Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 19 Apr 1945

Vol. 96 No. 21

Committee on Finance. - International Civil Aviation—Motions of Approval.

Minister for External Affairs (The Taoiseach)

With the permission of the Dáil, I propose to move formally No. 1 motion and as they are interrelated to deal with motions Nos. 1 and 2, in relation to my Ministry, on the Order Paper.

1. Go gceadaíonn an Dáil an Comhaontú Eatramhach ar Aer-Loingseoireacht Síbhialta Eadarnáisiúnta do síníodh i Chicago an 7ú lá de Nollaig, 1944, agus ar leagadh cóip de ar Bhord na Dála an 11ú lá d'Abrán, 1945.

That the Dáil approves of the Interim Agreement on International Civil Aviation, signed at Chicago on the 7th day of December, 1944, a copy of which was laid on the Table of the Dáil on the 11th day of April, 1945.

2. Go gceadaíonn an Dáil an Conbheinsiún ar Aer-Loingseoireacht Síbhialta Eadarnáisiúnta do síníodh i Chicago an 7ú lá de Nollaig, 1944, agus ar leagadh cóip de ar Bhord na Dála an 11ú lá d'Abrán, 1945.

That the Dáil approves of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed at Chicago on the 7th day of December, 1944, a copy of which was laid on the Table of the Dáil on the 11th day of April, 1945.

Mr. Dillon

I take it that if the Taoiseach is asking for permission to deal with these two motions as one, it opens a general debate on the civil aviation policy of the Government.

The Taoiseach

It opens a debate on the question of these two agreements.

Mr. Dillon

Yes. The Taoiseach is initiating a general debate on aviation policy.

The Taoiseach

On these agreements. The Chair will have to regulate the rest. The two international agreements covered by these motions are so closely related as to form virtually but one single arrangement and it is as such that I am asking the Dáil to approve of them.

The first, the interim agreement, is intended to cover the period that must elapse before the permanent arrangement provided for by the convention can come into force.

These agreements have resulted from the deliberations of the International Civil Aviation Conference, held in Chicago in November and December last, at which 54 nations, including Ireland, were represented.

Both the interim agreement and the convention have already been signed on behalf of the Government. What is now desired is the approval of the Dáil so that the Government of the United States may be formally notified that our signature constitutes formal acceptance of the interim agreement, and so that the further steps for the ratification of the permanent convention may be taken.

Up to yesterday the interim agreement has been signed by 42 States, and formally accepted by five of these States. The convention has been signed by 39 States, but has not yet been formally ratified by any. Both the agreement and the convention require the definitive confirmation of 26 States to bring them into operation. The texts of these agreements have already been circulated.

As civil aviation is within the province of the Minister for Industry and Commerce, and as officers and experts of his Department have taken a major part in the negotiations which led to these agreements, I will now hand over to him the task of detailed explanation.

Minister for Industry and Commerce (Mr. Lemass)

The invitation which was received from the Government of the United States to participate in an International Civil Aviation Conference intimated that the matters for discussion would include the establishment of provisional world route arrangement and matters connected therewith, the establishment of an interim council, and discussion on the principles to be followed in setting up a permanent aeronautical body and a multilateral convention dealing with air transport, air navigation and aviation technical subjects.

It was intimated that the invitation had been extended by the Government of the United States to all members of the united nations and nations associated with them during the war and to European and Asiatic neutral States. As the Taoiseach stated, 54 nations were represented at the conference. The Government decided that the invitation should be accepted. Our interests in the development of civil aviation in the North Atlantic area made that decision inevitable and, in fact, we gladly welcomed the opportunity of contacting the representatives of other nations similarly interested and we welcomed also the prospect of the development of civil aviation being regulated and assisted by international agreement.

The two documents covered by the resolutions before the Dáil are the Interim Agreement on International Civil Aviation and the Convention on International Civil Aviation. Other documents relating to the future of civil aviation were also drawn up and I shall make some reference to them later. The documents which are referred to in the resolutions before the Dáil were, however, the main instruments resulting from the conference. I do not propose to review in detail the provisions of the agreement or of the convention. They have been circulated to Deputies and presumably have been studied by them.

Mr. Dillon

At least the Minister will tell us what they mean?

Mr. Lemass

The interim agreement provisions differ from those of the convention only in so far as arises from their temporary and interim character. The principles enunciated and the organisations set up are essentially the same. I propose to confine my remarks in explanation of the convention to the provisions which might be regarded as of special interest to this country, or as having a bearing upon our present practice or legislation.

Chapter 1 of the convention states certain important principles relating to the sovereignty of the air. It defines State territory for the purposes of the convention; provides for the proper use of civil aviation; and limits the convention to civil aircraft only. Chapter 2 states the conditions governing flight over the territories of contracting States. Aircraft engaged upon non-scheduled flights are given general permission to fly into and across national territories without prior permission. They are given permission to make stops for non-traffic purposes. Scheduled air services, however, will require special authorisations. The right of internal transport is reserved to each State, and that right cannot be granted to another State on an exclusive basis. The right to declare prohibited areas is protected. Aircraft may be required to land on or take off from designated customs airports. Airport and similar charges are to be applied on a non-discriminatory basis, such charges being subject to review by the council set up under chapter 9 of the convention.

Chapter 4 deals with measures to facilitate air navigation, including the application so far as practicable of customs, immigration and general air navigation procedures in accordance with the standards and practices established or recommended under the convention from time to time. It provides for the exemption of aircraft engaged in international transport from customs duties, and makes provision concerning measures of assistance to aircraft in distress, as well as provision-for the investigation of accidents. Chapter 7 in Part II of the convention sets up an international organisation. The organisation is made up of an assembly, a council, and such other bodies as may be necessary. It is provided that the first meeting of the assembly will take place as soon as the convention comes into force. The permanent seat of the organisation remains unsettled until the end of the interim period.

Chapter 8 deals with the meetings of the assembly, and with its powers, duties and system of voting. It is provided that all contracting States shall have equal right to be represented at meetings and that each State shall have one vote. It is further provided that a majority of the contracting States constitutes a quorum and that decisions of the assembly will be taken by a majority of the votes cast. Chapter 9 deals with the composition, functions and election of the council as well as its president and system of voting. The council consists of 21 States elected by the assembly for a period of three years. In the election, the assembly is required to give adequate representation to States of chief importance in air transport, States making the largest contribution to the provision of facilities for international aviation and States of major geographical importance. Decisions by the council require the approval of the majority of its members. It is provided that any contracting State may participate in the council on any question which especially affects its interests.

Chapter 13 provides that the organisation may enter into appropriate arrangements with any general world security organisation, or with other international bodies. Chapter 15 deals with airports and other air navigation facilities, and provides for the council promoting the improvement of air navigation facilities and making arrangements with a contracting State, if the State should so desire, for the financing of new facilities and improvements. Chapter 16 permits joint operating organisations between contracting States and empowers the council to suggest the formation of such organisations to States. Chapter 17 requires States to denounce the Paris Convention or the Habana Convention, as the case may be, upon the coming into force of the Chicago Convention, and also requires the registration of all aeronautical agreements then existing, as well as the abrogation of arrangements inconsistent with the convention.

Chapter 19 states that, in case of war or national emergency, the provisions of the convention are not to affect the freedom of action of a contracting State, whether a belligerent or neutral. Chapter 21 provides that the members of the United Nations and neutral States may adhere to the convention. Other States may be admitted to participation in the convention, subject to approval by any general international security organisation and on a four-fifths vote of the assembly; but it is provided that in each case the assent of any State invaded or attacked during the present war by the State seeking admission is necessary.

The major differences between the new permanent convention and the Paris Convention of 1919, to which this country is at present a party, are the constitution of a council as well as an assembly, the inclusion of certain matters relating to air transport within the province of the new organisation, the specific power given the organisation to enter into arrangements with other international bodies, including any world security organisation, and the establishment of and improvement of air navigation facilities by arrangement between a contracting State and the council under which the council provides the finance.

The necessity for international regulation of aircraft has always been recognised and the law of air navigation is based on international agreement. Aircraft, by reason of their speed and extensive range of operation, find no physical restriction in national boundaries. It follows that whatever regulations might seem desirable should be by the common consent of nations. A convention for the regulation of aerial navigation was drawn up in Paris in October, 1919, and this country has been and is a party to that convention. In 1939, there were 32 States parties to the Paris Convention. Of the States in the American Continent, only Canada, the Argentine and Peru were parties to the Paris Convention.

In 1928, another convention dealing with civil aviation was drawn up at Habana and the United States and ten other States in Central and South America later ratified that convention. The assembly in Chicago of 54 nations, amongst them being almost all the signatories to the two existing conventions, provided an opportunity for the consideration of a single convention on civil aviation which could be observed in all continents. The conference addressed itself, amongst other matters, to a revision of the public law of the air and to a re-drafting of the articles of the existing conventions in a form which made them acceptable to a greater number of States.

The convention, which was drawn up at Chicago, is intended to replace-both the Paris and Habana conventions, so that on its entry into force international co-operation on civil aviation will be expressed in the one instrument. In the documents before the House, there is little or no change in the basic principles contained in the Paris convention. The already well-recognised principle of inter national law of the complete and exclusive sovereignty of each State over the air space of its territory is confirmed. In accepting these instruments, each State incurs certain rights and obligations in the belief that it is promoting, in the words of the Preamble to the Convention, "that co-operation between nations and peoples upon which the peace of the world depends," and "the development of international civil aviation in a safe and orderly manner."

