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Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 12 Jul 1945

Vol. 97 No. 21

Committee on Finance. - Agricultural Wages (Amendment) Bill, 1945—Committee and Final Stages.

Sections 1 to 3, inclusive, agreed to.
SECTION 4.
Question proposed: "That Section 4 stand part of the Bill."

Has the Minister considered the arguments that were presented to him on the Second Stage of this Bill in regard to this matter of withdrawing from the labourer his right to sue for arrears of wages for a greater period than two years? I cannot think of any conceivable reason why that right should be withdrawn so long as Section 5 of this Bill is passed. One could have conceived, under the original Act, that a farmer might have employed an incapacitated workman without realising that he should have got a certificate before he took him on and then, having that fellow in his employment for 15 or 20 years, that man could sue the farmer on the ground that he was bound to pay him the full agricultural wage, despite his incapacity, over the whole period of 15 or 20 years and, in the absence of a certificate, the court would have to decree accordingly. But, under the proposed Section 5 here, in such a case as I envisage the court is entitled to say: "We are satisfied that if this farmer had applied for a disability certificate when he employed the plaintiff, he would have got it and, therefore, we are going to deem that he did apply and did get it and is, therefore, not liable for the moneys for which he is sued now." But, apart from the case of a farmer who underpaid his labourer through a misapprehension, what justification is there for indemnifying a farmer who has deliberately defrauded the labourer of his hire?

I make no apology, despite the fact that it appears to grate on the ears of some of my colleagues, when I say that I was taught, as the Minister was taught and as, I suppose, most other Deputies in this House were taught, in the penny catechism, that one of the sins that cry to Heaven for vengeance is defrauding the labourer of his hire. Were not we all taught it? If that is true, and I believe it is true, and I think every Deputy sitting in the House at present agrees with me that it is true, why should we debar the labourer who is thus injured by his employer from recovering from his employer what was his due? I have no sympathy whatever with the employer who withholds from his labourer a payment to which he is entitled. I have no desire to mitigate the burden that man will have to bear. I have no desire to withdraw from the labourer any part of his power to put right what is wrong, and I do not think any other Deputy here has. Why then do we do it? I urge on the Minister most strongly to withdraw Section 4 and let the original Act stand, subject to the amendment proposed in Section 5.

I do not know if the Deputy is arguing entirely on moral grounds. If he is, I am afraid I cannot follow him in the argument. The reason I brought in this Bill was that the Agricultural Wages Board asked me to put in a clause of this kind, as well as three or four other clauses. The agricultural wages committees all through the country—as I explained to the House on the last stage of the Bill—are composed of employers' representatives and employees' representatives, a number from each county. There are five different regional committees and I was told by the board that they unanimously asked for a provision of this kind and then the board itself approved of that recommendation. The only difference was that they said they wanted one year, whereas I thought one year a bit short and I put two years into the Bill.

Very few Deputies have realised that we are not preventing a man from suing for arrears of wages on his agreement. In other words, if the wage is 40/- now and a labourer has agreed to work for 37/6, and if there is anything due on that, there is nothing here to prevent him from getting it. So, as far as he agreed to work, he will get his arrears of wages. All we are providing is that the difference between what he agreed to work for and the minimum wage fixed by Order will be recoverable by him only over a period of two years and not more. I argued the last time that we should discourage an employee from continuing to work very long for less than the minimum wage, as that would have a bad effect on the whole area. Farmers around would hear that such and such a farmer was able to get men to work for less than the minimum wage and they would be tempted to try the same thing. I do not say that they do so, as I suppose there is as good a proportion of law-abiding citizens amongest farmers as in any other class, but when a neighbouring farmer gets away with it, they are likely to try it, too. It is bad for the farmer and it is bad for the employee's brother-employees as, if this is going on, they find it difficult to get the full wage. Therefore, in the interest of both employers and employees, we should not encourage this thing, and I do not see how we can discourage it unless we put some limit to the time during which a person can get the difference.

I think Deputies will remember that, when the Act came before the Dáil in 1936, Deputies pointed out to me that it was an offence for an employer to disobey the Order but it was not an offence for the employee; and some Deputies held that it should be an offence for both. I resisted that, as I said: "If we make it an offence for both, neither will ever report it, but if we do not make it an offence for the employee he may come along and complain and so have it made right." We might, in all justice, have made it an offence for the employee to work for less. Therefore, it is not clearly a moral issue, as Deputy Dillon tries to make it. I do not think the employee is morally due this difference in pay for all time. It is really not a matter of principle but one of expediency, as to how far one can go to make the Act work.

