classes of the community. If that is done—and it may be done with a definite political purpose—the relative wealth of the different sections of the community is altered by that sudden change, so that when these changes are made, it seems to me that they are generally made so as to avoid the suggestion of arbitrary changes if they are made for a political purpose. If for a purely monetary reason, because there are certain dangers to be apprehended, the change is made in such a way as: "From to-day on, something is to happen." You allow some natural thing to determine it, other than the arbitrary action of either the Government or the central bank. You say: "From this forward, or from to-day, this is our position; let us agree to have changes develop as circumstances call for them." Remember that historically we were at parity. That is where we started. It was not something introduced arbitrarily at a particular moment, but as a result of being part of the one economic and financial system. You will always have to think, if at any particular time you have to change from parity, what the changes are going to mean. Parity, even if it had not been the actual historical position with us, and if it were not so changed, would mean, whenever there was a change of a substantial amount, considerable hardship to a certain section and an unfair advantage to another section.

Even if historically we had not parity, and were starting now to examine how we should back our currency, and what should be the external value, I think we would be likely to choose parity rather than some other ratio. I am talking of a fixed and not a variable ratio. Leaving out the immediate war situation, one would like to choose parity. There was the danger, the figures being the same, that there was a certain amount of interchangeability between the units. Approaching the matter coldly and from the purely scientific point of view, I think the argument would really point to parity, that is, if we had the same sort of unit pound, the 20th part, fractions and so on, as we have now. I think we would from the coldly scientific point of view choose the £ unless there was some feature, which might be obvious, showing that there were particular dangers.

Deputy Norton has not addressed himself to the point at all. I do not know whether he wanted to excuse himself by seeing it from the very narrow aspect. When dealing with it he did not keep to the narrowness of the aspect. He spoke of disadvantages and led us portion of the way to the general question, but took very good care that he did not suggest the alternative. Of course, the alternative or the choice—it is hard to get a word to express the position accurately—if we do not have parity is that we can have something fixed at a different ratio, either above or below it. When examined, above or below, it will be found that there are going to be immediate disadvantages for sections of the community and perhaps unfair advantages for other sections. On the whole, I think the disadvantages to the community as a whole can be shown to balance the advantages. The Deputy did not tell us whether he wanted, if it was not to be parity, the frish £ to appreciate or depreciate.

Deputy Norton will have another opportunity.

It was a simple question.

I do not think this debate has always kept to the exact letter of the amendment.

I am not suggesting that it should. I am saying that the Deputy went into a wider field. He should have answered the question I put to him when discussing some of the wider aspects. He should have told the House what he wanted. When asked what he wanted, all he answered was that in relation to the national aspect he did not want it fixed. He did not want it tied by statute. He wanted liberty for the Government. I suppose he meant liberty for the Government or the central bank to change the ratio any time it wished. I do not know yet whether the Labour Party had in mind that 100 Irish £s should be worth 125 English £s or if it should be the other way around. I do not know whether they want the Irish £ in terms of goods to be more or less value than the English £.

With regard to goods.

I tried to point out the difficulties of other countries that have been trying to get that sort of thing. They got very far away from managing that. Remember we are not isolated on the globe. Unless there is wide acceptance of the position not merely in one country but in a large number of countries, there will be competition in trying to use these changes for some particular national advantage. It is a game that two States can play at. What has happened is that countries came into conflict and got tired trying to play one against the other in order to reap a momentary advantage. They were damaging the whole structure of their countries by such competition. They tried to get something wider and, as a result, there is the sterling group which was much wider than Britain or the British Commonwealth.

You had the big sterling group, or practically the big sterling group, and then you had the gold group, and there was an effort being made by all the countries in the world to try to get some understanding, one with another, so that the relationship would not be changed and these fluctuations, which are damaging from every point of view, would not be taking place. As a matter of fact, there was a conference between the French, the Americans and the British—I forget the exact title of the conference—with a view to stopping these sudden fluctuations, and the Americans, the French and the British came to an agreement that these changes, made by one party, for its own advantage, as against the others, were going to be put a stop to, because they found that in wars and tests of various kinds it was a thing that two could play at and that, in the final result, all parties were injured by it.

Now, by our attachment to that group, at any rate—leaving out for the moment the particular ratio on which we were attached—we became part of a very big group, and, as you know, the larger the group and the greater the variety of interests in it, the less likelihood there is of having sudden changes and fluctuations which are undesirable. We were saved more by being attached to the large group than by being left to our own devices to manage the thing without reference to outside. In fact, we cannot do it without reference to outside, because, immediately that we have trade with other countries, we cannot isolate ourselves absolutely from outside. As I say, with regard to this matter, Deputy Norton, when dealing with the broader aspect, did not tell us which of the things, other than those which are being done, should be done. He did not tell us whether he was in favour of having the Irish £, in terms of goods, worth more than the British £, or having it, in terms of goods, worth less than the British £. If he had stated that he was in favour of one or the other, then we could have had an argument as to what would be the effect of one of these to the thing as a whole.

