I move for leave to introduce a Bill entitled "an Act to apply certain sums out of the Central Fund to the service of the years ending on the 31st day of March, 1944, and 1945." Central Fund Bills are a routine feature of our financial system and are required to implement the Ways and Means Resolutions which have just been passed by the Dáil. The present Bill is designed to authorise the issue from the Central Fund of (1) the total amount of those supplementary and additional grants for the present financial year which were not covered by the Central Fund or Appropriation Acts of 1943, and (2) the amount of the Vote on Account for the coming financial year. It also makes provision for borrowing by the Minister for Finance and for the issue by him of such securities as he thinks fit. The provisions of the Bill are in stereotyped form.
Committee on Finance. - Central Fund Bill, 1944—First and Subsequent Stages.
I move that the Bill be now read a Second Time.
I gave notice that I would ask that a reply be given to the question which I had proffered to the Ceann Comhairle and which would not be received in that form. I took it that the substance of the matter had been transferred to the Department thought to be the appropriate one. I am anxious to get a reply to the substance of the question. The other matter can wait until a later stage.
Did the Deputy ask a question? I am sorry I did not hear what he said.
I gave notice that I would raise on this Stage of the Central Fund Bill the substance of a question which I put into Dáil Question form but which was not received in the form in which I gave it by the Ceann Comhairle and the Office. I understood that the question had been transferred to the Department which the Ceann Comhairle thought to be the appropriate one, not the one which I thought to be the appropriate one, and I understood that it was to be replied to at this stage.
Will the Deputy now put the question?
The question, in the form in which I had framed and addressed it to the Taoiseach, had to do with a particular prosecution that took place before Christmas in connection with illegal traffic in sugar. In the District Court two men were found guilty and given sentences of imprisonment. The matter then came before the Circuit Court on appeal. The hearing of the appeal disclosed certain other facts.
It appeared from the evidence given in the Circuit Court that one of those gentlemen who, unfortunately, has died since, said that he had consulted an official of the Department of Supplies to see whether, in fact, he could traffic in this sugar in the way in which he intended, and that he had been assured by the official that he could traffic in this way: that it was perfectly legal. The suggestion was made that since the sugar had come into this person's hands before the control Order came into being traffic in it was permissible. The worst feature of it was that it was stated— as showing this official's bona fides— that he had contracted to purchase and had, in fact, purchased 2 cwt. of the sugar in question in respect of which the two accused men were found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment. One was removed to jail and the other accused man died on the morning on which he was to have gone to jail.
A further point emerged in the evidence taken in the Circuit Court. It was that when certain inspectors were sent to investigate the matter, this accused man, who has since died, told them that his excuse for certain action of his was the advice of a prominent official in the Department of Supplies who had assured him that the traffic was legal. Whatever then happened is somewhat under a cloud, but it is clear that no part of that statement, with reference to that official, appeared in the signed statement eventually produced in court from which it was clear that this accused man had said that that was the situation. All these facts were brought out in the Circuit Court, and the judge, when eventually confirming the sentence given in the lower court, made the remark that he hoped that the official in question would be given an opportunity of explaining his conduct and attitude towards the whole matter.
I put down, in the question to the Taoiseach, the substance of what I have just said. Having said that these were the allegations made, I asked if there was anybody aware that these allegations were made, and if they were whether, in fact, they were true. I asked if this official had been prosecuted or whether there was any intention of prosecuting him, and if not, why not.
I asked further if that official had been affected in any way in his pay, promotion or status on account of his conduct which had been called in question; I asked what is his present position, and what were the various steps in the promotion by which he arrived at that position, with dates that would indicate the more spectacular rises that he might have got. I had intended to ask, by way of supplementary question, whether that official was, in fact, still in a position in which he might give the same wrong advice, as it turned out to be wrong advice, to other people who might consult him, and whether he was in a position to make purchases which, so far as civilians are concerned, are held to be illegal, and if discrimination was to be made between ordinary citizens and a State officer. I requested to be informed whether there is any policy of discrimination between State officials and members of the public.
Because I had raised that general question as a matter of policy, I thought it right to address my question to the Taoiseach. I do not know how many conferences I had about the question. At the end I had a conference with the Ceann Comhairle, and was told that it was not considered a question that should be addressed to the Head of the Government, but should be addressed to the Minister for Supplies. I insisted that it made very little difference to me what the Minister for Supplies thinks about the prosecution of individuals. I would understand that to be a matter for the Attorney-General, and that if any Minister answered for it it might possibly be the Minister for Justice. I also said I was not concerned with what attitude the Minister for Supplies might take up as to whether this official had been penalised in any way because if he had that, clearly, would have been a matter for the Minister for Finance in whose Department is the Chief Establishment Officer. This would be an establishment matter, and if any disciplinary measures were taken against that man they might be taken through the hands of the Minister for Supplies, but he would be merely acting for the Minister for Finance in the matter. I am certainly not concerned to know what the Minister for Supplies thinks about Government policy in connection with discrimination, but if there is such a policy then I want to know what the Head of the Government thinks about it. I consider that my question was properly framed. It led up to the climax in which the pivotal point was whether, in fact, citizens were to be treated in the same way as State officials, or whether there is any question of discrimination.