That is the exact point joined between us—the Minister says it is not a matter of principle and I think it is. You have the case of the Truck Acts, which were designed to prevent the exploitation of the working-man by industrialists in England. The whole trend of that legislation is —and always was—that no matter what contract is entered into by the workman, no matter how elaborately drawn, no matter how skilfully disguised, the moment the court sees that the contract was designed to circumnavigate the Truck Acts, they simply say: "Sweep it aside, it does not matter how clever the man was who tried that; we are of opinion that it is a violation of the Truck Acts and it is not binding on the workman. All the rights he would have had, had he never signed that contract, are still his. We will award compensation on that basis and we will not hear the presentation that he forswore those rights as a result of the document which the employer produces."

I do not take the view that the employer and his workman are simply two contracting parties. I am sure that, on reflection, the Minister would not take that view either. I think the obligations of the employer are heavier than those of the employee. The employee has certain clear obligations which he is bound in justice to perform; while the employer also has clear duties which he is bound in justice and charity to perform, over and above the cold written word of the contract of employment that exists between the two parties. I am not trying to hold up the Minister as a kind of agnostic who attaches no value to moral principles. I am quite sure he attaches to them just as much value as I do. It is a mistake to allow the representations of the Wages Board, based purely on grounds of expediency, to prevail over what seems to be a clear principle. If the Minister had come in and said that the wages Board had made the case to him that the whole scheme would break down if some adjustment were not made to meet the practical difficulties that arose and that the lesser of the two evils would be to forswear this principle rather than see the whole system of wage fixation collapse, there might be something to be said. I do not see that we have grave grounds here for abandoning this principle.

The only argument I have heard is that, if we leave this right with the labouring man, it would be an inducement to him to take a lower wage, to the detriment of other workers in the area. I cannot feel that that is a very real danger. I want to create in the minds of the employing farmers that there is no use in their prevailing on a workman to work for a lower wage, as, the first time he has to check that fellow or sack him, the fellow will sue him at once for arrears and no argument that he puts forward about any agreement will prevail against the workman's right under the Act. All of us know that, if we should pay £2 a week under the Act, it is very much easier to find the last 2/6 every Saturday night than it would be to pay 37/6 and find 520 half-crowns if we had to sack that fellow ten years after he first entered into employment. No one likes to put his hand in his pocket and throw out £20 or £30, no one likes to put himself in the position that somebody whom it may be his duty to check will have that hold over him that he cannot afford to put his hand in his pocket and pay out that money. After all, we all know that every employer in the country insures himself against workmen's compensation, just to avoid that contingency.

I feel that, far from making the operation of the Act more difficult, the deletion of Section 4 would make it more easy and effective. Furthermore, I think the deletion of Section 4 would rehabilitate the important principle that, in so far as lies within our power in this House, we will not depart from moral principles where effective legislative effect can be given to them. I am not one of those who believe that you ought to make people good by law, or even try to make them good by law. But I think you can go too far in the opposite direction and simply say that where it is not convenient to be good we ought to legislate to be bad. If we cannot legislate to be good, let us at least forbear from indemnifying a person who commits a sin crying to Heaven for vengeance against the temporary worldly consequences of that dereliction of duty.

That is the way the case presents itself to me, and unless the Minister makes a stronger case on behalf of the Agricultural Wages Board, I have heard nothing which persuades me that I ought to change my opposition, and I think Deputy Corish agreed with me the last time we discussed this matter.

I think the fact that the Agricultural Wages Board unanimously recommended that this section should be included ought to bear very strongly with Deputies. The fact that representatives of the workers, who are diligent in looking after the workers' interests, have suggested that a time limit should be fixed, would indicate that there is, even from the workers' point of view, strong reason why this section should be included.

It is foolish and senseless to contend that there would be any higher moral principle involved in the enforcement of this Act than is involved in any other Act. It is, as we know, the moral obligation of every citizen to obey the law. If a citizen defaults in the payment of his dog licence, or any other duty of that kind, it is not suggested that a more severe penalty should be imposed on him than would be imposed if this section were not included. The contention that has been put forward that there is a higher moral principle involved here cannot be sustained.

It is the duty of the employer to pay his worker a fair wage, but even the Agricultural Wages Board has never contended that the wage which it fixes is in all cases a fair wage. It is a wage fixed by compromise, fixed on the basis of expediency, not on the basis of justice. While the wage which it fixes should, in certain circumstances, be a fair wage it does not follow that it is always fair. For example, you take a man who has been employed perhaps from the time he leaves school and who has no experience in agriculture. If he goes to a farmer and agrees that because he is inexperienced he will work for something less than the minimum wage, an agreement can be entered into between the farmer and the employee which will be absolutely fair to both sides, even though it may be below the minimum wage; with this exception, of course, that the farmer is violating the law.