At Chicago, for the first time, an international conference on civil aviation considered the possibility of settling the international regulation of air transport as distinct from air navigation. Air transport might be defined as the aviation activity which is concerned with the carriage of passengers and cargoes for hire or reward. Air navigation covers all other aspects of civil aviation activity. As might have been expected, the proposal to introduce the operation and economics of air transport into a code of international law raised many problems. After weeks of discussion of these problems it became clear that the necessary general agreement on measures to regulate international air transport was not forthcoming. The convention, accordingly, deals almost entirely with air navigation. It contains no provision on the contentious issues of the freedoms or privileges of the air, or on the adjustment of airline capacity to traffic offering or ancillary matters which were debated at Chicago. While the differences which arose at the conference on air transport matters received most publicity, most valuable work was done on the air navigation side, and resulted in general agreement on the two documents which are now before the House.

The new convention represents a considerable advance in the field of civil aviation. It is to be completed by the attachment of technical annexes which, in themselves, constitute a considerable achievement. The time available was too limited, however, to permit of carrying the technical discussions to a final conclusion, as the matters dealt with involved problems of great variety and complexity, and in many cases new ground was being broken. There was general agreement that the largest possible degree of international standardisation of practice is important to safe, expeditious and easy air navigation. Accordingly, the technical annexes, while shaped at the conference into final form, are to be regarded as drafts for immediate and continuing study by the States participating in the conference. The final views of the States on the technical drafts are to be forwarded to the United States Government or to the Interim International Council, and it is expected that further meetings of the technical committees, to be held in this year, will produce the annexes in final form for attachment to the convention.

I have already referred to the privileges or, as they are commonly known, the freedoms of the air, the grant of some or all of which is a fundamental element of commercial air operation. These freedoms of the air have been defined under five headings: (1) the right to fly over another State's territory without landing; (2) the right to land for non-traffic purposes, for example, for purposes of refuelling; (3) the right to disembark traffic coming from the country of origin of the air craft; (4) the right to embark traffic destined for the country of origin of the aircraft, and (5) the right to convey traffic between intermediate countries outside the country of origin of the aircraft on an international air route.

The mode of treatment of these freedoms of the air in the new convention gave rise to two major proposals. One viewpoint, of which the United Kingdom was the main protagonist, was that the new international organisation should be given powers of regulation over international air transport, powers which would include the determination of the maximum traffic capacity to be made available by countries operating on any particular international route, the distribution of that capacity between the countries concerned and the fixing of rates of carriage in relation to standards of speed and accommodation. Traffic capacity may be defined as the amount of space available for the carriage of passengers, goods and mails.

If there had been agreement to vest in the new international organisation that power of regulation of air transport, presumably the first four freedoms, as I have defined them—the right to fly over national territories, the right to land for non-traffic purposes, the rights to embark and disembark traffic to and from the country of origin of the aircraft—would have been included in the new convention, and it would have been proposed that the rights arising thereunder should be granted on a multilateral basis between the nations signing the convention, the fifth freedom—the right to convey traffic between intermediate countries on an international route—remaining for negotiation between the countries directly concerned.

The other proposal, for which the United States was the main advocate, envisaged an international organisation alike in constitution but differing in its powers. The proposal was for a purely consultative international organisation without powers of limitation upon air transport operation and for the multilateral grant of the first two freedoms only—that is, the right to fly over national territory and to make stops for non-traffic purposes—the grant of the other freedoms of the air to be a matter for bilateral negotiation between the nations concerned. The ebb and flow of the discussions at Chicago saw modifications accepted in both proposals but ultimately there still remained a difference which was basic enough to prevent reconciliation of the conflicting proposals. As I have stated, the convention, the multilateral instrument which was finally agreed and which we are now asking the Dáil to ratify, does not include provisions covering the five freedoms and commercial operation, so that the position which obtained under the Paris Convention still exists, namely, the prior authorisation of each State is necessary before a regular international air service may be operated.

General Mulcahy

Do I understand that each of the five freedoms, each of the things mentioned in the five freedoms, can only come into operation as between any countries when they make a positive agreement among themselves to bring these into operation?

Mr. Lemass

I should not like to answer that by a simple statement. I shall refer to that further.

General Mulcahy

I understood that what the Minister is now saying implied that.

Mr. Lemass

I said that this convention which we are asking the Dáil to ratify contains no provisions relating to the five freedoms, nor does the ratification of this convention by any State involve it in an obligation to afford these rights to any other State. A State which ratifies this convention can confer these rights in respect of its territory on other States by bilateral arrangements.

General Mulcahy

If it does give it to one country by a bilateral arrangement with that country, must it give it to others?

Mr. Lemass

There is nothing in the convention which requires that.

General Mulcahy

Nothing?

Mr. Lemass

In the course of the conference it became clear that a number of nations were prepared to subscribe to a multi-lateral instrument granting the first two freedoms and that a smaller number of nations were prepared to agree to a similar multi-lateral grant of all five freedoms. Independently of the convention and of the interim agreement on civil aviation, two other documents were drawn up and were opened for signature at the conclusion of the conference at Chicago. The first of these documents was called the International Air Services Transit Agreement, providing for the multi-lateral grant between the signatories of the first two freedoms, that is to say, the right of transit over national territories and of making non-traffic stops, and the second document was called the International Air Transport Agreement, providing for the multi-lateral grant of the five freedoms, that is to say, transit and full traffic rights. Thirty-four States have signed the former document and 22 States the latter document.

Mr. Dillon

Was that the broad division between the United States of America and Great Britain?

Mr. Lemass

The Deputy cannot expect me to express an opinion on that subject. After careful examination of this country's position in relation to these two agreements, it was decided that the Irish delegation should not sign these agreements. It will be appreciated that the rights granted under the "two freedoms" document, the right of transport over national territory and the right to make non-traffic stops, are of vital importance to this country and involve implications as serious as would the grant of the traffic rights covered by the other document which provides for the multi-lateral concession of all five freedoms. If the transit agreement were signed by this country, then air services could be operated freely over our territory by any of the other signatory countries. The United Kingdom and the United States are amongst the signatories. International air transport operators, in the present stage of aeronautical development, have a major interest in obtaining transit and non-traffic rights in this country because of our geographical position and our importance to operators over the Atlantic route, the route which, it is confidently expected, will be the blue ribbon route of air transport, as it is in the case of shipping. There are alternative routes across the North Atlantic, but the shortest route from the great centres of population, like New York, on the western continent, passes within a few miles of the River Shannon and of the Shannon airport on the way to the major centres of population in Europe.

While our participation in air transport operation over the Atlantic is contemplated at some stage, we have not at present the same degree of interest in advancing our rights as operators as we have in establishing our interests as air transport facility-providers and in considering the signature of the two documents, the paramount factor was the effect of our action on the future of the Shannon airport. The Government was satisfied that our interests would best be served by maintaining our liberty of action in so far as the grant of the freedoms of the air was concerned. That attitude does not mean that the Government is adopting a restrictive policy. On the contrary, the Government is quite willing to negotiate with the countries interested the grant of the necessary' freedoms through bi-lateral agreements, and the agreement recently concluded with the United States exemplifies our policy in that respect.

Before dealing with the agreement with the United States, it may be well to state very briefly that our policy regarding the Shannon airport is to ensure its inclusion in the main transatlantic route and on a basis securing the maximum traffic at the airport. It may be anticipated that there will be an inducement to operate connecting services between points not directly served by the trunk-line aircraft and the Irish airport on the west coast of Europe. The establishment of the Shannon airport connotes not only the provision of first-class airfield facilities, which include long runways and extensive buildings, but also the organisation and maintenance of first-class ancillary services providing adequate assistance for the navigation of aircraft. These services are, air traffic control, meteorological and radio communication, and it is fully appreciated that the standard of these services as well as of the airfield facilities must be at least as high as in the other countries concerned in the Atlantic route. A point of basic interest is the degree of operational importance of the Shannon airport on the transatlantic route. Of all forms of transportation the aeroplane is the most sensitive to gross weight; that is to say, the combined weight of fuel, revenue load, and the weight of the aircraft itself which constitute the gross weight to be carried. The longer the flight, the greater the amount of fuel which must be carried and the less the revenue load capacity remaining. The vice-chairman of the U.S.A. Civil Aeronautical Board, Mr. Edward Warner, has analysed long-range operations under specified conditions and has stated his conclusion that "the practically desirable distance between stops where economy is a factor of major importance would appear to range from 700 to 1,250 miles." Another U.S.A. study recently issued entitled The Geography of World Air Transport, by J. Parker van Zandt, shows that the optimum non-stop lenght of flight for maximum economy of operation is not likely to exceed 1,700 miles for some years to come. For immediate post-war operations a non-stop range of well under 1,500 miles will probably be preferable. Beyond these ranges economic penalties accumulate rapidly for the type of transport equipment which is foreseen in the near future. It is over 3,000 miles from New York to Ireland; the distance between Newfoundland and this country is 2,000 miles, so that the use of the Irish airport would appear to be a vital element in the economy of transatlantic airline operation. London and Paris are respectively 400 and 600 miles flying distance from the Shannon airport and the conclusion is obvious that the operation of express services non-stop to such points could only be carried out at high cost which the ordinary customer would not be disposed to pay in return for the small saving of time involved.

Aircraft can, of course, be designed to fly almost any distance. It is also possible that the conception of economic flight distances will have to be revised when radically new developments such as flying wings and jet-propulsion become commonplace. While, however, the present type of aircraft remain standard, a lower operating cost is likely to be reached by designing for non-stop flights of considerably under, rather than over, 2,000 miles. So far as is known, all the aircraft contemplated by prospective Atlantic operations are of the present standard type.