Questions are put on the Order Paper in the form accepted by the Chair. If the Chair does not accept them they do not appear on the Order Paper. The decision of the Chair in that matter is not to be questioned, directly or indirectly. I understood from the Deputy that there was a wider matter than mere detail in this: a matter of policy.
On general policy, I wanted to raise the question whether or not a distinction is made between officials and the general body of the citizens in connection with the investigation and prosecution of offences under the Emergency Powers Acts or other Acts. That question was refused in that form. I am not denying that the discretion resides in the Ceann Comhairle. I am asking to be discussed the points on which the discretion was exercised against me.
The points on which it was exercised against the Deputy may not be discussed.
I am not going to discuss it, but I think I am entitled to point out to the House——
The Deputy is not entitled to discuss the points on which the Chair did not accept his question.
Surely, I am entitled to say this: I tried to get the question answered by the Head of the Government, as it was dealing with a matter of Government policy, of discrimination between citizens. I am entitled to say that the Ceann Comhairle refused to accept it in that form. That is all I am stating—facts. With regard to these facts, certain Deputies have been speaking here on the subject of democracy as a form of government, and they have asserted that, particularly at the present time, when we are ruled by Emergency Powers Orders, the two great weapons still left unblunted in the hands of Deputies are (1) the method of Parliamentary motion, and (2) the method of Parliamentary question. I put down a question. If that question was to appear in the form in which it was to leave the Ceann Comhairle's office, it would have been a very blunted sort of performance that would have been operated by that particular question.
I suggest that in these days, when this House gives the Government every possible latitude, when measures are given to them almost without any discussion, when we have got into the habit of very infrequent meetings of the House, and when we have got used to what is almost a practice now, when the House is not in session, of announcements of a crisis being made over the wireless—I think in all these circumstances, when Emergency Powers Orders are impacted on citizens at every hour of the day, there might be some latitude with regard to these rules under which questions are manipulated in the way in which I suggest mine was treated. I asked if I could get the substantial matter of the question discussed here to-night and if I could get to know what are the facts with regard to this official, whether he gave wrong advice or whether there was a wrong purchase from other citizens.
This question was put down for answer, when I first thought of it, about a fortnight ago. When I was having my discussion with the Ceann Comhairle and his officials, I was told I might as well postpone the question for a bit, because the situation was still sub judice. It was a gorgeous phrase to use in the circumstances, my whole complaint being that the citizen faces a judge and the civil servant does not face a judge. I was told this man's case was still being examined. Examined by whom? By members of the Government? By other civil servants? It is going to be discussed in this House. I suggest that if there is any case as against a civil servant, that civil servant should go before the same tribunal that the citizen goes before, and that a judge regularly appointed under our Constitution should have the right to hear his case on the same terms as he hears the citizen's case, and to impose on him the same penalties that the citizen is liable to, and that the only defence open to a civil servant should be the type of defence open to the ordinary citizen.
Part of the question sought information as to whether there was any intention of amending the Emergency Powers Acts so as to allow the absence of a criminal intention to be pleaded by civilians in court proceedings. That cannot be done. Over and over again it has been the experience of members practising at the Bar, in the cases of people who have done something contrary to the Emergency Powers Orders, that when you take a certain line in the examination of a witness you are told that there is no use in proceeding further along that line, as it is only leading to the point where a person did not know what he was doing or that he had no guilty intention. Has the civil servant the right to make a defence that he has no guilty intention, or that what he did was an error of judgement, or is he in the position that he has a different tribunal, different people to face, different witnesses against him, no public inquiry, and penalties very much lighter than those which may be imposed on an ordinary citizen? In this case the man got six months and he died as a result of the sentence. The civil servant has never yet made his appearance before the courts. I want to know what has happened in his case.
There is one point I should like to make clear. With regard to my statement to the Deputy, I did not intend it for discussion in this House, but I do not object to its being mentioned in the House. I said, if my memory serves me right, I had been informed that the matter was under investigation, not sub judice.
It is a matter of recollection, and I understood that phrase was used. “Sub judice” was the phrase used, and the reason I know it was used is that I laughed heartily when it was used.
Does the Deputy say that phrase was used by me—“sub judice”?
Yes, it was merely a representation from the Minister, I think.
I should like to make it quite clear that, so far as the Government are concerned, there was no objection to answering now, or even a fortnight ago, any question that Deputy McGilligan chose to ask. The only difficulty that arose was the purely technical point relating to the form of his question, which he discussed solely with the Ceann Comhairle. If there was any difficulty which delayed him putting it on the Order Paper, it was one arising from the Standing Orders of the House. I do not care what questions the Deputy wants to ask, and I certainly am prepared to answer such questions at any time.