A very important consideration.

It is, of course, but there is no greater moral default on the part of the farmer who violates the law in that respect than there is on the part of the farmer who goes out without a light on his bicycle or commits some other offence. Undoubtedly, he commits an offence. On the other hand, a highly experienced agricultural worker who is forced by circumstances to accept this wage fixed by the State, may not be getting a fair wage either. The wage may be too low. The point is that the Agricultural Wages Act never set out to fix a fair wage, because the board never apparently had the power to do it. All it has is the power to compromise as between the farmer's income and what is considered as fair as possible to the worker in the circumstances. If we were to accept what was put forward by the head of the State yesterday, that it is in the power of the State to fix the remuneration of the farmer under certain conditions, then it might be possible to fix an absolutely just wage for all types of workers. That has not been attempted.

The Deputy is going beyond the section. The section does not differentiate between the different classes of wages. It is purely a matter of enforcing the wages fixed.

But an issue has been raised in regard to the immorality, if I may put it that way, from the point of view of default on the part of the employee, and I suggest the immorality is not as great in the case of an inexperienced worker as it would be in the case of a highly experienced worker.

That question does not arise. There is no differentiation as between the different qualities of the workers.

I contend that is the weakness of the Act and one of the reasons why this section should be included. The farmer in many cases is only a very small step above the agricultural labourer. As a matter of fact, his average weekly income may be lower than that of the agricultural labourer. If you divide the total income of this country among the total number engaged in agriculture, the weekly income of each person would be very slightly over the wage fixed by the Wages Board. Therefore, I think there is no big moral principle involved. It is merely a question of doing what is expedient and fair. It would be very unfair, particularly to the very small farmer, to allow a huge debt to accumulate which he might not be able to meet.

I think the Minister's case is very weak on this, but, bad as his case was, Deputy Cogan's reaches the limit. He puts forward the suggestion that because a farmer goes out without a light on his bicycle it is a moral offence, and because he defrauds his labourer of his wages it is also morally an offence.

There is no question of defrauding.

They are both on the same level, both technical breaches of the law. It cannot be suggested, either on moral or legal grounds, that the offence of going without a light on a bicycle and the offence of defrauding a labourer of his wages—not paying him the full wage laid down by the Agricultural Wages Board—are on the same level? Does not the Deputy realise that even on legal grounds there is a vast difference between cutting down a neighbour's tree and beating a neighbour up? They are both offences, but they differ in degree, morally and legally.

The Minister's sole reason is that the Agricultural Wages Board, as a result of the unanimous representations they have received from regional committees, have come to the decision that the period in which an agricultural labourer can sue should be limited to two years. That is supported by Deputy Cogan, because the whole basis on which agricultural labourers' wages should be fixed is one of expediency and not to arrive at some measure of a fair wage or a wage which would meet the workers' needs and at the same time be consistent with the income of the farmer. I think this is a very weak case and I am constrained to support Deputy Dillon's contention that there is a moral principle involved and, while it may not be possible to legislate to make people good, at any rate we ought not to legislate in such a way as to condone badness or defalcations or defrauding labourers of their rights. So far as I can see, it is merely a question of facilitating the Agricultural Wages Board in administering the Act.

I have heard time and again from the Labour and other benches that the Agricultural Wages Board is not satisfactory. We are not going to improve the position by limiting the period within which labourers can sue for wages. Irrespective of the moral principle involved, the period of the ordinary statute concerning recovery of debts is being considerably reduced. Even if the moral principle was not there, I think the period should not be reduced further than the statutory limitation of six years.

I suggest that the practical experience of the board that operated the Act for some years might be of some use to the House. We should face up to this question in a realistic way, because as far as I can see there is no intention of defrauding any body of their rights. I could understand the contention if there were men who did not know their rights, but I am well aware of the fact that every worker knows what agricultural wages he is entitled to. He is only being compelled to look for his rights within two years, so that arrears will not be allowed to be built up over a long period. That is simply what is being done here. The board had good reasons for not allowing arrears to be built up. It would be a bad example and would have a bad influence on employers in some districts if that were permitted. It is right to compel a man, who knew his rights, but who agreed to work at a wage below what he was entitled, to take steps to do so within a certain period. Why should it not be made obligatory on a workman to look for his rights within a specified period?

If labourers know their rights, surely farmers know their rights.