The point is that I was quite prepared, and am quite prepared, to keep to the narrow aspect of this thing, but the Deputy did not deal with the narrow aspect. He was talking about all sorts of things, such as the dangers in connection with the British £ and so on, and he got into this question of the broader aspect of what should be the relationship between our £ and the British £. I have challenged him to say what else, other than parity, we should have. If he wants a varying one, I would tell him at once that this day-to-day variation has been found to be bad: that, theoretically, it is clear that it will be bad, and we should aim at the greatest possible amount of stability. I am talking now about normal times, and not about the abnormal times created by the present emergency, because if we were dealing with the present situation, we would have to deal with it on an entirely different basis. It would have to be done in an entirely different way and dealt with by an entirely different kind of measure, but that is not what is intended here.

I am in a quandary, then, to know what the Deputy wants, other than that we should not have this in this Bill. If that is all he says, then I say that this Bill is meant for normal times, that it is an advantage to the community to know that there will not be these sudden changes, that a Government, overnight, is not going to bring about these changes, and that if we are going to have anything fixed in it, then the arguments are altogether in favour of parity—not even in favour of a link with sterling, on a different ratio—that is, in normal times. We have disadvantages, of course, from it. We have the disadvantages that when we are living in a world, what other people do affects us, and affects us in a variety of ways. It affects us in this monetary way.

If people turn from human efforts for the making of goods which we can buy, and from the producing of raw materials which we need—if they turn from these things to making military weapons, then they are affecting us, and from one angle they are affecting us to our detriment because they are depriving us of doing those things which they do and which, from their point of view, are to their own advantage—perhaps, even to a wider advantage than their own. These things, undoubtedly, affect us, and if we want goods of one kind, and if they continue producing goods of another kind, they are going to affect us, as we think, to our detriment, but we are not living in isolation; we are living in a world in which what other nations do affects us, and Deputy Norton or anybody else is not going to enable us to devise a system by which we will be insulated or isolated from the actions of other people. I agree with the Deputy that, so far as it is possible, we should endeavour to prevent these reactions coming upon us detrimentally, and if he were to indicate methods by which that could be achieved, then I am sure that there is not a member of this House, no matter how we may have differed in the past, who would not be with him in trying to help him to get some means by which the shocks, which come to us as a result of being in the world, could be diminished. If he can suggest any shock absorbers of any kind, I am sure that the whole House will be with him in trying to perfect them, but, as Deputy O'Sullivan said, he has done nothing but attempt to cloud the issues before the House, to confuse people's minds, and to raise prejudice and nothing more.

Question put: "That the words proposed to be deleted stand."
The Committee divided: Tá, 46 6; Níl, 6.

  • Bartley, Gerald.
  • Beegan, Patrick.
  • Bennett, George C.
  • Boland, Gerald.
  • Bourke, Dan.
  • Brady, Seán.
  • Breen, Daniel.
  • Briscoe, Robert.
  • Cole, John J.
  • Cosgrave, William T.
  • Crowley, Tadhg.
  • Derrig, Thomas.
  • De Valera, Eamon.
  • Dockrell, Henry M.
  • Doyle, Peadar S.
  • Flynn, Stephen.
  • Gorry, Patrick J.
  • Harris, Thomas.
  • Hogan, Daniel.
  • Hughes, James.
  • Keane, John J.
  • Killilea, Mark.
  • Kissane, Eamon.
  • Lemass, Seán F.
  • Little, Patrick J.
  • Loughman, Francis.
  • Lynch, Finian.
  • McCann, John.
  • Morrissey, Michael.
  • Moylan, Seán.
  • Mulcahy, Richard.
  • Nally, Martin.
  • O Ceallaigh, Seán T.
  • O'Grady, Seán.
  • O'Loghlen, Peter J.
  • O'Reilly, Matthew.
  • O'Sullivan, John M.
  • Rice, Brigid M.
  • Ryan, James.
  • Ryan, Jeremiah.
  • Ryan, Robert.
  • Sheridan, Michael.
  • Smith, Patrick.
  • Traynor, Oscar.
  • Walsh, Richard.
  • Ward, Conn.

Níl

  • Cogan, Patrick.
  • Corish, Richard.
  • Hannigan, Joseph.
  • Hickey, James.
  • Norton, William.
  • Pattison, James P.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Smith and S. Brady; Níl: Deputies Hickey and Hannigan.
Question declared carried.
Amendment negatived.
Bill reported in respect of Section 58 and amendment No. 61.
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