If I have any objection to the question which the Deputy proposes to ask, it is that upon the basis of a complete distortion of the facts he was making insinuations and assumptions which were completely unjustified. I think the House will very easily grasp the facts in this case. When the two men to whom Deputy McGilligan referred were being prosecuted, one of them stated that he had been assured by a Government official that it was legal for him to deliver, after the date upon which rationing came into operation, sugar which he had sold before that. First of all, let me state that the official concerned was not an official of the Department of Supplies. He was an official of the Department of Industry and Commerce. And in case any Deputies might think there is a connection between the Department of Supplies and the Department of Industry and Commerce because they are at present housed in the same building and subject to the same Minister, at the time this happened they were neither housed in the same building nor under the same Minister.
When I saw that statement reported in the newspapers, I made inquiries and got the facts. I find the facts are very different from those which Deputy McGilligan implied in his question and implied in his statement here to-day. I may say, before I give the facts, that an official of the Department of Supplies who was present at the court when the statement was made communicated with his senior officer by telephone; that officer communicated with me and I directed the official concerned to go forthwith to the court for the purpose of answering any statement that had been made. The official proceeded to the court, but he arrived there after the case had concluded and he did not get an opportunity of dealing with the statement.
I think the House is fairly familiar with the facts of the case. A quantity of sugar was purchased early in 1941. It was purchased, according to the statement made by the person who conducted the transaction, in anticipation that there would be an increase in the duty on sugar under the Budget. He found there was no such increase and he had sugar in his possession in excess of his requirements. It is necessary to remember that all this happened three years ago, at a time when there was no scarcity of sugar. Although control of the sale of sugar was introduced in August, 1941, it was not because there was a scarcity of sugar then. That control was introduced primarily for the purpose of preventing the illegal export of sugar across the Border. The rationing of sugar on the coupon basis occurred much later. Consequently, when this person found himself with a quantity of sugar in excess of his requirements, he had no means of disposing of it. It was not then a commodity which was scarce and for which there was a demand. It was not a commodity which was scarce, or in great demand, and which could be sold at an increased price. At that time, the difficulty was in getting rid of it. According to the information which became available in the course of investigation, subsequently, a small proportion of that sugar was disposed of by him to relatives, personal friends, and employees in his business, and this official of the Department of Industry and Commerce purchased some of it. There was, as I have explained, no restriction at the time on the sale or purchase of sugar; no illegality was committed and, consequently, there was no question of proceedings being taken against those persons, including the Government official, who had made these purchases. In the case of this Government official, the sugar was, in fact, delivered to him a short time after the introduction of the rationing scheme in August, but there was nothing in the Government Order which prevented the delivery of sugar which had been purchased before the rationing scheme came into force. The statement made by the individual who was charged was that he had asked this official, during a casual conversation, whether there was anything to prevent him from delivering, after the introduction of rationing, sugar which had been purchased before rationing came in, and that the official's statement was that he did not believe there was: that there was no illegality in the delivery, so far as he was aware, but that the proper course for the individual to take was to inquire from the Department of Supplies.
I refuse to believe that two persons, one of whom had a professional position, which obliged him to know exactly what the Government regulations concerning sugar were, and whose professional business it was to advise other people upon these regulations, and the other of whom was the secretary of a company, whose duty it was to know about these regulations and to advise his employees accordingly, should be dependent, or should have acted subsequently, on information casually obtained from an official of another Department, who knew nothing whatsoever about it. The two persons concerned in the case mentioned by Deputy McGilligan were charged, not with an offence committed in 1941, but with an offence committed in 1942, at which time it was illegal for them to sell sugar without a licence. That was the offence with which they were charged and convicted, and the persons to whom they sold sugar illegally were also prosecuted and convicted.
Now, the Deputy stated to-day that it came out in evidence in court that the inspectors of the Department of Supplies induced the said accused to omit from the statements they made all reference to this official. When I saw that allegation with regard to officials of the Department, I had these officials summoned from their duty to the head office, and they were asked if any such incident had occurred. They denied, emphatically, that any such incident had occurred. The Deputy, in his question, alleged that it was stated in evidence in court that these officials had so acted. I emphatically deny that it was stated in the court that these people said that it had happened. There is no evidence of that, and the senior inspector of the Department of Supplies, who was present in the court during the whole of the proceedings, stated that he had heard no such statement. The officials who conducted the inquiry stated that they made no attempt to influence the accused persons in the matter of their statement, whether from the point of view of the inclusion in or the exclusion of anything from the statement.
Let me say this—because I think it is necessary to say it in order to clarify the position—that there were two statements, the first of which was one denying their guilt, and the second was the one which was produced in court. As I have said, the first statement was one completely denying any guilt on their part, and I am informed that it is the normal practice in police court cases, and it is also the practice of the Department of Supplies, that where there are two conflicting statements of that kind, the earlier statement is not produced in court because it is assumed that the production of conflicting statements would unduly prejudice the case against the accused. That has been the practice here for many years, and that is the reason why the first statement by the accused was not produced. The statement contained no reference to Government officials having had any transaction in the previous year, which was 1941, and in connection with which there was no illegality whatsoever. The official concerned, therefore, was not prosecuted, simply because he had not committed any offence. As I have said, the persons who were concerned as purchasers of the sugar in 1942 were also prosecuted.