Accepting that, if a man says he is not very efficient, and not able to give the return that would be expected from the average worker, if he suggested to the farmer that they would not mind the terms of the Agricultural Wages Act, and if a foolish man fell for that story, why not compel the workman to look for his rights within a specified period by taking the employer into court? Having regard to the experience of a board composed of employers and employees, we should accept their recommendations. They gave sound reasons why this provision should be inserted. I listened to the Minister's statement on the Second Reading, and I support the Bill, because I think this proposal a practical one. We should not tolerate men, deliberately over a long period, building up arrears against poor, struggling farmers, if they fall for another proposal, or who may not be able to pay £2 a week.

I can imagine the righteous indigation that rises in the Deputy's soul in such a case. He tried to picture the case of a cunning individual who trapped a farmer.

It is not fair to misrepresent me. I mentioned poor, struggling farmers.

We had an example of the cunning Uriah creeping up to a poor, struggling farmer seeking a job, and the poor man falling for the proposition. According to Deputy Hughes, Dáil Eireann should rush in in sympathy with him. Let us look on the other side of the picture, the side which induced the British House of Commons to pass the whole code of Truck Acts. Take the case where the farmer knows his duty, but does not like to pay £2 a week, and tells the man that he would be well off with 35/-

The Deputy is getting away from the poor, struggling farmers now.

The Deputy told us all about the poor struggling farmer who fell for such a proposition. There is another picture, that of the labouring man with considerable family responsibilities who, when he looks for a job, is told that there are plenty of fellows who would be glad to take 35/- a week, and that if he does not take that he can go back on the dole. That man takes the job at 35/- a week, and when he is asked why he did not assert his rights for the larger amount, he points out that there are plenty of good men idle in his part of the country and that on Saturday night, when his five children would ask him where was the 35/-, he would have to tell them that he had got the sack for asserting his rights. If Deputy Hughes had to make a choice between asserting his rights in satisfaction for getting some weeks' arrears of wages, or of losing his job, what would he do? Would he keep the job or would he assert his rights? If I was a labouring man I would keep the job.

How long?

Until I could get another one. What would Deputy Hughes do? Would he throw up his job to vindicate his rights?

Before throwing it up I would look for another job.

Supposing one could not be got. Remember that there are often many more labourers than jobs. At the end of two years, if the underpayments amounted to 2/- a week, the labourer could claim arrears under this Act amounting to £10. At the end of 20 years of 2/- a week underpayment he can still only claim £10. Deputy Hughes said: "The devil mend him; why did he not claim it in time?" The answer is that if he did so he would lose his job. That was why the Truck Act was passed in England many years ago. Up to that time labourers in England were compelled to take their wages in whatever form it was given to them by their employer. When a labourer went to look for his wages, or his arrears of wages, the employer offered him 70 left-foot boots, and if the labourer refused to take them he was sacked, with the result that the vast majority of labourers in England were paid, very often, in left-foot boots. If he asked his employer what he was to do with them or how he could sell them, the employer's answer was that he would buy them back from him at half the cost.

That is what happened. Where there was a contract between the employer and the employee requiring the employer to pay his employee £3 a week, the employer gave the employee 70 left-foot boots, knowing that he could not sell them, and the employer took them back from his employee at half the cost, which meant that instead of paying his employee £3 a week he was only paying him 30/- a week. Up to the time that the Truck. Act was passed, it was the case that no matter what happened between an employer and his employee, having undertaken to pay £3 a week, he actually only had to pay 30/- a week. Up to the time that that law was passed and operated, an employer, whether he were the Lord Chief Justice or the smallest employer in the land, could give his employee, with whom he had contracted to pay £3 a week, 30/- by means of such devices, and the unfortunate employee was defrauded, by one means or another, of the other 30/- that were due to him. According to Deputy Hughes, the whole object of this Bill is to prevent an effort being made to withhold from the employees part of the wages to which they are entitled——

I think that is a misrepresentation.

——and that a maximum period should be left to the employee for recovering. Surely, if the Agricultural Wages Board have an argument, they could put it up here. The best argument put forward by the Minister is to allow the present system to go on, and to encourage the working man to take less wages. If that argument prevailed, the Truck Act would never have been passed. The kind of thing to which I have referred prevailed in England until the passing into law of the Truck Act, which was regarded as the charter of the workingman in England up to the time of the growth of the trade union movement to its present strength. For the reasons I have given, this is a section to which I cannot assent.

Will Deputy Dillon tell us why the British Parliament, for instance, found it necessary to pass Lord Tetterden's Act or why they found it necessary to put a limitation of six years on the collection of ordinary contract debts?

If Deputy Moran will read the debates on the Second Reading, he will find that we discussed that matter fully.