The agenda of the Chicago Conference contained, as well as the permanent convention, the more immediate question of the grant of operating rights to enable commercial air services to be developed throughout the world as soon as the course of military events made that possible. It was recognised that civilian air transport systems could bring aid to needy countries and hasten the return of normal trade and commerce. At the same time, it was felt that there should be as great a measure of uniformity as possible in any agreements that may be made between States for the operation of air services. The conference drew up a set of standard clauses for incorporation in the bi-lateral agreements which would be entered into by States desiring to produce an early expansion of air transport. These standard clauses are set out in the final act of the conference under the title "Standard Form of Agreement for Provisional Air Routes", as a recommendation to the States attending the Chicago Conference. It was, of course, left entirely open for States to add other clauses so long as they were not inconsistent with the standard clauses.

While our delegation was in Chicago the United States indicated that they desired to negotiate a bi-lateral agreement with this country following the framework of the Chicago draft. The Government authorised discussions between the two delegations on that basis and the eventual result was the agreement effected by an exchange of notes between this Government and the American Government of which copies have been circulated to Deputies. Articles 1 to 9 of that agreement are based on the standard articles accepted by the Chicago Conference. They comprise general provisions relating to the technical competency of the air-carrier, non-discrimination in airport charges and operational facilities, application of national laws and regulations, nationality of operators, registration of the agreement with the Provisional Civil Aviation International Organisation, and the preservation of operating rights already granted. Article 10 preserves the existing air navigation agreement with the United States except to the extent to which it is modified by the new agreement. Article 11 provides for amendments of the agreement by mutual action.

Article 1 and the Annex to which it refers are the provisions of major importance. Airlines of the United States are by the agreement granted full commercial rights of operation at the Shannon airport, and Irish air lines are accorded identical rights in the United States. Where non-traffic stops are made by the aircraft of either party, the other party may require that aircraft making such stops will provide a commercial service reasonable in the circumstances. The rights of traffic desiring to embark or disembark at the Shannon Airport are safeguarded by that provision.

The routes which are specified in the Annex are from the United States to Ireland and countries beyond, via intermediate points and in both directions. That section must be read in conjunction with the statement made some months ago by the United States Civil Aeronautics Board as to the international air routes which they considered were desirable for post-war operations by United States carriers.

Four routes over the North Atlantic were specified by the United States Civil Aeronautics Board. Route 1 was from New York to Newfoundland or Labrador to Ireland and thence to London, Amsterdam and points beyond. Route 2 was from New York to Newfoundland or Labrador to Ireland and thence to Paris, Switzerland and points beyond. Route 3 was from New York to Newfoundland or Labrador to Greenland and Iceland and thence to Scandinavia and Russia. Route 4 was from New York to Bermuda, to the Azores and Lisbon and points beyond. An estimate made of the distribution of traffic flow over those routes shows that over 80 per cent. of the traffic is expected to travel on routes 1 and 2. These are the official United States routes over the Atlantic. They may be modified to a minor extent in the course of hearings for operating certificates before the Civil Aeronautics Board, but so far as the interpretation of the agreement is concerned, it is clear that the routes covered in the Annex are routes 1 and 2, which I have defined.

The clear determination of the routes involved is a matter of much importance in the interpretation of the provision in the Annex regarding landings at the Shannon airport. It is agreed in the Annex that, in view of the long trans-oceanic flight and the still limited development of aeronautical science, all east-bound aircraft on the routes specified in the Annex shall stop at the Shannon airport as first European port of call, and all west-bound aircraft on the same routes shall stop at the airport also.

Mr. Norton

Did the Minister say that west-bound aircraft would stop here?

Mr. Lemass

Yes. Of the whole agreement and Annex, that provision gave rise to the most prolonged discussion when our representatives were negotiating with the United States representatives. Before it was written into the final draft, it had been examined from every angle. The Government considered its inclusion in the agreement to be of major importance, in view of our policy regarding the Shannon airport.

Deputies may remember that a similar provision was included in the agreement regarding transatlantic air services made between the Irish, Canadian and British Governments at Ottawa, in December, 1935, and to which I will refer again later. The text of that agreement reads:—

"Subject to force majeure, all east-bound aircraft on the transatlantic air service on the direct route shall stop at the Irish Free State airport as first European port of call and all west-bound aircraft on the direct route shall stop at the Irish Free State airport."

I have already explained the considerations mentioned in the Annex of the new agreement of long flight and limited development. The clear interpretation of the agreement is, accordingly, that United States aircraft flying over Irish territory in the course of transatlantic operation on certain routes, which must be assumed to be those officially specified by the United States authorities, will all land at the Shannon airport, either east-bound or west-bound.

Although the agreement protects our rights as potential transport operators, the operation of transatlantic air services by this country would involve very large initial expense and for some time to come would require a subsidy. As I have said, our right to operate them has, however, been fully safeguarded. It is desirable that the operations of the Irish company should be expanded and, in present circumstances, it would seem that participation in connecting services to and from the Shannon airport is the most likely development. The complete inability of the Irish company, in the circumstances of the past few years, to obtain aircraft of the type they require has necessarily restricted its expansion. It is hoped that conditions in the near future will alter that situation. At present, as well as operating the cross-Channel air services, Aer Lingus Teoranta also provide the traffic handling organisation at the Shannon airport in connection with certain services operated by the British Overseas Airways Corporation.

The Dáil was informed in 1936 of the agreement to which I have referred, made with the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada, in connection with transatlantic air services. That agreement envisaged the setting up of a joint operating company, in which each of the three countries— Canada, the United Kingdom and ourselves—would have an interest. It was then contemplated that the joint company would take over operation of the North Atlantic air service as soon as certain experimental flying had been completed. It seemed that this stage had been reached in 1939 but, unfortunately, efforts to have the company established and operating did not meet with success. Conditions which arose during the war brought about changes in the relative operating positions of the countries concerned in the proposed joint company. It became clear that there was no likelihood that proposals along the lines originally drawn up would be implemented and that agreement is inoperative.

General Mulcahy

The agreement is not operative now?

Mr. Lemass

The joint operating company was never established. The permit which was granted under that agreement to Imperial Airways, which has since been merged in the British Overseas Airways Corporation, to operate services in and out of this country on the Atlantic route, has been renewed on an annual basis up to date. The agreement made with the Government of the United States is in no sense exclusive. As I have stated earlier, our position is that we are ready and willing to enter into negotiations for bi-lateral agreements with any other countries which may desire to make such agreements with us.

The main aims of our civil aviation policy in relation to Atlantic services are, I think, fully appreciated and approved by all members of the Dáil. They are, first, to ensure that we will obtain due advantage from our favourable geographical position on the main North Atlantic route, by the provision of first-class airport facilities, by participation in international agreements which have the effect of discouraging the possibility of non-commercial considerations preventing air transport operators availing of these facilities and by the conclusion of bi-lateral arrangements which will ensure their use. Secondly, there is the provision of adequate air transport facilities, in which the Irish company will play an appropriate part, between an Irish airport and destinations across the Atlantic and in Western Europe, which will be suitable to the needs of our citizens. The agreements concluded at Chicago are in line with these aims of policy, and, therefore, the Government recommends them to the Dáil.

I do not propose to discuss to-day other aspects of civil aviation policy. Deputy Dillon inquired if all aspects would be open for discussion. I have confined my observations to the agreements concluded at Chicago, and to matters affecting the operation of transatlantic air services. I have not attempted to deal to-day with the development of internal air services or the development of services to Great Britain or to the Continent of Europe. These matters might be raised more appropriately on another occasion— for example, on the Vote for the Department of Industry and Commerce, in which certain expenditures and subsidies are provided.

These agreements which the Dáil is asked to ratify provide a general code of international law for air navigation purposes, and as our interests are undoubtedly served by the establishment of such a code by international agreement, it is clearly desirable that the Dáil should ratify these agreements.

General Mulcahy

I wish to say that the Minister's statement, as it developed, became quite satisfactory and has cleared the atmosphere very considerably. He has been, perhaps, brutally frank in indicating that the major part of our policy here is to sell to those people who can use it, the favourable geographical position that we have at the Shannon for aerial transport services. I think it is a matter for congratulation that the United States Government have realised that they have something to get there that will be worth any money they pay for it. When we consider that in the past the development of civil aviation has been tied up with the prestige of various countries and their security, and when we consider how much apparent disagreement and fighting for position that there has been among the various countries concerning aerial plans, I think it is a matter for congratulation that the number of countries that have been mentioned by the Minister has agreed to the convention that is now put before us and, arising out of that, that an agreement with the United States has actually been reached.

When we saw that there was a conflict, let us say, between the British and the United States points of view with regard to what might be fundamental principles concerning the organisation of air transport in the future, and when we saw a certain amount of intemperate language used by the representatives of various countries in relation to what was going on, we might have been a little bit disturbed. When we saw a Commonwealth Air Transport Council set up to carry out exhaustive investigations into various routes that the countries in the British Commonwealth were interested in from the point of view of aerial development, and that we were not represented on that council, or could not get any information as to whether our Government knew anything about that council, naturally we were a bit disturbed as to what might be the relations, in matters concerning aviation, between ourselves and the British Government. I think the Minister's statement has cleared the situation to some extent, and it is gratifying to us to be able to place the interpretation on the Minister's statement that we feel we are able to place on it to-day.