There is, of course, no discrimination between State officials and the general public in the matter of prosecutions for offences. I think that the fact that some State officials have, in the course of the past four years, been prosecuted for offences under Emergency Powers Orders, is proof to the contrary. I think I have stated all the facts, but may I say this: that apart from the circumstances of this case, I think that as a general rule it is undesirable that State officials, no matter how much they may be within the law, should have commercial dealings of an unusual character with persons with whom they have had or may have official contact. That aspect of this case is one that is being considered.
There is one further general remark that I should like to make before I conclude. I think that Deputies should be slow to attack State officials here. State officials are in an unusual position. They are not merely unable to protect themselves, by reason of the general privileges extending to Deputies of this House, but they cannot even reply to charges against them made outside this House. In that respect, they are different from other members of the community, who can use the public Press or other resources in order to refute charges made against them. Public officials cannot do that. Such publicity is debarred to them, and, therefore, I think that as a general rule Deputies should be slow to make charges against public officials, since they are not in the same position as Deputies who, after all, are fair game, or ordinary members of the public who can defend themselves. In this particular case, when reference was made in the court to this matter, the charges were fully investigated and the circumstances were as I have described. There was no offence and no irregularity on the part of the official concerned in this respect.
The question is : "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."
I can speak on the Third Stage.
The Central Fund Bill is not debated except on Second Stage.
May I not reply to what the Minister has said?
The Deputy has spoken once on the Second Stage.
And I am entitled to speak on any stage.
The Deputy is not so entitled. I can recall no precedent for debate on any stage but the Second Stage.
I claim the right to speak in answer to the Minister.
No Deputy may speak twice on the Second Stage.
I do not propose to speak on the Second Stage, but I am entitled to speak on the Fourth or Fifth Stages. There is nothing in Standing Orders to take away my right in that respect.
There is the established practice of 20 years to the contrary.
During the emergency.
Perhaps the Deputy would resume his seat for a moment. It is not in order on a later stage of a Bill to reply to something said on the Second Stage. It is against precedent.
I submit that it is quite in order to reply on the Fourth or Fifth Stages to what was said on the Second or Committee Stages of any Bill, and I do not think that can be denied.
The Chair disagrees.
That one cannot reply to matters raised in the course of the Second Reading debate, that these matters cannot be raised again on the Fourth or Fifth Stages? I suggest that that could not be a ruling. So far as the other matters are concerned, I submit, on a point of order, that there is nothing in Standing Orders which takes away my right to speak on the Fourth or Fifth Stages of a measure and I propose to speak on some of these stages.
Regarding the Second Stage of a Bill, the Deputy ought to know from his experience that a Deputy may discuss what he would like to see in the Bill, but on the Fifth Stage he is confined to what is actually in the Bill.
And I propose to speak on the Fourth or Fifth Stage on what is in the Bill, but calling attention to deficiencies in administration arising out of some of the Votes for which we are passing money to-night.
The Deputy might also realise the fact that, on the Second Stage of the Central Fund Bill, matters of general policy and not details of expenditure are discussed. I have allowed the Deputy to discuss a matter of some detail. That is against precedent.
It may be, but it was because of the definite agreement entered into yesterday. When I asked if this would be permitted and suggested that, if it was not, I should get an answer then, as I was inside my rights in raising it on the Vote on Account and would have done so, I was deprived of my right to raise it because I was told that it could be raised on the Central Fund Bill. I suggest that that agreement was come to openly in the House.
There was no such arrangement so far as I am aware, and I was in the House all the time.
I spoke of the matter. If the Minister was here, he must have heard me speaking of it.
There was no such arrangement or agreement.
If the Minister means that he did not enter into an agreement with me, that may be all right, but I said that I wanted to raise two points and that I understood an arrangement had been made for this Party to raise one matter, the cost of living. I did not want to complicate the issue by raising two other issues, and I, therefore, proposed to hold the other over, but it was held over only on the understanding that I could raise it later, and certainly it was very definitely tacitly agreed that it could be raised. I suggest that if there is any objection to my raising it, yesterday was the time to have put it forward.
I do not want to object to the Deputy raising it. If there is anything of that kind alleged about a civil servant, the sooner we have it out and get the air cleared the better. All I say is that I was here all the time and in charge of the business of the House and I certainly never assented directly or indirectly to any such arrangement.
And did not dissent.
Does the Minister deny that it was mentioned?
The Deputy did speak about it, but there was no assent or dissent about it.
I want to raise a matter of general policy.
On what stage are we now?
The Second Stage.
I should like to preface my remarks by saying that I agree with the Minister for Supplies with regard to the making of unfounded accusations against civil servants, but I want to know what is the Government policy concerning secretaries of Departments or officers junior to secretaries who are serving in that capacity and, at the same time, serving as either directors or managing directors of public companies, of companies such as Irish Shipping, Limited. One civil servant does exercise such functions—a man of the highest integrity—and I do not for one moment want to be taken as making any accusation similar to the wholly-unfounded accusation made here by Deputy Flanagan.