We must have some limitation here, just as in the case of any other Acts. Take the matter of the collection of ordinary debts—the case of a shop-keeper down through the country—there is a duty on him to issue a claim for his debt within a period of six years, and if he does not do so, he cannot recover that debt by law, and quite rightly. There is that duty upon him, as the Deputy is well aware, to take action within a period of six years. Let us take also the case of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Under that Act a workingman must lodge his claim within six months, and the reason for that is that, if he does not do it within the prescribed period, he might prejudice the employer, and if he were allowed to leave it over for a number of years it might mean that he could completely ruin the employer. In the same way, why should a workingman be allowed to sit down for a number of years and then bring an action against his employer —a farmer, in this instance—and put him out of business as a result of that delay? Deputy Dillon knows quite well that some limitation must be laid down in all these cases. For instance, if somebody sits down on a man's land for a period of 12 years, he can take possession of the land. That is the fault of the individual concerned, the owner who did not put him out within that time. In this Bill, the workingman knows that he has a certain period within which to bring an action, and that it is his duty under the law to bring the action within that time. You have similar limitations in connection with other Acts, not alone in this country but in other countries, and there is an obligation on the working man to bring his action within a specified time. I think we should not allow such a man as Deputy Dillon is talking about to sit down, knowing his rights and knowing the amount of money that might accumulate after a certain number of years, and then make a claim on his employer—a claim that, possibly, the employer could not pay when the day of reckoning came, and which might mean his ruin. There should be some restriction on this. Whether it be for a period of one year, two years or six years, certainly there should be some restriction on it.

I confess that I have a certain amount of sympathy with the point of view expressed by Deputy Dillon in arguing the position of the worker in this particular matter. If I saw anything in this particular section that was against the interests of the workingmen, I should certainly take Deputy Dillon's point of view and ask for its deletion, but the last speaker, Deputy Moran, has somewhat anticipated what I intended to say. There is a limitation in the Act, to which Deputy Dillon referred, and there is also a limitation of time in connection with the Workmen's Compensation Acts, and the other Acts to which Deputy Moran referred.

I do not think there is a limitation in the Truck Act.

Well, there is a limitation of time in connection with Acts dealing with shop-keepers' debts, for instance, and in other Acts. I think it is six years. It was fixed at six years because it suited all the people connected with the matter, in that particular case. There is also a limitation of time in connection with certain insurance Acts, in the case of injuries. I think that in some cases you have to lodge a claim within three days, because, obviously, it would be difficult to prove the claim afterwards if some limit were not put upon the time for making an application. In this particular case, I think that the limitation of two years was not put in without grave consideration, and I cannot see that the position of the labouring man is worsened at all by the insertion of a two years' limitation. Deputy Dillon spoke at length of the horrible position in which the working man might be put by the rapacious and greedy farmer bamboozling him into accepting a lower wage, and alleged that the working man is prevented by the operation of this section from claiming his rights. Now, we all agree that the law is contravened in many respects both in this country and in many other countries. In this particular case, the law is violated by different people occasionally, sometimes severely and sometimes very trivially. I doubt if there is any Deputy in this House who is not aware that in certain circumstances there are what you might call compassionate cases, such as where a man is delicate or temporarily disabled, and not able to do full work. That man may happen to be employed by a sympathetic farmer, and there may be an agreement between the farmer and himself that the labourer will work at a lesser wage than an ordinary able-bodied man would get. Now, both of them deliberately contravene the law. The farmer knows that he is giving less than the recognised wage, and the wage-earner knows full well that he is accepting that lower wage owing to the peculiar circumstances. There is a two years' limit which would cover that.

That is provided for in Section 5.

Yes, but the difficulty would be to extend that to three, four or five years, because it might be very difficult to prove the case after such a lapse of time. Perhaps I might be permitted to take the case of Deputy Dillon himself who, unfortunately, was afflicted with a lame ankle a few months ago. Compassionately, I engage Deputy Dillon. Deputy Dillon agrees with me that he is not a fully competent man, able to work a ten or twelve hour day. He says that he is not worth the minimum wage and that he will work for £1 a week and his "grub." We are giving Deputy Dillon two years in which to prove that. We do not want to give him more, for the reason that his leg would be healed before two years and it would be very difficult for me to prove that Deputy Dillon was not capable of working a full day at the time of his engagement. That is one aspect of the case.