I can understand that many people would be interested in getting a rather realistic statement of what this country's interest is in the development of the air, but if the Minister confines the discussion here simply to saying that we are not yet quite clear as to what operational interests we are likely to develop, and if he asks us to consider these motions simply in the light of the Shannon airport and its place in the world of aviation, then I think we are quite satisfied to subscribe to these motions: but at the same time I think it would be of some interest to us if the Minister would indicate what expenditure he considers is likely to be undertaken in order to make the Shannon an airport equal to the requirements and to the standards of the countries that will be using it. These countries, if we understand the Minister correctly, will be Great Britain, the United States and France. It will, I think, require a very considerable development of the technical services at Foynes, the repair and maintenance and stores services there, if the Shannon is to hold the premier place that the Minister indicates it could hold on the blue ribbon route for air services. It is a matter of importance for this country to know whether we will get back in actual economic benefit the money we are likely to have to put into the development, to a proper standard, of the Shannon airport.

I understand from the Minister that the agreement that has been made with the United States is likely to be the pattern of the agreement we may make with France, on the one hand, and Great Britain on the other. I would welcome a little more lifting of the curtain by the Minister as to what he hopes for, or what would be our natural normal policy in relation to agreements with Great Britain or with Canada. When the Minister says that our operational business here will be participating in connecting services, I take it that the connecting services in which we would participate in an operational way will be services lying between ourselves and Great Britain, on the one hand, or ourselves and the Continent of Europe on the other. When he speaks of participating in connecting services, does he mean the running of separate Irish services from here to Great Britain, or from here to Europe, or does he contemplate the kind of participation in aerial transport that was contemplated by the 1935 agreement where, so far as I understand the Minister's references to it, it was possible that a company jointly composed of Canadian interests, Irish interests and British interests, might be formed for the purpose of running services that would connect Great Britain with this country and with Canada?

The Minister may not be in a position to outline very much with regard to that, but I think it would be of help if we could have some information as to what the Minister's tendency is in the matter, because I take it this has been given a considerable amount of consideration. When we read what the position is with regard to aviation in countries that are particularly interested in its development, the number of aeroplanes likely to be used in the operation of their air services in any particular year will be fairly limited. The cost, which will be very high, the types of aeroplanes to be used and the training of pilots, ground staff and technicians are all matters of very great importance. They are matters which can scarcely be brought to a very high state of development in a country with as few air services as we are likely to develop here.

However, I want to express my satisfaction with the Minister's statement so far as it went, and to express satisfaction that he has removed some of the doubts we had when we could not get any information as to why we were not represented at the Commonwealth Air Council. I take it that that is a matter arising entirely out of the emergency situation and that the spirit which dictated the making of the 1935 agreement with Great Britain and Canada in respect of the North Atlantic route still exists, that the economic, geographic and other interests that impelled the making of that agreement still remain and that, following the initiative taken in making the agreement with the United States, we may very shortly see other agreements of a similar or, at any rate, a suitable kind, which will put us in a clear and definite position in the aviation world, whether we look to the East or to the West.

Mr. Norton

The Minister has given a very clear and comprehensive statement in respect of the proceedings at the conference in the United States and of his interpretation of the agreement with the United States, together with a brief survey of our position vis-a-vis the world point of view on the development of civil aviation. I think our delegation in the United States had a very tough furrow to plough and that, in all the circumstances, they did pretty well, having regard to the difficulties which surrounded them, and I also think that the Government's decision that our delegation should not sign the two documents but rather endeavour to negotiate a bilateral agreement was the wisest in all the circumstances.

We are in a rather peculiar position in the matter of civil aviation and its development. We are a very small country with 3,000,000 people under our jurisdiction, wedged in between two very powerful nations with very large populations, and, more than that, two nations with enormous financial resources and an enormous aeronatical potential, an aeronautical potential which is probably unrivalled in Europe to-day, especially because of the enormous strides which have been made in the development of aircraft as a result of the war over the past five or six years. Consequently, in relation to these two great Powers, our possibilities of civil aviation development are bound to be dwarfed, and our range of activity bound to be circumscribed in a very considerable degree.

We have, however, one big advantage, that is, the geographical position in which we are placed—between Europe, on the one hand, and the vast Continent of North America, on the other. Our obvious strategy and policy —indeed our only ability—is to exploit that special position to the utmost. I think the delegation and the Government have done that, so far as they possibly could, and it may well be said that they have got as much as they could out of the agreement, or out of whatever resources we had for sale or for bargain at this International Air Conference. There is, I think, considerable satisfaction in the fact that carrier aircraft owned by United States lines which must stop here coming from America and going to America will give Foynes an international reputation, and will generally tend to enhance and exploit our advantages as a special point of location in air transit between the two worlds.

There is, however, one weakness in this agreement. It is its duration of one year. That year is going to be a rather troublesome year in the international sense, and it might well pay the United States Government, or any other Government, to conclude an agreement with us, or with anybody else, for one year, because very little will be done in that year. I do not say that unworthy motives were behind the agreement, but it might be that the United States Government were anxious to get in and make a preliminary agreement with us for a year during which there will be no effective activities of an aeronautical character between the two countries, and use the fact they got in on the ground floor this year as a means of jockeying for position at the end of the year in the hope of getting a more favoured position on the termination of the agreement.

It probably was not possible for us, with only one salmon biting at the bait, to decide that we would not make the agreement unless it was of longer duration, but I think it is a point which must be borne in mind in putting a valuation on the agreement, and I should like the Minister to tell us whether any discussions took place as to the policy of the United States Government, on the one hand, and our Government, on the other, with regard to the operation of the agreement outside the one-year period provided for therein.

Many people who take an intelligent interest in aerial development and who have an opportunity of discussing air development with folk whose task during the war has been to operate aircraft will develop the suspicion that we are probably on the threshold of an era of aeronautical development such as we have never experienced. I have had the opportunity from time to time of discussing aeronautical development with folk who have been engaged in long-range flying in various parts of Europe and some of their stories of that development would stagger one. As these are people well versed in air navigation and in the technique of aeronautical development, one is inclined to get the impression from them that we are reaching a stage at which distance will almost be annihilated by the plane, even the passenger-carrying plane.

That brings me to the importance of Foynes. It was a feat of endurance and of durability if an aircraft crossed the Atlantic safely 20 years ago. Even perhaps, in more recent times, a speedy flight across the Atlantic was regarded as an achievement worthy of mention in the world Press. But, nowadays, particularly during the past few years, fleets of bombers have been flown across the Atlantic, so that, in fact, the Atlantic is like Charing Cross from the point of view of air traffic.

I do not think we have reached the limit in respect of the mechanical and scientific development of aircraft. My belief—it may be an inexperienced fear based on the ordinary observation of developments and with such information as one can get from experienced persons on these matters—is that we are rapidly reaching a stage in which Foynes may not have the value which it has to-day, and that all aircraft flying from the United States will probably prefer to land where its main cargo of passengers desire to go, namely, to the large centres of population in Britain or on the Continent.

If planes can travel safely from Labrador or Newfouldland to Foynes, it would be no great aeronautical development to get them to fly another 400 miles to London, or 200 miles further on to Paris, with the advantage of a non-stop at Foynes, a non-stop at London, and with no necessity for a change of route. My fear of the whole matter is, that while I hope Foynes will endure as an important airport for this country, that development in aircraft will be such that no matter what we try to do, and no matter how we try to exploit Foynes, the scientific and mechanical developments in aircraft will be such that they will probably by-pass Foynes and probably lessen the value which Foynes had in the pre-war world, which it probably had in the war-time world, and which it may now have for a short period until scientific development renders its value less than it is to-day.

The Minister confined his remarks, in the main, to interpreting the agreement with the United States, and to reviewing the proceedings at the Chicago Conference. I understand that he expressed the desire that the development of air services generally should be discussed on his Vote later. I wonder, in connection with the American agreement, can the Minister give us any idea as to whether within the period of the currency of this agreement it is contemplated to purchase aircraft for operation between Foynes and the United States, because when the agreement ceases to exist we have got to negotiate an agreement with the United States before we can fly aircraft to that country? Is it contemplated to purchase flying aircraft for use from here to the United States within the period of this agreement, or is it contemplated at this stage to purchase aircraft for use from Foynes or whatever other connecting centres may be established arising out of the use of the North Atlantic route and the stopping of American aircraft at Foynes, or does the Minister contemplate any kind of link between Aer Lingus and a company established to operate a scheme of aircraft between the United States and here?

I would like if the Minister could tell us generally what is the Government's policy in respect of the utilisation of our air possibilities, such as they may be. I gathered from portions of the Minister's speech that he thought at the moment that our best policy was to sell Foynes and the possibilities which Foynes offers and to allow our development of our actual air services to await, perhaps, more favourable times or the growth of events. I would like to know if the Government contemplate any aeronautical development which may result in an Irish air service operating between Foynes and the United States as a separate company, or does it contemplate any kind of link-up between an air company here and a United States company. Does it contemplate establishing an Irish company which may operate a service between Foynes and such other centres of traffic which it might be desired either by ourselves or by the United States services to fly aircraft over? I realise that in the circumstances confronting ourselves, and the delegation, that the Government had a particularly unenviable task. I think that in the circumstances they have done pretty well. I think that, at this stage, it would be rather premature to put a value on the agreement, particularly in view of its short duration. The Minister may tell us, if it is not unwise to do that in a public Assembly at this stage, what the Government contemplates is likely to be the development when this agreement with the United States expires.

Mr. Dillon

There are two motions on the Order Paper. One deals with international civil aviation. So far as that document is concerned, we had no alternative but to subscribe to it. No one gave a straw whether we liked it or not. We had to do the best we could. Of course, it would have been folly for us to disassociate ourselves from it. It is a vague document, manifectly a document that will not long survive in its present form as soon as the big aeronautical powers have reached some sort of modus vivendi. It will be amended to contain such agreements as they reach between themselves, whether by way of annex or new documents, and the nations will be asked to subscribe or disassociate themselves from the new arrangements.