The secretary of the Department of Supplies acts as chairman of the Millers' Control Committee, and I should like to know what is the general Government policy with regard to that. I should like to say this that, whether or not any cases have come to light, there is an impression, or there is likely to be an impression, that an official in that capacity, acting as he must act or may be likely to act, at the same time, in a discretionary capacity, due to his high office in the Department, may be placed in an invidious position and, as the matter has been raised, I think we should have an authoritative explanation of Government policy in that regard.
Some individual may, at some time, have occasion to look for a licence or for some facility to which he is entitled from the Department. He may see a company, whether private or public, receiving a benefit, and while on the merits of the case that company may be entitled to the full benefit and he may not be entitled to any benefit, the fact that the idea gets abroad that, because of the association with it of an individual who is, at the same time, an officer of the Department, influence may be exerted, will have, in my opinion, a detrimental effect on the Civil Service as a whole.
I know from my own information that what the Minister has said concerning the secretary of the Department of Supplies and the particular company is absolutely a fact, and I deprecate the making of unfounded accusations, but I think the position should be cleared up because that particular officer may be placed in an invidious position due to the fact that he is chairman of the Millers' Control Committee, and chairman of Irish Shipping, Limited, and, at the same time, secretary of the Department of Supplies.
That the Bill be now read a Second Time—agreed?
If you will regard me as answering questions, Sir, I will deal with the points raised. Deputy Cosgrave has asked certain questions which I should like to answer.
Very well.
The appointment of the secretary of the Department of Supplies as chairman of Irish Shipping, Ltd., was due to the fact that it was necessary, in relation to that company on its formation, to ensure that its policy developed in accordance with the Government's intentions. Normally, we would have sought somebody with experience of the shipping business, but having regard to the peculiar circumstances here, we could not regard any such person available to us as disinterested, and, furthermore, difficulties would have arisen in making a selection as between personnel from the boards of existing companies. May I say that the chairman of the company receives no remuneration for acting in that capacity? The Millers' Control Committee is in a somewhat different position. I was not anxious that the secretary should act as chairman of that body.
Why did you not stop him?
The Control Committee, as the House may not know, is established for the purpose of regulating the business of the flour-milling industry during the emergency. It was necessary to eliminate the unnecessary transportation of wheat from the areas in which it was grown, or the merchants who purchased it, to flour millers, to ensure that the wheat from a particular district went to the nearest mill and that the flour from that mill was sold in the area adjacent to the mill. There was, as it were, a rationalisation of the collection of grain and the distribution of flour. Furthermore, under the subsidy arrangement, it is necessary to ensure that there will be agreement among the millers as a whole to the distribution between themselves of a proportion of the total proceeds of the industry which constitutes the 6 percent. on capital which they are entitled to earn. Unfortunately, we could not get agreement on any other chairman, and the only proposal which the committee would accept was one involving what I hoped would be the temporary chairmanship of the secretary of the Department. In order to get the scheme working, they agreed to that. In practice, I think he rarely presides at the meetings now, but the situation in which he is chairman of the committee has continued in operation since then. Again, there is no question of any remuneration attaching to the post.
Supplementary to the Minister's reply, in connection with Irish Shipping, Limited, I understood from the reply the Minister gave to-day that if, say, the firm of Messrs. Wm. and P. Thompson were applying for shipping space, the secretary of the Department had no function?
No function whatever. May I say that it is the standard practice in the Civil Service—certainly in the Departments of the Civil Service with which I am acquainted—that where any official has any association of any kind with a firm doing business with the Department—that association need not necessarily be a financial one; the firm may be the property of a relative or may be managed by a relative—that official, even if in the normal course it would come within his official duties, does not deal with the matter. In relation to any business which the firm of Messrs. Thompson and Co. have to do with the Department of Supplies, the secretary of the Department does not see the papers, nor is he in any way consulted concerning the matter. The firm have, in fact, very little business with the Department of Supplies.
The allocation of shipping space for the importation of prunes, which was the matter raised to-day, is a routine matter. It is occasionally possible to give shipping space for the importation of prunes and everybody interested in that importation of prunes gets an allocation of space. The actual quantity of prunes imported by this firm, since the importation of prunes was resumed, represents only a very small fraction of the total importation. The granting of export licences is, of course, in accordance with normal practice, by which firms doing an export business, like brewers and distillers, and so forth, are facilitated in maintaining their export connection during the emergency.
Mr. Larkin
May I ask who allocates the shipping space?
I do.
Mr. Larkin
You yourself?
It is my official responsibility. There is a section of the Department which deals with it.
Mr. Larkin
Who advises the space measurement?
The head of the section of the Department. There is a special section of the Department which deals with shipping space allocations.
Mr. Larkin
I suggest that it is a very bad practice to have a civil servant a director of any company. It is not permissible, I understand, under any Government but this.
This is not a private company.
Mr. Larkin
Nobody is going to imply any abuse of his position to this officer, but it is in the minds of people that space is given to others.
Irish Shipping, Ltd., is in no sense a private company.