Generally speaking, those infringements of the law are carried out by the connivance of both parties. There may be occasions when the labourer is forced into acceptance of a low wage but I do not believe that that is general. If there is any breach of the Wages Order, I believe it is with the consent of both parties. Both the employer and the labourer know that they are breaking the law and do it with their eyes open, in circumstances which suit both of them. There will always be cases of an old lady or an old man employing a person who is on the point of passing out at a lower wage than the minimum wage. If a longer period were allowed than two years, a claim might be brought for six years' arrears of the balance of the legal wage at a time when the unfortunate people would not be able to meet it. I think that it is better that the section should stand inasmuch as it seeks to do justice between both parties. The labourer is not wronged by the section. If he thinks he has suffered injustice, he has two years in which to get a decision in his favour. I do not think that there is anything more wrong in fixing two years as the limit than there is in fixing the limit under the Workmen's Compensation Act or in general commercial practice.

It was interesting to listen to Deputy Dillon talking about the Truck Acts of England. I think that they were passed in the 18th century.

The 19th century.

They never applied to Ireland. They were passed by the British Government because it was necessary to curb the actions of their own tyrannical employers. These Acts never applied to this country and I do not think that they are necessary now. The employers of labour here compare favourably with those of any other country. Taken as a whole, they are much better than those of other countries.

They are as good, in any event.

They are much better than were the tyrannical employers of England in the early 19th century when these Truck Acts were found necessary. The "Mother of Parliaments" did not consider it necessary to put them into operation here. I cannot see what injustice is being done by this Bill. I do not think that any member of the House—even Deputy Dillon, who has a kink and thinks that he is a greater moralist than any other Deputy—believes that any injustice is being done to the agricultural worker under this section. It is just a warning to agricultural workers that, if they are employed at less than the minimum wage, they must claim for the legal wage within two years; otherwise, they will not get more than two years' arrears. Under the Children's Allowances Act, if a person does not claim within three months, the amount to which he is entitled is forfeited to the State. A tyrannical State refuses to pay a widow with perhaps seven or ten children the allowance if she does not claim her rights within three months. That law was set out by the Dáil within the past year, and I did not hear Deputy Dillon telling the Minister for Industry and Commerce or the Minister for Finance that he was proposing to act callously towards a widow with seven or ten children. A number of people came to me and stated that, because they had not claimed the allowance within the specified period, they could not obtain it. There was no redress for them. This section warns the agricultural worker who is receiving less than the minimum wage that he cannot continue to work for the reduced wage for longer than two years and hope to recover the whole of the arrears. No member of the House would do injustice to any agricultural worker, and Deputy Dillon knows that very well. Deputy Bennett mentioned an example to show that a claim could be made against a widow for arrears of the agricultural wage after a long period.

Against a widow!

Yes, immediately after she becomes a widow. The agricultural labourer might have been working for her husband for ten years at less than the legal rate of wages and his claim against the estate might be so large that it would not be able to bear it. All farmers are not so affluent as Deputy Dillon. Their farms are not so large as his. Five years' arrears of 10/- a week might, in some cases, be more than a farm would be worth. Greater injustice might in that way be done to the farmer than would otherwise be done to the labourer.

One aspect of this question has not been touched upon though the matter has been exhaustively debated—the difficulty of procuring evidence after a long number of years. The wage agreement between a farm worker and a farmer is usually a verbal agreement. It might happen that a farmer would employ a worker for six years. For three or four years, he might pay him below the minimum wage and then, realising that he was violating the law, he might raise the wage to the legal amount. After a further couple of years, the man might leave his employment and proceed to claim the arrears due him in respect of the first three or four years of his employment. The whole question might turn on the date on which the agreement was entered into and the date on which the man's wages were raised to the proper level. As the farmer does not keep books in the same way as the business man or industrialist, it would be impossible for the court, after such a lapse of time, fairly to decide between the employer and the worker.

Is it not the labourer who must prove the contract?

Yes. No accounts are kept by either side and the court would have to try to decide the case on the basis of what is considered equitable. It would be very hard for the court to decide what would be fair in that case. The court would probably come to a decision in favour of the worker. It might or it might not, but, at any rate, in the interests of justice it would be unfair even to the court to have to take on the job of deciding a case of that kind which occured four or five years ago.