When we come, however, to the agreement which we have made with the United States Government, I want to warn this House that I think it is a diplomatic blunder of the first order. Secondly, it is of no material value to this country whatever. These facts I propose to demonstrate to the House. Thirdly, it is turning our backs on the one hope we had of making the Shannon airport virtually indispensable to the transatlantic traffic of the future, and Deputy Norton notwithstanding, permanently indispensable to that. We have a gold mine in the Shannon if we go the right way about it. We have a gold brick in the Shannon if we go the wrong way about it.

Now it is notorious that at the Chicago Conference there was a head-on collision between the British delegation and the United States delegation, and that the conference wound up its proceedings in an atmosphere that was none too sweet. It is bad policy for this country to go fishing in troubled waters of that kind. If we had any sense we would make no agreement of this kind with the United States without a contemporaneous agreement with the United Kingdom. Everyone in this country knows that I boast of the fact that I am pro-America. I regard America as the closest and the best friend that this country has ever had. I have never been afraid or ashamed to say that in fair weather or in foul. But this agreement simply makes a pawn of us in the fight that is going on between the aeronautical interests in the United Kingdom and in the United States. I interpret the meaning of the agreement to be—America giving notice to Britain that unless there was a softening-up in the attitude adopted by Lord Swinton at Chicago de Valera would be called into play. I want to warn the House that if that course of diplomacy is going to be followed in the peculiar position in which we find ourselves, in a fight between the United States and the United Kingdom, we are going to get ourselves into trouble. This country ought to serve as a link to combine together the two great pillars of democracy in the world. We should do it and sometimes we might display, when they with their great interests are in conflict, a wisdom and prudence that they are not capable of. Instead of entering into a bargain with either of them, as a pawn in that battle, it might be much better for us to say to both of them: "Now, gentlemen, you have allowed great interests and their clash to confuse your judgment. We decline to be thrown into a maelstrom of that character because we know that ultimately you will have to reconcile your interests in the interests of the whole world. We are willing and we are anxious to collaborate in any plan which represents a reasonable compromise between the pair of you. We are anxious to lend our counsel, our facilities, in the working out of such a plan. but let neither of you ask us to concede special facilities to one wherewith to bring pressure on the other. Ask us for anything that will promote goodwill between you, ask us to make any contribution within our power to smooth out ruffled feelings and difficulties, but ask for nothing which one of you proposes to use as a lever against the other."

In my judgment, the nominal concession made here in this agreement is merely a petulant gesture to demonstrate to Great Britain that, if she is not able to soften up in face of United States pressure, other means can be brought to bear and that the peculiar position of Ireland will provide facilities that Great Britain may be tempted to withhold in her own territory from the United States, in the course of negotiations in which the British were trying to make the British view prevail over that of the Americans.

Is this agreement of any real use to us? The Minister has frankly given us his interpretation of it. The Minister for Air in London has given his interpretation of it. Remember, it is not what our delegation said to somebody else's delegation in the course of a luncheon party in Chicago that is going to rule the meaning of that agreement. It is what is written on the face of it. The jurists of China, or the jurists of Peru or the jurists of Great Britain have as much right to apply their powers of interpretation to that document as we have. I notice that the jurists of the United States of America have not yet given any authoritative interpretation of that. But the Minister for Air in Great Britain has assured the British House of Commons that that agreement does not mean that every aircraft coming from the United States of America to Europe must stop at the Foynes airport, and our Minister here to-day has made it perfectly clear that all aircraft travelling on routes 3 and 4 do not pass here. He is under no misapprehension as to that and he recognises that all aircraft travelling on routes 3 and 4 do not come within this agreement, but he does, I think, use language here to-day, if not explicit, designed to persuade the House that all aircraft travelling on routes 1 and 2 must pass here and come within the purview of the annex to that agreement, but he does not go on to say that by adding seven miles to the trip, the United States Government can use the airfield outside Belfast and not cross Irish territory at all, and if the aircraft never crosses Ireland, never touches Ireland, never comes near Ireland, can it be said that it is on a route to Ireland and countries beyond?

Suppose we seek to enforce our rights under our agreement with the United States, the United States can divert their entire traffic to their own air base at Lough Swilly and to their own air base in the outskirts of Belfast. What is that document worth then? Less than the paper it is printed on, but it will have left behind this nasty taste, that the moment the United States and Great Britain get at cross purposes, the mischievous disturber, located by the Lord God Almighty between them, acts the role of the mischievous promoter of discord, instead of accepting the lofty destiny of being the interpreter to the British of the Americans and of the Americans to the British which we were surely destined by God to be.

I take this occasion of saying to the House—and the Taoiseach knows by his own experience that what I am saying is true—the Minister for Industry and Commerce does not know it as well as the Taoiseach knows it; he has not travelled in America or in Great Britain as widely or as frequently as the Taoiseach has done—this phenomenal statement is true that we understand the British and we understand the Americans, that we can get on with both of them, but that the Americans and the British find it very difficult to get on together. In matters relating to air agreements of this kind, we are the one people in the world who can come between these two great nations and, understanding the faults and qualities of both, interpret them to one another. If ever there was an occasion offered when that might have been profitably done it was in connection with this aeronautical agreement. When we were offered this agreement by the United States Government, had we been equal to the position we ought to occupy in the world, we should have said to the United States Government: "No. The making of an agreement of that kind is capable of the gravest possible misunderstanding in Great Britain. We do not choose to get any little advantage for our country at the expense of the greater consideration of promoting understanding and goodwill between you and the British people. We know you may be vexed at the moment. We know that you may want to give the British lion's tail a twist. No one in the world can twist it better than we can, but we are not prepared to use our peculiar skill in conducting that operation at the present moment, for it is expedient neither for Great Britain, the United States nor for Ireland to do it."

I believe that agreement is useless from our own interests, not only because it is capable of half a dozen different interpretations but also for the reason mentioned by Deputy Norton, that at the end of 12 months, when the international atmosphere in relation to aeronautics has changed between Great Britain and the United States, as it most certainly will, because greater interests, wider interests, more universal interests, will require those two parties to smooth out the differences that divide them on these very specialised questions at the present time—when that new situation arises, we will be informed by the United States that the renewal of this agreement will require certain amendments or we will be informed that the United States Government knows that we have interpreted this agreement to mean a certain thing; that it does not mean that and that we ought to realise at once, before we renew it, that aircraft passing over Ireland shall be interpreted to mean traffic from the United States to Ireland and countries beyond, but if the aircraft does not pass over our territory, the terms of this agreement do not apply to it at all and that unless we are prepared to accept that interpretention, they will divert all their traffic on routes 1 and 2via Lough Swilly, Belfast, and so on. They can do that any day by adding seven miles, and only seven miles. In how much better a position would we stand at this present moment if we had rejected that agreement and said: “We will have no agreement except an agreement which promotes understanding and goodwill between ourselves and the Government of Great Britain and we are not prepared to make an agreement with either of you until such time as you can approach us with the assurance that such understandings are well under way.”

Instead of having that worthless agreement with the United States of America and the measure of ill-will which has already been raised in Great Britain by the discussion of this agreement which has taken place in the British House of Commons, we would be in a position to take up a proper attitude towards these two nations, with neither of whom we can compare from the point of view of force or wealth or anything else. But we might have proved their superior in wisdom at this early stage of these difficult negotiations that have to take place between these two partners. We might have set a headline for them. We might have stood between them and warned them that when embarking on negotiations of this kind they should not allow ill-will to override prudence in their own interest and the interest. of everyone else. I am afraid that we have been presented to the British people as a Government prepared to fish in troubled waters and to take part in silly little manoeuvres when some men lost their tempers, when we might have acted as an interpreter between the two parties in order to secure an understanding which, put into operation, would produce a greater understanding between two peoples upon whose good understanding the destinies of the whole human race ultimately depend.

Mr. Davin

The word "manoeuvre" is not a wise one.

Mr. Dillon

Let me be explicit. There has grown up a dirty slimy practice in this House of being afraid to speak the truth. I know the American people; they are not afraid of the truth.

Mr. Lemass

We hope the American people know you.

Mr. Dillon

Thank God, they do, and I am proud of it. I know them. They are not afraid of the truth. They are not deceived by insincere adulation. The Deputy has a better acquaintance with the British people and I think he will agree with me that they are not afraid of the truth and they are not deceived by insincere adulation.

Mr. Davin

I questioned the wisdom of the word "manoeuvre."

Mr. Dillon

I say deliberately that this whole transaction is a manoeuvre in the course of a well-recognised clash of interests between the United States aeronautical interests and those in Great Britain, and I think anyone with an understanding of these things knows that well.

Now I want to suggest to the House that we have it in our power to make the Shannon a gold mine. The Minister, in dealing with the matter, quoted from a number of American authorities on aeronautics opinions phrased as follows: Of all forms of transportation the aeroplane is the most sensitive to gross weight. He went on to speak of the maximums fixed by experts where economy is the major issue. I ask the House particularly to note that in every case where the Minister was prepared to quote an authority to that effect you always find the word annexed to the opinion: "Where economy is the major issue." Does any Deputy so far deceive himself as to imagine that in express passenger traffic economy will ever be the major issue? Has any Deputy ever travelled on express passenger routes on the Atlantic where economy was the major consideration? I remember speaking to captains of ships crossing the Atlantic and they said to me: "If we cut down the speed of the ship by two knots we could save practically half of our transatlantic expenses, but it is the extra two knots of speed that win for us the Blue Riband of the Atlantic and that is what gets us the express traffic. But, if we had not got that, human creatures are so irrational that they would willingly pay the German lines, the Italian lines and the American lines a fantastic premium for the privilege of getting to New York five hours earlier than we would deliver them." It is contrary to reason, it is silly for a man to pay £20 more for five hours, because he might save the five hours in the middle of the night. The difference between the Blue Riband liner and the fast liner might be that he will arrive in New York at a quarter to one in the morning instead of a quarter to six. Nevertheless, human beings, being what they are, so long as they are travelling the fastest way are prepared to pay any premium.