Mr. Larkin
I know that. I know practically as much about it as the Minister knows. The point is: who allocates the shipping space? The measurement of the ship is there and the allocation must be made according to measurement, and I suggest it is a bad idea to allow to get abroad that people who hold private directorships at the same time hold these particular key positions.
I can assure the Deputy that the allocation of shipping space is my responsibility and that the official concerned has no function in the matter. He is certainly not consulted in relation to any application by the firm in question. I am sure that all the officers of the House who know the official in question will understand that he would be most conscientious in a matter of that kind.
It was in order to clear up any insinuations against him that I raised the matter.
Is the Minister aware that Mr. Leydon's firm is in receipt of £2 3s. per gallon for wine in Northern Ireland? I hold that Mr. Leydon refused facilities to one merchant to compete against his company.
The Deputy is completely wrong in that regard.
Were the applications made?
No licences for the exportation of imported wine have been granted to anybody since 1942.
Are Messrs. Thompson and Co. exporting no prune wine to Northern Ireland?
There is one firm in this country—I believe the only firm in the world—a firm with which the secretary of the Department is associated, which manufactures this product.
Who are they?
Messrs. Thompson and Co. There is no other firm in this country or, so far as I know, in the world, which makes the same product. It is a splendid company to have operating in the country. It does a world-wide export business. Almost the entire production is exported. It has been in existence for the best part of 100 years doing that business and there is no reason why we should restrict this trade during the war so long as we can keep it going.
Deputy Flanagan rose.
The Deputy may not speak again.
I am entitled to information.
This is the Second Stage of the Bill.
I thought we were on Committee Stage.
We are on the Second Stage.
And the Minister has spoken twice on the Second Stage.
I understand that he only answered questions.
I claim the right to answer the Minister on the Second Stage or the Third Stage.
I did not ask the Deputy any questions.
This discussion apparently turns on prune wine. Would anybody enlighten me as to what exactly prune wine is?
The whole thing is a racket and the Minister is in the racket, too.
The Deputy must withdraw that allegation.
Why does the Minister not take the necessary steps to see that his officers are not connected——
The Deputy must withdraw.
I hold that the Minister is definitely responsible.
The Deputy will withdraw from the House now, having flouted the Chair.
Deputy Flanagan withdrew from the House.
On the Third Stage, I want to say——
If the Deputy wishes, he may get in on the Fifth Stage. Will that suit?
Very good.
Although it is against precedent.
If there is any question of precedent, I suppose I could move an amendment at this stage?
It is rather late now.
It is not my fault that the Bill is flashed at us at this point. It is all subject to a certain amount of amity between the Parties. Otherwise, this matter could have been held up. However, I am to get in and I am satisfied.
Anything which is being done is being done by an arrangement between the Parties.
Might I remind the Tánaiste—I think the Parliamentary Secretary to the Taoiseach will confirm this—that the arrangement made between the Parties, as I pointed out to-day, referred to the Vote on Account?
And the Central Fund Bill, I understand.
I am one of the "arrangees," and I pointed out to the Parliamentary Secretary to-day, through Deputy Doyle, that, until to-day, there was no mention of the Central Fund Bill, but that even though it came at that late stage, I would try to get it through, so far as I could. When we discussed it last week, however, the Central Fund Bill was not mentioned.
I thought he knew his job better than that.
I understood that the Central Fund Bill was to be taken with the Vote on Account, because they are always taken together.
True, but the arrangement made was that we would give the Minister the Vote on Account this evening. I know that the other Bill always follows, but the Central Fund Bill was not included in the arrangement.
Was not mentioned?
Not until to-day.
Is it quite clear that the Fifth Stage is open to me for debate? Otherwise, I want to move an amendment.
I have so said —though it is against precedent.
I do not wish to break precedent. I will move an amendment:—
To take out the sum of £1,025,388 and insert the sum of £1,025,387.
Surely I am entitled to put that amendment into the first clause, to reduce the amount by £1. Will that amendment be received?
Yes. It would be in order.
I do not like this harping on matters of precedent.
The Chair and the House are guided largely by established practice.
I submit that I am not obliged to view this matter as put by you—that it is entirely against precedent that speeches should be made on the Fourth or Fifth Stages of the Central Fund Bill. I believe I could quote occasions when such speeches were made.
Possibly, but not to my recollection. Would the Deputy be satisfied to get in on the Fifth Stage, without reference to precedent?
Yes.
In regard to the question which I raised and which was discussed on the Second Reading, of course, one gets accustomed to this attitude with regard to the Civil Service, but there are times when it passes the bounds of honesty, and I think to-night is one of those occasions. This House has grown up in the tradition that civil servants, in the main, are people who cannot answer back and, therefore, that it is not fair to attack them, as they have not the ordinary rights of a human being of meeting the attack with a reply. We have drifted into the stage in which the anonymity of civil servants has now become their great strength. Life has been made more chaotic than ordinarily it is by the civil servants operating at every hand's turn on people's lives, with their being protected by anonymity, so that people do not know against whom they are operating.