We have had a very long debate on this point. I do not say the time has been ill-spent, because it is a very important point, but, listening to the debate, it occurs to me that it reduces itself to this: You have two people involved in a case, the employer and the employee. Who is likely to be the more wronged in leaving the law as it is, or in making this change? I must admit that the cases that come before me are cases where the employer is at a great disadvantage, if not labouring under a great injustice, as the law stands. The employee, anyway, has two years to make up his mind to get out and make a claim, or he can make the claim if he likes without getting out. After all, I do not think there is any great injustice in his case. He has two years to make his claim and to get any arrears of wages that are due. Deputy Dillon has another kind of case in mind, I think—perhaps the ordinary case of a labourer going to work for a farmer, and they agree on a wage somewhat lower than the minimum wage, perhaps by 2/- or 3/- a week. I shall give two or three cases from a number which I have before me. I find that, first of all, you can divide employees into two categories, the first being where the employee is mentally or physically incapacitated. Such employees are covered by Section 5. There are then those who are not either mentally or physically incapacitated, and they again fall roughly into two categories. That is where the trouble arises. In the first category you have the case where the employee is related to the employer, and in the second category the case where an employee is working for an employer who is not altogether a farmer. We have many cases in these two categories. Deputy Bennett had something to say about the case of the widow, but I should like to tell Deputies a very pitiable story of a widower. The widower, who was a small farmer with 40 acres, found himself with nobody in the house. A relative came along, and he asked him to come to work for him. As far as I can learn, neither of them worked very hard, and the employee was not very well paid. They fell out after five or six years, and then the employee put in a claim for £343. We all know of cases of that kind. What really happened was that the widower said to his relative: "I am very lonely; come along and live with me." Things went grand for about six years.

With the implication that he would leave the farm to the relative when he died.

I do not know whether that was alleged.

And the employer would double-cross the relative about half-an-hour before dying.

The employer got away with it on the contract of service, but it was a very near thing as far as I could read it. If the decision of the court had gone the other way, I suppose the employer and the employee would change places.

When the old fellow died, he would get the farm.

He would get it before the old fellow died if he succeeded in his case. In that particular case he was there for six years. If he thought he was being wronged, surely he could put in his claim inside two years?

And get thrown out?

I am sure if the widower had any idea in the beginning of what would happen he would have thrown him out.

They were having a good time drinking together.

We have a number of cases of that kind in which relatives give a lot of trouble. I do not see how you can cover them very well. Another case was that in which a lady had 10 or 11 acres and a shop—I think a publichouse. I have always noticed that men in the country are prepared to work for a lower wage for a publican than for anybody else; I suppose they have what they call "chance". Anyway, they are prepared to work for a lower wage. In this case, the employee again worked four or five years and then he put in a claim for £227. The question there was whether he was an agricultural worker or not, because he had been working in the shop as well. In that particular case it was decided that he was an agricultural worker.

Although he worked in the shop?

He worked in both places as a matter of fact. As the Act stands, if an employee does agricultural work to any extent, I think the court would have to come to a decision that he is an agricultural worker. There again that man was quite happy to take a lower wage as long as things went well. The third case I need not go into, because it is the same as the second. Again it was the case of a person with a small holding of land— seven acres—and a shop and the claim was for £250. We are not really dealing with the type of case that Deputy Hughes and Deputy Dillon had in mind. We are, of course, covering such cases but these cases do not arise to the same extent as the type of case I have mentioned—the case of the man working with a relative and the case of the man working with a small farmer who has also a shop.

These are the types of cases which cause a great deal of trouble, firstly, on the question as to whether it was agricultural work, and, secondly, whether there was a proper contract of service or some other consideration involved. If these cases are decided in the employee's favour, it has the effect of ruining the employer. The employee absolutely ruins the employer if he wins on the first two points. I think Deputies will agree that it is rather hard luck on the employer, in such cases. I think if we give the employee two years' arrears, he will come out of it fairly well. Such cases, I am afraid, cannot be covered in any other way. We did try to frame other legislation but we found it was a hopeless job and we had to give it up. We thought the fairest thing on the whole was to adopt the recommendation of the Agricultural Wages Board, except, as I explained, that we modified it from one year to two years.

It is quite clear that the case we are trying to cover is very different from the cases we first had put forward.

I did quote these cases on Second Reading.

The real dilemma which the Minister now represents himself as being in, is that the interpretation of the Act by the courts tends to be somewhat uncertain and that the real hardship arises in cases where there was a genuine misunderstanding as to the true nature of the employment. You have fellows taking speculative actions to try to get themselves declared as having been agricultural labourers, whereas the commonsense view is that they were handy men about a shop. I see that there is a difficulty there but that could have been met in another way, by giving the court a wider discretion to determine whether in fact a man was or was not an agricultural labourer and not by laying down that if a man did any substantial amount of agricultural labour, he was therefore deemed to be an agricultural labourer for the purposes of the Act. The cases mentioned by Deputy Moran bear no relation to the position, because, so far as the contract debt is concerned, the shopkeeper need not give credit, if he does not want to.

And the labourer need not work for a particular farmer, if he does not want to, either.

What does the Deputy suggest he should do—starve?

He can work for somebody else.

Suppose he cannot find anybody else to employ him?

He can bring his action within two years.