Mr. Davin

About 5 per cent. of them.

Mr. Dillon

These are the people who will travel in aeroplanes across the Atlantic. Deputy Davin and I will go over in two-funnel steamers for the rest of our days. It is the big shots like the Taoiseach who will go on the aeroplane. Do you imagine that he will go in a two-funnel liner when he can get an aeroplane?

He will be on the fastest aeroplane and every Fianna Fáil Deputy will be boasting that the Taoiseach was on the fastest aeroplane that ever flew. He has that in common with everybody who is in a position to command such facilities.

Mr. Davin

He can pay.

Mr. Dillon

He can pay. The Taoiseach is doing plenty of hard work; most of it is very bad work, but it is hard work. No man in this country, if it is volume of work is considered, is giving better value for the money, but thank God, they are not all so mistaken. For volume of work, let nobody reflect on the Ministers of this State, they are not getting more than they are worth for the volume of work they do.

The express passenger service will never stop at the Shannon; it will fly over it. People will laugh at the suggestion that the express passenger service to the continent of Europe should come down on the Shannon. The handicap of doing it is unthinkable as compared with the advantage that would accure in the form of the extra passengers that might be carried in lieu of petrol load. The great argument for the Shannon is that if a transatlantic aeroplane coming from America comes down on the Shannon she has to carry far less petrol when leaving New York and that measured in terms of pay-load, that means a dozen or half a dozen extra passengers. But no express air liner will get its extra dozen passengers and then pay the dues at the Shannon to curry out the extra repairs made necessary by the extra descent, pay the various other charges, too technical and too numerous to mention, made necessary by an intermediate stop between two great centres of population. I venture to predict, and I believe the Minister knows it as well as I do, that in five years' time, if you suggested that an express air liner from the United States to a point east of Ireland from their point of view would come down on the Shannon to take on petrol, the pilot would break his heart laughing. You might just as well suggest that in pre-war days the "Queen Mary" would stop at Castletownberehaven to get fresh water.

But there is a gold mine in the Shannon and it is this. Let us turn our minds from passenger traffic. We have no more chance of collecting the transatlantic passenger traffic than we have of making emus breed in Kerry. But at the Shannon we have an entrepot port for freight such as Danzing used to be. If we exploit that, we have within our grasp the thing that made Hamburg and Danzig two of the richest ports in Europe. Freight traffic, no matter how express it may be, with the exception of jewellery and items of that kind, will never attach the same importance to a few hours as passenger traffic does. I hope to see free trade all over Europe. I hope to see common agreements about transport regulations and so forth in my time and I hope that a great many years will pass before my time is done. During those years I want to see the Shannon becoming the hub of distribution for all merchandise going to and coming from the United States of America.

Conceive the problem that a merchant has in sending a parcel of merchandise to Europe to-day. He has to determine the tariff barriers and the packing regulations. Nobody who has not some experience of foreign trade will realise what an extraordinary complex thing package regulations can be. He has to understand the traffic laws, the kind of things that cannot be carried by aeroplane over the territory of a particular State. These will differ in every State in Europe, quite possibly. If we rail off a square mile round the Shannon airport and declare that within that square mile aeroplanes can go in bound for Europe, with any freight they like to bring, we should give the assurance that there is neither tariff restriction nor anything else to hinder them, that it is understood that every facility they want. however extravagant, will be provided by us at a price and that we are not concerned to say they must do this or do that. We should provide a luxury service for freight. The Minister has described one of the ancillary services that a port of that kind should have and I would add one—an adequate repair service, to enable repairs to be made to aircraft in transit, which I think is a very important service.

Our effort should be to have every conceivable convenience that luxury accommodation could reasonably expect there for incoming aircraft. Our object should be to provide for those who desire to avail of our link lines with their ultimate destinations, as a permanent feature of our service, freight taxis prepared to carry a consignment of freight to any other centre to which the consider wants it to be sent. We should have available there not only these services, but if any individual with any particular aeronautical problem of his own desires some special supplementary service, however extravagant and difficult it may be to provide it, we should be eager and ready to afford it at a price. We want those who use the airport to feel that it is their airport and that our primary concern is to ensure that, at that port, they will receive facilities which they cannot get in the various other quarters of the world.

If we can jump in on that now, the greater volume of the entrepot traffic of America with Europe and the greater part of the entrepot traffic of Europe with America will be done there in both directions. Remember this, whoever cashes in first on that traffic will keep it. Anybody who is in business knows what goodwill is. Once train the international merchant to look upon Shannon as one place where he can dump his cargo without any difficulty, and have the authorities in Shannon and other parts of the country as his agents, concerned with one thing only and that is getting the freight where the consigner wants it left, and you have established a goodwill that no other country will be able to take away from you. If we do that now, there is an immense opportunity. If we fail to put that work in hand and go dandering round with draft ideas that we are going to divert all the transatlantic passenger traffic to the Shannon, we are sunk. We are suited to one kind of traffic—freight, and all that codology that we are going to become the air capital of Europe is of no use.

There are other features of that trade that may be dealt with, but one of them ought to be touched upon now. It is natural that we here should desire to see Irish services functioning on the air trade routes of the world, but we ought to make up our minds to the fact that, apart from the internal passenger traffic in our own State and, possibly, between our State and Great Britain, we have no role to play, none whatever. As a freight distributing centre, we could become as important in the aeronautical world of to-morrow as Greece or Norway was in the shipping world of yesterday.

Remember that Greece was one of the greatest tramp nations in the world. Greece! Who would imagine it, on looking at the map? Who taking no interest in international transport would have thought of Greece as one of the greatest carriers of the seven seas? But it was not the Blue Riband line: she knew she could never finance that or have the traffic where with to build up such a trade. Yet with to built up a trade that paid her well, and that provided her, in times of emergency, with equipment that would have stood her in good stead, had she been allowed to use it. We have an immense opportunity and one which, I trust, the Minister for Industry and Commerce will proceed to exploit, without delay, in the commercial sphere.

In the diplomatic sphere, we have what is to me an even more precious opportunity. Even at this eleventh hour of our diplomatic history, we have still the opportunity to regain the place which we have almost thrown away— that is, the role of interpreter between the American and British peoples, the link to bind together the one force remaining in the world which can secure liberty and decency for all mankind. All of us will hope that the invocation of that force may never come, that it may never be necessary to mobilise those great resources for the defence of the things in which we believe; but only fools will close their eyes to the possibilities of the imperfect world in which we live. Bearing these considerations in mind, I ask the Taoiseach, as the Minister for External Affairs for the next four years, to remember the immense responsibility that rests upon him. It is what will be done in the next two or three years that is going to shape the destiny of things to come.

We can either take up the position in which we make the whole world our debtor, or we can play the ignoble role of a little chancer fishing in troubled waters. This country was never born for such a wretched rôle. We have the capacity; God has given us the opportunity to play a nobler part, and strangely—for it is not given to many for this to happen—our interests coincide with our destiny, our higher destiny, in this regard. By linking those two nations ever closer, not only dignity but wealth may well accure. We must depend on the Taoiseach as to whether Ireland is to occupy that place or not. I hope and pray that this agreement and the circumstances surrounding it are not typical of what we may expect in the years to come but, rather, given the extraordinary opportunity he has, he will lead his nation in a rôle of conciliation, whether it be to our material advantage or not, and will refuse resolutely the offer of either party, Great Britain or America, to trade on passing misunderstandings that may draw them apart, that he will consistently reject such proffered gain, in the assurance that the role of interpreter and conciliator will secure far higher and more precious dividends to the country for which he speaks.

Mr. D. Morrissey

I did not intend to intervene in this debate at all, and I would not do so were it not for the speech which has just been delivered. I think it is very regrettable that that speech should have been delivered. I think that Deputy Dillon allowed his emotions to run away with the wisdom which, as he said, should have been exercised in connection with this whole matter when he declared that there was something very dishonourable, some thing highly mischievous and with the deliberate purpose of driving a wedge between the British and American peoples, in the signing of this agreement. The Deputy has alleged here that the outstanding motive actuating our delegation in signing this agreement was to give the lion's tail another twist.

Mr. Dillon

No such allegation was made by me at all. I said advantage was taken of a misunderstanding between interests in Great Britain and America to accept the invitation of interests in America to twist the lion's tail and that we should have replied: "We will not do that, but we will try to have a good understanding between them."

Mr. D. Morrissey

I have no desire in the world to exaggerate in any way what the Deputy has said. I would feel far happier if I could minimise it. The Deputy not only said that, but he stated it in a number of ways; he repeated it over and over again.

Speaking for myself, I do not subscribe to one word of the speech made by Deputy Dillon. It is rarely in this House within the last 20 years, certainly within the last 12 or 13 years, that it has fallen to my lot to agree with the Government rather than with the Opposition. But this is a highly dangerous time for anybody in this country, and particularly for anybody in this House, to say anything that might endanger our position, situated as we are between two of the greatest Powers in this world. It is dangerous to suggest that it was in a spirit of mischief that this agreement was initiated and signed. I do not believe that. I believe that the agreement was signed in an open and honourable way. I believe it was signed because those who signed it believed they were doing it in the best interests of this country.