In any event, I have been making most careful inquiries regarding this case and I have refrained from giving the official's name. My description, even if it is a misdescription, is that he is "in a particular Department" and I have tried to preserve his anonymity. I made inquiries and verified every item I have down in the question, from people who were in court. I was not content to verify it from merely one person, but I got corroborative evidence on every point. What am I to do? The Civil Service cannot be attacked, but an allegation is made with regard to a civil servant in open court and at the end of the case the judge is moved to say:—
"I hope the official mentioned will be given some opportunity to explain his position."
There is, in any event, such a situation.
How can a Deputy raise that point? Surely it is by putting down a question in the form in which I put one down—"Is somebody aware that in connection with a particular prosecution it was stated in court...." I say that and then put the statement or allegation and then I go on to ask my question, as originally drafted: "whether in fact the official had purchased the sugar and had given the particular assurance that the traffic was legal." How can I raise this matter? Is the Civil Service going to be so entirely protected that we are to be dumb in this House with regard to such a matter?
If there are any rights in this matter, surely I must raise this question. I suggest that I have raised it in the most careful manner possible. It is agreed that the official did make a purchase. We are told now, of course, that it was in regard to sugar that was not really the subject matter for prosecution. From what is told to him, the Minister is satisfied that no crime was committed. I do not care what the Minister thinks: it is a question for the law officer. Why should the judge not take some cognisance of what the official did? There were two accused persons. That is what is annoying people. These officials are being sent around the country to turn things inside out and they have to get something. They are in the nature of agents provocatures. They go around snooping to see whether people are overcharging or whether they are selling things they should not sell or whether they are selling without licences. There is a feeling, often expressed in court, that these officials decide these matters. Here was a case where an official definitely told a man his sale would be legal. It was also stated in court definitely—and I am informed was agreed to by the inspector —that he had sought this advice and got an assurance from the official that his transactions were legal. The Minister tells us he is satisfied that a man of the standing of this accused person —now dead—would not need to fall back on the assurance of such a person. Whether he had to or not, I say it was stated in court that he did go looking for advice and got such advice. The official backed up the assurance to the man by purchasing sugar.
With regard to the inspectors, I queried that point with the greatest particularity and this was certainly what occurred in court. The inspector, in cross-examination, agreed that this accused man had stated at some time that he had sought the assurance from this official, which was verified by this official's purchase of sugar. He recited that, whether he did it or not and, because that statement was not in the document produced in court, the official was asked to explain it and admitted that it was beyond all question that this unfortunate man certainly had stated to the man investigating that he went to the official with the subject-matter of this question and had got an assurance from him. There is no doubt about it that that statement nowhere appears in the document as signed by him. Why was it omitted? When people are sent to make an investigation, they put questions and take down the answers and put the result in narrative form. When a man offers a statement, there has to be some good reason why it is omitted. It possibly is that the word "induced" is a wrong word to have used in the question, but there is an omission. How did it occur? That is a substantial matter.
As a matter of fact, I understand that, when the point was raised in court, it would appear—I do not think any statement was made about this— that the presiding authority in that particular court deemed it to be a much more grave thing, that something admitted, even stated, had disappeared from the statement. Then, whether what was said was true or not, these are two things which cannot be denied. I say that a denial may come to me here but, with regard to my position as a Deputy, I was not content to go to one person alone in this connection, but I had it verified in a variety of ways and got it brought down to very fine points of detail and I checked up on those details. I got at least corroborative evidence from more than one person in respect of every item in the question. I suggest there is something here to which the Minister has to reply—whether it is admitted by the inspectors that, at some stage or another, they heard from this accused man these assertions; and, if it is a fact that these assertions do not appear in the final statement, some reason must be given as to why they were omitted. That is what I want to know.
I think I can answer the Deputy's question quite easily. I must not have made the picture clear to him or the House when speaking previously. The accused person had ten tons of sugar which he purchased on speculation early in 1941 and which he was under a difficulty in disposing of when he wished to do so. There was, as I have said, at the time no scarcity of sugar and consequently no reason why people should buy sugar from this individual rather than from their regular suppliers. He succeeded in disposing of a small quantity of that ten tons of sugar—a quantity less than half a ton—in his personal sales, before sugar rationing came into operation. In relation to that sale of sugar by him, or the purchase of that sugar by the individuals concerned, there was no offence and, consequently, no prosecution lay either against the people who purchased the sugar or against the person subsequently accused for the sale of that quantity of sugar. In the following year he sold the remaining 9½ tons illegally and to persons who purchased it illegally, and was able to do so because the circumstances had by then fundamentally changed. In the following year, there was a scarcity of sugar. There was a formal rationing scheme in operation and people were disposed to adopt irregular methods in order to get sugar in excess of the ration. It is with the offence of selling sugar in 1942 that these two men were charged and, as I have said already, those to whom they sold the sugar were also charged.