That is another story. The Deputy says that the labourer can work for somebody else, but that is just the difference. Suppose he cannot? That is the whole kernel of the problem. Circumstances are sometimes such that he must work for that man or work for nobody at all, and that is why you get cases in which an employer can get a man to work for him for less than the employee is entitled to get. We must bear in mind that we are dealing with a microscopic minority of employers. Ninety-nine per cent. of the farmers pay their labourers wages honestly and fairly and I think 99 per cent. of the labourers deal honestly and fairly with their employers; but there is a microscopic minority of unscrupulous employers, as there is a microscopic minority of unscrupulous employees, and this whole code of legislation was designed to deal with them.

If there was never a minimum wage law, I believe that the vast majority of farmers would pay their labourers a fair wage, but the whole purpose of a minimum wage law is to provide against the individual who would not pay it if he could get out of paying it. We must keep present to our minds the fact that we are not legislating for the average farmer, but for the farmers who require legislation of this kind, and they are a very small minority. I see at once that there is a difficulty when the Minister quotes these cases, but I think that difficulty is to be met by giving the court wide discretion in the matter of determining, according to common sense, whether a man was or was not employed as an agricultural labourer.

If he does a substantial amount of agricultural work, he should get the agricultural rate of wages.

The Deputy, living in the East of Ireland, would find that set-up rather more difficult to understand than we in Connacht. In Connacht, it is a very common thing to find somebody with a small publichouse and perhaps 15 acres.

He is a damn sight better able to pay than the fellow depending on the 15 acres.

Hear me out.

I have no sympathy with such people at all.

Very well; why not join with me? I will give the Deputy a chance to join with me in making them pay. I am trying to show the Deputy that a situation can obtain in parts of the country which he does not fully understand. In that set-up which I describe, you may get somebody who will employ a fellow behind the bar— tapping barrels and carrying sacks— and at farm work, such as milking the cow.

Much more profitable work.

That may be, but that fellow is employed on the basis that, in addition to wages, he gets what the Minister calls "chances." Let us not argue indefinitely whether that man has more profitable work or not. That is the position. You may get cases of such men trying to prove that they are agricultural labourers, and in such cases let the court decide whether they were or not, and not put on the court the obligation to deem them agricultural labourers if they did any substantial amount of agricultural work and not deprive the really aggrieved agricultural labourer of the remedy he ought to have and the only effective remedy we can possibly give him, of extracting from the unscrupulous employer, the very small minority, the wages to which he is entitled. I will not say any more about it, but I am going to ask for a division on it.

When trying to convince Deputy Dillon, I imagined certain cases which I suggested would justify the retention of this section. I will now quote a fact. I know of a widow—fortunately in good circumstances—who employed three workmen within the last five years, believing she was paying them the full wages. One day the inspector called to her place and interviewed the men, who told him they were all satisfied and had no complaints to make. The thought occured to the lady that she should interview the inspector herself. She did so, and to her amazement discovered that while she was paying one man nearly the correct wage, she was paying a second man £33 a year more than the proper wage, and the third man £29 a year too little. He had been in her employment for about two and a half years and she had been paying him the wages he had asked for and which she understood were the right wages.

This man could go back over the years and recover a sum of money from her. She went immediately to the man and handed him something over £40. He did not want to take it, but she said that he would have to take it. To that lady, in very good circumstances, £40 did not mean very much, but one of the widows whom I imagined when I was speaking might have been involved, and to her £29 would mean a great lot. In that particular case, the mistake might not have been discovered for a number of years and we might have a position in which the representatives of this lady might be responsible for this amount for a number of years beyond the two-year period. The Minister's section in all the circumstances should be allowed to stand.

With regard to the point raised by the Minister, that there might be a difficulty in deciding whether a man was engaged in farm work or not, that difficulty would be aggravated by the extension of the period beyond two years, because it would be very difficult to go back over the years and decide what kind of work a man was doing. Another point has emerged from the debate, and it is that the wealthy publican in a rural or urban area is not subject to any minimum wage, while the struggling farmer is compelled to pay a minimum wage. That may shake Deputy Dillon on his high moral horse.

It seems to me to be an utterly irrelevant observation.

Question put and declared caried.

Votáil.

The Deputy is late, but the Chair will allow him to challenge a division.

I do not want to cause any inconvenience, but I wish to be recorded as voting against the section.

Section 5 and 6 and Title agreed to.
Bill reported without amendment.
Agreed to take the remaining stages now.
Question—"That the Bill be received for final consideration"—put and agreed to.
Question proposed: "That the Bill do now pass".

I wish to be recorded as dissenting.

Question put and agreed to.
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