To suggest that we should have refused to sign this agreement merely because there was a disagreement, or there were different points of view, between the heads of the American authorities and the heads of the British authorities in Chicago, and that consequently we should hesitate to take any part in it is childish. It is still more childish to suggest that we should have offered to step in between the two great Powers and keep them from each other's throats. Those two great Powers have agreed. and had to agree for the past five years, on matters of far greater importance than these aeronautical agreements. They are welded together and have proven it by far greater bonds than anything we could hope to achieve in linking them together.

I am one of those who firmly believe in telling the truth, in having the truth told. It is quite another thing to tell what you think is the truth, but what may be far from the truth. I think that Deputy Dillon ought to get this into his head, that there are people in this House, in all parts of the House, who are as anxious for the safety and security of this country as he is. There are people in this House, perhaps on all sides of the House, who are anxious for the closest possible co-operation with our nearest neighbours and with America, and any man who is not anxious for that is a lunatic. Mind you, it is sometimes a case of "save me from my friends", and sometimes in telling what we are pleased to call the truth, we may be doing more harm than good.

Further, I would like the Minister to make this position clear. Right through Deputy Dillon's whole speech was running the suggestion, the implication, the innuendo, that by signing this agreement we had locked the door against the British, that we could not sign any similar agreement with the British. The Deputy's suggestion was that we had tied ourselves hand and foot to the Americans, that we had allowed ourselves to be used. by the Americans as a pawn in the game, as the stick with which to beat the British. He said the bargaining powers of the British had been lessened by our placing at the disposal of the Americans the airport at Foynes. To me that seems to be childish reasoning. If American aerial traffic is not going to Great Britain but beyond it to the Continent, they will not want Foynes, it will be no use to them.

The Deputy in the first half of his speech took up the line that Foynes was all-important. In the second half of his speech he said that from the aerial point of view it was of no importance, that planes would simply pass over, the same as if Foynes did not exist. Unlike some people in this House, I am not an expert in regard to this matter; I know very little about it, but I do know that this world is going through the most trying time ever known in its history. I know we are living in highly dangerous times. Public men, and particularly noted public men in neutral countries, would need to be careful of every word and sentence they utter, dealing particularly with international matters.

I feel that we are not doing a service to this country or to our people, and we are not doing any service to our present or future relations with the United Kingdom or the United States of America by taking up, to use the Deputy's own words, the sort of mischievous line that has been taken up here this evening. In this matter I am speaking for myself. I have had no consultation or contact with any of my colleagues. I want to make it quite clear that my views are absolutely different from the views expressed by Deputy Dillon. I believe this agreement was signed in good faith, not only by ourselves but by the Americans, and I have more respect for the American Government and the American people than to think they will treat this agreement as a scrap of paper and, instead of flying to our territory, that they will go northwards and fly over Lough Swilly or over Belfast.

Donnchadh O Briain

Ba mhaith liom failte a chur roimn na comhaontuithe seo atá da bplé againn, ós rud é go bhfuil dluth bhaint acu leis an ndáilcheanntair a chuir annso mé. Táim cinnte go raghaidh na comh aontuithe seo idtairbhe don bhFaing agus co cathair Luimnighe agus don cheann tar go léir mágcuaird.

Ní thuigim ró-mhaith sgéal so na h-aer-loingseaireachta. Tá aer-phort ag Faing ann fé láthair agus tá aer phort i Rinn Eanaigh leis agus ní thuigim go ró-mhaith an difruíocht atá eatorra, ach ba mhaith liom a rá go raibh failte mhór roimh an comhaontú so idir Rialtas na Stát-Aontuithe agus Rialtas na tíre seo nuair leigheadh ins na páipéiri é.

Ní rabhas annso nuair bhí an Teachta. Diolún ag cainnt, ach nuaír bhí an comhaontú idir an Rialtas so agus Rialtas na Breataine os comhar na tíre sa bhliain 1935, is coimhin liom go raibh cainnt den tsórt ceana ar súil ar an uair sin agus a bhí ar siubhal annso anocht ag an dTeachta Diolún, sé sin go raibh Rinn Eanaigh díolta leis na Sasanaigh. Sin a dúradh ag an am sin agus tá an port céana anois ag an dTeachta mar gheall ar an gcomhaontú so idir sinn féin agus Ameiriceá; ach tá a fhios ag an ngnáth-duine i gcathair Luimnighe, í bFaing agus sa cheanntair san go rachadh na rudaí seo chun tairbhe don cheanntar agus do na ndaoine atá na gcomhnai ann agus go mbeidh obair le fáil ag a lán daoine nach raibh obair le fáil acu go dtí seo mar gheall ar an comhaontú seo. Mar sin cuirim fáilte roimhe.

An Ceann Comhairle

Though motion No. 1 was moved by the Taoiseach, the terms of the convention were, naturally, explained by the Minister for Industry and Commerce. May I take it that the House agrees that the same Minister should conclude this debate?

Mr. D. Morrissey

Certainly.

Mr. Dillon

Certainly.

Mr. Lemass

In case some official or other person interested in civil air transport development should read the record of debates of this House, I think it a good thing that Deputy Morrissey put on record an exact definition of Deputy Dillon's status here. I do not think Deputy Dillon intended to create mischief. I think it was just sheer inability to understand the significance that might be attached to his words by somebody who did not understand his status that prompted his remarks. The Deputy is so far from a realisation of the truth in relation to this agreement with the United States of America that it is almost impossible to begin putting him right.

The outcome of the Chicago Conference was a convention which contains no provisions relating to the control of air transport. If inter national air transport is to take place, it must and can only be as result of bilateral agreements made between States. The Government of the United States of America informed the conference of its desire to conclude such bilateral agreements with States there represented. The conference itself drew up a series of standard clauses which should, in its opinion, be inserted in all such bilateral agreements which it hoped and expected would be concluded following the termination of the conference.

The British representatives at the conference were fully aware of the fact that discussions were proceeding between the Irish delegates and the American representatives with a view to the conclusion of a bilateral agreement. They had been informed of our willingness to conclude a similar agreement with the Government of the United Kingdom. The American Government have, since the conclusion of the Chicago Conference, completed similar bilateral agreements with the Governments of Spain, Sweden, Iceland and Denmark, and, according to reports appearing in the newspapers, are at present negotiating bilateral agreements with other European Governments. Do these facts not completely dispose of the contention of Deputy Dillon that there was some ulterior motive behind the conclusion of this agreement between ourselves and the Government of the United States, on our part or on their part, because that, of course, was the full implication of his allegation?

Mr. Dillon

An ulterior motive on their part was my allegation.

Mr. Lemass

I have no reason to think that the Government of the United Kingdom dislike or disapprove in any way the agreement we have concluded with the United States. Let us be clear, however, that the concern of the Government of this country is to protect our interests. Deputy Dillon said that, as a result of making this agreement with the United States, we have increased the bargaining power of the United States in some future negotiations with the Government of the United Kingdom. If we had refused to make this agreement with the Government of the United States, we would presumably have lessened their bargaining power in any future negotiations. The representatives of the United States invited the representatives of this country to discuss the conclusion of a bilateral agreement on civil aviation. Should we have refused? Should we have refused for the reason Deputy Dillon has stated, that otherwise the United States might get some mythical advantage in some future negotiations? I do not think it necessary to labour that point.

We have our interests to protect. We concluded an agreement ten years ago with the Government of Great Britain and the Government of Canada relating to the development of air transport services across the Atlantic. That agreement was one designed to exclude from the business of air transport across the Atlantic all other countries, unless each one of the parties to the agreement assented to their admission. Under that agreement, with the full assent of all the parties, a permit to operate transatlantic services was given to an American company. Discussions proceeded, and ultimately agreement was reached to give a similar permit to a French company. In practice, however, because of war developments, the French company was unable to operate and the joint operating company which it was intended should have a major interest in that route was never established.

We have reached the position now at which there is no intention to have exclusive rights given to any single country or any single company to operate over the Atlantic. Should we have refused to the American Government the rights which are given in this agreement? Surely not. Apart altogether from the question of our own interests, if there is to be a development of air transport services across the Atlantic, it is because we, having regard to our geographical position, are prepared to give facilities to those operating these services. It is not merely a question of airport facilities. Planes operating across the Atlantic will require more than a right to come down at the Shannon airport. They will require meteorological information; they will require radio direction; and they will require traffic control. We, because of our position and because of our decision, will provide these facilities to all companies operating air transport services across the Atlantic.

In return for these facilities, we want from them recognition of our interest in the matter. We want from them some assurance that non-commercial considerations are not going to exclude the use of the Shannon airport. We are satisfied that, so long as commercial considerations predominate, the use of the Shannon is inevitable. It may be that at some later time there will be developments in aeronautical science which will reduce the commercial advantages at present secured by companies utilising the Shannon airport. Those developments are not in sight yet. We know what the main companies operating across the Atlantic from the Shannon at present have in contemplation in the matter of aircraft design, and we know that if commercial considerations determine the issue, if political or other non-commercial considerations are not brought in, and provided we have at the Shannon facilities as good as can be provided elsewhere, the future of the Shannon airport is assured.

But let us not blind our eyes to the fact that there are in Great Britain municipalities which regard themselves as rivals of the Shannon in the provision of airport facilities for transatlantic services. The agitation and the political pressure which the representatives of these municipalities may direct against the British authorities will undoubtedly influence these authorities, but, so far as the information available to the Government here is concerned, there is no reason to assume that, in the ultimate development of transatlantic air services, the Shannon will not be an important, if not the most important, factor.