Deputy McGilligan, in a very formidable-sounding statement, said that this individual sought an assurance from the official in question as to his right to dispose of the sugar. In fact, he asked him the question during the course of a game of golf. Is it seriously suggested that this secretary of an important company, who had regular contacts with Government Departments and knew where to go for advice, would, in the course of a game of golf, ask a casual question of an official of another Department relating to sugar rationing and then, 12 months later, act as if the reply given to that question still represented sound advice in the circumstances then existing? Anyone who likes to believe that can do so. In any event, while I think the official was ill-advised even to offer a suggestion on a matter affecting another Department, the opinion which he is reported to have offered was correct at that time. That was in June, 1941, before sugar was rationed at all and 12 months before the offences with which the two men were subsequently charged were committed. I can say also that the law advisers of the Government were consulted and did formally advise that no prosecution lay against the persons who had purchased the sugar in 1941.
There is a further suggestion by Deputy McGilligan that the inspectors of the Department of Supplies who dealt with this matter subsequently acted irregularly in the sense that they sought to secure the deletion from the statement made by the accused person of the name of an official because it would be embarrassing to the Department or for some other reason. I have stated that the chief senior inspector of the Department of Supplies was present in court during the whole of the proceedings and he assures me that he heard no statement made in evidence to the effect that there had been a previous statement by the accused person containing the name of the official; and the two inspectors who took the statements have testified to me that neither of them ever indicated to any person concerned in the transactions that it would be embarrassing or undesirable to mention the transaction in which the official was involved. They stated definitely that there was no mention of the official's name in either statement, and that the question of mentioning that name had not been raised in any way by either of the two accused persons. I am prepared to take the statement of these two officials, who had no interest in this matter. As a matter of fact, when that official's name was mentioned as an official of the Department of Supplies, their first response was that there was no such person in the Department of Supplies—nor was there— that they never heard of the official in question and, consequently, would have no interest whatever in suppressing any information concerning him. Nor did they, in fact, do so, because the full reports of these officials were available to the Department, the books of the firm were available to the Department, and extracts from these books, containing the records of the transactions, are still available in the Department and they show all these transactions.
Mr. Larkin
Is there a record of 10 cwts. purchased from a firm that does not sell sugar? This man bought 10 cwts. of sugar from a firm that does not deal in sugar—Brown and Polson.
He did not. He bought a much smaller quantity of sugar. About 9 or 10 cwts. of sugar were disposed of to a number of persons. There was no illegality in that, because there then was no restriction on the sale of sugar. There was no rationing of sugar and no licence was required. There was no offence committed either by the seller or the purchasers.
Mr. Larkin
Is it usual for an officer of your Department to buy 10 cwts. of sugar?
Were both officials in court all the time?
It was the senior inspector of the Department who was present in court. He had nothing to do with the preparation of the case against the accused persons.
You mentioned that you consulted both officials and that they never heard of any such reference.
Both inspectors stated first of all, that they never indicated to the accused persons, when preparing their statements, that it was undesirable that they should mention the transaction and, secondly, that there was, in fact, no mention of this official's name in either of the statements they prepared—either the first or the second statement.
Mr. Larkin
Surely the judge could tell you whether or not he asked that this man should be brought before him.
The judge made some such reference. As I stated, I received a telephone message in my office that this statement was made and I gave instructions that the official should go at once to the court, but, by the time he arrived, the case was over and he did not get the opportunity that he would be glad to have and that I should be glad he would have.
How long is it since this happened—since the court proceedings?
The 14th January.
How many days has that court sat since?
This case was disposed of.
Could not the official be brought in to give a statement? The object of sending the man to court was that he might be examined on oath.
No, the object was to remove any false impression created.
And that he would be available as a witness?
No.
He would not be available as a witness?
The Deputy must not try a trick question like that. There was no question of any witness at this stage. This was a case in the High Court of Appeal.
In the Circuit Court. Does not the Minister understand that witnesses are heard in the Circuit Court on appeal?
I take it the facts are regarded as having been determined in the lower court.
Will you take some instruction in that matter?
I am prepared to take instruction in that matter.
The case was a complete rehearing. Every witness who appeared below had to appear above. Does the Minister say that his object was not that the official should be paraded as a witness?
I received a telephone message to the effect that the name of this official had been mentioned as having been involved in this transaction. I did not know what the reference in the court had been. I merely said: "Tell him to go there straight away and give the court any assistance it requires."
The Minister said that the conversation in question took place during a game of golf before the rationing of sugar came in?
Yes.
Why should a person who was accused in the case speak to an official about any transaction before rationing came in?
The conversation, it is alleged, occurred in August, 1941, just after the rationing came into operation. The purchase of the sugar took place before that and the delivery afterwards, which was not an offence.
Who says so?
The Attorney-General and his advice are good enough for me.
Is it not a fact that if any ordinary individual got sugar from any wholesaler or retailer after the rationing, he would be guilty of an offence?
There was no offence committed on either side—either in selling or purchasing the sugar at that time.
Every sale is a question of date. Delivery is the important point.
I have the highest legal authority for that opinion.
I suppose it was the same authority that told you that cases were not retried in the Circuit Court?
This is a Money Bill within the meaning of Article 22 of the Constitution. Seanad Eireann will be notified accordingly.
The Dáil adjourned at 11.40 p.m. until 3 p.m. Tuesday, the 21st March.