Deputy Dillon suggested that there would be advantages in making the Shannon airport a free port. He appears not to be aware of the fact that the intention of the Government to promote legislation to make the Shannon airport a free port was announced before the Chicago Conference met. If he reads the terms of the convention he will find there in specific provision made at the instance of the Irish delegation for the establishment of a customs free airport. There is, in fact, no recorded intention of any other Government to adopt a similar course. So far as we are aware the Shannon airport will be not merely the first but, possibly, the only free port of its kind in the world. When I spoke of transatlantic traffic I was not speaking of passengers only. I referred specifically to passengers, goods and mails, and there is no reason to assume, if we make the facilities available, that the great bulk of the traffic in passengers, goods and mails that will cross the Atlantic by air will not pass through the Shannon airport.

Mr. Dillon

Passengers, no; the other two, certain.

Mr. Lemass

I prefer to rely in this matter upon the recorded opinions of experts in civil aviation whose writings are available, and upon the recorded and published decision of the United States Civil Aeronautical Board which has laid down the routes which it is proposed to sanction for American companies operating international services. They may not have heard of Deputy Dillon and perhaps they will change their opinion when they have read the report of his speech, but I doubt it.

We are undertaking a substantial capital expenditure to provide these airport and other facilities at the Shannon. We have already expended over £1,000,000 there, and it will take probably another £1,000,000 to complete our programme. The airport has been developed only partially so far. Concrete runways of substantial length have been built upon the land-plane landing field. The harbour for flying boats has not been completed. The dredging work could not be undertaken during the war, but the contract for the completion of that dredging work is about to be placed. A temporary airport building is being constructed. The permanent building, which is being designed, will not be completed for about three years. The runways, which are at present being extended up to 8,000 feet for the main runway and to 6,000 feet for the subsidiary runways, will have to be further extended. The design of aircraft, and the speed of aircraft have so developed since the construction of the Shannon airport was begun that it is clear we will have to contemplate runways much longer than those which we originally intended.

The issue between land planes and flying boats is not yet settled, but in so far as it is possible to get an indication of the intentions of the main transport operators, it appears probable that the land plane will be the main instrument of transatlantic transport, and, consequently, we are fortunate in the fact that the construction of the aerodrome at Rineanna has proceeded so far that we can afford there immediate facilities for land plane operation. At the present time the flying boat services, now operated by three companies, are based upon Foynes.

Some Deputies have spoken of the Shannon airport as the Foynes airport, and some as the Rineanna airport. The Shannon airport includes both Rineanna and Foynes, and it is intended that the work that is being done at Foynes in the provision of facilities for flying boats, will be retained, and that Foynes will, at all times, be an integral part of the Shannon airport, even though there will be constructed, side by side with the flying field, a seaplane base which can be fully utilised in all weathers and serviced by the staff housed in the main airport building.

Having regard to the expenditure and the work which we have undertaken at the Shannon, it is clearly in our interest that we should avail of every opportunity that may arise to ensure that the transatlantic services will use that port. I would say that we would have neglected our duty as a Government if we had failed or refused to respond to the invitation of the American Government to conclude an agreement on these lines. Again I want to say that we cannot leave entirely out of account the possibility that some technical development in aircraft, or the introduction of noncommercial considerations in air transport policy, will result in the Shannon being by-passed by some, or all, of the main air transport operators. I think, however, that we would have failed in our duty if we had not taken steps to develop the facilities that are available at the Shannon, facilities which, in the opinion of pilots operating civil aircraft across the Atlantic, are unequalled anywhere else. We may not put the Shannon into the centre of the world air transport map, as we hope to, but we could not have done so if we had not provided the facilities there. The provision of these facilities was decided on many years ago. If the construction of the airport has not been completed according to our schedule, it is due entirely to the fact that we were unable to obtain during the war the equipment and the materials necessary for that purpose.

Deputy Norton appears to be under a misapprehension concerning the duration of this agreement. He read one clause as signifying that it was an agreement for one year only. It is incorrect. It is an agreement of indefinite duration. There is, however, provision contained in it which empowers either of the contracting parties to withdraw from the agreement on giving one year's notice. That is the provision which Deputy Norton misread. The agreement does not terminate in a year. There is, in fact, no provision in the agreement for its automatic termination at any time unless and until notice to terminate is given, in which case the requirement of the paragraph of the agreement is that one year's notice of intention to withdraw must be afforded to the other party.

I do not wish to enter into any discussion with Deputy Dillon as to the most suitable air routes across the Atlantic. I informed the Dáil that the United States Civil Aeronautics Board has laid down and published the routes it is prepared to authorise for American civil air transport companies operating to Europe. Two of these routes pass through Ireland. There is certainly no suggestion that other routes are covered by the terms of the annex to this agreement. The annex to this agreement relates clearly to the two routes published by the American Civil Aeronautics Board to be operated by American companies from the United States to Newfoundland or Labrador to Ireland and from Ireland to London, Amsterdam and points beyond or from Ireland to Paris and points beyond. There is certainly no intention to interpret the agreement as requiring American aircraft flying on the route from Greenland to Iceland to call at an Irish port or American aircraft flying on the route from Bermuda to the Azores and to Lisbon to call at an Irish port.

Mr. Dillon

Would the Minister be good enough to say would an aeroplane flying from the United States across Northern Ireland and to Paris be required to call at the Shannon airport?

Mr. Lemass

What I am trying to make clear to the Deputy is that the American Civil Aeronautic Board has laid down four routes, and only four routes, which it is prepared to approve for American companies operating these services. That board may change its routes at some time, but at the moment these routes do not include any such route as the Deputy apparently contemplates.

Mr. Dillon

But if they did, they would not come within the purview of our agreement with the United States.

Mr. Lemass

The routes specified in the annex to this agreement are routes Nos. 1 and 2 of those prescribed for transatlantic services by the American Civil Aeronautics Board.

Mr. Dillon

The Minister has a profound reluctance to say yes or no to my question.

Mr. Lemass

The Deputy's question is almost incomprehensible to anyone who understands the situation.

Mr. Dillon

To nobody but the Minister.

Mr. Lemass

Deputy Norton in quired if we contemplated acquiring aircraft for the purpose of operating a transatlantic air service ourselves. We do not think it is probable that the operation of transatlantic air services by an Irish company will be undertaken in the near future. Clearly, the development of our activities as air transport operators, other than services to Great Britain, will be most likely to be undertaken in the direction of providing feeder services to the main transatlantic services to and from points not served by these services. In the provision of services of that kind, we hope Aer Lingus Teoranta will be able to play an appropriate part. Arrangements for such services must, of course, be made with the Governments in the countries to which the services will operate. Under our existing arrangements with the American and British companies operating into Foynes we have the right to participate in the link services to the Shannon airport. We have not been able to exercise that right because of inability to procure suitable aircraft during recent years.

It is not easy to give a precise indication of the economic benefits which will accrue to this country from the development of the Shannon as an international airport. The air companies using that airport pay fees They involve themselves in consider able expenditure upon staffs and materials in this country. The total outlay of these operating companies in respect of airport fees and other charges arising in connection with their operation at Foynes in last year was about £110,000 and a very substantial expansion of that figure might be anticipated when normal conditions are restored. But it is, of course, reasonable to assume that other less direct benefits will accrue to this country if we make good our ambitions in relation to the Shannon. It is not correct, as Deputy Norton assumed, that the potentialities of civil aviation in this country are limited by our population. While population is an important factor, and while the main international transport operators will always be the countries with the big populations, nevertheless, it is possible for us to contemplate participation in international civil aviation on a larger scale than our own population would appear to indicate. While, no doubt, in the case of Holland before the war there were exceptional features, particularly the fact that Holland had a large colonial empire, it is, nevertheless, worth remembering that Holland before the war had established for itself, despite its comparatively small home population, a prominent, if not a predominant, place in long-distance air transport operation.

I doubt if there, are any other matters that it is necessary to refer to at this stage. The Dáil will, I am sure, agree that the convention which was signed at Chicago and which has been accepted by a very large number of nations as representing an agreed international law governing civil aviation matters should be ratified by us. It is clearly necessary that there should be an international law regulating air navigation and international air contracts.

Mr. Dillon

Hear, hear.

Mr. Lemass

There can be no question about the desirability of having these conventions accepted by all nations and brought into force by their agreement. Whatever course we may subsequently take for the protection of our own interests or to develop our own services can at all times be discussed in the Dáil. They arise annually for review upon the appropriate Estimate, but when this convention is ratified and comes into force it will establish an international code to replace that previously in operation, that which was drawn up in 1919 and which has been adhered to since by most European countries. This new convention has this advantage over the 1919 convention, that it is acceptable not merely to all the countries that subscribed to the convention of Paris in 1919 but also to a number of other countries which were unwilling to participate in that convention and were parties to another separate convention prepared in 1928.

Mr. Dillon

The Habana Convention.

Mr. Lemass

If Deputies desire to discuss further the question of air transport development and the action which the Government may take to improve facilities for air transport in the country, they will have an opportunity of doing so when the Estimate for the Department of Industry and Commerce is before the House.

Mr. Dillon

Will the Minister look at Article No. 2 of the International Civil Aviation Conference and inform us whether the words "State aircraft" refer exclusively to battle craft? There is a distinction drawn there between civil and State aircraft. Does "State aircraft" apply only to war-planes or might that be interpreted to include the aircraft of a transport company which is owned and operated by the State?

Mr. Lemass

If the Deputy will look at page 4, paragraph (b), Article 3 of Chapter I, it is stated there that aircraft used in military, customs and police services shall be deemed to be State aircraft.

Question put and agreed to.

The Taoiseach

I move Motion No. 2.

Question put and agreed to.

Mr. Dillon

Which is the one dealing with the exchange of notes?

An Ceann Comhairle

That is not being submitted.

The Dáil adjourned at 8.45 p.m. until 10.30 a.m. on Friday, 20th April.